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The virtues of non-domination: Anarchism for and against republicanism
Benjamin Franks
Abstract
Virtue theory is long associated with statist, and especially conservative, political theory.
Amongst the reasons for this connection is the assumption that the maintenance of the
hierarchies of domination provides the necessary means for developing appropriate character
traits and identifying the most heroic moral actor (from Aristotle to Roger Scruton). This
paper, by contrast argues that social practices based on principles of non-domination, drawn
from contemporary and older anarchist sources, are the richest in maintaining and promoting
internal goods such as bravery, wisdom and justice. It highlights the particular anarchist
interpretations of ‘non-domination’, distinguishing it from standard republican political
theory. It further addresses the reasons why standard conservative, hierarchical virtues, which
require institutions of domination, in particular patriotism are not (or no longer) virtues and
that wisdom involves the egalitarian diffusion of hierarchical power not the production of
relationships of domination.
Introduction
This paper is part of a wider project develops the case for the particular suitability of virtue
theory to anarchism (and anarchism to virtue theory). It shows how the significant virtues,
like wisdom, justice and courage are not only consistent with anarchist practice, but are
particularly generated from activists that contest domination. Consistent with the traditions of
analytical political philosophy,1 this paper clarifies concepts such as ‘radical virtue theory’
and ‘non-domination’, to demonstrate its similarities to and differences from the tradition of
republican political theory, in order to explain how practices consistent with anarchist
constellation of principles allow for the interpersonal virtues to flourish. It refutes arguments
that portray virtue theory as being dependent on domination, especially from conservative
critics, particularly Roger Scruton, that view virtuous relationships as being those which
maintain hierarchical values and social arrangements. This argument seeks to defend an
account of anarchist ethics that is neither consequentialist nor deontological.2 The
conclusions stands in opposition to many previous academic treatments of anarchism, which
1
Analytical political philosophy tends to be based on conceptual clarification and argument analysis as its core
defining features, often to the inappropriate exclusion or marginalisation of other important philosophical
characteristics such as negotiating uncertainty and instability, contextualising and de-contextualising, (re)imagination and inspiration. See D. McDermott, ‘Analytical Political Philosophy’ in D. Leopold and M. Stears,
eds., Political Theory: Methods and approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 11; M. Freeden,
Ideologies and Political theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 37, 44; D. West, ‘Continental
Philosophy’, in R. Goodin and P. Pettit, A companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2000); B. Franks, ‘Anarchism and Analytic Philosophy’, The Continuum Companion to Anarchism
ed. R. Kinna (London: Continuum, 2012).
2
See B. Franks, ‘Post-Anarchist Meta-Ethics’, Anarchist Studies (2008) and B. Franks, ‘Virtues and Anarchism’
in B. Franks and M. Wilson, Anarchism and Moral Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).
1
Draft only: Please do not cite without the permission of the author. Many thanks.
from the likes of Robert Paul Wolff tend to treat anarchism as realist and deontological3 or
Saul Newman who consider that a ‘radical’ and ‘renewed’ anarchism should be based on
subjectivism.4
Many activists, whose activity rarely involves detailed consideration of their ethical
perspective tend to drift from a dogmatic universalism to an entirely personal basis for ethics.
This is not necessarily a problem, when full immersed in a set of anti-hierarchical social
practices it is often unnecessary to identify the normative content or epistemological status of
ones underlying principles. Indeed, the types of discourse and professional practice which
characterise much contemporary moral philosophy could undermine radical actions, just as
over-analysis of concepts utilised in the wooing of lovers, interrupts the romantic flow. To
challenge the reciter over the apparent contradiction that ‘to see her was to love her’ and that
‘he loved her blindly’5 would not only to miss the point of the poetic utterance but cool the
erotic passions. Similarly interrupting discussions on how to deal with an imminent fascist
threat against anti-poverty protestors6 is unlikely to be assisted with calls for meta-ethical
clarifications of the epistemic status of ‘rights’. Nonetheless, as Matthew Wilson has
indicated, when it comes to deciding priorities or dealing with disputes within groups there
are significant disadvantages if there is a failure to identify shared, effective, legitimate
grounds for decision-making.7 So if there are practical outcomes to the argument identified
here, it is in defending a form of analysis, which is already utilised in some anarchist
quarters, as a tool for planning and assessing radical practices.
Radical Virtue Theory: Outlined
Virtue ethics is widely associated with Aristotle. Because of his authoritarianism, including
advocacy of slavery, there is a challenge, to radicals appealing to this applied theoretical
approach. This challenge is discussed in more detail below with respect to contemporary
conservative virtue theory. There is however, an immediate appeal of Aristotelianism for
radicals. Aristotle, as the Hellenist D. J. Allan explains, regarded politics and ethics to be
3
R. P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism , such an approach can also be found in more general political
philosophical approaches to anarchism, see
4
S. Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 4-5, 163-64.
5
It is almost compulsory for any one based in Dumfries to acknowledge the work of Robert Burns at least once.
6
One such instance is the attack by members of the English Defence League and Scottish Defence League
against Occupy Newcastle in October 2011.
7
M. Wilson, ‘Freedom Pressed: Anarchism, liberty and freedom’, in B. Franks and M. Wilson, eds., Anarchism
and Moral philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).
2
Draft only: Please do not cite without the permission of the author. Many thanks.
practical, investigative activities generating better ways of living.8 There is, as Andrius
Bielskis identifies a commitment to praxis, broadly defined as political action combined with
practical wisdom, generated by discussion.9 The Politics begins with Aristotle identifying
that society is constructed out of people organising into practical associations to generate
goods (internal and external).10 However, Aristotle’s ‘fatal flaws’ (for the anarchist) are the
assumptions that these associations have to be hierarchically organised internally as there are
natural leaders and natural slaves,11 and these hierarchical social institutions need to be under
the control of a single natural authority, the state.12
Radical virtue theory outlined here, is based on Alasdair MacIntyre’s ‘revolutionary
Aristotelianism’.13 It rejects the authoritarian features of Aristotle’s theory and reconstructs it
on egalitarian grounds. MacIntyre’s radical virtue theory has much in common with the
commitments of many anarchist thinkers and movements, though as shown below, there are
some areas of potential difference. Anarchist virtue similarly has significant similarities with
the Perfectionism outlined by anarchist-influenced philosopher Samuel Clark.14 Clark’s
Perfectionism, like virtue theory in general, is geared towards eudaimonia (flourishing).
