CHAPTER SIX
THE CLAIMS OF DISPUTING PARTIES
I am not suggesting that the world is any more furtive or dishonest than
you already suppose, and I am certainly not suggesting that you be furtive
or dishonest. I wish that Statesmen and businessmen had good reason to
communicate freely and honestly--both because honesty, in general is
right, and because much secrecy and deception is collectively destructive.
Nevertheless, people do play their cards close to the vest, and self-serving
distortions, to others and to oneself, are common. To identify or prevent a
lie, you must put on the liar’s cloak, see his stakes and make his inferences.
So without being careful to insert pious disclaimers, I will ask you to don
the dissembler's costume along the way.
-Caveat Lector, in Applbaum's Knowledge and
negotiation…
I
THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE
The Bakassi peninsula dispute is a classic example of a zero-sum game
type. A zero-sum game, according to M. Nicholson (1997), is the case of pure
conflict where interests are totally opposed. Such purity, even if sinister, is rare in
human life. Zero-sum games are also a situation where the outcomes of
negotiation or effort at settling disputes are a win-lose situation. Nicholson
emphasizes that in situations of strong hostility, a conflict game can approach
zero-sum, adding that these games are not without application in the real world.1
The disturbing thing about the Bakassi peninsula dispute is that, given the zerosum character of claims, it is going to be difficult to understand the entire case
given only the positions of the two leading antagonists—Cameroun and
Nigeria—without the introduction of more evidence.
One would expect that with the introduction of more evidence from the
Ambazonia side that both Cameroun and Nigeria authorities would react with
cool-headedness, and withdraw their forces from Bakassi and the entire territory
of Ambazonia. On the contrary, Nicholson warns that in such situations, "at the
precise moment when rational assessment and rational decision should be
paramount, such procedures are particularly under threat."2
Rational behavior is necessary given the introduction of new evidence
because it is economically cost-effective to do so, and morally, the upright thing
to do. To cut the cost of the conflict, we need to know the positions of the
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disputing parties. To do so, Rubin, Pruitt & Kim (1994) recommend that we can
do so in more than one way:
Persuade the parties to talk about their interests" and listen to them
"with a third ear" by being attentive to the points 'Other'
emphasizes, the place it becomes emotional, and the issues it
neglects to mention; drawing inferences from Other's behavior
outside the conflict situation; and finally, asking third parties about
Other's values and standards.3
This is precisely what we intend to keep in mind as we examine the
different positions of the multiple parties involved in the Bakassi peninsula
dispute. The claims of Cameroun, Nigeria and Ambazonia are given a summary
treatment that would give the reader a proper understanding of the dispute.
Thus, we go beyond the legal arguments in the next chapter, to make deductions
and draw conclusions. Who should exercise sovereignty over the Bakassi
peninsula will be clearer than has been presented so far.
II
CAMEROUN CLAIMS AND ARGUMENTS
The claims and arguments of Cameroun point in the direction of
prescription, cession and contiguity—that is, the evolution of the politics of the
Cameroon with specific reference to the Plebiscite Treaty gave Cameroun the
title to the Bakassi Peninsula within West Cameroon, then former Southern
Cameroons (later, Ambazonia), which was one of two states that formed the
Cameroon Federation. Thus Cameroun has exercised authority over the
peninsula administratively and otherwise. But how true these claims are would
depend on how well they contrast or agree with Ambazonia arguments
weighted against those of Nigeria, especially given that Cameroun's claims of
prescription have not been peaceful, let alone beneficial in terms economic and
social advancement of the lives of the inhabitants of Ambazonia. As Bishop
(1962) has commented on the Island of Palmas case, claims to territory based on
contiguity, as the basic of territorial sovereignty, have no foundation in
international law. Besides, territorial sovereignty, accordingly, involves the
exclusive right to display the activities of a state--a right that is corollary in
nature—"the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other states, in
particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together
with the rights which each state may claim for its nationals in foreign territory."4
The position of the Cameroun government concerning the border dispute
with Nigeria has been expressed in two documents. Firstly, on March 29, 1994 it
filed an Application with the Registry of the Court in which it formerly instituted
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proceedings against the Federal Republic of Nigeria in respect to only the Bakassi
peninsula border dispute. Then on June 6, 1994, an additional Application was
deposited with the Registry for the purpose of extending the subject of the
dispute to include another dispute in the Lake Chad area, still against Nigeria. In
the second Application, Cameroun requested the Court to "specify definitively"
the frontier between the two states from Lake Chad to the sea—thus the case is
commonly referred as "Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria."
Cameroun's case was made public through a document titled Declaration
of the Government of Cameroun on the Border Dispute with Nigeria.5 In it the
Cameroun authorities summarized their case against Nigeria, laying emphasis
on "the precise historical and solid landmarks" to charge that it is Nigeria that is
refusing to "recognize her frontier with Cameroun." The government then quoted
what it termed legal instruments that define the land and maritime boundary
between Cameroun and Nigeria, as follows:
i) The final Act of the Berlin Conference of June 26, 1885;
ii) The London Accords of March 11, 1913;
iii) The Obokum Accords of April 12, 1913;
iv) The Franco-British Declaration of July 10, 1919;
v) The Exchange of letters of July 9, 1931;
vi) The Maroua Accords (1975) on the demarcation of the maritime
boundary to point G;
vii) The Reports of the meetings of the Lake Chad Basin Commission of
1988;
ix) The Principle of the intangibility of the frontiers inherited from
colonization, recognized and accepted in 1964 by the Heads of State and
Heads of Government of the member States of the OAU, including
Cameroun and Nigeria, and more.
In charging that Nigeria has "time and again initiated and multiplied
incidents on the frontier with Cameroun," the Cameroun government went
ahead to enumerate what it termed "the most significant incidents from May 16,
1981—February 2 & 3, 1996," most of them in the Bakassi peninsula. Cameroun's
Declaration further stated that both bilateral and multilateral efforts have been
made to ensure that Accords arrived at with Nigeria are respected but that
Nigeria "does not honor her word." The Bilateral and Multilateral Accords
include:
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1) The first Yaounde Declaration of August 14, 1970, in which the CamerounNigeria Frontier Joint Commission stated that the demarcation of the frontier
between the two states should be:
Carried out in three stages (the demarcation of the maritime
frontier based on the Anglo-German protocol signed in Obokum on
the 12th of April 1913 and confirmed by an exchange of letters of
July 6, 1914; to be followed by the demarcation of the land frontier
and finally the signing by the two countries of a treaty so as to give
a legal framework on the frontier thus demarcated on land). The
demarcation of the maritime frontier had to be completed on
September 30, 1970 at the latest.6
2) The Second Yaounde Declaration (April 4, 1971) by which the two Heads of
State (of Nigeria and Cameroun) gave instructions to the Commission to the
effect that the frontier separating the two countries is that resulting from the
compromise line on map No. 3433 of the British Admiralty, to three nautical
miles from the line linking points Sandy and Tom Shot, in accordance with the
Anglo-German Treaty of 1913;
3) The Lagos Declaration of June 21, 1971, in which the Commission traced the
line of the territorial waters on April 4, 1971, but postponed its finality in search
of an adequate map;
4) The Kano Declaration of September 1, 1974, establishing a four-kilometer wide
corridor defining a frontier where petroleum exploitation was prohibited for
both parties;
5) The Maroua Declaration of June 1, 1975 signed to confirm the maritime
frontier from point G. and submitted to the UN to acquire the status of a treaty.
Accordingly, Cameroun laments that "…this Convention has on a permanent
basis been denounced by Nigeria under the pretext that it was never ratified by
its National Assembly which was however nonexistent at the time, given that
Nigeria was constantly under Military regimes as a consequence of Coup d'etat."7
The Cameroun Government then enumerated many instances of diplomatic and
humanitarian efforts, which they underwent in order to avert continuous
aggression and escalation and to ensure compliance so that both nations can
promote good neighborliness but that these efforts failed. Henceforth, Cameroun
decided to try the judicial level when it took the case to the ICJ on June 6, 1994.
At the close of its Application, (based on the Court's Request of
Provisionary Measures, No.94, Mar. 15, 1996), Cameroun submitted that based
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on "…the foregoing statements of facts and legal grounds, the Republic of
Cameroun, while reserving for itself the right to complement, amend or modify
the present Application…and to submit to the Court a request for indications of
provisionary measures…asks the Court to adjudge and declare,”
a) That sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula is Camerounian, by virtue
of international law, and that the territory is an integral part of the
Cameroun territory;
b) That the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating the
fundamental principles of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization
(uti possidetis juri);
c) That by using force against the Republic of Cameroun, the Federal
Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating its obligations under
international law and customary law;
d) That the Federal Republic of Nigeria, by militarily occupying the
Cameroun peninsula of Bakassi, has violated and is violating the
obligations incumbent upon it by virtue of treaty law and customary law;
e) That in view of these breaches of legal obligation, mentioned above, the
Federal Republic of Nigeria has the express duty of putting an end to its
military presence in Camerounian territory, and effecting an immediate
and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from the Camerounian
peninsula of Bakassi—that all these unlawful acts involve the
responsibility of Nigeria; that consequently and on the account of material
and non-material damages inflicted upon the Republic of Cameroun,
reparations should be paid based upon the Court's determination from
assessing the damage caused by Nigeria;
f) And that in order to prevent any dispute arising between the two states
concerning their maritime boundary, the Republic of Cameroun requests
the Court to proceed to prolong the course of its maritime boundary with
the Federal Republic of Nigeria up to the limit of the maritime zones
which international law places under their respective jurisdiction. In its
second Application, Cameroun dwelt more on the other disputed
territories in the Lake Chad area.
III
NIGERIA'S COUNTER-CLAIMS AND ARGUMENTS
Examination of Nigeria’s claims reveals a leaning towards conquest or
illegally based cession. This position would be obvious as we present Nigeria's
counter-claims and arguments; it would become more apparent as we evaluate
all three arguments in the concluding chapter. For now, to understand the
position established by the Nigerian case, two stages are important: Firstly, the
preliminary objections to Cameroun's case that were raised on December 13, 1995
and secondly, the Nigeria counter-claims made on May 31, 1999.
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In its Preliminary Objections, Nigeria not only debunked Cameroun's
claims but also went ahead to explain its position on the dispute. It refuted
Cameroun's request that the Court should demarcate the maritime boundary
between the two states, arguing that there is no legal dispute over the maritime
boundary between the two states. However, Nigeria accepted that the Court
could admit Cameroun's case. Similarly, and most importantly, by a court order
of March 3, 1999, Nigeria's time limit to file a Counter-Memorial was extended,
at Nigeria's request, from March 31, 1998 to May 31, 1999. Nigeria has so far
honored the said date. The Preliminary Objections were summarily presented in
eight chapters as follows:
Chapter 1: The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain Cameroun's
Application.
Chapter 2: The duty of the Parties to settle all boundary questions by
means of existing bilateral machinery.
Chapter 3: The exclusive competence of the Lake Chad Basin Commission.
Chapter 4: The Court cannot determine the tripoint in Lake Chad.
Chapter 5: There is no dispute concerning boundary delimitation from the
tripoint in Lake Chad to the sea.
Chapter 6: There is no basis for a judicial determination that Nigeria bears
international responsibility for alleged frontier incursions.
Chapter 7: There is no dispute susceptible of adjudication as to the
maritime boundary.
Chapter 8: Maritime delimitation necessarily involves the right of third
states.8
Specifically, the Preliminary Objections stated on Bakassi that:
"13. The political and Administrative history of the Bakassi peninsula is
linked very closely with the Cross River and Akwa Ibom States. These two
States were created in 1967 and inherited the administration of the Bakassi
Peninsula from the Eastern Region of Nigeria." It went further to reiterate
the history of the area since whence the Germans established the
Protectorate of Kamerun. It then confirmed that "the Southern Cameroons
were joined in one Administrative union with Eastern Nigeria," through
the Plebiscite to when the Cameroons became a unitary state in 1972, and
that shortly after the Cameroons adopted the name "Republic of
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Cameroon.” The Preliminary Objections also reiterated the history of the
link between the Bakassi peninsula and Old Calabar.9
In criticizing Cameroun's Application as being untimely, the document
give details of diplomatic endeavors that have taken place in an effort to resolve
the dispute bilaterally and multilaterally—thus Cameroun's Application is seen
as stifling the diplomatic endeavors. Further, the document presented defects in
the Cameroun Application, elaborated on the history of incidents along their
common border, and examined the dispute in terms of economic and political
analysis. Specifically, in showing statistics of the production of petroleum by
both countries, it showed that Cameroun's production was dwindling—a reason
why Cameroun is interested in the Bakassi peninsula is because of the riches of
the area. On one serious note, the Preliminary Objections of Nigeria in charging
that Cameroun accepted the jurisdiction of the Court surreptitiously, noted also
that in the course of various contacts immediately before March 1994,
Cameroun carried on discussions with Nigeria in a normal manner,
with no suggestion by Cameroun that it was even contemplating,
let alone about to take, such a significant step in the bilateral
relations between the two States as to institute proceedings before
the Court: no threat or suggestion or other warning of imminent
arbitral or judicial proceedings was made by Cameroun.
Cameroun thus knowingly misled Nigeria, and - as was doubtless
Cameroun's intention-Nigeria was taken by surprise by the
institution of proceedings against it. Nigeria finds it difficult to
reconcile such an attitude on the part of Cameroun with the
dictates of proper respect for proceedings before the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations.10
In as much as this (to me) is the most important statement found in the
entire 81 pages of the Preliminary Objections, that Nigeria provided more facts
than the Cameroun Application did is yet to be proven. Yet, Nigeria devoted a
good 29 pages in trying to list mistakes or misinformation in the Cameroun
Application in what it titled "Schedule of Annexes which are Incorrectly
Referenced and inadequacies in volume 1 of the Cameroun memorial"—listing
and tabulating at least 300 of these.
Concerning its May 31, 1999 counter-claims (which the Court found to be
admissible) Nigeria noted that it "pointed out that there are many cases in which
incursions are occurring along the border from the Cameroun side and for which
Cameroun is internationally responsible". On this note, Nigeria asked the Court
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to declare that the incidents referred to "engage the international responsibility of
Cameroun, with compensation in the form of damages, if not agreed between the
Parties, then to be awarded by the Court in a subsequent phase of the case."11 The
Court further stated that Cameroun did not challenge Nigeria's right to submit
counter-claims. To the Court, this development meant that Nigeria's counterclaims would be examined simultaneously with Cameroun's claims during the
proceedings on the merits. The communiqué noted that under the rules of the
Court (Art. 80, para. 1), "a counter-claim may be presented provided that it is
directly connected with the subject matter of the claim of the other party and that
it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court." In confirming that this is so with
the case, the Court stated that both states "pursue the same legal aim, namely the
establishment of legal responsibility and the determination of the reparation due
on this account."12
IV
AMBAZONIA CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY
You there…who show so odiously your hatred for the other, tell me why
on this condition: that if in what you tell me you seem to have a reasonable
complaint against him you devour with such foul relish, I, knowing who
you are, and his soul's taint, may speak your cause to living memory, God
willing the power of speech be left to me.
Dante, in The Inferno, p. 271.
You ask me to renew a grief so desperate that the very thought of speaking
of it tears my heart in two. But if my words may be a seed that bears the
fruit of infamy for whom I gnaw, I shall weep, but tell my story through
my tears.
Ugolino, in Dante's The Inferno, p. 275.
Another serious development in the Cameroun versus Nigeria case is the
attempt made by the Ambazonia Movement for her side of the case to be heard.
As of now, latest reports from the Vice Chairman of Southern Cameroons
Restoration Movement (SCRM) Dr. Arnold B.Yongbang, who is based in
Cameroun, and from the veteran Ambazonia leader in exile, Fon Gorgi Dinka II,
who recently returned from The Hague, indicate that the Register of the ICJ,
turned down their interpleader13 because the UN has not yet ruled on the status of
this former UN Trust Territory (Southern Cameroons). The Ambazonia leader in
exile produced the original interpleader and copies were sent to the home front,
which then produced the SCRM document that has been widely publicized in
local and international media.14
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The merit of the Ambazonia Case rests primarily on illegal occupation by
Cameroun, with the breach of the Plebiscite Treaty at its core. Arguments
presented show that the case is built solidly in discovery, and prescription—
given the many treaties and political evolution of the territory. This makes
ownership or legal title to the Bakassi Peninsula to assume an intrinsic quality,
especially given that both Nigeria and Cameroun never once challenged
Ambazonia territorial maps and treaties that defined her (Ambazonia or
Southern Cameroons) boundaries before and after the plebiscite of 1961. Thus,
according to the Interpleader submitted by Ambazonia in 1994, the Bakassi crisis
is deeply rooted in the fact that Cameroun illegally occupied Ambazonia,
dissolved its government, and then assumed its old name—implicitly seceding
from the treaty of Union--thereby assuming the functions of the Federal
Cameroon Republic when indeed the Federation itself is non-existent. The
Ambazonia Interpleader therefore serves as a challenge to Cameroun to show the
constitutionality or legality of the process by which it assumes that the
Cameroons are “united” before defending itself that it should exercise
sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula.
The Interpleader was published and widely circulated in Cameroun in
December 1998 by one of the weekly newspapers, Hotline News.15 The Editorial
termed it “Another Southern Cameroons Offensive.” The Interpleader began it
argument stating that Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) is a former UN trust
Territory under United Kingdom Administration by Trusteeship Agreement,
Document No. A/151/REV2 OF 13 December 1946. It elaborated on the UN
Resolutions that created the territory and defined its borders, as between
Ambazonia and Nigeria, and between Ambazonia and the Republic of
Cameroun as of 1st January 1960. It also traced the treaties that gave
international recognition to the boundaries of the State and the wrangling
developments in violation of the Plebiscite Treaty that gave birth to the United
Republic of Cameroun and then in 1984 to the Republic of Cameroun again. The
Interpleader then charges foul-play on the part of the Cameroun governments,
whose actions show a long-standing design to annex by all means possible, the
State of Ambazonia.
The interesting thing about the Interpleader is that it gives a chronological
development of events, especially those that defined the boundary between
Ambazonia and its neighbors, and those that gave Ambazonia legal status as
opposed to Cameroun claims that it is still united with Ambazonia. We note also
that the Ambazonian leader had equally lodged a Declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with the United Nations
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Secretary General requesting that the Interpleader should be forwarded to the
Parties to the Statute and Registrar of the Court accordingly.
