Foundation Briefs
Advanced Level September/October Brief
Resolved: On balance, public subsidies for
professional athletic organizations in the United
States benefit their local communities.
September/October 2014
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................... 1
Defend Your Source ............................................................................................................................................. 11
Authors .......................................................................................................................................................... 11
Organizations ................................................................................................................................................ 16
Definitions............................................................................................................................................................. 21
On Balance Definition AMS ..................................................................................................................... 21
Professional Sports Organization Definition AMS................................................................................... 21
Level of Public Subsidies Defined. ASF .................................................................................................. 21
“Public subsidy” definition DAT .............................................................................................................. 22
Topic Analysis One............................................................................................................................................... 23
Topic Analysis Two .............................................................................................................................................. 27
Topic Analysis Three ............................................................................................................................................ 31
Pro Evidence ......................................................................................................................................................... 40
How Sports Subsidies Provide Economic Benefits .......................................................................................... 41
Other Ways that Sports Stadiums Benefit Cities AMS ............................................................................ 41
Intangibles: Civic Pride AMS ................................................................................................................... 42
Cities charge more property tax on stadiums than they’re worth DAT .................................................... 42
Examples of Economic Benefits from Sports Subsidies .................................................................................. 43
The Citizenry Benefits from A Consumer Surplus ....................................................................................... 43
Explaining a consumer surplus, Fj ............................................................................................................ 43
Baseball stadiums can result in a consumer surplus, Fj ............................................................................ 43
Further Analysis of the Irani study, Fj ...................................................................................................... 45
NBA and NHL Arenas consistently create a net surplus, Fj..................................................................... 45
Consumer surplus is related to stadium subsidies, Fj ............................................................................... 46
Economic Gain.............................................................................................................................................. 47
Colorado State University Stadium Benefits Community AMS .............................................................. 47
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Minneapolis’ Economic Benefit Grows AMS .......................................................................................... 47
Benefits of Jacobs/Progressive Field, Fj ................................................................................................... 48
Other Benefits of Jacobs/Progressive Field, Fj ......................................................................................... 48
Benefits of Coors Field, Fj ........................................................................................................................ 49
Other Benefits of Coors Field, Fj .............................................................................................................. 49
Benefits of AT&T Park, Fj ....................................................................................................................... 49
Benefits of Petco Park, Fj ......................................................................................................................... 50
Benefits of National Park, Fj .................................................................................................................... 50
Benefits of Target Field, Fj ....................................................................................................................... 51
Benefits of Cleveland Browns Stadium, Fj............................................................................................... 51
Benefits of Lucas Oil Stadium, Fj............................................................................................................. 52
Benefits Of Minor League Stadiums ................................................................................................................ 53
Minor leagues that are subsidized are a better investment than private minor leagues. ASF................... 53
Preferable Methodology. ASF .................................................................................................................. 53
Minor League stadiums cause communal benefits. ASF .......................................................................... 55
Minor Leagues are not comparable to Major Leagues. ASF .................................................................... 56
Minor League management causes economic gains. ASF........................................................................ 57
Minor Leagues Increase Per Capita Income $67 to $201. ASF ................................................................ 58
Minor Leagues Boost Per Capita Income .2 - .7%. ASF .......................................................................... 59
Benefits of Springfield Falcons routine operating expenses, Fj ............................................................... 59
Springfield Falcons impact on local businesses, Fj .................................................................................. 60
Springfield Falcons charity, Fj .................................................................................................................. 60
Sports Help Other Industries............................................................................................................................. 61
Statistics Demonstrate Far-Reaching Impact of Sports Sector AMS ....................................................... 61
Mega Events Help Build Infrastructure ............................................................................................................ 64
Financial Impact of Super Bowl AMS...................................................................................................... 64
Superbowl Impact AMS ........................................................................................................................... 64
Positive Impact of the Olympic Games AMS........................................................................................... 65
How Big Events Help Build Infrastructure AMS ..................................................................................... 66
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Advantages of Hosting Big sports Events AMS ....................................................................................... 66
Economic Benefits from Track and Field Stadiums ......................................................................................... 67
Stadium Generates Huge Economic Impact AMS.................................................................................... 67
Impact for Greensboro, North Carolina AMS .......................................................................................... 68
Des Moines, Iowa – Drake Stadium, Drake University AMS .................................................................. 69
Albuquerque, New Mexico – Albuquerque Convention Center AMS ..................................................... 70
New York’s 168th Street Armory Youth CenterAMS ............................................................................. 70
Public Ownership of Teams is Effective .......................................................................................................... 71
Public sports team ownership is effective as a safety net and funding mechanism DAT ........................ 71
Public ownership keeps subsidy costs reasonable, as opposed to private ownership DAT ..................... 72
Case study: the Green Bay Packers DAT ................................................................................................. 73
New Stadiums Revitalize Urban Communities ................................................................................................ 74
Case study from Cleveland’s Gateway Complex DAT ............................................................................ 74
Stadium Funding is a Proper Infrastructure Investment ................................................................................... 75
Cities can generate economic growth by developing the infrastructure for stadium areas DAT ............. 75
Stadium financing is an effective cover for funding necessary infrastructure work DAT ....................... 76
Modern stadium construction projects are likely to reduce future costs for cities DAT .......................... 77
The Olympic Effect .......................................................................................................................................... 78
Large sporting event championships generate income in surrounding communities. JCD ...................... 78
Regular season games generate revenue for local economies. JCD ......................................................... 78
Ex post studies claiming no net benefit are flawed. JCD ......................................................................... 79
Large sporting events boost local businesses’ revenues. JCD .................................................................. 79
Large sporting events yield revenue years after the event due to tourism. JCD ....................................... 79
Large sporting events increase quality of life for residents. JCD ............................................................. 80
Rental prices are higher in cities with professional sports teams. JCD .................................................... 80
During these events the rental values are significantly higher. JCD ........................................................ 80
Hosting major sporting events promotes bipartisanship in local governments. JCD ............................... 81
The Olympics generate large amounts of income. JCD ........................................................................... 81
The Olympics lead to job creation and training in host cities. JCD ......................................................... 81
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The Olympics spur much needed infrastructure reform in host cities. JCD ............................................. 82
Tourism will likely increase in the long term because of the Olympics. JCD.......................................... 82
After the Olympics, Olympic Park has high probability of becoming a hub for business. JCD .............. 83
Economic benefits from the Olympics will continue in the near future. JCD .......................................... 83
The Benefits To Social Cohesion ..................................................................................................................... 84
Social Cohesion Reduces Crime. ASF...................................................................................................... 84
Sense of community decreases crime. ASF .............................................................................................. 85
Even one pro team greatly increases social cohesion DAT ...................................................................... 86
Small, socially cohesive communities are more capable of attracting business DAT.............................. 87
Gentrification of Neighborhoods Is Good ........................................................................................................ 88
Residents of gentrified neighborhoods don’t move out. ASF................................................................... 88
Residents of gentrified neighborhoods have higher credit scores. ASF ................................................... 89
Financial health of original residents increases. ASF ............................................................................... 90
Credit scores of gentrified neighborhoods go up 8 points on average. ASF ............................................ 90
People displaced by gentrification fare better in the long run. ASF ......................................................... 91
Con Evidence ........................................................................................................................................................ 92
Stadiums Fail to Bring Large Economic Impact .............................................................................................. 93
Why Stadiums are a Poor Investment AMS ............................................................................................. 93
Sports Stadiums Fail to Bring Widespread Impact AMS ......................................................................... 94
Why Sports Subsidies for Stadiums Fail to Produce Economic Benefits AMS ....................................... 95
20 years of research has already concluded that sports are not an economy booster DAT ...................... 95
Sports teams replace employment and income instead of generating it DAT .......................................... 96
Little Economic Impact AMS ................................................................................................................... 97
By nature of their audiences, pro sports cannot generate economic expansion DAT .............................. 98
The hidden costs of stadiums, Fj............................................................................................................... 99
Professional teams don’t heavily impact local economies, Fj .................................................................. 99
A team leaving doesn’t impact the local economy, Fj .............................................................................. 99
Funding a stadium can wreck cities’ credit DAT ................................................................................... 100
Corruption in Sports........................................................................................................................................ 101
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Tales of Corruption in Professional Sports AMS ................................................................................... 101
Sports Institutions are Monopolies ................................................................................................................. 102
Legislation Protects Sports Organizations from Laws Preventing Collusion AMS ............................... 102
NFL Corruption Benefits Executives AMS ............................................................................................ 103
Professional teams are too ludicrously profitable to warrant public funds DAT ................................... 104
Current tax law encourages cities to meet sports leagues’ egregious financial demands DAT ............. 105
Case study: Seattle vs. OKC DAT .......................................................................................................... 106
NFL teams are too highly incentivized to move to have a permanent local impact DAT ...................... 107
Problems with “Sports Diplomacy” ................................................................................................................ 108
Sports Diplomacy Organization SportsUnited is Wasteful AMS ........................................................... 108
The Holdout Problem...................................................................................................................................... 109
How Sports Stadium Construction Causes Economic Problems AMS .................................................. 109
Opportunity Costs of Public Funding for Pro Sports ...................................................................................... 110
Stadium construction saddles governments with annual debt DAT ....................................................... 110
Publically-funded stadiums financed by reallocation still tax cities’ citizens DAT ............................... 110
Pro sports funding is a false dilemma DAT ............................................................................................ 111
Funding for stadiums comes at the expense of better options, Fj ........................................................... 112
Baltimore’s new publically-funded stadium complex ravaged industrially-valuable areas DAT .......... 112
Opportunity cost does not need to be financial. ASF ............................................................................. 113
Funding Pro Sports Teams Is Against the Public Will ................................................................................... 114
Municipalities fund pro sports teams in opposition to their voters DAT ............................................... 114
Stadium construction referendums present a false dilemma for voters and taxpayers DAT .................. 114
Teams use money to influence the democratic process, Fj ..................................................................... 115
Amount of money spent is sometimes unprecedented, Fj ...................................................................... 116
The public has no say. ASF .................................................................................................................... 116
Teams are circumventing public displeasure and extracting more funds from governments DAT ....... 117
Sports Industry Displaces Economic Revenue ............................................................................................... 118
Sports Industry Fails to Generate Economic Revenue Because it Displaces Other Forms of Economic
Activity AMS .......................................................................................................................................... 118
Stadiums reduce individual wages, Fj .................................................................................................... 119
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Coates and Humphreys methodology, Fj ................................................................................................ 119
Minorities Are Marginalized By Stadiums ..................................................................................................... 120
Stadium development projects in urban areas force out minority residents DAT .................................. 120
Native Americans........................................................................................................................................ 120
Stadiums are built on Native American Grounds. ASF .......................................................................... 120
The Native American Community Is Upset At The Stadium’s Destruction of Culture. ASF ................ 121
Native Americans are minimalized by stadium. ASF ............................................................................. 122
Racism in sports is noticeable for Native Americans. ASF .................................................................... 123
Sexism and Discrimination in Sports.............................................................................................................. 124
Perception of females in sports is objectifying. ASF .............................................................................. 124
NFL cheerleaders make less than minimum wage. ASF ........................................................................ 124
NFL Violates Union Rights ............................................................................................................................ 126
NFL illegally side-steps lockout. ASF .................................................................................................... 126
The NFL does not provide for the safety of players. ASF ...................................................................... 127
Eminent Domain Is Bad .................................................................................................................................. 128
Eminent domain is not in the spirit of the law. ASF ............................................................................... 128
Eminent domain is designed to rid the impoverished rather than help. ASF ......................................... 129
The use of eminent domain has discouraged government to evaluate stadiums. ASF ........................... 130
Eminent domain ignores community definitions of benefit. ASF .......................................................... 131
The Downside of Mega-Events ...................................................................................................................... 132
Ex ante studies are fundamentally flawed. JCD ..................................................................................... 132
Ex post studies find little benefit from subsidizing professional athletic programs. JCD ...................... 132
Large scale sporting events carry steep price tags. JCD ......................................................................... 133
Security concerns bring additional costs. JCD ....................................................................................... 133
Most economic estimates incorrectly apply multipliers. JCD ................................................................ 133
No existing evidence supports the claim that tourism increases in the long term from major sporting
events. JCD ............................................................................................................................................. 134
Any boosts to tourism are shortlived. JCD ............................................................................................. 134
The reputation of local cities are tarnished by major sporting events. JCD ........................................... 134
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The willingness for local populations to invest in sporting tickets for their local professional teams is a
negligible gain. JCD................................................................................................................................ 135
The effect on property values is extremely limited even within the host city. JCD ............................... 135
The rise of rent prices is not a good indicator of the effect of sports teams. JCD .................................. 136
Major sporting events such as the superbowl do not necessarily raise rental values. JCD .................... 136
The effect of large sporting events on rental prices is negligible. JCD .................................................. 136
The increase in rental values in Atlanta is likely due to outside factors that are ultimately harmful. JCD
................................................................................................................................................................. 137
The effects on rental values, on balance, is insignificant. JCD .............................................................. 137
The hosting process for the Olympics is propelled by private business interests. JCD.......................... 138
A conflict of interests arises when bidding for the Olympics. JCD........................................................ 138
Benefits to bipartisanship in local governments are rather limited in scope. JCD ................................. 138
The environment large scale events like the Olympics are planned in are conducive to poor economic
decision making. JCD ............................................................................................................................. 139
The use of these high maintenance facilities over time siphons from the potential benefits. JCD ........ 139
The short term costs of the Olympics far exceeds the increased revenue. JCD ..................................... 139
Public perception of the host city is not always positive. JCD ............................................................... 140
Tourism is not increased during the Olympics but rather it displaces the usual crowds in already popular
tourist destinations. JCD ......................................................................................................................... 140
The cost of hosting major sporting events is huge. JCD......................................................................... 140
The cost of hosting major sporting events is grossly understated. JCD ................................................. 140
The costs of hosting major sporting events is underreported. JCD ........................................................ 141
The cost of hosting largescale events continues to rise. JCD ................................................................. 141
Hosting the Olympics leads to other extraneous spending with little long term gains. JCD .................. 141
Private business donations to hosting major events are rather limited. JCD .......................................... 141
The Olympic economic effect is a myth. JCD ........................................................................................ 142
Forecasts on the effects of the Olympics are unreliable. JCD ................................................................ 142
Statistics citing profits from the Olympics are skewed. JCD ................................................................. 142
Most of the cost is put on the government. JCD ..................................................................................... 143
The London Olympics were not profitable. JCD .................................................................................... 143
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The methods used to measure the Olympics success economically is misleading. JCD ........................ 143
Private sector sponsors are unreliable for the Olympics. JCD................................................................ 144
The Vancouver games were incredibly costly. JCD ............................................................................... 144
The debt following the Vancouver Olympics is crippling. JCD ............................................................. 144
Development costs skyrocketed while preparing for the Olympics. JCD .............................................. 144
Only small cities get a boost from mega events DAT ............................................................................ 145
Pro Counters........................................................................................................................................................ 146
Urban Sprawl .................................................................................................................................................. 147
In Defense of Urban Sprawl AMS .......................................................................................................... 147
In Defense of Impact Analyses ....................................................................................................................... 148
Economic impact analyses for building stadiums can leave out economic benefits DAT ..................... 148
Substitution Effect rebuttal ............................................................................................................................. 149
Substitution effect does not take into account out of town visitors, Fj ................................................... 149
Nashville Convention and Visitors Bureau study methodology, Fj ....................................................... 149
The Use of Eminent Domain is Justified ........................................................................................................ 150
Constitutional basis for eminent domain, Fj ........................................................................................... 150
Meyer v. City of Cleveland,Fj ................................................................................................................ 150
Berman v. Parker,Fj ................................................................................................................................ 151
Kelo v. City of New London, Fj ............................................................................................................. 151
Stadiums Lack of Success Due to Other Factors ............................................................................................ 152
Study Basis, Fj ........................................................................................................................................ 152
Downtown Location affects success, Fj.................................................................................................. 152
City Economic and Demographic Characteristics affect success, Fj ...................................................... 153
Walkability affects success, Fj ................................................................................................................ 154
Public Transit affects success, Fj ............................................................................................................ 155
Con Counters ...................................................................................................................................................... 156
Statistics from Sports Institutions are Inaccurate ........................................................................................... 157
Why the Pro Team’s Statistics are Imbalanced and Inaccurate AMS .................................................... 157
Capital Costs Funded by Taxpayers AMS .............................................................................................. 157
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The Math Does Not Add Up AMS ......................................................................................................... 158
Flaws in Economic Studies Exposed AMS ............................................................................................ 159
A further examination of economic impact studies DAT ....................................................................... 161
Economic impact studies entirely ignore opportunity costs DAT .......................................................... 162
Small markets vastly oversell themselves to justify excessive funding of local teams DAT ................. 163
Public Subsidies are Not Good for the Public ................................................................................................ 164
How Public Subsidies for Stadiums Hurt the Public AMS..................................................................... 164
America’s Poorest Cities Overspend on Sports AMS ............................................................................ 164
Pro teams bring the wrong kinds of jobs with them DAT ...................................................................... 165
Sports Don’t Attract Outside Investment........................................................................................................ 166
Stadiums and their teams replace other local entertainment without adding extra value DAT .............. 166
Stadiums are a poor tool for revitalization/gentrification efforts DAT .................................................. 167
There is no “Public Good” .............................................................................................................................. 168
Public Good Argument Fails AMS ......................................................................................................... 168
Civic Pride Leads To An Increase In Crime ................................................................................................... 169
Sport Franchises Hide Crimes For Positive Public Image. ASF ............................................................ 169
City-championed urban renewal projects drive up and redistribute criminal activity DAT ................... 170
Mega Events Are Not Economically Justifiable ............................................................................................. 171
Subsidies for mega events drive up costs and lower standards DAT ..................................................... 171
Cases ................................................................................................................................................................... 172
Pro Case .......................................................................................................................................................... 173
Introduction: ................................................................................................................................................ 173
Contention One: Consumer Surplus ........................................................................................................... 173
Contention Two: Subsidies help centralize business .................................................................................. 174

Benefits of Petco Park ....................................................................................................................... 174

Other Benefits of Coors Field ........................................................................................................... 174

Benefits of Jacobs/Progressive Field ................................................................................................ 174
Contention three: Public ownership creates mutual interest ....................................................................... 175
Con Case ......................................................................................................................................................... 177
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Introduction: ................................................................................................................................................ 177
Contention One: Sports Industry fails to generate economic revenue because it displaces other forms of
economic activity ........................................................................................................................................ 177
Contention Two: No Long Term Economic Impact ................................................................................... 178
Contention Three: Opportunity Costs of Spending on Stadiums................................................................ 179
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Authors
Roger I. Abrams
Professor Abrams is Richardson Professor of Law at the Northeastern University School of Law. He is a prolific
author and leading authority on sports and labor law and legal education. He has served as a salary arbitrator for
major league baseball and as a permanent arbitrator for the television, communications, electronics and coal
industries, for the US Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, Walt Disney World, the State of Florida and
Lockheed-Martin Company.
Agha, Nola
Dr. Agha is an Assistant Professor in the Sport Management Program at the University of San Francisco.
Education: Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Allyn, Bobby
Reporter for WPLN, Nashville's NPR station. Reported for The New York Times, NYMag.com,
TheAtlantic.com, The Oregonian, The Tenneasean, Washington City Paper, Ad Busters, The Chronicle of
Higher Education and other publications.
Joseph Bast
Joseph Bast is president and CEO of The Heartland Institute, a 29-year-old national nonprofit research center
located in Chicago, Illinois. According to a recent telephone survey, among state elected officials The Heartland
Institute is among the nation’s best-known and most highly regarded “think tanks.”
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Robert Baumann
Dr. Baumann is an associate professor in the Department of Economics at the College of the Holy Cross. He
holds a Ph.D. in economics from Ohio State University.
Gwen Burrow
Gwen Burrow is a distinguished member of Economic Modeling Specialists Inc. (EMSI). EMSI and CCbenefits
Inc. are now a single company under the EMSI name, dedicated to providing high-quality data, tools, reports,
and analysis to regional decision makers. EMSI is known in the workforce and economic development fields for
its detailed labor market information and input-output modeling. CCbenefits is known for conducting groundbreaking socioeconomic impact studies for over half the community colleges in the U.S. and Canada. Together,
EMSI and CCbenefits offer an array of data-driven products and services to stakeholders in the "triangle" of
regional prosperity: economic development, workforce development, and higher education.
Carr, Susan
Senior staff writer and city government reporter for Ocala Star Banner.
Timothy Chapin
Timothy S. Chapin Ph.D. is Chair of the Department of Urban and Regional Planning and co-chair of the Policy
Panel. His areas of expertise include Growth Management and Comprehensive Planning, Urban Redevelopment
and Revitalization, Urban Economic Development, and Geographic Information Systems.
Dennis Coates
B.A., SUNY at Albany (History), 1979; M.A. University of Arizona, (Latin American Studies), 1982,
(Economics), 1983; Ph.D., University of Maryland, 1988. Published in Public Choice, Public Finance, Sports
Economics.
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Senator Tom Coburn
Thomas Allen "Tom" Coburn (born March 14, 1948) is an American politician and medical doctor. A member
of the Republican Party, he is the junior United States Senator from Oklahoma. Coburn was elected to the U.S.
House of Representatives in 1994. He upheld his campaign pledge to serve no more than three consecutive
terms and did not run for re-election in 2000. In 2004, he returned to political office with a successful run for
the U.S. Senate. Coburn was re-elected to a second term in 2010 and pledged not to seek a third term in 2016.
John L. Crompton
In 1974, Dr. Crompton came to Texas A&M University. He received his doctorate in Recreation Resources
Development in 1977. For some years he taught graduate and undergraduate courses in both the Department of
Recreation and Parks and the Department of Marketing at Texas A&M University, but he now teaches
exclusively in the Department of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences. Dr. Crompton's primary interests are
in the areas of marketing and financing public leisure and tourism services. He is author or co-author of 11
books and a substantial number of articles which have been published in the recreation, tourism, sport and
marketing fields.
Fenelon, James
Director of Center for Indigenous Peoples Studies
Professor of Sociology at California State University (San Bernardino). Education: PhD, Northwestern; B.A.,
Loyola Marymount; Masters, Harvard & the School for International Training.
Pat Garofalo
Patrick Lee "Pat" Garofalo is an American politician and member of the Minnesota House of Representatives. A
member of the Republican Party of Minnesota, he represents District 58B, which includes portions of Dakota
and Goodhue counties in the southeastern Twin Cities metropolitan area. Garofalo graduated from Mankato
State University in Mankato, earning his B.S. in law enforcement in 1994.
Malcolm Gladwell
Malcolm T. Gladwell, CM is a Canadian journalist, bestselling author, and speaker. He has been a staff writer
for The New Yorker since 1996.
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Peter Groothius
Dr. Groothius is a professor in the Appalachian State University Department of Economics. He holds a Ph.D.
from the University of Kentucky. His fields are environmental, labor, and sports economics.
Halsne, Chriss
Lead investigative reporter for KIRO TV. His in-depth reporting on controversial topics has earned him a
National Edward R. Murrow award for Investigative Reporting, several National Press Club Consumer
Journalism awards and numerous regional Murrow and Emmy honors.
Kahn, Aron
Reporter and editor at Saint Paul Pioneer Press and Knight Ridder Newspapers. Regular guest commentator at
Minnesota Public Radio. Journalism instructor and lecturer at University of Minnesota. Media and crisis
management consultant.
Stefan Kesenne
Dr. Kesenne serves in the Department of Economics at the University of Antwerp (Belgium). His research is
focused on applied economics.
Judith Grant Long
Judith Grant Long is Associate Professor of Urban Planning at the Harvard University Graduate School of
Design. Her research and teaching interests include infrastructure mega-projects, public-private partnerships for
urban development, and the intersection of tourism, historic preservation, and city branding strategies.
Gerard Mildner
Dr. Mildner is associate professor of real estate finance at Portland State University.He teaches in the areas of
urban economics, housing economics, public finance, cost-benefit analysis, political economy, poverty and
welfare, economic development.
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Jeffrey G. Owen
Dr. Owen holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Iowa. He is currently on faculty at Gustavus
Adolphus College in the Department of Economics and Management.
Bruce Seaman
Dr. Bruce Seaman is Associate Professor of Economics, former Department Chair, and a Research Associate at
the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. He also serves as Affiliated Faculty to
the Fiscal Research Center and to the Nonprofit Studies Program at the University.
David Schultz
David Schultz is a professor in the Hamline University Department of Political Science where he teaches
classes in American politics, public policy and administration, and ethics. Professor Schultz also holds an
appointment at the University of Minnesota law school where he teaches election law, state constitutional law,
and professional responsibility (legal ethics). Professor Schultz has a Ph.D. in political science and a J.D. (law
degree) from the University of Minnesota, an LLM from the University of London, M.A.s in political science
and philosophy from Rutgers University and SUNY Binghamton respectively, a Masters of Astronomy from
James Cook University (history of astronomy) and a B.A. in political science and philosophy from SUNY
Binghamton.
Stanton, Erin A.
J.D., City University of New York School of Law, May 2005. B.A., North Carolina
State University, May 1996.
Louisa Thomas
Louisa Thomas is a contributor to Grantland and a Fellow at the New America Foundation. She is also the
author of Conscience: Two Soldiers, Two Pacifists, One Family–A Test of Will and Faith in World War I
(Penguin Press, 2011). Her writing has appeared in The New York Times, Vogue, the Paris Review, and other
places. She graduated from Harvard.
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Troy M. Van Dongen
Mr. Van Dongen is a member of the California State Bar Association and serves as the Chair for the Tax
Section, State and Local Tax Committee. He also is a member of the American Bar Association’s Tax Section,
the Bar Association of San Francisco’s Tax Section, the Institute for Professionals in Taxation’s Property Tax
Section, and the Taxation Committee of the United States Council for International Business. In addition, Mr.
Van Dongen serves as Chair for the Marin County Assessment Appeals Board.
Organizations
The Atlantic
The Atlantic is an American magazine, founded in 1857 as The Atlantic Monthly in Boston, Massachusetts,
now based in Washington, D.C. It was created as a literary and cultural commentary magazine and quickly
achieved a national reputation as a high-quality review with a moderate worldview—a reputation it has
maintained for over 150 years.
BBC News
BBC News is an operational business division of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) responsible for
the gathering and broadcasting of news and current affairs. The department is the world's largest broadcast news
organisation and generates about 120 hours of radio and television output each day, as well as online news
coverage.The service maintains 44 foreign news bureaus and has correspondents in almost every country.
Brookings Institution
The Brookings Institution is an American think tank based on Embassy Row in Washington, D.C., in the United
States. One of Washington's oldest think tanks, Brookings conducts research and education in the social
sciences, primarily in economics, metropolitan policy, governance, foreign policy, and global economy and
development] In the University of Pennsylvania’s 2012 Global Go To Think Tanks Report, Brookings is ranked
the most influential think tank in the world.
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University of Cambridge
The University of Cambridge is a collegiate public research university in Cambridge, England. Founded in
1209, Cambridge is the second-oldest university in the English-speaking world and the world's third-oldest
surviving university. The institution is frequently ranked as the best university in the world.
Center for Public Policy and Administration
The Center for Public Policy and Administration (CPPA) is the hub of interdisciplinary public policy research,
teaching, and engagement at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. CPPA teaches and conducts rigorous
research to realize social change and solve problems for the common good. CPPA faculty and alumni are
effective policy leaders from the local to the global levels in addressing topics such as family and care policy,
environmental issues, emerging technologies, social inequalities, and governance.
The Coloradoan
Since 1873, the Fort Collins Coloradoan has been Northern Colorado’s most trusted local news source and the
#1 medium for community information.
The Economist
The Economist is an English-language weekly newspaper owned by The Economist Newspaper Ltd and edited
in offices in London. It takes an editorial stance of classical liberalism and economic liberalism which is
supportive of free trade, globalisation, free immigration and cultural liberalism (such as supporting legal
recognition for same-sex marriage). The publication has described itself as "a product of
the Caledonian liberalism of Adam Smith and David Hume”. It targets highly educated readers and claims an
audience containing many influential executives and policy-makers.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis was established in 1914, after the creation of the Federal Reserve
System in 1913. The Eighth Federal Reserve District is headquartered in St. Louis and has branches in Little
Rock, Ark., Louisville, Ky., and Memphis, Tenn. As one of the 12 regional Reserve banks in the Fed System,
the St. Louis Fed is central to America's economy. All of the Reserve banks share some degree of similar duties.
But because the banks are independent of one another, each has some specialized assignments and tasks that
distinguish it.
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Goldwater Institute
The Goldwater Institute is a Phoenix, Arizona-based public policy advocacy and research organization
established in 1988 with the support of the late Senator Barry Goldwater. The Goldwater Institute advocates
public policies with emphasis on empowering states to thwart overreach by the federal government, improving
government transparency, reducing the tax burden, expanding school choice, and protecting entrepreneurship
and free enterprise.
Initiative for a Competitive Inner City
The Initiative for a Competitive Inner City (ICIC) is a nonprofit research and strategy organization and the
leading authority on U.S. inner city economies and the businesses that thrive there. Founded in 1994 by Harvard
Business School Professor Michael Porter, ICIC strengthens inner city economies by providing businesses,
governments and investors with the most comprehensive and actionable information in the field about urban
market opportunities.
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The IMF is a self-described "organization of 188 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation,
secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic
growth, and reduce poverty around the world.” The organization's objectives are stated in the Articles of
Agreement and can be summarised as: to promote international economic co-operation, international trade,
employment, and exchange-rate stability, including by making financial resources available to member
countries to meet balance of payments needs.
Maine Heritage Policy Center
Maine Heritage Policy Center (MHPC) is a conservative think tank located in Portland, Maine. According to its
mission statement, the MHPC is "a research and educational organization whose mission is to formulate and
promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise; limited, constitutional
government; individual freedom; and traditional American values–all for the purpose of providing public policy
solutions that benefit the people of Maine. It has encountered controversy regularly in pursuing its goals.
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University of Michigan
The University of Michigan (UM, U-M, UMich, or U of M), frequently referred to as simply Michigan, is a
public research university located in Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States. It is the state's oldest university and
has two satellite campuses located in Flint and Dearborn. The university has very high research activity and its
comprehensive graduate program offers doctoral degrees in the humanities, social sciences, and STEM fields
(Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) as well as professional degrees in medicine, law, nursing,
social work and dentistry.
The Nation
The Nation is the oldest continuously published weekly magazine in the United States, a successor to William
Lloyd Garrison's Liberator. The periodical, devoted to politics and culture, is self-described as "the flagship of
the left." Founded on July 6, 1865, it is published by The Nation Company, L.P., at 33 Irving Place, New York
City. It is associated with The Nation Institute.
The Nation has bureaus in Washington, D.C., London, and South Africa, with departments covering
architecture, art, corporations, defense, environment, films, legal affairs, music, peace and disarmament, poetry,
and the United Nations.
Pacific Standard
Pacific Standard, formerly Miller-McCune, is an American magazine, published bimonthly in print and
continuously online by the nonprofit Miller-McCune Center for Research, Media and Public Policy,
headquartered in Santa Barbara, California. The magazine was created for opinion leaders, policymakers, and
concerned citizens who are interested in developing solutions to some of the world’s toughest social and
environmental problems.
Property and Environment Research Center
PERC—the Property and Environment Research Center—is the nation’s first and largest institute dedicated to
improving environmental quality through property rights and markets. Founded more than 30 years ago in
Bozeman, Montana, PERC began as a think tank where scholars documented how government regulation and
bureaucracy often led to environmental degradation. PERC sought to explore how property rights and markets
could play a more direct role in improving environmental quality. From this work originated the idea of free
market environmentalism (FME).
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Southwestern University of Economics and Finance
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics or SWUFE is a national university located in Chengdu,
China. It is one of 3 specialist finance and economic universities under direct administration of the Ministry of
Education (Republic of China) and has been selected as a Project 211 university by the Chinese government as
part of the national endeavor to build world-class universities in the 21st century.
Star Tribune
The Star Tribune is the largest newspaper in the U.S. state of Minnesota and is published seven days each week
in an edition for the Minneapolis–Saint Paul metropolitan area. A statewide version is also available across
Minnesota and parts of Wisconsin, Iowa, South Dakota, and North Dakota. The paper's largest competitor is the
Saint Paul-based Pioneer Press, though it competes with a number of other papers in its wide circulation area.
United States Code
The Code of Laws of the United States of America (variously abbreviated to Code of Laws of the United States,
United States Code, U.S. Code, or U.S.C.) is the official compilation and codification of the general and
permanent federal laws of the United States. It contains 51 titles, along with a further four proposed titles.
University of Washington
The University of Washington (UW), commonly referred to as Washington or informally UDub, is a public
research university in Seattle, Washington, United States. Founded in 1861, UW is one of the oldest universities
on the West Coast and has one of the best medical schools in the world UW has been labeled one of the "Public
Ivies," a publicly funded university considered as providing a quality of education comparable to those of the
Ivy League.
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Definitions
Definitions
On Balance Definition AMS
University of Cambridge. “Cambridge Dictionary.” Cambridge Dictionary Online. N.p.,
2014. Web. 16 Aug 2014.
On balance: after considering the power or influence of both sides of a question.
Professional Sports Organization Definition AMS
U.S. Code 3701. USCS 3701 Article 3 Title 28 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure: Part 6.
Particular Proceedings: Chapter 178. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection.
US Code 3701
(USCS 3701 Article 3 Title 28 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure: Part 6. Particular Proceedings: Chapter 178.
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection)
a professional sports organization is
(A) a person or governmental entity that sponsors, organizes, schedules, or conducts a competitive game in
which one or more professional athletes participate, or
(B) a league or association of persons or governmental entities described in subparagraph (A). above
Level of Public Subsidies Defined. ASF
Malanga, Steven. "The Public Dollars Fueling the NFL Dispute". Manhattan Institute for
Policy Research. June 1, 2011. http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/miarticle.htm?id=7158#.VANBVrywLXR
With more owners clamoring for stadiums, the NFL then started a loan fund which has helped owners build or
renovate another 12 venues. Still, taxpayers have borne about 40 percent of the nearly $8 billion in
construction costs for these, though that number is largely skewed by the fact that the Giants and Jets
privately financed their extremely expensive (some would say overpriced at $1.6 billion) new stadium. In
other venues, including those in Indianapolis, Denver, and Chicago, financing from private sources
amounted to less than one-third of the total cost, even with the NFL loan fund pitching in, Vrooman
estimates.
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Definitions
“Public subsidy” definition DAT
“Defining Subsidies.” World Trade Organization. 2006. Web.
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr06-2b_e.pdf
Depending on the context, a large number of government programmes may be considered subsidies. For
simplicity, these programmes can be grouped into at least three categories: firstly, the government may transfer
funds to producers or consumers, resulting in direct or potential budgetary expenditure, or use its power to
instruct private entities to make a transfer. Direct transfers, like re-training grants or child allowances, would
fall into this category….
Secondly, the government may provide goods or services at no cost or below market price, such as university
education, public transport or food stamps. Such transfers also involve expenses for the government, with the
difference being that beneficiaries receive in-kind contributions as opposed to funds they can freely dispose
of….
Thirdly, regulatory policies may be seen as subsidies, if they create transfers from one group to another. Border
protection, for example, allows for price discrimination and pooling of revenues to producers that are implicitly
financed by domestic consumers (Schluep and De Gorter, 2000).
Public stadium funding deals typically fall into one of the first two categories. If a city partners with a
team to fund a stadium, it would be the first category. If the city builds the stadium and leases it to the
team, this would fall into the second category—stadium leases do not cover the total construction costs of
the facility.
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Topic Analysis One
Topic Analysis One
Resolved: On balance, public subsidies for professional athletic organizations in the United States benefit their
local communities.
At first glance this month’s topic appears fairly straightforward. But there are a few nuances teams can play on
to make debates interesting. First, let’s discuss definitions:
“On balance” – Most PF teams will be familiar with this phrase. Remind your opponents that an “on balance”
resolution requires the teams to carefully weigh the options. There are clear advantages and disadvantages to
professional athletic organizations, but the final impact should be weighed above any small discrepancies. This
gives the pro a slight advantage. The pro can use financial impacts, civic pride, or any other benefits that result
from professional athletic organizations. The con on the other hand, must conclusively prove that there are no
benefits from all professional athletic organizations.
“benefit” – The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “benefit” as a “good or helpful result or effect.” This is a
simple word that both teams can work to their advantage. Pro teams should use a weak definition like the
Merriam Webster one because it lessens their burden—the Pro needs only to prove a few good or helpful results
to win that debate. The Con should try to find a stronger definition. For example, the Oxford dictionary defines
“benefit” as “an advantage or profit gained from something.” This can be a little harder to fulfill. The Con
should use this definition to argue that professional athletic organizations must on balance provide a distinct
advantage over any disadvantages these subsidies cause.
These two definitions show how each team can shift the burden in this debate. Pro teams should use a weak
definition of “benefit” to claim that if there are even a couple slight good results from public subsidies for
professional athletic organizations, they win the debate. Con should focus on the bigger picture, arguing that the
advantages must overcome any problems with these subsidies.
“in the United States” – This part of the resolution is clear. Teams should make sure to use evidence from U.S.
athletic organizations only. While Olympic Games held inside the United States are fair territory, be careful
with this evidence and be sure to stay in scope. It is safer to use statistics from U.S. specific mega-events, like
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Topic Analysis One
the Super Bowl. This evidence is best for Pro teams because mega-events provide a boost to the economy with
advertisement, gained infrastructure, and the massive influx of tourism these huge events attract.
“local communities” – A local community can be reasonably defined as the same small community that paid
taxes for the public subsidies in question. This smaller subset gives the Pro a slight advantage. Pro teams should
focus on all benefits to the people close to professional athletic organizations. Larger outcomes, like the effects
upon the United States federal budget are out of scope if the benefits to local communities are substantial. On
the other hand, Con teams should frame local communities as a smaller piece of the United States in general.
Thus, larger effects like the U.S. budget are definitely within the scope of this resolution. Although the
difference may seem inconsequential, phrasing will be very important for this debate. Pro teams must focus
almost exclusively on the smaller picture, the communities and families that will benefit from professional
sports organizations. Conversely, con teams can focus on the bigger picture and emphasize larger impacts, like
the overall cost of these public subsidies.
Next let’s consider the popular arguments for this debate. In terms of headline material, Con definitely has the
advantage. There are countless articles with statistics demonstrating that public subsidies for sports are not all
they were cracked up to be. Con teams should use this material at the very least as an introduction to the rest of
their cases. However, all is not lost for Pro teams. There are many more subtle arguments available from this
brief to create an interesting and well-developed Pro case. For example, track and field stadiums tend to
produce a large economic benefit to their surrounding communities, as demonstrated in this brief.
Pro teams can also use less obvious benefits to win their debates. While numbers are definitely convincing from
a judge’s perspective, there are other less obvious impacts from professional sports organizations in the United
States. A few of these non-fiscal benefits are:

Civic Pride: Many politicians argue the benefits of increased civic pride. More positive citizens are more
productive and generally more engaged.

