1
The compelling case in climate change science for an emergency upgrading of Arctic monitoring
2
capacities
3
4
Peter D. Carter
5
Climate Emergency Institute
6
4708 Captains Crescent
7
Pender Island, BC
8
Canada V0N 2M2
9
petercarter46@shaw.ca
10
11
Abstract
12
This paper describes global warming positive feedbacks already operant in the Arctic, explains the
13
large risk of planetary catastrophe they present, and argues that this risk necessitates an emergency
14
upgrading of Arctic monitoring and assessment. The combination of global inaction on greenhouse gas
15
emissions, climate system inertias, and multiple Arctic positive feedbacks constitutes a high-risk
16
planetary emergency. Under global warming, the Arctic is changing far faster than other regions of
17
Earth. Various – and potentially extremely large – sources of amplifying (positive) feedbacks have
18
been triggered in response to rapid Arctic warming. These Arctic feedbacks, if not addressed at the
19
appropriate time and with the appropriate degree of mitigation, can be expected to accelerate the rate of
20
global warming. They risk catastrophic planetary consequences, including Arctic greenhouse gas
21
feedback runaway. Yet science has not determined the future rate of these Arctic feedback emissions.
22
In order to plan a rapid and successful response, we need comprehensive and ongoing Arctic
23
monitoring of all aspects of all the feedbacks, which means an urgent upgrading of Arctic monitoring
24
capacities. Avoiding planetary climate change catastrophe calls for the most comprehensive Arctic
25
monitoring program possible.
26
27
Keywords
28
Arctic monitoring, Arctic feedbacks, runaway climate change, Arctic amplification, methane
29
feedbacks, Arctic greenhouse gas feedback runaway
30
31
32
The compelling case in climate change science for an emergency upgrading of Arctic monitoring
33
capacities
34
35
36
Introduction
This paper presents a compelling case, supported by the climate change research, for a major
37
upgrading of Arctic monitoring capacities. The combination of global inaction on greenhouse gas
38
emissions, climate system inertias, and multiple Arctic positive feedbacks (covered in this paper)
39
constitutes an extreme-risk planetary emergency.
40
Research on climate change and the Arctic shows that we face a catastrophic risk of
41
uncontrollable, accelerating global warming due to various amplifying feedbacks from enormous
42
feedback sources in the Arctic. These include the Arctic snow/ice-albedo feedback and greenhouse gas
43
feedbacks (methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide).
44
Under global warming, the Arctic is changing far faster than other regions of Earth. Numerous
45
– and extremely large – Arctic sources of amplifying feedbacks are already responding (have been
46
triggered in response) to rapid Arctic warming. These Arctic feedbacks, if not addressed at the
47
appropriate time and with the appropriate degree of mitigation, can be expected to accelerate the rate of
48
global warming. They constitute a very large risk of planetary catastrophic consequences, including
49
Arctic greenhouse gas feedback so-called "runaway" climate change.
50
The requirements for Arctic monitoring are best determined by the degree of risk that Arctic
51
changes present to the planet. Yet despite the rapidity of these changes in the Arctic, science has not
52
determined the future rate of Arctic feedback emissions, underscoring the need for a rapid increase and
53
improvement of Arctic monitoring.
54
55
This paper describes global warming positive feedbacks already operant in the Arctic, explains
the large risk of planetary catastrophe they present, and argues that this risk necessitates a large and
56
57
urgent upgrading of Arctic monitoring and assessment.
It presents the definitions used, global warming commitments, three crucial recent Arctic
58
research papers, Arctic temperature increase, vulnerable carbon pools, tipping points as immediate
59
danger (including Arctic methane hydrate risk from 2ºC), a list of positive feedbacks in the Arctic,
60
Arctic methane, a list of Arctic positive feedback planetary dangers, Arctic amplification, authoritative
61
Arctic assessments that have pointed out the great risks of the rapidly changing Arctic and the acute
62
need for an upscaling in Arctic monitoring, the IPCC confirmation of these points, and a conclusion.
63
64
65
Definitions
Applying the following definitions, we show by multiple lines of evidence that high-level
66
capacity Arctic monitoring of albedo and greenhouse gas emissions is required on a planetary
67
emergency basis.
68
We define "emergency" by the World Health Organization (2013) definition of "a managerial
69
term, demanding decision and follow-up in terms of extra-ordinary measure…. It requires threshold
70
values to be recognized…. Conceptually, it relates best to Response. Emergency preparedness: Actions
71
taken in anticipation of an emergency to facilitate rapid, effective and appropriate response to the
72
situation."
73
We define "risk" according to the formula used by the IPCC (2007, AR4 WG3 2.2.3): "the
74
'combination of the probability of an event and its consequences,' as defined in the risk management
75
standard ISO/IEC Guide 73."
76
We define "positive feedback" according to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
77
Administration (NOAA 2013a) definition, as "a process in which an initial change will bring about an
78
additional change in the same direction." We note that this is a process that will cause an additional
79
change. We therefore assume that once a positive Arctic feedback has started to add heat or greenhouse
80
gases to the climate system, it will not stop without intervention.
81
We define "commitment" as unavoidable, locked-in warming from all sources. This includes
82
warming we will not be able to avoid given the world's climate and energy policies as well as the
83
inertias inherent in the climate system.
84
85
86
Commitments to Global Temperature Increase
Policy commitment. The combined national emissions reduction pledges presented to the
87
United Nations commit the world to a warming of 4.5ºC by 2100 (Climate Interactive 2013), which is
88
approximately 8ºC total warming long after 2100 (NRC 2011).
89
Climate system commitment. Realized or transient warming is only about half of the full long-
90
term equilibrium warming (NRC 2011). Air pollution aerosol cooling is a deferred warming. Carbon
91
feedback emissions will add some warming. The physics of climate change therefore commits us to an
92
irreversible warming of three times today's warming or more – 2.4°C mean, according to Ramanathan
93
and Feng (2008).
94
Time frame commitment. Global warming lasts, in effect, forever:
95
The removal of human-emitted CO2 from the atmosphere by natural processes will take
96
a few hundred thousand years. This extremely long time required by sinks to remove
97
anthropogenic CO2 makes global warming, climate change and ocean acidification
98
irreversible on human time scale. (IPCC 2013, AR5 WG1 6-6)
99
Global temperature and ocean acidification cannot stabilize without stopping additional CO2