Clark bases his account of anarchism largely on the avoidance and contestation domination.15
Clark like Aristotle, the great proponent of virtue theory, initially described it in individual
terms, he also highlights how a flourishing individual requires a community in order for the
virtues to develop.16 MacIntyre’s Aristotelian virtue ethics, 17 like Clark’s Perfectionism,18
stresses that social enhancement is the product of collective individual enhancements. So,
encouraging activities which encompass bravery, compassion, wisdom, liberality and
integrity, rather than cowardice, hardheartedness, ignorance, insularity and deceitfulness are
8
D. J. Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 123-25.
A. Bielskis, ‘Alasdair MacIntyre and the Lithuanian New Left’, Virtues and Politics, eds. P. Blackledge and K.
Knight (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2011), 300.
10
Aristotle, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1.
11
Aristotle, Politics, 2-3, 8.
12
Aristotle, Politics, 1, 22.
13
As Anton Leist notes, one of the features of MacIntyre’s account of Aristotle’s Ethics is that it is critical of
some of Aristotle’s illiberal assumptions (‘Troubling Oneself with Ends’, Virtue and Politics ed. P. Blackledge
and K. Knight(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2011), 205.
14
S. Clark, ‘Kicking Against the Pricks: Anarchist perfectionism and the conditions of independence’ in B.
Franks and M. Wilson, eds., Anarchism and Moral philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).
15
S. Clark, Living Without Domination: The possibility of an anarchist utopia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
Living Without Domination and ‘Kicking Against’ are separate works, but the one published later overtly draws
on the arguments of the earlier in its account of perfectionism (36-7).
16
Aristotle, The Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), pp. 273-4; Clark, Living Without Domination, esp.
137-38.
17
Aristotle, The Ethics, pp.91-5
18
Clark ‘Kicking Against’, p. 35.
9
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likely to lead to a better social outcome. These inter-personal attributes are goods inthemselves, but the more they are practised and the greater their extent the more likely
produce a happier more fulfilled society, and the more they are undermined then the social
world becomes more fractured and dystopic.19
Some apparent differences between Clark’s Perfectionism and radical virtue theory are more
apparent than real. Clark suggests that there is a weakness in virtue theory, as other nonmoral features are also required for a prospering individual and society – such as good health.
As Clark notes, it is not immoral in itself to sick20 (although ill-health brought about by greed
is criticised by Aristotle).21 So for Clark, there is an account of the good, which must include
health. However, MacIntyre’s virtue theory includes such non-moral resources in his account
of practices maintained by institutions. Practices are rule governed activities (although these
norms may adapt over time), which generate internal goods, as well as potentially producing
external goods.22 These are protected by particular, types of stable resources (institutions). So
good health, through the intellectual, physical, emotional and psychological well-being of
human labour would constitute part of the resource framework for the generation of virtues
and one of the features that need to be sustained in order for virtuous practices to flourish.23
Good health on its own would not be desirable, if it is part of a malign practice, for instance
intervening to deliberately extend the physical strength of a torturer engaged in persecution.24
There are more significant differences between Clark’s perfectionism and MacIntyre’s – as
well as important divisions between MacIntyre and the anarchist variant. Clark differs from
MacIntyre in one significant manner. Clark, although critical of Robert P. Wolff’s version of
anarchism,25 considers the goal of an anarchist perfectionism is to produce independent moral
agents as this make for a more robust account of the good.26 This is not the ‘monkish’
independence, but a fully developed but unconstrained moral reasoning compatible with
positive freedom, the ability to determine one’s own goals, rank preferences and have
19
A. MacIntyre, After Virtue second edition (London: Duckworth, 2006), 155-56 and 194-95. For more on the
links between virtue theory and anarchism see Franks, ‘Anarchism and the Virtues’, in B. Franks and M.
Wilson, eds., Anarchism and Moral philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).
20
Clark, ‘Kicking Against’, 34-35.
21
Aristotle The Ethics, 124-25.
22
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 187.
23
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 194-95.
24
This is separate to the inherent goal of a good medical practitioner who assists the physical well-being of her
patient without improper reference to their profession or lifestyle.
25
Clark, Living Without Domination, 4.
26
Clark, ‘Kicking Against’, 36-41.
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resources to act to fulfil them in a rational manner.27 However, Clark’s account is still based
on the fixed, modern liberal model of independent agency and agent perfection. MacIntyre,
by contrast identifies that humans are necessarily dependent beings, and that developing
virtue-rich practices requires us to recognise this feature of our physical being.28 A view
shared, for instance by Ericco Malatesta. ‘It is a fact that Man [sic.] is a social animal whose
existence depends on the continued physical and spiritual relations between human beings.’29
If we were not mortal creatures that were prone to disease, then there would be no need for
the virtue of compassion and nurturing. MacIntyre criticises Aristotle for prioritising the selfsufficient ‘superior’ as the ideal of the virtuous agent, marginalising the virtues of those who
develop the capacities for dealing with dependence.30 Further, there is no single account of
the ideal agent, perfection being reached differently according to ones location within the
network of inter-personal social practices.31
Radical virtue theory recognises that resources such as shelter, food, companionship are need
for humans to thrive. A virtuous person is not required to achieve the impossible, such as fly
unassisted, or procreate independently. However, anarchist virtue theory differs from
Aristotle and (in the main) MacIntyre in rejecting that there is a fixed or innate goal, which
rationality will discover. For their virtue theories refer to the realisation of human potential to
reach this fixed telos.32 Anarchist virtue theory recognises shared common and pervasive
biological needs whose satisfaction is necessarily for development, also recognises that there
is no fixed biological essence from which a theory of the good is derived. If technology alters
such that procreation and child-rearing is possible asexually, then some of the virtuous
practices and institutions associated with reproduction would significantly alter.
Greater goals (telē) than the specific objectives of a particular social practice are generated
and sustained through agents participating in - and between - adjacent activities. For instance
a general guiding account of ‘human liberation’ forms the telos of someone who, for instance,
participates in anti-fascist activism and then takes part in selective environmental direct
action before engaging in union activity. The telos, however though stable is adaptable as
Clark, ‘Kicking Against’, 37.
A. MacIntyre, Dependent, Rational, Animals: Why human beings need the virtues (London: Duckworth,
1999), 5-6.
29
E. Malatesta, Malatesta: Life and ideas (London: Freedom, 1984), 73.
30
MacIntyre, Dependent, Rational, Animals, 7.
31
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 181.
32
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 52-53.
27
28
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what constitutes ‘liberation’ might become more sophisticated over time, and the agent to be
emancipated might extend beyond a particular species. These stable but adaptable telē are
pervasive and core, but not necessarily universal.