City Marketing: Sporting events, especially mega-events like the Super Bowl are great advertising for
cities. In particular, there are success stories from more famous stadiums demonstrating the effect these
centers can have on an area. For example, Oriole Park in Camden Yard (Baltimore) and Jacobs Field
(Cleveland) are hallmarks of redevelopment that some argue transformed these cities into thriving
metropolitan hubs. Remind judges of these sentimental economic milestones to hit home the importance
of drawing in tourists through ballparks.
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 Spin-Off Development: A big reason city marketing is important is because of the process it sets in
motion for large cities. These establishments attract retail stores, restaurants, and parking structures.

Job Multipliers: This argument goes hand in hand with the spin-off development argument. New stores
and restaurants require new employees, providing another boost to the host city economy.
Pro teams shouldn’t ignore statistics. There are several studies available in this brief that demonstrate the direct
economic impacts of sports subsidies and provide statistics to counter Con teams. However, Pro teams should
also stress the intangible benefits of professional athletic organizations in the United States to win this debate.
These effects, civic pride in particular, are impossible to pinpoint and absolutely necessary for any developing
economy.
Con teams also have a variety of intangible effects available to them. For example:

Substitution Effect: This is the argument that if the families, teams, and other game-goers were not
spending their money at stadiums and ballparks, they would be spending it at other places in the same
city. These sports developments are merely a replacement for existing alternatives and therefore no gain
is achieved by constructing more stadiums.

Executive Payoff: A huge percentage of the economic benefits from sports subsidies don’t go to local
communities at all. Instead this money pads the pockets of wealthy ballpark owners, sports team
executives, and professional athletes. Many of these wealthy owners and athletes do not even live in
their host team’s city, taking their earnings to a different community and not benefitting their local
communities.

Eminent domain: In order to achieve the mass of land needed to construct a typical stadium or ballpark,
many establishments must use the right to extract land from owners with the promise of compensation.
Although landowners are compensated for this land, many still resent the force of the principle.
Sometimes forcibly relocated businesses choose to move their establishments to another city, causing a
loss of revenue for the host city through displacement.

Opportunity Costs: This argument can be used to deflect many Pro Team points. For example, if a Pro
team argues that sporting events help to market their host cities for tourists, the con can counter by
arguing that if the money that went into the sporting event went instead to better the city itself (public
transportation, etc.) the city would be better off altogether.
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Topic Analysis One
These are a few of the most possible arguments for both sides of this month’s resolution. With this advice on
definitions, framing, and popular arguments in mind, I have the following advice:
1. Carefully frame the debate to your advantage. Subtle wording differences may make all the difference in
this debate. Pro teams must focus on local communities and can use to their advantage by emphasizing
intangible benefits. Con teams should focus on the straight numbers—the multiplicity of studies
available showing the economic cost of public subsidies for professional athletic organizations in the
United States.
2. Don’t get caught up in numbers. It is easy to get into a game of statistics where both teams are
countering with different studies. Focus instead on the actual arguments to avoid getting lost and
dragging your judge into the weeds.
3. Don’t limit yourself. Many teams find one favorite argument and focus too much on one particular
benefit or disadvantage in an on balance debate. It is okay to have a secret weapon, but be sure to have
all your bases covered. Focusing only on one aspect is dangerous if this particular argument does not
resonate with your judge.
With this advice in mind, happy debating and see you next month!
--Amanda Sopkin
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Topic Analysis Two
Topic Analysis Two
While debate involves the use of facts and logic to persuade the judge, emotions and convincing
narratives still play an important role in deciding who wins the round. The narrative conflict in this resolution is
one between a national pastime that has provided nostalgic memories for many versus the supposedly corrupt
business practice behind it. The Pro wins by restoring luster to the former while the Con wins by making a
strong argument that the latter is the reality behind the gilded surface.
Pro
The majority of the evidence favors the Con. To win on the Pro side, one has to rely on solid rebuttals
and opponents that make mistakes. That being said, there are still some solid arguments that one can make on
the Pro side of this resolution.
Consumer Surplus
The first is the idea of a consumer surplus. Consumers are often charged more than what they can afford.
Such is the nature of business. However, there are rare exceptions. In some cases businesses charge consumers
less than what they are willing to pay. Such is the case with sports franchises. Even though consumers are
willing to pay a lot of money for tickets, they are charged at much lower prices. The following pieces of
evidence help prove this:

Further Analysis of the Irani study
o These calculations produced consumers’ surplus estimates ranging from 2.2 to $54.1 million
with an average around $18 million. Using Bain’s estimates of the cost incurred by local
governments in accommodating sports teams, he concluded that in five of eight cases the
consumers’ surplus exceeded this cost. Thus, his study suggests that public subsidies of
professional sports teams can often pass the benefit-cost test.

NBA and NHL Arenas consistently create a net surplus
o If elasticity is 0.75 or below, consumers’ surplus exceeds the annual payment on a $150 million
arena for 23 of 26 NHL franchises and 24 of 29 NBA teams. In fact, even if elasticity is 1,
consumers’ surplus is greater than the annual cost of a low cost basketball or hockey arena in 35
of 55 cases. Moreover, even high cost arenas pass the benefit-cost test in 41 cases if elasticity is
0.5.
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Con
Topic Analysis Two
Due to the nature of sports, most people see only the athletes and coaches that are employed by their
favorite teams. Rarely does one think of the management when someone brings up the Yankees or the Patriots.
Thus, the first task of anyone arguing the Con is to remind the judge that even professions like sports are held
up by businessman. After that, establishing corruption is much easier. Due to the activities that led to the Great
Recession in 2008, business leaders have lost much of the respect they used to have. The challenge is to get the
judge to understand that the businessmen that run sports are not different from the ones that run the rest of the
economy. Ultimately, you have to prove that they are both groups of people who have attained their current
positions through pursuing profit at the expense of the general public.
Corruption has infected the realm of stadium finance
Most people despise the role that money plays in politics. Democracies should be beholden to the
interests of their people, but oftentimes they are instead influenced by rich donors. Every business spends
money lobbying to create an environmental conducive to economic gain. While that may be expected behavior
from corporations like Microsoft and J.P. Morgan, sports franchises never enter the conversation. Even though
our favorite athletes may be playing on the field, the same types of business practices that are used by
multinational corporations are also used by the people who run our favorite sports team.
This relates especially to subsidies for stadiums. Even though most teams can pay for their own
stadiums, they don’t. Maximizing profit is the purpose of every single business and sports franchises follow this
formula. They don’t want to miss out on hefty subsidies; accordingly they influence the democratic process in
their favor. The following pieces of evidence help to make this argument:

Teams use money to influence the democratic process
o In 1997, both San Francisco and the state of Washington held a referendum to determine whether
to subsidize a new NFL stadium. Proponents in San Francisco outspent opponents by twenty-five
to one and opponents in Washington were outspent eighty-to-one, with both referenda barely
passing in favor of the subsidy.

Amount of money spent is sometimes unprecedented
o The key factor, say sociologist Eckstein and his co-author Kevin Delaney, is to have a strong
"growth coalition" of business leaders pushing for them — as when Cincinnati's powerful local
chamber of commerce helped raise $1 million for a "Keep Cincinnati a Major-League City"
campaign to raise sales taxes for new stadiums for the Reds baseball team and Bengals NFL
franchise, more than double the city's previous record spending on any ballot initiative.
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 The public has no say
Topic Analysis Two
o Usually, city officials do not give residents an opportunity to participate in, or object to their
plans, insisting instead that a new sports arena will improve the local economy… These are the
same officials who attend games sitting next to wealthy developers and team owners in the
"sparkling new luxury boxes," while the average fan faces steeply increased ticket prices.
Emotional arguments will not win the debate by themselves. However, these arguments are useful for
giving you the edge and for erasing any bias the judge has towards the Pro. Specifically, they go to show the
intent of team owners. In any criminal trial, the difference between a manslaughter conviction and a first or
second-degree murder charge is intent. In a debate round, intent is the first step to make judges doubt whether
team owners have the public’s best interests in mind. While this argument will not prove that stadium subsidies
are a bad economic investment, it can increase the impact of an economic argument. If you prove that stadium
subsidies are a waste of taxpayer money, you can also tie that into how team owners are using manipulative
methods to perpetrate their fraud. It is one thing to use money to further your own agenda; it is another to do it
at the expense of the general public. This combination shows that team owners purposefully attempt to take
decisions out of the hands of their fans. Even worse, it erodes the idea of democratic accountability. Thus,
professional athletic organizations not only harm their local communities; they intend to.
Opportunity Cost
A basic idea in economics is opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is essentially the concept that making
certain decisions robs you of the ability to make other ones. In the case of financial decisions, money spent on
one object cannot be spent on another.
Opportunity cost applies to all government subsidies. The government has to support important
functions of our society. These include building infrastructure, creating a social safety net, and providing for the
general welfare. The government also spends money on more trivial pursuits such as the arts and entertainment.
This is because while there are always more important needs to be met, government also has an obligation to
create a vibrant and diverse social fabric.
Government expenditures on arts and entertainment still need to be as judicious as possible. Perhaps the
best test of government subsidies for art and entertainment is whether or not these subsidies are necessary for
the survival of a specific field. Stadium subsidies clearly fail this test. Since sports teams have enough money to
finance their stadiums, subsidies become an unwise investment.
This resolution is an on balance resolution. An excellent way to overwhelm the Pro is not only force
them to defend the monetary costs of subsidies but also their opportunity costs. If the money could have been
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Topic Analysis Two
spent on a better investment, or to fulfill a more urgent need in the community, the stadium subsidy also came at
the expense of a brighter and better future. Here are a few examples of this situation:

Funding for stadiums comes at the expense of better options
o Not only that, but the operating subsidies are almost certainly coming out of general fund
revenues," he says. "If there's a ticket tax or anything that looks like a user tax, at least then the
people who are enjoying the benefits are paying. But if it's operating subsidies coming out of
general fund revenues, that's money that could go to any other alternative use in the city, like
education or public safety”… Ryan Splitlog of Common Cause Georgia, a nonprofit, nonpartisan
citizens' lobby, notes that the money going to the Falcons comes from hotel-motel tax revenue
that is designated for promoting tourism and convention business.

