In pursuit of wisdom: Ancient Chinese and Greek perspectives on
cultivation
International Conference at UNSW Australia (Sydney), 15-18 January 2016
Keynotes
Professor Sophie-Grace Chappell
Open University
Happiness and eudaimonia: some Greek perspectives
In what sense, if any, is Plato or Socrates or Aristotle a “eudaimonist”? And what might we learn from
their views?
------------------------------------------------Professor Yahei Kanayama
Nagoya University
Everlasting Inquiry in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Socrates, Plato and the Sceptics
Philosophia in Greek is different from its Chinese equivalent, 哲學, in its inclusion of philo (love). For
Socrates and Plato philosophy was above all ‘love of sophia (哲, wisdom)’, consisting in consideration in
quest of happiness. Greek skepsis, too, was different from its equivalent, 懷疑, in that skepsis was
positive in meaning, representing ‘consideration’ in pursuit of wisdom, while 懷疑 is rather negative,
with 疑 meaning ‘standing stock still, being unable to decide’. Later in Hellenistic philosophy skepsis
approaches懷疑, when it comes to imply ‘doubt’ under the influence of the Sceptics. However, I
maintain that their skepsis still kept its core meaning of ‘consideration’, without abandoning ‘pursuit of
wisdom’. Their doubt was an outgrowth of their everlasting inquiry, and helped them to distance
themselves from threatening appearances and disturbing suspicion, and to achieve tranquillity, or at
least moderation of passion, so as to be able further to engage in pursuit of wisdom and cultivation of
the mind. This is essentially the same as the attitude of Socratic awareness of ignorance, and I think in
this sense the Sceptics were genuine followers of Socrates and Plato, sharing their attitude of
emphasizing ‘pursuit’ more than ‘wisdom’. This emphasis is taken to be a distinctive character of Greek
philosophy.
-------------------------------------------------
Professor Mu-chou Poo
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Mortuary practice and the search for happiness in Han China
The aim of personal cultivation, as implied by the theme of this conference, is in pursuit of wisdom. The
reason to pursue wisdom, ultimately, is to find happiness. However, as demonstrated by generations of
thinkers, happiness is a vague concept. It could be defined as a state of contentment, a kind of existence
that has no want, yet what that contentment entails may vary throughout time and space and among
different cultures. Yet scholars in pursuit of the pursuit of happiness found it fascinating how people in
different cultures satisfied their urge to seek for happiness in life. It could even be argued that by
looking at what happiness means and how happiness is supposed to be achieved in different cultures
we could find a common denominator that is the converging point of similarities and differences of the
meaning of human existence. In this paper, I propose to look at the problem not from a philosophical
point of view, but by looking at the mortuary practices, in ancient China in particular. My view is that,
since happiness is often elusive, and life is short, people resort to constructing an existence beyond this
life on earth, based on their earthly experience, their aspirations and apprehensions, as well as their
hopes for a rewarding life. The relationship between the concept of the netherworld, the belief system,
and the social norms that formulated the idea of happiness, therefore, may provide researchers with
insights into a particular cultural system. How people imagined the afterlife and make mortuary
preparations to ensure that existence could reflect what people had in mind of an ideal existence, or
happiness. If, as many may have assumed, this ideal existence was defined and confined by the
conventional wisdom of the day, it was a demonstration of the collective value of the society as a whole,
which may or may not be in accord with the elite ideologies in that society, or, for that matter, in other
societies. Through comparison, therefore, we learn that such differences can be traced back to how
people in different historical and cultural contexts managed to deal with universal human problems.
------------------------------------------------Professor Lisa Raphals
University of California, Riverside
On Spontaneity
Several modes of action or attitudes of mind have been proposed as skills or processes at the heart of
good lives. Prominent among these are, in a Greek context, the devious but felicitous quality of
mētis, and in a Chinese context the particular type(s?) of indirection characterized as wuwei 無為.
Both, in different ways, are centrally concerned with spontaneity.
In Reason and Spontaneity, A.C. Graham attempted to address Hume's famous lacuna between “is”
and “ought.” He proposed a theory of value that grounds all values in the imperative to “be aware,”
an approach explicitly derived from the Zhuangzi. I reconsider these arguments from three points if
view: (1) Graham's account of inclination informed by awareness as the basis for agency and choices
among ends; (2) recent research on the biology of agency; and (3) possible continua between humans
and animals. I conclude with a few brief remarks on how Greek mētis and Chinese wuwei might fit
into such an account of awareness and spontaneity.