Thomas Swann and the Leninist Alex Callinicos argue that universals are required to avoid
conflict and promote revolutionary change.33 To use Swann’s example of a group of
anarchists from the same movement, but some wish to assist an animal rights direct action
group over those assisting an anti-racist organisation, because they have different
revolutionary telē. Without a single universal final principle or goal, argues Swann, the
conflict would not be wholly resolvable. However, such conflict might itself be socially
productive as each informs the other in order to sway the debate, and resolution which is
mutually beneficial can take multiple forms (find common ground, share resources between
the two goals as a collective, a mutual parting in the hope of future reconciliation) and can
subtly shift the apparently rival telē. Even if there was a universal goal (and it is unclear as to
what single method discovers it), as different peoples have different histories their
interpretations of the ‘universal’ would still conflict. Instead, as MacIntyre argues, it is
through shared practices that people encounter one another and find agreement, but such
agreements can only be contingent, even if they are stable. To jump from shared concerns to
a ‘single collective subject with a universal interest, is to go from good politics to bad
metaphysics.’34
Non-Domination: Defined
Under the influence of Wolff’s ‘philosophical anarchism’ absence of coercion, which
generates a de facto rejection of the state, has been inaccurately regarded as the anarchist
minimum within academic philosophy. However, as republican theorists, such as Quentin
Skinner, have pointed out mere rejection of actual coercion is insufficient to identify political
freedom, instead they prioritise ‘non-domination’. Skinner, one of the major contemporary
republican political theorists, explains that non-domination includes not just the notion of
negative freedom, but also absence of ‘alien control’ which can impact on the agent’s
T. Swann, ‘Can Franks’ Practical Anarchism Avoid Moral Relativism?’, Anarchist Developments in Cultural
Studies. Post-Anarchism today, 2.1 (2010), 207-08; A. Callinicos, “Two Cheers for Enlightenment
Universalism: Or, Why it’s hard to be an Aristotelian Revolutionary’, Virtue and Politics: Alasdair MacIntyre’s
Revolutionary Politics eds., Blackledge and K. Knight (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2011.
34
A. MacIntyre, ‘Where We Were, Where We Are, Where We Need to Be’, Virtue and Politics: Alasdair
MacIntyre’s Revolutionary Politics eds., Blackledge and K. Knight (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press,
2011), 318,
33
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decision making without direct coercion.35 For instance, a person who has a powerful
overseer (dominus), might make decisions on the basis of what the overseer would want and
the potential punishment meted out if denied, even though the superintendent makes no active
intervention.36 Simply by being in a subservient position within a hierarchy, where one can be
subject to the interests of others as above your own (even if these are not ever carried out),
means that the individual knows themselves to be unfree and therefore not a freely acting
agent.37 To be free, is to have to identify where your interests lie and act on them.
Domination, necessarily requires power structures and identities based on stable inequalities
of controlling power.
Kelvin Knight provides a detailed account of different republican political theorists, and their
similarities with and differences to radical virtue ethics and thus to anarchist virtue theory. He
explains that there initially strong parallels between republican theory and MacIntyre’s ethics,
which because of their shared antagonism towards liberalism, led to a degree of
convergence.38 Both historically promote the development of character and a complex view
of agency,39 although more contemporary republican theorists’ account of agency tends
largely towards liberal conceptions of the agent as being a rational being acting in their own
self-interest, which arbitrary power violates.40For republican freedom to be realised, not only
must the individual be under no dependent control, but that freely willed institutions are
required to maintain one’s liberty. For almost all republican theorists, non-domination shares
Aristotle’s statist ‘fatal mistake’, that the instrument for non-domination requires the state
(for republicans, one which is under the control of the free citizenry As Knight observes:
‘Whereas republicans identified ethics with the public activity of citizens, liberals privatised
morality’.41 Republicanism, requires the citizenry to be moral to uphold the state, and for the
state to protect the conditions for their moral improvement.42
Q. Skinner, ‘On the Slogans of Republican Political Theory’, European Journal of Political Theory, 9. 1
(January 2010) , 96-97.
36
Skinner, ‘On the Slogans’, 96.
37
Skinner, ‘On the Slogans’, 98.
38
K. Knight, ‘Virtue, Politics, and History: Rival enquiries into action and order’, Virtue and Politics ed. P.
Blackledge and K. Knight(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2011), 241 and 254.
39
Knight, ‘Vritue, Politics, and History’, 241-42
40
See P. Markell, ‘The Insufficiency of Non-Domination’, Political Theory 36.1. (Feb 2008), pp. 9-36.
41
Knight, ‘Vritue, Politics, and History’, 242.
42
Knight, ‘Virtue, Politics, and History’, 243-44.
35
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Drawing on the work of J. G. A. Pocock, Knight explains that non-domination is understood
in statist terms. Republicanism regards the generation of virtues, and virtuous practices as
depending on, and being generated by the state.43 Knight then explains that despite the
similarities, there are significant differences between republicanism and revolutionary virtue
ethics. Republicanism compartmentalises the ‘self’, in fixing the identity of the ideal moral
agent, within the model of the republican. MacIntyrean ethics argues that the unified moral
agent has different identities in different practices and contexts.44 Further, Knight argues,
consistent with anarchist, that radical virtue theory is incompatible with statism, as it
promotes not just one identity, but to subjugate private interests to a single managerial
authority.45 Republicanism whilst providing an account of the non-dominated citizen does so
in relation to the dominated non-republican subject, whether these be the slaves to the
freemen in the original Roman ideal, or the dominated worker (‘wage-slave’) who provides
for the free employer in the modern republic. The republican state helps to negotiate and
stabilise this hierarchy.46
By contrast Alex Prichard argues that an anarchist republicanism can be discerned in the
works of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, which does not depend on a centralised state to protect the
freely acting individual, but on multiple, freely combining voluntary organisations.47 The
notion of the free, independent citizen advanced by republican theorists,48 like Quentin
Skinner and Philip Pettit, shares similarities with Clark’s perfectionist model of the
independent individual. By contrast Errico Malatesta, Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin,
are closer to MacIntyre’s social view of responsible but fluidly, interdependent beings.
Anarchism shares with republican theory the notion that inherently valuable qualities, such as
freedom are imbedded in particular types of civil institution and that dominating power
disrupts the generation of goods like inter-dependant freedoms. However, republican
accounts of non-domination because they are based on a statist framework, identify the
notion of ‘domination’ in different ways to anarchists. For republicans virtuous attributes are
Knight ‘Virtue, Politics, and History’, 245.
Knight, ‘Virtue, Politics, and History’’, 254.
45
Knight, ‘Virtue, Politics, and History’, 256.
46
Knight, ‘Virtue, Politics, and History’, 272-73; 278.
47
A. Prichard ‘The Ethical Foundatuion of Proudhon’s Republicanism’, B. Franks and M. Wilson, eds.,
Anarchism and Moral philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).