100
emissions, which includes anthropogenic and carbon feedback emissions. Therefore, feedback carbon
101
emissions from large vulnerable Arctic carbon sources can make it impossible to ever stop global
102
warming from increasing. "In fact, only in the case of essentially complete elimination of emissions can
103
the atmospheric concentration of CO2 ultimately be stabilized at a constant level" (IPCC 2007, AR4
104
FAQ 10.3). With already committed global warming, nothing short of an international emergency-scale
105
Arctic surveillance project is required for world security.
106
107
Three Recent Papers that Reinforce the Arctic Planetary Emergency
108
109
Three recent Arctic studies relevant to tipping points show greatly increased Arctic risks to the
planet.
110
i) Unprecedented recent summer warmth in Arctic Canada
111
According to Gifford Miller and colleagues (in press), who have been studying tundra plants on Baffin
112
Island, the Arctic is now warmer than at any time in the last 44,000 years and perhaps for the last
113
120,000 years.
114
[R]adiocarbon dates on rooted tundra plants revealed by receding cold-based ice caps in
115
the Eastern Canadian Arctic […] show that 5000 years of regional summertime cooling
116
has been reversed, with average summer temperatures of the last ~100 years now higher
117
than during any century in more than 44,000 years, including peak warmth of the early
118
Holocene when high latitude summer insolation was 9% greater than present. (Miller et
119
al. in press)
120
ii) Speleothems reveal 500,000-year history of Siberian permafrost
121
The recent field research of Anton Vaks and colleagues (2013) deep in permafrost Siberian caves
122
indicates that Siberian permafrost will release much more carbon, much faster ("global climates only
123
slightly warmer than today are sufficient to thaw significant regions of permafrost") and that a global
124
warming of 1.5ºC or less is the thaw-down tipping point for terrestrial Siberian permafrost (Vaks et al.
125
2013).
126
iii) The degradation of submarine permafrost and the destruction of hydrates on the shelf of
127
East Arctic seas as a potential cause of the "Methane Catastrophe": some results of integrated studies
128
in 2011
129
A recent paper authored by 21 Russian scientists concludes that there is a planetary catastrophic risk
130
from the enormous amount of subsea floor methane in the East Siberian Shelf, the largest shelf in the
131
world. "The emission of methane in several areas of the ESS is massive to the extent that growth in the
132
methane concentrations in the atmosphere to values capable of causing a considerable and even
133
catastrophic warming on the Earth is possible" (Sergienko et al. 2012).
134
135
136
Arctic Temperature Increase
While the global temperature increase has slowed, the Arctic is warming faster than anticipated
137
(AMAP 2009). Due to Arctic amplification as a result of the decline of snow and sea ice albedo cooling
138
the Arctic, temperature has been increasing rapidly, which is increasing the warming of Arctic
139
greenhouse gas feedback sources.
140
141
Vulnerable Carbon Pools
142
Vast amounts of carbon are stored in the Arctic. The Arctic region contains about one third of
143
the carbon held in the world's terrestrial ecosystems and 40 percent of the carbon in near-surface soils
144
worldwide (AMAP 2009).
145
The Arctic is thought to hold huge quantities of methane hydrate, which is frozen solid methane
146
gas, under pressure, found deep below permafrost and beneath the seafloor of shallow Arctic
147
continental shelves, where it is most vulnerable to ocean warming (AMAP 2009). There is a large pool
148
of these hydrates; in the Arctic alone, the amount of methane stored as hydrates could be more than 10
149
times greater than the methane presently in the global atmosphere (IPCC 2013, AR5 WG1 TS 6-77).
150
Permafrost and subsea floor methane hydrate are each a huge source of methane vulnerable to Arctic
151
warming:
152
Permafrost, including the sub-sea permafrost on the shallow shelves of the Arctic Ocean,
153
hold[s] at least twice the amount of carbon currently present in the atmosphere as carbon
154
dioxide. Should a sizeable fraction of this carbon be released as methane and carbon
155
dioxide, it would increase atmospheric concentrations, which would lead to higher
156
atmospheric temperatures. That in turn would cause yet more methane and carbon
157
dioxide to be released, creating a positive feedback, which would further amplify global
158
warming. (IPCC 2013, AR5 WG1 TS FAQ 6.2)
159
At present the Arctic is a sink for carbon dioxide and a source for methane. The Arctic is
160
estimated to be a source for 15-50,000,000 tonnes of methane each year, which is 3-9% of the global
161
net methane emissions from land and sea (AMAP 2009). This makes the Arctic a potentially significant
162
contributor to a large increase in atmospheric methane from feedback emissions.
163
164
165
Tipping Points that Pose an Immediate Danger
In 2012, the director of the University of Western Australia's Oceans Institute, Professor Carlos
166
Duarte, warned that "the Arctic region is fast approaching a series of imminent 'tipping points' that
167
could trigger an abrupt domino effect of large-scale climate change across the entire planet"
168
(University of Western Australia 2012):
169
If set in motion, they [tipping points] can generate profound climate change, which
170
places the Arctic not at the periphery but at the core of the Earth system. […] There is
171
evidence that these forces are starting to be set in motion.[…] This has major
172
consequences for the future of humankind as climate change progresses. (University of
173
Western Australia 2012)
174
In a risk-analysis of global climate tipping points, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact
175
Research explains how soon we could reach a methane tipping point, i.e., "at warming levels above
176
2ºC," which could be as early as the 2040s (Betts et al. 2011):
177
Large amounts of methane are stored in ice form as methane hydrates in ocean floor
178
sediments. A warming of the deep ocean may trigger the release of methane to the
179
atmosphere and act as a strong positive feedback for global warming. Inventories,
180
observations and modelling of the effects of methane hydrates are in a very early stage
181
of scientific development. Preliminary results point to a very important potential effect:
182
if methane hydrates start to decompose once warming penetrates to the deep ocean, the
183
global climate system may move to a different state, in which the continuing release of
184
methane prevents warming from slowing down, or decreasing, for millennia, even if
185
anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions cease (Archer et al. 2009). Such preliminary
186
results show this may happen at warming levels above 2°C, but this is highly uncertain
187
given the level of understanding. (Frieler et al. 2011)
188
189
190
List of Positive Feedbacks Operant in the Arctic
Potentially very large Arctic positive feedbacks, which are all now operant, include the
191
following (Vonk et al. 2012):
192

