Mock Exam 2012
The Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations of October – December 1921 were somewhat successful in the immediate term and, although controversial and divisive, were quite successful in the longer term.
When the British Government offered a truce and negotiations in mid-1921, DeValera set about attempting to achieve agreement with the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, on the key issues of sovereignty and partition . DeValera, recognising that absolute independence would not be agreeable to the British, offered a complex alternative – ‘External Association’. On the issue of partition, no agreement was achievable at this stage, as the Government of Ireland Act (1920) had assured the place of N. Ireland within the United Kingdom in British & Unionist eyes. With this in mind, DeValera made his most controversial decision; not to lead or even attend the formal negotiations in London between October & December 1921. Whether or not he took this decision based on his own interpretation of protecting the Office of the President of the Dáil from
disagreeable compromises, his absence certainly affected not only the successful outcome of the negotiations, but also created the serious opposition within Sinn Féin to the eventual Treaty signed on 6 th December 1921 .
The success of the negotiations greatly depended on the strength of the delegation that Dáil
Eireann sent . With DeValera’s absence, Griffith, Collins, Barton, Childers & Gavan Duffy were selected to form the delegation. The careful mix of moderates and hard-line Republicans was an attempt to balance the opposing needs of both pragmatic diplomacy and ambitious Republicanism.
The delegation was given ‘plenipotentiary’ powers; that is the power to negotiate and conclude a treaty between Dáil Eireann and the British Government delegation. However, contrary to these powers, DeValera instructed the delegation to refer back to the Dáil Cabinet any “main question” or before any treaty was about to be signed. The contradiction inherent between DeValera’s private instructions and the power of ‘plenipotentiary’ that the delegation were given by the Dáil, seriously undermined and affected the possibility of outright success that all of Sinn Féin hoped for .
The success of the negotiations was also greatly hampered by the ‘mis-match’ of experience and political skill seen in comparing the two delegations . Whereas the Sinn Féin delegation was made up of passionate and determined moderates and Republicans, the British delegation in Downing
Street was made up of individuals with long experience and great political skill. Lloyd George, accurately referred to as the ‘Welsh Wizard’, together with Churchill and Lord Birkenhead, sat opposite the Sinn Féin delegation. When it came to the point of thrashing out an agreeable compromise between British necessities and Irish demands, both the relative isolation and inexperience of the Sinn Féin delegation greatly hampered the success of the negotiations from an
Irish perspective .
After the initial declarations of aims were tabled by both delegations on the 11 th October 1921, the issue of sovereignty was seriously discussed in sub-committees. Griffith and Collins took a lead role in attempting persuade Lloyd George & Churchill on the practicality and suitability of ‘External
Association.’ Having remained behind in Dublin, DeValera had given the Sinn Féin delegation a copy of ‘Draft Treaty A’, which attempted to explain the intricacies of ‘External Association.’ However, without DeValera’s presence, even Griffith and Collins, not being privy to initial discussions between
Lloyd George & DeValera, failed to fully understand or articulate the relevance or suitability of
External Association. This was one of the key failures of DeValera & the Sinn Féin Delegation; a complex idea, formed through correspondence over time, could not adequately be explained by those who had no experience or part in its creation .

In response to the inarticulate explanation of External Association, the British delegation offered
‘Dominion Status.’ This would mean that an independent Irish State would remain part of the British
Empire and allow the British Government to retain control over key ‘Imperial’ issues; foreign policy,
Head of State, Post & Telegraphs etc. The hard-line elements of the delegation were totally opposed to any membership of the British Empire or any recognition of the King of England as Head of State.
Yet, without a viable alternative like ‘External Association’, the Sinn Féin delegation could not propose a suitable alternative. Griffith, a moderate, understood and accepted the British explanation of maintaining their empire and protecting their strategic interests by maintaining a British Navy presence in what would become known as the ‘Treaty Ports’. Collins also seemingly accepted this, as was later seen in his defense of the Treaty as being a ‘stepping stone’ to greater independence.