In Ambazonia’s Interpleader Summons, (those sent to the ICJ in 1994) the
Ambazonian leader requested that:
(a) Sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula: That the Bakassi Peninsula is
an integral part of the territory of the Interpleader Party and so neither the
Claimant nor the Counter-claimant has sovereignty over it;
(b) No Locus Standi for Claimant: that any border dispute at the Locus in
quo is properly a matter for the Counter-Claimant and the Interpleader
Party, in which the Claimant has no locus standi at all and should
accordingly be struck out of this law suit;
(c) Making the Cease-Fire Permanent, An Order to Show Cause: That
the Combating parties show cause why their forces be not withdrawn and
confined within their respective borders pending the final determination
of sovereignty over Bakassi Peninsula;
(d) Breach of International Obligations: That the United Nations Redress
the Breach of its Obligations to the Interpleader Party under Article 76 of
the Charter.16
In Ambazonia’s Order to Show Cause, the Ambazonian leader and legal
Committee demanded to be shown cause why the following Order Nisi should
not become absolute, that is to say:
(a) The forces of the Combating Parties, including all elements of any
authority which is neither under the flag and command of the Republic of
Ambazonia nor that of the United Nations be urgently withdrawn from
the land, sea and air space of Ambazonia and be confined within their
respective international borders, pending the final determination of the
case;
(b)
That with effect from the notification of this order nisi to
the parties, the United Nations Secretary General, urgently takes steps to
ensure compliance and enlist the assistance of UN member States or the
Security Council to create a Security umbrella over the governance of
Ambazonia.
(c)
That the president of the UN General Assembly make
available to Ambazonia her seat as an adult member state.17
In the Ambazonia Affidavit, the Ambazonian leader-in-exile, Fon Gorji
Dinka is introduced18 and the judgment of the case of Ambazonia versus Cameroun
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held in the Cameroun High Court in 1992 was equally cited. This position is
fortified with arguments as to how the international boundary between
Ambazonia and Cameroun, and between Ambazonia and Nigeria came about,
specifically stating where these boundaries end, and supported by maps and
historical facts. In arguing that while Nigeria and Cameroun had become full
Member States of the United Nations, and that Ambazonia was still a United
Nations Trust Territory, with Bakassi as part of its territory, the Ambazonian
Interpleader noted that:
10. That on 11February 1961 the United Nations conducted a plebiscite in
the said Trust Territory on its future, in which the inhabitants of
Ambazonia, including those of the Bakassi Peninsula took part in the
voting.
11. That this being an acknowledgment by the United Nations that the
Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) is neither part of Nigeria nor part of
Cameroun, the legal rules of ESTOPPEL preclude any member State, or
Organ of the United Nations (including the International Court of Justice)
from alleging today that the Bakassi peninsula is not an integral part of
Ambazonia.19
In points 12 and 13, the Interpleader stressed the difference between a
nation’s sovereignty, which is inherent and inalienable, and a nation’s
government, which can be alienated by conquest, colonial administration and
international administration. It then stressed that the legal effect of alienating a
government is that the nation is physically prevented from freely and
independently exercising her sovereignty, which regardless of the alienation of
the nation remains inherent and inalienable. The example of France during
World War II is cited to support these facts, notably the fact that the Allies
acknowledged these differences (between a nation’s sovereignty and its
government) when they treated as Head of State of France, Charles de Gaulle
who was then a French refugee in London, instead of the French General Petain
who was then heading the French Government under German occupation.20
The most prominent arguments in the Ambazonian Interpleader are the
following portions, most relevant to this section and not worthy of any other
interpretation or omission (from the original interpleader submitted to the ICJ),
and on which behalf exchange of notes took place between the ICJ and the
Ambazonia Sovereignty Society-North America (AMBASOS-NA):
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(15) That according to International Law, once a nation has internationally
recognized borders then sovereignty automatically attaches to that nation
as surely as human rights attach to a human at birth.
(16) That any nation challenging Ambazonia’s Sovereignty over the
Bakassi peninsula cannot at all be countenanced by any court of law until
a treaty by which Ambazonia ceded Bakassi to that nation is tendered in
evidence.
(17) That at the trial of this matter Ambazonia would request the Court to
adjudge and declare as follows:
(a) The Trusteeship status of The Southern Cameroons within the
United Nations being analogous to the status of an infant within
the family, then once The Southern Cameroons independence
was formalized by the promulgation of the SOUTHERN
CAMEROONS CONSTITUTION ORDER-IN-COUNCIL on 1st
October 1960, the state became ipso facto an adult member of the
family upon adulthood.
It was therefore a breach of an international obligation for the United
Nations to have failed so far to give a seat to Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia) as an adult member state of the United Nations.
(b) That having formalized the independence of the territory by
promulgating the Southern Cameroons Constitution, the objective of
Trusteeship as stated in article 76 (b) of the United Nations Charter,
INDEPENDENCE, had been achieved. Accordingly, the Trusteeship
Administration ceased to be valid.21
It is with such legal arguments that Ambazonia’s Interpleader denounces
all acts after the promulgation of the Southern Cameroons Constitution Order-inCouncil of 1960, as being totally outside the ambit of article 76 (b). What would
have been done then was that Ambazonia should have been granted adult
membership of the UN. In this regard, the Ambazonia Interpleader called all
actions after the Constitution of Southern Cameroons was promulgated to be
“ultra vires and accordingly null and void ab initio, and of no legal effect
whatever.”22 The manipulations of international law to suite the dictates of
power-hungry nations, and at the expense of the masses of Ambazonia whom
decolonization should have served with the attainment of independence are
largely responsible for the onset and escalation of the Bakassi peninsula dispute.
The Interpleader traces five of these manipulations as such:
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(1) Keeping the territory still under a Trusteeship, which was terminated
by
operation of the law.
(2) Compelling Ambazonia under threat of total abolishing her
independence and merging her into Nigeria unless Ambazonians accept
the alternative of giving the United Nations a mandate to join their
country’s territory and La Republic du Cameroun into a Confederacy of
Sovereign States.
(3) Conducting a plebiscite in the territory in violation of Ambazonian
independence on those two imposed TWO ALTERNATIVES.
(4) Backing out of the very terms specified in the alternatives which the
inhabitants of Ambazonia opted for in the imposed plebiscite.
(5) Arranging for troops of the Franco-Cameroun alliance to illegally
occupy Ambazonia to this day.23
The Ambazonia Interpleader further accused the United Nations of perpetuating
Britain’s role as its administering agent from when Southern Cameroons had a
separate constitution till October 1, 1961, charging:
18.
That…instead of leaving the independent Ambazonia alone, or at
worst, letting her come under the direct UN administration to which
Ambazonia had thus automatically reverted, for the purpose of
implementing the proposed confederacy, troops of the FrancoCameroun alliance swept into and occupied Ambazonia right to this
day.
19.
That the departed British Officials insisted that this illegal FrancoCameroun occupation of Ambazonia was an interim United Nations
arrangement to protect Ambazonia from anti-French UPC guerrillas
who were then ravaging La Republique du Cameroun.
20.
That (a) it is by this ILLEGAL AND FORCIBLE OCCUPATION that
the troops of the Franco-Cameroun alliance have been operating in
Ambazonia right to Bakassi where they provoked the present
Cameroun-Nigeria military confrontation. (b) It is by this illegal and
forcible occupation that Cameroun now bases her claim of
sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula.
21.
That sovereignty being inalienable cannot and will never pass from
Ambazonia to the Franco-Cameroun alliance. And that is why in
the Lawsuit cited in paragraph 2 above (HCB/28/92) the Cameroun
government conceded to the Cameroun High Court proceedings
formalizing the legal recognition of Ambazonian sovereignty as well
112
as ordering Cameroun to withdraw all elements of this illegal
occupation.
22.
That from the foregoing Cameroun has no evidence to sustain her
claim of sovereignty over Bakassi and this accounts for why
Cameroun has had to resort to advancing such myths as:
(a)
That “a certain WESTERN CAMEROUN” opted to become part of
La Republique du Cameroun. Yet Cameroun knows that the United
Nations has never treated with any such thing as a WESTERN
CAMEROUN, neither as an object nor as a subject of international
law. Or,
(b)
That there is a certain CAMEROUNESS by which a territory can be
identified which would thus entitle Cameroun to exercise
sovereignty over same….
23.
That to advance such myths and fictions for lack of facts and law to
sustain a claim before such a court of law as high as the
International Court of Justice, is eloquent proof of the arrogance and
contempt which has been the practice and constant study of FrancoCameroun authorities towards Organs of Justice, the sovereignty of
other nations, or the principles of international law and the comity
of nations.24
In its concluding paragraphs the Ambazonia Interpleader noted that it
had reason to believe that unless the international Court of Justice avails itself of
the non-controversial procedure of ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, a full scale war
would be triggered, and that responsibility for such escalation would be that of
the court for failing in its obligation to transform the present cease-fire into a
permanent peace in the area. The Interpleader noted that consistent with the
declarations of the parties to comply with the decisions of the court, the parties
should equally comply with the Order to Show Cause “which places on each
party the onus to show why their combat-ready troops be not withdrawn and
confined within their respective undisputed international borders pending the
final determination of the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula,” it
concluded. Finally, in swearing that he believed the above Interpleader
Summons and the Order to Show Cause to be true to the best of his knowledge,
the Ambazonian leader in exile, Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka signed and dated it.25
The seemingly none-admittance of the Ambazonia Interpleader by the
Registrar and President of the ICJ is going to be subject of the next chapter on
evaluation of claims of disputants. What comes up very strongly is the fact that
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the UN Charter and the Statute of the ICJ does not give the President and the
Registrar the powers to singularly or collectively dismiss the claims of a would
be disputant or claimant.
CONCLUSION
These excepts from the Interpleader of Ambazonia to the ICJ are intended
to show not only the gravity of the Bakassi peninsula border dispute but also the
legal ramifications that are involved. Not only is it becoming clearer that it is a
tough case to decide based only on the evidence submitted by Cameroun and
Nigeria, but that any decision that takes into consideration only the first two
arguments may increase, rather than reduce tensions in the region. Clearly, and
in contrast to the arguments presented by Cameroun and Nigeria, Ambazonia's
arguments make those of Cameroun and Nigeria to be very shaky in terms of
reflecting the truth as to why both nations are fighting over the Bakassi
Peninsula, or at least makes their assertions to be more questionable.
To get the complete picture of the case also requires that we examine the
ongoing legal proceedings, to see the position the judges and the Court are
taking. This will be the subject of the next chapters. So far, we have been able to
show that the ingredients of the Bakassi peninsula dispute are many, and that
failure to take all the right ingredients into consideration would only spell doom
for the international legal system and for the disputing parties.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
Undoubtedly, the question of God and human evil is one of the most
serious problems arising out of the Holocaust…The natural temptation of
theologians would be to assert the existence of either a natural or a-God
ordained law binding upon all men and nations in terms of which the
Holocaust can be judged. Unfortunately, even if it were possible to prove
that such a law exists, it is difficult to see what practical difference that
would make in…contemporary politics…assume that such a law
exists…What would be the penalties for violating it and the means where
by it could be enforced? In an earlier age, men and women genuinely stood
in awe of the punitive wrath of divinity, but is this any longer true? Does
not the Holocaust demonstrate that there are absolutely no limits to the
degradation and assault the managers and technicians of violence can
inflict upon men and women who lack the power of effective resistance? If
there is a law that is devoid of all penalties when violated, does it have any
functional significance in terms of human behavior? Is not the law, which
carries no penalties functionally equivalent to no law at all? Even if it
could be demonstrated that it exists, can it not be safely ignored? We are
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sadly forced to conclude that we live in a world that is functionally godless
and that human rights and dignity depend upon the power of one's
community to grant or withhold them from its members…Fortunately, the
American political system has insisted until now upon limitations of the
chief executive's power. And it is a good thing. Otherwise, there might be
no limit to the tyrannies a modern ruler might inflict upon those whom he
governs.
-R. L. Rubenstein in The Cunning of History (p. 90-91).
The interesting thing about legal arguments is that they are questionable,
verifiable, and debatable in terms of how the assumptions, facts and counterfacts fit with written laws and field evidence. Therefore, what makes conflict
difficult to resolve is not the lack of or the weakness of laws and even the
physical evidence in the field, but the interpretations given to them by
individuals, taking into consideration their interests. But the truth stands that
legal arguments when interpreted correctly, are unchallengeable—so too do they
make the interpretation of physical evidence to be much more reliable, with a
higher validity.
To test the legal arguments concerning the Bakassi peninsula case and the
linkage to the sovereignty question over Ambazonia, or the claims of
Ambazonia, requires a careful examination of the following factors: (i) The
expanded nature of the case (the admitted Equatorial Guinea claims and
complaints), (ii) Claims of disputants in terms of factors that determine legal title
to territory, (iii) The decisions of the ICJ, and (iv) The independent opinion of
judges.
I
THE EXPANDED NATURE OF THE CASE
So far, varied opinions that represent the multiple claims of sovereignty
over the Bakassi peninsula have been presented. All our belligerents sound
seemingly convincing in their own narrow and natural domains, and for once, it
seems also convincing that in fact there is much truth to each of their claims. But
somewhere in between lies many questions, which when asked could be the
basis for determining which nation should exercise sovereignty over the
disputed peninsula.
To answer these questions judiciously requires that there should be no
impartiality in the international legal system. But again, reflecting on the Bakassi
dispute and its relation with the stateless Ambazonia, may lead one to conclude
that the international system either deliberately or mistakenly subjected that
territory to its present demise—one that from every indication, is central to the
settlement of the current dispute. This issue alone gives credence to third party
claims while at the same time weakening the arguments of the two famous
belligerents—Cameroun and Nigeria.
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However, this work is not out to denigrate the international system or sue
it to itself, but rather to show that enough legal instruments exist which if
utilized with devotedness would resolve any dispute put before the international
legal system with ease. The assumption is that the rules that govern the
international community already exist and only need to be dug into, applied
accordingly and appropriately, in situations like this. The system is not perfect,
occasionally some people or states will feel cheated by it, but the overall picture
one gets of the development of the international legal instruments is that it is
increasingly growing, gaining momentum and increasingly, becoming more
effective and respectful. If this were not the case, belligerents such as Cameroun,
Nigeria and Ambazonia would not seek and rely on its adjudication. Therefore,
what this work advocates is that in disputes of this nature, all possible victims,
who are affected directly or by implication of the major dispute, and who have
expressed concerns to that effect, should be given the opportunity to express
themselves. This is what would make the international legal instruments in the
face of field evidence to make sense with its judgments. Only by so doing would
a clearer picture of any dispute be established. Any ruling that emanates from
such comprehensiveness of evidence would more likely resolve the dispute and
more so, accepted by belligerents, than criticized and attacked.
In this section we are concerned with seeking answers as to whether it is
possible to render justice in the dispute in question, and if so, how well are the
Judges (of the ICJ) doing the job. Further, what this section does to us is to set us
up to ponder on such questions as: would it be prudent, assuming some parties
turn out to be losers, to grant damages, especially in the case of Cameroun and
Nigeria, (who have both registered casualties and physical damages) and if so,
how? What if eventually the Court finds Ambazonia's claims admissible, and
decides that the peninsula does indeed belong to her or "the UN Trust Territory
of Southern Cameroons," how would Cameroun and Nigeria be asked to
compensate for the injuries both have inflicted on the said territory and on each
other? And above all, will a ruling in favor of Ambazonia lead to the
creation/admission to the UN of Ambazonia, a new state between Nigeria and
Cameroun? If so, what will be the political and legal ramifications of such a
ruling on the Cameroun-Nigeria border on this section of the disputed frontier?
While this work does not answer these questions, they are important in that they
impact on the hidden intentions of the legal arguments of the disputants.
The Judges of the case and their judgment, we are optimistic, will be based
on the evidence presented to them. So far, the Court has admitted only evidence
from Cameroun and Nigeria with a request from Equatorial Guinea to intervene
in the proceedings having been accepted—an indication that the case is
expanding. On March 30, 1999, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea filed its
Application to intervene in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroun and Nigeria. In its Application, Equatorial Guinea stated,
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"the purpose of its intervention is to protect its legal rights in the Gulf of Guinea
by all means…so that these may remain unaffected as the Court proceeds to
address the question of the maritime boundary between Cameroun and
Nigeria."1
On a further note, Equatorial Guinea accused Cameroun of ignoring it on
previous occasions when addressing the maritime boundary issue. Just like
Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea did also charge Cameroun that in diplomatic
discussions between the two countries "Cameroun…never once hinted that it did
not accept the median line as the maritime boundary between itself and
Equatorial Guinea," noting that the area between the three countries is an area
that is undergoing active oil exploration. Thus Equatorial Guinea maintained:
"any judgment extending the boundary between Cameroun and Nigeria across
the median line with Equatorial Guinea would be relied upon by concessionaires
who would likely ignore Equatorial Guinea's protests and proceed to explore
and exploit resources to her legal and economic detriment."2
Even with this development, the big question that is still pending, (in the
event of Ambazonia not becoming a legal party to the dispute), is whether it is
possible for the ICJ to arrive at a fair judgment—one that does not antagonize the
already abused Ambazonians? This question presents the ICJ with no easy task.
Rather than second guess on the outcome of the case, it is indeed much more
prudent if we focus more on the role of the Court, given both the law and the
evidence of the case, on the assumption that the Judges are truly our “learned
Judges.” We do hope also that when judgment is finally rendered, that the victor
shall by interpretation become the vanquished—or who in singing "oh learned
judge!" or "a Daniel has come to judgment!” like the famous rich but wicked
Shylock in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice—that judgment would truly
serve justice worth the respect of all the parties involved and of everyone else.
II
EVALUATION OF CLAIMS OF DISPUTANTS IN TERMS OF
FACTORS THAT DETERMINE LEGAL TITLE TO TERRITORY
In opening this chapter a statement was made to the effect that all the
disputants in the case of the Bakassi peninsula dispute sound convincing. This
statement can be evaluated by reference to the law concerning claims to territory,
especially given the concerns of the international tribunal that the rule which
they have been directed to apply to territorial disputes are inadequate. Often "the
provisions of treaties, awards or legislation which purport to delimit a boundary
may be found to be ambiguous, inconclusive or incomplete."3 Since international
Tribunals are out to resolve disputes definitively, they often find the criteria,
which they are given to be inconclusive, and thus, interpreted to permit a
decision based on other criteria.