declining Far North spring/summer snow cover albedo cooling
193

declining summer sea ice extent albedo cooling
194

methane emissions from warming Far North wetland peat
195

methane and carbon dioxide emissions from thawing permafrost
196

methane gas emissions from Arctic subsea floor methane (hydrate and free methane)
197

nitrous oxide emissions from cryoperturbed permafrost
198
Nitrous oxide (N2O) is an extremely powerful greenhouse gas. "Nitrous oxide, also being
199
emitted, has 289 times the global warming effect of carbon dioxide and lasts in the atmosphere 115
200
years" (IPCC 2007). It is not generally realized that there may be a very large amount of N2O coming
201
out of the Arctic from cryoperturbed permafrost (Elberling et al. 2010; Repo et al. 2009). Thawing and
202
refreezing permafrost is emitting N2O in regional amounts that, extrapolated across all of the
203
permafrost, would be a very large Arctic-wide emission of this potent greenhouse gas.
204
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is also an issue in Arctic positive amplifying feedbacks. Collapsing
205
coastal permafrost is emitting CO2 in unexpectedly large amounts (Vonk et al. 2012). Furthermore,
206
although methane emissions last in the atmosphere as methane for just over a decade, methane's global
207
warming effect continues because the chemically reactive methane is oxidized to other greenhouse
208
gases, notably water vapour and CO2 (IPCC 2007, AR4). Arctic carbon feedback emissions therefore
209
include serious amounts of CO2, N2O, and methane. CO2 and N2O last an extremely long time in the
210
atmosphere. (Mastepanov et al. 2013)
211
212
213
Arctic Methane (CH4)
Methane being emitted by the warming Arctic poses a risk of runaway global climate change.
214
CH4 has a global warming effect 80 times that of CO2 over the 20-year period after its emission (IPCC
215
2013, AR5 WG1). Having increased 150% from 1850 to 2000, the atmospheric increase of CH4 leveled
216
off until 2006-7. But since 2007, it has been on a renewed, sustained increase.
217
With respect to the post-2006/7 atmospheric CH4 increase (partly put down to subarctic wetland
218
peat; see below), "uncertainties in emission trends [of global methane] do not allow definitive
219
conclusions [about sources] to be drawn" (Kirschke et al. 2013).
220
Scientists think that this increase is due to feedback emissions rather than human sources
221
(Fisher et al 2011). The feedbacks have been attributed to CH4 from wetland peat, mainly in the tropics
222
with some in the Far North, but methane monitoring is insufficient to be certain. The highest
223
atmospheric CH4 level is at Lac La Biche, on the southern edge of the vast Canadian wetlands (NOAA,
224
2013b).
225
[A] rise in natural wetland emissions and fossil fuel emissions probably accounts for the
226
renewed increase in global methane levels after 2006, although the relative contribution
227
of these two sources remains uncertain. A better quantification of the global CH4 budget,
228
with regular updates as done for carbon dioxide, will be key to both embracing the
229
opportunities and meeting the challenge. (Kirschke et al. 2013)
230
The catastrophic dangers of Arctic methane and the inadequacy of both monitoring and the
231
knowledge base are documented in the review, "Global Atmospheric Methane in 2010: Budget,
232
Changes and Dangers":
233
Natural emissions of CH4 are likely to increase in a warmer climate; however, the
234
magnitude and rate of change of future emissions from natural sources are largely
235
unknown. There are large amounts of carbon stored as organic matter in permafrost or as
236
CH4 hydrates in the ocean sediments. However, it is not clear how quickly these carbon
237
stores can be released and how much would survive microbial oxidation between the
238
source and the atmosphere. The risk of a rapid increase in CH4 emissions is real but
239
remains largely unquantified. During the first half of 2009, globally averaged
240
atmospheric CH4 was 7ppb greater than it was in 2008, suggesting that the increase will
241
continue in 2009. There is the potential for increased CH4 emissions from strong
242
positive climate feedbacks in the Arctic where there are unstable stores of carbon in
243
permafrost ... so the causes of these recent increases must be understood. (Dlugokencky
244
et al. 2011)
245
Methane feedback has become more important because it has been ascertained that the natural
246
warming out of ice age glacials is primarily driven by methane feedback emissions and most likely
247
from wetlands (Levine et al. 2011; Levine et al. 2012).
248
Shallow Arctic sea sediments, especially offshore of Siberia, are thought to be rich in
249
organic matter that may be emitted to the atmosphere as the seawater temperature
250
increases. In addition, ice hydrates deep within the Arctic sea shelf sediments may
251
destabilize due to warmer water temperatures and release methane to the atmosphere.
252
Currently, the amount of CH4 emitted to the atmosphere by these processes is thought to
253
be about one third of that emitted from wetlands in the Arctic tundra (Shakova et al.,
254
2010; McGuire et al., 2012); however, the sparseness of atmospheric observations
255
makes this difficult to confirm. (Bruhwiler & Dlugokencky 2012)
256
257
258
There is evidence from satellites that subArctic wetland peat has been emitting much more
methane (Bloom et al. 2010).
Arctic methane from extremely large feedback sources constitutes a risk of so-called runaway
259
global climate change. According to the risk formula cited above (IPCC 2007, AR4 WG3 2.2.3), this is
260
a very large risk.
261
We have made an assessment of the available scientific literature on CH4 feedbacks
262
related to natural sources of CH4 from wetlands, permafrost, and ocean sediments. In
263
summary, the complex and non-linear processes governing the sources and atmospheric
264
chemistry of CH4 cause feedback loop between the climate, the terrestrial vegetation as
265
the source of the BVOCs [biogenic volatile organic compounds], the oxidation capacity
266
of the atmosphere, and the atmospheric CH4 burden. The feedback loop can be described
267
in simple terms as follows: rising CH4 emissions from wetlands, thawing permafrost,
268
and destabilizing marine hydrates increase atmospheric CH4 concentrations; this
269
increase in CH4 concentration, amplified by the effect of CH4 on its own chemical
270
lifetime, results in a greater radiative forcing on climate and terrestrial ecosystems. The
271
ecosystems, given our current understanding, respond to the warmer, more humid
272
conditions by an increase in BVOCs, which further augments the chemical lifetime of
273
CH4. Finally, the resulting additional radiative forcing [from fast responding wetland
274
CH4] could lead to more or faster thawing of permafrost, further destabilization of
275
marine hydrates, and potentially even larger wetland CH4 emissions. (O'Connor et al.
276
2010)
277
Arctic tundra is releasing methane, but inadequate monitoring makes it difficult to calculate
278
how much will be released in the future. Future emissions of carbon from tundra could be as CH4 or as
279
CO2. The amounts of each must be known in order to assess how great the impact could be. "Thawing
280
permafrost has strong potential to affect the global climate system acting through release of greenhouse
281
gases [mainly methane] to the atmosphere" (Anisimov & Reneva 2006).
282
In 2007, researchers from the Zackenberg research station in Northeast Greenland made a
283
surprising discovery. In autumn, when the surface of the tundra freezes and ice is formed, large
284
quantities of methane are released. The quantities released were so large that the annual CH4 emissions
285
had to be doubled in the calculation of the tundra's CH4 budget. According to researcher Magnus Lund,
286
"It's a problem in the Arctic that we don't perform measurements at enough locations. The variation
287
between locations is substantial both for CO2 and not least for methane" (Aarhus University 2013).
288
[Emphasis added.]
289
290
291
292
List of Potentially Catastrophic Arctic Planetary Dangers
The potential rapid Arctic warming induced global catastrophic impacts are:

