Chapter 3. Descriptive Theories of Reference: Names
3.1 The Classical Description Theory
Question 1: How does a name refer?
Frege and Russell’s answer:
i)
The sense of a name is given by a definite description associated with the name. E.g., the
sense or meaning of the proper name “Aristotle” is given by the definite description “the pupil
of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great”.
ii)
Sense is supposed to determine reference. (so this theory of sense should supply a theory of
reference). (p. 45)
Question 2: In virtue of what does a definite description “F” denotes a name’s (“a”) reference x?
Russel’s theory of description gives an answer:
“The F” denotes x iff “F” applies to x and to nothing else. (p. 46)
Question 3: In virtue of what does a general term apply to an object?
The descriptive theory of names plus Russell’s theory of descriptions reduce three problems to one: the
problems of designation for names, denotation for definite descriptions, and application for general
terms are reduced to the problem of application for general terms.
In addition to asking about meaning, Devitt also asks about understanding: What is it to be competent
with the use of a name such as “a”?
A likely answer: to grasp its senseto associate “a” with “the F”to possess an inferential disposition
that links the usage of “a” with that of “the F”. A description has a “conceptual role” or “functional
role” that is tightly linked in inference to a name.
This theory of competence plus the theory of reference implies that a competent speaker associates the
name with a description that uniquely applies to its bearer. This association leads to a belief that the
speaker would express “a is the F”. Given that “a” designates what “the F” denotes, the belief must be
true. The classical theorists argue that the true belief is knowledge. But there is a gap between true
belief and knowledge. (p. 46)
Devitt guesses that the gap is filled up by accepting the “Cartesian assumption”, which is that the
meaning of a term is directly known to us; we have a privileged and non-empirical access to meaning.
In the following, we consider how the classical description theory handles the various issues mentioned
in 2.5:
1.
Identity Statements: E.g., “Mark Twain is Mark Twain” and “Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens”
have different meanings: it’s because “Mart Twain” and “Samuel Clemens have different senses.
“Mark Twain”’s sense is given by the description: the author of Hucklebury Finn
“Samuel Clemens”’s given by the description: the man living at 12 Elm street.
2.
Existence Statements: E.g., “James Bond does not exist” is paradoxical, whereas “Clinton exists”
is tautological. The first statement is true iff the definite description associated with JB does not denote.
There is nothing paradoxical about it. Even if the definite description denotes, The second statement is
true iff the definite description associated with Clinton denotes. There is nothing tautological about it:
even if it were false, it would be meaningful. (p. 47)
3. Empty names: “Santa Claus is coming to town” is meaningful even though “SC” is an empty name.
This is because the sense of “SC” is given by its definite description.
4. Opacity (not so easy): it has to do not just with a name’s or description’s denotation, but with the
mode in which the denotation presents itself to the speaker. (p. 48)
Some serious problems for the classical description theory:
1.
Principled Basis. There are usually more than one description that are associated with a name.
Which one determines the sense of the name? Is there any principled basis for deciding?(p. 48)
2.
Unwanted ambiguity. The sense of a name is ambiguous because in a community there are many
ways in which speakers use different descriptions to pick out the same referent of the name. (p. 49)
3.
Unwanted Necessity. Consider (a) and (b)
(a) Aristotle taught Alexander the Great.
(b) The pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great taught Alexander the Great.
(a) seems to be contingent while (b) seems to be necessary.
3.2 The Modern Description Theory
The cluster theory (inspired by Wittgenstein, elaborated by Searle and Strawson): It’s not that one
single description denotes the referent of a name, but a cluster of descriptions. Hence, to understand a
name is to grasp its sense, which requires a speaker to make a functional-role association of the name
with the appropriate cluster of descriptions. Different degree of “weights” can be assigned to different
descriptions of a cluster in the determination of a name’s referent.
It thus solves the three problems as follow (but all the problems remain):
1.
There is no need to offer a principled basis for selection. The burden is on a cluster of descriptions
itself to give a sense to a name. (But still, how is the cluster to be determined? We still need a
principled basis)
2.