Stadium construction saddles governments with annual debt DAT
o According to Bloomberg…Businessweek, the U.S. Treasury loses $146 million a year on
municipal bonds with tax-free interest issued for sports structures. The taxpayer subsidies to
bondholders on the $17 billion tax-exempt debt on stadiums built in the last 27 years will be $4
billion. You know what would be a better use of $4 billion? Repairing roads, building sea walls,
preparing for the next big storm.
By working opportunity cost into the debate, you force your opponents to not only argue why stadium
subsidies are a good investment, but also why they are a better investment than any number of pressing
concerns. The news is always filled with stories of budget cuts for schools, non-profit organizations, and
pension funds. Are unnecessary stadium subsidies a better use of money than these issues? It will be hard for
your judges to say yes.
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Topic Analysis Three
Topic Analysis Three
A backgrounder
The debate over stadium financing has been brewing since the modern era of stadium financing. I delineate the
modern era as a time when public financing became the source of financing for a majority of new stadiums. It’s
important to understand the trends underlying modern sports financing; the current debate over stadium
financing did not begin in a vacuum.
The change from private to public financing, like many long-lasting socioeconomic changes, began following
World War II as America shook off the lull of a Great Depression and began flexing the economic muscles it
had generated as a result of military-based production. As populations and incomes shot up, so too did demand
for “middle class” resources: cars, clothes, entertainment, etc. Professional entertainment fit neatly into the
latter category of “entertainment.” At the time, as continues today, a majority of professional sports teams were
privately owned; this distinction is important, as the significance of profits also increases with private
ownership. Most stadiums were urban hubs, making transportation and integration with the community a simple
affair. But with economic growth also came a relocation of wealth: the 1950s coincided with the
suburbanization of America.
Arena owners, left with the prospect of catering to a wealthier clientele outside their urban homes, did not have
adequate funds to fully finance the kind of posh stadiums (with requisite enhanced seating capacity) mandated
by an increase in both the wealth and size of their audience. Between the public’s ravenous demand for
professional sports and team owners’ inability (or unwillingness) to finance new digs for their teams, the
modern public financing model came into its own. By the 1960s and 1970s, public financing had peaked, in
terms of public willingness to fund stadiums. Cities would often foot the entire cost of stadiums for their local
teams. Arenas were considered public infrastructure. This means they could be included with urban renewal
efforts—urban stadiums could be either rebuilt or renovated at whim. Dr. Judith Grant Long of Rutgers
University puts the average public share of costs at 89%, or $117 million, by 1979.
The 1980s saw a renewed boom. Because cities over the previous three decades often footed the entire bill for
stadiums, they were on point for construction of the facilities. Stadiums were thus constructed with an eye for
efficiency. Of course, efficiency and profit generation often did not go hand in hand. Football stadiums, for
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Topic Analysis Three
instance, were often constructed with baseball in mind—an awkward fit, given the funky dimensions of a
baseball stadium.
It was two efficiencies of publicly funded construction that crumbled in the 1980s: multipurpose stadiums and
democratic seating. Both were remedied with new stadiums. Major League Baseball (MLB) led the initial
charge, as it was baseball teams that suffered profit losses from both factors the most. Democratic seating
indicates a lack of premium seating. That is, no luxury boxes, “club” levels, etc. With revenue sharing
agreements in place, however, big-market teams needed ways to retain cash. And because premium seating was
typically exempt from revenue sharing calculations, the onus was on team owners to construct facilities which:
a) Minimized conflicts of use which would make the stadium suboptimal for its original intent, and b)
Maximized luxury seating capacity, as well as general seating. This is generally still the guiding philosophy of
stadium construction today.
By the 1990s, public funds were harder to come by. Public funding as a ratio of total funding for new stadiums
fell from its peak of 89% (see previous page) to 57%. Whereas the post-WWII years saw an all-or-nothing
approach—some owners would independently construct stadiums, while cities would entirely finance others—
the 1990s saw the broader emergence of a modern bastion of stadium construction: split financing. That is,
teams and private interests would divvy up the cost of a new stadium in whatever manner they saw fit.
Modern financing
So how does the modern sports team finance a modern sports stadium? Before we get into that, we need to
understand the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (it’ll come up throughout the brief). The Tax Reform Act (TRA) was a
bipartisan federal effort to stymie the kind of public financing that had grown rampant by the 1980s (see
backgrounder above). The goal of the TRA was to prevent egregious borrowing practices from public funds by
private businesses, e.g. the public financing of stadiums for private owners. Prior to the TRA, cities relied on
the issuance of tax-free bonds to finance projects, including those for worthwhile private industry. That is, the
city would sell off bonds which generated interest. That interest was exempt from federal income taxes, and the
city was on the hook for paying interest on those bonds to the bondholders. These tax-exempt bonds were
instrumental for cities to be able to uphold their share of bargains struck with sports franchises to fund their
stadiums.
The TRA essentially tried to eliminate stadiums from the kind of facility that could benefit from the sale of
these tax-free bonds. The TRA required that if more than 10% of the debt (e.g. the bonds sold) accrued in the
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Topic Analysis Three
process of building a facility for non-government use was repaid from revenue generated by the building, host
cities’ bonds would no longer be federal income tax-free.
To put the above paragraph more simply: if the locale financed any more than 10% of a stadium’s cost, it
couldn’t sell tax-free bonds to raise the money needed to pay for the stadium. Given that the peak of 89% city
financing was already long gone by 1986 and was decreasing en route to the 57% share we saw in the 1990s,
lawmakers behind the TRA believed that the bill would halt public financing of sports stadiums through taxexempt bonds. The alternative was cities performing economic manipulation: finding a source of surge funding
for stadiums other than tax-exempt municipal bonds, or pay more than 90% of financing costs for massive,
technologically advanced options.
Contrary to lawmakers’ predictions, the latter option was chosen. Instead of wilting away, public financing
became a boon for privately owned teams. While hesitant to fund them, lawmakers and people continue to see
pro sports teams as a net benefit to their communities (see the “intangible” arguments provided in Topic
Analysis 1). Pro sports teams, of course, are in artificially limited supply. The leagues—NFL, NHL, etc.—
determine whether or not that supply meets the demand. Of course, it doesn’t. Every large metropolitan area
wants to either have or keep a professional sports team. This becomes a simple, but perverse, problem of
economics: limited supply, soaring demand, and a pricing structure inadvertently designed to place the burden
on cities to account for a substantial portion of financing.
Current funding methods
Public subsidies (or lack thereof) come in many shapes and sizes. It’s advisable for teams to familiarize
themselves with the different ways cities and pro sports teams cooperate, they can better understand the
resolution and their side of the case. Understanding currently accepted formats for subsidizing sports teams is
also an excellent baseline for teams to develop their own advocacies on this issue. Having a cogent idea for how
subsidies should work will especially be helpful to Pro teams; arguing for some nebulous idea of a pro sports
subsidy can get Pro into hot water with sharpshooting Con teams who have case studies and strong analytical
evidence at their back.
Model 1: The public-private partnership | Case study: Cowboys Stadium (Arlington, TX)
This is currently the most common format of financing new stadiums in the United States. Under this system,
the community and the team reach a deal where each subsidizes some portion of the construction cost. While
the baseline for funding is approximately 50-50 split between the city and the team, it can vary depending on
circumstances. Ownership can belong to either the team or city, depending on the conditions in place.
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This was the model used by the city of Arlington to build Cowboys Stadium, a gleaming mecca of football in
what was already an athletic and tourist hotspot—Arlington hosts MLB’s Texas Rangers. Since 2005, Arlington
has sold $300 million in tax-free municipal bonds to help fund the stadium. As a concession to issuing tax-free
bonds (so bondholders make more profit off the bonds), the city offered 4% interest—lower than a standard
bond. In exchange for its financing of the stadium, the city of Arlington retains ownership of Cowboys stadium;
the Dallas Cowboys pay a relatively nominal $2 million annual rent on the facility. The lease has a total lifespan
of 30 years.
The bonds funding the stadium were voter-approved. The conditions included a 0.5% general increase in the
sales tax, a 2% hotel tax, and a 5% rental car tax. When initially negotiated, the stadium deal would leave the
city paying $343 million in interest by 2034—the year the municipal bonds matured. In a bit of additional
economic finagling, the Cowboys do not pay property tax on the stadium they lease—a $17 million annual
savings. Acquiring the land for the stadium required the razing of 162 properties. The land upon which the
stadium is build sits near both the Texas Rangers’ stadium and the area’s iconic Six Flags.
The city’s layout of funds for the stadium was not completely fruitless. Sales tax revenue for the city of
Arlington rose 5.4% from 2011 to 2012 following completion of the stadium, with tourism in 2010 supporting
9.5% more jobs than in 2008 (the nation as a whole saw the same number, but with a decline instead of an
increase).
The most striking current incarnation of the public-private partnership rests in Detroit. Within a week of the city
declaring bankruptcy, billionaire Detroit Red Wings & Tigers (of the NHL and MLB respectively) received
$284.5 million in public investment for a $650 million sports and entertainment district development, which
includes a new stadium to replace the Red Wings’ famed Joe Louis Arena. Detroit, a city with nearly $20
billion in debt on its hands to refinance, diverted nearly $13 million in annual dollars from its School Aid Fund.
While the fund is being compensated for by other means, there will still be $13 million missing annually from
the state’s coffers.
Pro teams looking for an economic “in” can look two paragraphs up; Con teams looking for instances of the
depravity of public sports financing can simply look one paragraph up. The point, then, is to indicate that there
are case studies in support of both sides. Case studies are not an excuse to begin exercises of inductive
reasoning; they are there to give an idea of how a certain policy (in this case, public-private sports financing
partnerships) can work.
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We can see that the effectiveness of such a funding model is dependent on the municipality in question. Stuck
between larger Texas cities, Arlington is a municipality dependent on “outside” revenue, of which Cowboys
Stadium was a component when constructed; the city-team partnership made sense. As for Detroit, the city’s
main problem is economic revitalization. Given that the literature is almost unanimous on the economic
inefficacy of stadiums, Detroit is largely augmenting its financial woes by funding another stadium for another
billionaire.
Given that this is the most popular model for sports financing, and that most of these partnerships end up
favoring the team far more than the host city, Pro teams can easily argue the problem with the status quo in
America simply by evaluating all the failures of public-private financing partnerships across the nation. That
said, however, the Pro can still advocate this model of financing as a tenable one for the local community. Even
in instances like Detroit, for example, if the Pro limits the “local” community size, there is obviously a gain: the
arena location goes from an unused chunk of land to a (hopefully) bustling center of commerce. The key for the
Pro, with every model, will be to frame the debate in favorable terms. If the Con objects to the framework, this
is a debate that must first be settled before digging into the resolution. By establishing and defining the
definition rigidly and favorable, the Pro can turn net negative situations (like the Detroit financing issue) into a
positive; greater Detroit might suffer, but greater Detroit doesn’t have to be the community in question.
Model 2: Full private funding | Case study: MetLife Stadium (Meadowlands, NJ)
Given the economics of the modern NFL, it makes almost no sense for a private financing scheme to build a
stadium. This is due to a multitude of factors, many of which we’ve already discussed: the emphasis on luxury
amenities drives the price of stadiums (and future renovations) up, while the combination of limited teams and
political capital makes municipalities inclined to financially subsidize their sports teams as a means of keeping
them from relocating.
That said, the New York Giants’ and Jets’ new home presents a unique example of how fully private funding
would make financial sense for not only municipalities but also the teams they host. The teams’ new stadium,
built four years ago, was created adjacent to the ashes of Giants Stadium, which used to host games for both
teams. Both the new and demolished stadium are part of the Meadowlands Sports Complex, a multi-arena
swathe of land in New Jersey proposed and municipally funded beginning in the 1970s.
The new stadium itself, while sitting on municipally owned and developed land, is entirely privately-financed;
the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority retains nominal control of the facility. Neither the Jets nor
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Giants individually had the funds for a stadium, so the two split the facility’s $1.6 billion pricetag 50-50. The
result is the most expensive stadium not only in the United States, but the world.
With formal municipal ownership (by the NJSEA; see previous paragraph), MetLife Stadium is under lease by
both teams. Each team can independently back out of the lease; given that the Jets historically “borrowed”
Giants Stadium, it is reasonable to assume the Jets would be inclined to leave and make a new, smaller,
independent stadium their home.
The stadium’s construction went off relatively smoothly, and the Meadowlands area was left with a new
stadium that sees twice the usage of the average football stadium (the two teams alternate home games there)
without any of the public financing boondoggles that typically accompany such massive construction projects.
Neither team had to finagle tax favors or engage in political strong-arming to push the project through, and the
state receives a nice kickback in the form of enhanced revenue from the newer, pricier stadium.
On the surface, then, this case study plays nicely with potential Con arguments surrounding opportunity costs.
After all, MetLife Stadium is standing proof that a state-of-the-art stadium can be constructed for a professional
athletic team without extra taxation, special allowances, or eminent domain proceedings complicating the mess.
The state is then left with all the benefits of revenue from the new stadium without the financial obligations to
break even on an initial investment; these are surplus funds that can be used to fund schools, infrastructure
work, etc. Theoretically, this is both a practical and ideal arrangement for cities to fund stadiums (instead of
solely team-based funding) would amount to robbing taxpayers blind.
The boon for Pro teams, however, is that MetLife is indeed the manifestation of an ideal set of circumstances.
Every potential drawback to the stadium plan had already been mitigated prior to it breaking ground. The
property was already available for development, given that the complex was solely for sports and entertainment
anyway. There were no outstanding issues of eminent domain, land purchase, or property tax to iron out. The
primary source of revenue was not one, but two private enterprises, both of them being teams in the most
financially viable sports league (NFL) in the largest market (NY/NJ) in America. Everything was already set up
for the two teams to have a state of the art stadium.
Pro teams can use the above circumstances to demonstrate that solely private financing is simply a nonstarter
for the bulk of stadium financing initiatives. Few municipalities in America have the capacity for sports teams
which rake in enough revenue to construct a $1.6 billion dollar stadium. Even fewer already have massive tracts
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of viable land being currently used for successful cultural and athletic initiatives already, with space for another
new stadium. Of course, there’s always the argument that such lavish stadiums are unnecessary; there should
still be enough material here, however, for Pro teams to demonstrate the unfeasibility of solely private financing
in most cases. The Pro simply needs to establish the basic premise that having a sports team—ignoring the
funding costs from the city—is general beneficial for a municipality. The logical conclusion is that some kind of
public influx of cash, however small, is necessary.
Model 3: Full public funding | Case study: Qualcomm Field (San Diego)
I’ll be brief (no pun intended) on this point, given that it serves as the least applicable to modern standards of
sports financing. Qualcomm Field, current home of the San Diego Chargers, was financed by a $27 million
bond in 1965. The stadium is both owned and managed by the City of San Diego, with the Chargers currently
being the only team playing in it (it was originally designed as a multipurpose stadium to also house baseball).
The venue is outdated, and is currently ineligible to host a Super Bowl. While there is currently an $800 million
project on the table for a new stadium in San Diego dedicated to just football, its funding situation is currently
in flux.
From my perspective on this debate, this funding model looks to be a creative advocacy for Pro teams to pursue.
This may seem counterintuitive, but it could have positive impacts for the Pro. The issue is of priorities. As a
private business, the incentive for pro teams is to retain as much cash as possible, and I’ve covered some of the
means of doing so: increased capacity, luxury amenities, and ancillary services (fee-operated parking lots are
common; advanced fan involvement tech, as seen in the 49ers new stadium, is set to become ubiquitous in new
stadiums as well). This means that even if a public domain agrees to finance only a part of the cost of a new
stadium, this cost can escalate quickly simply due to the base price of an advanced stadium with all its bells and
whistles.
Municipalities are typically interested in efficiency; taxpayer money is at stake. On that front, the onus on
public planners is to construct something which provides a marriage of utility and comfort. One intriguing
advocacy for the Pro, then is to push for municipalities to adopt middle-ground policies on stadium
construction: build stadiums which carry advanced features that teams want (e.g. luxury boxes, retractable
roofs), but also don’t push the envelope with amenities or capacity. New stadiums don’t necessarily have to be
the biggest and most advanced, despite most teams pushing for just that. Especially in a time of fiscal austerity,
this can hit the sweet spot for teams looking to milk revenue, while cities can recoup their money by both
managing the initial outlay (though control of project goals and budgets) and controlling the property—the city
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can set lease terms agreeable to both pro teams and its residents. With more frugal stadium construction, public
ownership and financing can be advocated as a win-win by Pro teams.
Full public ownership | Case study: Green Bay Packers
The operative word here is ownership—of the team, not the stadium. The Green Bay Packers are emblematic of
such an arrangement today; it’s technically forbidden in the Big 4 leagues of American pro sports, but the
Packers’ communal ownership system was grandfathered in. We’ll cover this more in-depth in the public
ownership section of the Pro case, but here’s a quick rundown: the Packers source the general public for
funding, but it isn’t a tax. Instead, the team is controlled by an eponymous corporation whose sole operation is
the management of the team, including stadium upgrades and personnel decisions. Ordinarily, the team runs off
its own sources of revenue—ticket sales, merchandise, etc. When additional revenue is needed, the team taps
the public. But instead of having Green Bay sell municipal bonds or raising sales taxes, the team essentially
sells stock in itself. This stock is largely a nominal offering, lacking the traditional benefits of holding stock in a
company. Stockholders don’t have a share of the company, don’t help run the team, etc. Over 90% of this “tax
base” is from the Green Bay area, so the Packers are funded almost entirely by their local community. The sale
of these virtually useless bonds to fans is the large-scale revenue source which enables the team to make large
investments in building upgrades, outsized player contracts, etc. The team is thus able to tap a large swathe of
population to fund its operation without having to levy a formal tax; instead, it is true supporters of the team
which finance its success. No one pays who doesn’t want to.
While this is an obsolete model for current professional sports, it is still of use to the Pro. The Pro’s job isn’t to
convince the judge that all modern forms of public subsidies for pro sports are beneficial to local communities;
the weight of evidence swings in the Con’s favor on this point. A much more attainable goal for the Pro,
however, is to show judges that public funding of some sort can be feasible. While this isn’t necessarily
presenting a policy (a nonstarter in PF debate), the onus is still on the Pro to present a financially viable method
for public subsidies of pro sports teams. Public ownership is such a method.
A publicly-owned team is a stable one. There is no threat of it moving, because the owners and funders of the
team are almost all local. There is no incentive to lobby for political capital because the team already has the
means of obtaining financial support. There is no need for municipalities to juggle funds because their own
funds aren’t being used; only certain constituents “volunteer” to pay up.
Admittedly, this is a left-field idea. Going into this topic and putting myself in the shoes of a likely novice
debater, it seemed like working the Pro side of the case would take more finesse, creativity, and extrapolation of
evidence. Researching this topic has not changed this perspective. The Con comes in armed with lay judges’
preconceived notions (a majority of the public within the past decade has shifted to an anti-subsidy stance,
emblematic of a general trend toward fiscal austerity in the United States). The Con also enters the debate with
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a wealth of evidence pointing to the conclusion that stadiums make for a terrible return on investment. The Pro
needs rebuttal evidence on this point, sure. But the Pro also needs to develop a strong case that can put Con
teams into a defensive stance which prevents them from using valuable debate time for sniping at the economics
of sports financing. The argument for public ownership is a paradigm-shifting, potentially emotional one. It
entails switching the perspective on professional athletic teams, from coalitions of millionaires robbing cities
dry, to cultural and civic foundations financed by the people. This line of logic is only relevant to the topic if
Pro teams can finagle public ownership into their definition of a public subsidy. By setting the stage with clear,
reasonable, and effective definitions, this shouldn’t be a trouble point.
General analysis
A debate round is what you make of it. The one sentence of a PF debate case is never detailed enough to lock
debaters into a box. So as always, we implore you to go deeper. Dig out of the box. I’ve tried to discuss
everything relevant about all the public funding models for sports stadiums, but I hope this analysis, and this
brief as a whole, serves simply as a starting point. Even with a relatively narrow topic like this one, there is far
more information—and far more perspectives—than what can fit on this brief. Our goal is simply to provide the
most comprehensive and broad scoped of starting points.
We know what happens when we assume; this is especially true for PF rounds. It can be easy to stay in the box,
and with good evidence and solid delivery, it will win rounds. That said, however, there is too much
information out there to justify sticking to stock arguments and basic data. I’ll point out one assumption right
now: that stadium construction is basically the only form of public subsidy. In nearly all cases, it is, and this is
reflected in the selection of evidence we have placed in the brief. But a subsidy can also be direct funding of a
team (i.e. something akin to the Packers’ model), or it can be ancillary funding—maybe a city finances the
roads connecting a stadium, but not the stadium itself.
During the months this topic is out in the wild, the World Series will start, as will the seasons of the NFL, NBA,
and NHL. These are the perfect months to delve into the business of American pro sports. Win some rounds,
have some fun, and probably don’t draft Sam Bradford to your fantasy football team.
-
Dan Tsvankin
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Pro Evidence
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Pro: How economic benefits
How Sports Subsidies Provide Economic Benefits
Other Ways that Sports Stadiums Benefit Cities AMS
University of Michigan. “Stadium Subsidies.” 2014.
http://www.umich.edu/~econdev/stadium_subsidy/
New sports stadiums usually create jobs. Though many stadiums simply replace older facilities in another part
of town, employment is usually increased at new facilities since new elaborate stadiums tend to require more
staff, and prove to be more successful at increasing net expenditures originating from outside the immediate
geographic area. These new expenditures minimally increase direct employment, such as stadium and franchise
staff, but can significantly boost indirect employment serving neighboring shops, hotels, restaurants, and
transportation. The specific local and regional job multipliers related to new stadium are highly contested,
though it is clear that new stadiums tend to successfully attract spending from those outside of the region and
create some new local employment. Proponents argue that as long as no better job-creation strategy is in place,
these new jobs are well worth subsidizing.
Spin-off Development + Expanding the Tax Base:
Subsidies are constructed in a variety of ways, though the taxes imposed on stadium activities such as ticket,
concession, and merchandise sales don't tend to supersede the significant abatements offered directly to teams
by host cities. Proponents argue that new stadiums stimulate spin-off development such as new retail
establishments, restaurants, concession suppliers, and parking structures. These new developments,
coupled with a boost for existing local economic players, and increased property values, generate enough
of a tax base increase to pay off the initial stadium investments while laying the groundwork for a healthy
and sustainable tax base.
Marketing the City:
It has been argued that through the regional and national television broadcasts of sporting events, cities
are become marketed to potential tourists and investors. Supporters assert that stadiums built in the 1990s
such as Oriole Park at Camden Yard (Baltimore) and Jacobs Field (Cleveland) have served as proven gateways
of redevelopment for their respective cities and that the tourism produced by these new ballparks has
transformed both their image and capability of attracting new investment.
This card provides an economic analysis of the ways that sports stadiums benefit their host cities.
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Pro: How economic benefits
Intangibles: Civic Pride AMS
University of Michigan. “Stadium Subsidies.” 2014.
http://www.umich.edu/~econdev/stadium_subsidy/
Boosting civic pride has been a primary challenge for many city leaders throughout the country. It is believed
that positive attitudes towards cities improve productivity, encourage local constituents to become further
invested and engaged, and attract new talent and growth. Proponents argue that enticing sports teams to
relocate into cities, or building sleek new facilities for existing franchises has been a successful tool in
boosting this intangible asset. Though this effect is difficult to quantify, it provides utility far beyond the
cost of the subsidies.
Cities charge more property tax on stadiums than they’re worth DAT
Van Dongen, Troy. “Don’t Confuse Cost With Value When Assessing the Worth of
Professional Sports Facilities.” National Association of Property Tax Attorneys. 7
June 2010. Web.
Although the costs of major league sports facilities has increased significantly in recent years, the public’s share in these
investments has not kept pace. As mentioned above, historically, the public’s share of the construction costs in Major
League ballparks has averaged roughly 70 percent of the total costs. Yet, the public’s investment in the Mets’ new
ballpark was just 27 percent, and the public’s investment in the new Yankee Stadium was only 17 percent.
The public’s reluctance to maintain its historically high prorata investment in these projects may be from either a reduced
perception of the value received by the community from such projects (or perhaps a perception that the value has
remained static), or a recognition by the team owners that their investment is of a greater value. In either case, however,
the market evidence still generally supports a decrease in overall value from year to year.
As explained above, professional sports facilities have a significant rate of depreciation. Although this may be
offset somewhat by the honeymoon effect for the first few years, the depreciation is incurred almost
entirely by the private entity, because the public entity retains the infrastructure, redevelopment, civic
pride, and other intangibles associated with having a professional sports team located in the community,
regardless of how well the team fills the seats at its stadium. On the other hand, the private possessory
interest is disproportionately affected by the trailing-off of the honeymoon effect, as the team will eventually
experience just average performance on the field, with a corresponding impact on the revenues attributed to the
real property. Consequently, although the public investment in professional sports facilities has decreased while
the construction costs have increased, the result of this phenomenon does not signal an increase in the
property’s assessable value. Indeed, team owners that have not undertaken the work to assure that their
facilities are being properly assessed are likely to be paying property taxes based on values that were
erroneously set too high by the local assessor.
This card shows how investment in a stadium is actually safer for the city than for the team. Cities retain
all the intangible benefits of the stadium while collecting property tax (in most cases) that’s in excess of
the property’s value. Owners, meanwhile, are left with depreciated properties. Because this depreciation
can go unrecognized, the local community is insulated from drops in property tax revenue.
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Pro: Examples economic benefits
Examples of Economic Benefits from Sports Subsidies
The Citizenry Benefits from A Consumer Surplus
Explaining a consumer surplus, Fj
Wilhelm, Sarah. “Public Funding of Sports Stadiums” Center for Public Policy &
Administration. April 30, 2008.
Attendance at sporting events can create what economists call consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is the
difference between what a fan is willing to pay for a seat at the game, and what they actually have to pay.
A fan who was willing to pay $800 to attend a playoff game but only had to pay $50 for their ticket gained
$750 in consumer surplus.
Baseball stadiums can result in a consumer surplus, Fj
Irani, Daraius. “ Public Subsidies to Stadiums: Do the Costs Outweigh the Benefits?”
Public Finance Review. 1997.
Even though ticket prices to games are set to extract as much rent as possible from the fans, there may be some
rent that is not captured by the sports franchise. These uncaptured rents accrue to the city in the form of net
consumer surplus, and this is an increase in the city’s welfare. If net consumer surplus and other
financial benefits of a stadium exceed its cost, then the city should consider subsidizing its construction or
renovation. Previous studies have overlooked this welfare gain. I attempt to measure the dollar value of the
city’s welfare gain by estimating a Marshallian demand curve for baseball games and then calculating the net
consumer surplus from the demand curve. The calculated welfare gain in this article only represents a partial
measure of the total welfare gain because it does not include events that may occur at the stadium other than
baseball games.
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Pro: Examples economic benefits
The results show that the net benefit of a stadium ranged from minus $19.1 million to $32.8 million in the
absence of any economic activity that may be induced by the stadium.
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Pro: Examples economic benefits
While this study may not unequivocally support subsidies, it does provide a potentially powerful
argument in its favor. It is also important to remember that the monetary gain from a consumer surplus
does not take into account how much businesses in the region benefit from a stadium. This means the
potential gain could be even bigger.
Further Analysis of the Irani study, Fj
Alexander, D. L., Kern, W., & Neill, J. (2000). Valuing the consumption benefits from
professional sports franchises. Journal of Urban Economics. 3(3), 355-378.
doi:10.1006/juec.1999.2169
Using data on annual attendance for MLB teams and ticket prices, Irani estimated an attendance demand for
tickets function. Using his parameter estimates and actual attendance data, he calculated the choke ticket price
and actual ticket price in 1985 for each team. Then, he estimated the consumers’ surplus from attendance for
each NLB team by integrating his estimated attendance function over the range of ticket prices defined by the
team’s choke price and the actual ticket price. These calculations produced consumers’ surplus estimates
ranging from 2.2 to $54.1 million with an average around $18 million. Using Bain’s estimates of the cost
incurred by local governments in accommodating sports teams, he concluded that in five of eight cases
the consumers’ surplus exceeded this cost. Thus, his study suggests that public subsidies of professional
sports teams can often pass the benefit-cost test.
This analysis is not only backed up by the tables from the previous card, its rhetoric also makes a
stronger argument for stadium subsidies.
NBA and NHL Arenas consistently create a net surplus, Fj
Alexander, D. L., Kern, W., & Neill, J. (2000). Valuing the consumption benefits from
professional sports franchises. Journal of Urban Economics. 3(3), 355-378.
doi:10.1006/juec.1999.2169
Our benefit-cost tests are generally more supportive of arena construction. If elasticity is 0.75 or below,
consumers’ surplus exceeds the annual payment on a $150 million arena for 23 of 26 NHL franchises and
24 of 29 NBA teams. In fact, even if elasticity is 1, consumers’ surplus is greater than the annual cost of a
low cost basketball or hockey arena in 35 of 55 cases. Moreover, even high cost arenas pass the benefitcost test in 41 cases if elasticity is 0.5. Thus, arena construction appears to be easier to defend on benefit-cost
grounds, particularly when the arena has multiple uses.
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Pro: Examples economic benefits
Consumer surplus is related to stadium subsidies, Fj
Porter, Philip and Thomas, Christopher. “Public Subsidy, Location, and Price of Sports”
Southern Economic Journal. 2010.
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Pro: Examples economic benefits
Economic Gain
Colorado State University Stadium Benefits Community AMS
Lyell, Kelly. “Fort Collins Chamber Announces Support of CSU Stadium.” June 4, 2014.
Coloradoan. http://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/local/csu/2014/06/03/fortcollins-chamber-announces-support-csu-stadium/9927401/
May cited a recent economic impact study prepared by Icon Venue Group, which was selected by CSU as
the project manager for the proposed $254 million stadium, that estimated construction of the stadium
would have a $72 million impact on the local economy. The report said continued use of the facility would
generate "at least $40 million to the local economy above and beyond what is generated by events at
Hughes Stadium.
"That doesn't include any redevelopment that will be spurred by having a stadium in town along Shields
(Street), Prospect, College Avenue, the Campus West area along West Elizabeth. Those areas will all benefit."
Specific examples of the economic impact from sports subsidies both allow Pro teams to demonstrate
their points in a memorable way and counter Con claims that sports subsidies do only harm.
Minneapolis’ Economic Benefit Grows AMS
Roper, Eric and Kaszuba, Mike. “Minneapolis’ Slice of Stadium Funding Could Jump.”
May 1, 2012. Star Tribune.
http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/149761315.html
Minneapolis' contribution to a new Vikings stadium could become millions more than city officials have
publicly revealed if local sales tax revenue increases faster than expected.
Mayor R.T. Rybak's administration has said the city's contribution of local sales taxes to a new stadium
on the Metrodome site will amount to approximately $338 million for capital and operations over 30
years, or $675 million when including interest costs. But a provision in the stadium bill raises that figure if the
local economy booms.
The city's contribution could reach $890 million if tax revenue grows by 5 percent each year for 30 years,
based on a Star Tribune analysis of figures provided by the city's chief financial officer, Kevin Carpenter.
In that scenario, the city would also be left with more money to spend on the convention center and economic
development.
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Pro: Examples economic benefits
Benefits of Jacobs/Progressive Field, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Progressive Field (1994)
Progressive Field, the home of the Cleveland Indians, was identified as one of Rosentraub’s “major league
winners” in his 2010 book, Major League Winners. Though Cleveland’s investment in Progressive Field was
substantial, contributing $180 million to the $279 million stadium, Progressive Field has been a catalyst for
economic development in the Gateway District of downtown Cleveland. (Rosentraub 2010)With Cleveland’s
economy and image on the decline in the early 1990’s due to racial tension, loss of jobs, and population
outflow, city leaders decided something needed to be done to give the city a boost. They turned to sports and
entertainment to try to reestablish downtown Cleveland as an attractive and exciting place to visit, contributing
to the construction of downtown sports venues, new theatres, and other attractions, such as the Rock and Roll
Hall of Fame. Though no private investment for new projects was pledged at the time of public investment
in such attractions, it came in the following years, with the $1.85 billion (in 2004 dollars) of private
construction in Cleveland between 1980 and 1989, jumping to $4.1 billion (in 2010 dollars) between 1995
and 2003. Though causality cannot be attributed, it is certainly very likely that it was as a result of
Cleveland’s improved image and downtown scene. (Rosentraub 2010)
Other Benefits of Jacobs/Progressive Field, Fj
Jensen, Scott. “Financing Professional Sports Facilities with Federal Tax Subsidies: Is it
Sound Tax Policy?” Marquette Sports Law Review. 200.
Thomas Chema, developer of Cleveland's Jacobs Field, indicated that twenty-eight new businesses
employing over 1200 people opened between 1994 and 1996 within a two-block area of the stadium. See
id. In addition, he indicated that over 500 housing units were planned near the stadium.
Jacobs Field and Progressive Field are the same field.
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Benefits of Coors Field, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Coors Field (1995)
Economic development was already underway in Denver’s LoDo (lower downtown) neighborhood before the
presence of Coors Field, but studies indicate that Coors Field greatly quickened the pace of development and
provided an additional boost to the neighborhood. LoDo was a low-income neighborhood that attracted little
outside growth until the early to mid-1990’s, when it began to become somewhat of a trendy art district, though
still not an economically thriving one. (Buckman and Mack 2012) Within in a year of Coors Field’s opening
in 1995, housing units in LoDo doubled and there was also a significant growth in area restaurants and
retail stores, which many say Coors Field had a large part in. LoDo continues to be a thriving
neighborhood to this day. (Buckman and Mack 2012)
Other Benefits of Coors Field, Fj
Jensen, Scott. “Financing Professional Sports Facilities with Federal Tax Subsidies: Is it
Sound Tax Policy?” Marquette Sports Law Review. 2000.
The history of the down town area in Denver, Colorado also provides a historical example of revitalization
following the construction of a stadium.
Horrow indicated that twenty-five new restaurants opened in the downtown area following the
construction of Coors Field along with land value increases around Coors Field of almost $25 per square
foot. See id. In addition, Horrow estimates that an additional $20 million was spent in the downtown
Denver area in the year following the opening of Coors Field..
Benefits of AT&T Park, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
AT&T Park (2000)
AT&T Park, home of the San Francisco Giants, is the only MLB stadium in the last 50 years to be entirely
privately funded (though San Francisco did invest $80 million for infrastructure improvements around the park)
was built in the Mission Bay neighborhood of San Francisco that had long been little more than an abandoned
industrial zone. Following the construction of the park, hailed as one the most beautiful in baseball, the
neighborhood now contains 6,000 apartments and condominiums, 6 million square feet of office space, 40
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acres of parks, a hospital, and a research campus for the University of California-San Francisco. Both
developers behind such projects and San Francisco city officials directly cite AT&T Park as a very
important reason development occurred in the Mission Bay neighborhood. (Swift 2007; Gordon 2004)
Benefits of Petco Park, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Petco Park (2004)
Petco Park, home of the San Diego Padres, was another of Rosentraub’s “major league winners,” in large part
due to the ability of San Diego to get assurance of a large amount of private investment in return for their
investment into the stadium. Building the new stadium became a necessity with the Padres’ losing money due to
their unfavorable revenue-sharing agreement with the San Diego Chargers, whom they shared Qualcomm
Stadium with. In order to ensure that the Padres would not move elsewhere, the city of San Diego worked with
the Padres to build Petco Park downtown in the East Village neighborhood, which had a small residential base
but was far from economically thriving. (Rosentraub 2010) San Diego invested $303 million investment in
the stadium, but that figure is dwarfed by the over $1 billion of private sector investment that occurred in
the newly created “Ballpark District” between the announcement of plans for the park and 2010. Much
of the investment was guaranteed in the initial agreement, but hundreds of millions of dollars worth
followed due to the success of the area. Rosentraub also states there is the potential for an additional $1
billion of private investment in the Ballpark District in the coming years. (Rosentraub 2010)
Benefits of National Park, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Nationals Park (2008)
Nationals Park in Washington, D.C. was placed in a struggling, crime-riddled part of the city and wisely paired
with plans for private real estate development around the park. As of 2011, very little had happened and many
were convinced the planned office and apartment buildings were never going to be built. But as of this year,
the developers, who said the recession had caused them to wait to build, have undertaken construction
for the project and many other businesses have announced new plans to open around the park.
Highlighting such construction is The Yards, a mega-development that will contain 1.8 million square
feet of office space, 400,000 square feet of retail space and 2,700 rentals or for sale homes. Additionally,
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the business tax levied on the area’s most wealthy businesses is generating far more revenue than
expected and the 30-year bonds on the stadium are projected to be retired 12 years early. (O’Connell
2012; Benfield 2012)
Benefits of Target Field, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Target Field (2010)
Though built in the same neighborhood of Minneapolis that the Metrodome, which failed to generate any sort of
economic development, inhabits, Target Field has been a success story so far. Despite its more modest price
tag compared to other newer MLB stadiums and the Twins’ mixed success on the field, Target Field
continues to draw huge crowds, which has generated an additional $4 million a year in tax revenue for
Minneapolis. Additionally, in the two years following the opening of Target Field, there were $70 million
of permits filed for proposed new building around the stadium as well as a $30 million upgrade to the
Ford Center, a vast yearly increase for the area. Existing area businesses have also reported a major
spike in revenue following the stadium’s opening. (Williams 2011)
Benefits of Cleveland Browns Stadium, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Cleveland Browns Stadium (1999)
As was previously described regarding Progressive Field in Cleveland, Cleveland was in a state of disarray by
the early 1990’s and turned to professional sports and entertainment to revitalize the city’s image. An
additional negative blow to Cleveland was the loss of the original Cleveland Browns, who left in 1995 for
Baltimore, becoming the Baltimore Ravens. Thus, when the city was given the ultimatum, shortly after
the loss of the Browns, that if they were to quickly mobilize and secure 70 percent of funding for a new
stadium, they could receive an expansion team that would again be the Cleveland Browns. This
prevented them from sustaining a major loss in image and growth that would have put a damper on the
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other redevelopment projects underway. (Rosentraub 2010) The only space that they could quickly secure
was the land on which the previous Browns stadium was located on, on the periphery of downtown Cleveland
on the lake. Though the stadium opened in 1999, by the time at which a lot of the city’s redevelopment
projects were already completed or in the advanced stages. In 2004 dollars, the value of private
construction projects that had occurred in Cleveland between 1980 and 1989 was about $1.85 billion. In
the period between 1995 and 2003, the value of private construction in 2010 dollars was $4.1 billion,
meaning private investment in Cleveland in the latter period was about double of the first period.
Cleveland Browns Stadium was an integral part of the overall redevelopment plan for Cleveland and
helped maintain the high yearly private investment in Cleveland, which would have very likely suffered
had the Browns never came back. (Rosentraub 2010)
Benefits of Lucas Oil Stadium, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Lucas Oil Stadium (2008)
Lucas Oil Stadium, home to the Indianapolis Costs, is the last of Rosentraub’s “major league winners.” Though
Indianapolis’ $620 million contribution to the $719.6 million Lucas Oil Stadium is very sizeable, one can
convincingly argue that the public is seeing a high amount of return. As a small to mid-market, Indianapolis had
already been in an arrangement where they were covering many upgrades to the outdated RCA Dome as well as
covering some of the Colts’ financial shortfalls to assure their continued presence in Indianapolis. By the early
2000’s, Indianapolis was paying out well over $10 million a year to the Colts in subsidies as part of the
agreement and would have risen over $20 million had the new stadium not been constructed. The new stadium
already hosted the 2012 Super Bowl, the NCAA Men’s Basketball Final Four in 2010 and is slated to again in
2015, and as of 2011 will host the Big Ten Football Championship annually. (Rosentraub 2010)
Though it is hard to attribute new construction directly to the presence of a stadium, it is hard to ignore the
boost in new construction that occurred following the opening of Lucas Oil Stadium. In 2007, before the
stadium opened, $155.9 million of new construction projects were approved and in 2008, that number
jumped slightly to $173.9 million. However, by 2009, that number soared to $459.2 million, which one
must suspect is in large part due to the success and downtown location of Lucas Oil Stadium.
(Rosentraub 2010)
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Benefits Of Minor League Stadiums
Minor leagues that are subsidized are a better investment than private minor leagues. ASF
Agha, Nola. “The Economic Impact of Stadia and Teams: The Case of Minor League
Baseball.” Journal of Sports Economics. 14(3) pp. 227 – 252. 2013.
https://www.academia.edu/7267312/The_Economic_Impact_of_Stadiums_and_Tea
ms_The_Case_of_Minor_League_Baseball
Independent leagues are not governed by Minor League Baseball, are free to set their own schedules, sign
their own players, and were unaffected by the 1990 stadium requirements. Yet independent leagues have
always struggled with financial viability because they have had to cover the entire portion of their
expenses with no assistance from major league teams. Despite lower player talent than affiliated teams,
independent teams must rely more on player talent, wins, promotions, and marketing to drive attendance and
therefore revenues to the team. The result is independent leagues tend to exhibit more market volatility, as
evidenced in Table 1, and stay in a city only 25% as long as an affiliated franchise, on average. (pg. 7)
There is a comparison between Independent Minor Leagues, and Minor Leagues affiliated with Major
League Teams. Independent leagues handle their own funding completely, leading to less economic
stability and a life span 25% that of an affiliated Minor League Baseball team because affiliated teams
are subsidized. Opponents may say they are only subsidized by Major League teams, however those
teams have additional money to spend on minor leagues due to public subsidies.
Preferable Methodology. ASF
Agha, Nola. “The Economic Impact of Stadia and Teams: The Case of Minor League
Baseball.” Journal of Sports Economics. 14(3) pp. 227 – 252. 2013.
First, the smaller towns where minor league baseball teams are located help avoid an econometric issue that has
plagued major league research. Because major league teams are located in roughly the 50 largest metro
areas, there is a collinearity problem between population and the presence of a team. On the other hand,
between 1980 and 2007 there were 269 metro areas that hosted a minor league baseball team with 2006
population ranging from 15,469 to 18.8 million. Thus, minor league baseball offers the opportunity to
dramatically increase not only the variance in population but also the size of the sample. Next, although
Baade et al. (2008) point out that the enormity of major metropolitan areas makes it difficult to find effects due
to normal fluctuations in the regional economy, this problem should be partially alleviated in minor league
baseball because metropolitan areas are generally smaller. Because the effect of a team may be smaller as well
it may be theoretically ambiguous, ex ante, whether minor league teams are a larger or smaller portion of the
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economy than major league teams are. With 269 metro areas in the sample, at minimum there should be a
wide variation in the degree to which teams are either a large or small part of the local economy.
Third, the minor league baseball context extends the current major league literature to a new and relevant
segment of U.S. sports. Although there were several critical, but non- econometric, studies on the potential for
minor league teams to affect local economics in the mid-1990’s (Baade & Sanderson, 1997b; Colclough,
Daellenbach, & Sherony, 1994; Johnson, 1995; Rosentraub & Swindell, 1991), it is only in recent years that
econometric interest in minor
league baseball has begun (e.g. Cebula, Toma, & Carmichael, 2009; Gitter & Rhoads, 2010, 2011; Winfree,
2009) although none of these studies focus on economic impact. In 1997, Baade and Sanderson claimed that
econometric analysis of minor league baseball was not possible because of the non-existence of data for
small communities. Fortunately, the opposite is now true and data is so freely available, even for small
communities, that this research contains all but five minor league teams that played in the U.S. in a 22year period.
Finally, this research also helps inform the current debate on public funding for minor league stadiums
by evaluating the veracity of claims made by stadium proponents. With hundreds of millions of public
dollars spent each year on minor league baseball stadiums, the economic effects of teams on communities have
important policy implications.
This is the most inclusive and conclusive study on public subsidies in relation to minor league stadiums. It
analyzes 269 stadiums (all but 5 teams from 1991 – 2013) with data that has only recently become
available. It answers criticism of previous studies because data was not available. It also directly
addresses public subsidies and gives a direct comparison to major league stadiums.
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Pro: Minor league stadiums
Minor League stadiums cause communal benefits. ASF
Carr, Susan Latham. “Is there major league benefit to minor league baseball?” Ocala
Star Banner. December 9, 2012.
www.ocala.com/article/20121209/ARTICLES/121209753?template=printpicart
Arthur T. Johnson, University of Maryland's professor emeritus in the Fishell Department of Bioengineering at
the University of Maryland, says Minor League Baseball can be an economic driver for a community if it meets
the community's strategic goals.
Johnson, who published his research on Minor League Baseball in 1996, found there are ways a
community can benefit economically from Minor League Baseball. He is the author of the book “Minor
League Baseball and Local Economic Development.”
“If it's going to be a successful economic driver, the location of the stadium is going to be very
important,” Johnson said. “Communities have used the stadium to bolster a dying downtown or as part of
a redevelopment project or to open new lands for development.”
He said a stadium could be used as an entry point for residential or retail development. It could also be
used to improve the quality of life, by opening it up to amateur sports like high school or college teams, so
that the community gets greater use of the facility. He said northern towns have used them for ice rinks.
The parking lots can be used for RV shows and the like.
“It becomes a community forum,” Johnson said.
He said people may travel distances to see a Major League team's spring training games, but they will not for
minor league games.
“So you are not going to get 10,000 people a game. They're not going to spill over to the bars and restaurants. A
lot will be families that go to the game and then go home,” Johnson said.
He said communities will not get a return dollar-for-dollar on Minor League Baseball.
“That doesn't mean it's not worth it,” Johnson said. “Elected officials should be making decisions
whether or not, in their strategic vision for the community, this is going to bring something that meets
one of their strategic goals.”
He said in Harrisburg, Pa., one of the goals was to bring suburbanites into town and it worked. People
who came into town for the game would stay in town and visit the restaurants.
“That's the type of thing that can happen, even in a small community,” Johnson said.
In this quote, Johnson is noted saying economy isn’t the only benefit the community can derive, but they
can have a specific role they want the stadium to play, and thus it is holistically considered a benefit, even
if the numbers don’t speak to that front.
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Minor Leagues are not comparable to Major Leagues. ASF
Agha, Nola. “The Economic Impact of Stadia and Teams: The Case of Minor League
Baseball.” Journal of Sports Economics. 14(3) pp. 227 – 252. 2013.
https://www.academia.edu/7267312/The_Economic_Impact_of_Stadiums_and_Tea
ms_The_Case_of_Minor_League_Baseball
Minor league baseball is major league baseball on a small scale. Teams play shorter seasons in smaller ballparks
that tend to be located in smaller cities with lower per capita incomes. Minor league teams have operating
budgets that pale in comparison to their major league affiliates, they employ fewer people, the salaries they pay
are much smaller, and the jobs are mostly seasonal (Johnson, 1991, 1995). Although major leagues often import
over 50% of their total budget from revenue sharing and lucrative national television contracts, the only
financial inflows attributable to minor league teams are the player salaries paid by major league affiliates. Even
these payments are absent in the case of independent leagues. In addition, the minor leagues have lower levels
of media exposure and brand association, decreased league longevity, more frequent team moves, shorter
seasons, and lower quality players producing lower quality contests. If the effect of a major league team on
income is insignificant or negative, the minor league results should be more so.
In spite of this inauspicious expectation, it is important to note that minor league baseball is not a homogenous
product. Affiliated teams should have a more positive effect than independent teams because of higher
quality players, stronger history, fewer league and team movements, and the benefits of affiliation in
branding, increasing attendance, and generating media exposure. Likewise, within classifications the
quality of play, season length, population, substitutes, and longevity in a market are distinctly different. For
example, AAA and AA teams benefit from large populations (as a proxy for demand), little competition from
MLB, and longer seasons in larger stadiums. Given these conditions, it is expected AAA and AA teams will
have the least negative effect while A and rookie teams are expected to have a more negative effect on local per
capita income.
Finally, minor league team owners routinely claim that their product is a local leisure activity, not a
sporting contest (Johnson, 1995). If this is truly the case, then a comparison to MLB may be less
appropriate than a stand-alone evaluation of the degree to which minor league baseball can generate new
visitor spending. (pg. 8-9)
Because there is such a wide variety of Minor Leagues in baseball, and the teams participate on such a
small and local scale, the activity is not comparable to the Major Leagues because it lacks the competitive
edge that the Majors market on. Moreover, Minor League teams affiliated with Major League teams
(meaning they have subsidies; see above) do not move often, and have relatively high turnout and media
exposure.
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Minor League management causes economic gains. ASF
Agha, Nola. “The Economic Impact of Stadia and Teams: The Case of Minor League
Baseball.” Journal of Sports Economics. 14(3) pp. 227 – 252. 2013.
https://www.academia.edu/7267312/The_Economic_Impact_of_Stadiums_and_Tea
ms_The_Case_of_Minor_League_Baseball
The results of this research highlight the positive effects of AAA teams, A+ teams, AA
stadiums, and rookie stadiums on local per capita income. The findings also indicate non- positive effects of
AA, A, A-, rookie, and independent teams as well as AAA, A+, A, A-, and independent stadiums.
There are several reasons the positive effects are particularly interesting. First, and in contrast to decades
of major league results, there are no significant negative effects. All of the significant results are positive.
In addition, the a priori expectations based on a thorough conceptual analysis were that all of the results would
be negative.
To be clear, teams and stadiums in the majority of classifications have insignificant effects on per capita
income. This is consistent with prior major league research. What is unique about the minor league context
is that entire leagues of teams at the AAA and A+ levels are, for the first time, reflecting positive changes.
Yet, no cost-benefit analysis was conducted so there is no implication that cities should invest in AA or rookie
stadiums. What is distinctive about these results is the acknowledgement that perhaps fundamental
differences in the business structure of sports can result in dramatic changes in the ability of sports teams
to affect their local economies. (pg. 27-28)
The simple differences in how Minor League stadiums and teams are run and structured uniquely cause
them to have economic benefits to the local community in Per Capita Income gains.
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Minor Leagues Increase Per Capita Income $67 to $201. ASF
Agha, Nola. “The Economic Impact of Stadia and Teams: The Case of Minor League
Baseball.” Journal of Sports Economics. 14(3) pp. 227 – 252. 2013.
https://www.academia.edu/7267312/The_Economic_Impact_of_Stadiums_and_Tea
ms_The_Case_of_Minor_League_Baseball
Model 2 was run with a more detailed breakdown of affiliated teams to address the differences between
classifications. Model 3 tested this further stratification and a Wald test confirmed (p = 0.022) that the
distinction between A+, A, and A- was significantly different from zero. Therefore, Model 4 implemented this
stratification at both the team and stadium level. Finally, Model 5 added entry and exit honeymoons. Model 5 is
the fully specified model and is used for discussion, although the results are strongly similar between the
various models. The R-squared value of 0.34 is lower than other similar major league research. But, since Rsquared is simply the fraction of unexplained variance in the model, it seems unsurprising that 238 minor league
metro areas that range from a AAA metropolis to an Independent village have more natural random unexplained
variability than 40 nearly identical major league metro areas.
The first difference of the rate of employment is statistically significant and in the expected direction. The first
difference of the percent change in population is negative suggesting, in this case, that the increasing labor
supply is lowering wages. Two other control variables, the first differences of stadium capacity and the quality
of the major league parent club, are statistically insignificant.
As mentioned in the previous section, although the model was first differenced, the parameter interpretations
have not changed. Thus, the mere presence of an AAA franchise is associated with a $67.25 (p = 0.034)
increase in per capita incomes, holding all else constant. Similarly, an A+ franchise is associated with a
$117.57 (p = 0.044) increase in per capita income. The honeymoon period for stadiums at the AA (160.83,
p = 0.033) and rookie level (201.99, p = 0.032) also have significant impacts on per capita income. The
entry and exit honeymoon variables are all insignificant. (pg. 17)
This analysis of the data shows that each type of affiliated minor league stadium results in a increase in
per capita income for the local community, ranging from $67 at the highest level of play, to $201 at the
lowest level of minor league play. It should be noted that the AA and rookie level income gains are not
long standing and only part of a "honeymoon" phase, though this lasts 5 years.
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Minor Leagues Boost Per Capita Income .2 - .7%. ASF
Agha, Nola. “The Economic Impact of Stadia and Teams: The Case of Minor League
Baseball.” Journal of Sports Economics. 14(3) pp. 227 – 252. 2013.
https://www.academia.edu/7267312/The_Economic_Impact_of_Stadiums_and_Tea
ms_The_Case_of_Minor_League_Baseball
This study used a model as similar as possible to Coates and Humphreys (1999) so that comparisons could be
made between major and minor league sports. Although the unique structure of minor league baseball made it
infeasible or impossible to include identical variables, many of the same ones were used. In addition to a longer
and more current dataset, this research took advantage of new techniques in panel data analysis and used a
different estimator.
Coates and Humphreys (1999) found insignificance for MLB stadium construction and entrance coefficients
whereas the minor league coefficients are significant in four instances (see Table 6). The effect size of a minor
league team is small, ranging from 0.7% of M[etropolitan]S[tatistical]A[rea] per capita income for a
rookie stadium to 0.2% for an AAA team, but is similar to other minor league research (Gitter & Rhoads,
2010; Winfree, 2009) that has also found small but strongly significant effects.
Minor League franchising entering a Metropolitan Area bolsters per capita income from .2 - .7%
depending on the level of play of the team. This is statistically significant, and when compared to major
leagues, has no negative impacts.
Benefits of Springfield Falcons routine operating expenses, Fj
Walker, Sharianne and Enz, Michael. “The Impact of Professional Sports on The Local Economy”
Western New England College School of Law. March 24, 2006.
Such valuation is illustrated by examining the economic impact of a minor league hockey team in
Springfield, Massachusetts. Springfield is home to the Springfield Falcons, an American Hockey League
(AHL) team, and the AHL headquarters.
The local economic benefits derived from routine operating expenses are often overlooked. For example, the
Springfield Falcons spend over $150,000 in bus transportation with Peter Pan Bus Lines, a local
transportation vendor. The team also retains a variety of local medical providers, including physical
therapists, MRI centers, and other sports-related treatment specialists. Baystate Health System, a local hospital
network, also enjoys related ancillary benefits, using team endorsements to drive other users to the facility.
Additionally, the Falcons spend approximately $150,000 a year on local media buys, or advertisements.
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Springfield Falcons impact on local businesses, Fj
Walker, Sharianne and Enz, Michael. “The Impact of Professional Sports on The Local Economy”
Western New England College School of Law. March 24, 2006.
According to Mr. Denver, this direct and measurable benefit to the local economy is supplemented by economic
spin off in terms of fan-related spending. The Springfield Falcons compete at the recently renovated
MassMutual Center in downtown Springfield. On game nights, fans patronize local restaurants and bars. Mr.
Denver reports that at Samuel's Sports Bar and Tavern, located one block from the MassMutual Center,
business increases by 65 percent on nights when the team plays at home. Mr. Denver also offered the
example of a downtown restaurant, The Student Prince, which serves an additional sixty-five to seventyfive meals as a direct result of Springfield Falcons fans being in the downtown area.
Mr. Denver notes that the city itself benefits from game night fan spending. The Springfield Parking
Authority (SPA) reports an additional 150 to 375 parked vehicles on nights when the Spring field Falcons
play at home. The added revenue generated from forty home-game nights each year contributes to the SPA's
ability to pay off its bond obligations.
Visiting teams, Mr. Denver adds, also make important contributions to the local economy. For example, Mr.
Denver noted that a local hotel reports that visiting teams book approximately 1,500 room nights at two
major downtown hotels in Springfield each season. Visiting players and team officials not only stay in local
hotels, but they also eat in local restaurants and rent cars locally.
Springfield Falcons charity, Fj
Walker, Sharianne and Enz, Michael. “The Impact of Professional Sports on The Local Economy”
Western New England College School of Law. March 24, 2006.
Lastly, according to Mr. Denver, the team has made a significant economic contribution to the Springfield area
through its support of many non-profit agencies. The Springfield Falcons Charities, the team's charitable
arm, has donated over $400,000 to the local community in the past ten years.
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Pro: Helps other industries
Sports Help Other Industries
Statistics Demonstrate Far-Reaching Impact of Sports Sector AMS
Burrow, Gwen. “Not Just a Game: The Impact of Sports on the U.S. Economy.” Economic
Modeling. July 9, 2013. http://www.economicmodeling.com/2013/07/09/not-just-agame-the-impact-of-sports-on-u-s-economy/
Besides arts, entertainment, and recreation, the industries that benefit the most from the sports sector
are educational services (private); other services; and health care & social assistance.
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What’s even more interesting, however, is to trace the ripple effect that sports occupations have on these
industries. Initial, direct, and indirect show the jobs multiplier at work:
Check out the dollars side of things:
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So even without an excessively rigorous study, at the end of the day we can feel more than a little justified
about America’s obsession with sports. “Just a game”? Far from it. Who knew that when you took your kid
out to the ballgame, you were doing your country so much good?
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Mega Events Help Build Infrastructure
Financial Impact of Super Bowl AMS
Maine Heritage Policy Center. “The Economic Impact of Sporting Events.” 2014.
http://www.mhpc.com/financial/the-economic-impact-of-sporting-events/
Numerous studies estimate the benefits to a host city of the Super Bowl. [2014]’s host city was New York.
According to the NFL, estimates of the economic impact of Super Bowl XLVIII on the New York / New
Jersey region range up to $600 million, an increase of 20 per cent over the numbers seen in New Orleans
[in 2013] which boosted the recovery from Katrina.
Superbowl Impact AMS
Gong, Qi. Southwestern University of Economics and Finance. 2008.
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2363&context=thesesd
issertations
The impressive extent of gross economic impact fi·om a mega-sporting event is easy to be found in the media,
industry reports and academic studies. Super Bowl 2008, hosted by Phoenix, generated $500.6 million in
direct and indirect spending by visiting fans and organizations (KnowWPC, 2008). According to the W. P.
Carey School of Business at Arizona State University, "the gross impact of a half billion dollars in the
Arizona marketplace brings rejuvenation to an economy that has been weakened by a recession".
Halkias, Robinson-Jacobs and Case (2011) cited the data from Legends Hospitality that, during the Super Bowl
XLV 2009 in the Cowboy Stadium, game-day spending on food and drink was $89 per capita with total
attendance of 103,219 spectators. Therefore, the on-site sale of food and beverage reached $9 million.
Regarding to the Super Bowl XL VI 2011, accounting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers projected the direct
spending could amount to approximately $200 million, whilst others estimated that the total economic
impact, including multiplier effects as well as direct spending, could surpass $600 million.
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Pro: Mega events
Positive Impact of the Olympic Games AMS
Gong, Qi. Southwestern University of Economics and Finance. 2008.
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2363&context=thesesd
issertations
A study on the Olympic Games from 1972 through 2008 by Preuss (2004) showed that the Games from
1972 to 2008 all had revenues that outweighed the costs, particularly, in Barcelona in 1992 when growth
on revenues achieved a level of fifty percent. A study conducted by the Japan's Dentsu Institute for Human
Studies regarding the 2002 World Cup, estimated a $24.8 billion positive impact for Japan and an $8.9 billion
positive impact for South Korea (Finer, 2002). The gross economic impact is dramatically positive to the
hosting communities, especially in the quotes ofleagues and sport boosters, which is prevailingly considered by
the economists that the numbers are exaggerated. However, most of mega-sporting events created positive
economic impact to the hosting communities (Chen, 2008; Balogu et al., 2010; Preuss, 2004). The economic
impact study from Marheson and Baade (2004) admitted that the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) basketball tournament for Women's Final Four was incline to produce a positive economic impact, up
to $100 million.
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Pro: Mega events
How Big Events Help Build Infrastructure AMS
International Monetary Fund. Finance and Development. March 2010.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2010/03/pdf/fd0310.pdf
Beyond the construction period, sports-event-generated infrastructure can provide the host metropolitan
area or region with a continuing stream of economic benefits. The venues built for these events can be
used for years or decades afterward. More important, upgrades to the transportation infrastructure can
provide a significant boost to the local and regional economy, if local businesses are able to make use of the
improved transportation structure.
The indirect economic benefits generated by mega sporting events are potentially more important than
the direct benefits, but are more difficult to quantify. One possible indirect benefit is the advertising
effect of such events. Many Olympic host metropolitan areas and regions view the Olympics as a way to
raise their profile on the world stage. In this sense, the intense media coverage before and during the Olympic
Games or other big events is a form of advertising, possibly attracting tourists who would not have otherwise
considered the ctiy or region, and who may generate significant, broad, and long-lasting economic benefits.
If argued effectively, statistics involving mega international sporting events are one of the Pro’s biggest
strong suits for this debate. United States Olympic and World Cup teams do receive public funding and
therefore, the economic impact in the United States that results from mega events in the U.S. is relevant
to this topic. Be careful to stay inside United States soil when discussing the economic impact—the U.S.
has hosted the Olympic Games eight times and the World Cup in 1994—providing substantial evidence
for economic results from the Games on U.S. territory.
Advantages of Hosting Big sports Events AMS
Wilson, Bill. “Top Sports Events ‘Boost Economy.’” February 16, 2010. BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8516889.stm Web. 20 Aug. 2014
Hosting major sports events, such as the Winter Olympics or football World Cup, can help boost a city's
economy and global image, a new report says.
Social development also benefits, says the Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu report.
It says hosting an event allows a city or country to move quickly on a wide range of issues and activities
that might otherwise not get under way.
Winter Olympic host Vancouver has used the games to build a convention centre, rapid transit rail line, and
motorway.
"Emerging countries and cities are seeking to distinguish themselves in the new economy by hosting major
events to put themselves front and centre on the global stage," says the report's co-author Greg Pellegrino, of
DTT.
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Pro: Track & field
Economic Benefits from Track and Field Stadiums
Stadium Generates Huge Economic Impact AMS
Mondo White Papers. “The Positive Economic Impact of World-Class Track and Field
Facilities for Cities and Local Businesses.” 2013.
http://www.sportscommissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VfbhUFjpH3I%3d&t
abid=231&portalid=0&mid=556 Web. 20 Aug. 2014
The Birmingham (Ala.) CrossPlex is a 750,000 square foot, world-class, multipurpose athletic and meeting
facility. The indoor track/volleyball facility boasts a Mondo six-lane oval hydraulic track with eight-60 meter
lanes for sprint/hurdle events, a 50-meter indoor Olympic swimming pool, and two 1-meter and two 3-meter
diving boards. The facility can be configured for volleyball, wrestling, cheering and gymnastic events. Other
amenities include full-size locker rooms and showers for both men and women, a first aid room, a meet
management/multipurpose classroom and seven VIP suites equipped with the latest technology.
When the CrossPlex opened in August 2011, anticipation was high that the indoor track and field venue,
natatorium and meeting space, with its top-notch features, would draw athletes and visitors from around
the world and have a huge, positive impact on the city and its local businesses. The city’s convention and
visitors bureau projected that the CrossPlex would generate $13 million in economic impact for
Birmingham in its first year of operation. The facility far exceeded that number, however: In 2012, the total
economic impact was $20 million, and that was just for hosting a couple of NCAA conference track and field
championships, and a number of small state and local events.
With an estimated 55 - 60 sporting events, and 45 - 50 non-sporting events, the economic impact estimate
for 2013 is even greater: $35 million. The city estimates that the five NCAA conference championships the
facility already has hosted in 2013 brought in $11 million, and that the NCAA Division II National