This degree of freedom as we may term it, is based on a number of criteria,
which include among others discovery, recognition, acquiescence and
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preclusion, prescription, cession, conquest and contiguity. Since developments in
international law have made conquest to be unacceptable as a means of acquiring
title to territory, disputes that have already escalated into armed conflicts—an
attempt at conquest for the most part—must be taken very seriously in
association with evidence and legal instruments. Some of these are singularly
irrelevant to the evaluation of the case in question since political evolution has
raised the statute of the territory to that of a portion of a state or a nation.
However, according to Bishop (1962) a state may acquire territory through
a unilateral act of its own by occupation, by cession consequent upon contract
with another state or with a community or single owner, or by gift, by
prescription through the operation of time, or by accretion through the operation
of nature. These conditions could be re-examined as (1) conditions based on preexisting agreements, (2) the general considerations of convenience, and (3)
international law adopted by tribunals.
1.
CONDITIONS BASED ON PRE-EXISTING AGREEMENTS
A criterion based on pre-existing agreements is influenced by recognition,
acquiescence and preclusion (or estoppels). This could be in the form of treaties
or fulfillment of some recognized criterion. If such evidence should exist, then
there is no dispute because the parties would simply be referred to their previous
agreement(s). Some examples of cases in which this was used include the
Temple of Preah Vihear Case and the Eastern Greenland case. As Munkman
notes, "this approach forms one of the major trends in the jurisprudence of the
International Court… Title to territory is governed primarily by the rules
underlying the Principles of sovereignty, recognition, consent and good faith".4
However, even if such evidence should exist, international law still has
provisions that could deprive a Power of its seemingly right title to territory
especially if the obligation of the state to prevent its territory from causing
economic injury to neighboring territories (or the territory being contested) in a
manner not permitted by international law.5
What this condition does is inflict heavy injury on Cameroun claims,
since, as we will see in the concluding chapter of this work, it never did honor
the agreements that put the two Cameroons together. More so, glaring economic
and social deprivation does exist to support Ambazonia claims of breach of
treaty against Cameroun. That the Cameroun claims are found to be in violation
of even good faith is what has provoked Ambazonia to seek intervention, which
for the most part is intended to defeat Cameroun claims and expose it to the rest
of the world as being a nation that is not law abiding.
2)
THE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF CONVENIENCE
Another important determinant of legal title to territory has to do with the
attribution of territorial sovereignty based on preponderance of administrative,
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social, geographical, historical and cultural links. These are also called general
considerations of convenience. But this criterion is weak in the sense that it is not
possible to examine and exhaust all priorities of a given area in dispute. A case
where this method has been used is the Rann of Kutch case, in which greater
emphasis was laid on maps and activities of the claimant states and their
predecessors and the activities of their citizens.6 But contrary to the Island of
Palmas (or Miangas) case, such preponderance of administrative or social ties are
insufficient for granting claims to territory.
However, even though there were continuous gaps in the display of
Netherland sovereignty over the Island and over the centuries, the Court
observed that "apart from the consideration that the manifestation of sovereignty
over a small and distant Island, inhabited only by natives, cannot be expected to
be frequent, it is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should go back to a
very distant period. It may suffice that such display existed in 1898, and had
already existed as continuous and peaceful before that date long enough to
enable any Power who might have considered themselves as possessing
sovereignty over the Island, or having a claim to sovereignty, to have, according
to local conditions, a reasonable possibility for ascertaining the existence of a
state of things contrary to her real or alleged rights."7
What this condition does is inflict injury on Nigerian claims, which for the
most part seem to rely on the pre-colonial era and the affiliations of the adjacent
territories before the advent of international boundaries became imposed by
colonialism. These colonial boundaries are the basis of determining claims to
sovereignty and not some concocted theories of pre-colonial times. For instance,
the association of Nigeria’s claims of Bakassi as once being part of Old Calabar is
not reliable and thus cannot validate its efforts at exercising legal title to the
disputed Bakassi peninsula. This is particularly true given that during the precolonial and colonial periods the nation of Nigeria did not exist.
3.
INTERNATIONAL LAW ADOPTED BY TRIBUNALS
The Statute influences this factor as an instrument of international law by
specifying the criteria adopted by tribunals for the attribution of sovereignty to
disputed territory. This includes recognition, acquiescence and preclusion,
possession and administration, affiliations of the inhabitants of the disputed
territory, geographical considerations, economic considerations, historical
considerations and others. Munkman has indicated that most of these
formulations require something in addition, such as the passage of an
indeterminable period of time, coupled with acquiescence, or simply the absence
of opposition of the international community in general or particular interested
states, or some positive act of recognition. Political tribunals in the settlement of
territorial problems regularly apply these conditions—administration,
geographical, social and economic links.8
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Much evidence presented by Cameroun and Nigeria can be evaluated in
terms of the formulations we have just discussed above. Again, one would
suppose that the different methods by which nations and states acquire title to
territory already are weakening and nullifying the arguments presented by the
two main antagonists. It becomes even clearer that the involvement of third
parties could shed more light and shape the direction of resolving the case(s).
Thus, could it be said that if one takes the arguments of the two leading
antagonists and discount them with those presented by Ambazonia, that a
clearer picture of the case would be established? Since each case has its own set
of evidence that makes it different from others, it is likely that in this case
especially, the Judges of the ICJ would adjudge based on the merits of each piece
of evidence weighted against those of the other claimants. This will not be the
case if the claims of Ambazonia are neglected.
III
THE DECISIONS OF THE ICJ
The Court's position on the proceeding before it (concerning the case
between Cameroun and Nigeria) is clearly stated in its Indication of Provisionary
Measures and the Order of the Court on Provisionary Measures, both dated
March 15, 1996. Fifteen Judges assisted the President of the Court, Judge
Bedjaoui Mohammed and his Vice Schwebel, with Mrs. Mbaye Keba and Bola
Ajibola, sitting as Judges ad hoc for Cameroun and Nigeria, respectively. The
Court then reiterated the developments that have taken place so far, concerning
the case Cameroun deposited in 1994, requesting the Court “to determine the
course of the maritime frontier between the two states in so far as the frontier
had not already been established by the Maroua Declaration signed by the
Cameroun and Nigerian Heads of State in 1975.”
The Court, in noting that both Cameroun and Nigeria have accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with respect to Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the Court, recalled that Cameroun had deposited another
Application on June 6 1994 which extended the case to cover the entire border
between the two States. Nigeria raised her Preliminary Objections on December
13, 1995 to both the Jurisdictions of the Court and the admissibility of
Cameroun's case. After a suspended period, Judge Mohammed Bedjauoi, then
President of the Court, by an Order of 10 January 1996, fixed May 15, 1996 as the
date for Cameroun to present a written statement of its observations and
submissions on the preliminary objections raise by Nigeria. This was done at the
prescribed time.
Cameroun had requested the Court on February 12, 1996 to indicate
provisionary measures concerning serious armed incidents that took place
between the forces of both Cameroun and Nigeria in the Bakassi peninsula. After
public hearings between March 5 and 8, the Court ordered that both parties
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should show restraint from any action that “might aggravate or extend the
dispute before it.” Furthermore, on June 11 1998, the Court in rejecting seven of
the eight preliminary objections raised by Nigeria ruled that it (The ICJ) had
jurisdiction in the case and found Cameroun's claims admissible. Furthermore,
by another order of June 30, 1998, the Court fixed March 31, 1998 as the time
limit for Nigeria to file a Counter-Memorial, which at Nigeria's request was
extended to March 3, 1999.
As far as this work is concerned, the most important development in this
case is the Order of the Court on Provisionary Measures, of March 15, 1996. The
Order has to do with the request of Cameroun for provisionary measures with
respect to the escalated nature of the border dispute following the February 3,
1996 incidents at the Bakassi peninsula. The ICJ on March 15, 1996 issued the
following provisionary measures:
1) By a unanimous vote, the Court ordered that
Both Parties should ensure that no action of any kind, and particularly no
action by their armed forces, is taken which might prejudice the rights of
the other in respect of whatever judgment the Court may render in this
case, or which might aggravate or extend the dispute before it;
2) By 16 votes to 1, that
Both parties should observe the agreement reached between the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs in Kara, Togo, on 17 February 1996, for the cessation of
all hostilities in the Bakassi peninsula;
3) By 12 votes to 5,
Both Parties should ensure that the presence of any armed forces in the
Bakassi peninsula does not extend beyond the positions in which they
were situated prior to 3 February 1996;
4) By 16 votes to 1,
Both Parties should take all necessary steps to conserve evidence relevant
to the present case within the disputed area;
5) By 16 votes to 1,
Both Parties should lend every assistance to the fact-finding mission,
which the Secretary General of the United Nations has proposed to send
to the Bakassi peninsula.9
The Judges who voted against one or more of the Court Orders each
submitted Independent Opinions expressing the reasons why they voted against
the measures. However, one other important development as of now has to do
with Nigeria's request for interpretation of the Court's Judgment of June 11, 1998,
and the judgment itself. Article 60 of the Statute lays emphasis on the fact that
the judgments of the Court are "final and without appeal." This being the case, it
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is only to be understood that the Court's judgment should or must be without
flaw.
For instance, Nigeria's sixth preliminary objections had insinuated that
Cameroun has transformed the dispute to involve the entire border. But the
Court ruled that that was not the case, stating that it was a matter of submitting
further evidence that are relevant to the first Application. It noted that it made no
distinction between "incidents" and "facts" and that the same rules governed the
introduction of new evidence (Articles 38 and 60). The Court then stated that its
interest was not to examine whether there is between the parties a dispute as to
the meaning or scope of Judgment of June 11, 1998 as contemplated by Article 60
of the Statute.10
The Court also found that there was no reason to charge Nigeria with
additional costs Cameroun incurred in responding to its request for
interpretation of the Judgment of June 1998, stating that it would not depart from
the general rules set forth in Article 64 of the Statute, which confirm the “basic
principle regarding the question of costs in contentious proceedings before
international tribunals, to the effect that each party shall bear its own.” 11 The
Court then Declared by a vote of 13-3 inadmissible Nigeria's request for
interpretation of the Judgment of June 11, 1998 in the Case of Cameroun versus
Nigeria; and unanimously Rejected Cameroun's request that Nigeria bears the
additional cost to Cameroun by the above-mentioned request for interpretation.
The three Judges who did not vote in favor of the Court's position then
submitted dissenting opinions to the Judgment of the Court to explain their
respective reasons for voting against the declaration.
The June 11, 1998 judgment itself has come under scrutiny in this work.
Overall, the judgment centered on the preliminary objections of Nigeria, much of
which was rejected. The arguments of the claimants centered among others on
time limit and the filing of Applications, the method and time lag taken to
communicate the accused party, motive and good faith, the acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the Court only when a country seems to want its services,
conditions of reciprocity, the right of third states concerning the case, and the use
of estoppel. While the Court dismissed most of the objections it is worth noting
that three were of crucial importance.
Firstly, the contention that the time limit was essential, according to
Nigeria, because the Court (in its ruling of 26 November 1984 in the case
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua)
required a reasonable time for the withdrawal of declarations under the Optional
Clause did not hold well with legal arguments. The Court ruled against the
argument, stating that the judgment cited by Nigeria is not applicable to the
deposit of those declarations, noting that:
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Withdrawal ends existing consensual bonds, while deposits
establish such bonds. The effect of withdrawal is therefore purely
and simply to deprive other states which have already accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court of the right they had to bring proceedings
before it, against the withdrawing state…accordingly, no time limit
is required for the establishment of a consensual bond following
such a deposit.12
Another ruling concerned the Principle of good faith and the rule of pacta
sunt servanda was invoked by Nigeria in support of its argument. According to
Nigeria, Cameroun and Nigeria had for 24 years an understanding "to settle all
boundary questions through the existing bilateral machinery." Thus taking this
present dispute to the Court was not right, and that by its conduct “Cameroun
was estopped from turning to the Court.” But the Court in ruling against Nigeria
observed that:
An estoppel would only arise if by its acts or declarations Cameroun
had consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the
boundary dispute submitted to the Court by bilateral avenues
alone…Cameroun did not attribute an exclusive character to the
negotiations conducted with Nigeria, nor as far as it appears, did
Nigeria. Furthermore, Nigeria does not show that it has changed its
position to its detriment or that it has sustained prejudice. In
bringing the proceedings to the Court, Cameroun did not disregard
the legal rules relied on by Nigeria in support of its second
objection. Consequently, Nigeria is not justified in relying on the
principle of good faith and the rule pacta sunt servanda, both of
which relate only to the fulfillment of existing obligations."13
Lastly a noted ruling concerns the eighth preliminary objection of Nigeria,
which concerns the delimitation of the maritime boundary, which according to
Nigeria, the delimitation necessarily involves the rights and interests of third
States. The Court ruled that it could not give a ruling on the eight preliminary
objections because it is yet to be seen if such states are yet to exercise that right.14
But as we have already observed, not only is Ambazonia challenging the claims
of Nigeria and Cameroun, but also, Equatorial Guinea has stated its intentions to
become a party to the case as far as the maritime boundaries are concerned.
The rulings on the other preliminary objections mostly concerned the
other parts of the Cameroun-Nigeria border in dispute, such as the Lake Chad
area. On the part of Ambazonia, exchange of letters between the DelegateGeneral of the Ambazonia Sovereignty Society-North America (AMBASOS-NA),
Mr. Ngang Edwin, and the Registrar of the ICJ, Edwuardo Valencia-Ospina, and
also exchanges between the United States Senator Timothy J. Penny and then US
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Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, suggest that the matter
is not being taken lightly in the international arena.
For instance, the Registrar of the Court15 responded to the Ambazonia
Interpleader by quoting Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute, which as was claimed,
was on behalf of the President of the Court. Under Article 62 of the Statute,
1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature,
which may be affected by the decision in this case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.
2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request”;
And under Article 63 of the Statute:
1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which States other
than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the
Registrar shall notify all such States forthwith.
2. Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the
proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the
judgment will be equally binding upon it.
As expected, Mr. Ngang responded again and this time drew the attention of the
Registrar to the fact that the actions of the Registrar contravenes,
a) Article 26.3 of the rules, which state, “in the discharge of his
functions the Registrar shall be responsible to the Court.” Please
repeat, the Court and not the President of the Court.
b) Article 36.6 of the Statute, which state, “in the event of a dispute
as to whether the Court has jurisdiction the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court.” Please, repeat, the Court
and not the President of the Court.
c) Article 84.2 of the rules, which vest in the Court and the Court
alone exclusive competence to decide on any objection as to “an
application for permission to intervene,” or “admissibility of a
declaration of intervention.”16
Article 84.2 of the rules, which vest in the Court and the Court
alone exclusive competence to decide on any objection as to “an
application for permission to intervene,” or “admissibility of a
declaration of intervention.”16
With these arguments, the Ambazonia Delegate charged that the Court Registrar
was participating in a cover-up intended to suppress the Ambazonia
Interpleader. With that, the Registrar retorted stating:
With reference to your letter of 11 August 1994 which concerns my
own dated 18 July 1994, may I draw your attention to the fact
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clearly indicated herein, that in replying to your earlier
communication I was acting on the instructions of the President of
the Court. I therefore regret to inform you, also on the President’s
instructions, that there is nothing to be added to the
aforementioned letter and that no further correspondence on the
matter can be entertained.
Concerning exchanges between Congressman Timothy J. Penny and
Ambassador Albright, on June 20, 1994, Penny had written to, and forwarded the
Ambazonia Interpleader to the Ambassador, requesting that she enquire from
the ICJ what was going on and also state the position of the US Government to
that effect and get back with him with this information, stating:
As a supporter of United Nations reforms, I have advocated
“preventive diplomacy” as a tool for UN to prevent instability and
violence in the world. We have seen countless examples of internal
problems leading to violence, and sometimes, genocide. The
Ambazonia Movement has been a peaceful one to date; however, I
believe that the UN should intervene diplomatically in situations,
which could ultimately lead to international crises.17
Besides writing to the US Ambassador to the UN, T. J. Penny forwarded
the package of the Ambazonia Interpleader to all the Members of Congress. On
her part, Ambassador Albright’s acknowledgement that she had received the
package on July 13, 1994, noted that her office had “asked the office of the
Department of State’s Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs to provide
more information on this case,” and on September 14, 1994, she sent
correspondence to the Congressman stating how far the ICJ had gone on the
entire dispute surrounding the Bakassi dispute, noting “the United States
supports the peaceful settlement of disputes and takes a positive view of the
parties’ recourse to the Court for this purpose.”18
While the final stages of the Court proceedings are still awaited, it is hard
to imagine that the Court will totally ignore the Ambazonian intervention
regardless of whether or not Ambazonia is actively accepted as a party to the
case. Clearly, some angles of the law seem to have been ignored or tampered
with, when it comes to simply observing the behavior of the Court at this stage,
as indicated by the arguments of Ambazonia. But at this stage, it will be hard to
draw a lasting conclusion given that the final decision is still pending. It is our
hope that the final decision should reflect the reality and totality of factors that
are involve in the making of the dispute if there is any hope that final resolution
will not escalate the dispute.
IV
THE INDEPENDENT OPINION OF JUDGES
The degree of freedom and independence enjoyed by the Judges of the ICJ
is the expression of their opinions regarding the decisions of the Court. These
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independent opinions are important in that they not only show that the Court
operates democratically but also that by expressing their independent opinions,
the ideals of freedom of thought and expression, together with the interests of
the disputing parties are protected. Thus in order to measure elements of bias or
the interests of the judges, it is important that their opinions should come under
examination. In Cameroun versus Nigeria the independent opinions are expressed
following three waves. The first of these opinions came after the March 15, 1996
Order of the Court on Provisional Measures.19 On the whole, a total of 17 Judges
voted five times on the measures of the Court. A total of 8 Judges voted against
all five measures, while a total of 77 votes were in favor of the decisions of the
Court—a 90.6% in favor, and only 9.4% against—assuming all seventeen Judges
each voted five times.
The most conspicuous finding is that but for the unanimous vote, the ad
hoc judges (representing Cameroun and Nigeria) voted nationalistically. All five
times Judge Mbaye of Cameroun voted in favor of the decisions, while with the
exception of the first vote that demanded restraint from the belligerents, Judge
Ajibola of Nigeria voted against all other measures. This is a disturbing finding.