declining spring-summer Far North snow and summer Arctic sea ice with declining
293
Arctic albedo cooling effect (the cause of Arctic amplification and a positive global
294
amplifying feedback)
295

multiple Arctic positive greenhouse gas emitting feedbacks that will add to global
296
warming and the risk of "runaway" global climate change (the Arctic holds by far the
297
largest pool of carbon vulnerable to warming)
298

a large sudden methane release from subsea floor methane gas hydrate
299

disruption to the thermohaline ocean circulation (extreme cold affecting Europe, an
300
issue this paper does not address)
301

302
303
irreversible destabilization of the Greenland ice sheet (very long term sea level rise,
not addressed in this paper )

risk of increased and prolonged Northern Hemisphere extreme heat, drought and
304
flooding events resulting from the loss of Arctic snow and summer sea ice albedo
305
cooling (impacting northern hemisphere and therefore world food security, not
306
addressed in this paper)
307
308
Although this paper only addresses the Arctic positive feedbacks, the above list shows the very
high risk of planetary catastrophes due to Arctic warming.
309
310
311
Arctic Amplification
The melting of Arctic snow and sea ice, a common factor in all of the above global catastrophic
312
risks, will continue at an increasing rate because of Arctic amplification. Arctic amplification is a
313
vicious cycle set off by Arctic warming up to four times the global average rate over the past three
314
decades (Screen et al. 2012). Arctic spring-summer snow and Arctic summer sea ice are in a long
315
established rapidly declining trend. "The extent of snow cover and sea ice in the Northern Hemisphere
316
has declined since 1979, coincident with hemispheric warming and indicative of a positive feedback of
317
surface reflectivity on climate" (Flanner et al. 2011).
318
Research has found that Arctic amplification is mainly a result of the loss of Arctic albedo from
319
the melting of snow and ice (Screen & Simmonds 2010). The rate of loss of Arctic albedo determines
320
the rate of future Arctic warming amplification, which depends greatly on the sea ice extent loss rate.
321
While computer model projections show an Arctic summer free of sea ice in decades, the extrapolation
322
of volume and extent loss trends indicates a matter of years, as pointed out by Peter Wadhams.
323
Professor Wadhams is extremely concerned that the virtual total loss of Arctic summer sea ice will
324
result in a large boost in Arctic methane emissions, in particular from below the sea floor of the East
325
Siberian Arctic shelf (personal communication 2012).
326
The year 2012 set a record for Arctic albedo loss. The rapid albedo loss is a result of the Far
327
North spring/summer snow cover receding more rapidly, meltwater cooling on the surface of the
328
Greenland ice sheet, and the thinning as well as the collapsing extent of the Arctic summer sea ice.
329
Research estimates that the albedo effect of the Far North snow cover is equivalent to that of the Arctic
330
summer sea ice (Flanner et al. 2011). This Arctic albedo loss is enough to become a significant global
331
feedback, boosting the rate of global warming.
332
Arctic amplification being observed today is expected to become stronger in coming decades,
333
invoking changes in atmospheric circulation, vegetation, and the carbon cycle, with impacts both
334
within and beyond the Arctic (Serreze & Barry 2011).
335
336
337
Authoritative Arctic Assessments that Call for More and Better Monitoring
James Hansen has made public statements that the Arctic summer sea ice had passed its tipping
338
point, putting the world in a state of planetary emergency. Hansen has made high level presentations
339
explaining the state of planetary emergency, which involves ice sheets, Arctic summer sea ice and
340
Arctic methane positive feedback. He has been explaining for some years that our global warming
341
status amounts to a planetary emergency because of climate inertia, "warming in the pipeline," and
342
tipping points that include ice sheet disintegration and frozen methane in tundra and on continental
343
shelves (Hansen 2010).
344
In 2007, J. Hansen was lead author of a paper warning that our emissions and Arctic feedbacks
345
are putting our planet in peril. "Recent greenhouse gas emissions place the Earth perilously close to
346
dramatic climate change that could run out of our control, with great dangers for humans and other
347
creatures. The Arctic epitomizes the global climate situation" (Hansen et al. 2007).
348
349
The Arctic region is already undergoing abrupt climate change, which risks abrupt global
climate change due to the multiple Arctic positive feedbacks.
350
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of Arctic climate change is the risk of passing tipping
351
points. The Arctic region arguably has the greatest concentration of potential tipping
352
elements in the Earth system, including Arctic sea ice, the Greenland ice sheet, North
353
Atlantic deep-water formation regions, boreal forests, permafrost and marine methane
354
hydrates. Recent analyses have added several more candidates. The array of tipping
355
elements in the Arctic [is] not independent – they are causally connected to one another,
356
and to other areas for concern. Warming of the Arctic region is proceeding at three times
357
the global average, and a new "Arctic rapid change" climate pattern has been observed
358
in the past decade. Near complete loss of the summer sea ice, as forecast for the middle
359
of this century, if not before, will probably have knock-on effects for the northern mid-
360