48
Ronen Shnaydern argues that contemporary republican theorists have changed from promoting a similar view
of the individual and freedom to the classical liberal theorists, but emphasising the requirement for positive
institutions to preserve such freedom, to a wider concept of freedom and the individual. See ‘Liberal versus
Republican Notions of Freedom’, Political Studies 60.1. (March 2012), 45.
43
44
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those that maintains the hierarchy of the state to protect from domination, for anarchists the
state is a form of domination.49
As such, whilst Prichard’s label ‘republican anarchism’ captures some important historical
and theoretical similarities, between the two schools and is a valuable corrective to more
reductive, neo-Kantian readings of anarchism in general, and Proudhon in particular, it is
perhaps inadequate as republicanism is based on civic virtue co-ordinated by and structured
within the state. The intersecting layers of the citizen are ultimately the responsibility of the
single locus of authority. As such republicanism structures apparently similar concepts in
ways distinct from anarchism. The types of virue the republican state generates for its own
survival, such as those of patriotism are incompatible with anarchist virtue theory.50
Virtues and Anarchist Non-Domination
Whilst ethical discourse is a frequent and overt feature of anarchist activist discussion,
concerning issues like rights, good outcomes, equality, fairness, bravery and integrity, the
identification of a systematic, coherent ethical outlook is rarely a central area of concern.
Indeed some have shied away from ethical analysis, considering contemporary ethical
discourse, to be simply the ideological superstructure produced by capitalism to stabilise
class rule.51 However a recent example of an explicit endorsement of virtue theory comes
from a recent edition of The Cunningham Amendment, headlined: ‘Eudaimonia: Living a
flourishing life’.
We derive our morality from what is good for our group. We get it from ancestors
whose behaviour gave them a better chance to survive and reproduce.
People who belonged to groups in which individuals looked out for each other: a
shared set of values and a deep sense of solidarity and friendship.52
Similarly Kropotkin describes the medieval city state in similar terms of providing the
framework for sustaining practices (craft trades, medieval guilds, kinship and friendship
groups) that promoted mutual respect, equality, development of communication of practical
Knight, ‘Virtue, Politics, and History’, 255-56.
Knight, ‘Virtue, Politics, and History’, 255.
51
A. Lintzgy, ‘Human Right or Class justice’, Class War: The Heavy Stuff 1 (1987), 4.
52
‘Eudaimonia: Living a Flourishing Life’, The Cunningham Amendment, 13.2 (May 2012), 28.
49
50
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knowledge and justice. These traditional practices maintained – and were supported by – the
flourishing medieval commune.53 Anarchism, promotes social practices that avoid, oppose or
attempt to minimise dominating power.
Clark utilises the notion of rejecting ‘domination’ as a central feature of his practical
anarchist utopia. Because much of his discussion concerns protection of the individual from
coercion of the state, it might initially be regarded that he is simply making ‘domination’ a
synonym for coercion, and his practical utopia, a return to classical liberalism. However, this
is mistaken. The autonomy that Clark envisions, is one rooted in intersecting networks of
rule-governed social institutions,54 necessary for developing valuable human characteristics.
This privileging of localised practices conflicts with the centralism of legitimacy in liberal
capitalism and republicanism. Thus ‘non-domination’, in the anarchist sense is not just an
iteration of classical non-coercion, but recognition that it involves interdependence and
contestation of hierarchy.
More recently, post-anarchists like Todd May, have embraced features of Aristotelian virtue
theory. May who also draws upon writers like Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jacques
Ranciere highlight how relationships that are good in themselves, in particular friendships,
that are geared towards the benefit of others, but not done so out of any consequentialist
analysis (‘maximising yields’), that stand in opposition to dominant neo-liberal identities and
social practices.55 As a result non-domination, in its multi-institutional anarchist form,
provides possibilities for compatibility with radical virtue theory. However a stronger thesis
is proposed that: social practices that conform to core anarchist anti-hierarchical principles
are better suited to promoting virtues than conservative rivals.
Examples
In the opening to The Ethics, Aristotle identifies thirteen virtues (courage, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, proper ambition, patience, truthfulness, wittiness,
modesty and righteous ambition) which he later describes and justifies alongside the pivotal
53
P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid (London: Pelican, 1939), 129-79; Tom Hodgkinson draws out the Aristotelian link
in How to be Free (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2007), XXX
54
Clark, Living Without Domination, 57 and 59.
55
T. May, ‘Friendship in an Age of Economics’, New York Times, 4 July 2010,
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/friendship-in-an-age-ofeconomics/?scp=1&sq=%22todd%20may%22&st=cse>; T. May, ‘’, Anarchist developments in Cultural
Studies, ‘http://anarchist-developments.org/index.php/adcs/article/view/25/20
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virtues of justice, theoretic and practical wisdom, continence and friendship. Other, more
recent ethicists have provided thorough book length introductions to the topic.56 However,
partly because of constraints of space, I shall only sketch out just a few core virtues and
explain how they are embodied many anarchist practices. There is, however, a second reason
why the list of anarchist virtues it not means exhaustive. A total list would be impossible and
counter-productive, to suggest a check list of attributes, as The Cunningham Amendment
rightly identify would be to deny the development of responsibility and intellectual practices
necessary for the virtues to flourish. 57 Fixing the virtues into a predetermined ‘dogma’
suggests that there is a universal higher authority that can identify the virtues across all social
practices, and this conflicts with the idea that virtues develop over time (even with new ones
arising to sustain some of the older ones, whilst some are marginalised as they are no longer
necessary).
The three virtues I wish to concentrate upon are: bravery, justice, wisdom.58 These are not
necessarily the three most important in every social practice. Different Practices will have
different constellations of virtues at their core. Social practices that are primarily based on
assisting the education of the young, such as teaching them chess are likely to have patience
and perseverance as more pivotal virtues than, for instance, physical bravery. It is not that
physical bravery is denied or redundant, but it is unlikely to be central to that practice as it
would be in adult martial arts training. However, I picked the first three, because they are
amongst the most frequently mentioned in more activist anarchist literatures in their critiques
of their opponents activities as well as in reflections on their own politics. For instance
SchNews highlight the stupidity (absence of wisdom), cowardice and injustice in stateprotecting, nationalist and fascist movements.59
Bravery
In Aristotle’s description of courage he identifies it as the mean between the competing vices
of rashness and cowardice. Courage involves facing up to fear and these are initially at least
56
See for instance R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); R. Adams, A
Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
57
The Cunningham Amendment, ‘Eudaimonia’, 28
58
Elsewhere I discuss the virtue of modesty in relation to anarchism see the paper ‘Revolutionary Modesty’, IreImagining Revolution’, delivered at the ASN Conference 2008.