------------------------------------------------2
Professor Wang Keping
Institute of Philosophy
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Two Ways of Pursuing the Good life: The Beauty Ladder and the Mind Excursion
Being two ancient thinkers living in the axial period, both Plato (428-348 BC) from Hellas and Zhuangzi
(369-286 BC) from China are preoccupied with the human condition in general, and engaged in the search of
the good life in particular. They have offered many interesting alternatives among which two acknowledged
ones turn out to be more appealing to my reconsideration: one is renowned as the beauty ladder and the other
the mind excursion.
As depicted in the Symposium by Plato, the beauty ladder is set to comprise seven levels of beauty (kallos),
ranging from the beauty of one body, the beauty of two bodies, the beauty of all bodies, the beauty of souls,
the beauty of observances and laws, the beauty of learning or sciences, up to the very essence of beauty in
itself, the essence that makes all other kinds of beauty become what they are. Having climbed up to the top of
the ladder, one is so delighted to encounter with the main ocean of the beautiful, and thereby he attains not
merely a peak experience of intellectual and spiritual joy via due contemplation, but also a fundamental
knowledge of the idea of the beautiful itself. Such joy is a special type owing to its profundity, duration, and
higher values. It is stemmed from intelligent intuition apart from aesthetic perception, and identified with the
supreme happiness that leads one to live a worthwhile life. Allegorically, the seven levels of the beauty ladder
imply a process of getting to know the seven kinds of beauty. The process as such involves personal
cultivation that can be seen as an epistemological progression from the phenomenal to the essential, and a
moral pilgrimage from the carnal attraction to the spiritual exaltation. Its possible accomplishment is supposed
to lie in the step-by-step enlightenment via aesthetic wisdom, moral wisdom, political wisdom and theoretical
wisdom.
Then, as noted in The Great Venerable Master (Da zong shi) by Zhuangzi, the mind excursion is claimed to
have eight stages of meditation for absolute spiritual freedom and independent personality. The eight stages as
a whole consist in a process of self-cultivation through approaching and exercising the Dao itself. Specifically
they include the first stage of going beyond the world (wai tianxia) that means the freedom from social
engagement in search of ambition and fame, the second stage of going beyond external things (wai wu) that
symbolizes the freedom from material acquisition and fetishist desires, the third stage of going beyond life
(wai sheng) that implies the freedom from bodily preservation, the fourth stage of morning enlightenment
(zhao che), the fifth stage of seeing the unique (jian du), the sixth stage of non-distinguishing between the past
and the present (wu gu jin), the seventh stage of living in the realm of neither death nor life (ru yu bu si bu
sheng) that is approximate to the state of nirvana, and the last stage of attaining the Dao in serenity (ying
ning). All this features a gradually deepened understanding of what it takes to live well in the light of the Dao
itself. It thus ranges from the initial insight into the Dao up to the final attainment of it as is companied by a
free play with it.
3
Paper and Panel Abstracts
Anstey, Peter
University of
Sydney
Back,
Youngsun
City University
of Hong Kong
Benitez, Rick
The University
of Sydney
Chan, Shirley
Macquarie
University
Socrates as dikaios in Plato’s Crito
This paper argues that the central theme of Plato’s Crito is what it is for a person to be
dikaios. It claims that Socrates’ attitude both to his impending death and to Crito’s
offer to help him escape from prison reveal him to be the exemplar of such a person.
Confucian Heaven and the Good Life
This paper examines the Confucian conception of tian, conventionally translated into
English as “Heaven.” The secondary literature on tian has primarily focused on the
question of what tian is: e.g., whether tian is an anthropomorphic deity or a
naturalistic force, or whether tian is transcendent or immanent. Instead, in this paper,
I locate tian with respect the ethical life of human beings and argue that tian directly
involves a particular way of understanding the world. Accordingly, by investigating
the Confucian conception of tian, we can figure out how early Confucians perceived
the world, how they conceived of the way to flourish in such a world, and what kind of
flourishing life they actually dreamed of. This paper will provide us with a more
comprehensive understanding of the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods
in the early Confucian conception of the good life.
Cultivation and Harmony in Plato and Confucius
Plato once wrote that "rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential to the whole
of human life," while Confucius claimed that "of the things brought about by the rites,
harmony is the most valuable." For both, harmony provides the framework within
which a conception of cultivation for both individual and society can be worked out.