It however goes to fortify the position expressed by Monique ChemillierGendreau (1996) in her Ph. D. Dissertation, that such behavior is typical of an
arbiter, who “represents the parties concerned and is concerned with satisfying
their interests.”20 Here the Declarations of Mbaye and Ajibola are of primary
importance.21
Judge Mbaye of Cameroun, in his separate opinion, noted the similarities
between the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso versus Mali
Republic) Provisional Measures, and the Cameroun versus Nigeria case and upheld
the position of the Court demanding restraint from both parties. He considered
the provisions taken to be very necessary to ensure that future events that may
escalate the conflict are avoided. On his part, Judge Ajibola of Nigeria, while
accepting the first decision of the Court, regretted that he could not vote with the
rest of the members on the other four provisions “because they are unnecessary,
non-legal and counter-productive.”
The rest of the Judges saw wisdom in the decisions of the Court and
upheld them as, in the words of Judge Ranjeva, having the aim of maintaining
“international peace and security, which come within the remit of the United
Nations.” Judge Koroma stressed a similar point, commenting on the measures
as being necessary "to preserve the respective rights of either party," with the
hope that "the Order will discourage either Party from taking any measures
which might cause irreparable damage to the millions of each of the parties
nationals residing in the other territory" and "help reduce tension between the
two states and restore the fraternal relations which have always existed between
the two countries, pending the decision of the Court."
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The second wave of Independent Opinions came following the June 11,
1998 Judgment. Judge Kooijmans noted in his separate opinion that the existence
of a dispute may be established from the examination of the positions of the
parties, as expressed in the diplomatic history of matters. He questioned whether
to this effect it could be said that there is a dispute concerning the maritime
boundary, especially given the fact that there is a disagreement about the
location of “point G,” the starting point of the maritime boundary, and the fact
that the Parties have agreed that the delimitation of their maritime boundary
involves a third party. A series of three questions not only express his position
but also shed more light on the case:
How can the subject matter of such a dispute be described in legal
terms? What are the opposing legal claims, which empower the
Court to make a judicial decision having final and binding force on
the Parties? Can it really be said that there is a legal dispute which
is at the present time appropriate for resolution by the Court?"22
In Judge Oda's opinion, apart from the question of delimitation of offshore
areas in the mouth of the Cross River, and the prolongation of the delimitation of
the exclusive Economic zone and the Continental shelf—issues totally
independent of the Bakassi peninsula—the delimitation of the maritime
boundary cannot be the object of the adjudication of the Court, unless it is
requested jointly by the Parties, as a simple failure of negotiations between States
does not mean that a legal dispute has occurred under Article 36 (2) of the
Statute."23 He then agrees with the Court's position that the legal disputes over
territorial sovereignty should be dealt with at the merits phase of the case.
On his part Judge Vereshchetin did not vote in favor of 1 (e) because of his
believe that the findings on which that part of the judgment is based is not
supported by the evidence offered by the Applicant and so cannot be objectively
determined. To Vereshchetin,
For the Court to decide on the existence of a dispute between the
two Parties as to the legal basis of the whole boundary, it must
previously have been established that the Republic of Nigeria
challenges the validity of the legal title to the whole of the
boundary relied on by the Republic of Cameroun, or relies on a
different legal title, or place a different interpretation on a given
legal instrument relating to the entire boundary. None of those
conclusions may be 'positively' inferred from the documents or
statements presented to the Court.24
Accordingly, he noted that the real scope of the dispute could only be
clarified at the merit stage when the Court has compared the maps produced by
both Parties, together with their interpretation of the legal arguments. Judge
Ajibola argued that the Right of Passage Case over Indian Territory (in reference
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to Article 36 (4) of the Statute) was wrongly or inadequately interpreted in 1957
and that time has come for the same to be corrected after 41 years. He argued
that Paragraph 4 of Article 36 provides that Declarations under the Optimal
Clause shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and
the same shall be transmitted to all the State Members and to the Registrar of the
Court. He then lamented that while the Court rightly and properly interpreted
the former in 1957, it failed to do so in the present case, and instead argued that it
would bring "uncertainty" into the operation of the declaration of the "accepting
State." To Ajibola, this argument is neither convincing nor is the correct
interpretation of Article 36 (4) as a whole.25
This argument is re-enforced by that of Judge Koroma, who in a separate
opinion urged the Court not to recognize the Principle of stare decisis—which the
principle of binding precedent does not apply in Court. He noted that even when
the Court in a particular case accepts legal principles, they are not regarded as
binding on other States or in other disputes. "The Court has the power and the
duty to depart from previous decisions when this is necessary and in the interest
of justice," he emphasized.26 Judge Koroma concluded by stating vehemently,
"the Court should not have allowed its decision to be governed by the Judgment
of the Right of Passage case." He lamented that the Court did not take the
opportunity provided by the Cameroun versus Nigeria case to review the decision
in the Right of Passage case.27
Whatever stand has been taken by the Judges and ad hoc Judges at the ICJ
would be properly evaluated only when the final phase of the case is through
and the Court Decision taken. However, for now, it is proper to weigh the entire
case with an expert opinion from Chinedu Munir Nwoko, a historian, author and
solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales. In an article in West Africa
magazine titled “No Win Without Ambazonia,” Nwoko in reiterating most of the
points stated by the Ambazonia Interpleader noted,
Cameroun has been forced to drop the politics of claiming that
Ambazonia is part of a single Camerounian nation. In its litigation
it, in effect, claims that it is suing Nigeria in exercise of a mandate
given to it by the Ambazonian people. According to Cameroun
statement of claim, the Ambazonian people gave Cameroun that
mandate through the plebiscite of February 1961.28
Nwoko evaluates the pre-plebiscite politics and international situation,
especially the facts that because the Trusteeship for Ambazonia (The British
Southern Cameroons) had been effectively terminated when the territory
attained not only self-government, but had a promulgated Constitution, the
plebiscite was not only illegal but the UN had no mandate to organize it. This,
Nwoko justifies by stating that the UN realized this and thus failed to conclude
the plebiscite treaty when it effectively scrapped the commission of experts,
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which it had appointed for that purpose. So to this date, no UN conference has
been convened for the completion of the process ignited by the illegal plebiscite.
According to Nwoko’s observations Cameroun’s claims based on the plebiscite
collapsed before Nigeria filed its own statement of defense. Accordingly, things
were made worse for Cameroun when Ambazonia asserted its sovereignty by
filing an Interpleader against both Nigeria and Cameroun.
Also in the article, Nwoko comments the enlarged international
diplomacy caused by the Ambazonia Interpleader, noting specifically concerns
from the United States which has written to the Court questioning it on behalf of
Ambazonia and Paris has also mounted pressure on the Biya government,
pleading that it should recognize Ambazonia before it is too late or before
Nigeria takes advantage of her.26 Thus, Nwoko delves into the advantages—both
legally and diplomatically—that would accrue to Nigeria should Nigeria become
the first of the disputants to recognize Ambazonia as a sovereign state. Four
important points came across strongly as legal advantages in case of Nigeria
recognizing Ambazonia:
1. Since Cameroun had no legal authority to act on behalf of Ambazonia,
Nigeria’s recognition of Ambazonia as a sovereign state would formally
render all previous accords between Nigeria and Cameroun on the
Nigeria-Ambazonia boundary absolutely null and void ab initio. This is
automatic and is certainly more fatal than arguing for example, that
former Nigerian leader General Gowon did not comply with some
internal administrative rules of his Supreme Military Council, for if
Nigeria is bound by other acts of Gen. Gowon, including his seizure of
power in violation of the Nigerian Constitution, the ICJ will certainly hold
Nigeria bound with Gowon-Ahidjo Accords.
2. Recognition of Ambazonia would deprive Cameroun of any claim of
the right to sue Nigeria. Nigeria would then move the Court under Article
79 of the ICJ rules to strike out the case because Cameroun has no locus
standi.
3. By recognizing Ambazonia, Nigeria would thus negotiate with
Ambazonia on the basis of mutual sovereignty equality. This sovereign
equality would make any agreement between Nigeria and Ambazonia on
boundary adjustments valid and unimpeachable.
4. By recognizing Ambazonia, Nigeria would be playing no greater role in
ensuring Ambazonia’s right to self-determination than India in its vital
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role which included armed intervention in supporting Bangladesh’s right
to self-determination.27
On the diplomatic level C. Nwoko concluded that Nigeria’s formal recognition of
Ambazonia would:
a. Shift the burden to the international community and the United
Nations, which must then show a legal justification for keeping
Ambazonia out of the United Nations;
b. Open the way for preventive diplomacy to move in and prevent an
Ambazonia-Cameroun blood-bath which is already looming and would
certainly make the human tragedy in Rwanda look like child’s play; and
c. Prevent the exodus of millions of refugees fleeing such a tragedy into
Nigeria, which would have a destabilizing effect on Nigeria.28
Consistent with the rules of the law, these arguments seem to be very
plausible and suggest also that Cameroun has an equal, if not greater
opportunity to do the same and benefit from both the legal and diplomatic
advantages of recognizing Ambazonia, especially given its forty years of
affiliation with the Ambazonian peoples. This will become more apparent in the
concluding chapter of this work. Nwoko is certainly right about the fact that this
matter is rather complicated and that if proper care and diplomatic commitments
are not infused into it, there could be a blood bath in that region. That would
certainly defeat the purpose of the very existence of the UN and its legal organ,
the ICJ.
The big question is this: will the international community, the learned
Judges of the ICJ and scholars in academia allow this to happen, and if so, in the
end say these issues were not properly diagnosed?
CONCLUSION
So far, we have come to the realization that the dispute between Cameroun
and Nigeria has expanded not just in terms of territory under dispute but also in
the number of parties involved. Equatorial Guinea's complaints against
Cameroun are suggestive of the fact that as friendly or as law-seeking as
Cameroun seems to portray itself, that nation does not seem to value its external
relations with its neighbors. Something is definitely not right with its foreign
policy and it would serve this work well not to second guess on it. Regardless of
whether or not the dispute has expanded, the important thing to note in this
work is that the evidence presented by both Cameroun and Nigeria does suggest
130
that the epi-center of the case would be properly understood only at the merit
stage. At the merit phase, questions of maps and treaties would come into play,
and it is the contention of this work that the arguments presented by Nigeria and
Cameroun would be found to be sloppy. The arguments would be seen most
likely then as hiding or avoiding something and that the focus of the case would
revert to the question of sovereignty not just over the Bakassi peninsula but also
of the entire Ambazonian territory.
Again we observed that so far international law could only go as far as the
arguments of the Claimant parties are concerned. For instance, most of the
arguments in Nigeria's preliminary objections are uncalled for, because these are
out-dated (over two hundred years) or better-still pre-date the era of colonialism,
which defined the borders. Secondly, neither does the literature cited by both the
disputants and the Judges go any where near the issue at stake—that of who has
legal title over Bakassi? From the way the matter is being treated, one can only
imagine what the toll would be in terms of costs to both nations and the
international legal system as a whole, not forgetting the fact that there is
presently a stalemate in the disputed territory and that the lives of the
inhabitants of the peninsula and that of the people of Ambazonia, Cameroun and
Nigeria as a whole, are being placed under unnecessary strain.
From the evidence presented by both sides, the strongest point for Nigeria
seems to be the population factor, which from every indication can be
understood since by virtue of its large population and high population density, it
is only natural that most inhabitants in the Bakassi peninsula will be of Nigerian
origin. But that alone will not settle the dispute over sovereignty. The problem
with the Cameroun case seems to be the lack of coherence and the fact that it
relies on documents that gave the Federal Cameroon government the right of
sovereignty over the entire Ambazonia territory, but does not indicate whether
or not that plebiscite treaty was ever effected.
But, would Cameroun be asked to show cause as to why the state of the
Federation should not be questioned? What laws or treaties determine the
constitutionality of the name changing syndrome and the seeming end of the
Federation? Cameroun has changed its name three times (from the Federal
Republic to the United Republic and lastly to the Republic of Cameroun since
independence). So far the legal arguments have not touched on this issue and it
is expected that when it does, a "can of worms" would be opened to show that
Cameroun's claims over Bakassi are just as crooked as that of Nigeria. When
Cameroun is asked to show proof as to the implementation of the plebiscite—the
international instrument that supposedly gave it jurisdiction over the territory of
Ambazonia, the entire case as presented by Cameroun will collapse for lack of
substantive evidence!
131
We observed also that the legal argument that Cameroun expanded the
dispute did question the fact as to whether or not Nigeria did challenge their
entire border. This was entirely unnecessary since in Cameroun's Application it
was more of a request that the entire border should be delimited from Lake Chad
to the sea. This request is legally sound since there is every indication that there
could be future dispute along the common border as it is now. There is nothing
wrong with such a request. Thus, the dragging arguments on the issue were, in
many ways unnecessary, a waste of time and equally a waste of vital resources,
which this author believes both countries could utilize otherwise.
From every indication the Court has narrowed down on identifying the
legal dispute as centered only on Bakassi first, the Lake Chad area second, before
that of the delimitation of the maritime boundary. The issue of Ambazonia’s
sovereignty complicates our concern over the Bakassi peninsula. This is an issue,
which Cameroun and Nigeria both missed when presenting their cases. As we
conclude this work, it is my hope that more light would be shed on the fact,
indeed the argument that no legal title over the Bakassi peninsula can be granted
to either Nigeria or Cameroun without documentary proof, and that the legal
title over Bakassi cannot exclude or precede legal title over Ambazonia.
Therefore, ignoring the Ambazonia Interpleader is prelude to causing a future of
instability, or a direct provocation of the Ambazonians that they have a right to
exercise their right to bear arms and engage in a war of liberation. This will be
counter-productive to, or better still, contravene the Articles of the UN Charter
and the Statutes of the International Court of Justice and their hallow claims of
functionality towards “preventive diplomacy.” The parameters of the Bakassi
peninsula case and the arguments as presented by the two major claimants—
Cameroun and Nigeria—together with the involvement of the Equatorial Guinea
and Ambazonia’s Interpleader provide surmounting evidence to the effect of not
posing a big challenge to the intelligence of international legal practitioners. In
other words, simple logic and simple knowledge of conflict resolution is enough
to provide a concrete and lasting solution to the entire land and maritime border
claims. The matter only becomes complicated the more we try to discount or
ignore the evidence provided by the Ambazonia movement, by basing the legal
case on political claims by the two leading belligerents.
The questions posed by the Ambazonia side have to be addressed one
way or another, by diplomacy or by legal pursuit. Otherwise, only the accident of
time will correct the situation, as perhaps the UN had hoped when it ignored
then Southern Cameroons’ quest for total independence during decolonization.
In other words, all those international conferences and summits, both diplomatic
and scholarly, that try to give meaning to ending and preventing disputes and
conflicts by developing peacekeeping and peace-making formula would be
inconsequential if the UN workers, and judges of its legal organ—the ICJ—
charged with implementing them, fail to make the necessary connections that
give greater meaning to chances of peacefully resolving them.
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As the Bakassi dispute shows, it seems all the necessary evidence for
resolving the dispute is in place and what can derail the process is interpretation
by those charged with such a duty.
CHAPTER EIGHT
ICJ FINAL JUDGMENT
When the Son of Man shall come in his Glory, and all the Holy Angels
with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his Glory. And before Him
shall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from another,
as a Shepard divideth his sheep from the goats: And he shall set the sheep
on his right hand, but the goat on his left. Then shall the King say unto
them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father; inherit the
kingdom prepared for you from the Foundation of the world….
-Mathew 25:31-34
As we have seen so far, the study of international conflicts and how best
to resolve them, especially by application of international law is a complex issue.
Not only do the raised stakes of belligerent nations and would-be nations conflict
in nature as they do with the law, but also, the dispute resolution processes are
equally full of pitfalls, contradictions, distortions, misconceptions and
misperceptions and other shortcomings—sometimes deliberately and otherwise
out of ignorance on how best to apply the law.
What the following literature sets out to accomplish is that by challenging
the intuition of students and researchers of conflict and international law, they
are called upon to re-examine the literature—from the final judgment of the ICJ
through the reactions from the belligerents and those of other interested
parties—to find out where errors of interpretations (of stakes, evidence) and
application (of the rule of law or diplomacy aimed at arbitration) exist and what
ought to have been done that was not, so that in similar conflicting situations—
say in Kashmir, Tibet, Western Sahara, Palestine and many others, we could
respond better by apply superior reasoning in resolving the disputes and
conflicts.
Students and researchers are also called upon to examine the literatures in
light of arguments advanced in the concluding chapter of this work so as to
properly understand the nature of the dispute, their escalation and causes of
escalation and how best to have them resolved. Students especially are given
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some questions at the end of this chapter to help them reflect on the issues raised
in this work.
I
PRE-JUDGMENT & PRE-EMPTIVE UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMACY
The following section presents literature from media on pre-Judgment UN
Diplomacy in attempting to bring the two lead belligerent nations—Nigeria and
Cameroun, into an understanding that they should both abide by the ruling of
the ICJ and avoid all attempts at resurrecting their stakes and claims, which
could definitely lead to further escalation and jeopardize current stability in the
entire Gulf of Guinea sub-region. They are called upon to abide by the ruling
concerning the peninsula, regardless of whether they win or lose. The ultimate is
the promotion of better and friendly relations between nations far and near. Two
pre-Judgment articles caught my attention. Here re-edited articles and excerpts:
1. COMPROMISE POSITION OFFERED BY AMBAZONIA
Written in April 2001 and published in Cameroun Daily Newspaper, The Post in
May 2001, with a change in the date of publication for “The Rebellion of
Ambazonia, from being the first document to the third—from 1983 to 1985:
AN OPEN LETTER TO CAMEROUN’S PRESIDENT PAUL BIYA:
JUST BEFORE THE BAKASSI PENINSULA DISPUTE BECOMES A
DISASTER FOR CAMEROUN!
By Justice Muluh Mbuh,
Spokesman,
Ambazonia Sovereignty Society North America (AMBASOS-NA).
Your Excellency,
“To them who would not believe the truth and be saved, God sends
into them a strong delusion to make them believe a lie and be
destroyed”
-Gal. 2:10-11
The Republic of Ambazonia (British Southern Cameroons) was reborn in
1984 by His Royal Highness Fon Gorji-Dinka II, Traditional Ruler of the
Widikum people. This was in direct response to your Restoration Law No.