The ambiguity of a name can be removed because different set of descriptions possessed by
different speakers of a community can all be accommodated in the cluster. (but people have very
different beliefs. It thus seems unlikely that they will associate the name with a same set of
descriptions)
3.
the unwanted necessity can be rid off because any description, including the one in (a), may not be
in the cluster, and hence that (a) might not be true. (yet a cluster of descriptions denotes a set of
properties that seem to be necessary properties of the bearer of the name. However, as Kripke
points out, they are not necessary properties. Again, the cluster theory yields unwanted necessity.
Kripke’s argument is based on modal intuitions that many like Searle do not share.) p. 51
4.
Lost Rigidity
Kripke argues that names are rigid designators (they refer to the same people in all possible worlds
if they refer at all) but descriptions are not. Hence the description theory is wrong. (There is
evidence for the difference in rigidity between names and descriptions that is found in modal
contexts. Consider (a) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle, and (b) Aristotle might not have
been the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great.) p. 51-2.
Kripke points out that there is a way to avoid problems 3 and 4: we do not view the description theory
as a theory of sense, a sense that determines referece as Frege thought. Rather, we see it as a theory of
reference: the name refers to whatever is picked out by the associated descriptions, but no claim is
made about its meaning. This maneuver is no help with problems 1 and 2, and will create two more
problems for the description theory: (p. 52-3)
5.
The description theory creates contingent apriori knowledge (see p. 53 for details)
6.
It commits itself to a “Two-Factor” theory which is incomplete with regard to offering an
explanation of how sense is determined if not by a reference-determining cluster of descriptions?
Devitt’s proposal: to avoid problems 3 and 4, revise the description theory by claiming that a name is
synonymous with a rigidified description. (p. 53-4)
3.3 Ignorance and Error
A catastrophic problem was raised by Kripke against the description theory. Kripke shows that it is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the speaker to associate with the name descriptions that denote the
object. The moral is that description theories place too heavy an epistemic burden on competent users
of a name (this problem is enhanced by the Cartesian assumption accepted by description theories) p.
54-55
Identifying beliefs are not necessary
a) The case of “Cicero”: “is Tully”, “the denouncer of Catiline”, etc., are the descriptions we generally
associate with “Cicero”. We seem to be in a vicious circle producing a name-free identifying
description for historical figures such as Cicero.
b) The case of “Einstein”: the description “the discoverer of the theory of relativity” is associated with
“Einstein”, but few of us can manage to identify “the theory of relativity” independently of Einstein.
These two cases show that description theories require people who appear to refer successfully with
names to have beliefs that they do not in fact have: they are too ignorant. (p. 55)
a’) The case of “Columbus”: we may believe that Columbus is the first one to say that the Earth is
round. This belief is wrong, but we still succeed in talking about him when we say “Ohio was named
after Columbus”. This is a case of actual error.
b’) The case of “Moses” given by Wittgenstein and the case of “Jonah” given by Kripke are cases of
possible error: what we believe about Moses from the bible may all turn out to be false. Does this
imply that “Moses” is an empty name, referring to no one? According to the description theory, yes.
But Kripke’s “Jonah” case shows that the descriptions of Jonah in the bible are substantially false,
nonetheless, “Jonah” still refers to Jonah, a man who did exist in history. (p. 56)
Devitt’s conclusion: We can use a name to designate an object even when we are ignorant of the object
or when our error about the object is massive. Hence, it’s not necessary to have the identifying beliefs
required by descriptions theories. The epistemic burden placed on us by description theories is far too
heavy. (p. 57)
Identifying beliefs are not sufficient
(a) The story-telling case: one can tell a story with the descriptions that happen to be true of real
people in the world. The audience thought the story is true and passed on to others. Does the
audience refer to people when they talk about them?
(b) Kripke’s Godel case: the description “the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem” might be true
of Schmidt, but “Godel” remains to refer to Godel.
The examples show that even where a speaker’s beliefs involving a name succeed in identifying an
individual, the name may not refer to that individual. (p. 57)
3.4 Reference Borrowing
A proposal of borrowing our reference from others can avoid problems of ignorance and error. Can it?