This paper will focus on three 'levels' of harmony in Plato and Confucius. The first is
the level of rectification, where harmonious adjustment to right ways is necessary to
potential future happiness. The second is the level of understanding, where ordinary
rectification is adjusted to the greater melody of insight. The third is the level of
performance, where musical life enables the philosopher or sage to promote not only
personal happiness, but the happiness of society. Both Plato and Confucius believe
that musical life constitutes the highest level of harmony, and the greatest cultivation
possible for a human being. Thus, the harmony advocated by both philosophers is the
very essence of cultivation, not something merely instrumental to it. I conclude with
some observations about the application of Platonic and Confucian harmony to 21st
Century society.
In Pursuit of Self-fulfilment: a Reading of the Confucian Analects
Alan Gewirth defined self-fulfillment as "carrying to fruition one's deepest desires or
one's worthiest capacities," and "the attainment of a satisfying and worthwhile life
well lived."(Gewirth, 1999). Gewirth notes that self-fulfillment comes from living a
good human life with a realization of one’s capacities. In this paper, by reading the
Analects, I will discuss what Confucius can offer in seeking self-fulfillment and living a
good life.
4
Coulson, Lee
The University
of Sydney
Di Lauro,
Frances
The University
of Sydney
The cultivation of εὐήθεια: the good disposition of noble simplicity
Etymologically understood εὐήθεια is a compound of εὐ+ήθος, and thus has the
semantic value of good disposition or character. Yet in ancient Greece the term's use
was largely pejorative, generally connoting foolish naïveté and simplemindedness. My
paper argues that Plato's revaluation of εὐήθεια seeks to redress what Thucydides
warns are the dire consequences of losing "the ancient simplicity (τὸ εὔηθες)" (Th.
3.83.1). That his progressively positive use of the term in the so-called early and
transitional dialogues culminates in Republic’s affirmation of εὐήθεια as "the truly
good and fair disposition (εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος) of the character and the mind" (R.
400e). A noble and virtuous disposition that, I submit, is personified in Laws as the
Εὐηθέστεροι Virtue-Hero-Myth.
Εὐήθεια in Plato inscribes a remarkable semantic arc from its largely pejorative use in
early Greek literature to its personification in the Εὐηθέστεροι, whom as δαιμόνιο
may afford a deific function and serve as a personal tutelage deity. For as Heraclitus
says: "man's character is his daemon (ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων )" (Heraclitus, DK
22B119). The cultivation of εὐήθεια is seemingly essential to satisfying the soul's
affections for the virtue qualities of courage, temperance and righteousness. Indeed,
in Plato εὐήθεια may be synonymous with wisdom.
Esoteric concepts of self and self-cultivation in early Daoist thought
Confucian texts like the Doctrine of the Mean, espouse self-cultivation by adhering to
communal norms, refining relationships between “monarch and subjects … the father
and the son … the husband and the wife etc.” Three moral traits of “sagacity, charity
and character” are attained through “studying”, “charity” and “doing good deeds”, and
having “a sense of shame.” Early Daoist self-cultivation texts instead prescribe
internalized practice to achieve individual transcendence. Abstract or esoteric
concepts of self-cultivation are first discernible in the philosophical speculations of
the “Warring States” or Zhangou age, the period to which the emergence of the
Daoism can be traced. The earliest of these, the Neiye (“inward training”) grounds
psychology and self-cultivation in a physiological substratum, and prescribes
techniques to induce self-transcendence, optimum health, and longevity.
This paper will examine the concept of the emptiness in Chinese philosophical
thought, outlining the development of abstract notions of the self and self-cultivation
practices in the formative period of daojia (Daoist philosophy), and the mutation in
meaning of the concept of wu wei, variously rendered “non contrived,” “non-artificial,
“non striving,” and “taking no action contrary to nature,” in texts that precede the
Wang Bi, after which it was read as “non action.”
5
Fech, Andrej
South
University of
Science and
Technology of
China
Hendrischke,
Barbara
University of
Sydney
Hooper,
Anthony
University of
Sydney
The role played by auditory and visual perception in moral cultivation as represented
in early Confucian and Daoist texts
When consulting the early Chinese texts on the topic of moral cultivation, we
encounter a large number of passages dealing with the issue of auditory (wen 聞) and
visual (jian 見) perception. Moreover, this topic seems to be of comparable
importance to philosophical traditions that had a radically different understanding of
the nature of moral cultivation such as Confucianism and Daoism. Therefore, in this
presentation, I am going to talk about similarities and differences in concepts of
sensory perception as represented in the texts associated with the two schools. Its
leading question can be formulated as to how perceptive abilities came to be
connected to the question of moral excellence and which contents of sensory
perception were regarded by the two schools as beneficial to cultivation.