The issue of partition was also difficult for the Sinn Féin delegation to achieve progress on. With the successful passage of the Government of Ireland Act (1920), Northern Ireland had been formally constituted (formed) and made an integral part of the United Kingdom. When Griffith and Collins protested against partition, Lloyd George’s assistant, Tom Jones, offered the concept of a ‘Boundary
Commission’ which would look at re-drawing the border in the aftermath of the negotiations. While this offer seemed agreeable, the success of the negotiations, from an Irish perspective, were seriously undermined by the acceptance of this ‘promise’, one which would lead to intransigence and failure in the mid-1920s, thereby cementing partition. Griffith’s declaration that the Irish would accept ‘Dominion Status’ in return for the “essential unity” of the island was therefore counterproductive; in accepting one, they had inadvertently accepted both. When Griffith attempted to protest, Lloyd George produced the note which Griffith had written to him stating his acceptance of
‘Dominion Status’ in return for “essential unity.”
Under duress and facing the threat of “immediate and terrible war” if they did not sign the Anglo-
Irish Treaty, the Sinn Féin delegation accepted the compromise between Irish Republicanism and
British Imperialism and signed the treaty on 6 th December 1921. Collins remarked in a private letter that “..today, I have signed my own death warrant”. When the Sinn Féin delegation returned to
Dublin with the Treaty, DeValera was furious that they had signed without his instruction. W.T.
Cosgrave had the casting vote in an evenly-split Cabinet and voted for a Dáil debate and vote. The eventual, narrow success of the Treaty by a vote of 64 – 57 on 7 th January 1922 demonstrated the the almost even split in the party over the Treaty . Hard-line Republicans, led by DeValera, rubbished the Treaty, declaring that the Oath of Allegiance to the King of England was contrary to their oath to the Dáil. They pointed out that British military presence was maintained by the acceptance of the Treaty Ports and, to a lesser degree, the partition of the north from the rest of the country.
In defending the treaty, Collins and Griffith argued that the Treaty was a real success . Collins described it as “freedom to achieve greater freedom”, underlining the fact that 26 counties would now be significantly independent of Britain. Griffith also pointed out that it was successful in the very fact that it was the first treaty ever agreed between an Irish delegation and a British
Government which recognised, albeit limitedly, Irish Nationalist aspirations. Dominion Status, though disagreeable, was a start. Critics of the Treaty pointed out that countries with similar status such as Canada and Australia, were vastly greater in size and far removed geographically from
Britain.
The success of the treaty ultimately would be found in later years as it gradually developed and was manipulated to create an independent Republic in 1949 . In the winter of 1921 and early 1922, however , its success was limited by the fierceness of opposition within Sinn Féin itself . Once the vote on the Treaty was passed on 7 th January 1922, DeValera led the opponents of the Treaty out of

the Dáil and so began a slow, inexorable drift towards a total split into Pro-Treaty (Collins, Griffith &
IRB) and Anti-Treaty (DeValera, Brugha and majority of IRA). The eventual Irish Civil War of 1922 –
1923 was an expression of the deep frustration and conflict between idealistic, intransigent
Republicanism and the pragmatic realism of the moderate elements within Sinn Féin. One eventual success of the Treaty was that it created two parties from one; Cumann na nGaedhael (Pro-Treaty) and eventually Fianna Fáil (Anti-Treaty) . The emergence of two utterly opposed and bitter political parties in the early years of the Irish Free State would eventually guarantee the democratic strength of the new Irish State. While the negotiations failed in achieving an outright, independent Republic as declared by the 1916 Proclamation and the Declaration of Independence in 1919, it did provide the modest success on which all other subsequent (later) successes were built . Considering Sinn
Féin’s relative inexperience, the disproportionate size between Ireland and the world power that was Britain at this point, DeValera’s absence from the negotiations and the lack of a viable alternative to either Dominion Status or a military solution, one can say that the negotiations were indeed successful, if not agreeable to hard-line, idealistic Republicans.