001/84 that Fon Gorji-Dinka’s “THE NEW SOCIAL ORDER” (March 20, 1985),
addressed detailing what was wrong with your Restoration Law as well as with
the attempts at forming the Cameroon Federation, from your predecessor,
Ahmadou Ahidjo to you. Then came his “Letter to Cameroun’s L’etat-Major:
“DEFUSE THE TIME BOMB” (May 5, 1985), followed by the third document,
“THE REBELLION OF AMBAZONIA” (July 11, 1983) which was supposed to
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have served as a confession demanded by your regime while he was locked up
in the Yaounde Brigarde Mixte Mobile (BMM) maximum security Prison. This
third letter still charged Cameroun for annexationist tendencies and beyond it,
revealed your restoration law as a secessionist move—a breakaway from the
attempts at building a truly law-abiding Cameroon (Kamerun) Federation.
Unfortunately for Cameroun and Ambazonians, instead of addressing the
situation as stated, you authorized that Fon Dinka should be arrested and
charged for treason. This later resulted in a Military Tribunal trial in Yaounde
under the Command of General Peirre Semengue, who eventually dismissed the
charges in 1986. In other words, Fon Gorji-Dinka was vindicated—meaning that
his analyses were true. But even though your government placed him under
house arrest from which he escaped into exile, I am sure you and your
government are aware of his uncompromising legal activities intended to deliver
his promise to the Ambazonian people, in the event that there is no Cameroon
Federation.
In this regard, besides the three key documents mentioned in the first
paragraph, just in case you did not know, the following have been our landmark
achievements since the fateful Military Tribunal trials:
(1) Ambazonia Versus Cameroun case held at the Bamenda Cameroun
High Court (1990-1992) with Default Judgment HCB/28/92 of May 1992
in favor of Ambazonia and based upon the estoppel included in the
original summons demanding that Cameroun should evacuate
Ambazonian territory forthwith;
(2) Fon Gorji-Dinka Versus British Foreign Secretary before the Crown
Court in London (1994-1997); Fon Dinka had the British Government
acknowledge that by the Commonwealth of Nations laws to which British
Cameroons (Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons or
Ambazonia) was part, Ambazonian citizens were entitled to British
citizenship until power was effectively handed back to native
Ambazonians after the termination of the Trusteeship. In other words,
since the Plebiscite did not have power transferred to the Native
Ambazonians but had French and Cameroun troops move in and occupy
that territory since then till date, the Trusteeship was wrongfully
terminated and so Fon Dinka and every other Ambazonians (Southern
Cameroonians) are entitled to British citizenship. Accordingly, the
judgment passed in 1997, and in pursuance of that objective, the British
then gave him International Refugee Status in London with joint UN
Protection.
(3) Ambazonia Interpleader Summons at the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) (1994--). In this Interpleader, Ambazonia’s leader, Fon Gorji-Dinka
reliably informed the Court of HCB/28/92 and drew their attention to the
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failed Cameroon Federation, which never ever took off according to the
laws, notably, United Nations Resolution 1608 of April 21, 1961 which
approved the results of the plebiscite and demanded that it should be
implemented according to previous agreements—in this case the
Plebiscite Agreement duly signed by Cameroun’s President Ahmadou
Ahidjo and Southern Cameroons Prime Minister John Ngu Foncha, in
addition to the Draft Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon
(Part of The Two Alternatives imposed by the UN) which was drawn up
in the event that Southern Cameroons opted for the Federation
Alternative.
Your Excellency, Ambazonia has placed the International Community on
notice as to the illegalities that surround the Bakassi peninsula dispute as well as
those that have characterized the so-called Cameroun sovereign territory to
which your lawyers foolishly allege that Ambazonia is inclusive. In invoking the
Breach of Treaty Argument (Plebiscite Treaty) and at the same time asserting
Ambazonia Sovereignty, an inalienable international and human right,
Ambazonia has placed both Cameroun and Nigeria cases and arguments at the
ICJ in great jeopardy. Just as we did in 1985, Ambazonians remain in good faith
to espouse these facts before your very eyes.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) will dismiss Cameroun’s case on
Bakassi on the grounds that Cameroun lacks the legal right to sue Nigeria. As a
result, Cameroun would have to pay for making Nigeria incur military, legal and
diplomatic expenses, which would be in billions of dollars. Meanwhile, had
Cameroun been minded to implement the results of the February 11, 1961
Plebiscite, even as late as now, Cameroun would win the case and it would be
Nigeria which would have to incur losses by paying Cameroun the billions of
dollars.
Your Excellency, your lawyers acknowledge before the ICJ that Bakassi
belongs to Ex-British Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia). Thus, indirectly
confessing that Cameroun has annexed Ambazonia. And that this took place in
1961 in execution of the plebiscite results. This has put the terms of the options
contained in the fifteen paged plebiscite manifesto THE TWO ALTERNATIVES
before the ICJ for interpretation. It is known that your lawyers never read it and
if at all they did, they lacked any understanding of the principles of
interpretation of such documents. The alternatives before Ambazonia are stack:
Ambazonia would either surrender its sovereignty and be absorbed by
Nigeria or join in creating a relationship with French Cameroun Republic where
each State would jealously preserve and exercise exclusive powers over every
aspect of State but submit policies in the eight subjects mentioned in the Pact to
be supervised and harmonized by a federal authority which Cameroun and
Ambazonia would create if the plebiscite results went in favor of that alternative;
136
provided that the draft constitution of such a federal authority would be worked
out:
a) By an international conference chaired by the United Nations and the
Administering Authorities of the previously Trust Territories of
Cameroun and Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons), in this regard the
French and British respectively, to which Cameroun and Ambazonia
would send representative delegations (see UN Res. 1608 GAOR,
especially paragraph 5);
b) The draft itself must then be submitted for approval by the representatives
of the populations of the two countries—Ambazonia and Cameroun.
Your Excellency, you know that no such international conference has
taken place. British archives disclose that Britain worked hard to prevent it ever
taking place because it would end up with a union like the European Union
where each Member State is sovereign. As far as Britain’s Colonial Secretary Ian
McLeod was concerned, as long as little Ambazonia remained sovereign, even in
such a union, it would establish diplomatic relations with, and come under the
influence of Ghana and the Soviet Block. This, according to McLeod’s fears,
would put British investments in the Cameroon Development Corporation
(CDC) at risk. To prevent this, McLeod stroke a “Slave Trade Deal,” which sold
British Southern Cameroons to France to annex to French Cameroun.
Consequently, a contingent of French troops based in Cameroun moved into
British Cameroons and British Troops, which were protecting us, sailed home.
Ambazonia was thus annexed to Cameroun. And that is the position in the
documents before the ICJ today. So the plebiscite on which Cameroun rests its
case did not envisage an annexation but the formation of a CamerounAmbazonia Confederacy. A former United States Diplomat from Louisiana of
French extraction and a lawyer moved to salvage Cameroun, a Francophone
country, from losing out to Nigeria. He had been following the Ambazonia
independence struggle like that of Quebec in Canada with interest.
He postulated that the Buea/Yaounde (the capitals of British Southern
Cameroons and French Cameroun respectively) Plebiscite Pact being a treaty
between sovereigns States could still be implemented without UN involvement if
only Ambazonia were held bound by the renovation of the treaty by the
Cameroun High Court Case Judgment HCB/28/92. The Lawyer contacted
Ambazonia Mission in Washington DC (now Ambazonia Sovereignty SocietyNorth America) which confirmed this. He then contacted the lead attorney for
Cameroun Professor Alain Pellet who agreed that a proclamation jointly signed
by the Ambazonia and Cameroun Head of State creating a CamerounAmbazonia Confederacy would end the illegal position, which Cameroun now
finds itself in Ambazonia. Cameroun troops in Bakassi would then become
troops of the Cameroun-Ambazonia Confederacy.
137
Consequently, Cameroun would then move the ICJ for Nigeria and
Cameroun to withdraw to the boundaries they held before the plebiscite and
pending ICJ demarcation of the line separating them from Chad to the Atlantic
Ocean. The advantage for Cameroun would be that Nigeria has no treaty for
creating a union with any part of British Cameroons whereas the Buea/Yaounde
treaty entitles the two to form a Confederal Union. Given Article 76.b of the
United Nations Charter, the United Nations Trusteeship powers lapsed. It
therefore follows that the plebiscite organized in 1961 was ultra vires in so far as
it was in purported exercise of Trusteeship powers, which had lapsed since 1958.
The result would be that Nigeria would have no right to incorporate Northern
Cameroons into Nigeria at all. But Professor Pellet reported that Cameroun had
rejected his proposal and gave the American Frenchman the phone and fax
numbers of Cameroun’s Justice Minister. All attempts to get Douala Motoume
failed.
Your Excellency, these are legal matters and no one should doubt the
consequences. I am thus making this an open letter so that Camerounians and
Ambazonians should know the truths that surround the so-called “Anglophone
Problem” or anger in Cameroun and expect anything, anytime. The citizens of
both States should know that the opportunity has been offered Paul Biya and his
government to win the Bakassi case for Cameroun and Ambazonia and that even
as late as today he can act appropriately with expected and well scrutinized
results as expected outcome in our favor: get the billions from Nigeria or pay
them eventually. Any refusal of these facts will end up not only separating
Cameroun and Ambazonia and who knows for how long, but Cameroun will
incur another debt in Billions as war indemnity to Nigeria because of stupidity
and shameless greed.
Mr. President, could it be that your men have hidden these truths from
you? If so, then you now know what to do right away. Act now and fast for you
have very little time, as little as perhaps a month or two before Ambazonia raises
its stakes even further. However, if they have told you the truth, but you prefer
the lies which will destroy you and us and put an additional debt of say seven
billion, to say the least, upon your neck, then punishment will not only come
from the Courts but also from above to visit not only Cameroun, you their
leader, and your swindling gangsters but the children and children’s children to
generations without end; for so says the Lord of Host,
“… for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of
the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation
of them that hate me”
-(Exodus 20:5).
138
Believe me Mr. President, while my generation is preoccupied and bent on
breaking tribulations that our elites and the international community have
placed before us, for now be informed and mindful that a treaty that has been
breached can never ever be tended, and to say the least, admitted as evidence in
making claims such as your government has done with regards to Ambazonia
and the Bakassi Peninsula. Let the people know that we were never too antiCameroun not to come to its rescue in the hour of dire need!
2. Nigeria, Cameroon Agree To Settle Dispute Through Negotiations
By Toye Olori 9/16/2002 (Curled from AllAfrica.com)
LAGOS - Nigeria and Cameroon have agreed to settle their long-running dispute
over the ownership of the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula, a 1,000-square-kilometre
string of islands located in the Atlantic Ocean, through negotiations. In an
unpublicized trip to Paris by President Olusegun Obasanjo last week, the
Nigerian leader met with his Cameroonian counterpart, Paul Biya at a parley
initiated, and attended, by Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General and French
President Jacques Chirac. The meeting came a month ahead of the October 19
verdict to be delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague,
The Netherlands, to which the two countries had referred the border dispute for
adjudication. Analysts say the meeting has brightened chances to a quick
resolution of the conflict. Fighting between Nigeria and Cameroon over the
Bakassi Peninsula first flared in 1994, and both countries now have a large
military presence on the island. The two countries have clashed several times
over the peninsula since 1994, when Cameroon asked the International Court of
Justice in The Hague to rule on sovereignty.
A UN statement, made available to IPS this week, says a number of strategies,
including a possible withdrawal of troops from the troubled region, have been
drawn up. President Obasanjo and his Cameroonian counterpart Biya have
resolved to respect the ruling of the International Court of Justice, according to
the UN statement. ‘'Both leaders also agreed on the need for confidence-building
measures, including the eventual demilitarization of the Peninsula, with the
possibility of international observers to monitor the withdrawal of all troops,''
according to the statement. They also agreed to ‘'an early visit to Nigeria by
President Paul Biya; and the avoidance of inflammatory statements or
declarations on the Bakassi issue by either side''. A joint ministerial commission,
comprising Nigerian and Cameroonian officials, will meet in Abuja, the
administrative capital of Nigeria, at the end of the month (September). ''This is a
good development because Nigeria and Cameroon are not just neighbors but
there are thousands of Cameroonians in Nigeria, while we have as many
Nigerians in Cameroon. In a situation where our common border is too porous,
nobody can keep the inflow and outflow of people in check,'' says Bola
Akinterinwa. Akinterinwa, a researcher at the Nigerian Institute of International
139
Affairs in Lagos, says: ''The meeting between the two leaders is desirable for two
reasons; first, we cannot be talking of regional integration and African unity and,
at the same time, talking about division. If we are talking of regional integration,
there is no need for countries to quarrel. ''Secondly, the Lake Chad Basin
Commission to which Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger belong, provides for
political dialogue in settling disputes among member states,'' he says.
Akinterinwa is also happy that France is involved in the move to settle the
conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon.
''We must praise Chirac and Annan for bringing the Obasanjo and
Biya together. Their meeting in France is good because France
never wanted war between the two neighbors because of her
economic interests, especially in Nigeria. Nigeria plays host to
more French investments than any Francophone (French speaking)
country in Africa. French investments in the whole of Francophone
West Africa are not up to French investments in Nigeria and for
France to accept a war between Cameroon and Nigeria is also to
accept the destruction of her investments in both countries,''
--he says, without elaboration.
Tension mounted late June when Ngole Ngole, Cameroon's Minister of Special
Duties at the Presidency, said his country had the might and the will to prosecute
a war with Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula. ''As far as we know, we are
serious. We have the might and the will and the 16 million people of Cameroon
are behind the government to defend the territorial integrity of our country.
Therefore, it is not a joking matter,'' Ngole was quoted by the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) as saying in June. Responding to Ngole's
interview, Olu Agunloye, Nigeria's Minister of State for Defense, warned that
‘'Nigeria will not fold its arms and watch its territorial integrity rubbish by a
belligerent neighbor.'' ''It will be foolhardy and thoughtless for any West African
country to think it can take on Nigeria at this point in time. But we will ensure
that hostilities will not lead to full-blown war, but if it does, Nigeria will be fully
prepared to handle any threat scenario that will arise,'' he told journalists in
Abuja.
The people living on the Peninsula, he said, are Nigerians and that the
government of Nigeria had been administering them since independence from
Britain in 1960. ''Nigeria will therefore, not tolerate any act that will put the lives
of the persons on the land in jeopardy. Anybody who dares this country, does so
at his own risk,'' Agunloye warned. Nigeria and Cameroon will, however, not be
bound by the Oct 19 verdict, as ICJ does not have the instrument to enforce its
ruling, says Akinterinwa. ''The two countries are supposed to abide by the ruling
but there is the issue of unseen circumstances. The residents of the area can say
they want to belong to one side if the boundary is demarcated by the ICJ, and if
140
the country they wish to go with does not agree with them, they can ask for selfdetermination and autonomy,'' he says.
3.
U.N. chief meets with Nigerian, Cameroon leaders on dispute
Daily News: Fri Nov 15,10:15 AM ET
By ALEXANDER G. HIGGINS, Associated Press Writer
GENEVA –
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan met with the presidents of Nigeria
and Cameroon on Friday in a renewed attempt to resolve a territorial dispute
over an oil-rich peninsula. Annan first met separately with Presidents Olusegun
Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon in a Geneva hotel, said U.N.
spokeswoman Elena Ponomareva. The three then had lunch together before
holding formal, joint talks in the United Nations European headquarters,
Ponomareva said.
The U.N. chief, who declined to talk to reporters before the meeting,
arranged the talks after Obasanjo balked at accepting a World Court decision
that upheld Cameroon's claim to the Bakassi peninsula. Obasanjo, who is seeking
re-election next year, said the ruling was "politically too hard for Nigeria to
swallow."
Opposition Nigerian politicians have painted the ruling as a major failure
for Obasanjo. Nigeria's Senate has recommended that Obasanjo "strengthen our
military presence in Bakassi." "Everything must be made to make Nigeria combat
ready," the Senate said in a statement Wednesday.
Annan met with the two leaders in Paris last September and said that they
had agreed to abide by the decision of the World Court, formally known as the
International Court of Justice. But Obasanjo denied making any such promise.
In its Oct. 10 ruling, the United Nations' highest judicial body upheld
Cameroon's claim to the peninsula, which juts into the Gulf of Guinea. The
court's panel of judges agreed with Cameroon that it had been granted the
territory in a 1913 treaty between the German and British colonial powers in
West Africa.
Nigeria maintains the ruling is invalid because it is based on colonial
treaties that it considers illegitimate. It also has accused the court's French,
German and British judges of being biased against Nigeria.
The territory brought the two countries to the brink of war in 1981, and
has been the cause of repeated clashes since then. Nigeria had originally wanted
to negotiate a settlement, but Cameroon declined and in 1994 filed its claim with
the World Court.
The 665-square kilometer (257 square mile) peninsula is in an area so rich
in oil resources that it is often seen as a future alternative to the Persian Gulf as a
major supplier to the United States and other importers.
West Africa, led by Nigeria, already supplies the United States with 15
percent of its oil—about Saudi Arabia's share of the U.S. market.
141
II
ICJ FINAL JUDGMENT
And he that sat upon the throne said, Behold, I make all things new. And
he said unto me, Write: for these words are true and faithful. And he said
unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end. I
will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely.
He that overcometh shall inherit all things; and I will be his God, and he
shall be my son. But the fearful, and the unbelieving, and the abominable,
and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all
liars, shall have their part in the lake, which burneth with fire and
brimstone: which is the second death….
--Revelations 21:5-8
4.
JUDGMENT IN CAMEROON-NIGERIA BOUNDARY DISPUTE
10/10/2002
Press Release
ICJ/603
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE GIVES JUDGMENT
IN CAMEROON-NIGERIA BOUNDARY DISPUTE
10/10/2002
Press Release
ICJ/603
THE HAGUE, 10 October—The International Court of Justice (ICJ), principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, has today given judgment in the case
concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening). In its Judgment, which is
final, without appeal and binding for the Parties, the Court determines as follows
the course of the boundary, from north to south, between Cameroon and Nigeria:
In the Lake Chad area, the Court decides that the boundary is delimited
by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, as incorporated in the
Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (between Great Britain and
France); it finds that the boundary starts in the lake from the Cameroon-NigeriaChad tri-point (whose co-ordinates it defines) and follows a straight line to the
mouth of the River Ebeji as it was in 1931 (whose co-ordinates it also defines) and
thence runs in a straight line to the point where the river today divides into two
branches.