The talk will be based on such texts as the Xunzi 荀子, Laozi 老子, Zhuangzi 莊子 as
well as the newly excavated texts Wuxing 五行 (Mawangdui, Guodian), Wenzi 文子
(Dingxian) and Ting you wu huan 聽有五患 (Yinqueshan).
Nurturing life in the Laozi as understood by Han Fei
The term “nurturing life” does not occur in the Laozi. However, what the Laozi says
on lengthening life had a big impact on the text’s enduring popularity. This paper
starts with a brief introduction to Laozi 50. This section deals with the threat of death.
More questions are raised than answered. The paper’s main topic is Han Fei’s (d. 233
BCE) engagement with Laozi’s advice to avoid the “terrain of death”. Han Fei applies
the innovative concept of “dao’s patterns” (dao li 道理) to argue that personal survival
relies on the accurate and comprehensive analysis of one’s own situation.
My, How Death Becomes You! or Cultivation, Death, and Immortality in Plato’s
Symposium
Plato is a thinker who is centrally concerned with the cultivation of a virtuous
character, and no small amount of ink has been expended to explicate the faculties,
behaviours, habits, and perspectives that one must develop to live a eudaimon life. But
Plato’s interests in cultivation extend beyond ensuring a happy life, as he also has an
interest in ensuring that one may enjoy a state of death that is maximally productive
of virtue. But here I refer not to Plato’s various comments regarding the post-mortem
existence of the soul, but a subject on which insufficient ink has been spilled: the
account of immortality that is offered to us in the Symposium. This presentation is
idiosyncratic because it does not concern the post-mortem existence of the soul, but
rather concerns the vicissitudes of remembrance people may enjoy in this world. In
the voice of Diotima, Socrates here details how people win immortality by having the
memory of their virtue inspire others towards the production of virtue long after
one’s death.
According to Socrates, the enterprise of winning immortality through memory
necessitates various modes of cultivation. These include: i) a re-evaluation from
seeing virtue as something that is valuable only when it is ‘one’s own’ to something
worthy of production in its own right; ii) a shift in emphasis from the production of
virtue exclusively in oneself, to a concern in bringing about virtue in others; and iii) a
commitment to the idea that the development of one’s own wisdom concerning virtue
constitutes merely one stage in an inter-subjective process of learning. Prima facie
these particular modes of cultivation of character appear relevant only to winning
immortality, however they more generally underlie the foundations of the
development of philosophical communities in life. In this way, happiness in death
flowers from the same soil as happiness in life. Time permitting, I also hope to
comment on whether this account of cultivation has any parallels in Confucianism and
Daoism.
6
Hui, Oceana
University of
New South
Wales
Kim, Hyun Jin
The University
of Melbourne
King, RAH
Berne
University
Machek, David
Berne
University
PANEL:
Virtues, virtue
and roles in
China and
Greece
(Organiser:
R.A.H. King)
The Zhuangzi’s Free and Easy Wandering: Equanimity through Metacognition and its
Associated Processes
The opening chapter of the Zhuangzi, titled "逍遙遊", has been translated several
ways: "Free and Easy Wandering", "Enjoyment in Untroubled Ease" or "Going
Rambling Without a Destination". These various iterations bring to mind ideas of a
calm, relaxed existence that is free from sources of worry. Accordingly, one might
expect such a chapter to advocate a quiet, reticent life. Counterintuitively, there are no
such prescriptions therein. Instead, one finds that it is brimming with paradoxical
anecdotes, dialogue, and witty criticisms. This paper adopts a literary analysis
approach to examine how the narrative form of the text itself might trigger
metacognition through the continual disruption of reader expectation. In doing so, it
is suggested that achieving a state of equanimity involves the restructuring of both
cognitive and affective dispositions.
The ‘Good life’ according to the sages: ‘Solon’ and ‘Confucius’
The ancient Greeks and the early Chinese both articulated the good life and also
discussed what was good about it in their surviving works of literature. This paper
examines the Greek perception of the good life as presented by 'Solon' in Book 1 of
Herodotus. That perception is then compared with the 'Confucian' articulation of the
good life as practiced by the Junzi. It is observed that the socio-political milieu of both
traditions is critical to understanding the similarities and differences in the respective
representations of the good life in Greece and China.
Virtue and a swarm of virtues (King)
In Plato’s Meno, Socrates famously argues against Meno’s view that there are lots of
virtues - a swarm – for men, women, children, and he demands that meno give him a
definition of virtue – that form because of which anything is virtue, if it is virtue (72C).