Championships brought in $15 million. (The NCAA paid for all student athletes to stay in hotels for the full
week.)
The economic impact for 2014 is expected to be similar or even greater to 2013.
The statistics on the Pro side of this debate can be rather bleak. Pro teams can win this debate by
focusing on unique economic impacts—for example, the generous economic benefits from track and field
stadiums.
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Pro: Track & field
Impact for Greensboro, North Carolina AMS
Mondo White Papers. “The Positive Economic Impact of World-Class Track and Field
Facilities for Cities and Local Businesses.” 2013.
http://www.sportscommissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VfbhUFjpH3I%3d&t
abid=231&portalid=0&mid=556 Web. 20 Aug. 2014
Aggie Stadium at North Carolina A&T State University has proven to be an economic win for Greensboro, N.C.
The facility, which underwwent a comprehensive $1.5 million renovation in 2004, features a Mondo Super X
Performance track and a state-of-the-art video scorecard. Since 2004, Aggie Stadium has hosted numerous
major events, including:
--The East Region prelimianries fo the 2010 and 2013 NCAA Division 1 Track and Field Championships
--The annual National scholastic Athletics Foundation
--The Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC)
--The USATF National Junior Olympic Track and Field Championships
--USA Track and Field(Region 3, Youth Athletics, Jr. Olympics)
--NC High School Athletic Association State Championships
In total the Greensboro Convention and vIsitors Bureau has 58 major events recorded at the venue and
estimates that the total economic impact for events the facility has hosted since 2004 is more than $146
million, or an average of $16 million per year.
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Pro: Track & field
Des Moines, Iowa – Drake Stadium, Drake University AMS
Mondo White Papers. “The Positive Economic Impact of World-Class Track and Field
Facilities for Cities and Local Businesses.” 2013.
http://www.sportscommissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VfbhUFjpH3I%3d&t
abid=231&portalid=0&mid=556 Web. 20 Aug. 2014
Drake Stadium on the campus of Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa, has been home to one of the
nation’s oldest and most respected track and field competitions—The Drake Relays. Thousands of high
school, college and professional track athletes come to Drake Stadium in late April to compete in one of the
largest track meets in the United States.
Estimated annual revenue generated by The Drake Relays, now in its 104th year, is $4.5 million. What’s
more, overall income for the city has grown from $3 million in 2007, to an anticipated $100 - $110 million
in
2014. Part of that is due to Drake Stadium’s Mondo Super X Performance track, which was installed in 2006
as part of a $15 million renovation. “Now with a world-class Mondo facility, Drake Stadium has become a
track and field destination, enabling the school to host additional revenue-generating events,” said Mark
Kostek, Sports Event Manager, Greater Des Moines Convention and Visitors Bureau.
Some of the additional events Drake Stadium has hosted since the installation of the Mondo surface that have
led to the city’s revenue growth include:
•
2008 and 2011 NCAA Divsion I Outdoor Track and
Field Championships
•
World Junior Olympics
•
NCAA Regional Championships
•
USATF Championships
Des Moines assigns an average rate per day/per visitor of $275.00 for lodging and meals.
foundationbriefs.com
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Pro: Track & field
Albuquerque, New Mexico – Albuquerque Convention Center AMS
Mondo White Papers. “The Positive Economic Impact of World-Class Track and Field
Facilities for Cities and Local Businesses.” 2013.
http://www.sportscommissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VfbhUFjpH3I%3d&t
abid=231&portalid=0&mid=556 Web. 20 Aug. 2014
The Albuquerque Convention Center features a Mondo portable track, which was installed in 2005. Since the
venue opened and through March 2013, the city of Albuquerque and the University of New Mexico, which
both use the facility, have hosted 46 events with an average annual direct expenditure of $1.5 million,
which results in an economic impact of $2.6 million to $3 million per year according to standard
economic impact formulas.
New York’s 168th Street Armory Youth CenterAMS
Mondo White Papers. “The Positive Economic Impact of World-Class Track and Field
Facilities for Cities and Local Businesses.” 2013.
http://www.sportscommissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VfbhUFjpH3I%3d&t
abid=231&portalid=0&mid=556 Web. 20 Aug. 2014
“Since its purchase and first use in January 2005, the indoor track facility has been an important economic
driver for Albuquerque during the time of the year which is usually a slow period within the city,” said Richard
J. Ceronie, Ph.D., Track & Field Office, Department of Athletics, University of New Mexico. “The facility has
allowed us to host the finest track athletes in the country either through our collegiate series or the postcollegiate athletes via the USA Championships. Our indoor track has assisted the state of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, and the University of New Mexico to reap positive publicity throughout the country. The New
Mexico track & field program has grown significantly since the purchase of the track because our athletes get to
train and compete on a weekly basis in a world-class facility.”
New York’s168th Street Armory Youth Center The New York’s 168th Street Armory Youth Center is one of
the busiest venues in the world, with more than 500,000 usages per year. It, along with its New Balance Track
& Field Center, plays host to a myriad of high school and college track and field competitions, including its
Collegiate Invitational, which attracts 200 university teams from across the country. For nearly 20 years, the
facility’s track surface of choice has been Mondo. Using the formula provided by NYC & Co, the Armory
conservatively estimates that it generates more than $10 million for Upper Manhattan a year.
foundationbriefs.com
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Pro: Public ownership of team
Public Ownership of Teams is Effective
In this section, we’ll take a look a twist on the idea of public subsidies for sports teams. An effective
strategy will be to advocate a workable format for publicly subsidizing professional sports teams, and to
demonstrate the multitude of positive impacts that stem from it. In summary: find a general model that
works, and show how it works (demonstrate the impacts). One outside-the-box model the Pro can cover
under this topic is public ownership, the last vestige of which is the NFL’s Green Bay Packers. The
Packers are run as a small public company; a board makes decisions on infrastructure and personnel.
The funding comes entirely from “shareholders”: the team sells “stocks” which offer no return to the
public. Essentially, anyone with a vested interest in seeing the team succeed can chip in to fund the team,
thus making its finances dependent on public subsidy. The Packers’ “tax base” is willing fans (most of
whom are in the Green Bay area—see “Case study” card).
Advocating a public ownership model can help Pro teams go on the attack in rounds, rather than
defending against the Con’s depth and breadth of evidence. Because they cannot threaten to move,
publicly-owned teams have lower retention costs, and can more easily secure necessary investment
because they already have willing investors (the sports-hungry public). Pro teams can then link shortterm results (cheaper, easier to retain) with long-term impacts, such as securing infrastructure around
public team’ stadiums is easier (the infrastructure is guaranteed to have long-term use). This model also
backs up general Pro claims on behalf of pro sports teams. For instance, while sports teams do generate
civic pride, publicly-owned teams are easier to link to this impact: people are more likely to feel strongly
positive about a team that finances from willing fans’ money instead of the entire taxpayer base, and
cannot threaten to leave.
Public sports team ownership is effective as a safety net and funding mechanism DAT
Smith, Brad (2003) "How Different Types of Ownership Structures Could Save Major
League Baseball Teams from Contraction," Journal of International Business and
Law: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 6.
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context
=jibl
Especially in recent times, teams frequently need to pay players a substantial signing bonus along with a high
annual salary, so selling shares to the public could serve to ensure that the cash required to conclude
negotiations is readily available. Moreover, U.S. teams also could raise funds through this form of ownership
for new stadium construction.
There are additional factors providing an impetus for teams to raise funds by selling shares on the stock market.
Existing owners of a privately-held business often desire an "exit option.” Due to the fact that equity in a
private corporation can be difficult to sell, going public is beneficial to these owners because it provides
them with an opportunity for shareholders to liquidate at least part of their investment. Besides the stock
market providing an "exit option" where the owners can arrange to have some of their shares distributed as part
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Pro: Public ownership of team
of an IPO, it is also possible for these individuals to rely at a later date on the liquidity that stock exchange
listing typically creates and sell equity on the market.
The advocacy of public ownership sidesteps most Con objections. Public subsidies are disfavored
amongst voters, but selling shares to the public ensures only those willing and able are paying for a team.
The teams are also less able to extort excessively favorable terms from a city because they have a less
legitimate threat of moving; the public is a massive voluntary resource for providing funds the teams
need to complete moves.
Public ownership keeps subsidy costs reasonable, as opposed to private ownership DAT
Smith, Brad (2003) "How Different Types of Ownership Structures Could Save Major
League Baseball Teams from Contraction," Journal of International Business and
Law: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 6.
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context
=jibl
The demands of some private owners in Major League Baseball for public assistance have reached new levels
in that they insist on subsidies from their host communities greater than their teams are worth. For example,
Minnesota Twins' owner Carl Pohlad attempted to obtain $250 million from the Minnesota state
legislature for a state-of-the-art retractable roof stadium, even though the team is only worth about $125
million. As a result, communities are wondering why they should give these private owners more money
than the team is actually worth simply to keep the franchise in town for another 10 to 15 years, instead of
the fans and the community buying the franchise themselves and ensuring its continued existence in the
same place. These same questions have been raised in Florida and Montreal with private owners asking the
community to provide more money than the franchise is worth. This makes them look greedy and merely
interested in owning the franchise to make a profit at the expense of their community and the fans.
Unfortunately, these maneuvers by private owners often cause the fans to become upset and disinterested in the
game of baseball because they feel that these franchises are taking advantage of them.
Most public subsidy deals are owner-favored because of the artificially limited market for pro sports
teams in the U.S. With public ownership, cities can keep retention costs down by eliminating the threat of
a team moving while dictating their own terms for new stadiums. This card helps combat the relevance of
the weight of Con evidence against stadium subsidy deals.
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Pro: Public ownership of team
Case study: the Green Bay Packers DAT
Smith, Brad (2003) "How Different Types of Ownership Structures Could Save Major
League Baseball Teams from Contraction," Journal of International Business and
Law: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 6.
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context
=jibl
A board of directors that is elected by the shareholders is in charge of managing the business operations of the
team. The board must approve all substantive changes, such as upgrading the scoreboards at Lambeau Field,
adding luxury boxes to the stadium, and building a new indoor practice facility. Both President Bob Harlan and
Executive Vice-President/General Manager John Fabry have the authority to make all football operations
decisions.
One of the most significant features of the Packers' bylaws is that a majority vote of the shareholders is
necessary to relocate the franchise. With over 90% of the shareholders residing in Green Bay, all most likely
avid Packers fans, it is extremely unlikely that any shareholder would ever vote to relocate the team. As a
result, community based ownership essentially serves as a mechanism for preventing teams from moving
out of town. The team can only move through dissolution, and if this occurs the shareholders get back the
amount of money that they invested. If a shareholder ever decides to sell his or her stock, the Packers'
bylaws state that the shares must be offered back to the corporation first. As a result of their corporate
structure, the publicly owned Green Bay Packers have become the most stable team in the NFL and the city of
Green Bay has never faced the threat of the team relocating.
Pro teams don’t need to combat the Con’s economic stats on stadium financing; the weight of evidence
will likely preclude any effort to do so. Sidestepping Con attacks by advocating public ownership,
however, can be an effective strategy. Much of the extortive financing occurring in professional sports
stems from the perpetual possibility of sports teams leaving their cities, which is typically seen as a blow
to a city’s relevance; public ownership would likely prevent such moves.
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Pro: Revitalize communities
New Stadiums Revitalize Urban Communities
Case study from Cleveland’s Gateway Complex DAT
Chapin, Timothy. “Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts. Journal of the
American Planning Association, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 2004.Web.
For the first indicator of urban redevelopment-the reuse of existing underutilized buildings-the Gateway district
has experienced remarkable success. Formerly vacant buildings have been renovated as market rate housing,
bringing upper-middle-class residents to this portion of the city for the first time in decades (Figure 4, items 714). A total of seven residential projects, with a combined total of over 800 units, have opened in the
district since I994, with almost an equal number of units currently in the planning stages (Historic
Gateway Neighbcrhood, 2002). Included in these renovations are a number of historic and architecturally
significant structures (including the old Statler Hotel and the Osborn Building). Buildings have been reused for
retail spaces as well (items 15 and I6). Although not illustrated on the map, new restaurants have been carved
out of other formerly vacant properties (Bullard, 1998; Hirzel, 1996).
(...)
While new development in the district has generally gone into existing spaces, some new construction has also
occurred. This construction has taken the form of a new hotel to the southeast of Gateway (Item 6) and two new
parking decks and an office building as part of Gateway itself. Plans exist for another hotel immediately next to
Jacobs Field, with the Major League Baseball Indians owner having long held the rights to develop this
property.
Gateway fares equally well on the final indicator of urban redevelopment-the establishment of an entertainment
district. Prior to Gateway's opening, this district was best described as a large parking area for downtown office
workers. Since the project opened, the district has been given a new name, "The Gateway District," and it has
emerged as a very healthy and successful "place for play" (Fainstein & Stokes, 1998). The district has
experienced a revival through the combined investments of the public and private sectors in hotel, commercial,
and residential projects (Bullard, I998; Hirzel, I996; "Sports Complex," 2000). To date, the value of
redevelopment projects in the district comes in at well over $250 million since Gateway's opening in I994,
excluding the $467 million invested in the complex itself.
Most modern stadiums don’t get build today without public money. With that in mind, we can attribute
economic development to the initial public stimulus required to build the stadium. Because stadiums
typically are built on potentially valuable parcels of land, their value is revealed when they help
regenerate entire communities around the precious property they occupy.
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Pro: Infrastructure investment
Stadium Funding is a Proper Infrastructure Investment
Cities can generate economic growth by developing the infrastructure for stadium areas DAT
“An Economic Development Case for Building Sports Stadiums.” Initiative for
Competitive Inner City. 24 August 2011. Web.
In a Forbes article last week, Adrian Melville explains that “Sports is Helping to Spur Growth in Boston.”
During the 163 Boston sports home games last year (Red Sox, Celtics and Bruins) fans injected $300 million in
to the local economy. (For the sake of full disclosure—I’m a die-hard New England sports fan, and often
contribute to this spending.) It’s hard to miss the craze that happens each time the hometown team plays.
But Boston’s stadiums aren’t new – so let’s take a look at Foxborough, MA, home of the New England Patriots.
Owner Bob Kraft wanted to complement the new Gillette Stadium, and as such, built Patriot Place. This
mega-mall comprises the 500 acres surrounding the stadium and includes a four-star hotel, 16
restaurants, a 14-screen movie theatre, a full-service hospital, and myriad shops and retail outlets. It is
estimated that Patriot Place brings in $2 million in tax revenue to Foxborough each year.
With sports and retail covered, now the Kraft family is working to support the local arts and culture community
as well. Last month, the Krafts made a 1,300 sq. ft. vacant storefront available to The Artist’s Studio &
Gallery as a means of highlighting the work of local artists. This is a classic example of a corporation
creating “shared value” for its local community.
Though Gillette Stadium has been largely privately-funded, the Kraft family sought public subsidies for
infrastructure improvements to accommodate increased traffic flow from the development.
The classic rebuttal against publicly-funded stadiums is the idea of average citizens helping the private
enterprise of billionaires. If done right, however, sports subsidies are within the scope of governmentfunded infrastructure. Infrastructure, like stadiums, are a publicly-funded means of enhancing and
enabling private enterprise. If a pro team is subsidized by infrastructural development from a local
government, this presents an opportunity for the government to fulfill an already-present duty
(infrastructure—roads, parking lots, etc.) while spurring economic development and enterprise without
directly investing cash in it.
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Pro: Infrastructure investment
Stadium financing is an effective cover for funding necessary infrastructure work DAT
Baumann, Robert, and Victor Matheson. “Infrastructure Investments and Mega-Sports
Events: Comparing the Experience of Developing and Industrialized Countries.”
College of the Holy Cross. August 2013. Web.
If a temporary surge in visitors or the creation of new or improved sports infrastructure cannot be seen as
saviors for mega-events, then one is left to appeal to the creation a long-term legacy, perhaps through the
construction of non-sports infrastructure, as an economic justification for hosting mega-events. As can be seen
in Table 4, non-sports related infrastructure expenditures often exceed the spending on sports venues by a wide
margin, and unlike sports venues, expenditures on transportation networks and other types of general
infrastructure have the potential to encourage future growth. Mega-events can serve as an impetus to engage in
needed infrastructure investments that don’t get done due to a lack of political will.
The main impact demonstrated here isn’t infrastructure development itself, but political capial—a more
valuable asset. Local politicians salivate over subsidizing sports teams. Athletics are popular;
infrastructure (especially if funded by tax hikes) is not. Not only is infrastructure a crucial and long-term
improvement to a local community, it’s just one possible reform made possible by the political leverage of
professional sports.
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Pro: Infrastructure investment
Modern stadium construction projects are likely to reduce future costs for cities DAT
Gerardes, Randy. “Game’s On: Sports Facilities’ New Competition.” Wells Fargo
Securities. 12 February 2013. Web.
http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/pages/14889/$file/Game's%20On_Sports%20
Facilities%20New%20Competition_021214.pdf
In the near term, we believe a stronger U.S. economy should provide an accommodative environment for
continued solid attendance for sports leagues. However, we expect a wave of stadium updates that will focus
primarily on increasing the user’s experience in stadium through technological advancements to compete
with at-home viewer advancements. We believe luxury suite lessors, club seat owners and Personal Seat
License (PSL) holders are more likely to demand state-of-the-art technology given the premiums they are
paying over the face value of the ticket. Those facilities that fail to keep up with the latest technology risk
higher vacancy rates on suites and club seat, and holders of PSLs risk a softer secondary market for PSLs, and
ultimately, the leagues risk downward pressure on ticket prices.
On a positive note, technological innovation is likely to be supportive of a continuation of the significant
increase in television rights deals signed by the major sports leagues. This in turn, we believe, will be
supportive of middle- and smaller-market teams given the push to secure greater revenue sharing under
the most recently signed CBAs, providing upward pressure on team valuations. Higher team valuations
make it more likely for team owners to invest in stadium facilities to keep them both physically and
technologically relevant.
As with infrastructure, the best stadium investment is one that enhances reliability and decreases future
costs. By funding modern stadiums now and significantly driving up franchise valuation, especially in
small markets, cities give themselves better future ability to retain sports teams which can fund their own
stadiums—this is made even more likely because the cost of advanced stadium tech will go down with
increased implementation. By investing in stadium as with infrastructure—focusing on reliability and the
potential for lower costs down the road—cities can set themselves up for the win-win of retaining teams
without paying as much for facilities.
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Pro: Olympic effect
The Olympic Effect
Large sporting event championships generate income in surrounding communities. JCD
Baade, Robert A. "Big Men on Campus: Estimating the Economic Impact of College
Sports on Local Economies." College of the Holy Cross, Aug. 2007. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
Sports boosters often claim that sports teams, facilities, and events inject large sums of money into the cities
lucky enough to host them. Promoters envision hoards of wealthy sports fans descending on a city’s hotels,
restaurants, and businesses, and showering them with fistfuls of dollars. For example, the National Football
League (NFL) typically claims an economic impact from the Super Bowl of around $400 million (National
Football League, 1999) and Major League Baseball (MLB) attaches a $75 million benefit to the All-Star Game
(Selig, Harrington, and Healey 1999) and up to $250 million for the World Series (Ackman 2000)
Regular season games generate revenue for local economies. JCD
Baade, Robert A. "Big Men on Campus: Estimating the Economic Impact of College
Sports on Local Economies." College of the Holy Cross, Aug. 2007. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
Even regular season games prompt claims of huge benefits. For example, the Oregon
Baseball Campaign, a group dedicated to bringing MLB to Portland, reported that “a MLB team and ballpark
would generate between $170 and $300 million annually in gross expenditures to the state of Oregon” (Oregon
Baseball Campaign 2002) while a similar analysis completed for the Virginia Baseball Authority stated that a “a
major league baseball franchise and stadium in northern Virginia would pump more that $8.6 billion into the
economy over 30 years,” or $287 million annually
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Pro: Olympic effect
Ex post studies claiming no net benefit are flawed. JCD
Baade, Robert A. "Big Men on Campus: Estimating the Economic Impact of College
Sports on Local Economies." College of the Holy Cross, Aug. 2007. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
A valid criticism, however, of the existing body of work regarding the ex post economic impact of sports is that
these studies are trying to uncover the proverbial needle in a haystack.
For example, even if a MLB franchise or a Super Bowl does result in a $300 million boost to the host city, this
is less than 0.1 percent of the annual personal income of a large metropolitan area like Los Angeles. Any
income gains as a result of a new franchise or a big game would almost certainly be lost within the normal
fluctuations in the region’s economy. In the study of mega events, this problem is further compounded due to
the time frames involved. Even if the effects of a mega-event are large in the time period immediately
surrounding the event, this impact is likely to be obscured in the annual data upon which many studies,
including Coates and Humphreys (1999; 2002) and Baade and Matheson (2001; 2004; 2006), rely.
Large sporting events boost local businesses’ revenues. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Local, state, and national governments typically justify their spending on sporting events on three grounds.
First, they contend that these events attract athletes, spectators, officials, and media which increases revenue for
accommodations, restaurants, and retail establishments. For example, the NFL estimates that the average
economic impact of the Super Bowl on the host city is $300 to $400 million (Arizona Super Bowl Host
Committee, 2008). Multi-day events such as the Summer or Winter Olympics or the World Cup can generate
economic impact estimates well into the billions of dollars.
Large sporting events yield revenue years after the event due to tourism. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Second, the sports boosters suggest that sporting events serve to publicize host cities to prospective tourists and
future visitors. In justifying the $7.7 million budgeted to sports tourism, the Hawaii Tourism Authority states,
“The positive media and publicity generated from national and international TV/ media coverage promotes
Hawaii as a desirable sports venue and an attractive visitor destination.” (Hawaii Tourism Authority, 2007, pg.
22)
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Pro: Olympic effect
Large sporting events increase quality of life for residents. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Third, these events may improve the quality of life of local residents by allowing them opportunities to watch
major sporting events. The excitement surrounding these major events may make certain cities particularly
desirable places to live or work.
Rental prices are higher in cities with professional sports teams. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Carlino and Coulson (2004) employ a different tactic in determining that NFLfranchises have a positive impact
on host cities. In particular, their goal is to assess the benefits of the presence of a sports franchise in the
metropolitan area, benefits that are supposed to reach all neighborhoods in the area, regardless of distance to the
home field of the team. They find that housing rental prices are higher in cities with NFL teams and hypothesize
that residents are willing to pay higher rents for the opportunity to live in a city with an amenity like an NFL
franchise.
During these events the rental values are significantly higher. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
By contrast, the Olympic and World Cup variables are frequently individually significant. For example, there
are effects on the rental housing market in the year before and the year after hosting the Summer Olympics, the
year prior to hosting the Winter Olympics, and both before and after hosting the World Cup. In Model 1, our
results indicate that in the years before and after hosting the Summer Olympics, Atlanta saw its rents lower by
8% to 11%. The significance of these results is sensitive to the inclusion of year and central city interactions,
however. Consistent with the results in Coates and Gearhart (2008) for NASCAR races, the central city and
non-central city are affected differently by the Summer Olympics. Looking at the results in Model 4, the noncentral city housing units around Atlanta are not affected by the run up to the Summer Olympics and see an
increase in rents after the games, while rental units in the city of Atlanta have lower rents both before and after
hosting the games. Note that these effects are net of any general Atlanta effect and any Atlanta specific trend, as
there are both a city specific intercept and city specific time trend in the model. Nonetheless, it may be that
these results are specific to Atlanta rather than related to the Summer Olympics, as Atlanta is the only host of
Summer Olympic Games in our data.
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Pro: Olympic effect
Hosting major sporting events promotes bipartisanship in local governments. JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The
Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
The good news is that municipal and state decision-making, which may be gridlocked under normal
circumstances, is forced to overcome political bickering to approve financing for construction projects. Some of
these projects may be long-delayed, needed improvements to the city's infrastructure. Hosting the Olympics
may catalyze their undertaking. Insofar as the Olympics impels cities to finally do what was long overdue,
hosting the games has a potential benefit.
The Olympics generate large amounts of income. JCD
Sivaev, Dmitry. "A Year On: An Update on the Economic Legacy of the London 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games." Centre for Cities. N.p., Oct. 2013. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
The National Audit Office (NAO) Olympic Evaluation report shows that:
• LOCOG sold 11 million tickets to the Olympic and Paralympic Games which was over 97 per cent of all
tickets that were made available to the public. This generated £660 million of income.
• LOCOG efficiently recruited and deployed 70,000 volunteers, and thousands were more attracted by the
Greater London Authority and Transport for London.
• The opening and closing ceremonies were a great success largely due to introduction of innovative
administration and management structures.
The Olympics lead to job creation and training in host cities. JCD
Sivaev, Dmitry. "A Year On: An Update on the Economic Legacy of the London 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games." Centre for Cities. N.p., Oct. 2013. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
The National Audit Office (NAO) Olympic Evaluation report shows that:2
• LOCOG sold 11 million tickets to the Olympic and Paralympic Games which was over 97 per cent of all
tickets that were made available to the public. This generated £660 million of income.
• LOCOG efficiently recruited and deployed 70,000 volunteers, and thousands were more attracted by the
Greater London Authority and Transport for London.
• The opening and closing ceremonies were a great success largely due to introduction of innovative
administration and management structures.
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Pro: Olympic effect
The Olympics spur much needed infrastructure reform in host cities. JCD
Sivaev, Dmitry. "A Year On: An Update on the Economic Legacy of the London 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games." Centre for Cities. N.p., Oct. 2013. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
A post-Olympics report produced by Transport for London (TfL) points out that:4
• The Games have supported the delivery of crucial infrastructure that will have a significant impact on East and
South-East London
• The Games have helped TfL to develop new approaches to transport and behaviour management, which
resulted in high levels of customer satisfaction during the Olympics and the Paralympics and will be applied in
the future.
Tourism will likely increase in the long term because of the Olympics. JCD
Sivaev, Dmitry. "A Year On: An Update on the Economic Legacy of the London 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games." Centre for Cities. N.p., Oct. 2013. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
The Visit Britain report shows that:
• Overall there was only a very slight increase in the number of foreign visitors coming to the UK in the
Olympic year, but there was been a 5 per cent growth in visitor spending, which may been largely explained by
Olympic ticket purchases.
• However the Olympics allowed VisitBritain to run an innovative, worldwide marketing campaign and
improve its presence on social networks.
• An improved image for the UK has been the most significant and lasting positive outcome. An expert survey
has suggested that the improved perception of Britain will encourage more people to visit in the future.
• Overall the excellence of the Games organisation has been acknowledged across the board. Last year we
argued that it is important to learn from this positive experience, and it is encouraging to see that organisations
like TfL and Visit Britain have used the Olympics to develop and introduce new practices. It is also good to see
that the CompeteFor procurement system, which was widely praised during the Olympics preparation phase,
was sustained.
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September/October 2014
Pro: Olympic effect
After the Olympics, Olympic Park has high probability of becoming a hub for business. JCD
Sivaev, Dmitry. "A Year On: An Update on the Economic Legacy of the London 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games." Centre for Cities. N.p., Oct. 2013. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
Last year we suggested that London needs a clear vision for the future of the Olympic Park. The Olympic Park
is the most visible legacy of the Games. If the Olympics were to have an impact on the economic performance
of the Capital and on the lives of people in East London, it would start with the Park. This is a good reason to
revisit progress on its future. The success in securing legacy venues, as well as the performance of the private
sector in and around the Park in the build-up to the Games, suggests that the area has significant potential for
becoming a new business hub.
Economic benefits from the Olympics will continue in the near future. JCD
Sivaev, Dmitry. "A Year On: An Update on the Economic Legacy of the London 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games." Centre for Cities. N.p., Oct. 2013. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
In the year since the end of the Olympic and Paralympic Games London can already report some legacy
successes. However, it is still early days. It took Barcelona a decade to translate the boost from the 1992 Games
into economic benefits. London should be ready to keep pursuing its economic legacy targets for just as long.
This will require attention to move away from assessing what the Games may or may not have brought to
London and the UK, to actions that will make the Olympic glow last. At the moment top priority should be
given to helping the local population access economic opportunities provided by the Games and making the
most of the Olympic Park.
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September/October 2014
Pro: Social cohesion
The Benefits To Social Cohesion
Social Cohesion Reduces Crime. ASF
Hirschfield, Alex. Bowers, Karen J. “The Effect of Social Cohesion on Levels of Recorded
Crime in Disadvantaged Areas” Urban Studies, Vol. 34, No. 8 1275 – 1295, 1997.
http://usj.sagepub.com/content/34/8/1275
It is clear from these results, therefore, that there is a significant relationship between social cohesion levels
in disadvantaged areas and levels of certain types of crime. The more that an area that is at a
disadvantage economically pulls together as a community, the greater its capacity to combat crime. These
results have obvious implications for crime prevention strategies. Disadvantaged areas that are socially
disorganised according to the ethnic mixing factor should have strategies that aim for the reduction of
burglaries, perhaps by introducing programmes that appeal to all ethnic groups and encourage
participation by transient residents of the area. This should also help to lower levels of assault and
robbery in these areas. Areas that are socially disorganised according to the social control factor should
employ strategies that divert juveniles and young adults from anti-social behaviour and crime and programmes
that offer support to single-parent families. This should also help to lower incidents of assault and robbery.
However, the prevention of sexual offences would have to employ a dual-level approach: one to target offences
committed by strangers; and another to target other offences. The authors acknowledge that such strategies are
ambitious, but they are probably more realistic than strategies that aim to combat crime through economic
revival. The existence of Single Regeneration Budget-funded initiatives aimed at encouraging community
participation, demonstrates that such strategies can be realised and leaves us with the optimistic conclusion that
steps are being taken to tackle problems directly by focusing on probable causal processes.
Social cohesiveness can reduce crime a great deal, especially when the methods to achieve social cohesion
can transcend ethnic differences. The civic pride that occurs from rallying around a new stadium or team
affects all in the area, indiscriminately by race. This evidence explains why that would reduce crime.
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Pro: Social cohesion
Sense of community decreases crime. ASF
Wedlock, Elaine. "Crime and cohesive communities" Home Office Online Report. June
19, 2006.
http://www.bucksdaat.co.uk/attachments/093_crime_cohesive_communities.pdf
The sense of community factor was found to be the strongest predictor of various types of recorded
crime. This sense of community factor is made up of some questions that include elements of social control
such as whether people pull together to improve the area, whether they feel safe walking at night, whether
neighbours look out for each other and whether they trust people in their neighbourhood. It also includes a
more general sense of camaraderie such as whether people enjoy living in the area and are proud of the
neighbourhood.
The sense of belonging factor also contains aspects of social control. This measures whether respondents know
many people in their neighbourhood and whether they feel a sense of belonging to the local area and
neighbourhood. This factor is not a strong predictor of lower levels of crime.
This means that you don’t need to feel a strong sense of attachment to an area in order to benefit from
the sense of community that is linked with lower levels of crime, which somewhat negates Kasarda and
Janowitz’s theory that high levels of attachment lead to local integration and the shared goal of keeping the
neighbourhood safe. A sense of community rather than a sense of attachment is the most important
predictor of lower levels of crime. This is good news for areas with high population turnover, particularly
because this sense of community is not only linked with lower levels of violent crime (the type of crime
most often linked with social control), but also with other types of neighbourhood level crime such as
burglary from dwelling, theft of and from motor vehicles and the overarching ‘all reported crime’
measure.
If people are proud of the community, there is a strong relationship to lower crime rates. Moreover, the
lower crime seems to uniquely come from a sense of community and pride, as opposed to actually
attachment to the area itself. This means that gentrified neighborhoods should also experience lower
crime rates if they rally around their teams.
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Pro: Social cohesion
Even one pro team greatly increases social cohesion DAT
Roger I. Abrams, Hardball in City Hall: Public Financing of Sports Stadiums, 3 Pace.
Intell.Prop. Sports & Ent.L.F. 164 (2013).
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pipself/vol3/iss1/8
Much has been written lately about what might be termed the politics of public happiness. A new stadium may
not make a city richer, but it might make its inhabitants happier by improving their quality of life and civic
pride, much like clean air, good weather and scenic views. Community self-esteem, status and prestige as a
public good may be harder to measure than gross local domestic receipts, but it is just as real. As Art
Modell, the owner of the Baltimore Ravens which he relocated from Cleveland, explained: “The pride and the
presence of a professional football team is far more important than thirty libraries.” The opposite effect, of
course, follows from the loss of a sports franchise. Cleveland, for example, has suffered from a communitywide malaise for decades. The loss of its beloved football franchise impacted on the psyche of inhabitants
across the Western Reserve. Much the same happened decades earlier when Brooklynites lost their
treasured Dodgers.
While long-term public happiness may ultimately depend upon the success of the franchise in league
competition, there is a genuine public benefit in civic pride from national recognition as a major league
city even if the local club is an also-ran. The opportunity for city residents to root for their “home team”
provides them a common interest, a cohesive force for any city. One person's consumption of this public
good does not deplete the psychic nourishment available to others, and no citizen can be excluded from its
enjoyment, although not all can afford the price of a ticket to attend a game in person.
It can Pro teams to look at sports teams not as businesses but vehicles of community good. This puts them
on the same ground as roads, libraries, etc. (rather than standard profit-generating businesses). This
leaves Con teams less able to question the economic validity of sports, putting the debate on Pro team’s
ground.
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Pro: Social cohesion
Small, socially cohesive communities are more capable of attracting business DAT
Roger I. Abrams, Hardball in City Hall: Public Financing of Sports Stadiums, 3 Pace.
Intell.Prop. Sports & Ent.L.F. 164 (2013).
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pipself/vol3/iss1/8
While large metropolises may have franchises in all four team sports, smaller cities, such as Green Bay,
Oklahoma City, Sacramento, and Salt Lake City, have a single franchise in one sport, but even that single entry
places them among the premier cities of the country. There is some evidence that other businesses -- those
that actually create real, long-term, well-paying jobs -- seek to locate in a city that can boast that it has a
major league franchise.
Proponents of public subsidies have posited that new construction provides social benefits to members of the
community, enhancing self-esteem and social cohesiveness. Not only do people feel better about their city,
outsiders do as well. Cities make investments in the “good will” of their communities all the time.
Museums, libraries, schools and clean streets enhance the public’s perception and attract outsiders to
come and visit or even relocate. Although it may be difficult to monetize these intangible social benefits,
no one doubts that they are real.
Between lower crime rates and greater publicity, cities with major sports teams have an advantage over
their otherwise mediocre competitors.
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Pro: Gentrification
Gentrification of Neighborhoods Is Good
Residents of gentrified neighborhoods don’t move out. ASF
Sullivan, Laura. "Gentrification May Actually Be Boon To Longtime Residents" NPR.
January 22, 2014. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/22/264528139/long-a-dirty-wordgentrification-may-be-losing-its-stigma
The neighborhood is gentrifying.
That's been a dirty word for 30 years, since the middle and upper classes began returning to many urban cores
across the U.S. It brings up images of neighbors forced out of their homes.
But a series of new studies are now showing that gentrifying neighborhoods may be a boon to longtime
residents as well — and that those residents may not be moving out after all.
Even Foster is conflicted by the change he sees happening around him.
"Some things are good; some things are bad," he says. "But sometimes the good outweighs the bad."
Gentrification burst into the social consciousness on Aug. 6, 1988, with the Tompkins Square Park riot in New
York City's East Village. Residents carried signs saying "Gentrification is class war." Police carried batons. The
bloody battle that ensued left more than 100 people injured.
The protesters' fury centered on the idea that the poor would be made homeless so the rich could live in their
neighborhoods, destroying whatever character they may have had. Lance Freeman, the director of the Urban
Planning program at Columbia University, says that's what he believed was happening, too. He launched a
study, first in Harlem and then nationally, calculating how many people were pushed out of their homes
when wealthy people moved in.
"My intuition would be that people were being displaced," Freeman explains, "so they're going to be moving
more quickly. I was really aiming to quantify how much displacement was occurring."
Except that's not what he found.
"To my surprise," Freeman says, "it seemed to suggest that people in neighborhoods classified as
gentrifying were moving less frequently."
Freeman's work found that low-income residents were no more likely to move out of their homes when a
neighborhood gentrifies than when it doesn't.
He says higher costs can push out renters, especially those who are elderly, disabled or without rent-stabilized
apartments. But he also found that a lot of renters actually stay — especially if new parks, safer streets
and better schools are paired with a job opportunity right down the block.
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Pro: Gentrification
Though a team may cite that gentrification occurs due to stadiums, this is no longer a bad thing for
original owners. What we see is that the long-standing residents don’t actually move out during
gentrification more frequently, but actually remain to benefit from the new jobs and economic spillover
that may be generated.
Residents of gentrified neighborhoods have higher credit scores. ASF
Sullivan, Laura. "Gentrification May Actually Be Boon To Longtime Residents" NPR.
January 22, 2014. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/22/264528139/long-a-dirty-wordgentrification-may-be-losing-its-stigma
That squares with a recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
"We're finding that the financial health of original residents in gentrifying neighborhoods seems to be
increasing, as compared to original residents in nongentrifying, low-priced neighborhoods," says Daniel
Hartley, a research economist with the bank.
He looked at the credit scores of original residents and found that they went up — regardless of whether
they rented or owned — compared with residents who stayed in nongentrifying neighborhoods.
"There may be these kind of side benefits to gentrification that we've been less focused on, that can actually
help the original residents of the neighborhood," he says.
This shows there is a unique benefit to having a neighborhood that gentrifies when compared to
neighborhoods that do not. This means that if a stadium does cause gentrification, it actually gives a
unique advantage when compared to neighborhoods with no new stadiums. Increasing credit score is
uniquely beneficial to the residents of these low-priced neighborhoods because it gives them access to a
greater deal of social mobility. High credit scores allow for greater loans and more financial stability.
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Pro: Gentrification
Financial health of original residents increases. ASF
Hartley, Daniel. "Gentrification and Financial Health" Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland. September 6, 2013.
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2013/1113/01regeco.cfm
Gentrification is sometimes viewed as a bad thing. People claim that it is detrimental to the original residents of
the gentrifying neighborhood. However, a look at the data suggests that gentrification is actually beneficial
to the financial health of the original residents. From a financial perspective, it is better to be a resident of a
low-price neighborhood that is gentrifying than one that is not. This is true whether residents of the
gentrifying neighborhood own homes or do not and whether or not they move out of the neighborhood.
This is interesting because one might expect renters to be hurt more by gentrification, and one might also be
concerned that people who moved out of the neighborhood did so because they were financially strained.
Gentrification raises the credit scores of everybody who is associated with the neighborhood during the
time of gentrification whether they move out or not, and whether they rent or own. This is important
because credit score is an economic indicator of affordable quality of life. If credit score is increasing this
means that residents are capable of staying up-to-date on payments and cost of living.
Credit scores of gentrified neighborhoods go up 8 points on average. ASF
Hartley, Daniel. "Gentrification and Financial Health" Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland. September 6, 2013.
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2013/1113/01regeco.cfm
Rising home values, educational levels, and incomes are all positive developments. But some people have
voiced concerns about the side effects of gentrification. The most common is that gentrification displaces
existing residents from the neighborhood. Renters face higher rents, and homeowners may face higher property
taxes, possibly causing liquidity problems even though their home values have increased. To assess how the
existing residents fare in neighborhoods that gentrify, I examine how gentrification is associated with
changes in their credit scores. The credit score used is the Equifax Risk Score, which provides a summary
measure of a person’s creditworthiness and is one of the scores used by lenders to decide whether or not to
make a loan to someone.
How does gentrification correlate with changes in individuals’ Equifax Risk Scores? I looked at a number of
regressions which aimed to assess the differences in changes in Equifax Risk Score from 2001 to 2007 between
residents of gentrifying and nongentrifying neighborhoods, controlling for the individuals’ ages and credit
scores in 2001. In other words, how much did the creditworthiness of people in gentrifying neighborhoods
increase compared to people with similar ages and initial credit scores in nongentrifying neighborhoods?
Living in a neighborhood that gentrified between 2000 and 2007 is associated with about an 8 point
higher increase in credit score compared to living in a low-price neighborhood that did not gentrify.
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Pro: Gentrification
Improving credit outcomes in gentrifying neighborhoods are also reflected in delinquency rates. The share
of people with an account 90 or more days past due fell by 2 percentage points in gentrifying neighborhoods
relative to other low-price neighborhoods during this period (again controlling for age and initial credit score).
People displaced by gentrification fare better in the long run. ASF
Hartley, Daniel. "Gentrification and Financial Health" Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland. September 6, 2013.
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2013/1113/01regeco.cfm
Another way to cut the data is to compare movers and nonmovers across gentrifying and nongentrifying
neighborhoods. Interestingly, there is a slightly larger increase in credit score (1.5 points more) associated
with residents of the gentrifying neighborhoods who moved to a different neighborhood relative to those
who lived in a gentrifying neighborhood but did not move. So it appears that, on average, movers are
even slightly more positively affected by gentrification than nonmovers.
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Con Evidence
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Con: Econ impact fail
Stadiums Fail to Bring Large Economic Impact
Why Stadiums are a Poor Investment AMS
Garofalo, Pat and Waldron, Travis. “If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky
Economics of Sports Stadiums.” September 7, 2012. The Atlantic.
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-notcome-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/
This is an altogether too common problem in professional sports. Across the country, franchises are able to
extract taxpayer funding to build and maintain private facilities, promising huge returns for the public in the
form of economic development.
For instance, just three of the NFL's 31 stadiums were originally built without public funds. In two of
those cases, public funding was later used to upgrade the stadium or surrounding facilities, even as all 32
of the NFL's teams ranked among Forbes' 50 most valuable sporting franchises in the world in 2012.
(Only MetLife Stadium, shared by the New York Jets and New York Giants, received no public funding.)
Time after time, politicians wary of letting a local franchise relocate -- as the NBA's Seattle Supersonics did, to
Oklahoma City before the 2008-2009 season -- approve public funds, selling the stadiums as public works
projects that will boost the local economy and provide a windfall of growth.
However, according to leading sports economists, stadiums and arenas rarely bring about the promised
prosperity, and instead leave cities and states mired in debt that they can't pay back before the franchise
comes calling for more.
"The basic idea is that sports stadiums typically aren't a good tool for economic development," said Victor
Matheson, an economist at Holy Cross who has studied the economic impact of stadium construction for
decades. When cities cite studies (often produced by parties with an interest in building the stadium) touting the
impact of such projects, there is a simple rule for determining the actual return on investment, Matheson said:
"Take whatever number the sports promoter says, take it and move the decimal one place to the left. Divide it
by ten, and that's a pretty good estimate of the actual economic impact."
Others agree. While "it is inarguable that within a few blocks you'll have an effect," the results are questionable
for metro areas as a whole, Stefan Szymanski, a sports economist at the University of Michigan, said.
PUBLIC MONEY BALL
There are numerous reasons for the muted economic effects. The biggest is that arenas often sit empty for
a significant portion of the year. Jobing.com Arena is guaranteed 41 hockey games annually. The other
324 nights, it must find concerts, conventions or other events to fill the schedule, and in Glendale, where
the arena competes with facilities in nearby Phoenix, that can be tough to do.
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Con: Econ impact fail
"We've looked at tons of these things, and the one that we found that seemed to make sense is the Staples
Center in Los Angeles," Matheson said. "But they use it 250 dates a year. They don't make sense when
you're using it 41 times a year and competing with another venue down the street."
Another reason the projects rarely make sense is because of the way they are structured. Stadiums and
arenas are financed with long-term bonds, meaning cities and states will be stuck with the debt for long
periods of time (often 30 years). And while cities make 30-year commitments to finance stadiums, their
commitments to government workers and other local investments are often made on a year-to-year basis,
meaning that, just as in Glendale, it becomes easier to eliminate public sector jobs and programs than to
default on debt incurred from arenas.
Sports Stadiums Fail to Bring Widespread Impact AMS
Garofalo, Pat and Waldron, Travis. “If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky
Economics of Sports Stadiums.” September 7, 2012. The Atlantic.
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-notcome-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/
While Glendale First claims that more than 600,000 visitors -- three times Glendale's population -- came to the
city for hockey last year, the Coyotes finished last in the NHL in attendance. And it is unclear how many of
those visitors were, like Wyatt, residents of nearby communities who may patronize restaurants but don't spend
money shopping or staying in hotels.
Matheson estimates that 20 percent of fans for a Major League Baseball game come from outside the
local area, and that the figure for hockey games is likely much smaller. That's hardly enough to fill the
local hotels or to add outside spending to the local economy in other ways, he said.
"It's not generating new revenue. This is local spending on a local event," Matheson said, adding that most of
the money spent in and around arenas and stadiums would likely be spent elsewhere in the local economy if
there were no sporting events to attend.
Though it is clear that new facilities are not a wise investment for taxpayers, the argument from Glendale First
stems from the fact that Jobing.com Arena is already there. Refusing to use more public financing - and
potentially allowing the Coyotes to leave for a new town - Wyatt said, would amount to the city turning its back
on its initial investment and risking the failure of hotels, restaurants, and other businesses.
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Con: Econ impact fail
Why Sports Subsidies for Stadiums Fail to Produce Economic Benefits AMS
Schultz, David. “Dumb and Dumber: The folly of Taxpayer Handouts for Professional
Sports.” February 10, 2011. http://www.minnpost.com/communityvoices/2011/02/dumb-and-dumber-folly-taxpayer-handouts-professional-sports
In general, as one surveys local debates about stadium construction in the United States, three basic arguments
are employed to support using public money to build sports stadiums. First, proponents claim that building a
new stadium will have a big impact on the economy, generating many new jobs and bringing new
businesses to the area. However study after study has demonstrated that advocates of public spending on
stadiums consistently exaggerate the benefits of sports to a local economy.
A 1996 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, "Tax-Exempt Bonds and the Economics of
Professional Sports Stadiums" (Zimmerman 1996) concluded that sports stadiums represent a small
percentage (generally less than 1 percent) of a local economy. It also stated that there is little real impact
or multiplier effect associated with building sports stadiums. By that, if one looks at the economic impact of
the dollars invested in sports stadiums, the return is significantly smaller than compared to other dollars
invested in something else.
Moreover, the building of stadiums merely transfers consumption from one area or one type of leisure
activity to another, and overall, sports and stadiums contribute little to the local economy and instead
represent an investment that costs the public a lot while failing to return the initial investment. Dollar for
dollar, the opportunity costs of investing in sports stadiums is a terrible option if the goal is economic
development, job development, or producing new economic development in a community. In short, the
nearly $3 billion in sports subsidies it documented produced little, at the cost of over $120,000 per job.
20 years of research has already concluded that sports are not an economy booster DAT
Coates, Dennis, and Brad R. Humphreys. “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on
Subsidies for Sports Franchises, Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” North American
Association of Sports Economists. August 2008. Web.
There now exists almost twenty years of research on the economic impact of professional sports franchises and
facilities on the local economy. The results in this literature are strikingly consistent. No matter what cities or
geographical areas are examined, no matter what estimators are used, no matter what model
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Con: Econ impact fail
specifications are used, and no matter what variables are used, articles published in peer reviewed
economics journals contain almost no evidence that professional sports franchises and facilities have a
measurable economic impact on the economy.
Baade and Sanderson (1997) examined the employment created by sports facilities. The authors used data on
employment from the Amusements and Recreation, and Commercial Sports Industry classifications of the
Standard Industrial Classification for ten cities and their states covering the years 1958 through 1993. They
estimated separate regressions for each city, with the dependent variable either the city’s share of state
employment in the Amusements and Recreation or the city’s share of state employment in Commercial Sports.
They found very little effect of newly constructed stadiums or from having additional professional teams
on employment shares. When new stadiums were significant, their effect was to reduce the city’s share of
employment. An additional team statistically significantly raised the city’s share in several cases, and
reduced it significantly in one case. Thirteen of twenty coefficients for the number of teams were not
statistically significant. Baade and Sanderson sum up their results by saying, “In general, the results of this
study do not support a positive correlation between professional sports and job creation” (112).
Sports teams replace employment and income instead of generating it DAT
Coates, Dennis, and Brad R. Humphreys. “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on
Subsidies for Sports Franchises, Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” North American
Association of Sports Economists. August 2008. Web.
Hudson (1999) examined the economic impact of professional sports on urban employment in 17 metropolitan
areas over a twenty year period. This study used both the number of professional sports franchises in the
metropolitan area and indicator variables for the presence of MLB, NFL, NBA and NHL franchises, as
well as a variety of explanatory variables reflecting local wages, income, energy prices, population and
taxes. None of the sports franchise variables were statistically significant, indicating that professional
sports teams had no effect on employment in this sample of cities.
Coates and Humphreys (1999) examined the impact of professional sports on the level and growth rate of per
capita income for all 37 metropolitan areas that had an NFL, MLB or NBA franchise over the period 19671994. This study included a vector of variables reflecting the “sports environment” in these metropolitan areas
that included franchise indicator variables, new facility indicator variables, variables identifying the first ten
years that a new franchise or facility was in a metropolitan area, stadium and arena capacities, and variables
identifying periods after franchises left cities. The models contained metropolitan area fixed effects, a lagged
dependent variable, and local population. Although few of the variables in the sports environment vector were
individually significant, an F-test on the entire vector indicated that the variables were jointly significant, and
the average effect on the level of real per capita income was negative. The sports environment vector was not
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Con: Econ impact fail
significant in the regression that used the growth rate of real per capita income as the dependent
variable. Coates and Humphreys (1999) concluded that professional sports had no positive effect on
metropolitan area real per capita income and may have a negative effect.
Most sports venues aren’t in constant use; the average football stadium will barely hit double digits in us
count for a given year. Given the extremely temporary nature of any facility use, stadiums cannot
generate permanent income or employment, which is the most important consideration for analyses of
economic growth. One can see why they would have a negative impact as well: stadiums have massive
physical footprint. It takes a massive tract of land to house a stadium and its requisite infrastructure—
feeder streets, parking, public transport connections, etc. This massive area is then being used to generate
temporary jobs rather than for businesses which generate a more permanent impact.
Little Economic Impact AMS
Garofalo, Pat. “More Evidence Shows That Pro Teams Don’t Boost the Economy.”
January 3, 2013. http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/01/03/1393781/blsbasketball-lockout/ Web. 20 Aug. 2014
But according to research published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, having a pro sports team in town
may be a net negative for the local economy. Paul Staudohar, professor emeritus of business administration at
California State University, found in an examination of last year’s National Basketball Association lockout that
shutting down sports leagues can be good for a city’s finances:
Even if the 2011–2012 season had been canceled, it likely would have had little, if any, effect on the
economic health of the cities that host NBA teams. A 2001 study of past work stoppages found that, in 37
metropolitan area economies with professional sports franchises, there was no overall financial impact. Indeed,
the cities appeared to perform better financially in years that games were canceled. There were other options
that people spent their entertainment dollars on, in a substitution effect, while security needed for public safety
at sporting events cost less because games were not played.
This study shows that the cancellation of an entire season would not have economically impacted host
cities for NBA teams. This revelation clearly shows that sports teams (and sports subsidies) are not
having a hugely positive impact on their host cities.
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Con: Econ impact fail
By nature of their audiences, pro sports cannot generate economic expansion DAT
Seaman, Bruce. “The Supply Constraint Problem in Economic Impact Analysis: An
Arts/Sports Disparity.” University of Chicago Cultural Policy Center.
http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.edu/papers/2004-lasting-effects/Seaman.pdf
It is well known that unless there is significant import substitution, sports, arts or other institutions can have no
net incremental regional effect on jobs, income and output if the audiences that it attracts are entirely localized,
hence generating only diversions of spending from one sector to another without injecting any new economic
activity into the region. Import substitution will occur if local residents would have spent a portion of their
income outside the relevant region (typically on non-localized substitutes) had it not been for the
existence of the local institution. A rare explicit measure of this effect was related to an event rather than an
institution, when Gazel and Schwer (1997) identified 3,660 local Las Vegas residents attending a Grateful Dead
(GD) concert (out of 4,134 such attendees) who “reported that they would travel someplace else to patronize the
GD concerts in the absence of the show locally” (p. 49). O’Hagan (1992) provides another estimate of such
import substitution related to an event in noting that about 10 per cent of Irish attendees of the Wexford Festival
“indicated that they would have taken a holiday outside Ireland if the Festival had not been on” (p. 65).
Interestingly, there may be a reverse effect in what might be called “import enhancement” resulting from the
development by local arts institutions of a greater interest in cultural consumption that then stimulates more
tourist visits by local residents to non-local destinations to partially satisfy their demand for the arts. Thus, a
reasonable conclusion is that, given the limited and contradictory evidence regarding import substitution,
institutions that largely serve local audiences may generate substantial local consumption benefits, but will not
generate any measurable output, income, jobs or tax revenue effects.
The difference between professional sports and something like a concert venue is that people likely
cannot see professional sports (in person) if they’re not local; Seattle Supersonics fans weren’t road
tripping en masse to OKC Thunder games when the team moved to Oklahoma, for instance. Based on the
logic of this card, the absence of a publically-funded sports team in a city does not constitute an economic
loss—fans wouldn’t be diverting their dollars outside a certain locale to see a professional team because
this is simply a logistical impossibility.
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The hidden costs of stadiums, Fj
Kuriloff, Aaron. “Stadiums Cost Taxpayers Extra $10 Billion, Harvard’s Long Finds”
Bloomberg. November 6, 2012.
Taxpayers in the U.S. spent about $10 billion more on stadiums and arenas for professional sports teams
than they forecast, according to a new book by Harvard University urban planning professor Judith
Grant Long.
The costs of land, infrastructure, operations and lost property taxes add 25 percent to the taxpayer bill
for the 121 sports facilities in use during 2010, increasing the average public cost by $89 million to $259
million, up from $170 million commonly reported by the sports industry and media, she writes in the
book “Public/Private Partnerships for Major League Sports Facilities.”
Long’s analysis added costs such as those for land, infrastructure and lost tax revenue, while subtracting money
that flows back to states or cities from revenue or rent payments.
Professional teams don’t heavily impact local economies, Fj
Chodosh, Jonah. “Take Me Out of the Ball Game: The Efficacy of Public Subsidies in the
Success of Professional Sports Stadiums” Claremont McKenna College. 2011.
Interestingly, according to Keating (1999), the multiplier effect doesn’t exactly lead to the substantial impacts
to large market economies, as promised. In New York, the comptroller estimates that all of the professional
teams in the metropolitan New York City area account for a total of $1.15 billion in economic activity,
based on generous multipliers (Keating 1994). This surmounts to only 0.3 percent of the regional
economy, resulting from nine professional sports teams. In addition, these multipliers added to subsidies
may not even be positive, as the average resident’s tax increases may cause total spending to be diminished
(Keating 1994).
A team leaving doesn’t impact the local economy, Fj
DeMause, Neil. “Do cities gain from subsidizing sports teams?” Al Jazeera America.
August 21, 2013.
Even if the Pacers, say, had left town after being denied a new round of subsidies, studies indicate that the
economic impacts would have been less than dire: When Humphreys and Dennis Coates of the University of
Maryland looked at income data for cities that lost their teams, as well as during sports league strikes
and lockouts, they found no significant effects. "The departure of a franchise in any sport," they wrote,
"has never significantly lowered real per capita personal income in a metropolitan area."
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Con: Econ impact fail
Funding a stadium can wreck cities’ credit DAT
Gerardes, Randy. “Game’s On: Sports Facilities’ New Competition.” Wells Fargo
Securities. 12 February 2013. Web.
http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/pages/14889/$file/Game's%20On_Sports%20
Facilities%20New%20Competition_021214.pdf
There have been a number of communities that expected significant increases to tax collections related to
economic development anchored by stadium facilities. When revenues were less than projected, the
municipality’s credit was negatively affected. For example, Harrison, N.J., invested $39 million to
purchase land to build a $200 million arena for the MLS’s New York Red Bull; however, the economic
downturn caused incremental tax revenues to be below estimates, increasing stress on the town’s general
fund leading to a downgrade to Ba3 from Baa1 by Moody’s in May 2011. Hamilton County, Ohio, financed
stadiums for both the Cincinnati Reds (MLB) and the Cincinnati Bengals (NFL) via sales tax secured debt in
1998. The final cost of Paul Brown Stadium, home to the Bengals, was approximately 25% higher than original
estimates excluding infrastructure improvements. The higher stadium costs combined with sales tax revenue
growth below projections due to poor economic conditions led Moody’s to downgrade the county’s sales
tax supported bonds to A2 from A1 in May 2012. To make matters worse for the county, it agreed to
cover a significant portion of operating costs for the stadium, which currently constitutes more than 16%
of the county’s budget. Clearly in the case of Hamilton County, controversy stemmed from the risk allocation
and revenue expectations as opposed to the project fundamentals of the stadium itself.
When a city gets downgraded, it makes borrowing more difficult and expensive down the road. Con
teams need to show how stadiums fail to pay cities back their investment, and this is a more out-of-the
box example of just that.
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September/October 2014
Con: Corruption
Corruption in Sports
Tales of Corruption in Professional Sports AMS
Easterbrook, Gregg. “How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers.” September 18, 2013. The
Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleecestaxpayers/309448/%20Y2K
Pro-football coaches talk about accountability and self-reliance, yet pro-football owners routinely binge on
giveaways and handouts. A year after Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, the Saints resumed hosting NFL
games: justifiably, a national feel-good story. The finances were another matter. Taxpayers have, in stages,
provided about $1 billion to build and later renovate what is now known as the Mercedes-Benz
Superdome. (All monetary figures in this article have been converted to 2013 dollars.) The Saints’ owner,
Tom Benson, whose net worth Forbes estimates at $1.2 billion, keeps nearly all revenue from ticket sales,
concessions, parking, and broadcast rights. Taxpayers even footed the bill for the addition of leather stadium
seats with cup holders to cradle the drinks they are charged for at concession stands. And corporate welfare for
the Saints doesn’t stop at stadium construction and renovation costs. Though Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal
claims to be an anti-spending conservative, each year the state of Louisiana forcibly extracts up to $6 million
from its residents’ pockets and gives the cash to Benson as an “inducement payment”—the actual term used—to
keep Benson from developing a wandering eye.
(...)
In NFL city after NFL city, this pattern is repeated. CenturyLink Field, where the Seattle Seahawks play,
opened in 2002, with Washington State taxpayers providing $390 million of the $560 million construction
cost. The Seahawks, owned by Paul Allen, one of the richest people in the world, pay the state about $1
million annually in rent in return for most of the revenue from ticket sales, concessions, parking, and
broadcasting (all told, perhaps $200 million a year). Average people are taxed to fund Allen’s private-jet
lifestyle.
The Pittsburgh Steelers, winners of six Super Bowls, the most of any franchise, play at Heinz Field, a glorious
stadium that opens to a view of the serenely flowing Ohio and Allegheny Rivers. Pennsylvania taxpayers
contributed about $260 million to help build Heinz Field—and to retire debt from the Steelers’ previous
stadium. Most game-day revenues (including television fees) go to the Rooney family, the majority owner
of the team. The team’s owners also kept the $75 million that Heinz paid to name the facility.
In countless cities the funds from professional sports institutions go straight to their wealthy owners—
leaving the people who provided the tax dollars for these stadiums with nothing.
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Con: Monopolies
Sports Institutions are Monopolies
Legislation Protects Sports Organizations from Laws Preventing Collusion AMS
Easterbrook, Gregg. “How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers.” September 18, 2013. The
Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleecestaxpayers/309448/%20Y2K
This situation came into being in the 1960s, when Congress granted antitrust waivers to what were then
the National Football League and the American Football League, allowing them to merge, conduct a
common draft, and jointly auction television rights. The merger was good for the sport, stabilizing pro
football while ensuring quality of competition. But Congress gave away the store to the NFL while getting
almost nothing for the public in return.
The 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act was the first piece of gift-wrapped legislation, granting the leagues
legal permission to conduct television-broadcast negotiations in a way that otherwise would have been
price collusion. Then, in 1966, Congress enacted Public Law 89-800, which broadened the limited antitrust
exemptions of the 1961 law. Essentially, the 1966 statute said that if the two pro-football leagues of that era
merged—they would complete such a merger four years later, forming the current NFL—the new entity could
act as a monopoly regarding television rights. Apple or ExxonMobil can only dream of legal permission to
function as a monopoly: the 1966 law was effectively a license for NFL owners to print money. Yet this
sweetheart deal was offered to the NFL in exchange only for its promise not to schedule games on Friday nights
or Saturdays in autumn, when many high schools and colleges play football.
Public Law 89-800 had no name—unlike, say, the catchy USA Patriot Act or the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. Congress presumably wanted the bill to be low-profile, given that its effect was to
increase NFL owners’ wealth at the expense of average people.
While Public Law 89-800 was being negotiated with congressional leaders, NFL lobbyists tossed in the
sort of obscure provision that is the essence of the lobbyist’s art. The phrase or professional football