59
See for instance, SchNEWS, 787 (Friday 9th September 2011); SchNEWS, 796 (Friday 11th November 2011),
SchNEWS 718 (16th April 2010).
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largely physical: facing up to death in warfare is taken as the prime example.60 Bravery
involves having legitimate fears, and facing up to them. It is not the absence of fear, which
can be rashness. Aristotle recognises that it is not unique to the soldier, and that there is more
to fear than bodily harms, such as reputational damage or psychological harm.61 Indeed to
risk physical harm to avoid facing up to romantic loss can, such as a spurned lover
committing suicide, be a form of cowardice.62
One of the challenges sometimes made against virtue theory, is that ‘bravery’ cannot be
virtue as there were Nazi soldiers who, continued to fight even against overwhelming odds.63
If there can be courageous Nazis, then virtues are an insufficient basis for making moral
judgements. However, the main feature of the virtues is that they cannot be isolated, but must
be seen in relation to the other virtues. Thus, fortitude if it lacks compassion and justice and
is based on intellectually facile grounds is bloody-minded, rash and petty not magnanimous
or courageous. A bully is not brave, unlike someone standing up to a tormenter. The first
maintains structures of domination, the latter undermines and transforms them. Closer to
home, if the soldiers are engaged in an unjustified, unwise and indiscriminating war abroad,
they cannot be the virtuous ideal or ‘hero’, despite this being the unremitting description of
them by major charities and newspapers.64 However recognising that soldiers damaged in
such conflicts are not heroic does not mean demobilised martial labour are undeserving of
compassion and assistance.
Anti-fascist activity takes multiple forms, from physical confrontation of organised racists,65
providing support structures to immigrants and refugees66 and in promoting anti-hierarchical
social practices whose core features conflict with fascist principles.67 It is the physical
60
Aristotle, The Ethics, 129-30.
Aristotle, The Ethics, 127-28.
62
Aristotle, The Ethics, 130-31.
63
Discussed, by amongst others, J. Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy second edition (London:
McGraw Hill, 1993), 164.
64
See for instance ‘Help for Heroes’, Max Hastings, ‘How you can help heal our broken heroes in the Mail's
Christmas appeal’, Daily Mail 5 December 2009, < http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1233336/Howhelp-heal-broken-heroes-Mails-Christmas-appeal.html#ixzz214kYwJVl> last accessed July 19 2012.
65
D. Hann and S. Tilzey concentrate on the more Leninist Red Action’s role in anti-Fascist Action, (No Retreat
(London: Milo, 2003)), the shorter Anti-Fascist Action: An anarchist perspective by an anonymous exLioverpool AFA member (London KSL, 2007)
66
J. Shantz, Constructive Anarchy: Building structures of resistance (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 122-26; see
also Todd May XXXX
67
Shantz’s descriptions of constructive anarchist practices that embody participation, anti-discrimination and
co-operation is indicative of social forms and identities that are antipathetic to fascism.
61
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intimidation of fascists, identified as courage by many anarchists, 68 that has been queried by
Wilson, amongst others. For Wilson such actions are in conflict with principles of justice.69
Wilson makes two direct points that: 1) there is an unrecognised inconsistency with anarchist
promoting freedom, whilst actively constraining significant rights of organised bigots; 2) this
restriction is inconsistently applied as it is not applied to ‘animal abusers’ who eat meat.70 A
third, however can be developed form these, that as anti-fascists are behaving unjustly – in
violating rights - and without constancy their physical fortitude and risk-taking is not brave
but a form of rashness.71 This argument is also raised against militant anti-fascism by
pacifists.72
Whilst anarchism would embrace virtues like ‘animal concern’ (the recognition that animals
have interests), whether this necessarily involves veganism is too broad for particular
discussion here. However, Wilson’s overt points might be dealt with by indicating that few
anarchists, outside rhetorical flourishes, present their movement as being concerned with
absolute freedom. Whilst freedom has been consistently understood as an intrinsic good,
though also generative of other goods (solidarity, welfare, wisdom), it is not a sole, supreme
good.73 It is moderated by other intrinsic principles such as equality,74 and recognised as
operating within mutually beneficial social structures.75 Thus, someone who has agrees to
participate in a game of football (or ‘soccer’) is not at liberty to pick up the ball and run into
the opposition’s goal without receiving a proportionate sanction. Proportionately violating the
liberal freedom of those engaged in maintaining and perpetuating racially oppressive
hierarchies is not inconsistent with courage, nor is it in conflict with anarchism. If the
violation of rights was itself disproportionate generating a form of domination (such as
organising a mass campaign of humiliation and vilification against a largely powerless retired
‘Dedicated Followers of Fascism’, SchNEWS 795, Friday 4th November 2011.
Wilson ‘Freedom Pressed’, 123-24.
70
Wilson ‘Freedom Pressed’, 124-25.
71
See Aristotle’s account of those who risk physical pain out of instinct or weakness of will rather than from
good reason, (The Ethics, 132-33).
72
See Ian Bone’s account of the anarchist-pacifist Crass’s reaction to militant anti-fascism in Bash the Rich
(Bristol: Tangent, 2006), 168.
73
Colin Ward’s, sociological studies show how the most autonomous forms of social structures tend to generate
social benefits. See for instance his studies on the homeless squatters’ movement, Anarchy in Action (London:
Freedom, 1982), 71-73.
74
For Saul Newman, there is a rather thin anarchist minimum of ‘equal liberty’ or ‘equaliberty’ (The Politics of
Postanarchism, 144-45.
75
P. Kropotkin, ‘"Anarchism", from The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1910’, Anarchy Archives,
<http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/kropotkin/britanniaanarchy.html>
68
69
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grandparent who had used a racial epithet in a private conversation), then this would be
inconsistent with anarchism.
Courage is a significant virtue within anarchism. It involves the recognition of risks (harms
and likelihood of these being realised), the identification of possible benefits and the
development of structures of support which enable agents to participate. For instance
SchNEWS commend activists who face physical discomfort or arrest in their direct action
against dominating structures or in protecting environmental others.76 Thus protestors fleeing
a heavily supplied police force are not cowardly, if the threat is overwhelming, instead it
would be foolhardy to continue. Following continued state harassment, which culminated in
2002 in the illegal arrest of 40 (out of 41) activists, the anarchist-influenced Movement
Against the Monarchy members disbanded as the risks to supporters wishing to take part was
too great. As a result many of the activists became involved in other radical activities, which
were not subject to such great scrutiny.77
It is because we are psychologically and corporeally vulnerable, that there is the possibility of
bravery. If we were physically indestructible then there would be no risk and therefore no
virtue of bravery. The humanism of virtue theory is not that moral principles are biologically
hard-wired (intuitive) or those which are shared universally, as our biologies differ and
change, but that appropriate social relations have to take into account the materiality of the
situation, and the transformative options available.