Aristotle, as is well known argues against this view, but only in the Politics (I 13) –
where he poses the question about whether there can be virtues for slaves and
women and children. His view of politics is based on the family, and extends these
roles to the operation of the city. In this paper, I present Socrates’s arguments, and
suggest that Aristotle is right, both in having a general account of virtue in itself and in
wanting to preserve the role centred virtues. In the absence of a general account of
virtue in China the question arises of what serves as the core of virtue, and I scout
some possibilities, above all wisdom. Because not all have wisdom, this view of virtue
militates for forms of social dependence. It is also a central claim of the Socratic
tradition.
Being a tax-collector, a human, a wife: China Warring States views about selfcultivation in light of a role-defined self (Machek)
Is studying philosophy or learning how to control one’s emotions more conducive to
becoming a better person than learning to play the piano, or even learning to cook? Is
development of some skills or habits more central for cultivating one’s self than of
some others? The answer will depend largely on what we think this “person” or “self”
actually is. Besides defining the self in terms of entity (e.g. soul, mind, character or
body), we can also define the self in terms of its role: one can be a father, an officer,
and/or simply a living being. One’s self can be defined by multiple roles (that may be
in tension with each other), or by one fundamental role from which other roles are
derived. What exactly the self defined by its role amounts to, and what are the
implications for the appropriate self-cultivation curricula, was a much debated issue
in Warring States thought. Three different accounts from different fourth century
B.C.E. texts – Mengzi, Zhuangzi, as well as a Guodian text “Six excellences” – will be
outlined in order to bring out the diversity of existing positions in this debate.
7
Lai, Karyn
The University
of New South
Wales
Lee, Yungwhan
Ewha Womans
University
Ley, James
University of
Sydney
Reliability as the linchpin of Confucian life
In Analects 2.22, Confucius remarks on the implausibility—or impossibility—of a life
lacking in xin 信, reliability (人而無信，不知其可也). In discussions of Confucian
philosophy, this aspect of life is often eclipsed by greater emphasis on Confucian
values such as ren 仁 (benevolence) and yi 義 (rightness). More attention is typically
given to the Confucian value orientation, with less detail provided on the cultivation
processes that underpin the successful realisation of values. My discussion addresses
this imbalance by focusing on reliability, extending current debates in two ways.
First, it proposes that the common translation of xin as ‘trustworthiness’—to denote
coherence between a person’s words and deeds—is inadequate. The translation fails
to capture the longer-term consistency in a person’s actions and behaviours in
different circumstances across time, which is an irreducible dimension of xin. Second,
I suggest that reliability is not only moral but also epistemic in nature. That is, in
order to be able to proceed (行 xing; Analects 15.6) reliably, a person needs to know
how best to act or respond in different circumstances. I focus especially on the
processes involved in equipping oneself with this knowledge.
Cultivation of reason and ethics as an invitation to philosophy
Aristotle characterizes the good person as “heeding the reason/argument” (logoi
peitharchein). While the masses, living according to passion, should be persuaded
only with penalties, reason and teaching (logos kai didachê) cultivates the soul of the
well brought up person to enjoy and hate proper things. Even though it is obvious that
the reason takes the central place in Aristotle’s ethics, the reasonableness (capacity to
heed the reason) of the good person, how it is cultivated and how the excellences of
the character (not only the excellences of the intellect) are related with it, has not
been given sufficient discussion. Nicomachean ethics will be the primary text I will
discuss but I will also examine Plato’s Gorgias and the discussion of the power of
logos in it also. I will suggest in the end that we read NE as protrepticus where
Aristotle encourages students with good upbringing to listen to and appreciate (the
power of) his arguments and be properly motivated to follow philosophers’ path in
their lives.
The cultivation of memory in Classical Greek Philosophy
For both Plato and Aristotle living well involves acting in the right way in relation to
the capacities of human memory. Both philosophers describe iterative practices that
affect memory and determine whether we live well or badly. These practices concern
both the acquisition and retrieval of memories and they have effects both upon our
access to knowledge and our ability to live a good life. Plato’s recommendation that
philosophers target the retrieval of long-held propositional memories is familiar to us
as his ‘theory of recollection’. But he also carefully warns against the harmful
acquisition of new memories in the Phaedo. In this paper I consider Plato’s separation
of beneficial and harmful practices in relation to memory and Aristotle’s responses to
it.