leagues was added to Section 501(c)6 of 26 U.S.C., the Internal Revenue Code. Previously, a sentence in
Section 501(c)6 had granted not-for-profit status to “business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate
boards, or boards of trade.” Since 1966, the code has read: “business leagues, chambers of commerce,
real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues.”
The insertion of professional football leagues into the definition of not-for-profit organizations was a
transparent sellout of public interest. This decision has saved the NFL uncounted millions in tax obligations,
which means that ordinary people must pay higher taxes, public spending must decline, or the national debt
must increase to make up for the shortfall. Nonprofit status applies to the NFL’s headquarters, which
administers the league and its all-important television contracts. Individual teams are for-profit and presumably
pay income taxes—though because all except the Green Bay Packers are privately held and do not disclose their
finances, it’s impossible to be sure.
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Con: Monopolies
NFL Corruption Benefits Executives AMS
Easterbrook, Gregg. “How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers.” September 18, 2013. The
Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleecestaxpayers/309448/%20Y2K
In the NFL, cynicism about public money starts at the top. State laws and IRS rules generally forbid the
use of nonprofit status as a subterfuge for personal enrichment. Yet according to the league’s annual
Form 990, in 2011, the most recent year for which numbers are available, the NFL paid a total of almost
$60 million to its leading five executives.
Roger Goodell’s windfall has been justified on the grounds that the free market rewards executives whose
organizations perform well, and there is no doubt that the NFL performs well as to both product quality—the
games are consistently terrific—and the bottom line. But almost nothing about the league’s operations involves
the free market. Taxpayers fund most stadium costs; the league itself is tax-exempt; television images made in
those publicly funded stadiums are privatized, with all gains kept by the owners; and then the entire
organization is walled off behind a moat of antitrust exemptions.
The reason NFL executives’ pay is known is that in 2008, the IRS moved to strengthen the requirement that
501(c)6 organizations disclose payments to top officers. The NFL asked Congress to grant pro football a waiver
from the disclosure rule. During the lobbying battle, Joe Browne, then the league’s vice president for public
affairs, told The New York Times, “I finally get to the point where I’m making 150 grand, and they want to put
my name and address on the [disclosure] form so the lawyer next door who makes a million dollars a year can
laugh at me.” Browne added that $150,000 does not buy in the New York area what it would in “Dubuque,
Iowa.” The waiver was denied. Left no option, the NFL revealed that at the time, Browne made about $2
million annually.
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Con: Monopolies
Professional teams are too ludicrously profitable to warrant public funds DAT
Gladwell, Malcolm. “The Nets and NBA Economics.” Grantland. 10 October 2011. Web.
http://grantland.com/features/the-nets-nba-economics/
At the very moment the commissioner of the NBA is holding up the New Jersey Nets as a case study of
basketball’s impoverishment, the former owner of the team is crowing about 10 percent returns and the
new owner is boasting of “explosive” profits. After the end of last season, one imagines that David Stern
gathered together the league’s membership for a crash course on lockout etiquette: stash the yacht in St. Bart’s
until things blow over, dress off the rack, insist on the ’93 and ’94 Cháteau Lafite Rothschilds, not the earlier,
flashier, vintages. For rich white men to plead poverty, a certain self-discipline is necessary. Good idea, except
next time he should remember to invite the Nets.
One of the great forgotten facts about the United States is that not very long ago the wealthy weren’t all that
wealthy. Up until the 1960s, the gap between rich and poor in the United States was relatively narrow. In fact,
in that era marginal tax rates in the highest income bracket were in excess of 90 percent. For every dollar you
made above $250,000, you gave the government 90 cents. Today — with good reason — we regard tax rates
that high as punitive and economically self-defeating. It is worth noting, though, that in the social and political
commentary of the 1950s and 1960s there is scant evidence of wealthy people complaining about their situation.
They paid their taxes and went about their business. Perhaps they saw the logic of the government’s policy:
There was a huge debt from World War II to be paid off, and interstates, public universities, and other public
infrastructure projects to be built for the children of the baby boom. Or perhaps they were simply bashful.
Wealth, after all, is as often the gift of good fortune as it is of design. For whatever reason, the wealthy of that
era could have pushed for a world that more closely conformed to their self-interest and they chose not to.
Today the wealthy have no such qualms. We have moved from a country of relative economic equality to a
place where the gap between rich and poor is exceeded by only Singapore and Hong Kong. The rich have
gone from being grateful for what they have to pushing for everything they can get. They have mastered
the arts of whining and predation, without regard to logic or shame. In the end, this is the lesson of the
NBA lockout. A man buys a basketball team as insurance on a real estate project, flips the franchise to a
Russian billionaire when he wins the deal, and then — as both parties happily count their winnings — what
lesson are we asked to draw? The players are greedy.
Even prior to considering that most studies find that sports stadiums do not repay (financially) the cost of
building them incurred by their host cities, we can consider the need for public tax breaks and funding to
begin with. For a city to incur extra costs to host a pro sports team is a cost that simply is not logically in
line with the financials of most pro sports teams (at least those in the big 4 leagues: NFL, NBA, NHL,
MLB).
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Con: Monopolies
Current tax law encourages cities to meet sports leagues’ egregious financial demands DAT
Kuriloff, Aaron, and Darrell Preston. “In Stadium Building Spree, U.S. Taxpayers Lose
$4 Billion.” Bloomberg. 4 September 2012. Web.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/in-stadium-building-spree-u-staxpayers-lose-4-billion.html
The financing plan relied on the city’s ability to issue bonds paying interest that is exempt from federal income
taxes. Almost 20 years earlier, U.S. lawmakers from both parties set out to block muni bonds for municipally
financed stadiums as part of an attack on public borrowing for private businesses, according to former Senator
Bob Packwood, the Oregon Republican who was chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.
“We wanted to limit it,” Packwood said in an interview. “It was one of the most egregious uses of the part of the
tax code that allowed for industrial development bonds. It was clearly not what the tax code had in mind when
tax-exempt bonds were authorized.”
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 removed sports facilities from the types of projects that could qualify for the
subsidy. It required such bonds to become taxable if more than 10 percent of the debt for a facility built
mainly for nongovernment use was to be repaid with revenue from a private business. The lawmakers
who thought this would call a halt to tax-exempt stadium financing were wrong, according to
Zimmerman, the economist.
The wording of the law encourages cities and states to offer more-favorable terms to pro teams wanting
financial assistance while preventing the borrowers from using stadium revenue to pay off the bonds, he
wrote. The measure functions as “an open-ended matching grant” for stadiums, he said. Cities and states
borrowed more money backed by tax revenue, not less, to make sure that no more than 10 percent of a
stadium’s debt payments came from a private business, Zimmerman said.
“They have to take it out of the pockets of their taxpayers,” Zimmerman said. “It forces a bigger subsidy, if
you’re going to use tax-exempt debt.”
In the case of Cowboys Stadium, Arlington has borrowed about $300 million by selling muni bonds since
2005. A 29-year portion maturing in 2034 yields 4 percent. Arlington owns the field, and the Cowboys
pay $2 million a year under a lease that expires in 2038. Over 30 years, the rent comes to $60 million.
This card helps link the rest of the individual economic evidence together for the Con. Con teams already
have a wealth of economic evidence against stadium construction in the form of both case studies and
financial analyses. This card shows and explains the systemic reason this happens: extortive financial
arrangements are legally encouraged. Con teams can thus demonstrate the intractability of the current
public funding landscape to mitigate any Pro advocacies for different funding schemes.
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Con: Monopolies
Case study: Seattle vs. OKC DAT
Coates, Dennis, and Brad R. Humphreys. “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on
Subsidies for Sports Franchises, Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” North American
Association of Sports Economists. August 2008. Web.
A recent example from the NBA illustrates the kind of thing that often goes on now. The Seattle Supersonics
were unhappy with their former home, KeyArena, and sought to have the city of Seattle build a new arena.
Seattle refused and the team explored moving, which would require breaking their lease with the City of Seattle
for KeyArena. A lawsuit ensued and they settled out of court, with the team moving to Oklahoma City, for the
2008-2009 season, and paying Seattle tens of millions of dollars to break the lease. Oklahoma City attracted the
team by promising to spend $100 million renovating its existing arena to bring it up to current NBA standards
and an additional $20 million to construct a practice facility. The existing arena in Oklahoma City was built
without an occupant during the 1990s as part of a downtown redevelopment plan. The Seattle-Oklahoma City
case suggests relevant lessons: Professional sports leagues are able to restrict entry and play one city off
against another to extract the best subsidy deal. In doing so, there is a significant positional element—one
city’s fan-base loses, another gains. And teams exploit the cities where politics most effectively taps the
taxpayers.
The Seattle-Oklahoma City case described above is a perfect example of the global case against subsidies.
Oklahoma City offered larger subsidies than Seattle was willing to make, so the basketball franchise left Seattle
for Oklahoma City. Basketball fans in Seattle lose, basketball fans in Oklahoma City gain. Perhaps there are
more fans in Oklahoma City than in Seattle or fans in Oklahoma have more intense preferences for NBA
basketball than fans in Seattle, so that there might be some slight gain in average welfare as a result of the
franchise move. By and large, however, the franchise changing cities is a zero sum game for basketball
fans. The team is enriched by the larger subsidy available in Oklahoma, but the move is clearly not a
Pareto improvement in the allocation of resources. From a social perspective, a better approach to
maximizing welfare might be for the NBA to expand the number of franchises so basketball fans across
the country had their own local team to cheer. That, of course, is not in the best interests of the current
league members who derive substantial benefits, like the subsidies, from their restriction of supply.
This case study is demonstrative of the broader professional paradigm: the extraction of profit from any
willing suitor. This aids the emotional component of Con arguments: if Con teams can portray sports
teams as ruthlessly profit-focused businesses, judges are more receptive to arguments against their
continued funding. Combined with the strong evidence against teams’ claims that they drive economic
growth, and sports teams are reduced to being an ineffective attempt at economic stimulus.
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Con: Monopolies
NFL teams are too highly incentivized to move to have a permanent local impact DAT
Mildner, Gerard, and James Strathman. “Baseball and Basketball Stadium Ownership
and Franchise Incentives to Relocate.” Center for Urban Studies. Portland State
University. July 1997. Web.
For football, the need to locate in large metropolitan areas is a league concern and not a significant team owner
concern. This is because fans are willing to drive longer distance for weekend football games (hence, the market
is regional, not metropolitan) and because of the importance of the national television contract in team revenue.
Thus, teams are able to survive in small metropolitan areas such as Green Bay and Jacksonville, and teams can
make franchise shifts to smaller markets, such as the Rams move from Los Angeles to St. Louis, or the Oilers
move from Houston to Memphis (and ultimately to Nashville). In those cases, the desire to reduce stadium rents
and increase luxury box and concession revenue were more important factors.
The NFL’s concern for franchise location is much greater than individual owners. Failure by a league to
have a presence in major television markets can lead to new league formation and a loss of monopoly
rent. This has happened twice before to the NFL, most recently when the American Football League
established franchises in the then under-served markets of Boston, New York, Houston, Denver, and Buffalo,
and later expanded to Miami.
Individual teams are tenable in small markets, but the NFL controls these teams and their locations, and
it’s simply less profitable to have small market team. Given that the NFL is interested in limiting
expansion (it’s an effective bargaining chip) and catering to bigger markets, NFL teams are not a reliable
revenue booster for local communities in the long term. Con teams can use this to call into question Pro
teams’ assumptions of long-term growth and productivity from pro sports teams.
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September/October 2014
Con: Sports diplomacy
Problems with “Sports Diplomacy”
Sports Diplomacy Organization SportsUnited is Wasteful AMS
Senator Tom Coburn. “Waste Book.” October 2012.
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b7b23f662d60-4d5a-8bc5-8522c7e1a40e
SportsUnited is touted by the Department of State as being the premier sports exchange program for
what the department calls “sports diplomacy.” Through this initiative, the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs sends American professional athletes and coaches all around the world to “conduct drills, lead
team building sessions, and engage youth in a dialogue on the importance of education, health, and respect for
diversity.”
Taxpayers will spend [spent] $5.5 million on SportsUnited this year [in 2012]. Since 2005, the United
States has sent over 220 athletes to more than 50 countries. Taxpayers have sent Major League Soccer
player Tony Sanneh to Ethiopia, NBA players like Dikembe Mutumbo and George Gervin to Sudan and India,
and a former WNBA star to China. SportsUnited also brings athletes from other countries to the United States
as part of their Sport Visitors program. The program has brought nearly 1,000 international visitors since 2003.
For example, the government paid for Tunisian swimmers’ trip to the U.S. Olympic Swimming Trials this
summer. Taxpayer dollars also paid for track and field athletes to travel from the Caribbean to Oregon and
beach volleyball players from Russia to southern California. In our current fiscal climate, investing scarce
resources in overseas trips for high-paid, jet- setting professional athletes should not be a high priority for the
federal government”
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Con: Holdout problem
The Holdout Problem
How Sports Stadium Construction Causes Economic Problems AMS
Rasmussen, Spencer. “The Holdout Problem.” Duke University. 2014.
http://sites.duke.edu/urbaneconomics/?p=1088
The Holdout Problem: “is a form of monopoly power that potentially arises in the course of land
assembly. Once assembly begins, individual owners, knowing their land is essential to the completion of
the project, can hold out for prices in excess of their opportunity costs” or “individual owners, realizing
that they can impose substantial costs on the developer, seek prices well in excess of their true reservation
prices.”
A holdout problem must require assembly, which is the need for at least two distinct properties for a
development.
Result: Large-scale projects that require assembly, like housing developments, parks and open spaces,
stadiums or shopping malls, will have high bargaining costs. This will create incentives for developers to
look for land where ownership is less dispersed, which will minimize assembly. This will lead to these
large building projects taking place on the fringes of cities leading to unnecessary urban sprawl In order to
combat urban sprawl…
i.
Developers can maintain their secrecy about projects by utilizing dummy buyers to help acquire
assemblies. This would be useful because sellers would not know that a single buyer is attempting all of the
land in a certain area. This is more difficult for government-backed projects because they often require
openness.
ii.
Governments can create incentives or subsidies for building in city centers or disincentives for
building in the suburbs. The justification for this can come from redevelopment of central areas.
iii.
The use of eminent domain, but this often raises issues about whether or not a private
organization should be able to benefit from the use of eminent domain.
The holdout problem “represents a situation where landowners whose property is essential to the completion of
some large development project to seek to block completion of the project in an effort to extract monopoly
rents” This biases development away from areas where ownership is the most dispersed, city centers, and
towards areas where ownership is more concentrated, the fringes or suburbs of cities.
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Con: Opportunity cost
Opportunity Costs of Public Funding for Pro Sports
Stadium construction saddles governments with annual debt DAT
Thomas, Louisa. “Up and Running.” Grantland. 5 November 2012. Web.
http://grantland.com/features/examining-outrage-cancelation-new-york-citymarathon/
If we’re going to talk about the abuse of public resources for sports — and we should! — we should give our
attention where attention is due. Only three NFL stadiums were built without public funding, and two of those
three used public funds for upgrades. (Only the Jets’ and Giants’ MetLife Stadium, as it happens, was privately
built.) Yankee Stadium cost taxpayers $321.5 million. The Yankees are the country’s richest sports team (along
with the Cowboys, who play in a stadium built in part with tax-free borrowing). According to Bloomberg
(hello!) Businessweek, the U.S. Treasury loses $146 million a year on municipal bonds with tax-free
interest issued for sports structures. The taxpayer subsidies to bondholders on the $17 billion tax-exempt
debt on stadiums built in the last 27 years will be $4 billion. You know what would be a better use of $4
billion? Repairing roads, building sea walls, preparing for the next big storm.
Stadium construction is pitched as a one-off expense: pay for the stadium, and watch decades of
economic dividends roll in. The problem is that the contractual details of public-private stadium
construction partnerships often negate the tax burden of the teams building stadiums and shifts financial
responsibility to public entities instead.
Publically-funded stadiums financed by reallocation still tax cities’ citizens DAT
“Pay and Play and Pay Some More.” The Economist. 19 November 2013. Web.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/11/stadium-financing
The Braves complained that Turner Field needed $150m in "infrastructure work alone", which would not
"significantly enhance the fan experience". The new location puts them closer to more of their season-ticket
holders, most of whom come from the city's rich northern suburbs.
Here's how it will work: the Braves will buy 60 acres of land, and give 15 of them to the Cobb County stadium
authority. Those 15 acres, on which the stadium and 2,000 parking spaces will be built, will be exempt from
property taxes. The Braves will develop the rest into a "mixed-use, 365-day destination", on which they will pay
tax and from which, of course, they will keep the revenue. Cobb County will pay around $300m over the
next 30 years. Relative pittances will come from those old stadium slush funds: taxes on rental cars and
hotels. Mayors love them because they can tell their constituents that only visitors will pay them, though
in Cobb's case that doesn't quite hold up. Visitors may be paying for hotels, but probably not for rental
cars—Cobb is too far from the airport. Increased hotel and property taxes in the area to be developed
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Con: Opportunity cost
around the stadium will add more, but the bulk—$260m over the next 30 years—will come from a
"reallocation" of existing property-tax revenues. This lets Cobb's executive boast that there will be no
property tax increases.
That is technically true, but essentially malarkey: the reallocated taxes are currently paying for parks, and were
due to sunset in 2017 or 2018. So homeowners may not pay more in the future than they pay today, but
they will pay more in the future than they otherwise would have. And this does not even consider what
else the county could have done with that $260m, had they decided to keep the tax in place and not funnel
it into a sports team's already-deep pockets. Neil deMause at the invaluable Field of Schemes
blog explains that Cobb taxpayers are probably looking at losses as high as $200m. Kasim Reed, Atlanta's
mayor and an expert knife-twister, told a press conference that "we can't spend money that liberally in the city
of Atlanta. We are fiscal conservatives here." (Of course, Atlanta will throw hundreds of millions of public
dollars at a new stadium for their football team, but better one white elephant, I suppose, than two.)
In Atlanta’s case, the city is essentially taking money from parks & rec to funnel it into for-profit private
enterprise, with its own citizens footing a potential $200 million bill down the line. Especially for
otherwise fiscally conservative counties, this is money that likely won’t be reallocated again back to its
original intended purposes.
Pro sports funding is a false dilemma DAT
Jeffrey G. Owen. “The Intangible Benefits of Sports Teams.” Indiana State University.
Public Finance and Management, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 321-345. 2006. Web.
http://www.cas.unt.edu/~jhauge/Teaching/Sports/Owen.pdf
Assume for a moment that we actually know with certainty residents’ true valuations of teams exceed the
construction costs of stadiums. This would still not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such subsidies are
correct public policy. Just because consumers are willing to pay a certain amount for a good does not mean that
they have to or should have to. If professional sports at the same level of quality can be provided without a
subsidy to the team, this is obviously better for the city. Public policy should be to attempt to provide
sports teams at the least possible cost, which could mean contributing nothing to the construction of
stadiums if a team can operate profitably when paying the full cost of the playing facility. Even the most
accurate contingent value survey would only give a reservation price for the cities.
With the Tax Reform Act of 1986, cities are inadvertently incentivized to not aim for “least possible
cost.” Cities are encouraged to ensure that less than 10% of stadium financing is repaid by stadium
revenue, leaving cities on the hook for the remaining debt. This escalates cities’ bid offers; allowing teams
to overstep the 10% line precludes cities’ issued bonds from being tax-free.
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Con: Opportunity cost
Funding for stadiums comes at the expense of better options, Fj
DeMause, Neil. “Do cities gain from subsidizing sports teams?” Al Jazeera America.
August 21, 2013.
Humphreys, in fact, says that operating subsidies like those handed out to the Coyotes and Pacers are likely to
get even less bang for the buck than stadium cash, which at least might create a few thousand temporary
construction jobs. "Not only that, but the operating subsidies are almost certainly coming out of general
fund revenues," he says. "If there's a ticket tax or anything that looks like a user tax, at least then the
people who are enjoying the benefits are paying. But if it's operating subsidies coming out of general fund
revenues, that's money that could go to any other alternative use in the city, like education or public
safety."
Even public money with strings attached could go to fill other city needs, say budget watchdogs. Ryan Splitlog
of Common Cause Georgia, a nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' lobby, notes that the money going to the
Falcons comes from hotel-motel tax revenue that is designated for promoting tourism and convention
business. "I think you could paint with a pretty wide brush stroke when talking about what that means for the
city of Atlanta," he says, suggesting fixing the "atrocious" roads and sidewalks in the blocks surrounding the
convention center campus as one example. "You could talk about infrastructure projects that improve the
quality of life for people who actually live here. I think the public would get much more behind something like
that."
Baltimore’s new publically-funded stadium complex ravaged industrially-valuable areas DAT
Chapin, Timothy. “Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts. Journal of the
American Planning Association, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 2004.Web.
Somewhat perversely, instead of new development being catalyzed in the immediate district, areas surrounding
Camden Yards have seen the opposite: clearing of land for surface parking lots (E. Cline, personal
communication, May, 1998). These lots have spread into the Camden Industrial District to serve the
massive influx of automobiles and buses on event days. The Maryland Stadium Authority has purchased
or leased a number of parcels in the Camden Industrial District and paved them over for event parking
(see Figure 2), much to the chagrin of local planners. Attendees also park on other undeveloped parcels, as
well as along the streets of this district on event days. City planning staff expressed concern with the infiltration
of parking because the city has promoted industrial and manufacturing development in this district, an area that
remains best suited for industrial uses U. French and J. Leviton, personal communication, August, 1998).
(…)
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Con: Opportunity cost
From the above it might be suggested that Camden Yards has experienced some success as an urban
redevelopment catalyst. However, such a conclusion overlooks the fact that Baltimore's Inner Harbor flourished
long before Camden Yards was built. Camden Yards did not create the success that is Inner Harbor; it
simply incorporated roughly 20 formerly industrial blocks into the postmodern tourist economy. Camden
Yards offers yet another destination in downtown Baltimore, but one that remains disconnected from
many of the neighborhoods surrounding it. The old retail district to the north remains disengaged from
the downtown entertainment economy; revitalization of this area will likely result from the expansion of
the UM-B campus and not Camden Yards. Similarly, Sharp- Leadenhall and Pigtown remain largely
untouched by the crowds and dollars spent at Camden Yards, except for local entrepreneurs charging event
attendees $20-40 to park in these neighborhoods during events.
The direct local impact is striking in the above card: reduced economic viability and no direct benefits
(correlative or causative).
Opportunity cost does not need to be financial. ASF
Kahn, Aron. "Minnesota Lawmakers Debate Stadium Quality-of-Life Issue" Knight
Ridder Tribune. April 28, 2004. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1115980642.html/print
The Tax Committee vote is expected to come Friday or early next week, and it might be close. Abrams said that
if the committee turns down the measure, the issue is dead for the session, despite the many methods
traditionally available to revive bills.
But it appeared the chairman and supporters alike coalesced behind the notion that the two teams do contribute
to the quality of life in Minnesota.
"My kids and I are all the time talking sports," Art Rolnick, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank in
Minneapolis, testified before the committee. That quality-of- life issue is worth something, he said, but a
public investment in early childhood education is far more important, he said. "Hands down."
Rolnick said the best way to measure the quality-of-life quotient is a referendum of affected voters. Most
stadium bill supporters oppose referendums on the grounds that they would delay or potentially nullify
the projects.
If people cannot vote on a stadium that may displace them, this directly costs them access to education,
which is a key necessity in social mobility. The tradeoff here is not necessarily economic, but rather direct
access to education.
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Con: Public will
Funding Pro Sports Teams Is Against the Public Will
Municipalities fund pro sports teams in opposition to their voters DAT
Groothius, Peter A. et al. “Public Funding of Professional Sports Stadiums: Public Choice
or Civic Pride?” Eastern Economic Journal. University of North Texas. Vol. 30, No.
4, Fall 2004. Web. http://econ.unt.edu/~jhauge/Teaching/Sports/Groothuis.pdf
The second type of externality allegedly generated by a sports team is civic pride— a nonuse benefit. Without
ever paying the team, people can cheer for it, read about it in newspapers and magazines, and brag about it to
out-of-town friends and relatives. To the extent that teams generate civic pride, subsidies to teams and arenas
may be efficient. Using a CVM survey, however, Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead [2001] find that,
while the Pittsburgh Penguins of the NHL generate substantial civic pride, the value of those public goods
falls far short of the cost of a new arena. Johnson and Whitehead [2000] also used a CVM survey to
determine that the public goods generated by a minor league baseball stadium in Lexington, Kentucky, and a
new arena for University of Kentucky basketball fail to justify significant public subsidies.
The CVM results are consistent with the outcomes of many referendums on taxes to subsidize stadiums—they
often lose. Yet, even in cities where stadium referendums fail, governments still often find ways to
subsidize sports teams [Fort, 1997]. This suggests a public choice explanation that public stadium
financing results from the influence of special interest groups.
Some studies have suggested a public choice motivation for subsidies. Swindell and Rosentraub [1998] say that
fans, players, and owners benefit from a team’s presence, and that fans themselves value the intangible benefits
the most. Kalich [1998] studied three stadium-funding initiatives and found that, when the benefits were
concentrated among a small group and a much larger group shared the costs, the funding initiative
succeeded.
A CVM survey is a way to put a tangible number on something that otherwise doesn’t have a dollar
figure, e.g. civic pride. Its most common current use is real estate and environmental appraisal.
Stadium construction referendums present a false dilemma for voters and taxpayers DAT
Jeffrey G. Owen. “The Intangible Benefits of Sports Teams.” Indiana State University.
Public Finance and Management, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 321-345. 2006. Web.
http://www.cas.unt.edu/~jhauge/Teaching/Sports/Owen.pdf
This CVM study finds interest in the team is a critical element of willingness-to-pay for sports stadiums
and teams. Still most of the public debate centers on the economic impact of sports on local economies.
Why does the “economic impact fantasy” have such staying power? It may be that the economic impact
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Con: Public will
argument is a convenient out if you want the team to stay but hate the idea of giving millions of tax dollars to
rich people. By accepting the projections of economic impact subsidies, a public subsidy for the wealthy
becomes a noble public works project. Everyone is a hero. Team owners are providing the centerpiece for
economic growth. City officials are creating a monument to their active pursuit of a great economic future for
their community. Each fan is making his contribution to the city’s future as well. You are not voting for the
stadium because you want the team to stay and the owner has backed you into a corner; you are voting for it
because it will benefit the entire community. No one is being selfish. It is easy to see why voters, owners, and
civic leaders would all be willing to believe in the fallacy. The protective veil of economic impact,
however, is a thin one. When support for a stadium is in doubt, owners and city officials remind local
citizens of the implications of a failed vote – their local team playing somewhere else.
Like previous CVM studies of sports teams, this study finds that aggregate willingness-to-pay values are not
large enough to cover the costs of sports facilities. The range of values is large enough, however, that intangible
benefits have to be considered an important factor in public support for stadium subsidies. A plausible argument
could be made that the values are large enough to explain stadium subsidies depending how non-response and
other factors are handled.
This card is an exploration of the problem with economic impact studies. In reality, people’s willingness
to fund a pro sports team is contingent mostly on being a fan (to at least some extent) of the team.
However, this fandom gets conflated with promises of economic gain to coerce even those without actual
willingness to pay to vote for tax hikes, stadium funding referendums, etc. Public financing is thus
presented as the only means of retaining a pro team, ensuring the self-fulfilling prophecy of continued
public funding.
Teams use money to influence the democratic process, Fj
Johnson, Garrett. “The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities”
University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal.
Attempts to curtail enormous subsidies have also included the ballot box (i.e. voter referenda and initiatives).
However, these referenda might not accurately express the “will of the people” because like all democratic
elections, a major determinant in deciding the vote is who shows up to vote and what type of information is
available in order for them to make their decision. Economic scholars argue that those who are in favor of
subsidizing new stadiums greatly outspend those who oppose it. In 1997, both San Francisco and the state of
Washington held a referendum to determine whether to subsidize a new NFL stadium. Proponents in San
Francisco outspent opponents by twenty-five to one and opponents in Washington were outspent eightyto-one, with both referenda barely passing in favor of the subsidy.
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Con: Public will
Amount of money spent is sometimes unprecedented, Fj
DeMause, Neil. “Do cities gain from subsidizing sports teams?” Al Jazeera America.
August 21, 2013.
Roads and sidewalks, though, lack the lobbying power of sports team owners. Both Eckstein and Long note that
party affiliation makes little difference in sports deals, with Republican and Democratic mayors equally willing
to back subsidies to teams. The key factor, say sociologist Eckstein and his co-author Kevin Delaney, is to
have a strong "growth coalition" of business leaders pushing for them — as when Cincinnati's powerful
local chamber of commerce helped raise $1 million for a "Keep Cincinnati a Major-League City"
campaign to raise sales taxes for new stadiums for the Reds baseball team and Bengals NFL franchise,
more than double the city's previous record spending on any ballot initiative.
The public has no say. ASF
Stanton, Erin A. "Home Team Advantage?: The Taking of Private Property For Sports
Stadiums" New York City Law Review. Vol. 9:93. Winter 2005.
http://www.cunylawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Winter-05-v9-no-1_Ch3-Stanton.pdf
City leaders have become very aggressive in the competition to acquire a professional sports team., Not only
will a professional team put their city "on the map," but it will also bring in more revenue opportunities.
Usually, city officials do not give residents an opportunity to participate in, or object to their plans,
insisting instead that a new sports arena will improve the local economy. They argue that the building of a
new stadium will create construction and stadium jobs, attract tourists and new industry to boost the local
economy, and the overall increase in local income will have a "multiplier effect," which will cause still "more
new spending and job creation." These are the same officials who attend games sitting next to wealthy
developers and team owners in the "sparkling new luxury boxes," while the average fan faces steeply
increased ticket prices. (pg. 108-109)
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Con: Public will
Teams are circumventing public displeasure and extracting more funds from governments
DAT
Roger I. Abrams, Hardball in City Hall: Public Financing of Sports Stadiums, 3 Pace.
Intell.Prop. Sports & Ent.L.F. 164 (2013).
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pipself/vol3/iss1/8
As public resistance to cash payouts to franchise owners has increased, clubs and cities have cleverly devised
alternative forms of financial subsidies. Tax abatement became a first alternative, but it was rarely enough
to convince the owner either to stay or to relocate from another city. Using government bonds to raise
construction funds cuts the cost of borrowing. Add to that a very low (if any) stadium lease fee, the
franchise’s capture of revenue from concessions, parking and on-sports events at the facility, and a
governmental guarantee of a full house of spectators, i.e., covering the cost of empty seats. More recently,
contracts with cities have included a provision similar to a public sector union “me-too” clause. The city
promises that the stadium it provides will meet the “state-of-the-art.” If other stadiums are “better,” the city
promises it will update its facility for the franchise at the public’s expense.
Sports franchise owners have also devised new ways to secure public funding, for example, by making the new
sports facility part of a comprehensive redevelopment package or, in the case of football, obtaining a promise
from the NFL to hold the prestigious Super Bowl in the new stadium at some time in the future.
Stadiums are typically considered a massive investment with progressive financial benefits down the line.
However, under modern financing schemes, the positive future impact of a stadium, which is heavily
“sold” to local communities to secure funding, is wiped out by contractual obligations for cities to
continue to provide funding for things like renovation. Con teams can dissolve the idea that stadiums are
even an investment in the classical sense of getting any kind of return on investment.
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Con: Econ displacement
Sports Industry Displaces Economic Revenue
Sports Industry Fails to Generate Economic Revenue Because it Displaces Other Forms of
Economic Activity AMS
Slivinski, Stephen. “Do sports teams really drive economic growth?” Goldwater Institute.
May 8, 2012. http://goldwaterinstitute.org/blog/do-sports-teams-really-driveeconomic-growth
As an extensive 2008 review of the peer-reviewed economic studies published over the past 20 years concludes:
"No matter what cities or geographical areas are examined, no matter what estimators are used, no matter what
model specifications are used, and no matter what variables are used, articles published in peer reviewed
economic journals contain almost no evidence that professional sports franchises and facilities have a
measurable economic impact on the economy."
One of the main reasons sports teams and the facilities in which they play are not drivers of economic
growth is because they don't create new economic activity. Instead, they displace other forms of economic
activity.
For example, imagine you were going to spend money on a night out. You could spend it on an expensive
dinner or you could spend it on tickets to a sporting event. But because you have a limited amount of
money to spend, you wouldn't spend it on both.
This substitution of one type of spending for another is exactly what you see happening when you analyze the
experience of cities with sports teams. Consumers spending more of their discretionary income on sports-related
goods is offset by those same consumers spending less on other things. Thus, no net new economic activity
results.
Another point economists make is that most of the profit generated by sports teams go to the players, owners,
and shareholders of the team. Those individuals tend not to live in the area in which the team plays. Instead, the
money is "exported" to be spent or invested elsewhere. This reduces or eliminates the "ripple effect" that sports
teams have on the local economy.
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Con: Econ displacement
Stadiums reduce individual wages, Fj
Coates, Dennis and Humphreys, Brad. “The Effect of Professional Sports on the Earnings
of Individuals: Evidence from Microeconomic Data” UMBC Economics
Department. September 11, 2003.
This paper explores the impact of professional sports teams and stadiums on the wages of individuals
employed in several narrowly defined occupational groups in cities in the United States. The occupational
groups examined are among those that proponents of public funding of professional sports claim will
benefit economically from these stadiums. Our analysis uses data from the March Supplement to the Current
Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1977 to 1998 as well as sports variables previously utilized by Coates
and Humphreys (1999), (2001). Previous research focused on aggregate measures of income whereas here the
focus is on the wages of individual workers. The results of the study confirm conclusions of earlier research
that the overall sports environment is frequently statistically significant as a determinant of earnings and
that the predicted mean impact of sports on wages in a sample of individuals employed in occupations
closely related to professional sports is an annual average decrease in real earnings of $47.95.
Coates and Humphreys methodology, Fj
Coates, Dennis and Humphreys, Brad. “The Effect of Professional Sports on the Earnings
of Individuals: Evidence from Microeconomic Data” UMBC Economics
Department. September 11, 2003.
Our analysis focuses on the effect of the professional sports environment in cities on labor market outcomes for
workers in several specific occupations. These occupations include food service, such as waiters and
waitresses, cooks, busboys, and restaurant managers, lodgings, such as hotel clerks, maids, and bellhops,
retail sales, including cashiers and sales personnel and sales managers, and in amusements and
recreation, including athletes, ushers, and radio and television announcers. Data on individuals reporting
one of these occupations was extracted from the Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplements for the
years from 1977 to 1998. We collected data on 53, 052 individuals spread about equally over the 22 years
from 1977 until 1998. From Table 1, hotel workers make up about 5% of the sample, food services about
46% and retail workers about 47% of the sample collected from the CPS.
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Con: Minorities
Minorities Are Marginalized By Stadiums
Stadium development projects in urban areas force out minority residents DAT
Lewandowski, James, and Steve Stover. “Urban Redevelopment, Baseball, and
Displacement in Washington D.C.” West Chester University. 2007. Web.
http://www.msaag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/7_Lewandowski_Stover.pdf
This study estimates the housing displacement of minority residents located in and around the proposed site for
a baseball stadium in Washington, D.C. Total displacement, direct (18) together with indirect and secondary
displacement (8,167), is estimated to be 8,185. While this displacement may seem small, numerically, the
underlying circumstances of redevelopment in the area pose significant problems for minority residents. Unable
to move because of economic conditions in the district and in surrounding housing markets, they face a difficult
choice: absorb increases in housing costs within the redeveloping area or absorb increases in total living costs
associated with a move to some new location with lower subsidies.
Given that stadium development projects happen under the cover of urban redevelopment projects, they
are often situated in communities which are mostly poor and minority. If we look at the local community
as the people occupying the space (and not the space itself) the impact of stadium development is a
squeeze of the local community.
Native Americans
Stadiums are built on Native American Grounds. ASF
Cass, Michael. The Tennessean. “Metro Council approves Nashville Sounds ballpark
deal.”
<http://archive.tennessean.com/article/20131210/NEWS/312100120/Metro-Councilapproves-Nashville-Sounds-ballpark-deal>
Metro government will build and own the Sulphur Dell ballpark and lease it to the Sounds for 30 years. The
Triple A baseball franchise will operate and manage the facility and be responsible for maintenance costs. The
Sounds will get to keep revenue “generated through ticket sales, broadcasts, advertising and the like,” according
to a summary of the lease terms. Metro will be responsible for capital expenses “necessary to keep the ballpark
in good condition,” such as roof and seat replacements.
Metro’s debt service is expected to cost $4.3 million a year for 30 years. The city plans to pay the debt
with:
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$700,000 the Sounds would pay each year to lease the stadium.
Con: Minorities
$650,000 a year in sales tax revenue generated by the facility.
$750,000 in annual property tax revenue from a $60 million residential and commercial development the
Sounds’ owners plan to build nearby, although they aren’t contractually obligated to do so.
$675,000 in annual property tax revenue from another developer’s planned $37 million apartment
development nearby, although that developer, Embrey, also is not contractually obligated to build.
$520,000 a year in existing tax-increment financing, a tool that uses the growth in property tax revenues
from selected developments to pay off debt that was used to subsidize them.
$250,000 that Metro now puts into Greer Stadium each year as part of the city’s budget.
$410,000 that Metro now pays the state annually to lease property for the Nashville School of the Arts (the city
is buying that property).
• $345,000a year in new expenses for Metro.
About 45% of the new Sulphur Dell Park will be funded through money collected on taxes. This is a
significantly high amount of public subsidization.
The Native American Community Is Upset At The Stadium’s Destruction of Culture. ASF
Allyn, Bobby. "Native American Activists Could Sue The City of Nashville Over Ancient
Remains" Nashville Public Radio. April 23, 2014.
http://nashvillepublicradio.org/blog/2014/04/23/native-american-activists-could-suethe-city-of-nashville-over-ancient-remains/
Native American activists are asking Nashville Mayor Karl Dean to halt the construction of a new minor
league baseball stadium after archeologists discovered ancient artifacts. One Native American activist
said a lawsuit could follow if the city ignores their demands.
Activist Albert Bender writes about Native American history for a living. He said more time should be given
to archeologists to study the site. Bender considers next spring’s scheduled opening date of the new $150million-dollar Sounds Stadium to be arbitrary.
“What is the problem with halting the construction of the ballpark for a few months to a year, when we’re
talking about thousands of years of history that is waiting to be unearthed?” Bender asks.
What archeologists dug from the earth were ancient pottery used to boil water in the production of salt,
which was then exported around the South some 800 years ago.
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Con: Minorities
Native Americans are minimalized by stadium. ASF
Gee, Brandon. “Native American group objects to Sounds stadium construction”.
Nashville Business Journal.
http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/morning_call/2014/06/native-american-groupobjects-to-sounds-stadium.html
The American Indian Coalition may sue Metro government over construction of a new Nashville Sounds
baseball stadium at Sulphur Dell.
Mayor Karl Dean’s office says the project complies with regulations for construction on ground housing
artifacts,NewsChannel5 reports, and also has offered to construct a memorial wall and install artwork honoring
the area’s history.
An official with the American Indian Coalition is unsatisfied, however, calling the offer “minimalization”
and wants construction delayed or stopped.
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Con: Minorities
Racism in sports is noticeable for Native Americans. ASF
Fenelon, James V. “Survey on Redskins team name found most American Indians believe
it to be offensive and racist.” 2004. Press Release – Center for Indigenous Peoples’
Studies. http://cips.csusb.edu/docs/PressRelease.pdf
The Center for Indigenous Peoples Studies at California State University, San Bernardino has conducted a
study on racial and ethnic perspectives on the team name Redskins and associated issues, and found that
the large majority of American Indians, when properly identified and polled, find the team name
offensive, disrespectful and racist.
The first question on the survey tells the basic story: The Redskins team name is a racial or racist word and
symbol. American Indians were 67 % in agreement, 12 % were neutral and 20 % disagreed with the
statement. Other ethnic groups are spread across the three major categories of seeing the term Redskins as
racist, as neutral, or disagreeing in seeing Redskins as racially offensive. Whites were 33% in agreement, 26%
neutral, and 41% disagreed the term was racial, generally the reverse of American Indian responses. The neutral
category played a significant role for whites in allowing them to not be seen as “racist” –upon further analysis
more than 60% of whites reject the term Redskins as racist, while more than 60% of Indians see the term
Redskins as racist.
Though the community cries out, because they are a minority group their voice is not as strong and thus
the franchise maintains its name, despite it being blatantly offensive. When running an argument such as
this it is important to incorporate a framework that stresses the systemic harms to minorities as a value
to prioritize in the debate. In order to make a judge care about this impact you must stress that the
system is designed to drown out the voice of the victim, and throw the problem to the side, so it is crucial
that we put that voice at center spotlight.
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Con: Discrimination
Sexism and Discrimination in Sports
Perception of females in sports is objectifying. ASF
Hanson, Valerie. "The Inequality of Sport: Women < Men" Undergraduate Review: a
Journal of Undergraduate Student Research. Volume 13, Article 5. 2012.
http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=ur
Women account for a large percentage of the sporting world, but it is disheartening and discouraging to
thousands of female athletes that they account for only a mere fraction of its media coverage. Pat Griffin, a
professor at the University of Massachusetts, attributes some of this disproportionate statistical information to
the fact that "decisions [are] made by men" and that there is "a lot of cultural anxiety about women" (Playing
Unfair). These decisions, made by men, include how much and what kind of media coverage should be
given to female athletes and women's sports, decisions that are largely influenced by male sports reporters.
Women athletes who do not expose themselves sexually, Mary Jo Kane of the University of Minnesota
explains, appear to the public with characteristics such as, "power and strength [which mean] butch"
(Alper). A woman who is athletically talented and doesn't show herself off in a sexual manner represents a
"butch" woman, a manly woman for lack of a better phrase. The summer of 1999, although a turning point for
women in sports, also provided a spotlight where these feelings could be perpetuated and exaggerated.
Decisions in the media of the sporting world are made by men and usually end up resulting in objecting
women and not giving them due coverage as athletes and the issues of genderization.
NFL cheerleaders make less than minimum wage. ASF
Wallace, Gregory. "NFL Cheerleaders: We're not even making minimum wage" CNN
Money. April 28, 2014. http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/28/news/cheerleader-wagelawsuits/
Several current and former cheerleaders are suing their NFL employers over pay.
Three separate suits filed against the Oakland Raiders, Buffalo Bills and Cincinnati Bengals describe contracts
that don't guarantee the minimum wage and claim the cheerleaders are vastly underpaid.
The suits say cheerleaders also aren't compensated for equipment they must buy, practices they must
attend and community appearances they must make. Cheerleaders must meet exacting hair, makeup and
uniform standards set by the team and keep up with physical fitness requirements, according to court
documents.
One former cheerleader for the Cincinnati Bengals, Alexa Brenneman, said she was paid no more than $90
for each game and worked 10 games. Including $75 for a public appearance, she said she was paid $855 for the
2013 season and worked "well over 300 hours a year."
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Including the games, practices and other events, she calculated her hourly wage at $2.85.
Team spokesman Jack Brennan responded, "The Ben-Gals cheerleading program has long been a program run
by former cheerleaders and has enjoyed broad support in the community and by members of the squad." The
team's attorneys filed documents in federal court which argued Brenneman "has been paid all wages allegedly
due" under state and federal law.
The case against the Raiders, which was filed in January, is tied up in court over a stipulation in the
cheerleading contract that disputes be settled in arbitration, said attorney Sharon Vinick, who represents a
former Raiders cheerleader named Lacy T.
"This is our dream job, we work extremely hard to be on this team and to maintain our spot on this team," Lacy
T., who is suing the Raiders, told CNN. The team declined to comment when the suit was filed and didn't
respond to a new request for comment last week.
The lawsuit against the Bills, filed by five former members of its cheerleading organization the "Jills,"
said "each individual Jill provides approximately 20 hours of unpaid labor per week ... This equals 840
hours of unpaid work per woman, per year."
For organizations to be funded by the public in the millions of dollars and to still underpay workers and
violate minimum wage laws sets a bad precedent for where public funding goes. Cheerleaders do not
have a union and have little power to fight the wage violations other than direct lawsuits. Public money
seems to be going to organizations that abuse their power from a financial perspective.
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Con: Union Rights
NFL Violates Union Rights
NFL illegally side-steps lockout. ASF
Associated Press. "Federal Judge Rules NFL Violated Deal" ESPN. March 2, 2011.
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6172379
In his 28-page ruling, Doty criticized special master Stephen Burbank for legal errors and erroneously
concluding earlier this month that the NFL can act like a self-interested conglomerate when in fact it is
bound by legal agreements to make deals that benefit both league and player.
Doty instead declared that the NFL violated its agreement with the union, which had asked that the TV money
be placed in escrow until the end of any lockout. A hearing, yet to be scheduled, will be held to determine
potential damages for the players as well as an injunction involving the TV contracts.
NFL spokesman Greg Aiello downplayed the significance of the ruling, saying the 32 teams were "prepared for
any contingency."
"Today's ruling will have no effect on our efforts to negotiate a new, balanced labor agreement," Aiello said. He
told The Associated Press that the NFL had not immediately determined whether it would appeal.
The case, however, has billions at stake.
The union accused the NFL of failing to secure the maximum revenue possible when it restructured
broadcast contracts in 2009 and 2010, and claimed the deals were designed to guarantee owners enough
money to survive a lockout. The union argued this violated an agreement between the sides that says the NFL
must make good-faith efforts to maximize revenue for players.
Unions act as a public body to represent workers, however the NFL blatantly ignores their demands and
violates the deals that have been made. This shows a bad relationship with the public, and that the
organization is strictly profit driven, and does not concern itself with the interests of the neighborhoods
in its surrounding, or its workers, as long as profit is ultimately made. The ability to side-step lockouts is
directly related to financial security, arguably coming from the freeing up of funds due to public
subsidies.
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Con: Union Rights
The NFL does not provide for the safety of players. ASF
Pelissero, Tom. "Players union: NFL 'on the verge' of 2014 season without HGH testing"
July 25, 2014. http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/07/25/union-cba-hghtesting-roger-goodell/13156713/
Nearly three years after the ratification of a collective bargaining agreement that included a promise to
test for human growth hormone, the NFL and its players union appear no closer than they've been since
last summer to a comprehensive drug policy.
In an email to players Friday obtained by USA TODAY Sports, the NFL Players Association once again
blamed the league for refusing to give up Commissioner Roger Goodell's authority over appeals not related to
positive drug tests, such as arrests and evidentiary cases — the primary issue that prevented a deal from getting
done last summer.
The league has made numerous concessions, including agreeing to the HGH population study the union
demanded, even though the NFL maintains the study is unnecessary. But the league has said repeatedly that
commissioner authority was agreed to in the CBA and is non-negotiable.
"Thus, we are on the verge of another year without a safer and cleaner game because the NFL refuses to
commit to fair due process for players who choose to appeal NFL discipline for alleged drug policies
violations," the union email said.
The league resists union negotiations for safer player conditions in relation to drug policies.
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Con: Mega events
Eminent Domain Is Bad
Eminent domain is not in the spirit of the law. ASF
Stanton, Erin A. "Home Team Advantage?: The Taking of Private Property For Sports
Stadiums" New York City Law Review. Vol. 9:93. Winter 2005.
http://www.cunylawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Winter-05-v9-no-1_Ch3-Stanton.pdf
More recently, the Supreme Court affirmed its prior decisions when it ruled in the controversial eminent domain
case involving the city of New London's taking of privately owned houses to make way for an "integrated
development plan designed to revitalize its ailing economy." The development project would be constructed on
ninety acres in Fort Trumbull, Connecticut, which was inhabited by 115 privately owned properties. Its
projected use would comprise of a waterfront conference hotel, restaurants, shopping venues, several marinas, a
U.S. Coast Guard Museum, office and retail space, and eighty new residences to create an urban community.
Citing Midkiff and Berman in its decision, the Supreme Court stated that although the city could not take the
petitioners' land simply to confer a private benefit on a particular private party, the taking was legal
because the development plan was not adopted to "benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals."
It further noted that it has long rejected "any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use
for the public." Instead, it has "embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as a
`public purpose.'
This ruling is unsound in two ways. First, it supports the theory that if the private parties associated with a
taking are not absolutely identified (e.g., private parties purchasing the property from developers once
construction is complete) , the taking will be legal because, at the time of the taking, no named private
individuals will benefit. Second, as Justice O'Connor stated in her dissent, the Court abandoned its "longheld, basic limitation on government power. Under the banner of economic development, all private
property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might
be upgraded," which
essentially erases the words "for public use" from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (pg. 9899)
This evidence is powerful, but must be used with the understanding that it is criticizing a Supreme Court
ruling. Just remember that just because something is “constitutional” does not mean it is inherently good.
This analysis of eminent domain discusses how private property may be taken, insofar as no private
beneficiary is named in the process. Once the land has been taken however, any private owner may
purchase the land. This allows the government to arbitrarily seize land for any intended purpose, insofar
as it develops the land, and can now sell it to the highest bidder. In our example, sports organizations.
The government can know about this ahead of time, but simply decline to name the beneficiary, thus
utilizing a loophole, allowing it to be legal. If the process is accessed through a loophole, it may be by the
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Con: Mega events
letter of the law, but not the spirit of it. If the deal goes south, as long as the land is developed, it does not
even need to be used.
Eminent domain is designed to rid the impoverished rather than help. ASF
Stanton, Erin A. "Home Team Advantage?: The Taking of Private Property For Sports
Stadiums" New York City Law Review. Vol. 9:93. Winter 2005.
http://www.cunylawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Winter-05-v9-no-1_Ch3-Stanton.pdf
Under the guise of "revitalization" or "urban renewal," officials determine what geographical areas would be
best served by condemnation and redevelopment. These targeted areas usually consist of minority and lowincome communities that have little voice in the decision-making process.
In order to legally condemn property, the local government or authority must establish that the area is
blighted. A "blighted area" is defined as `[a]n unaesthetic and uneconomic section; an area of such kind that
razing all the buildings will serve a public purpose, even though a few of them may not be substandard or
blighted." Pertaining to real estate, it is an area "marked by termination of healthy growth and
development accompanied by deterioration and decline of property values . . . the shame of every
metropolis."
It is widely held that urban renewal or redevelopment and the elimination of blight are public purposes, and that
state legislatures may properly grant the right of eminent domain to housing authorities or local governments to
carry out such purposes without constitutional violation. The theory is that these slums, or "blighted" areas,
are a "breeding ground for juvenile delinquency, infant mortality, crime, disease, and waste." Therefore, it
is for the benefit of the public if the government condemns these areas,' takes the property via eminent domain,
and then conveys the land to a private developer to "revitalize" the community. (pg. 100)
This explains that if a neighborhood is low-income (marked by low property values, i.e. affordable living
communities) a government has the right to seize the property via eminent domain forcing the lowincome families to relocate. The law furthers that these areas are a breeding ground for crime, disease,
and waste, implicitly giving commentary on the people who occupy the neighborhood, who are
predominantly minorities. It forces relocation rather than providing a solution to those in need.
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Con: Mega events
The use of eminent domain has discouraged government to evaluate stadiums. ASF
Stanton, Erin A. "Home Team Advantage?: The Taking of Private Property For Sports
Stadiums" New York City Law Review. Vol. 9:93. Winter 2005.
http://www.cunylawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Winter-05-v9-no-1_Ch3-Stanton.pdf
"Public use" is defined as "[t]he public's beneficial right to use property or facilities subject to condemnation."
There are two basic views of public use: the broad, "advantage-to-the-public" view, and the narrow, "use-bythe-public" view. Courts have virtually abandoned the narrow use-by-the public application because it
requires that the public directly benefit from the proposed condemnation. Instead, courts have applied
the broad definition such that if a taking could promote the general welfare of the public, it satisfies the
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, regardless of what private enterprises benefit. Moreover, if
the identities of the private recipients are not immediately identifiable at the time of taking, the taking is not
considered to be benefiting private parties at all.
Because legislation does not define "public use," the lack of constraint, combined with broad case
interpretation, has encouraged city and state officials to err on the side of private developers. The local
rules of eminent domain facilitate this process in that they incorporate "sports facilities" into their
definition of what is considered a public use. Eminent domain is no longer a concise doctrine, but rather a
broad guideline giving power to state and local governments to dictate where it will be used and how it will
benefit the public. More frustrating is that state legislatures empower local governments, authorities, and
even corporations with this authority. (pg. 103-104)
Courts have opted to use a broad definition of “public use” in that proposed construction only need
possibly benefit public welfare. Local governments have entrusted private corporations with the direct
use of eminent domain, meaning if they have a model that in theory could potentially benefit any area,
they are legally allowed to seize land. This impact is unique in that it bypasses any theoretical numbers,
and carries the debate more towards “real-world” impacts, which predominantly conclude for the con on
this topic.
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Con: Mega events
Eminent domain ignores community definitions of benefit. ASF
Stanton, Erin A. "Home Team Advantage?: The Taking of Private Property For Sports
Stadiums" New York City Law Review. Vol. 9:93. Winter 2005.
http://www.cunylawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Winter-05-v9-no-1_Ch3-Stanton.pdf
In October of 2004, the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development conducted
a survey of Prospect Heights residents for their reaction to the potential development of a 19,000-seat
arena and basketball sports complex in their vicinity. Prospect Heights is a Brooklyn neighborhood that
cherishes its sense of community, security, and social and economic diversity. The survey concluded that
although the residents would like to see development in their community, such development should create
affordable housing, good jobs, and most importantly, improve public education, ease traffic and parking
congestion, and enhance neighborhood safety. The majority of the respondents were very concerned
about being displaced through the use of eminent domain, which had been suggested by the developer
and project advocates.
Unsurprisingly, education, affordable housing, permanent employment, and security from crime were
priorities for the respondents, which, coincidentally, would benefit the public as a whole. However, the
Prospect Heights study showed that the stadium complex would negatively impact Prospect Heights; it
would not incorporate the interests of the residents and businesses in the community. Instead, it would
only further the interests of the private developers at the community's expense.
When discussing impacts we must remember that the impact must be the local community. When the
local community defines benefits as increased access to education and affordable housing, but have no
voice to fight something that would displace them, we see a direct tradeoff between the stadiums and local
public benefit.
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Con: Mega events
The Downside of Mega-Events
Ex ante studies are fundamentally flawed. JCD
Baade, Robert A. "Big Men on Campus: Estimating the Economic Impact of College
Sports on Local Economies." College of the Holy Cross, Aug. 2007. Web.
Independent studies of the economic impact of spectator sports have cast doubt on the promises of significant
financial gains accruing to host cities. A typical ex ante economic impact study used by league and event
promoters estimates the number of visitors an event or team is expected to draw, the number of days each
spectator is expected to stay in the city, and the amount each visitor will spend each day. Combining these
figures, an estimate of the “direct economic impact” is obtained. This direct impact is then subjected to a
multiplier to account for the initial round of spending recirculating through the economy, and this additional
spending is known as “indirect economic impact.” The sum of the direct and indirect impact is the total
economic impact.
While such an estimation method is relatively straight-forward, numerous academic articles such as Crompton
(1995) and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008), to name just two, have pointed out the shortcomings of
such ex ante studies. In summary, the general criticism of impact studies is that while they may do a credible
job in determining the economic activity that occurs as a result of a sports team or mega-event, they rarely
account for economic activity that is displaced due to sporting events. In other words, economic impact studies
typically measure gross economic activity rather than net activity and therefore bias upward the true impact of
an event on the local economy
Ex post studies find little benefit from subsidizing professional athletic programs. JCD
Baade, Robert A. "Big Men on Campus: Estimating the Economic Impact of College
Sports on Local Economies." College of the Holy Cross, Aug. 2007. Web. 26 Aug.
2014.
Numerous studies have looked back at the actual performance of economies that have had professional
franchises, built new playing facilities, and hosted mega-events and have compared the observed economic
performance of host cities to that predicted in ex ante studies. These ex post analyses of stadiums and
franchises, including Rosentraub (1994), Baade (1996), Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), Coates and Humphreys
(1999; 2003), and Baade, Baumann, Matheson (2008) among others, generally find little or no economic
benefits from professional 3sports teams or new playing facilities. Studies of mega-events, such as Porter
(1999), Baade and Matheson (2001; 2004; 2006), Coates and Humphreys (2002), Coates (2006), Coates and
Depken (2006), and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008), similarly uncover little relationship between
hosting major sporting events and real economic variables such as employment, personal income, personal
income per capita, and taxable sales.
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Con: Mega events
Large scale sporting events carry steep price tags. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
These premier events, however, often carry very high price tags. The governing bodies of sports such as the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), or the
National Football League (NFL) insist on state-of-the-art playing facilities and first-class accommodations for
athletes, officials, and spectators. For example, in order to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korea built
ten new stadiums at a cost of nearly $2 billion, and Japan constructed seven new stadiums and refurbished three
others at a cost of at least $4 billion. The total investment for new infrastructure in Japan for the event was
estimated by some analysts at more than 750 billion yen ($5.6 billion) (Baade and Matheson, 2004).
Security concerns bring additional costs. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
In addition, as these events attract worldwide attention, they also become targets for terrorist activities, as
witnessed at the Summer Olympics in Munich in 1972 and in Atlanta in 1996, and therefore security
requirements are also very high. Greece reportedly spent $1.5 billion on security alone for the 2004 Summer
Olympics (Meeks, 2004), and security restrictions in Beijing in 2008 “appear to have virtually eliminated any
boost in tourism from the Olympics.” (Baker, 2008) Thus, cities incur not only large capital expenses in
conjunction with hosting large sporting events, but the operating costs can also be astronomical.
Most economic estimates incorrectly apply multipliers. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
In general, while league-sponsored estimates may do a credible job in determining the economic activity that
occurs as a result of a mega-event, they usually do a poor job of accounting for economic activity that is
displaced by these games and often apply incorrect multipliers. For these reasons, numerous studies have
looked back at the actual performance of economies that have hosted mega-events and have compared the
observed economic performance of host cities to that predicted in ex ante studies. Ex post analyses such as
Porter (1999), Baade and Matheson (2001; 2004; 2006), Coates and Humphreys (2002), Coates (2006), Coates
and Depken (2006), Hagn and Maennig (2007a; 2007b), Jasmand and Maennig (2007), and Baade, Baumann,
and Matheson (2008), similarly uncover little relationship between hosting major sporting events and real
economic variables such as employment, personal income, personal income per capita, and taxable sales.
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Con: Mega events
No existing evidence supports the claim that tourism increases in the long term from major
sporting events. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Sports backers also suggest that sporting events serve to publicize host cities to prospective tourists. As noted by
Matheson (2008), “Sports fans may enjoy their visit to the city and return later raising future tourist revenues
for the area. Corporate visitors, it is claimed, may relocate manufacturing facilities and company headquarters
to the city. Television viewers might decide to take a trip to the host city at some time in the future based on
what they see during the broadcast of the mega-event. Finally, hosting a major event might raise perceptions of
the city so that it becomes a “major league” or “world class” city and travel destination. All of these claims are
potentially true although little empirical research has conclusively demonstrated any long-run connections
between hosting mega-events and future tourism demand, and there are not even any anecdotal examples of
companies moving corporate operations to a city based on the hosting of a sporting event.”
Any boosts to tourism are shortlived. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Empirically, the 1988 Winter Olympics did increase the worldwide name recognition of Calgary, but the effect
was short-lived (Ritchie and Smith,1991). Similarly, the aftermath of the 1994 Winter Olympic Games did not
bring a sustained boost in tourism to Lillehammer, but instead, 40% of the full-service hotels in the town soon
went bankrupt (Tieglund, 1999).
The reputation of local cities are tarnished by major sporting events. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Furthermore, while mega-events clearly shine the limelight on host cities, not all the publicity generated is
necessarily positive. For example, the riots following Detroit’s National Basketball Association championships
in the early 1990s did little to improve the city’s status, and the bribery scandal that surrounded award of the
2002 Winter Olympics to Salt Lake City similarly tarnished that city’s reputation. Likewise, the international
images of Munich and Atlanta were marred by the terrorist events that occurred during their respective Summer
Olympic Games.
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Con: Mega events
The willingness for local populations to invest in sporting tickets for their local professional
teams is a negligible gain. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Contingent valuation studies of professional sports franchises (Johnson, Groothius, and Whitehead, 2001;
Johnson, Mondello, and Whitehead; 2006), stadiums and arenas (Groothius, Johnson, and Whitehead, 2004),
and mega-events (Atkinson, et al., 2008; Walton, Longo, and Dawson, 2008) identify a willingness to pay for
sports teams and events that is not simply captured in ticket sales. These identified intangible benefits, however,
are generally smaller than the taxpayer contributions to stadium construction or event subsidization. Maennig
(2007) analyzes the 2006 World Cup in Germany and similarly concludes that claims of “increased turnover in
the retail trade, overnight accommodation, receipts from tourism and effects on employment [are] mostly of
little value and may even be incorrect. Of more significance, however, are other (measurable) effects such as the
novelty effect of the stadiums, the improved image for Germany and the feel good effect for the population.”
(Maennig, 2007, p. 1)
The effect on property values is extremely limited even within the host city. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Tu (2005) estimated the impact of FedEx Field in Maryland, just outside of Washington, DC, on the property
values around that venue using actual sale prices before and after construction in a differences-in-differences
analysis. Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2007) evaluate the impact of three venues in Berlin on property values using a
hedonic 7price model. Feng and Humphreys (2008) use spatial econometrics to assess the effects of venues in
Columbus, Ohio on property values in that city. The common link among these papers is that they focus on
properties in a single community and proximity to specific sports facilities. In each of them, there is evidence