Between Lake Chad and the Bakassi Peninsula, the Court confirms that
the boundary is delimited by the following instruments:
i) From the point where the River Ebeji bifurcates, as far as Tamnyar Peak, by the
Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 (paras. 2-60), as incorporated in the
Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931;
ii) From Tamnyar Peak to pillar 64 referred to in Article XII of the Anglo-German
Agreement of 12 April 1913, by the British Order in Council of 2 August 1946;
iii) from pillar 64 to the Bakassi Peninsula, by the Anglo-German Agreements of
11 March and 12 April 1913. The Court examines point-by-point 17 sectors of the
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land boundary and specifies for each one how the above-mentioned instruments
are to be interpreted (paras. 91, 96, 102, 114, 119, 124, 129, 134, 139, 146, 152, 155,
160, 168, 179, 184 and 189 of the Judgment).
In Bakassi, the Court decides that the boundary is delimited by the AngloGerman Agreement of 11 March 1913 (Arts. XVIII-XX) and that sovereignty over
the Bakassi Peninsula lies with Cameroon. It decides that in this area the
boundary follows the thalweg of the River Akpakorum (Akwayafe), dividing the
Mangrove Islands near Ikang in the way shown on map TSGS 2240, as far as a
straight line joining Bakassi Point and King Point. As regards the maritime
boundary, the Court, having established that it has jurisdiction to address this
aspect of the case ¾ which Nigeria had disputed ¾, fixes the course of the
boundary between the two States' maritime areas.
In its Judgment, the Court requests Nigeria expeditiously and without
condition withdraw its administration and military or police forces from the area
of Lake Chad falling within Cameroonian sovereignty and from the Bakassi
Peninsula. It also requests Cameroon expeditiously and without condition
withdraw any administration or military or police forces which may be present
along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on territories
which pursuant to the Judgment fall within the sovereignty of Nigeria. The latter
has the same obligation in regard to territories in that area, which fall within the
sovereignty of Cameroon. The Court takes note of Cameroon's undertaking,
given at the hearings, to "continue to afford protection to Nigerians living in the
[Bakassi] peninsula and in the Lake Chad area".
Finally, the Court rejects Cameroon's submissions regarding the State
responsibility of Nigeria. It likewise rejects Nigeria’s counter-claims.
Composition of the Court
The Court was composed as follows: President Guillaume; Vice-President
Shi; Judges Oda, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Higgins, ParraAranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby; Judges ad
hoc Mbaye, Ajibola; Registrar Couvreur.
Judge Oda appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge
Ranjeva appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge
Herczegh appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge Koroma
appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ParraAranguren appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge
Rezek appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge Al-Khasawneh
and Judge ad hoc Mbaye append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge ad hoc Ajibola appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court.
III VARIED INTERPRETATION OF JUDGMENT:
143
A. FROM THE NIGERIAN SIDE
5. Aftermath of International Court Verdict on Bakassi: Will Nigeria go to
war?
Weekly Trust Reporters
The long drawn legal, political and oftentimes physical struggle for the
absolute control of the enormously oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula has reached a
watershed. Yesterday, Thursday, the International Court of Justice at The Hague
(ICJ) delivered a judgment that confers sovereignty of the disputed peninsula to
Cameroon
at
the
expense
of
Nigeria.
But even before the verdict was delivered the general opinion among
diplomats, legal experts and political analysts was that whichever way the
verdict goes, will only be the beginning of a second and certainly more
dangerous phase of the eight-year stalemate. Legally the ICJ is the last resort for
both countries. Unfortunately neither country is likely to accept an unfavorable
verdict quietly. This leaves two options: Diplomatic intervention by the African
Union (AU) and physical engagement i.e. war. Because the first option never
worked before under the then Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), there is little
reason to believe that it might work now. The most likely scenario then is that
Nigeria will most likely reject the verdict, damn the consequences and use force
to maintain its current territorial position in the Peninsula. A strong pointer to
this is the request last week by the president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to the
Senate for a N50bn to prepare for "any eventuality" should Nigeria lose out at
The Hague. Although the request was rejected, it was by no means the end of the
matter…..
Perhaps few countries in the world will behave differently from Nigeria.
To begin with, except the verdict, almost everything else that pertains to the
issue is in Nigeria’s favor. Historically even Cameroon did not dispute that
Nigeria owned the territory in question, but was ceded to it through a verbal
agreement when General Yakubu Gowon was head of state, allegedly in
appreciation of Cameroon’s cooperation with the federal government during
Nigeria’s civil war…….
In terms of overall assessment, it is worth noting also that the Nigerian
military is among the most capable in Africa, having being battle tested during
the civil war and a number of impressive outings on peacekeeping operations in
Europe and Africa. All these advantages however cannot undermine Cameroon’s
own singular advantage. It will have the sympathy of the international
community (read Europe and America) on its side. Which raises further
questions about the objectivity of the ICJ.
6.
International Adjudication, the Bakassi Case And Its Aftermath
Vanguard (Lagos)
November 15, 2002
Posted to the web November 15, 2002, By Chidi Odinkalu
144
States involved in contentious cases before the Supreme Court and which
have none of their own national on its Bench are entitled under Article 31 of the
Statutes to nominate ad hoc judges. The quorum of the Court is nine judges. The
judges elect a President and Vice-President from among themselves who both
serve for three years.
The Federal Government was batting on worse than a weak wicket indeed
when it argued in its statement of 23 October "the French President of the Court
and the English and German judges should have disqualified themselves since
the countries which they represent are, in essence, parties to the action or have
substantial stakes. The judges, as citizens of the colonial powers whose action
had come under scrutiny, have acted as judges in their own cause and thereby
rendered their judgment virtually null and void." The fact that Nigeria failed or
omitted to make an application in these terms to the Court during the course of
the proceedings nor raise these as issues in the briefings during the proceedings
can only be taken as evidence of our lack of faith in this as a telling point.
In the light of Nigeria's reaction to the Bakassi decision it needs to be
pointed out that Articles 17 and 24 of the Statute of the Court require judges to
recuse themselves from the consideration of cases in which they have personally
been involved as counsel or in some other personal or professional capacity.
There is, however, no requirement for judges to recuse themselves merely
because the countries of which they are nationals are parties to a case or may
conceivably be interested in a case. It may be added that no such rule has
evolved in the practice of international courts and tribunals. South African Law
Professor and member of the International Law Commission, John Dugard SC,
explains that "the non-recusal of national judges and the appointment of judges
ad hoc are unfortunate practices, rooted in the composition of early arbitration
tribunals, that undermine the credibility of the Court - particularly as judges ad
hoc never, and national judges 'hardly ever' find against their own state." See
John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective, 2nd Ed,
(2000)……
To begin with, it is not clear why Nigeria went into fighting the case to its
logical conclusion if at the highest levels we were typically unprepared to
contemplate loss. Nigeria could have withdrawn from the proceedings after the
Court dismissed its preliminary objections in June 1998 or after the Court
declined to entertain Nigeria's request for interpretation of the preliminary
objections decision in March 1999. This would certainly have been controversial
but not unprecedented.
The United States withdrew from the proceedings in the Nicaragua case
(1986) ICJ Reports 14 after the Court affirmed jurisdiction and overruled the US's
145
preliminary objections. Similarly, France declined to appear in the Nuclear Tests
Cases (1974) ICJ Reports 253 and Iran did the same in the case concerning US
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1980) ICJ Reports 3……….
Nigeria's contention was thus a scorched earth argument that left open the
question of the basis on which the determination of sovereignty over Bakassi
would have had to be made. The logical consequence of Nigeria's claim, after all,
would have been for the ICJ to declare the existence of an autonomous Republic
of Bakassi as the Calabar Chiefs who reached those treaties with Queen Victoria's
alleged representatives so many scores of decades ago could not have
contemplated that they were thereby authorizing what Frederick Lugard and
Ms. Shaw did in 1914. Secondly, Nigeria's position would have had to contend
with the doctrine of preservation of pre-colonial boundaries (uti possidetis)
which was affirmed by Resolution 15(1) of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU ), meeting in
Addis Ababa in 1964. In that resolution, the Heads ridiculously - it must be said
now - described the pre-colonial borders as "a tangible reality" to be recognized
and preserved. Nigeria was represented at that Summit. In the event, the ICJ did
not find it necessary in this case to rely on Uti Possidetis but it said enough to
suggest that had it gone this far, its decision would have been unfavorable to
Nigeria. On Nigeria's claims of effectivités, the ICJ made four telling findings,
which the Federal Government needs to controvert in order to score. In
paragraph 212 of the judgment, the Court says that it is "unable to accept
Nigeria's contention that until its independence in 1960, and notwithstanding the
Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, the Bakassi Peninsula had
remained under the sovereignty of the Kings and Chief of Old Calabar. Neither
the League of Nations nor the United Nations considered that to be the position."
In paragraph 214, the Court asserts, citing a long record of previous acts by
senior Nigerian officials and representatives, that "Nigeria, drawing on the full
weight of its experts as well as its most senior political figures, understood
Bakassi to be under Cameroon sovereignty," explaining further in paragraph 215
that "this common understanding of the parties is also reflected in the geographic
pattern of the oil concessions granted by the two parties up to 1991." In
paragraph 220, the Court finds, again on the basis of evidence adduced by both
parties that "at the time of Nigeria's accession to independence, there existed no
Nigerian title (to Bakassi) capable of being confirmed subsequently by 'long
occupation.'"
After a review of demographic, settlement and migration patterns onto
Bakassi, the Court at paragraph 221 "finds that the evidence before it indicated
that the small population of Bakassi already present in the early 1960s grew with
the influx from Nigeria in 1968 as a result of the civil war in that country.
Gradually sizeable centers of population were established." These are far
146
reaching findings and assertions of fact. It may well be that they are
controvertible. If so, it is up to Nigeria to controvert them. Resort to abuse or ad
hominem attacks on the judges that participated in the proceedings detracts from
this objective. The only remaining point, therefore, is the rather weighty issue of
the fate of Nigerians in Bakassi. Nigerians in general and the Nigerians in
Bakassi in particular may want to ask why the Federal government failed to raise
this issue in the proceedings in the first place where it could have been addressed
with the seriousness it deserves. Nigeria had every opportunity to do this or
counter-claim against Cameroon in terms of an assertion of diplomatic
protection………..
The composition of Nigeria's legal team changed with the color of
changing regimes and some of our best legal minds were excluded from the team
for political or narrow commercial rather than professional reasons.
The Federal government's ill-advised and personalized criticism of some
judges, especially Professor Rosalyn Higgins Q.C., the English judge on the
Court, may have cut more ice had Nigeria not relied so heavily on English and
British lawyers, law firms and researchers in preparing the Case. Two of our lead
counsels in the case were Professor Ian Brownlie Q.C., and Sir Arthur Watts Q.C.,
both English Silks. Professor James Crawford S.C., the leading Australian Silk
who was also part of Nigeria's team is a dual UK national and Director of the
Research Centre on International Law (RCIL) at Cambridge University. Nigeria's
principal instructing solicitors in the case were the London law firm of D.J.
Freeman, while the UK Hydrographic Office and the International Boundaries
Research Unit at the University of Durham did much of Nigeria's cartographic
research. With so much of Nigeria's legal skills, research and representation in
the case derived from Britain, the government's gripe with Professor Higgins is
befuddling to say the least.
Conclusion
Nigeria and Cameroon are not the first countries to disagree over the
unfortunate legacies of colonialism. Several other African countries have had to
resort to the court to settle such disputes. Among African cases, Benin and Niger
and Botswana and Namibia have frontier and boundary related disputes
pending before the Court. Outside Africa, the case concerning the Application
for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case Concerning the
Land, Island and Maritime v Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras) is still
before the Court. In more contemplative moments, it will be realized that neither
Nigeria nor Cameroon can afford any course besides a negotiated settlement of
the Bakassi question. The ICJ decision hopefully clarifies the legal framework
under which such a negotiation may be undertaken. Nigeria cannot afford to
147
disregard the decision as people like Chief Akinjide SAN have advised it to do.
In the light of the decision, most other states will be justified in disregarding
Nigeria's assertion of sovereignty over Bakassi. Precedents for this exist in the
non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Israeli annexation
of Golan Heights and East Jerusalem and South Africa's discredited Homeland
States respectively…….. Nigeria may also choose to litigate the question of
diplomatic protection on behalf of Nigerians in Bakassi. About the future, it is
safe to say, adapting another staunch British colonialist, Winston Churchill,
nearly sixty years ago, that the Bakassi decision is neither the beginning of the
end nor the end of the beginning. Hopefully, it marks a beginning too of the
search for a pacific resolution of the issues arising from Bakassi.
7. Nigeria and the ICJ Bakassi Magouille
Vanguard (Lagos): By Bola A. Akinterinwa
Last month, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that sovereignty
over the Bakassi peninsula should henceforth belong to Cameroun and that
Nigeria and Cameroun should take necessary measures to avoid unnecessary
military hostilities. In a 150-page ruling, Mr. Gilbert Guillaume, President of the
ICJ, said, "the court decided that pursuant to the Anglo-German Agreement of 11
March 1913, sovereignty over Bakassi lies with Cameroun." Consequently, "the
court requests Nigeria expeditiously and without condition to withdraw its
administration and military or police forces from the area of Lake Chad falling
within Camerounian sovereignty and from the Bakassi peninsula." In the same
vein, the court also "requests Cameroun expeditiously and without condition to
withdraw any administration or military or police forces which may be present
along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula or territories
which pursuant to the judgment fall within the sovereignty of Nigeria." The UN
Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, has also asked both countries to take
necessary steps to comply with the ruling of the ICJ. Is this possible? Is it
acceptable to Nigerians? Will it solve the practical problems on the ground? Time
will tell but the ICJ ruling is interesting from many perspectives.
First, it raises the nature and character of the court as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. The ICJ ruling on the Bakassi Dispute is, at best,
very political. It seems to be a resultant of what the French people call a
"magouille", that is a decent fraud and this is not the first time this has happened.
ICJ statutes are part and parcel of the UN Charter. Any member State of the UN
can freely bring a case before it but non-members can still do so subject to the
recommendation of the UN Security Council. Switzerland, which accepted the
ICJ Status on 28 July 1948 and Nauru, were until 1995, the only non-member
States of the UN that were parties to the ICJ Statutes. Before then, Liechtenstein
acceded to the ICJ Status on March 29, 1950, while Saint-Marin did the same on
148
February 18, 1954, being non-members States of the ICJ, the UN Security Council
has the right to recommend that a legal dispute be referred to the Court……..
Additionally, if one takes a closer look at the various pronouncements of
public officials from Cameroun, they have always insisted on their confidence in
the ICJ and that Cameroun would certainly be favored by ICJ ruling. Professor
Ngole Ngole, Camerounian Minister for Special Duties, said last February
"Cameroun trusts the ICJ and sees the process going on right now as natural and
we are hopeful and confident that the proceedings at the ICJ will favor
Cameroun." If there is no politicization of justice, if there is no magouille, there is
no way one would have been predicting with much confidence and correctly the
direction of a court ruling in this particular case. Hence, there is the need to look
at the membership of the ICJ, where they come from and what ideological views
they hold on the matter. There is the need to look at the role of Britain and
France.
Secondly, the ICJ ruling on the Bakassi raises the contradictions between
territory, on the one hand, and people, on the other. There can be land for the
people but there cannot be people for the land. With the ICJ ruling, Cameroun
can have sovereignty over the territory but not over the people. The people in the
disputed area claim to be Nigerians by place of birth and by blood descendant.
They refuse to accept Cameroonian citizenship or to be an integral part of
Cameroun. Thus, they owe their political allegiance to Nigeria.
The implication of this is that Cameroun may decide to use force to push
out Nigerians and then the Government of Nigeria may then be compelled to
respond militarily if its international responsibility to protect its citizens is not to
be queried nationally and internationally. If the Nigerian Government fails to
protect the citizens there, there may be internal violence in Nigeria……..
Thus, Cameroun has always responded one-on-one basis and promptly,
while relying heavily on its deal with General Yakubu Gowon. The question to
address is why would a leader sign away a part of the territory of his country
without the consent of his people? This is the problem of non-accountability in
political governance in Nigeria and this is why Nigeria has always been
entrenched in political imbroglio, going from one problem to the other. At the
international level, the ICJ ruling also raises questions on foreign interests in the
Bakassi and it’s environ. If there is any war between Nigeria and Cameroun
today, the scenarios are likely to favor Nigeria more than Cameroun. Even
though the United States signed a mutual defense and assistance agreement with
Niger Republic in 1962, it will be very difficult for Niger to support Cameroun,
even if again, there is a defense agreement between France and Niger. Niger is
the friendliest neighboring country. It is landlocked and uses Nigeria's ports for
most of her imports. Chad is a house divided against it self, politically. She is not
stable and therefore will have little to contribute even if she chooses to assist
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either party. Considering the francophone factor and the fact that Chad is in the
Central African region like Cameroun, Chad may want to support Cameroun.
Spain signed a military pact with Equatorial Guinea in 1981 and
Equatorial Guinea also asked the ICJ to take into account her own interests in the
resolution of the Bakassi dispute. So, she too has onions to grind with Cameroun.
China, like France, has military assistance with Cameroun and with
Equatorial Guinea under a 1982 accord. China supported Biafra in the past and
may give support to Cameroun in the event of a new conflict. The support from
China cannot be reliable. The role of France seems to be difficult to predict. If we
consider the volume of economic interests in Nigeria compared with Cameroun,
it can be argued that France will prefer to support Nigeria. But if the factor of
cultural ties is considered, France can support Cameroun. But with the
aggressive pursuit of French cultural policy in Nigeria and the deepening crises
in Francophone Africa, it may be in the interest of France to ensure that there is
no war, in order to gain at both levels of Nigeria and Cameroun. Cote d'lvoire is
already a trouble spot for France. Creating another theatre of war in the Bakassi
will create additional headaches for France.
As for the United States, Nigerians are in love more with the people of
America than with the Washington government. President George W. Bush's
policy in Africa is such that American aid may be taken with caution. The US,
because of France's independentist policies vis-a-vis Washington may compel it
to engage in covert support for Nigeria in order to deal with France. There is no
reason why the US would not also want to support Cameroun, at least,
discreetly; Britain and the US foreign policies predicated on double standard. If
the problem of Bakassi exists today, the double standard of the British is a major
factor that explains it. The position of the British will be neither here nor there,
more so that Cameroun is not only bilingual, but has also joined the
Commonwealth. Britain cannot be the friend of Cameroun and the enemy of
Nigeria.