8
Liang, Yuhan
Nanyang
Technological
University
Lind, Per
Lund
University
Liu, Linna
Nanyang
Technological
University
Thinking as a method to cultivate moral character
For Mencius, moral cultivation is to nurture a moral character through long time
practice and thinking (si思) is a main method to do it. However, if we scrutinize the
whole text, some inconsistencies can be found. On the one hand, Mencius
proposes people should think to be moral. On the other hand, he also seems
to appreciate the moral actions that are carried out without thinking. In this paper, I
try to provide a plausible explanation of this problem by deciphering the functions of
thinking in moral practice. Despite that one can carry out moral actions occasionally,
this kind of moral impulse is unstable. Thinking is crucial for moral fortitude because
both the epistemological problem and motivation problem can be solved by thinking
in practice. Firstly, thinking not only can reinforce incipient moral judgments in mindheart but also assist mind-heart to make proper decisions in moral dilemmas.
Secondly, since thinking maintains a moral view, when one fails to do what ought to
do, feeling of shame would be triggered and motivate one to try again and harder until
he fulfills the goal. Thus thinking can assist one to adhere on the moral practice, until
one nourishes virtuous character and performs moral will spontaneously and reliably
in the most time.
How to Learn from Fake Mistakes: Raising metaconceptual awareness the Pyrrhonist
way
The present paper proposes that the wisdom cultivation technique prescribed by the
ancient Greek art-of-living school of Pyrrhonism sidesteps the central transformative
issue of the Stoic and Epicurean systems, namely the molding of the practitioner’s
cognitive outlook into accordance with school dogma. Instead, it is argued, the
Pyrrhonean technique of deliberately seeding cognitive conflict (“fake mistakes”) in
the mind of the practitioner aims to wake her up to the contingency, instrumentality
and negotiability of the cognitive structures she already employs. Observing that in
everyday experience, the presence of cognitive conflict (and its functional corollary
perplexity) signals the occurrence of a mistake (in the form of cognitive failure and/or
misjudgment) the basic developmental potential inherent to states of cognitive
conflict and perplexity is undeniable. According to the proposed reading, the
Pyrrhonean technique effectively harnesses the unique – and most likely hardwired –
function of cognitive conflict in the human cognitive architecture to derail habitual
and automated ways of conceiving the world so as to bring consciousness to bear
more immediately on the conflicting structures of cognition, which otherwise tend to
function outside the direct reach of volitional thought. In thus effectuating a shift from
the cognition of reality to the cognition of cognition, cognitive conflict enables the
owning up to of previously unacknowledged instances and levels of cognitive agency.
Forgetting Emotions: Zhuangzi’s Pursuit of Peaceful Mind
Zhuangzi advocates a peaceful mind free from the disturbance of emotions. However,
his perspective towards emotions seems contradictory. Does he mean that sages will
keep positive emotions like ordinary people, or should eliminate all influence of
emotions? Evidences on both views can be found in the Inner Chapters. In this paper, I
will firstly argue that both the opinions of “with emotions” and “without emotions”
fail to explain some counter examples in the text. Secondly, I will raise the idea of
“forgetting emotions” as a better approach to interpret Zhuangzi’s perspective, with
which we are able to read the text of the Zhuangzi consistently. Thirdly, I will
demonstrate how people can reach the state of “forgetting emotions”, and “fasting of
mind” will be discussed as one of the most important approaches to deal with
emotions.
9
Pfister, Lauren
Hong Kong
Baptist
University
Ciccotti, Jesse
Hong Kong
Baptist
University
(PANEL)
Dislodging Mundane Wisdom: Counter-Cultural Alternatives for Transformative
Forms of Cultivation in the Dialogic Teachings and Paradoxical Rhetoric of Master
Zhuāng and Rabbi Yeshuah (Pfister)
Practical wisdom is often dressed in rationalized garb, especially among the literati
elite in ancient China and the philosophical teachings of major intellectuals in ancient
Greece. They regularly presented a form of prudential wisdom couched within
rationalized visions of life involving idealized rulers and their own sagely teachers.
Nevertheless, counter points to these teachings were explicitly articulated in the more
paradoxical dialogues of Master Zhuāng and Rabbi Yeshuah (or, as Witherington
intones, the “Sage Jesus”). In order to dislodge more rationalized versions of wisdom
in their own traditions, both employ “dislodging” paradoxes and parables with
embedded critiques in order to reorient the development of a form of practical
wisdom based upon transformative understandings of the nature of reality –
including the human selves living within those realities.