Justice
Contemporarily justice has been identified with the recognition of rights. Injustice is
synonymous with violation of rights. Much of the discussion of rights following Marx’s
critique of rights in ‘On the Jewish Question’ and ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’,
suggests that discussion of rights is inherently bourgeois, based on and supporting property
relations and requiring the institution of the state and other hierarchical social structures for
‘Fort for a day’, SchNEWS 624, 7 March 2008; ‘Complete Hissy Fit’, SchNEWS, 748, 18 November 2010.
BBC ‘Jubilee protesters get damages’, BBC Online, 4 February, 2004,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/3459393.stm>, Colin Blackstock ‘“Execute the Queen” protesters
arrested: Anti-royalists held for five hours after Tower march’, The Guardian , 5 June 2002,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/jun/05/jubilee.monarchy7>
76
77
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their maintenance. Similarly parts of Aristotle’s discussion on justice bares his ‘fatal error’ of
concentrating, problematically, on legality and duties to the state.78
Nonetheless issues of rights are prevalent in anarchist discourse, for instance in denouncing
state injustices or demands for economic justice. Partly, this is because even if bourgeois
institutions legitimise themselves through discourses on rights, they will violate them in order
to maintain control. Thus, rights-based campaigns, like those in support of victims of state
violence,79 can undermine structures of domination by subjecting them to immanent critique.
But more importantly, justice has a two more important, though often overlooked meanings
in virtue theory. First, justice, for Aristotle, concerns ‘fairness’. Although Aristotle
problematically, gives an illustration based on exchange,80 nonetheless receiving or providing
unequal distributions of goods is regarded as an injustice.81 This account of justice also
includes principles of benevolence (giving proper accord to the interests of others). Fairness
here might have additional features that are broadly anti-hierarchical feature, such as ensuring
access to a practice to others.
One of the problems with the virtue of justice, is that even the most tyrannical of regimes
generate a self-justifying account which claim to embody it. Cruel treatment of the oppressed
is claimed to be in their best interests,82 or the interests of vulnerable groups. Nonetheless, the
misuse of claims of fairness does not negate the importance of the principle. Areas of dispute
are resolvable, if not always conclusively, by reference to the presence or absence of other
adjacent virtues (liberality, self-discipline, wisdom, benevolence).
The second problem is that, for Aristotle, justice is the key mediating relationship between all
the other virtues, and explains to whom they are practised. Justice is having the right balance
of virtues in order for the social practice to operate effectively and strive towards excellence.
Justice becomes the dominant virtue, just as, for some propertarians theorists, justice
(understood in terms of protecting the absolute principle of negative rights) is the over-riding
virtue. It might be virtuous to be considerate and liberal to others, argues Nozick, but not at
78
Aristotle, The Ethics, 172-74.
See for instance the Ian Tomlinson Family Campaign < http://www.iantomlinsonfamilycampaign.org.uk/>
and Justice for Harry Stanley Campaign, which are predicated on the issue of ‘justice’.
80
Aristotle, The Ethics, 182-85.
81
Aristotle, The Ethics, 186-7; see too D. S. Hutchinson, ‘Ethics’, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. J.
Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 222-23; See also MacIntyre, After Virtue, 152-53.
82
Markell, ‘The Insufficiency of Non-Domination’, 14-15.
79
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the price of violating property rights.83 Upholding property rights-as-justice, takes universal
priority even if it results in a situation of slavery.84 Justice is considered in negative,
propertarians terms and is the supreme organising principle, but this seems in conflict with
the Ancient’s account of justice, as also being about moderation: the recognition of limits.85
For radical virtue theorists, however, no virtue takes universal priority. As MacIntyre
demonstrates in his example of the Wampanoag Indians versus Mashpee, Massachusetts
lawsuit, in which a township had allegedly violated tribal landownership. Nozickian transfer
of property rightly (or Rawls arrangements to benefit the most disadvantaged) would not
work because the matter in dispute was over who had property rights and in resolving the
dispute, others were becoming disadvantaged by the legal uncertainty. A solution was found,
which allowed small domestic landowners (less than one acre) to have their disputed land
reclassified as protected, in order to defend the interests of the vulnerable. The decision was
based on ‘kata ton orthon logon’ acting ‘according to right reason’, which kept in mind a
variety of virtues and not just Nozickian principles of justice. It was a ‘rough and ready’
solution, as there is no universal moral principle which makes land of less than one acre more
or less morally significant. It did however, provided a virtuous response, which had it been
left to Nozickian principles alone, would have continued to blight all the land until the
complex case was resolved.86
Wisdom
One of the areas in which anarchism has made a noticeable impact on a social practice is that
of education. It stands as a challenge to conservative accounts, going back to the Ancients,87
as necessarily dividing society into the rulers and the ruled based on natural ability to
assimilate and reproduce the specialist knowledge suitable for their station. A view more
recently advanced by neo-conservatives like Leo Strauss. 88 Radical education theorists from
Paolo Freire89 to Judith Suissa90 have stressed that education is distinct from schooling, and
83
R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 94-95.
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia , 331; See also K. DeClark, ‘Autonomy, Taxation and Ownership: An
anarchist critique of Kant’s theory of property’, B. Franks and M. Wilson, eds., Anarchism and Moral
philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).
85
E. Baker, ‘Thrasymachus’ Conception of Justice’, Plato’s Republic: Interpretation and criticism ((Belmont:
Wadsworth, 1966), 19.
86
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 153-54.
87
See Plato, The Republic; Aristotle, Politics, Book VIII,
88
L. Strauss, ‘What is Liberal Education’,
89
P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1999).
84
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looked at different ways in which knowledge is constructed and shared on anti-hierarchical
grounds. Consistent with post-structuralists like Michel Foucault, the construction of
knowledge is a product – and constitutes a form - of power.
Social practices encourage dialogue over monologue and skill sharing rather than
monopolisation in order in Freire’s words to develop . An approach found in both to the
development and sharing of practical skills, in skill-sharing workshops and in theoretical
discourses. Uri Gordon for instance proposes an activist approach to philosophy, which
includes immersion into activist communities of resistance, in order to develop and share
skills and knowledge.91 David Graeber, similarly, proposes the production of a participatory
anthropology based on ethnographic practice.92
One of the problems is that both Gordon and Graeber identify a rejection of vanguards as a
feature of an anarchist pedagogy.93 However, as conservatives argue, how can there be a
claim to knowledge unless there is an entity which knows as against those currently
ignorant.94 One answer, is following Freire’s pedagogy, both parties start ignorant, but by
operating in collaborative dialogue to resolve a problem, this generates useful knowledge.