latitudes, shifting the jet streams and storm tracks. Several tipping elements have already
361
been set in motion and changes are accelerating. (Duarte et al. 2012)
362
363
Arctic experts continue to warn that the rapid Arctic change is a clear danger to our planet and
our future:
364
Arctic response to global warming is already very strong, very rapid, and of major
365
global significance. It poses an immediate and troubling danger to global climate that
366
will likely have severe consequences both for the biosphere and [for] the human
367
economy. Accordingly, sustained monitoring, focused research and sound risk analysis
368
are crucial for the predictions of future impact. Arctic [methane] hydrates have long
369
been identified as a likely source of strong positive feedback. (Nisbet et al. 2013)
370
[Emphasis added.]
371
A 2010 paper on Arctic methane positive feedback sources concluded that, based on a
372
comprehensive review of the literature, "significant increases in methane emissions are likely, and
373
catastrophic emissions cannot be ruled out" (O'Connor et al. 2010).
374
375
A special 2012 UNEP report, Policy Implications of Warming Permafrost, was an alert to
upgrade permafrost monitoring capacities:
376
The TSP [Thermal State of Permafrost] and CALM [Circumpolar Active Layer
377
Monitoring] [Arctic permafrost monitoring] networks need to be standardized and
378
expanded to better monitor permafrost status. Most stations … are funded and operated
379
by independent research teams. Funding is limited and irregular, making it difficult to
380
standardize network measurements, support databases of observations and expand the
381
coverage. For example, air temperature and snow depth, both key parameters for
382
understanding changes in permafrost, are not measured at all TSP and CALM sites. TSP
383
and CALM coverage is limited because installation and maintenance costs restrict sites
384
to regions with reasonable access by truck, plane or boat, resulting in a distinct
385
clustering of sites along roads and the Arctic coastline. The ability of the GTN-P [Global
386
Terrestrial Network for Permafrost] to provide timely and comprehensive evaluations of
387
the global status of permafrost would benefit greatly from expansion of the TSP and
388
CALM networks, standardizing the measurements and establishing easily accessible
389
databases of observations. (UNEP 2012)
390
A recent Arctic assessment, Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (AMAP 2012),
391
explains that "the past six years (2005–2010) have been the warmest period ever recorded in the Arctic.
392
There is evidence that two components of the Arctic cryosphere – snow and sea ice – are interacting
393
with the climate system to accelerate warming." The report documents an urgent need for upgrading of
394
Arctic monitoring capacities:
395
9.1.4. Regional changes in sea ice 9.1.4.1. Trends in extent Many landfast ice
396
records have not been continued in the past ten years due to closure of monitoring
397
stations.
398
9.3.5. Knowledge gaps and critical research needs There are currently large gaps
399
in knowledge that limit understanding of the complex interactions between Arctic biota
400
and their physical environment. […] Specifically, long-term commitments to ocean
401
observatories that explicitly examine biological responses to changes in the physical
402
structuring of the Arctic are urgently needed (e.g., Grebmeier et al., 2010). Such long-
403
term series, together with process studies, will improve understanding of the response of
404
sea ice to changing physical forcing mechanisms and feedbacks within and between the
405
physical and biological components of the system.
406
Loss of ice and snow in the Arctic enhances climate warming by increasing
407
absorption of the sun's energy at the surface of the planet. It could also dramatically
408
increase emissions of carbon dioxide and methane and change large-scale ocean
409
currents. The combined outcome of these effects is not yet known.
410
Arctic countries and international organizations should: Improve and expand
411
systematic, comprehensive surface-based monitoring of the cryosphere. Maintain and
412
support development of remote sensing methods for observing the cryosphere. Develop
413
and enhance systems to observe the cascading effects of cryospheric change on
414
ecosystems and human society. Expand research into processes that are important for
415
modeling the cryosphere, to reduce uncertainty in predicting cryospheric change. In
416
particular, improvements are needed in modeling permafrost dynamics, snow vegetation
417
interactions, and mass loss from glaciers, ice caps, and the Greenland Ice Sheet.
418
(AMAP 2012) [Emphasis added.]
419
In 2009, Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern was published by the Arctic Monitoring
420
and Assessment Programme (AMAP 2009). The issues included the Arctic carbon cycle, observations,
421
and predictive capability. The following recommendations were made:
422

423
424
information on key aspects of the Arctic climate system.

425
426
Enhance and expand networks of monitoring and observation points for short-lived
climate forcers.

427
428
Sustain and enhance the current level of monitoring of climate change updating
Initiate and maintain circumpolar measurements of carbon fluxes within the Arctic
and imports to and exports from the Arctic.

Integrate and expand monitoring efforts to enhance understanding of cause-and-
429
effect relationships and temporal and spatial variability driving a regional scale
430
climate.
431

432
433
434
Conduct studies on non-carbon dioxide climate forcers to improve understanding of
their role in the Arctic climate.