that properties closer to the sports venues are priced differently than otherwise identical venues farther from the
stadium or arena. These studies, therefore, estimate the extent of local externalities or spillovers from sports
facilities in the same way that one might consider the spillovers from proximity to a noxious facility, like a
prison or hazardous waste treatment facility
(Boyle and Kiel, 2001). Moreover, the conclusions are quite consistent with the argument against stadium and
arena subsidies that stadiums do not generate large area wide benefits but rather induce concentrated benefits in
a small area close to the venue.
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Con: Mega events
The rise of rent prices is not a good indicator of the effect of sports teams. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Of course, cities with professional teams are generally larger metropolitan areas, which offer many other
cultural attractions for which renters would also be willing to pay a premium. Indeed, Coates, Humphreys and
Zimbalist (2006) find that Carlino and Coulson’s results are highly dependent on model specification;
Major sporting events such as the superbowl do not necessarily raise rental values. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
First consider the uninteracted event variables, the first nine rows of the column, across the four models. None of the
Super Bowl variables is remotely statistically significant, indicating that a) there is no market anticipation of the
benefits of the Super Bowl in the year prior to the event, b) there is no evidence of the rental market being tighter in
the year of the Super Bowl, and c) after the Super Bowl there is no residual impact on the rental market. If hosting
the Super Bowl affects the rental housing market in an SMSA, it is not apparent in these regressions.
The effect of large sporting events on rental prices is negligible. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
The effect of hosting the Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City contrasts completely with the Atlanta results.
Without central city interactions, neither the year before nor the year after the games is statistically different
than other observations in our data. However, once the interaction terms are included, the evidence is that
central city Salt Lake housing units have higher rents both before and after hosting the games, and rents outside
Salt Lake City but still in the Salt Lake SMSA are lower than elsewhere prior to the games but no different
afterwards
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The increase in rental values in Atlanta is likely due to outside factors that are ultimately
harmful. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
In Atlanta, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions argues, in Atlanta’s Olympic Legacy: Background
Paper (2007), that the Olympics served as a catalyst for gentrification of downtown Atlanta at the cost of losses
of hundreds of rental units for low and moderate income individuals and families. Given the destruction of such
a large number of units, we would expect rents to rise. However, many of these units were in public housing
and it may be that individuals displaced from these units were too poor to effectively bid up rents on the
existing or newly developed units. Alternatively, and consistent with our results, perhaps these displaced city
dwellers moved out of the city 17but remained within the Atlanta SMSA. A large loss of demand in the city
would force rents down, while the exodus to the suburbs would tend to bid up rents there. Moreover, if the
gentrification produced an increase in the number of rental units for middle and upper middle class families that
would cause the price of such units to come down.
The effects on rental values, on balance, is insignificant. JCD
Coates, Dennis. "Mega-Events and Housing Costs: Raising the Rent While Raising the
Roof?" College of the Holy Cross, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
This paper examines the relationship between hosting mega-events such as the Super Bowl, Olympics, and
World Cup and rental housing prices in host cities. If mega events are amenities for local residents, then rental
housing prices can serve as a proxy for estimating residents’ willingness to pay for these amenities. An analysis
of rental prices in a panel of American cities from 1993-2005 fails to find a consistent impact of mega-events on
rental prices. When controls are placed on the regression models to account for nationwide annual fluctuations
in rental prices, mega-events generally exhibit little impact on rental prices in cities as a whole and are as likely
to reduce rental prices as increase them. Somewhat stronger evidence exists, however, that mega-events affect
rental prices outside of the center city in a fundamentally different manner than in the city core.
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Con: Mega events
The hosting process for the Olympics is propelled by private business interests. JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
If the process were rational, each local organizing committee would have a notion of how much their city stood
to benefit financially from the games and would cap their bid below that dollar figure. Since the Olympics are
likely to generate roughly similar amounts of business activity in any given city, the competition among wouldbe hosts would drive all of their proposals up to the limit, and whichever town was chosen would reap close to
zero net benefit from the event.
Local committees, however, invariably are motivated and run by private business interests which individually
stand to gain from the massive construction associated with the events. These interests include construction
companies, construction unions, architectural firms, investment bankers, and lawyers, among others. They come
together to form a coalition and bring politicians on board.
A conflict of interests arises when bidding for the Olympics. JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
The result is what economists call a principal/agent problem. The city (principal) is not properly represented by
the local organizing committee (agent). The committee that nominally represents the city really represents itself
and bids according to its sense of the private benefit (of its members) versus the private cost, rather than the
city's public benefit versus public cost.Since the private cost is diminutive and the private gain extraordinary,
the local organizing committees, on behalf of the cities, are bound to overbid, wiping out any modest, potential
economic gains.
Meanwhile, during the bidding process cities spend tens of millions of dollars to win the hosting competition.
Chicago spent a reported $100 million in its losing campaign to host the 2016 summer games.
Benefits to bipartisanship in local governments are rather limited in scope. JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Such a potential benefit is more alluring to a less developed city, such as Athens, than to a fully developed and
congested city, such as London or New York. Athens, after all, lacked a modern communications infrastructure
and had significant deficiencies in its transportation infrastructure.
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Con: Mega events
The environment large scale events like the Olympics are planned in are conducive to poor
economic decision making. JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
The challenge here is that the environment in which the preparations for the Games takes place is not conducive
to rational, effective planning. Sports venues and stadiums must be built and infrastructure serving those
edifices takes priority. The other challenge is that the budget, initially bloated, only grows over time as
construction costs escalate over the ten-year preparation period, bells and whistles are inevitably added, and
initial drawings are revealed to be overly optimistic.
The use of these high maintenance facilities over time siphons from the potential benefits.
JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Once the 17-day extravaganza is over, the city must then attempt to find productive use of the dozens of venues
it has built. These projects often cost hundreds-of-millions of dollars to construct, take up 10 to 20 acres of
valuable urban real estate (frequently for decades), and cost tens-of-millions of dollars to maintain each year.
Despite this, many of these former Olympic venues are scarcely used, as is the case with Beijing's Bird's Nest
and Water Cube, or many of the venues built for the Athens games. The list of white elephants is long.
The short term costs of the Olympics far exceeds the increased revenue. JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
These days the summer Games might generate $5-to-6 billion in total revenue (nearly half of which goes to the
International Olympic Committee). In contrast, the costs of the games rose to an estimated $16 billion in
Athens, $40 billion in Beijing, and reportedly nearly $20 billion in London. Only some of this investment is tied
up in infrastructure projects that may be useful going forward.
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Con: Mega events
Public perception of the host city is not always positive. JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
The high costs are bound to make hosting the Olympics a bad deal in the short-run. Promoters, however, claim
that there is a strong benefit that accrues over time connected to the advertising effect of hosting the games. The
idea is that the hundreds of hours of television exposure to hundreds of millions of viewers around the globe
will generate increased tourism and business for the city.
It's a lovely idea, but there is little evidence that it pans out. Whether or not the city receives a positive PR boost
from the TV exposure itself is uncertain. Should the Games be plagued by disorganization (e.g., the current
security snafu in London), the pervasive pollution of Beijing, the violence of Munich, Mexico City or Atlanta,
or the corruption scandals of Salt Lake City and Nagano, then the PR effect might be negative. Further, many of
the host cities are already well-known as tourist destinations around the world and the notion that hosting the
Olympics will put them on the map is about as implausible as Mitt Romney calling for national health care.
Tourism is not increased during the Olympics but rather it displaces the usual crowds in
already popular tourist destinations. JCD
Zimbalist, Andrew. "3 Reasons Why Hosting the Olympics Is a Loser's Game." The Atlantic.
Atlantic Media Company, 23 July 2012. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
It should be added that there is little evidence that tourism increases during the Games. Rather, Olympic tourists
replace normal tourists who want to stay away to avoid the congestion and greater expense during the Games.
The cost of hosting major sporting events is huge. JCD
Myers, Steven Lee. "Russians Debate Sticker Price of Sochi Games." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
President Vladimir V. Putin stoked the debate when he recently told a group of television anchors that Russia had
spent only 214 billion rubles, or roughly $7 billion, to erect the sporting venues for the games. And less than
half of that, he maintained, was government spending.
The cost of hosting major sporting events is grossly understated. JCD
Myers, Steven Lee. "Russians Debate Sticker Price of Sochi Games." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Mr. Putin’s figure was, Mr. Navalny said, “a lie of an absolutely absurd scale.” It is not only one-tenth of the
spending that has been widely reported, but it is also less than the $12 billion Mr. Putin pledged in 2007 to
spend on the games when he personally appealed to the International Olympic Committee to choose Sochi as
the host.
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Con: Mega events
The costs of hosting major sporting events is underreported. JCD
Myers, Steven Lee. "Russians Debate Sticker Price of Sochi Games." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Officials here once boasted of Russia’s ability to spend so lavishly, but of late they have embraced Mr. Putin’s
more frugal tone, and have sought to defend the outlays by redefining what constitutes spending on the
Olympics. They have argued that the billions poured into projects like the huge new power plant on the edge of
the Olympic Village or the adjacent new railroad station should not be counted as Olympic expenditures, but
rather as part of a broader economic stimulus project to rebuild the sea-meets-the-mountains resort on the Black
Sea.
The cost of hosting largescale events continues to rise. JCD
Myers, Steven Lee. "Russians Debate Sticker Price of Sochi Games." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
According to the group’s calculations, Russia has spent more than 1.5 trillion rubles on the Olympics, which at
today’s suddenly declining exchange rate would amount to at least $48 billion — more than China spent for the
far larger Summer Olympics in 2008.
While that figure is roughly comparable with a $50 billion estimate that Russian officials here disclosed a year
ago and then quickly disavowed, the group’s calculations are based on detailed accounting of project costs that
have remained largely opaque, perhaps on purpose.
Hosting the Olympics leads to other extraneous spending with little long term gains. JCD
Myers, Steven Lee. "Russians Debate Sticker Price of Sochi Games." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Mr. Navalny argued that beyond the most visible projects, like the stadiums and arenas, the government also
spent heavily on buildings that had nothing to do with the Olympics or even with future tourism in Sochi. They
include new residences for Mr. Putin, a church at the Olympic Village, and resorts for various agencies like the
prosecutor’s office and the Federal Security Service, all classified in the annual budgets as Olympic projects.
Private business donations to hosting major events are rather limited. JCD
Myers, Steven Lee. "Russians Debate Sticker Price of Sochi Games." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Mr. Navalny challenged the Kremlin’s assertions that much of the spending was private, not government. When
Mr. Putin said that less than half of the figure he cited was federal money, he sidestepped the fact that many of
the largest “private” expenditures were made by companies that are state-owned, like Russian Railways, the
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Con: Mega events
state bank and Gazprom, Mr. Navalny said. According to his organization’s analysis, less than 4 percent of the
overall spending came from truly private companies.
The Olympic economic effect is a myth. JCD
Myers, Steven Lee. "Russians Debate Sticker Price of Sochi Games." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Mikhail G. Delyagin, an economist in Moscow, said in an interview that as a rule, the Olympic Games rarely
prove to be the engines of economic revival that officials claim. “The situation in Sochi is indeed positive,
because there wasn’t even a normal sewer system there,” he said, “but one shouldn’t expect that these resorts
will recoup the cost.”
Forecasts on the effects of the Olympics are unreliable. JCD
Sivaev, Dmitry. "A Year On: An Update on the Economic Legacy of the London 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games." Centre for Cities. N.p., Oct. 2013. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
The report claims that by 2020 the economic impact of the Games will have added over £28 billion to economic
output and created over 600,000 years of employment.7 The methodology and assumptions behind these
numbers are one potential cause for concern, but it is more significant that public officials are focusing on
numbers rather than actions. The Olympics are not and have never been an investment project with decisions
based on expected returns, and the majority of benefits that the Olympics deliver are intangible. A view of the
Olympic legacy that focuses on GVA gains only, does not reflect the wider benefits that the Olympics can
deliver and suggests a more short-term view of the legacy as a whole. A Government action plan that sets out how to
make the most of various economic benefits of the Olympics in the years ahead would be more helpful in the longer
term than the benefit forecasts.
Statistics citing profits from the Olympics are skewed. JCD
Burton, Rick. "Consider Intangibles When Weighing Olympic Host City Benefits."
SportsBusiness Daily. N.p., 7 Sept. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
We noted with great interest the recent announcement from the Chinese government in Beijing that it made
$146 million in operating profit from hosting the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. This proclamation was notable
insomuch as the outcome didn’t suggest any forensic accounting had been conducted by an impartial third
party.
But that’s the norm. Each city hosting the Olympics wants to show its citizens (or government) the pomp and
circumstance didn’t cost anyone anything. As Shakespeare might have said, “All’s well that ends well … if
we’re profitable.”
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Con: Mega events
Most of the cost is put on the government. JCD
Burton, Rick. "Consider Intangibles When Weighing Olympic Host City Benefits."
SportsBusiness Daily. N.p., 7 Sept. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
In Vancouver, where 64 percent of citizens voted in favor of hosting the Games in a 2003 plebiscite, the Games
have come under scrutiny for budget shortfalls necessitating a bailout loan of approximately $87 million (U.S.)
and a recent request for around $20 million (U.S.) related to the construction of the Olympic village. (In
Vancouver’s case, the IOC has already announced it will financially help with — but not completely cover —
VANOC’s debts if there is a deficit following February’s Winter Olympics).
The London Olympics were not profitable. JCD
Burton, Rick. "Consider Intangibles When Weighing Olympic Host City Benefits."
SportsBusiness Daily. N.p., 7 Sept. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
In London, news is emerging that forensic accountants are suggesting a massive shortfall (roughly $160 million,
U.S.) in the London Development Agency’s 2012 Olympics account. If accurate, that is one deep hole.
Shouldn’t someone probe the issue of host city investment logic/strategy going in and the real results coming
out? Is there an over-focusing on costs and a lack of emphasis on long-term direct, indirect and intangible
outcomes?
The methods used to measure the Olympics success economically is misleading. JCD
Burton, Rick. "Consider Intangibles When Weighing Olympic Host City Benefits."
SportsBusiness Daily. N.p., 7 Sept. 2009. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
There is also the issue of “unit of analysis.” Do we measure impact by the organizing committee, the city, the
province/state, or the country? Or all of them collectively? For example, in Barcelona (1992), the Spanish
government was reportedly left a $6.1 billion (all figures U.S.) debt despite the organizing committee reporting
a profit of $3 million. Similarly, in Nagano (1998), reports suggested the Olympic committee showed a $28
million profit but various government groups were left with $11 billion in debt. Some Games do not
differentiate, such as Albertville (1992), which reportedly lost $57 million, and Atlanta (1996) and Sydney
(2000), who both reported breaking even.
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Con: Mega events
Private sector sponsors are unreliable for the Olympics. JCD
Austen, Ian. "A $1 Billion Hangover Awaits an Olympic Party." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 24 Feb. 2010. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Well before the Games began, the global recession pushed several of the Games’s sponsors, including Nortel
Networks and General Motors, into bankruptcy. Whistler Blackcomb, the resort that is hosting the Alpine skiing
events, will soon be sold at auction. Security costs, first estimated at $165 million, are now headed toward $1 billion.
The Vancouver games were incredibly costly. JCD
Austen, Ian. "A $1 Billion Hangover Awaits an Olympic Party." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 24 Feb. 2010. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
Still, organizers insist the operating budget will break even. But that forecast includes a $423 million estimated
contribution from the International Olympic Committee, and detailed financial information will not appear
until after the Games are over.
The debt following the Vancouver Olympics is crippling. JCD
Austen, Ian. "A $1 Billion Hangover Awaits an Olympic Party." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 24 Feb. 2010. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
As for Vancouver’s municipal government and the taxpayers, the bad news is already in. The immediate
Olympic legacy for this city of 580,000 people is a nearly $1 billion debt from bailing out the Olympic Village
development. Beyond that, people in Vancouver and British Columbia have already seen cuts in services like
education, health care and arts financing from their provincial government, which is stuck with many other
Olympics-related costs. Many people, including Mrs. Lombardi, expect that more will follow.
Development costs skyrocketed while preparing for the Olympics. JCD
Austen, Ian. "A $1 Billion Hangover Awaits an Olympic Party." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 24 Feb. 2010. Web. 26 Aug. 2014.
The real estate development industry, which is unusually powerful in Vancouver, provided the city with an
Olympic Village plan that seemed — and ultimately was — too good to be true. A development firm would
finance and build the village on a desirable piece of city-owned land. After the Games, the developer would
convert the accommodations into luxury condominiums and pay the city for the property. Vancouver would get
its village and turn a profit as well.
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But cost overruns, combined with the credit crisis in 2008, destroyed the financing. Once in office, Mr.
Robertson had to obtain special permission from the province to borrow $434 million to complete the village. In
all, the city is responsible for about $1 billion in development costs, a situation that lowered its credit rating.
Only small cities get a boost from mega events DAT
Baumann, Robert, and Victor Matheson. “Infrastructure Investments and Mega-Sports
Events: Comparing the Experience of Developing and Industrialized Countries.”
College of the Holy Cross. August 2013. Web.
There are individual cases where mega-events do seem to have major influence on future demand, but it appears
that a “perfect storm” is needed. Cities that are already on everyone’s map, London for example, gain little in
exposure from a major event since they are already at nearly maximum exposure. Other cities such as Atlanta
or many Winter Olympics hosts also gain little from exposure because the cities have little to offer
potential tourists after their events. Advertising without a subject to advertise is likely to be an exercise in
futility. Under very specific conditions, however, a “hidden gem” can raise its international profile by hosting a
major event. This appears to have been the case with Barcelona, a city with great artistic, cultural, and
architectural treasures, but also a city long overshadowed by European capitals such as Madrid, Rome, London,
and Paris, as well as 40 years of fascist rule. By 2012, twenty years after their moment on the world stage,
Barcelona was the fourth most visited city in Europe. Barcelona’s tourism experience, however, has not been
replicated in the majority of Olympic hosts. Brazil in general, and Rio in particular, offer unparalleled travel
opportunities for tourists, but may have been underutilized as vacation destinations by world travelers. In is
possible that Brazil’s upcoming moments in the spotlight could bring long-run increases in global tourism, but it
is important to note that Brazil in incurring very certain costs today for very uncertain future benefits.
It remains a widespread belief among countries that there are substantial national gains to be made from hosting
these global events, but the evidence indicates that this is rarely the case. Samuel Johnson once wrote that
second marriages reflect “the triumph of hope over experience.” Such thinking also pervades the vigorous
competition among countries to host these exciting but economically questionable events.
Big events tend to go to big cities, which often precludes the “perfect storm” situation described in this
card.
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Pro Counters
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Pro Counters: Urban sprawl
Urban Sprawl
In Defense of Urban Sprawl AMS
Holcombe, Randall. “In Defense of Urban Sprawl.” Property and Environment Resarch
Center. 2014. http://perc.org/articles/urban-sprawl-pro-and-con
The term "urban sprawl" has a bad ring to it. The name reinforces the view that metropolitan growth is
ugly, inefficient, and the cause of traffic congestion and environmental harm. Before we decide we are
against urban sprawl, however, we should be clear about what it is and why we do not like it. Once we
look at its specific characteristics, we can recognize their causes and what, if anything, to do about them.
My study of metropolitan growth indicates that three kinds of development are typical of what we call "urban
sprawl." They include: leapfrog development, strip or ribbon development, and low-density, single-dimensional
development. Let us look at each type in turn.
Leapfrog development occurs when developers build new residences some distance from an existing urban area,
bypassing vacant parcels located closer to the city. In other words, developers choose to build on less expensive
land farther away from an urban area rather than on more costly land closer to the city.
Because land prices are lower, housing in these developments is more affordable. Some people decide to
accept longer commutes in exchange for more comfortable, lower-priced housing.
What few people realize is that leapfrog development nurtures compact commercial development-retail
stores, offices, and businesses. The empty parcels that have been "leapfrogged" create an ideal location
for commercial activity. It is a fact of economic life that developers are reluctant to place new commercial
buildings on the outskirts of an urban area because these areas lack a large market to draw shoppers from. When
new development bypasses vacant land, however, the land in between is suddenly accessible to more people and
thus attractive to commercial developers. Thus, leapfrogging is a vital part of development in growing areas.
Many con teams will use the “urban sprawl” that comes from sports stadiums as a dirty word. This card
helps to refute these claims.
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Pro Counters: Impact analyses
In Defense of Impact Analyses
Economic impact analyses for building stadiums can leave out economic benefits DAT
Kesenne, Stefan, Ph.D. “Do We Need an Economic Impact Study or a Cost-Benefit
Analysis of a Sports Event?” University of Antwerp. 2005. Web.
Does this mean that a sports event with a negative net benefit for the country should not be organized, or should
not be supported by the government? It depends on what is included in the analysis and what is not, such as
some long-term or positive external effects. These can be long-term effects on foreign direct investment or on
the sports participation rate, health or labor productivity. Because these benefits are hard to estimate or to
quantify, or rather arbitrarily, they are often left out.
Most impact analyses fail to quantify externalities because they are typically intangible. Many refutation
of these analyses often attempt to quantify these intangibles, and often show a net negative result. This
omission cannot be looked as a failure of the economic impact study, and cannot conclusively be used to
refute its results.
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Pro Counters: Substitution effect
Substitution Effect rebuttal
Substitution effect does not take into account out of town visitors, Fj
Johnson, Garrett. “The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities”
University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal.
The Nashville Convention and Visitors Bureau believed that direct spending gave the most accurate way to
determine new and outside dollars that enter the local economy. Between 1997 and 2005, approximately
eighty-five groups or events with one thousand or more attendees have used the stadium or arena, with
thirty-two of those events exceeding fifteen thousand in average daily attendance. All totaled, an
estimated 1.3 million people attended major events at the two venues between 1997 and 2005 outside of
Titans’ and Predators’ games. Major events include: the CMA Music Festival, the Music City Bowl, SEC
Men’s and Women’s Conference Tournaments, and the U.S. Figure Skating Championships. The average outof-town attendance at these events was well over fifty percent, with the average total attendance at the
arena being 11,777 and average total attendance at the stadium being 25,723.205 The average total
spending from out-of-town visitors was approximately $3.5 million. The study found that between 1997
and 2005, an estimated $301,818,000 was spent directly on the eighty-five major events held at these two
venues. This study avoids some of the flaws that were previously pointed out in this paper concerning impact
studies. It did not look at the substitution effect on spending, but did not need to because the focus of the
study was on the amount of money spent by individuals from out-of-town. Presumably, they were only in
town for the specific event and would not have been in town otherwise. Because of this, they would not
have spent their money on something else in the city instead of the event they attended.
Nashville Convention and Visitors Bureau study methodology, Fj
Johnson, Garrett. “The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities”
University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal.
The direct impact is calculated by two different methods: a meetings/convention formula and a leisure spending
formula. The meeting /convention formula is calculated by the total number of out-of-town attendees
times the average amount of nights they stayed in the city (3.6 nights) times the average daily spending
($238). The leisure spending formula is calculated by the total number of out-of-town attendees times
main event days times the average each person spent on leisure.
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Pro Counters: Eminent domain
The Use of Eminent Domain is Justified
Constitutional basis for eminent domain, Fj
Johnson, Garrett. “The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities”
University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal.
With the increase in construction projects over the last couple of decades, comes the growing need to find
suitable land on which to locate these facilities. Property owners, as well as governments, have faced several
issues related to this, most notably eminent domain. Local governments increasingly use the power of eminent
domain to take land from private citizens, and give it to developers to build stadiums and arenas. The “takings
clause” of the Fifth Amendment, which is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
states that, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. “The “takings
clause” prohibits the government’s power to take property if it is not for public use.
Meyer v. City of Cleveland,Fj
Johnson, Garrett. “The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities”
University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal.
The courts have broadly construed the term “public use” in the context of sports and recreation, but generally
defer to the state legislatures when trying to formulate a justification and intent. Although the United States
Supreme Court has never heard a case which specifically dealt with a new stadium and its public use, a couple
lower courts have and consistently recognized the significance of stadiums to a community. The court in
Meyer v. City of Cleveland had to determine if a newly planned stadium was a “lawful municipal
purpose.” The court concluded that it was, stating a municipality’s duty to “please and amuse their
inhabitants . . . is unquestioned.”
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Pro Counters: Eminent domain
Berman v. Parker,Fj
Johnson, Garrett. “The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities”
University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, local officials will sometimes use a new stadium or arena as the
centerpiece of their urban renewal efforts. They argue that they have eminent domain powers for these
projects and cite several United States Supreme Court cases to support their assertions. In Berman v.
Parker, the Court opined that it supported the taking of commercial property within an area designated
for urban renewal. In Berman, Washington D.C. officials attempted to revitalize certain areas of town that
were designated as blighted. The plaintiff’s store was located in one of these areas and was condemned by the
local government. The plaintiff challenged this condemnation on the grounds that it was unconstitutional for the
government to take his land and give it to a private developer. The Court stated, “[i]f owner after owner
were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was
not being used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.” The
condemnation action was upheld by the Court because the redevelopment of the blighted area served a
public purpose and was a legitimate taking.
Kelo v. City of New London, Fj
Johnson, Garrett. “The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities”
University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal.
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held that economic development was a valid purpose
to satisfy the public use requirement. Kelo concerned an economically depressed area of New London,
Connecticut and local officials’ efforts to revitalize the area by placing a $300 million Pfizer facility in
it. Susette Kelo was among several people whose residence was located in this area, and refused to give up their
land in favor of the new development, arguing that the city’s taking was a violation of the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. The Court concluded that the use of eminent domain in this situation
was a legitimate use noting, “[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted
function of government.” These two decisions show just how broad the meaning of “public use” can be. If
those who support the construction of a new facility can couch their argument in terms of it serving a
public purpose, courts will have a difficult time determining that it is not a valid public use.
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Pro Counters: Other factors
Stadiums Lack of Success Due to Other Factors
Study Basis, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Literature suggests than only 8 of 55 stadiums that are currently in-use and were constructed with at least 25%
public funding have succeeded in spurring economic development in their surrounding area. This paper
examines trends in stadium building to highlight attributes of stadiums, in both structure and placement,
which are integral to their ability to successfully create economic development.
Downtown Location affects success, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
As seen by the fact that only successful stadium redevelopment projects have occurred in downtown
areas, it is imperative that cities work with MLB and NFL teams to see future publicly funded stadiums
are built in downtown areas. Stadium redevelopment projects are only able to succeed in downtown because
stadiums, on their own, only have the capacity to transfer spending from one location to another. By using a
stadium to transfer spending downtown, where there is a clustering of business and residential
development, the area can further grow from the influx of new spending. Non-downtown areas do not
possess such a clustering of development that would allow an area to further grow to the desired levels
from such an influx of new spending. (Rosentraub 2010)
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City Economic and Demographic Characteristics affect success, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
As shown above, on average, in cities where successful stadium redevelopment projects have occurred:
population is lower, average median household income is higher, crime index is lower, percent minority is
lower, and percent below the poverty line is identical. These findings suggest that building a stadium in
the downtown of a city that is better off relative to other comparable cities may more often lead to the
outcome of the stadium redevelopment project being successful.
Intuitively this makes sense, as cities with residents that have higher incomes will have higher levels of
disposable income which they can spend on items such as tickets for sporting events. Additionally, cities with
lower crime rates will be more likely to draw in visitors from surrounding areas who will feel safer enjoying
themselves in the city and doing things like taking their families to a sporting event.
The fact that the average populations of cities in which successful stadium redevelopment projects have
occurred may seem somewhat surprising. Certainly, in larger markets, there are more potential fans to attend
sports games and frequent businesses in the area surrounding stadiums. However, what this may suggest is that
population is not as a big a factor is initially believed. Recent stadium redevelopment projects, such as Yankee
Stadium in Bronx, NY, which has a population of 1,383,871, have not succeeded where other recent projects,
such as Target Field in Minneapolis, MN, which has a population of 382,578, have succeeded. Though smaller
markets face greater challenges on and off of the field, professional sports do have the ability to revitalize
smaller markets. On the other hand, though it is easier for the Yankees to draw large crowds than the
Twins, Yankee Stadium has brought little economic growth to the Bronx.
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Walkability affects success, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Walk Score is an independent corporation that calculates the walkability of different urban neighborhoods
throughout the United States by giving a rating out of 100 (higher being better). To assign a neighborhood a
Walk Score, the Walk Score company determines how clustered a neighborhood’s population is around the
buildings which they frequent and then does a regression analysis on such factors. (Walk Score 2012) Below are
the trends in Walk Score for the neighborhoods currently employed MLB and NFL stadiums are located in:
What is the big deal about being easily accessible by foot other than the environmental benefit that the use of
fewer cars brings? For one, less traffic on game days means less impact on residents and businesses and
also means more people will patronize the city that otherwise would have stayed away. (Property
Counselors 2006) Also, the fact that more people will walk to the stadium will increase the foot traffic
around the restaurants and businesses that are located near the stadium. The more car-dependent a
stadium such as Ford Field is, the more fans will go right to the stadium and bypass opportunities to spend their
money elsewhere. In addition, this effect might be doubled because businesses that may have had interest
in developing around a stadium will be less likely to do so knowing that fans will not be spending much
time in the surrounding area.
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Public Transit affects success, Fj
Koehler, Peter. “Why Do Some Stadium Redevelopment Projects Succeed Where Others
Fail? An Analysis Using Macro-Level Trends in Stadium Building” Colgate
University. Summer 2012.
Encouraging public transportation is of merit from an environmental aspect, as it is a highly efficient way of
transporting large numbers of people, and it is of merit from an economic level as well. A well-positioned
stadium will have public transportation that takes fans very close to the stadium, with them needing to
walk only a relatively short distance. However this foot traffic in the area directly around the stadium
will allow the potential for businesses there to thrive. It should thus come as no surprise that as shown below,
successful stadiums have public transit that is available closer to the stadium:
The role of subsidies in the success of stadiums is minimal. Subsidies keep stadiums in town; the success
of stadiums is due to other factors beyond the influence of subsidies. In other words, the failure of
stadiums is not because of the subsidies themselves.
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Con Counters
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Statistics from Sports Institutions are Inaccurate
Why the Pro Team’s Statistics are Imbalanced and Inaccurate AMS
DeMause, Neil. “Why Do Mayors Love Sports Stadiums?” July 27, 2011. The Nation.
http://www.thenation.com/article/162400/why-do-mayors-love-sports-stadiums
For politicians eager to embrace sports deals, it’s easy to find consulting firms willing to produce glowing
“economic impact studies”—even though sports economists nearly unanimously dismiss them as
hogwash. For example: Economic Research Associates told the city of Arlington, Texas, that spending
$325 million on a new stadium for billionaire oil baron Jerry Jones’s Dallas Cowboys would generate
$238 million a year in economic activity. Critics immediately pointed out that this merely totaled up all
spending that would take place in and around the stadium. Hidden deep in the report was the more meaningful
estimate that Arlington would see just $1.8 million a year in new tax revenues while spending $20 million a
year on stadium subsidies.
Jeanette Mott Oxford, who was an antisubsidy activist before being elected a Missouri state representative, says
it’s easy for her colleagues to be distracted with flashy claims. “Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear that elected
officials are much into evidence-based decision-making,” she explains. “Folks believe the threat that jobs will
be lost, that somehow the team will move. Then there’s the civic pride element around the status of having a
team. I think that too often, those motivate people no matter what the evidence says.”
Capital Costs Funded by Taxpayers AMS
Easterbrook, Gregg. “How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers.” September 18, 2013. The
Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleecestaxpayers/309448/%20Y2K
Judith Grant Long, a Harvard University professor of urban planning, calculates that league-wide, 70
percent of the capital cost of NFL stadiums has been provided by taxpayers, not NFL owners. Many cities,
counties, and states also pay the stadiums’ ongoing costs, by providing power, sewer services, other
infrastructure, and stadium improvements. When ongoing costs are added, Long’s research finds, the Buffalo
Bills, Cincinnati Bengals, Cleveland Browns, Houston Texans, Indianapolis Colts, Jacksonville Jaguars, Kansas
City Chiefs, New Orleans Saints, San Diego Chargers, St. Louis Rams, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and Tennessee
Titans have turned a profit on stadium subsidies alone—receiving more money from the public than they
needed to build their facilities. Long’s estimates show that just three NFL franchises—the New England
Patriots, New York Giants, and New York Jets—have paid three-quarters or more of their stadium capital costs.
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The Math Does Not Add Up AMS
DeMause, Neil. “Why Do Mayors Love Sports Stadiums?” July 27, 2011. The Nation.
http://www.thenation.com/article/162400/why-do-mayors-love-sports-stadiums
It’s a story that could have been told in almost any American city over the past two decades. Owners of
teams in the “big four” sports leagues—the NFL, MLB, NBA and NHL—have reaped nearly $20 billion
in taxpayer subsidies for new homes since 1990. And for just as long, fans, urban planners and economists
have argued that building facilities for private sports teams is a massive waste of public money. As University
of Chicago economist Allen Sanderson memorably put it, “If you want to inject money into the local economy,
it would be better to drop it from a helicopter than invest it in a new ballpark.”
Studies demonstrating pro sports stadiums’ slight economic impact go back to 1984, the year Lake Forest
College economist Robert Baade examined thirty cities that had recently constructed new facilities. His
finding: in twenty-seven of them, there had been no measurable economic impact; in the other three,
economic activity appeared to have decreased. Dozens of economists have replicated Baade’s findings, and
revealed similar results for what the sports industry calls “mega-events”: Olympics, Super Bowls, NCAA
tournaments and the like. (In one study of six Super Bowls, University of South Florida economist Phil Porter
found “no measurable impact on spending,” which he attributed to the “crowding out” effect of nonfootball
tourists steering clear of town during game week.)
Meanwhile, numerous cities are littered with “downtown catalysts” that have failed to catalyze, from the St.
Louis “Ballpark Village,” which was left a muddy vacant lot for years after the neighboring ballpark opened, to
the Newark hockey arena sited in the midst of a wasteland of half-shuttered stores.
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Flaws in Economic Studies Exposed AMS
Zimbalist, Andrew and Noll, Roger. “Sports, Jobs, & Taxes.” Brookings Institution. 1997.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/summer-taxes-noll
Unfortunately, these arguments contain bad economic reasoning that leads to overstatement of the
benefits of stadiums. Economic growth takes place when a community's resources—people, capital
investments, and natural resources like land—become more productive. Increased productivity can arise in
two ways: from economically beneficial specialization by the community for the purpose of trading with other
regions or from local value added that is higher than other uses of local workers, land, and investments.
Building a stadium is good for the local economy only if a stadium is the most productive way to make capital
investments and use its workers.
In our forthcoming Brookings book, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes, we and 15 collaborators examine the local
economic development argument from all angles: case studies of the effect of specific facilities, as well as
comparisons among cities and even neighborhoods that have and have not sunk hundreds of millions of
dollars into sports development. In every case, the conclusions are the same. A new sports facility has an
extremely small (perhaps even negative) effect on overall economic activity and employment. No recent
facility appears to have earned anything approaching a reasonable return on investment. No recent facility has
been self-financing in terms of its impact on net tax revenues. Regardless of whether the unit of analysis is a
local neighborhood, a city, or an entire metropolitan area, the economic benefits of sports facilities are de
minimus.
As noted, a stadium can spur economic growth if sports is a significant export industry—that is, if it attracts
outsiders to buy the local product and if it results in the sale of certain rights (broadcasting, product licensing) to
national firms. But, in reality, sports has little effect on regional net exports.
Sports facilities attract neither tourists nor new industry. Probably the most successful export facility is
Oriole Park, where about a third of the crowd at every game comes from outside the Baltimore area.
(Baltimore's baseball exports are enhanced because it is 40 miles from the nation's capital, which has no major
league baseball team.) Even so, the net gain to Baltimore's economy in terms of new jobs and incremental tax
revenues is only about $3 million a year—not much of a return on a $200 million investment.
Sports teams do collect substantial revenues from national licensing and broadcasting, but these must be
balanced against funds leaving the area. Most professional athletes do not live where they play, so their
income is not spent locally. Moreover, players make inflated salaries for only a few years, so they have high
savings, which they invest in national firms. Finally, though a new stadium increases attendance, ticket
revenues are shared in both baseball and football, so that part of the revenue gain goes to other cities. On
balance, these factors are largely offsetting, leaving little or no net local export gain to a community.
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One promotional study estimated that the local annual economic impact of the Denver Broncos was
nearly $120 million; another estimated that the combined annual economic benefit of Cincinnati's
Bengals and Reds was $245 million. Such promotional studies overstate the economic impact of a facility
because they confuse gross and net economic effects. Most spending inside a stadium is a substitute for other
local recreational spending, such as movies and restaurants. Similarly, most tax collections inside a stadium are
substitutes: as other entertainment businesses decline, tax collections from them fall.
Promotional studies also fail to take into account differences between sports and other industries in
income distribution. Most sports revenue goes to a relatively few players, managers, coaches, and
executives who earn extremely high salaries—all well above the earnings of people who work in the
industries that are substitutes for sports. Most stadium employees work part time at very low wages and
earn a small fraction of team revenues. Thus, substituting spending on sports for other recreational
spending concentrates income, reduces the total number of jobs, and replaces full-time jobs with lowwage, part-time jobs.
This analysis by the Brookings Institution not only points out the economic problems with public
subsidies for sports, but explains the flaws in studies done to demonstrate the economic benefit of these
studies. Use this card to explain the economic problems with expecting large scale impact from sports
subsidies and discount statistics from Pro teams.
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A further examination of economic impact studies DAT
Wilhelm, Sarah. “Public Funding of Sports Stadiums.” Center for Public Policy and
Administration. University of Utah. 30 April 2008. Web.
http://cppa.utah.edu/_documents/publications/finance-tax/sports-stadiums.pdf
Several flaws in the franchise consultant analysis have been identified. Not all analyses have all the mentioned
flaws, but most have at least one that leads to the overestimating of the impact of sports stadiums.
• Author biases. Economic consulting firms hired by franchises obviously have an incentive to find positive
results. Academics may have bias as well, although there is no reason to assume that all academics would be
biased against stadium construction. Yet all of their findings have been that stadiums do not create economic
growth.
• Method. Franchise consultants create estimates based on assumptions about projected future economic activity
for one metro area. Academic economists are analyzing past economic activity. Academic studies look at
multiple metropolitan areas and analyze economic activity controlling for other factors that will likely affect
economic growth.
• Ignoring the substitution effect. Franchise consultants often anticipate spending that would happen in and
around the new stadium without taking into account spending that may be reduced in other recreational
activities as fans divert their spending. Assuming families have relatively fixed entertainment budgets
that they split among many activities, increased spending at a new stadium will mean decreased spending
at other entertainment facilities (movies, amusement parks, museums, etc.). Thus, we can expect little
economic growth from local families redistributing their entertainment budgets. Some economic growth can
come from those outside the metro area choosing to spend their money at the sports stadium rather than
spending near their home.
• Ignoring visit motivation. Franchise consultants count every dollar spent by out-of-town fans as dollars
brought in by the stadium. However, many out-of-town fans attend games, but would have visited the
metro area without the stadium. Many attend games while being in town for a conference, a wedding, to
see an art exhibit, etc. Their spending on hotels, restaurants, etc. should not be included in stadium benefits if
the motive for their trip was not the stadium.
• Overstating the multiplier. Franchise consultants have used multipliers to estimate economic benefits such as
job creation as high as 2.5. That is, one job created by the stadium directly leads to 2.5 jobs being created
indirectly. Academic studies have found that a more reasonable multiplier would be 1.25. The lower
multiplier is justified because a large portion of spending goes to purchase goods produced outside the metro
area and the athletes typically live outside the metro area (at least during the off season).
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• Focusing on gross rather than net jobs. Jobs lost are often not included in the analysis done by franchise
consultants. While the new stadium may employ 1000 people, if the old stadium employed 900, net jobs
increased 100.
• Overstating the importance of the stadium in the local economy. Sports stadiums positive impacts are often
small relative to the economy of a metro area. In fact a sports franchise has about the same scale of economic
effect as a large grocery store. A civic leader in Sacramento claimed, “The Raiders coming to Sacramento
would be an event the magnitude of the Gold Rush.” During the Gold Rush 300,000 people moved to California
in the six years following the 1848 discovery of gold in Sacramento. The Raiders would have played 8 home
games a year there. Many find it surprising that a sports stadium does not generate more economic development
however; sports franchises are really small businesses. The Jazz generates about $10 million dollars - that is
0.029 percent of the Salt Lake economy which generated $33.6 billion dollars in personal income in 2005.21
Real Salt Lake will generate create 175 jobs or 0.027 percent of jobs in a metropolitan area that has 625,800
nonfarm employees.
This topic is rare, in that economists are nearly unanimous in their negative findings toward sports
stadium subsidies. With that in mind, this card offers the most empirical look at why any economic
impact study (which present the preponderance of evidence for the use of public funds for stadiums) is
unreliable. Statistics can’t be used to prove a point if their methodology is suspect and their numbers are
meaningless, as is nearly the case with pro-subsidy economic impact studies.
Economic impact studies entirely ignore opportunity costs DAT
Zaretsky, Adam M. “Should Cities Pay for Sports Facilities?” The Regional Economist.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. April 2001. Web.
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=468
Another glaring omission from these economic impact studies is the value of the next-best investment
alternative—what economists call the opportunity cost. "There's no such thing as a free lunch" is a favorite
economist expression because it sums up exactly what opportunity cost means: When making a choice,
something always has to be given up. The value of the "losing" choice must be considered when making the
decision and when calculating the value, or return, of the "winning" choice. In other words, when a city chooses
to use taxpayer dollars to finance a sports stadium, the city's leaders must consider not only what the alternative
uses of those funds could be—such as schools, police, roads, etc.—but they must also figure what return the city
would receive from these other ventures. Then, the return from the city's next-best alternative (for example,
schools) must be subtracted from the total return of the "winning" choice to arrive at the "actual" return
of the stadium investment. This adjusted calculation, though, is almost always missing from sports
stadium impact studies. Why? Because in just about every case, the adjusted calculation would show that
the next-best alternative was actually the better alternative.
The net cost of a stadium for a sports team thus ends up negative. If a stadium is robbing its
neighborhood of better alternatives (e.g. schools, theatres), it’s doing harm on balance.
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Small markets vastly oversell themselves to justify excessive funding of local teams DAT
Crompton, John L. “Economic Impact Analysis of Sports Facilities and Events: Eleven
Sources of Misapplication.” Journal of Sport Management. Texas A&M University.
1995. Web. http://agrilifecdn.tamu.edu/cromptonrpts/files/2011/06/Full-Text100.pdf
Changes in geographical boundaries of the area of impact are likely to lead to changes in multiplier size,
because the magnitude of a multiplier depends on the structure of the host community. That is, the degree to
which businesses at which visitors spend their money proceed to trade with other businesses within the
defined area, rather than with enterprises outside the defined geographical area. It is generally assumed
that a smaller community tends not to have the sectorial interdependencies that facilitate retention of
monies spent during the first round of expenditures. Hence, much of the expenditure would be respent
outside the local region leading to a low local economic multiplier. Conventional wisdom posits that the larger
is the defined area's economic base, then the larger is likely to be the value added from the original
expenditures, and the smaller is the leakage that is likely to occur.
Almost all professional sports franchises are located in major metropolitan areas. Hence, revenues the
franchises receive from out-of-town visitors and other external sources such as television, tend to stay in the
local area. For example, Schaffer and Davidson (1984, p. 15) concluded that about 70% of expenditures by the
Atlanta Falcons were made locally. They reported that 79 percent of the players and staff of the team live here
all year; 39 of 58 players and 46 of 50 staff members live in Atlanta. Most field personnel are local residents,
printing is local, the team uses Atlanta banks as well as an Atlanta based airline, and the team is locally owned.
Thus, much of the visitors' revenues received by the Falcons is respent inside the local region leading to a
relatively high economic multiplier.
There has been a tendency for aspirants in inherently small market areas seeking a new professional
franchise to expand the definitions of their traditional market area in order to strengthen their case with
existing team owners and with city officials and residents who will be expected to subsidize the franchise.
For example, promoters of Charlotte's NFL bid transformed the city of 396,000 into a region of 9.7
million people, despite the Charlotte metropolitan area having only 1.2 million residents. They counted
everyone within 150 miles of Charlotte as a potential fan in order to persuade team owners that their market
could generate the desired threshold of revenue, and residents that substantial economic impact would be
forthcoming (American Demographics, 1992). In fact, studies have consistently shown that at least 70% of fans
are likely to come from the immediate metropolitan area (Crompton, 1984; Schaffer & Davidson, 1975,1984).
The smaller a market for a sports team, the more likely that any revenue generated by the market will
eventually escape, leading to smaller gains. By artificially inflating their own value, small markets wind
up placing themselves under a burden which they cannot meet. This, then, is the real impact shown by
the above card: the outlay of a public subsidy for a professional sports team is inherently unsustainable
for small markets, and the manipulation of accounting figures to make the market seem sustainable
simply sets local communities up to bear a burden too large for them.
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Public Subsidies are Not Good for the Public
How Public Subsidies for Stadiums Hurt the Public AMS
DeMause, Neil. “Why Do Mayors Love Sports Stadiums?” July 27, 2011. The Nation.
http://www.thenation.com/article/162400/why-do-mayors-love-sports-stadiums
“Public subsidies for stadiums are a great deal for team owners, league executives, developers, bond
attorneys, construction firms, politicians and everyone in the stadium food chain, but a really terrible
deal for everyone else,” concludes Frank Rashid, a lifelong Detroit Tigers fan and college English professor.
Rashid co-founded the Tiger Stadium Fan Club in 1987, and for the next twelve years he fought an unsuccessful
battle against Michigan’s plans to spend $145 million in public funds to replace that historic ballpark. “The case
is so clear against this being a top priority for cities to be doing with their resources, I would have thought that
wisdom would have prevailed by now.”
America’s Poorest Cities Overspend on Sports AMS
Gordon, Aaron. “America Has a Stadium Problem.” Pacific Standard. July 27, 2013.
http://www.psmag.com/navigation/business-economics/america-has-a-stadiumproblem-62665/
All the while, American cities, counties, and states continue to struggle. Glendale, Arizona, may actually sell
City Hall so they can afford to keep subsidizing a hockey team that few people actually pay to see. Detroit isn’t
exactly the paragon of fiscal responsibility, with its Emergency Manager—they have an honest-to-god
“emergency manager”—offering a stern warning:
In a report to be presented to Michigan’s treasurer on Monday, Kevyn D. Orr, the emergency manager
appointed in March to take over operations here, described long-term obligations of at least $15 billion,
unsustainable cash flow shortages and miserably low credit ratings that make it difficult to borrow.
But, they’re somehow on the verge of finding $450 million for a new hockey arena.
And in Hamilton County, Ohio, where a combined $805 million in taxpayer money built the new football and
baseball stadiums, police and education budgets have been slashed, while one in seven people live below the
poverty line.
Not only are sports stadiums a bad economic investment—they are hurting the cities that need funding
the most.
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Pro teams bring the wrong kinds of jobs with them DAT
Bast, Joseph L. “Sports Stadium Madness.” Heartland Institute. 23 February 1998. Web.
http://heartland.org/sites/default/files/sports_stadium_madness_02-23-1998.pdf
While professional athletes are well paid, the great majority of jobs created by stadium development are lowpaying, seasonal, and part-time, such as parking cars and selling refreshments during games. These are not the
kinds of jobs that lead to greater economic growth for a region, or position a community to take
advantage of national and international trends toward workforces with higher skills and familiarity with
advanced technology. Many economists would agree that low-paying jobs often serve as valuable first rungs
on the employment ladder. Young people and people with few skills can use these jobs to learn how to increase
their productivity, thereby positioning themselves for better-paying jobs in the future. But research by Robert
Baade suggests that growth in the number of low-skilled jobs tends to follow the creation of higher
paying jobs, not the other way around. So the optimal economic development strategy, according to
Baade, may be to foster the latter, not the former.
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Sports Don’t Attract Outside Investment
Stadiums and their teams replace other local entertainment without adding extra value DAT
Bast, Joseph L. “Sports Stadium Madness.” Heartland Institute. 23 February 1998. Web.
http://heartland.org/sites/default/files/sports_stadium_madness_02-23-1998.pdf
Most people have an “entertainment budget” of time and money they are willing to devote to entertainment of
any kind. The act of subsidizing a sports stadium does not increase the size of that budget: We are not somehow
given more time to devote to recreation, and the price of tickets to see a live game does not go down (for
reasons explained below). Consequently, most of the money spent at a sports stadium or arena would have been
spent anyway at some other entertainment venue, such as a local theater, bowling alley, night club, or health
club.21
A stadium would indeed generate “new money” for a metropolitan area if it attracted a significant
percent of its fans from outside the immediate area. This is generally not the case for baseball and
basketball, where “the number and frequency of games means that most of the market for ticket sales is
metropolitan.” Football games, because there are fewer of them and they are scheduled on 22 weekends, draw
fans from greater distances. However, the small number of football games—just eight regular season home
games—means the total number of fans attending football games is much smaller than the number attending
baseball or basketball games.
The few sports teams that do attract fans from outside their immediate areas typically play in facilities
(such as Oriole Park in Camden Yards, Maryland) strategically located on the outskirts of major
metropolitan areas, in which case the host jurisdiction’s employment and tax revenue gains come largely
at the expense of the neighboring jurisdiction. Finally, a few long-established baseball franchises located
near the central business districts of major metropolitan areas also draw fans from outside the immediate area.
From an economic standpoint, funding sports stadiums is, even in its most ideal and efficient state, a
zero-sum game. In reality, the act of the public funding a sports team amounts to paying (typically
millions of dollars) to shuffle money from other entertainment sources/locations.
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Stadiums are a poor tool for revitalization/gentrification efforts DAT
Chapin, Timothy. “Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts. Journal of the
American Planning Association, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 2004.Web.
The project that has most recently furthered the perception that Baltimore has survived and thrived in the
postmodern economy is the Camden Yards sports complex. The twin stadiums at Camden Yards were
initially intended to address two primary goals: (i) to keep baseball's Orioles in Baltimore and (2) to
attract a National Football League franchise to the city (Richmond, 1993). The project can be considered
a success on these two fronts, as the Orioles are now one of baseball's more financially successful clubs,
and the NFL's Ravens now call Baltimore home after their relocation from Cleveland. As Camden Yards
developed, an additional goal was attached to the project: the revitalization of the western edges of downtown.
While projects along the Inner Harbor have revitalized the waterfront and nearby areas have seen hotels and a
large new convention center open, areas to the west and southwest of the harbor have experienced few changes
as a result of these redevelopment efforts.
(…)
In particular, the old retail district to the north of Camden Yards has not experienced an influx of new
businesses; buildings along these corridors remain vacant and dilapidated. As for criteria number two-new
construction in the district-downtown Baltimore's western edge has been strikingly unaffected by the new
stadiums. New facilities for the University of Maryland at Baltimore (Figure 2, item 3) and a convention
center expansion (item 4) represent the only major new construction in the immediate area. While plans
for new hotels in the district have existed for years, Camden Yards has not sparked new hotel
construction. On the residential front, the area did not experience an influx of housing in new or renovated
spaces in the area, despite the trend towards downtown housing in the United States throughout the I990s
(Birch, 2002). Only very recently has downtown seen any new residential development, along the Howard
Street corridor far to the north of Camden Yards (Harlan, 2001).
The case study in this card is an application of most points in the Con section: a city considers retaining
sports teams a victory as its economics remain stagnant despite stadium investment. This shows one of
the most relevant impacts to the debate: the infrastructure of the community surrounding the stadium,
and how it develops alongside new stadium investments.
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Con Counters: No “public good”
September/October 2014
There is no “Public Good”
Public Good Argument Fails AMS
Griffin, Tom. “Pro Sport's Impact on the Economy is Closer to a Bunt than a Home Run,
but There May Be Other Reasons to Keep Teams Swinging at Home.” University of
Washington. June 1997.
https://www.washington.edu/alumni/columns/june97/game1.html Web. 20 Aug.
2014
Just as a community supports parks, libraries, zoos and aquariums, it should also support professional sports as
a public good, say some advocates. "The Seahawks help celebrate our cultural diversity. Fans from all walks of
life unite in a common effort behind our team," notes literature from Football Northwest. "The Seahawks
identify Seattle and the Northwest as a world class city and region."
"You have to remember that the Mariners, Sonics and Seahawks are not just enjoyed by the fans in the
stadium," adds Conway. "There are hundreds of thousands of fans who watch them on TV and listen to them on
the radio. Think about that enjoyment. That has a value."
But measuring that value is close to impossible. Public Affairs Professor Richard Zerbe, an economist
who does cost benefit studies, says his field defines a public good as an element the normal market system
can't value. Classic examples of public goods are pollution control and national defense, he explains.
Few "public good" studies have tried to find the value of sports, he adds. To truly measure the public
good, "you'd have to track those who are not fans who would nevertheless be willing to keep the
Seahawks in Seattle. How much would they be willing to pay?" Zerbe tried to interest the Kingdome
Renovation Task Force into funding such a study, but the group turned him down.
"If you accept the public good argument," Zerbe adds, "then you have to allow for some kind of public
ownership. If there is a public good, why not let the public buy stock in the enterprise?"
Urban politics expert Bryan Jones, a UW political science professor recently hired away from Texas A&M,
finds little in new sports facilities that contributes to the public good. "You need a common sense approach,"
he maintains. "If you sat down and put together a list of priorities for this region, it is hard to believe that
two sports stadiums would be at the top of the list."
Jones says there is a "funnel" effect for public projects, especially construction of new facilities. A lot of
proposals are at the top of the funnel but only a few make it all the way through to completion. "If you crowd
out public projects with two sports stadiums, something else is not going to be done," he warns.
If Pro Teams use vague statistics or cite the public good, remind them that concrete numbers are needed
for economic evaluations.
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Con Counters: Civic pride
Civic Pride Leads To An Increase In Crime
Sport Franchises Hide Crimes For Positive Public Image. ASF
Halsne, Chris. "Crime inside NFL Stadiums Hidden from Police." Seattle News, Weather,
Traffic, Video and Sports. KIRO, 31 Jan. 2013
http://www.kirotv.com/news/news/crime-inside-nfl-stadiums-hidden-police/nT9RP/
The National Football League keeps detailed records of crime, alcohol abuse and security failures inside
every NFL stadium on game day, but, in an effort to protect certain teams from public scrutiny, keeps the
data secret.¶ A months-long investigation by KIRO-TV in Seattle (CBS/Cox Media Group) found that many
local police departments are helping the NFL’s cause, by either failing to create crime reports or underreporting
incidents that occur in the stands and nearby parking lots during football games. In an effort to independently
compile fan-related crime statistics, KIRO 7 contacted police departments covering all 32 NFL teams and
requested information from police reports taken on game days. So far, investigative reporter Chris
Halsne has reviewed about 10,000 incidents over two-and-a half seasons. Hundreds of felony-level crime
arrests appear in the reports; including, rape, kidnapping, lynching, theft, drug dealing, child sexual
abuse and aggravated assault of police officers. Thousands more cases of misdemeanor and citable
offenses like public intoxication, simple assault, exposure and scalping also show up in the reports reviewed.
Here we see that stadiums are covering up thousands of crimes strictly due to the popularity of teams.
Any argument that will say it is beneficial for civic pride now can be turned for the pro, because the pride
people take in the stadium causes the organization to hide crime.
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Con Counters: Civic pride
City-championed urban renewal projects drive up and redistribute criminal activity DAT
Dannes, Jeff. “Collateral Damage: Unintended Consequences of Urban Renewal in
Baltimore, MD.” Washington and Lee University.n.d. Web.
http://www2.wlu.edu/documents/shepherd/academics/cap_03_dannes.pdf
However dramatic crime reductions (and socio-economic improvements) may have been in the regions most
immediately effected by urban renewal (Inner Harbor/Camden Yards, Fells Point, Canton and lower
Downtown), crime rates throughout the city remained at high levels. Indeed, Schumacher and Leitner remind us
that even in most of downtown, crime rates were unaffected by the Harbor Project. Indeed, in many of the city’s
poorest neighborhoods, crime rates made a statistically significant increase after the Harbor Project began to
significantly impact crime rates along the waterfront. Analysis of city crime rates through the use of Global
Information Systems (GIS) data seems to indicate that urban renewal in downtown Baltimore did not
solve, to any consequential degree, the City’s crime problems, and in fact may have displaced criminal
activity, shifting crime away from the Harbor and into adjacent communities.
Unsurprisingly one of the areas that saw startling increases in crime after renewal began was Sandtown. One of
downtown Baltimore’s stable subareas before the city began its ambitious urban renewal schemes, this location
seems to have received much of Downtown’s displaced criminal activity. Changes in crime rates are affected by
numerous factors: prosecution patterns, drug trade and vacancy are merely a few of these. But the facts on
Sandtown remain undeniably clear: the once stable area became one of Baltimore’s most dangerous after
renewal began. In addition to the measured increases in burglary, the neighborhood also became one of
the centers for the city’s active open-air drug market. The violent crime rate in Sandtown is three times
that of the Inner Harbor. It also experienced simultaneous increases in poverty and vacancy rates. With
limited police presence, unlit, narrow streets and little established commerce, Sandtown stands in stark
contrast to the vibrancy of the Harbor. It is certainly unfair to suggest that (despite circumstantial evidence of
crime displacement) renewal in the Harbor is chiefly responsible for increases in criminal activity in Sandtown.
However, the neighborhood stands as a rather stark reminder of the neighborhoods left behind by urban
renewal.
The above card is a detailed analysis on Baltimore’s Inner Harbor urban renewal project, which included
new baseball and football stadiums to complement massive investments in cultural, commercial, and
residential spaces. If we include surrounding neighborhoods in our scope of a “local community” (a fair
assumption), we see a decrease in the overall prosperity of this community due to urban renewal schemes
as a whole.
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Con Counters: Mega events
Mega Events Are Not Economically Justifiable
Subsidies for mega events drive up costs and lower standards DAT
Baumann, Robert, and Victor Matheson. “Infrastructure Investments and Mega-Sports
Events: Comparing the Experience of Developing and Industrialized Countries.”
College of the Holy Cross. AUgust 2013. Web.
The potential for the surge in general infrastructure investment as a result of preparations for a mega-event
leading to overall economic growth following the event is a real possibility; however, several caveats are in
order. First, spending millions or billions of dollars in unproductive sports infrastructure simply in order to have
the excuse or the political will to make needed non-sports infrastructure investments is a distinctly second-best
economic strategy. Public capital would be more efficiently allocated if governments would simply make
reasonable public investment choices without a mega-event hanging over their heads.
In addition, mega-events can place surprising tight deadlines on major public works projects. These deadlines
can serve to raise costs due to rushed schedules, relaxed bidding rules, and potential corruption. Indeed,
as the event nears it may become all too common for a host nation trying to stay within a fixed budget to
reallocate resources towards sports infrastructure, which absolutely must be completed ahead of the
event, and away from the general infrastructure improvements that were both promised and also
comprised the best hope for long-run economic growth.
Finally, it should be noted that preparations for a mega-event can result in too high a level of investment in nonathletic infrastructure. An airport, transportation network, or number of hotel rooms that is the right size for
three weeks of tourist insanity may be extensively overbuilt for the post-event period. For example, two major
luxury hotels built for the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway, filed for bankruptcy shortly after the
close of the Games.
The infrastructure development that accompanies stadium construction only benefits a community if it’s
necessary. If it doesn’t serve a long-term purpose, infrastructure cannot recoup the investment made on
it. This is especially true if it turns into a maintenance issue due to poor initial construction, which is
more likely due to the lowered standards of prepping for massive athletic showcases like the World Cup
or Olympics.
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Cases
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Pro Contentions
Pro Case
Introduction:
Stadium subsidies help the general public by saving the consumers money, creating a better business
environment, and creating a mutually beneficial process.
Contention One: Consumer Surplus
Money saved is money earned. Usually this saying only applies to personal financial decisions. However,
sometimes businesses also save people money. This is called a consumer surplus. A consumer surplus is when
consumers are charged at price below what they are willing to pay. This means that they saved money. While
this money will not show up directly, it is still an economic benefit. It can be spent to purchase other goods and
services and boost the overall economy. Sports teams create a consumer surplus by keeping ticket prices low.