However, this would only work for certain forms of problem solving, and would nonetheless
still create a small group who had developed the specialist knowledge, against those who had
not. More problematically, Graeber and Gordon also give accounts in which there are those
with specialist skills, and who, therefore are a vanguard. Gordon’s method has three steps:
immersion into activist groups, absorption in understanding the thematic and conceptual
features of the debates and integration, in which the philosopher steps back to reflect and
restructure the issues in order to articulate them in a more cogent manner to assist the group
in problem solving.95 This too is based on a pre-existing specialist group of philosophers,
who gain and develop expertise, in this sense too they are more advanced (a vanguard) than
90
J. Suissa, Anarchism and Education (Oakland: PM Press, 2010).
U. Gordon, ‘Practising Anarchist Theory: Towards a participatory political philosophy’ in S. Shukatis, D.
Graeber and E. Biddle, Constituent Imagination: Militant investigations collective theorization (Edinburgh: AK,
2007).
92
D. Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (Chicagor: Pricky Paradigm, 2004); an approach also
embraced by J. Juris, ‘Practicing Militant Ethnography with the Movement for Global Resistance in Barcelona’,
philosophy’ in S. Shukatis, D. Graeber and E. Biddle, Constituent Imagination: Militant investigations
collective theorization (Edinburgh: AK, 2007).
93
Gordon, ‘Practising Anarchist Theory’, 278; Graeber, Fragments, 11; see also U. Gordon, ‘Participant
Observation’, The Continuum Companion to Anarchism, ed. R. Kinna (London: Continuum, 2012), 88.
94
SEE BLACK PAPERS
95
Gordon, ‘Practising Anarchist Theory’, 281-82.
91
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others. Thus, rather than being anti-vanguardist, Graeber and Gordon seem to be confirming
the conservative case that the virtue of wisdom requires necessarily hierarchical forms.
The problem is more apparent, than real. The anarchist pedagogy is against universal
vanguards and universal claims to knowledge. Within a particular practice, there are going to
be experts and those who are less proficient. The aim of education is to demonstrate
knowledge and by doing, so be able to share it, and by diffusing knowledge-power, it reduces
the hierarchy. Further, wisdom has to operate alongside other virtues like justice (fairness)
and modesty.
Bakunin recognised developed specialist knowledge, whilst admirable is not in-itself
sufficient. It requires to be developed alongside the other virtues. It is better to have less
scientific knowledge than scientific practice that encourages exploitation and brute selfinterest.96 Someone who develops proper expertise, is not only aware of the vast areas of
knowledge in their field they are unskilled in, but the limitations of their own disciplinary
expertise. Thus, a brilliant scientist might rightly be conscious of her brilliance within a
specific field, but she would also be appropriately modest in recognising that they are not
expert, and have no special authority in other fields.
Other Virtues
Contrary to Aristotle’s account, radical virtue theory suggests that virtues flourish best in
non- or anti-hierarchical social practices. It is, after all not brave to pick on the weak; wisdom
is best demonstrated by sharing knowledge with those who did not have it; liberality implies
solidarity but not joining forces with oppressors. Compassion is not meeting the evergrowing demands of the wealthiest, but satisfying the more pressing interests of the poorest,
and doing so in such a way that decreases their dependence by increasing their ability to
develop mutually beneficial relationships. Integrity does not mean informing on humane,
dissident colleagues to a despotic government, but uncovering and publicising the
mechanisms by which dominating power persists, sometimes at personal risk (but not when it
is foolhardy).
96
M. Bakunin, God and the State (New York: Dover, 1970), 64.
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As social practices develop, often in conflict with liberal bureaucracy and immodest
managerialism, different virtues come to the fore and new ones might be generated. Clark
advances the idea that some virtues are only relevant for revolutionary periods, and are nolonger relevant in a utopian, post-revolutionary society.97 Certainly, the development of new
types of relationship which challenge existing instrumental modes of behaviour are important
to a radical political project. Rosalind Hursthouse, although no radical, makes a good case for
‘animal concern’ being a virtue, consistent with wisdom and compassion. Similarly
‘environmental sustainability’, has been an increasingly desirable feature of a broad range of
social activities, with radical activists, following Murray Bookchin, regarding the appropriate
relationship with nature being best achieved through having just, compassionate human
relationships.
Criticisms
There are significant challenges to this account of virtues being more compatible with antihierarchy and resistance to domination. Amongst the most significant are those from
conservative theorists such as Roger Scruton and Knight. Knight makes a general argument
that domination and virtues are compatible; Scruton whilst sharing this general view
advances a number of practices and corresponding virtues which are inherently hierarchical.
In particular Scruton appeals to the republican of loyalty to the transparent, constitutional
state and thus appeals to patriotism. If he is right, then virtues are antipathetic to anarchist
non-domination.
Knight
In a riposte to the republican’s foundational principle of rejection of all alien power over the
interests of the individual, including non-interference, Knight argues that some virtues
require interference. ‘Capacities for “interference in the lives of others” should be exercised
in conformity with the shared rationality of social practices.’98 Knight gives the example of
education, in which the more knowledgeable exerts influence over the learner which might
not be in the immediate interests of the pupil, especially where the student is too young to
have intellectual competence. If Knight is right, then the requirement for domination within
the virtues and anarchism would appear to be equally incompatible.
97
98
Clark, ‘Anarchist Perfectionism’, 42.
Knight ‘Virtue, Politics, and History’, 280.
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However, there is no power-neutral social position. In order to meet their social and physical
needs and desires people have to enter into social practices.99 These have all have differences
in micro-power. Even in the most simple of social interactions, at some points some
participants are more central than others. Anarchism is not about the absence of all
domination as this is impossible but to their effective diminution. Anarchists attempt to
identify the differences in power, prioritising those in a particular context that are
substantively damaging to the development of virtuous relationships, and seek effective ways
to distribute it more evenly, whilst sustaining the goods-rich practice.100 In the example of
practices above, in which the generation of wisdom is a core virtue, whilst there is a hierarchy
of knowledge, it is only temporary, fluid and self-negating.
Scruton
Scruton, appealing to the republican theory of Machiavelli, argues that patriotism is a central
virtue, as it is the structure of, and loyalty to the nation state that protects justice (largely
understood in terms of rights) and liberality (what radicals might call ‘solidarity’).101 Whilst
Scruton does not explicitly define ‘patriotism’ he shares with MacIntyre the belief,102 that it is
necessary for the development of social ties. This attachment to, and potential sacrifice for,
the nation-state, is necessary for legitimate government and Enlightenment freedoms.103
Scruton distinguishes ordinary patriotism from the excessive nationalism of Nazism or the
French Revolution.104 It is this shared loyalty, that spontaneously, rather than through specific
design, that develops the institutions of state, which ensure just treatment and the
maintenance of virtuous practices.105 In an unacknowledged echo of Karl Schmidt Scruton
argues that patriotism helps to identify the enemy from the friend, and allows for the identity
of ‘friend’ to be properly worked at, rather than assumed. It provides the framework for the
different practices and agencies to operate on the basis of mutuality.