Based on revised reflections about the use of dialogic / pluralogic speech texts in
selected portions of the Inner Chapters of the Zhuāngzǐ (following cues from Yearley
and DeFoort) and the Four Gospels in the New Testament (with help from
Witherington), I will seek to characterize and compare these two varying approaches
to practical wisdom. Within this process, I will argue that transformative experience
must precede the search for practical wisdom for both sages, leading subsequently to
new expressions of inner peace, and fidelity to the Way. As already suggested, both
Master Zhuāng and Rabbi Yeshuah initiate this transformative process by dislodging
contemporary forms of “mundane wisdom” for the sake of recognizing and pursuing
alternative and higher (and therefore therapeutically more satisfying) forms of
sagacity.
The Feelings of Kingship: Mèngzǐ and Marcus Aurelius on Regal Emotion (Ciccotti)
Central to discussions of action and agency is the role of the emotions, and both Stoic
and Ruist (Confucian) traditions make much of the role of emotions in the moral life
in particular. While some general studies have been made to compare Greek and
Chinese theories of emotion,1 specific studies that closely examine texts comparing
Stoic and Ruist views of emotion and its relation to ruling have not yet been
undertaken. My paper will seek to fill this gap by comparing the writings of the
Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (AD 120-180) and the Chinese philosopher Mèngzǐ
(372-289 BC). In particular, I will be exploring the role(s) Aurelius and Mèngzǐ
believes the emotions play in the activity of ruling, and what prescriptions for
cultivating and exercising these emotions they advocate in order to assist the ruler in
ruling well. I will argue that appropriate regulation and engagement with apposite
emotions is a key resource that enables a ruler to perceive the needs of the people and
respond fittingly.
1For
example, G.E.R. Lloyd, “The Greeks and Chinese on the emotions and the problem of cross-cultural
universals and cultural relativism,” in How Should One Live?, edited by R.A.H. King and Dennis Shilling
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 241-258.
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Riegel, Jeffrey
University of
Sydney
Sharpe,
Matthew
Deakin
University
Sin, William
Hong Kong
Institute of
Education
Emotion and Accumulation in the Xunzi
Two key elements in the theory of moral cultivation found in the text of the Xunzi are
qing 情 (emotion) and ji 積 (accumulation). Several passages in the text illustrate how
emotional reactions to stimuli of various sorts disclose to a subject the boundaries of
proper behavior while learning and other experiences one has accumulated guide a
subject in transforming insightful feelings into a fuller understanding of what one
ought to do. The meaning of some key passages that relate to these ideas of moral
cultivation remains obscure and the passages themselves are perhaps corrupt. Part of
the problem is that the old forms of the graphs 情 and 積 were sufficiently similar that
there were easily confused by scribes. There is of course a wealth of philological
research on these passages done mostly during the 17th and 18th centuries. This paper
re-examines these passages and the relevant scholarship on them and then offers
what the author takes to be the best readings.
Cultivation in Seneca: Ilsetraut Hadot’s Spiritual Direction and Practice of Philosophy
2015 saw the translation of Ilsetraut Hadot’s magisterial study on Seneca: Spiritual
Direction and Practice of Philosophy into the French language. In contrast to recent
analytic treatments of his thought, the book argues that Seneca’s Stoicism and his
philosophical writings should be conceived as belonging to a long Greek and Roman
tradition of “spiritual direction”. This paper will critically reconstruct Hadot’s claims
concerning the practice of philosophical cultivation in Seneca’s writings, paying
particular attention to her defence of “the very idea” of such cultivation against
analytic readings of the great Roman Stoic.
Bruce Lee, Zhixing, and the Trolley Problem: Cultivating the Right Response in the
Desperate Moment
When an agent comes across a desperate situation, his ability to perform the right
action is often not a mere matter of theoretical clarification, but practical deliverance.
In the case of Trolley, for instance, even if it would be morally better for the agent to
save five lives by diverting an out-of-control trolley onto an innocent victim, he might
not have the strength and determination to perform the action. This point is echoed
by the martial artist Bruce Lee in his book Tao of Jeet Kune Do. Lee says that in the
case of street combat, unless the agent is prepared to die, and has complete devotion
to deal with the difficulty which arises in the moment, he will not survive the
challenge. In this paper, I will describe this ability with reference to the virtue of
zhixing 直性; the literal meaning of zhixing involves a preparedness to respond to
challenge in a straightforward manner and with complete determination. In addition
to Lee’s elaboration, I will explain the virtue of zhixing with reference to the doctrines
of Zen Buddhism and Confucianism respectively.