The idea: you heard Kai talking passionately about “Jerrold Katz”, but did not know at all who Jerrold
Katz is. Nevertheless, you can associate “JK” with the description “the person whom Kai knows well”,
and consequently the reference of your word “JK” can be traced through, or borrowed from, Kai.
This idea of borrowing reference is well taken, but it still faces problems 1 and 2: we still need a
principled basis for choosing one among a set that includes many reference borrowing descriptions,
reflecting conversations with many people about a name’s bearer. You could also hear Norman, Caleb,
Sermin, etc., talking about “JK”. Which reference do you borrow from? There will be an ambiguity
created because different decisions of whom to borrow from lead to distinct senses of “JK”. (p. 58)
The proposal does not help solve the problems of ignorance and error enough (p. 59). There is a
possible problem of circularity: When using a name, A relies the reference of it on B, B on C, C on D,
but D forgot all about the reference, and comes to depend on A. Also, there might be a problem of error,
because there may not be a correct identifying description available in the borrowing line. The
epistemic burden of the description theory is still too heavy.
A serious problem for the description theory is: how do we refer to general terms?
3.5 Rejecting Description Theory
Devitt argues that the fundamental problem for the description theory is that it is essentially incomplete
(p. 60-1). It’s basic schematic account of a name’s reference is the following: a name’s (“a”) reference
x a definite description (“the F”)  “the F” denotes x in virtue of the fact that “F” applies to x
What is lacking here is an account of application: in virtue of what does “F” applies to Fs? Since “F” is
a general term and does not refer to particular things, we confront a problem that the referential link
does not touch the reality.
Two attempts to save description theory:
1) circular descriptivism: it builds the required description around a term for the very semantic
relation that we are seeking to explain. E.g., the referent of “Einstein” is fixed by the description
“the object designated by (or called, named, etc.) “Einstein”. This account is apparently circular or
empty, because it says nothing in answering the question: in virtue of what does “the object
designated by ‘Eistenin’ denote Einstein”
2) causal descriptivism: its thesis consists of two claims
a)
“a” designates x in virtue of x’s standing in some (causal) relation R to “a”
b) the description “the cause of my ‘a’-talk” determines the reference of “a”.
--Devitt’s rejection of (2): it’s ingenious but fishy. The first problem is that the requirement that
speakers associate this “R”-description with “a” seems to be theoretically redundant. The fact that there
is a causal relation R between “a” and x is sufficient to explain reference.
--The second problem is that it requires everyone who designates has a theory of designation and that
the theory is right. Everyone must know the right R. There is again too much epistemic burden placed
on speakers.
How about a non-description theory such as a Fregean “identification” theory according to which we
do not fix the referent of a name by a set of descriptions but by being able to recognize or identify the
bearer of the name. This makes the idea of reference borrowing more valuable. But Devitt points out
that there are limitations on the number of objects that most of us could point out (Think of Cicero).
Nonetheless, the identification theory brings our attention to the fact that “that person” is a
demonstrative not a definite description. In this theory, the information a person associates with a name
is not linguistic, but perceptual or discriminative capacity of some kind. (p. 62) It shows that we can
have an alternative theory of reference.
Putname’s Twin Earth Argument is an argument against description theory: (p. 62-3)
Tom on earth and Tom* on twin earth both use the term “water” and associate the term with the same
beliefs and mental images, but Tom refers to water (with H2O structure) while Tom* refers twater
(with XYZ structure).
This shows that nothing internal is sufficient to determine the referent of “water”. In Putnam’s words,
“meaning just ain’t in the head”.
Devitt agrees with Putnam’s “externalist” view of meaning. He thinks that of course meaning is not in
the head, because meaning depends on reference and reference relates a person and his word to one
particular external object and not others. To suppose that an internal state can be sufficient to determine
reference is to suppose that an internal state has a truly magical power.
The same argument can also be applied to proper names like “Reagan”. If so, description theory is
incomplete. The reference of a name is determined at least partly by external factors, not just by
internal states with the contents given by descriptions.
An insight of description theory that can’t be denied: we must have some true beliefs about an entity in
order to refer to it by name. The idea of reference borrowing is also important. It is employed by
Putnam to explicate the fact that our ability to use our language is, in part, a social capacity. Putnam
calls this “the linguistic division of labour”.