Finally, the ICJ ruling on the Bakassi dispute is more a resultant of
'Magouille' than of law. The nationality of the ICJ President and the European
solidarity in the context of Franco-British relations, especially that Cameroun is a
bilingual State, cannot be ruled out in the final making of the ICJ decision. The
decision has not solved the problem of the habitants of the peninsula, but has
only addressed the issue of who has control over the territory. The specific
interests of the people have not been addressed. The ICJ ruling only opens the
doors of war more widely.
Consequently, African leaders should promptly begin to consider
alternative options to war, like condominium, referendum, internationalization
of the territory, etc. Besides, while the review of the status of colonial frontiers is
desirable, it is also necessary to look at the solution from the objectives of African
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integration. Intra-African war is not consistent with African Unity and
integration. So border community integration strategies may be explored. More
importantly, Nigerians should express gratitude, not only to the late General
Sani Abacha, who took the bull by the horn, by deciding to fight to maintain for
what belongs to Nigeria, but also to Nigeria's panel of international lawyers.
They have done their best but no best can succeed when there is magouille.
8. Ita-Giwa to Bafarawa: Don't Politicise Bakassi Issue
This Day (Lagos)
November 13, 2002
Posted to the web November 14, 2002. By Bature Umar, Abuja
Senator Florence Ita-Giwa has criticized Sokoto State Governor and
Chairman, All Nigeria peoples Party (ANPP) Caretaker Committee, Alhaji
Attahiru Bafarawa over the governor's attempt to politicise the Bakassi Peninsula
issue. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague had last month
awarded the disputed peninsula to Cameroun, a verdict that the Federal
Government said it was not prepared to accept.
Ita-Giwa, representing the people of the disputed territory in the Senate
and also President, Bakassi People's Self-Determination Front, said in a press
statement in Abuja yesterday that Bafarawa's congratulatory message to
President Olusegun Obasanjo for losing the Bakassi territory to Cameroun as
well as thanking him for preparing to go to war is "insensitive."
9. Bakassi: ICJ Judgment, Western Imperialists' Gang Up
This Day (Lagos)
November 12, 2002, Posted to the web November 12, 2002
Did General Yakubu Gowon cede the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon? This is the question that
has agitated the minds of Nigerians since the judgment of the ICJ on the matter. MARY
ONWUCHEKA argues that Gowon had no such powers to do so in 1975
Could the verdict of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] be seen as poetic
justice? A misfortune, which aims to punish Nigerians for acts of Commission and
omission in the successive Federal Governments handling of the conflict from the word
'go'. Gathering from writers who are familiar with the history of Bakassi Peninsula, the
population of Nigerians inhabiting the disputed region is estimated to be well over two
millions. These Nigerians [mostly Efiks and Effiat] have inhabited this region for well
over 200 years. I am now 64 years of age and I remember vividly spending two weeks
with a family friend in the disputed region, when I was 4 years of age - well over 60
years ago.
The pertinent questions one would like to ask the Federal Government are as follows:
Were the inhabitants of the disputed region consulted through referendum before the
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region was purportedly ceded to Cameroon by the Nigerian former Military Head of
State [General Gowon] in June 1975? And during the pendency of the case, was there a
referendum by Nigeria of the inhabitants in the disputed region to determine the wishes
of the people under her control? This would have been a factor in determining the case,
as self-determination and human rights are internationally accepted as norms.
_ Is Federal Government's presence felt in the disputed region? Successive Nigerian
leaders have grossly neglected the disputed region. It has just become relevant because
of the oil and gas in the region. Perhaps if the inhabitants have been well cared for by
Nigeria they would have demonstrated to show they object being ceded to Cameroon
since 1975 and this would have attracted international attention.
_ Was the National Assembly consulted before the Federal Government decided to go to
the Hague and before promising to abide by the ICJ decision?
Nigeria was not obligated to go to The Hague in a matter so crucial to her security,
defense and economic well-being. A diplomatic solution could have been brokered
somehow between Nigeria and Cameroon without going to The Hague.
Even after signing the Bakassi Peninsula over to Cameroon, Nigeria was still in control
and for Nigeria not to have been appropriately equipped with cogent factors in her
defense of the case at The Hague was a grave omission. With due respect to the eminent
lawyers who presented Nigeria's case, it would appear from their submissions and the
judgment that Nigeria did not prepare her case well.
For example, the Lawyers failed to argue strongly against the Anglo-German Agreement
of March 11, 1913, which in modern terms means slave trading of Nigerian citizens to
the Cameroon simply because of an Agreement made by two former Colonial Masters.
Also the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar could have been contacted and made to swear
to an affidavit of 'Oral Tradition' of historical antecedent/ownership of Bakassi
Peninsula. This document could have been another cogent factor in determining the
case.
Re ceding the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon by General Gowon in 1975, one may be
tempted to argue that since the former Nigerian Military Head of State (General Gowon)
was not an elected President by the people, any action taken by him should be
disowned. But then this may be seen as a weak argument. This is because the Military
Government once it ceases to be a de-facto Government and becomes a de-jure
Government (recognised internationally -like General Gowon's regime), its actions or its
inactions are as effective as that of a civilian government. General Gowon's regime was
internationally recognised.
What is important here is whether due process was observed before ceding part of
sovereign Nigeria to another Country. It is my contention that General Gowon did not
observe due process as only the Supreme Military Council - at that time, could have
taken such drastic decision (and there is no evidence to show that was the case). Again
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there was no referendum before the disputed region was ceded to Cameroon. In this
regards therefore, the action of General Gowon is null, void and of no effect as far as
Nigeria is concerned. Nigeria is still in control of the Bakassi Peninsula and so shall it be.
The Federal Government's commitment to abide by the ICJ decision even before the
judgment is an act of commission, which has now thrown everyone into confusion.
Again, apart from what most Nigerians term 'a gang-up by the Western Imperialists'
against Nigeria, the Federal Government's myopic view of the conflict even before the
case went to The Hague, has led to poor operation of the case and the resultant ICJ
judgment.
The best solution now would be to set up a joint commission of Nigeria and Cameroon
over the Bakassi Peninsula, aimed at diffusing tension between the two Countries. War
is not the best option. African Countries must see themselves as brothers and must resist
being torn apart by the external forces who have not got their interest at heart.
10. ECHOES OF BAKASSI PENINSULA
Vanguard (Lagos), November 4, 2002, Posted to the web November 5, 2002
N.U.A. Nwagbara
BUT for the arrogance, non-challance and unpatriotic spirit on the part of
Nigerian rulers, the nation could have been spared the regrets now being
expressed by many Nigerians on account of the ruling by the International Court
of Justice, ICJ, over Bakassi Peninsula. This disgraceful ruling which some
Nigerians call global conspiracy results from the fact that Nigerian rulers took for
granted the size of the rival country, Cameroun, and arrogantly assumed the
posture of a giant versus an ant, not minding that the law is an ass and no
respecter of person, no matter the corporate or size of the individual..
In the first place, Nigerian leaders misfired by involving in legal tussle
with Cameroun, their pet sister nation. Secondly, they failed to register a serious
protest when it was noted that the Head of the Jury was a French national,
realizing the interest of France in particular and the possible influence it could
wield on other world powers. Thirdly, while the case lasted for eight years, the
Nigerian leaders concentrated on personal acquisition and their quota of the oil
boom, rather than concern themselves with the corporate interest, image and
integrity of the nation. Lastly, the Bakassi issue has been totally shaded from
public view, facing the pursuit of who gets what from the nation's wealth.
To the ordinary Nigerian, there has been nothing to show that such
important case that affects the lives of many citizens was pending in World
Court; until the pronouncement of the judgment on the 10th October, 2002. It
was as if nothing was happening amidst the hustle and bustle characterizing the
sharing of the national cake. Indeed, a case of ignoring ulcerous nose to cut an
open teeth or chasing a rat when the house is ablaze!
Already, damage is done. Since the judgment was made public, there have
been chains of reactions echoing the voices of Nigerians all over, either in favor
153
or against the ruling. Some lament the loss, regretting that there is nothing to do
than accept the judgment as it is, since our leaders have allowed it to be so. Some
insist on the rejection of the judgment. Some suggest that the case be represented
to the World Court for a review. Others favor adoption of dialogue with the
Camerounian authorities, while some others suggest arms struggle. Upon the
lamentations, plus the regrets, and all the suggestions, the summary of it is
medicine after death. The bottom line is that Nigeria—the giant of Africa is in for
it. The nation has suffered disgrace due to mismanagement on the part of her
rulers.
Unfortunately, first things are done last in the Nigerian context. It has
been the habit always to prefer fire brigade approach to strategic planning.
Nigerian rulers believe in cure rather than prevention. It is characteristic of
Nigerians to start a search for a black sheep in the dead of the night, to cry over
spilt-milk rather than try to nip the cause of the spillage in the bud. Now that the
damage is done, it is pointless to dwell on the question of who is the cause of this
or that. That would mean wasting more time in finding solution to the already
compounded problem.
How I wish Nigerians could learn from past mistakes, more so, the fact
that if one kills because of anger, the same buries because of stench (Translated
Igbo adage). Here we are, face-to-face with a common problem created by
Nigerians to undo fellow Nigerians; A clear case of repercussion for household
animosity. A lesson that it is folly to throw afar, any valuable that needs to be
searched for thereafter. Again let this serve fellow Nigerians a lesson that a
foreigner can never be dearer than a brother.
Those who talk about war need to realize that wisdom is better than the
weapons of war. Now, it is assumed that Nigeria has lost the legal battle. Yet,
there is the hope that dialogue and diplomatic approach can bring about
amicable solution. Let us try these options to safeguard the lives and the interests
of many of our citizens whose ancestral home is Bakassi.
The world expects to make Bakassi a test-case for the Nigerian leaders,
past and present, who are renowned in the settlement of other countries crisis,
especially, the incumbent President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, well known for
his global connections and who specializes in conciliatory matters. It is time now
to apply same wisdom used to settle volatile issues of other nations. This is a
pure African affair and President Obasanjo is a renowned African leader. Nigeria
is expected to play the role of a "big brother" towards Cameroun, not by war, but
by peaceful negotiation. In the event that a bilateral agreement fails, Third Party
mediation may be sought from among African States, the African Union or the
ECOWAS nations.
It should be strictly noted that any attempt to go into war with the
Camerouns would further debase the status of Nigeria, being a leading State and
window of Africa. Worst still, such war may attract the sympathy of other world
powers in favor of Camerouns, not only because of the country's small size, but
154
also because of their investments in the oil rich peninsula as well as potential
interests.
In this circumstance, the case of Nigeria is rather precarious because,
whether they fight to win Camerouns or fight to lose they would have lost the
battle of integrity, confidence and respect as a leading nation in Africa. By such
war, the glory of Africa will be put in jeopardy. The might of Africa would have
been exposed for a test by the rest of the world.
It is advisable therefore, if Nigeria could discard all manner of pride,
swallow the bitter pills by seeking peaceful settlement with their sister country,
Cameroun. The error has been committed in the past and should not be allowed
to escalate to the point of attracting external forces into a matter that is purely an
African conflict, unless however, if Nigeria is prepared to make Africa a
battleground for the next world war.
Those battle-ready Nigerians should not allow themselves to be deceived
by the more than one battalion Generals now turned politicians, even if they first
advance to the battlefield. Their part is to motivate the masses that serve as
"guinea pigs" both in times of peace and war. It should be noted that any
outbreak of war between Nigeria and Cameroun now should be seen as war
between
Africa
and
the
rest
of
the
world
powers.
11. Massob Protests ICJ Decision On Bakassi
This Day (Lagos)
November 15, 2002. By Okon Bassey, Port-Harcourt
Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra
(MASSOB) has criticized the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at
The Hague ceding the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroun.
MASSOB in its position made public yesterday regretted the judgment
saying "there should be a call for referendum by the Bakassi people to determine
where they want to belong, which is the right of people under the United
Nations."
"The Bakassi people have the right to appeal to the United Nation for the
right to declare a sovereignty of their own since it appears that the people's
interest is not guaranteed in this whole judgment of falsehood delivered by a
jury which know little or nothing about the origin of the people of Bakassi or the
land which they were given to by the creator to inhabit before the advent of
imperialism.
MASSOB described as a ruse the treaty reached between the British and
the Germans over Bakassi in 1913, which is said to be the basis of the judgment.
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The statement by the administrative officer of the movement, Nwamazi
Obinna E. Okoro, said the said 1913 treaty was unlawful unjust, inhuman, null
and void and should not have been used to determine the location of the Bakassi
Peninsular or rather where the peninsular should belong.
"The people of Bakassi did reject the ceding of their land to Cameroun
under the German and did protest to the imperial British colonial rulers, then,
who assured them that the British and the treaty would be abolished not
knowing that it was a gimmick," MASSOB recalled.
It reasoned that the 1913 treaty between the British and the Germans or
the Biafra/Nigeria civil war treaty between Gowon and Ahidjo, were all null and
void since as in the two occasions Bakassi was not a Nigeria territory.
"In 1913, there was no entity called and known as Nigeria, as Nigeria came
to be the following year (1914) through a forceful amalgamation and during the
civil war the land and people known and referred to as Bakassi was under the
Biafra territorial control such that there was no justification why Gowon had to
travel to Marona in Cameroon to sign-off a land which was not under his control
to Cameroon."
The two conspiracies over the people of Bakassi, MASSOB said was now a
nightmare to the locals of the impoverished land of Bakassi where the Nigeria
had never bothered about the welfare of the people at this time as the people
leave in abject penury in the midst of plenty.
"Bakassi like all other Nigerian occupied territories of Biafra which lays
the proverbial "Golden Egg" is facing the same milking and dumping same
melted to the people of Oloibiri in present Bayelsa state where the first
commercial crude oil was struck and Ogoniland in Rivers State where the people
had to be attacked in a full blown war of ethnic cleansing by the Abacha regime."
The body said they have watched with all amazement the inhuman
decision of the international court of Justice, over the "paternity" of the Bakassi
Peninsular; hence, it was expedient to go through the memory length or
historical point of it.
From creation, the Bakassi peoples the movement observed had existed as
Bakassi people and nothing short of that; pointing out that it was during the
Balkanization conference of 1884 at Berlin, Germany, the African continent fell
victim of the European conspiracy of sharing various African lands between
them without minding the danger of separating a people of the same stock from
amongst themselves.
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MASSOP which expressed concern that the coming of the imperial British
and the balkanization which destroyed peace in Africa since 1884, also called on
the United Nations to order for an immediate referendum for the people of the
eastern part of the people of the entity called Nigeria; saying "we and other parts
of the forced nation do not have faith in the present day consummation of the
entity called Nigeria."
12. ICJ Judgment On Bakassi Peninsula Per Incuriam And Faulty
Vanguard (Lagos), OPINION, November 15, 2002, Posted to the web November 16,
2002, Ejike Ume
THE judgment of the International Court of Justice at The Hague was given or
delivered per incuriam, that is, mistakenly. The judgment was based on the
controversial 1913 Britain-German Agreement and the Gowon/Ahidjo
Declaration.
It must be stated directly that none of these two Agreements is binding on
Nigeria, for none was ratified by Parliament of law making organ of the state. A
judgment based on them at the plane of international is therefore faulty. It is a
well-established principle of international law, that a treaty not ratified by the
parliament of a state or the law-making organ of that state is not binding on the
state and it is as bad as not being in existence.
Taking the July 4, 1913 Anglo-German treaty first, indisputable records show
that in July 23, 1884 the United Kingdom signed treaty with the kings and chiefs
of the Old Calabar, the owners of areas which included the Bakassi Peninsula for
their "Protection."
By the order-in Council of November 22, 1913 the Protectorate of Northern
Nigeria and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated into a single protectorate of
Nigeria. The Amalgamation came into force on January 1914.
The Anglo-German treaty of 1913 was signed on March 11, 1913: It follows that
the Anglo-German treaty was signed before the legal persona called Nigeria
came into existence. You cannot bind a legal person with an agreement made
before it came into existence.
After the said treaty was signed, the owners of the land which included Bakassi
led by the Obong of Calabar protested vehemently and carried their protest to
London where they engaged Cathart Wason, MP, to raise the matter at the House
of Commons, which he did.
157
The then Colonial Secretary, Mr. Harcourt was asked whether Her Majesty's
government proposed to transfer the ownership of any land in Southern Nigeria
from the native owners to the Crown or to any other power or dispossess the
natives of their land.
Whereupon Mr. Harcourt categorically replied: "No Sir, the government have
never been made and have never entertained and would not entertain such a
proposal." That categorical declaration by the Colonial Secretary in the House of
Commons of all places was made in 14th July 1913 while the Anglo-German
treaty was signed on March 11, 1913. It follows therefore that the so-called
Anglo-German or Britain-German treaty on which the International Court of
Justice based its decision against Nigeria was not ratified by British Parliament.
This consequently makes the judgment per incuriam or delivered by mistake or
given without a binding legislation or authority. Such a judgment is therefore a
faulty judgment liable to be set aside and on which a person cannot legitimately
levy execution.
This principle operates in municipal law and also operates on the plane of
international law for it is based on legality, equity and good conscience. A
judgment of any court whether international or otherwise should not be based
on wrong premises. Every judgment should be based on natural justice and
should be accurate.
If this judgment were to be at municipal court level, an appeal should be made to
higher court to set aside the judgment having been manifestly given per
incuriam. Again, as the ICJ based its judgment on the Gowon/Ahidjo
Declaration, that judgment is equally faulty in that it was delivered per incuriam.
The Supreme Military Council of Nigeria did not ratify that Declaration, which
was the law-making organ of the state.
Not having been ratified it was not worth the paper that was written. It was not a
binding treaty. It follows that both the Anglo-German so-called treaty of 1913
and the Ahidjo/Gowon Declaration were not valid agreements or treaties on
which any valid judgment can be based.
Equally, as both Britain, France and Germany are clearly interested parties,
participation of their representatives in the proceedings in the Nigeria Cameroun
dispute over Bakassi should operate to vitiate the proceedings on the basis of
contravention of the rule of Natural Justice of Nemo Judex in Causa sua; No man
shall be a judge in his own cause. It is worse that the President of the Court was a
French man. France is deeply interested in the matter. This principle of natural
justice applies in International and municipal courts.
158
Nigeria should therefore refer the matter to the Security Council of the United
Nations to set aside the judgment by resolution, as the ICJ is an organ of the
United Nations. Nigeria can also apply to the ICJ for a review of the case as its
judgment is manifestly per incuriam.