Further Analysis of the Irani study
o These calculations produced consumers’ surplus estimates ranging from 2.2 to $54.1 million
with an average around $18 million. Using Bain’s estimates of the cost incurred by local
governments in accommodating sports teams, he concluded that in five of eight cases the
consumers’ surplus exceeded this cost. Thus, his study suggests that public subsidies of
professional sports teams can often pass the benefit-cost test.

NBA and NHL Arenas consistently create a net surplus
o If elasticity is 0.75 or below, consumers’ surplus exceeds the annual payment on a $150 million
arena for 23 of 26 NHL franchises and 24 of 29 NBA teams. In fact, even if elasticity is 1,
consumers’ surplus is greater than the annual cost of a low cost basketball or hockey arena in 35
of 55 cases. Moreover, even high cost arenas pass the benefit-cost test in 41 cases if elasticity is
0.5.
Even though professional sports teams don’t need subsidies, they still prefer them. When local referendums on
cancelling subsidies occur, ticket prices will decrease. What this shows is that subsidies offer the public a
certain degree of control over a sports team’s revenue stream. In order to win the public’s favor, tickets are sold
for a cheaper price than people are willing to pay. By giving consumers a democratic way to influence their
sports teams, subsidies give teams an incentive to help their consumers. In a profit-chasing environment such as
business, organizations that save people money are extremely rare. Subsidies help this exception to occur.
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Pro Contentions
Since subsidies offer the public control over a sports team’s revenue stream, it also induces them to sell tickets
for a cheaper price. The money saved by the fans can be spent towards other business, thus reinvigorating the
economy.
Contention Two: Subsidies help centralize business
This resolution is centered around the idea of stadium subsidies helping out their local communities.
Oftentimes, stadiums are built with the idea of revitalizing a downtown area. The entire concept of city planning
is to create an urban area where people are more likely to spend money. Stadiums are guaranteed bring
consumers to the area; thus surrounding businesses are bound to gain from a potentially larger clientele. This
obviously lucrative business environment only serves to attract more businesses to the region. This optimization
of city planning serves to maximize economic growth by making it more convenient to spend money. By
making stadiums central to revitalizing a city, many areas have experienced tremendous growth.