K. Marx, ‘The Preface’ to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress, 1981), 2021.
100
See Alan Carter who makes a similar response to those who reduce anarchism or other egalitarianisms down
to the achievement of a single impossible goal, though he argues for a single set of universally identifiable
significant inequalities, primarily those issuing from the state (‘Analytical Anarchism’, Political Theory, 28. 2
(Apr., 2000), 230-253: 231.
101
R. Scruton, A Political Philosophy (London: Continuum), 5-6.
102
MacIntyre, ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue’, 299.
103
R. Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the terrorist threat (London: continuum), 47.
104
Scruton, A Political Philosophy, 2, 15-16.
105
Scruton, A Political Philosophy, 11-12; Scruton, The West, 49.
99
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There has been much debate about the virtue of patriotism.106 MacIntyre has contributed to
this debate.107 However, it is Scruton’s on which we concentrate. Scruton claims that it is the
basis for reciprocal relationships for all within a community, which protects liberty (justice),
provides stability and tolerance.108 For Scruton’s argument to be compelling he would need to
show that patriotism was a good in-itself, second that it is compatible with other virtues, third
that it produces a more flourishing social practice or narrative for the development of
practices, or journey between practices than its opposite or absence. The first is irresolvable.
The fact that unlike bravery, compassion or reliability, patriotism is, at least to some of us,
non-obviously a prima facie good in-itself, does not discredit automatically Scruton’s case. It
could be that non-patriots have been so morally corrupted they are incapable of recognising
virtue any more, in the same way that, according to Scruton, too many townsfolk are
incapable of seeing the virtues of hunting or tolerate social engagement.109
The second and third are, perhaps open to some critical analysis, assuming that we are not too
corrupted by urban modernity. Does patriotism support the other virtues or undermine them,
and does it generate more flourishing social collectives? For Scruton, a patriot has ‘no
difficulty accepting a government whose opinions and decisions they disagree.’110 Tolerance
is tied to the state form, it is tolerance of the state’s authority, with the state similarly
tolerating opposition which does not undermine the nation state. It is ‘national loyalty’ that
enables people to co-operate and to ‘depoliticize society’.111 For Scruton, patriotism therefore
assures the other virtues.
In addition, for Scruton, the shared national standards, that are a feature of patriotism, allow
for capitalist development. National laws which protect property rights of all citizens,
regardless of other loyalties. It is part of the reason why Australia is more successful that
those based on purely localist ties.112 Thus patriotism is necessary for the third feature of a
virtue, that it assists social flourishing.
See for instance M. Mussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, Boston Review (October/November
1994), S. Nathanson, ‘In Defense of “Moderate Patriotism”’, Ethics 99,3 (April 1999), 535-52; P. Gomberg,
‘Patriotism is like Racism’, Ethics 101.1 (Oct. 1990), 144-50.
107
A. MacIntyre, ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue’, Debates in Contemporary Political philosophy’,
108
Scruton, A Political Philosophy,17-18.
109
See for instance R. Scruton, On Hunting (London: Yellow Jersey, 1999), 45 and 144-45.
110
Scruton, A Political Philosophy, 18.
111
Scruton, A Political Philosophy, 19.
112
Scruton, A Political Philosophy, 6-7.
106
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There are a number of counter-arguments. First patriotism, in Scruton’s account, seems to
conflict with virtues like liberality. If a democratic society state rules that contact with
citizens of another country are dangerous, whilst the citizenry can organise to overturn such a
law on the basis of a rival account of national self-interest, they should abide by it, according
to Scruton’s jurisprudence. Thus, patriotism must necessarily come into conflict with many
virtues of sociability such as solidarity and amiability. Similarly, Scruton’s account seems to
demonstrate patriotism also conflicts with wisdom or justice.
Appeals to membership of the same nation, argues Scruton, depoliticises society. Yet
decontestation encourages ignorance of deep, resolvable social cleavages because of a shared
national identity, leading to the continuing domination of one group within the nation-state
over another. Scruton’s appeal to Australia as a successful society seems indicative of this
problem, ignoring the construction of the nation state involved the genocide of Aboriginal
peoples and their continued marginalisation.
Scruton argues, with customary persuasiveness that non-Western refugees ‘are all fleeing to
the West, recognising no other place as able to grant the opportunities, freedoms and personal
safety that they despair at finding at home.’113 Scruton is not opposed to all immigration,
though he believes it needs to be gradual so that the new arrivals are socialised into the
dominant national culture and relegate former political and social ties. This suggests that the
appropriate reaction of those fleeing, oppression abroad is to abandon their ties to place, that
is to be initially unpatriotic. Further, Scruton’s example might be countered with the old
IWW adage that people flee to the West (or any dominant power) because it is usually less
harmful to be a victim of Atlanticist domestic policies than its foreign policies.
The basis for shared rules and values lies not in nations but in practices and their traditions.
For instance, two citizens of rival states might play chess through the Internet. Both might be
prohibited from the mutually beneficial practice if patriotism was the guiding principle.
Neither shares the same language or culture and their rival nation states would be suspicious
of such interaction; but the broadly share the same rules (their maybe negotiable differences
for instance in ‘queening’ rules) and can therefore develop features of a virtuous
relationships; patience, theoretical knowledge and liberality. Through their participation they
113
Scruton, The West and the Rest, ix.
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encourage others to participate in the game, encouraging further development of the practice,
or develop into other practices of friendship.
Conclusion
This paper argues that anarchism and virtue theory are mutually supporting, and proposes that
virtues flourish in networks of practices that avoid and/or contest domination. In doing so it
clarified radical virtue theory, based on MacIntyre’s work, and distinguished its main
similarities and minor differences with anarchist virtue theory. It also clarified the concept of
‘non-domination’ showing how it shares major characteristics with anarchist virtue theory,
but that because of its state form it privileges institutional arrangements and inter-personal
relationships that are incompatible with anarchism. Particular virtues are described and
illustrated to show how they are compatible with anarchism and non-domination, dealing
with criticisms such as the ‘brave Nazi’ objection and the plurality of goals. Rival
conservative virtues, pivotal to statist Republican accounts, such as patriotism are shown to
be flawed.
Benjamin Franks, August 2012
Benjamin.Franks@Glasgow.ac.uk
23