Conduct studies in the Arctic carbon cycle to identify key sensitivities and major
feedbacks to regional and global climate.
435
The fate of [methane] gas hydrates large remains largely uncertain in both the short- and
436
long-term…. Current understanding of the Arctic carbon cycle is limited by considerable
437
uncertainties…. A major challenge for carbon modelling is connecting fine scale
438
observational studies with the larger scales at which models describe the environment.
439
Observational networks should be designed to capture regional variations and also reveal
440
the underlying processes that govern carbon dynamics at various scales. (AMAP 2009)
441
[Emphasis added.]
442
Meeting these recommendations will require a large upgrade in Arctic monitoring.
443
The most recent full assessment of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment was published in
444
2004 (ACIA 2004). That assessment "focused on how climate change influences the Arctic cryosphere,
445
rather than the other way around" (UNEP 2012). It did record, however, the risk of feedback Arctic
446
greenhouse gas emissions and also that the extent of such risk had not been determined. The situation is
447
the same today but with stronger evidence of an extreme risk.
448
[T]he carbon stored in northern boreal forests, lakes, tundra, the Arctic Ocean,
449
and permafrost is considerably greater than the global atmospheric pool of carbon. […]
450
Because low temperatures have been so important for the capture and storage of
451
atmospheric carbon in the Arctic, projected temperature increases have the potential to
452
lead to the release of old and more recently stored carbon to the atmosphere. The release
453
of stored carbon will increase atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations and provide a
454
positive feedback to the climate system….
455
18.4.3. Abrupt climate change and extreme events. There may be an abrupt
456
release of carbon dioxide and methane from thawing permafrost in marine sent
457
sediments. […] In the marine environment there are vast stores of methane and carbon
458
dioxide in the form of gas hydrates. Even the release of the small percentage of methane
459
from gas hydrates could result in an abrupt and significant climate forcing.
460
As anthropogenic climate change continues, the potential exists for oceanic and
461
atmospheric circulation to shift to new or unusual states. The likelihood of any such
462
shifts or changes occurring is not yet well established but if the future is like the past the
463
possibility for abrupt change and new extremes is real.
464
Long-term time series of climate and climate-related parameters are available
465
from only a few locations in the Arctic. The need for continuing long-term acquisition of
466
data is crucial, including upgrading of the climate observing system throughout the
467
Arctic and monitoring snow and ice features, the discharge of major arctic rivers, ocean
468
parameters, and changes in vegetation, biodiversity, and ecosystem processes.
469
470
[I]t is important to re-emphasize that climate and UV radiation changes in the
Arctic are likely to affect every aspect of human life in the region and the lives of many
471
living outside the region. While more studies and a better understanding of the expected
472
changes are important, action must begin to be taken to address current and anticipated
473
changes before the scale of changes and impacts further reduces the options available for
474
prevention, mitigation and adaptation. (ACIA 2004) [Emphasis added.]
475
476
The Arctic Climate Change and Security Policy Conference in 2008 (Yalowitz et al. 2008)
determined that research into the science of Arctic climate change is deficient:
477
Global warming is accelerating the pace at which climate change is affecting the Arctic
478
region as well as climatic and environmental conditions in the U.S. While evidence that
479
global warming is affecting both the Arctic region and the world's environment is
480
incontrovertible, the scientific basis for understanding these phenomena and the
481
information available for making policy decisions remains inadequate. In order to define
482
issues for decision and set priorities for action, governments should demand accelerated
483
scientific study of issues critical to informed policy making and should be willing to fund
484
needed research. (Yalowitz et al. 2008) [Emphasis added.]
485
Finally, the NOAA explains its deficiencies in Arctic monitoring:
486
It is important to monitor Arctic greenhouse gases as they have great potential to
487
influence global climate through positive feedbacks. Consequently, NOAA ESRL [Earth
488
System Research Laboratory] currently measures atmospheric CO2 and CH4 weekly in
489
air samples from 6 Arctic sites (north of 53°N). This is down from 8 sites in 2011; sites
490
in the Baltic Sea and Station M in the North Atlantic were discontinued due to budget
491
cuts. (Bruhwiler & Dlugokencky 2012) [Emphasis added.]
492
493
IPCC Confirmation of Arctic Feedback Catastrophic Risk, Including Methane Hydrate
494
Does the IPCC record a risk of climate catastrophe due to Arctic warming? Yes, the IPCC
495
Fourth Assessment Report (2007) recognized the risk of catastrophic impacts from Arctic carbon
496
feedbacks – specifically from subsea methane hydrate. What follows are IPCC references to
497
catastrophic feedback risk from Arctic warming.
498
Risk of Catastrophic or Abrupt Change: The possibility of abrupt climate change
499
and/or abrupt changes in the earth system triggered by climate change, with potentially
500
catastrophic consequences, cannot be ruled out. Positive feedback from warming may
501
cause the release of carbon or methane from the terrestrial biosphere and oceans. (IPCC
502
2007, AR4 WG3 2.2.4)
503
Cryospheric Topics: As permafrost thaws due to a warmer climate, CO2 and CH4
504
trapped in permafrost are released to the atmosphere. Since CO2 and CH4 are greenhouse
505
gases, atmospheric temperature is likely to increase in turn, resulting in a feedback loop
506
with more permafrost thawing. The permafrost and seasonally thawed soil layers at high
507
latitudes contain a significant amount (about one-quarter) of the global total amount of
508
soil carbon. Because global warming signals are amplified in high-latitude regions, the
509
potential for permafrost thawing and consequent greenhouse gas releases is thus large.
510
(IPCC 2007, AR4 WG1 1.4.5)
511
Polar Regions: In both polar regions, components of the terrestrial cryosphere