Benefits of Petco Park
o San Diego invested $303 million investment in the stadium, but that figure is dwarfed by the
over $1 billion of private sector investment that occurred in the newly created “Ballpark District”
between the announcement of plans for the park and 2010. Much of the investment was
guaranteed in the initial agreement, but hundreds of millions of dollars worth followed due to the
success of the area. Rosentraub also states there is the potential for an additional $1 billion of
private investment in the Ballpark District in the coming years. (Rosentraub 2010)

Other Benefits of Coors Field
o Horrow indicated that twenty-five new restaurants opened in the downtown area following the
construction of Coors Field along with land value increases around Coors Field of almost $25
per square foot. See id. In addition, Horrow estimates that an additional $20 million was spent in
the downtown Denver area in the year following the opening of Coors Field..

Benefits of Jacobs/Progressive Field
o Though no private investment for new projects was pledged at the time of public investment in
such attractions, it came in the following years, with the $1.85 billion (in 2004 dollars) of private
construction in Cleveland between 1980 and 1989, jumping to $4.1 billion (in 2010 dollars)
between 1995 and 2003. Though causality cannot be attributed, it is certainly very likely that it
was as a result of Cleveland’s improved image and downtown scene. (Rosentraub 2010)
o Thomas Chema, developer of Cleveland's Jacobs Field, indicated that twenty-eight new
businesses employing over 1200 people opened between 1994 and 1996 within a two-block area
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Pro Contentions
of the stadium. See id. In addition, he indicated that over 500 housing units were planned near
the stadium.
Local communities are strongly benefited by stadium subsidies. By creating a business community where there
previously was none, stadiums manage to anchor social re-development projects. While they cannot create
growth by themselves, they still remain an important component of urban design. Clearly, stadium subsidies
manage to create benefits to the local population that surrounds them.
Contention three: Public ownership creates mutual interest
Private interests are often pictured at odds with the public good. Rarely does a situation arise when both are
benefitted. Creating such a situation channels a buisness’ relentless drive for money in a manner that benefits
the public good. Public ownership of a sports franchise is essentially the fans subsidizing their team by buying
publicly traded stocks. Such a scenario is detailed below, describing the NFL’s Green Bay Packers.
A board of directors that is elected by the shareholders is in charge of managing the business operations of the
team. The board must approve all substantive changes, such as upgrading the scoreboards at Lambeau Field,
adding luxury boxes to the stadium, and building a new indoor practice facility.
Both President Bob Harlan and Executive Vice-President/General Manager John Fabry have the authority to
make all football operations decisions.
One of the most significant features of the Packers' bylaws is that a majority vote of the shareholders is
necessary to relocate the franchise. With over 90% of the shareholders residing in Green Bay, all most likely
avid Packers fans, it is extremely unlikely that any shareholder would ever vote to relocate the team.
Community based ownership essentially serves as a mechanism for preventing teams from moving out of town.
The team can only move through dissolution, and if this occurs the shareholders get back the amount of money
that they invested.
If a shareholder ever decides to sell his or her stock, the Packers' bylaws state that the shares must be offered
back to the corporation first. As a result of their corporate structure, the publicly owned Green Bay Packers
have become the most stable team in the NFL and the city of Green Bay has never faced the threat of the team
relocating.
Apart from the direct logistics of it, funding pro sports teams isn’t about finances; it’s about control. When it
comes to huge money transfers, this is what both municipalities and businesses crave. Control is what local
communities get when they subsidize their sports teams. Individuals get controls through public ownership of
teams: their franchises no longer have the option of relocating and holding their hosts hostage. City planners
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Pro Contentions
themselves get economic control through a centralization of economic activity around sports stadiums. With a
stake in their construction, communities are able to get these favorable terms in return for an initial investment.
Regardless of the broader picture at hand, it’s local communities that stand to benefit from subsidy
arrangements.
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Con Contentions
Con Case
Introduction:
The builders of sports stadiums and owners of professional sports teams play up the benefits of sports for as
long as anyone will listen—they claim vague impacts based on “civic pride” and promise that each stadium is
bringing jobs to its host city. Unfortunately, these claims remain unsupported. When one looks at the actual
numbers it is clear that public subsidies for professional athletic organizations consistently cost more than the
benefits these investments produce. According to a report from the North American Association of Sports
Economists on the subject:
“There now exists almost twenty years of research on the economic impact of professional sports
franchises and facilities on the local economy. The results in this literature are strikingly consistent. No
matter what cities or geographical areas are examined, no matter what estimators are used, no matter
what model specifications are used, and no matter what variables are used, articles published in peer
reviewed economics journals contain almost no evidence that professional sports franchises and
facilities have a measurable economic impact on the economy.”
We will now go on to explain why sports teams are failing in almost every case to produce any recognizable
positive economic impact.
Contention One: Sports Industry fails to generate economic revenue
because it displaces other forms of economic activity
In 2012 the Goldwater Institute examined the factors causing and limiting economic growth in regards to
professional athletic organizations in the United States. The study found that:
“One of the main reasons sports teams and the facilities in which they play are not drivers of
economic growth is because they don't create new economic activity. Instead, they displace other
forms of economic activity.
For example, imagine you were going to spend money on a night out. You could spend it on an
expensive dinner or you could spend it on tickets to a sporting event. But because you have a
limited amount of money to spend, you wouldn't spend it on both.
This substitution of one type of spending for another is exactly what you see happening when you
analyze the experience of cities with sports teams. Consumers spending more of their discretionary
income on sports-related goods is offset by those same consumers spending less on other things. Thus,
no net new economic activity results.”
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Con Contentions
Another point economists make is that most of the profit generated by sports teams go to the players, owners,
and shareholders of the team. Those individuals tend not to live in the area in which the team plays. Instead, the
money is "exported" to be spent or invested elsewhere. This reduces or eliminates the "ripple effect" that sports
teams have on the local economy.
Contention Two: No Long Term Economic Impact
Every time a new stadium is constructed, large franchise extract funding from United States taxpayers to build
large private facilities, promising that there will be huge returns for the public. According to Pat Garofolo of the
Atlantic: “
“… just three of the NFL's 31 stadiums were originally built without public funds. In two of those
cases, public funding was later used to upgrade the stadium or surrounding facilities, even as all
32 of the NFL's teams ranked among Forbes' 50 most valuable sporting franchises in the world in
2012. (Only MetLife Stadium, shared by the New York Jets and New York Giants, received no public
funding.)”
This public funding is justified by sports teams’ owners, however, stadiums and areans almost never
deliver an economic benefit, leaving cities and states with hundreds of thousands of dollars in debts.
"The basic idea is that sports stadiums typically aren't a good tool for economic development," said
Victor Matheson, an economist at Holy Cross who has studied the economic impact of stadium
construction for decades. When cities cite studies (often produced by parties with an interest in building
the stadium) touting the impact of such projects, there is a simple rule for determining the actual return
on investment, Matheson said: "Take whatever number the sports promoter says, take it and move the
decimal one place to the left. Divide it by ten, and that's a pretty good estimate of the actual economic
impact." Others agree. While "it is inarguable that within a few blocks you'll have an effect," the results
are questionable for metro areas as a whole, Stefan Szymanski, a sports economist at the University of
Michigan, said.
There are numerous reasons for the muted economic effects. The biggest is that arenas often sit
empty for a significant portion of the year. Jobing.com Arena is guaranteed 41 hockey games
annually. The other 324 nights, it must find concerts, conventions or other events to fill the
schedule, and in Glendale, where the arena competes with facilities in nearby Phoenix, that can be
tough to do.
"We've looked at tons of these things, and the one that we found that seemed to make sense is the
Staples Center in Los Angeles," Matheson said. "But they use it 250 dates a year. They don't make
sense when you're using it 41 times a year and competing with another venue down the street."
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Con Contentions
Contention Three: Opportunity Costs of Spending on Stadiums
With no economic impacts to show, spending on stadiums and arenas for professional athletic organizations just
cannot be justified, especially with so many areas struggling to pay their regular expenses. An article from June
of 2013 by the Pacific Standard found that
In a report to be presented to Michigan’s treasurer on Monday, Kevyn D. Orr, the emergency
manager appointed in March to take over operations here, described long-term obligations of at
least $15 billion, unsustainable cash flow shortages and miserably low credit ratings that make it
difficult to borrow. But, they’re somehow on the verge of finding $450 million for a new hockey
arena. And in Hamilton County, Ohio, where a combined $805 million in taxpayer money built the new
football and baseball stadiums, police and education budgets have been slashed, while one in seven
people live below the poverty line.
Similarly,
According to Bloomberg [Businessweek], the U.S. Treasury loses $146 million a year on municipal
bonds with tax-free interest issued for sports structures. The taxpayer subsidies to bondholders on
the $17 billion tax-exempt debt on stadiums built in the last 27 years will be $4 billion. You know
what would be a better use of $4 billion? Repairing roads, building sea walls, preparing for the
next big storm.
There are many better ways and many better investments for the thousands of dollars the U.S. pours into
its sports arenas and sports stadiums. As countless studies and statistics demonstrate, on balance the
public subsidies for professional athletic organizations in the United States are not benefitting their local
communities.
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