11
Suzuki, Yumi
University of
Hong Kong
Tiquia, Rey
University of
Melbourne
“Examining a life” in the ‘Teaching’ of Socrates and Confucius
Both arête (ἀρετή/virtue) and ren (仁/humanity) are one of the most frequently
discussed topics in Socratic and Confucian ‘teaching’. Socrates famously suggests that
it is the greatest thing to discuss arete and to test himself and others on the issue
because the unexamined life is not worth living (Apology 38a). He thinks that the
discussion should come first, before the state of being virtuous, or any action whereby
to practice virtue, because it is impossible for us to examine how to come to possess
the virtue before knowing what it is (Meno 71b). On the other hand, Confucius often
responds to the question of what ren, renzhe (仁者) is, or what it is to practice ren in
various ways (4/1-7, 5/8, 19, 6/26, 7/30, 34, 12/2, 3, 22, 14/1, 4). Ren is developed
through reading the Classics, learning traditions and rituals, whereby we reflect on
ourselves in order to achieve ren (1/4, 4/17, 9/24,). This paper demonstrates that the
two different paths to become a good person entail different modes of doing moral
philosophy: the former focusses on developing hypothetical methods to approach the
destination, while the latter on the pragmatic approaches to the process.
Cultivating and Aligning Our Qi With the Flow of the Seasons
For Good Health and Good Life
“Everything is made of qi. Qi is both a process and substance, and comes into being as
the concrete manifestation of spacetime; differentiating into light and clear, the heavy
and turbid, qi ( now discernible in terms of yin and yang) becomes the basic stuff of
the visible universe” [John Major] . In pre-modern traditional Chinese medicine,
climate change qihou bianyi 氣候變易 is always contingent upon the ‘time and season’
shi 時 , ‘two-hour time periods’ shi chen 時辰, ‘day’ ri 日, ‘lunar month’ yue 月, ‘seventy
two pentads’ qishier hou
七十二候,, ’Twenty Four Periods of Qi ’ ershisige jieqi 二十四個節氣 , ‘four seasons’ si
shi 四時, ‘year’ nian 年 or sui 歲 and ‘sixty spacetime units’ jia zi 甲子 . And ‘climate
change’, which is now referred to in modern Chinese as qi hou bianhua, 氣候變化 as
seen from the perspective of the Yellow Emperor’s Inner Cannon is one of those
‘natural time sequences’ shi xu that ‘mark’ changes and transformations in ‘nature’
tian. Paraphrasing the Yellow Emperor’s Manual, the pre- modern TCM scholar/
practitioner Yang Ru Hou
(1861-1928) stated:
The cosmic yin and yang qi of the ‘sky/heaven/celestial sphere’ tian and ‘earth
/terrestrial sphere’ di ascend and descend and climatic weather conditions during the ‘four
seasons’ resonate with these changes. Humanity must harmonize and adapt to these changes as
well. During spring and summer seasons, one must nurture the cosmic yang qi; while during the
autumn and winter seasons one must nurture the cosmic yin qi. In this way, unusual illnesses will
not come about.
According to Chinese medical theory, if one maintains a balance of heart and mind
and a qi (yang) and blood (yin) that flow in harmony with the world around them xin
he qi ping 心和氣平, then there will be a presence of good health. And in accordance
with the classical, modern, Eastern and Western senses, ‘good humour’ or good qi
flow that is a natural effect of the alignment of emotions and seasons, which if absent
should be restored.
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Yang, Liuxin
Peking
University
On The Dao of Happiness of Kongzi: A Life Aesthetics of Classical Ruxue in The
Analects
In The Analects , Kongzi displays us a classical Ruxue’s life aesthetics and moral
wisdom of ‘happiness”,with his example personality,thought, words and
practices .This paper should focus on three questions of Kongzi’s “Dao of
happiness”.Firstly, how to understand “happiness”? Or, what is Kongzi’s “happiness?
It involves the classical Ruxue's concept of phenomena and essence of
“happiness”,especially the understanding of moral meaning of “happiness”.
Secondly, can “happiness” be learned and taught by people，if can, and how Kongzi
learns “happiness” by himself and teaches his students? Thirdly, How to get
“happiness”? Namely, in order to experience, actualize and get to the moral realm of
“happiness” of people and community, what kind of practices and methods are used
by Kongzi? Kongzi shows us a “Way” toward human life’s happiness. For us human,
today’s world community and everyone living in a context of globalization, Kongzi’s
life aesthetics and moral wisdom of learning and teaching “happiness” gives
extremely important enlightenment, and has eternal value.
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