512
and hydrology are increasingly being affected by climate change (very high confidence).
513
These changes will have cascading effects on key regional bio-physical systems and
514
cause global climatic feedbacks (very high confidence). (IPCC 2007, AR4 WG2 15)
515
Methane Hydrate Instability / Permafrost Methane: Methane hydrates are stored
516
on the seabed along continental margins where they are stabilised by high pressures and
517
low temperatures, implying that ocean warming may cause hydrate instability and
518
release of methane into the atmosphere. Methane is also stored in the soils in areas of
519
permafrost and warming increases the likelihood of a positive feedback in the climate
520
system via permafrost melting and the release of trapped methane into the atmosphere.
521
Both forms of methane release represent a potential threshold in the climate system. As
522
the climate warms, the likelihood of the system crossing a threshold for a sudden release
523
increases. Since these changes produce changes in the radiative forcing through changes
524
in the greenhouse gas concentrations, the climatic impacts of such a release are the same
525
as an increase in the rate of change in the radiative forcing. (IPCC 2007, AR4 WG1
526
8.7.2.4)
527
Global Climate Projections: [S]ome sources of future radiative forcing are yet to
528
be accounted for in the ensemble projections, including those from land use change,
529
variations in solar and volcanic activity […], and CH4 release from permafrost or ocean
530
hydrates. (IPCC 2007, AR4 WG1 10.5.1)
531
Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and the Risk from Climate Change: AR4
532
temperature range (1.1-6.4°C) accounts for this [climate-carbon cycle] feedback from all
533
scenarios and models but additional CO2 and CH4 releases are possible from permafrost,
534
peat lands, wetlands, and large stores of marine hydrates at high latitudes. (IPCC 2007,
535
AR4 WG1 Table 19.1)
536
537
538
Conclusion
This paper calls for a great, rapid upgrade of Arctic monitoring capacities because of the
539
evidence that we are in a planetary climate change emergency that is attributable to extremely rapid
540
Arctic changes. Multiple Arctic amplifying feedbacks could tip the planet into runaway global climate
541
change. Yet not only are all (known) Arctic positive feedbacks from enormous vulnerable carbon pools
542
now operant, the world is also committed to a much higher degree of warming than the warming that
543
has triggered these Arctic feedbacks.
544
545
Secondary evidence provided in this paper shows that there is substantial uncertainty as to the
actual magnitude and rate of emissions from the Arctic greenhouse gas (CH4, CO2 and N2O) sources
546
with continued global warming. But recent evidence (Sergienko et al. 2012; Vaks et al. 2013; Miller et
547
al. in press) indicates that the risks are much greater than had been thought. This lack of certainty
548
underscores the need for an urgent and major upgrade in Arctic monitoring.
549
Most governments are not responding to the threat from global climate change, so emissions
550
keep rising. Perhaps a reason for this is the scientific uncertainty about how great the risk of Arctic
551
greenhouse gas feedback runaway is. More monitoring, done on an emergency basis, could perhaps
552
convince governments of the Arctic (and therefore global) climate change emergency, upon which they
553
must urgently act.
554
555
References
556
Aarhus University. 2013. The tundra: A dark horse in planet Earth's greenhouse gas budget.
557
ScienceDaily. Accessed on the internet at http://www.sciencedaily.com
558
/releases/2013/10/131010091700.htm on 26 October 2013.
559
560
ACIA. 2004. Impacts of a warming Arctic: synthesis report of the Arctic climate impact assessment.
561
Fairbanks, Alaska: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Accessed on the internet at
562
http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/overview.html on 26 October 2013.
563
564
AMAP. 2012. Arctic Climate Issues 2011: Changes in Arctic snow, water, ice and permafrost in the
565
Arctic. SWIPA 2011 overview report. Oslo, Norway: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
566
(AMAP).
567
568
AMAP. 2009. AMAP 2009 update on selected climate issues of concern (observations, short-lived
569
climate forcers, Arctic carbon cycle, predictive capability). Oslo, Norway: Arctic Monitoring and
570
Assessment Programme (AMAP).
571
572
Anisimov O. & Reneva S. 2006. Permafrost and Changing Climate: The Russian Perspective. Ambio
573
35, 4, 169-175.
574
575
Betts R.A., Collins M., Hemming D.L., Jones C.D., Lowe J.A., & Sanderson M.G. 2011. When could
576
global warming reach 4°C? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 369, 1934, 67-84.
577
578
Bloom A.A., Palmer P.I., Fraser A., Reay D.S. & Frankenberg C. 2010. Large-scale controls of
579
methanogenesis inferred from methane and spaceborne gravity data. Science 327, 322-325.
580
581
Bruhwiler L. & Dlugokencky E. 2012. Carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4). Arctic Report Card:
582
Update for 2012. Boulder, CO, USA: NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory (ESRL) Global
583
Monitoring Division.
584
585
Climate Interactive. 2013. The Climate Scoreboard. Accessed on the internet at
586
http://www.climateinteractive.org/scoreboard on 26 October 2013.
587
588
Dlugokencky E., Nisbet E., Fisher R. & Lowry D. 2011. Global atmospheric methane in 2010: budget,
589
changes and dangers. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 369, 1943, 2058-2072.
590
591
Duarte C.M., Lenton T.M., Wadhams P., & Wassmann P. 2012. Abrupt climate change in the Arctic.
592
Nature Climate Change 2, 60-62.
593
594
Elberling B., Christiansen H.H. & Hansen B.U. 2010. High nitrous oxide production from thawing
595
permafrost. Nature Geoscience 3, 332-335.
596
597
Fisher R.E., Sriskantharajah S., Lowry D., Lanoisellé M., Fowler C.M.R., James R.H., Hermansen O.,
598
Lund Myhre C., Stohl A., Greinert J., Nisbet-Jones P.B.R., Mienert J. & Nisbet E.G. 2011. Arctic
599
methane sources: Isotopic evidence for atmospheric inputs. Geophysical Research Letters 38, L21803,
600
doi 10.1029/2011GL049319.
601
602
Flanner M.G., Shell K.M., Barlage M., Perovich D.K. & Tschudi M.A. 2011. Radiative forcing and
603
albedo feedback from the Northern Hemisphere cryosphere between 1979 and 2008. Nature
604
Geoscience 4, 151-155.
605
606
Frieler K., Meinshausen M., Braun N., Golly A., Hare W., Mengel M., van der Merwe K., Poulter B.,
607
Schaeffer M., Schleussner C.-F. & Schneider von Deimling T. 2011. Risk-analysis of global climate
608
tipping points. PRIMAP Research Group, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.
609
610
Hansen J. 2010. A convenient falsehood: global warming is a hoax*. Presentation to the French
611
National Assembly. 12 May, Paris, France. Accessed on the internet at
612
http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2010/May2010_FrenchNationalAssembly.pdf on 26 October 2013.
613
614
Hansen J., Sato M., Kharecha P., Russell G., Lea D.W. & Siddall M. 2007. Climate change and trace
615
gases. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 365, 1856, 1925-1954.
616
617
IPCC. 2013. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group 1 Contribution to the
618
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Accessed on the
619
internet at http://ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/#.UmvjJiTF9Ql on 26 October 2013.
620
621
IPCC. 2007. Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
622
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
623
624
Kirschke S. et al. 2013. Three decades of global methane sources and sinks. Nature Geoscience 6, 813-
625
823.
626
627
Levine J.G., Wolff E.W., Jones A.E., Sime L.C., Valdes P.J., Archibald A.T., Carver G.D., Warwick
628
N.J. & Pyle J.A. 2011. Reconciling the changes in atmospheric methane sources and sinks between the
629
Last Glacial Maximum and the pre-industrial era. Geophysical Research Letters 38, L23804, doi
630
10.1029/2011GL049545.
631
632
Levine J.G., Wolff E.W., Hopcroft P.O. & Valdes P.J. 2012. Controls on the tropospheric oxidizing
633
capacity during an idealized Dansgaard-Oeschger event, and their implications for the rapid rises in
634
atmospheric methane during the last glacial period. Geophysical Research Letters 39, L12805, doi
635
10.1029/2012GL051866.
636
637
Mastepanov M., Sigsgaard C., Tagesson T., Ström L., Tamstorf M.P., Lund M., & Christensen T.R.
638
2013. Revisiting factors controlling methane emissions from high-Arctic tundra. Biogeosciences 10,
639
5139-5158.
640
641
Miller G.H., Lehman S.J., Refsnider K.A, Southon J.R. & Zhong Y. In press. Unprecedented recent
642
summer warmth in Arctic Canada. Geophysical Research Letters, doi 10.1002/2013GL057188.
643
644
NOAA. 2013a. What are positive feedbacks? In A Paleo Perspective on Abrupt Climate Change.
645
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Accessed on the internet at
646
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/abrupt/story2.html on 26 October 2013.
647
648
NOAA 2013b. Earth System Research Laboratory, Global Monitoring Division. Accessed on the
649
internet at http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/dv/iadv/graph.php?code=LLB&program=ccgg&type=ts on
650
26 October 2013.
651
652
NRC. 2011. Climate stabilization targets: emissions, concentrations, and impacts over decades to
653
millennia (2010). National Research Council. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
654
655
Nisbet E.G., Allen G., Cain M., Dlugokencky E.J., Fisher R.E., France J.L., Gallagher M.W., Lowry
656
D., Lund Myhre C., Minshull T.A., Pyle J.A., Ruppel C.D., Warwick N.J., Westbrook G.K. & Worthy
657
D.E.J. 2013. Response of methane sources to rapid Arctic warming. Nature 499, 401-403.
658
659
O'Connor F., Boucher O., Gedney N., Jones C.D., Folberth G.A., Coppell R., Friedlingstein P., Collins
660
W.J., Chappellaz J., Ridley J. & Johnson C.E. 2010. Possible role of wetlands, permafrost, and
661
methane hydrates in the methane cycle under future climate change: A review. Reviews of Geophysics
662
48, 2010RG000326, doi:10.1029/2010RG000326.
663
664
Ramanathan V. & Feng Y. 2008. On avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
665
system: formidable challenges ahead. Abstract. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105,
666
38, 14245–14250.
667
668
Repo M.E., Susiluoto S., Lind S.E., Jokinen S., Elsakov V., Biasi C., Virtanen T. & Martikainen P.J.
669
2009. Large N2O emissions from cryoturbated peat soil in tundra. Nature Geoscience 2, 189-192.
670
671
Screen J.A., Deser C. & Simmonds I. 2012. Local and remote controls on observed Arctic warming.
672
Geophysical Research Letters 39, L10709, doi 10.1029/2012GL051598.
673
674
Screen J.A. & Simmonds I. 2010. The central role of diminishing sea ice in recent Arctic temperature
675
amplification. Nature Letters 464, 1334-1337.
676
677
Sergienko V.I., Lobkovskii L.I., Semiletov I.P., Dudarev O.V., Dmitrievskii N.N., Shakhova N.E.,
678
Romanovskii N.N., Kosmach D.A., Nikol'skii D.N., Nikiforov S.L., Salomatin A.S., Anan'ev R.A.,
679
Roslyakov A.G., Salyuk A.N., Karnaukh V.V., Chernykh D.B., Tumskoi V.E., Yusupov V.I.,
680
Kurilenko A.V., Chuvilin E.M. & Bukhanov B.A. 2012. The degradation of submarine permafrost and
681
the destruction of hydrates on the shelf of east arctic seas as a potential cause of the "Methane
682
Catastrophe": some results of integrated studies in 2011. Doklady Earth Sciences 446, 1, 1132-1137.
683
684
Serreze M.C. & Barry R.G. 2011. Processes and impacts of Arctic amplification: A research synthesis.
685
Global and Planetary Change 77, 1-2, 85-96.
686
687
UNEP. 2012. Policy implications of warming permafrost. Nairobi, Kenya.
688
689
University of Western Australia. 2012. Arctic scientist warns of dangerous climate change. University
690
News. Accessed on the internet at http://www.news.uwa.edu.au/201201304303/climate-science/arctic-
691
scientists-warn-dangerous-climate-change on 26 October 2013.
692
693
Vaks A., Gutareva O.S., Breitenbach S.F.M., Avirmed E., Mason A.J., Thomas A.L., Osinzev A.V.,
694
Kononov A.M. & Henderson G.M. 2013. Speleothems reveal 500,000-year history of Siberian
695
permafrost. Science 340, 6129, 183-186.
696
697
Vonk J.E., Sánchez-García L., van Dongen B.E., Alling V., Kosmach D., Charkin A., Semiletov I.P.,
698
Dudarev O.V., Shakhova N., Roos P., Eglinton T.I., Andersson A. & Gustafsson O. 2012. Activation
699
of old carbon by erosion of coastal and subsea permafrost in Arctic Siberia. Nature 489, 7414, 137-140.
700
701
World Health Organization. 2013. Definitions: emergencies. Humanitarian health action. Accessed on
702
the internet at http://www.who.int/hac/about/definitions/en/ on 26 October 2013.
703
704
Yalowitz K.S., Collins J.F. & Virginia R.A. (eds.) 2008. The Arctic climate change and security policy
705
conference final report and findings, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA, 1-3 December 2008.
706
Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College.