In the light of the foregoing, Nigeria is entitled to remain in the Bakassi
Peninsula and protect her citizens and interests, thereat. Equally, by the principle
of long possession and effective control over long period before and even after
1913, Nigeria is entitled to remain on the peninsula. It naturally belongs to it.
This principle is recognised on the plane of International Law and municipal law.
Even when Britain conducted plebiscite in case of Southern Cameroun in 1961,
Bakassi being recognised as Nigerian territory, no plebiscite was conducted
there.
These compelling facts show that Bakassi is a Nigerian territory. It has never
been ruled or occupied by Cameroun, whether British or French Cameroun.
Again by saying that Gowon gave or ceded the peninsula to them, Cameroun
unwittingly admits that the Bakassi peninsula is a Nigerian territory. For you
cannot be given what is yours. Unfortunately for them the Supreme Military
Council of Nigeria did not ratify the Declaration. Rather it was rejected by all the
Nigerian successive governments ever since.
13.
Britain Responsible for Bakassi Debacle - Ofonagoro
This Day (Lagos)
November 18, 2002
Posted to the web November 18, 2002, by Crusoe Osagie
Dr Walter Ofonagoro, former Minister of Information has stated that the British
are to be held responsible for the unfortunate ruling of the ICJ against Nigeria in
the case of the disputed Bakassi Peninsula. Ofonagoro explained that the British
are responsible for the giving away of the peninsula in 1884 without duly
consulting the authority of the natives of the land.
Ofonagoro who spoke with correspondents at the Murtala Muhammed Airport
in Ikeja at the weekend said when the British were going about the demarcation
of boundary with the Germans in 1885 they wanted the boundary to be at Rio del
Ruy.
Further analyzing the history of the issue, Ofonagoro said Rio del Ruy which
means River ruy in Portuguese, was the last river the British had to face between
Nigeria and Cameroon mountains and passing Calabar to River Ruy you have to
159
cross the Indian river, Ekpeyande river before getting to Calabar river and the
River Cross. River ruy was the boundary, but the Germans thought it was
Southern Cameroon which was German territory given to British to handle for
the United Nations.
In his words, "how do you think they are going to take Bakassi, - Nigerian
territory and dash it without the people living there to say their opinions, what is
sovereignty?, he asked. He explained that sovereignty belonged to the people
and not the land. He said it was possible to transfer sovereignty but not
ownership of the land.
He said that there is need to conduct an opinion poll on whether the people want
to go or not. Speaking on the issue of people in elective positions who seeks
second term he said it was not breach of constitution for them to desire such.
FROM THE CAMEROUN SIDE
14. Cameroon awarded oil-rich Bakassi
Francis Neba, BBC News.
Thursday, 10 October, 2002, 16:40 GMT 17:40 UK
Border disputes can hinder oil developments: The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) has awarded the disputed oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon, rejecting
Nigeria's claims. The court based its decision on a 1917 document between… The
two countries have clashed several times over the peninsula and Cameroon
referred the dispute to The Hague in 1994. The ruling cannot be appealed and
both sides have agreed to respect the court's judgment.
Pride: Cameroon has hailed the court's decision as "a victory for international
law". "This conflict was ripe for resolution," Professor Ngole Ngole, the Minister
for Special Duties at the presidency, told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme.
"As a Cameroonian, it feels great, we are that much prouder that we are
Cameroonian," he added. But the BBC's Geraldine Coughlan in The Hague says
that handing over the peninsula could be embarrassing for Nigeria's President
Olusegun Obasanjo ahead of elections next year. Nigerian troops in the
peninsula were placed on high alert ahead of the decision, reported Reuters news
agency. The BBC's Francis Ngwa Niba in Yaounde says that the people in the
Bakassi peninsula, mostly fishermen, want to belong to a country, which will
take care of them.
Long history: The dispute dates back more than 100 years, when the colonial
powers in the region left the status of the area undecided after agreeing on the
rest of the border between their colonies. Equatorial Guinea intervened in the
dispute in 1999, and asked the Court to protect its rights in the Gulf of Guinea.
The verdict ends eight years of legal battles between both countries, one of the
longest in the history of the ICJ.
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Agreement: Last month the United Nations said the countries' presidents had
agreed to respect the decision the ICJ would reach on the Bakassi Peninsula. Mr
Obasanjo and his Cameroonian counterpart, Paul Biya, also agreed at talks in
Paris to discuss the demilitarization of the peninsula. Meeting in the presence of
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan they agreed not to make inflammatory
statements on the issue, and to consider the possibility of deploying international
monitors.
Oil: The Bakassi peninsula is in itself a swampy strip of land with little value, but
its ownership has implications for fishing and oil rights offshore. Large numbers
of Nigerian and Cameroonian troops are reported to be in the area and tensions
there have been high for years. The British Foreign Office website says travelers
should avoid the area, as "the situation could escalate at any time." More than
150 Nigerians arrested in the Bakassi region by Cameroonian forces were
reportedly freed last month.
15. Bakassi: 'Yaounde Has the Might, Will for War,' By Appolonia Emeanua
This Day (Lagos), February 21, 2002 (Curled from globalpolicy.org/security/docs)
Cameroon's Minister of Special Duties at the Presidency, Professor Ngole
Ngole said his country has the might and the will to prosecute a war with
Nigeria over its claim on the Bakassi Peninsula. Speaking in an interview on the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) yesterday, Ngole said Bakassi is of great
concern to Cameroon. "As far as we know," the minister stressed, "we are serious.
We have the might and we have the will and the 16 million people of Cameroon
are behind the government to defend the territorial integrity of our country.
Therefore it is not a joking matter." He was responding to a question on whether
Cameroon can stand the might of Nigeria should war break out over the
disputed peninsula for which both nations have been at each other’s throat for
about 10 years.
Explaining the rationale behind Cameroon's decision to deploy troops to
the disputed territory despite the dissatisfaction of the soldiers there, Ngole said
although his country does not have a foreign policy of warfare, it is obliged to
defend its territorial integrity by positioning defensive troops in order to check
Nigeria's offensive and aggression. The Special duties minister accused Nigeria
of adventurism concerning its claim on the Peninsula. "Even our Nigerian
brothers know that Bakassi has always remained part of Cameroonian territory.
What has been going on since their invasion of that piece of Cameroonian
territory amounts to nothing but adventurism and we hope that the International
Court of Justice will put an end to it so that the two countries will continue to
enjoy cordial and neighborly relations," he said.
He, however, expressed the desire to see a quick resolution of the Bakassi
case at the International Court of Justice at The Hague. "The sooner the decision
from the international court, the better." He said the decision would make it
possible for Cameroonian troops to return to their normal position. Similarly, he
161
expressed the hope that Nigeria will equally respect whatever decision is reached
at The Hague and get "their troops out of our territory and return to their normal
Nigerian position." When asked whether Cameroon will take it gracefully if it
loses the case, Ngole who was evasive said Nigeria knows that Bakassi has
always remained part of Cameroonian territory. However, he expressed
confidence in the proceedings of the case at The Hague. Speaking further on his
impressions of the proceedings, he said, "Cameroon trusts the International
Court of Justice and sees the process going on right now as natural and we are
hopeful and confident that the proceedings at the International Court of Justice
will favor Cameroon." He said the International Court of Justice will be at the
side of justice and international law and that it will favor Cameroon because
Bakassi is an integral part of Cameroon,' adding, 'and it has been since colonial
time." Furthermore, he said his country wishes to continue to be good neighbors
to Nigeria. "We want to continue to extend our traditional hospitality to over 3
million Nigerians in Cameroon," he stressed, adding, "Our two countries
continue to enjoy cordial diplomatic relations."
Fighting between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakassi area first flared in 1994,
and both countries now have a large military presence there. The two countries
have clashed several times over the peninsula since 1994, when Cameroon asked
the Court to rule on sovereignty. On the other hand, Nigeria contested the case
and also argued that the court has no jurisdiction over the issue. Subsequently,
The International Court of Justice decided that it does have jurisdiction to hear
the case. The dispute dates back more than a-hundred years, when the colonial
powers in the region left the status of the peninsula undecided after agreeing on
the rest of the border between their colonies. The Bakassi Peninsula is thought to
hold significant reserves of oil.
16. SOUTHERN CAMEROONS NATIONAL COUNCIL (SCNC)
MOTTO: THE FORCE OF ARGUMENT, NOT THE ARGUMENT OF FORCE.
The Secretary General of the United Nations,
The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
The President of La Republique du Cameroun
Your Excellencies,
THE BAKASSI SETTLEMENT.
I
By Press reports, the people of the Southern Cameroons understand that
you are expected to meet in Geneva very soon on the Bakassi Question. And we
presume that the meeting is intended to work out a peaceful compliance with the
judgment of the International Court of Justice. While we share your anxiety for
good neighborliness between Nigeria and La Republique du Cameroun and at large
peaceful and harmonious co-existence between States, the people of the Southern
Cameroons, under the banner of the Southern Cameroons National Council,
162
(SCNC)
wish
to
make
their
stand
on
the
disputed territory abundantly clear.
II
Your Excellencies, our position is undoubtedly that of preference for the
Federal Republic of Nigeria to continue to retain the Bakassi Peninsular until the
State of the Southern Cameroons shall be restored. Then we shall ourselves
negotiate the retrieval of Bakassi from the hands of Nigeria, in a process we
believe shall be very friendly and easy as not to require arbitration.
We share a common Anglo-Saxon political culture with Nigeria by virtue
of having been governed by Great Britain together as a single entity for almost
half a century. Our notions of justice and injustice, fairness and unfairness, right
and wrong, truth and falsehood as well as Common law, democracy and Human
Rights are the same. Indeed, we have the same philosophy of life; we do not
dread Nigerians, but share mutual respect and confidence with them. Let it be
known that the Bakassi crisis was sparked off by the lawlessness of the corrupt
Gendarmes of La Republique du Cameroun, who seized babies from Nigerian
women and threw them into the ocean to extort bribe from traders in what is
perceived as a “Conquered Territory”.
III
On the other hand, the people of the Southern Cameroons do not want La
Republique du Cameroun to lay their hands on our Bakassi inheritance. After the
1961 voluntary Unification on a federal basis of TWO STATES of EQUAL
STATUS, La Republique du Cameroun knows how for almost half a century they
have strangled the Southern Cameroons into abject poverty, general deprivation,
degradation and humiliation. Besides, the ICJ did not in its ruling award the
disputed territory to La Republique du Cameroun. Instead, the ruling accorded the
territory to “Cameroon” with “oon”, which is semantically different from La
Republique du Cameroun. The following explanatory argument is in order.
In a case, which the Plaintiff bore the appellation of La Republique
Cameroun, the Court’s change of the appellation in the ruling to simply
“Cameroon”
with
“oon” is indicative. The Cameroon which is the new beneficiary of Bakassi (not
La Republique du Cameroun, the Plaintiff) is the English form of “Cameroun” with
“oun” and “Kamerun” with “run” in French and German respectively. The Court
is obviously referring to the entire protectorate of the German Cameroon as
defined
by the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913. That is the exclusive basis of the judgment.
It cannot be interpreted otherwise. The name “Cameroon” referred to by
the Court in whatever linguistic form could not be referring to La Republique du
Cameroun. The entity of La Republique du Camereoun did not exist as an
international personality until their independence on January 1, 1960. While the
Court’s ruling is referring to the much earlier German Cameroon of 1913. The
territory of the present day State of La Republique du Cameroon was only a
163
component of the global German -Cameroon with its capital in Buea, which
included parts of Tchad, Central African Republic, Congo Brazaville, Gabon and
the Southern Cameroons herself. It is noteworthy that most of these territories
had long ago detached themselves from the global German – Cameroon entity,
and by separate Union Treaties formed independent polities of their choice,
which the court implicitly upheld as acts of Self-determination recognized under
international law.
Therefore, the actual “Cameroon” to which the Court awarded Bakassi is
the residual German Cameroon. That residual territory is distinctly the present
day territory of the States of the Southern Cameroons and La Republique du
Cameroun. Both residual territories subsequently also became independent
separately on 1st January 1960 for La Republique du Cameroun and 1st October
1961 for the Southern Cameroons. (See UNGA document A/4737 of 20th April
1961 and Resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961. It follows that there is no
Successor State to the German Cameroon. Thus, the claims of La Republique du
Cameroun as such are null and void. Since Bakassi is in the Southern Cameroons
and like all other detachments from the German Cameroon of 1913, the Southern
Cameroons had achieved independence, the separate State of La Republique du
Cameroun could only lay valid claims on Bakassi if there was a Union Treaty
between La Republique du Cameroun and the Southern Cameroons based on the
defunct Federal Unification of 1961. But there is no such Union Treaty anywhere.
If it exists, the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) challenges La
Republique du Cameroun to brandish it to the International Community. The
characteristic surreptitious manoeuvres and intrigues of La Republique du
Cameroun against the Southern Cameroons all along have finally caught up with
them.
IV
It follows that Nigeria can not cede the Bakassi inheritance of the Southern
Cameroons to La Republique du Cameroun under the pretext that the “Cameroon”
referred to in the ruling as beneficiary is the so-called successor State of La
Republique du Cameroun.
This logic needs to be understood by the Secretary General of the United
Nations as well as the International Community if the Bakassi question is ever to
be resolved definitively. It is not just the question of how to keep Nigeria and La
Republique du Cameroun from going to war. It is more importantly how to
attribute the Peninsular to its rightful owner as a “Solomonic decision” that
would keep at bay the two belligerent States over a territory they do not own.
Such a disposition would be legality in the true spirit of the ruling, and the
application of preventive diplomacy in its wisest practice.
Long Live the United Nations, Long Live the right to Self-determination,
Long Live the Southern Cameroons.
DONE AT BUEA ON THIS 12TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2002
Dr. Martin Luma
164
National Chairman.
17.
[AMBASOS for APEM] Fwd: Re: [BSCNATION] NIGRIA &
CAMEROON: CURRENT SCNC PRESS RELEASE
Date:11/19/02 3:57:33 PM Eastern Standard
In BSCNATION@y..., "Elias K. Bongmba," wrote:
Dear friends,
I think that this move does not serve the cause and is ill advised. If the BSNation
(Southern Cameroons) seeks a place at the table, they can do so without
surrendering the disputed territory to Nigeria. This request does several things,
which from my interpretation are wrong.
-First, it effectively rejects the ruling of the International Court of Justice.
-Secondly, it (uncritically I believe) problematizes all colonial boundaries which
the court ruled always place Bakassi in Cameroon (even if one wants to read that
as Southern Camreoon).
-Thirdly, this letter ignores pre-independence political alliances (granted those
alliances have been called into question on grounds that Ahidjo negotiated in
bad faith), which resulted in the formation of the defunct Federal system.
Making a claim about the bad faith of the Foumban Accords and the failure of
the Cameroonian political elites to live up to the obligations of those Accords,
which according to some have rendered them null and void, is another thing, but
such claims do not erase the historical fact that at the time Nigeria and Cameroon
took their case to the World court, Southern Cameroon was part of Cameroon,
hence Bakassi by implication was part of Cameroon.
Any resolution of the issues (concerning Southern Cameroons) with
Cameroon would also resolve the Bakassi problem. Finally, this letter is a
political miscalculation of enormous proportions, because the leaders of
Southern Cameroon assume that they will be able to get Bakassi back from
Nigeria through peaceful negotiation. The leaders are not only dreaming, but in
political parlance, by stating that Nigeria should continue to administer Bakassi,
they effectively admit that Nigeria controls Bakassi today because they have
developed the area and created an administrative unit with representation at all
levels of the Nigerian federal system; a submission which Nigerian made to the
world court. This argument was reiterated in one of the dissenting opinions. You
do not own what was not yours just because you have administered it for many
years. Even if we all agree that they may be no harm in letting Nigeria continue
to administer the territory, new arrangements must be made by the United
Nations that would legalize such a process, which might entail creating a new
trust territory.
The leaders who are circulating this letter must indicate how they will get
the land back from Nigeria, and why Nigeria would not want to annex Southern
Cameroons. I may be wrong, but I see a naive assumption here, that because
BSCNation (Southern Cameroons) and Nigeria share the so-called Anglo-Saxon
165
culture, they might be able to negotiate this dispute in the future. The dispute is
about an oil rich land, and I am afraid, culture really does not count as much as it
might have under different circumstances. The dream that there would be a
peaceable kingdom between Southern Cameroon and Nigeria over Bakassi is just
that, a dream.
IV POST-JUDGMENT POST-EMPTIVE UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMACY
He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he which is filthy, let him be
filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still: and he that
is holy, let him be holy still. And behold, I come quickly; and my reward is
with me, to give every man according as his work shall be. I am Alpha and
Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last. Blessed are they
that do his commandments, that they may have the right to the tree of life,
and may enter in through the gates into the city.
--Revelations 22:11-14
18. U.N. CHIEF MEETS WITH NIGERIAN, CAMEROON LEADERS ON
DISPUTE
Fri Nov 15,10:15 AM ET
By ALEXANDER G. HIGGINS, Associated Press Writer
GENEVA - U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan met with the presidents of
Nigeria and Cameroon on Friday in a renewed attempt to resolve a territorial
dispute over an oil-rich peninsula. Annan first met separately with Presidents
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon in a Geneva hotel,
said U.N. spokeswoman Elena Ponomareva. The three then had lunch together
before holding formal, joint talks in the United Nations European headquarters,
Ponomareva said.
The U.N. chief, who declined to talk to reporters before the meeting,
arranged the talks after Obasanjo balked at accepting a World Court decision
that upheld Cameroon's claim to the Bakassi peninsula. Obasanjo, who is seeking
re-election next year, said the ruling was "politically too hard for Nigeria to
swallow." Opposition Nigerian politicians have painted the ruling as a major
failure for Obasanjo…..
The 665-square kilometer (257 square mile) peninsula is in an area so rich
in oil resources that it is often seen as a future alternative to the Persian Gulf as a
major supplier to the United States and other importers. West Africa, led by
Nigeria, already supplies the United States with 15 percent of its oil—about
Saudi Arabia's share of the U.S. market.
19. ICJ Judgment On Bakassi : How Enforceable?
Date:11/21/02 5:23:23 AM Eastern
This Day, (Lagos) ANALYSIS, November 19, 2002, Posted to the web November
19, 2002.
166
The vexatious judgment of the International Court of Justice on the Bakassi Peninsula
attracts the attention of AKPO MUDIAGA ODJE who advises the Federal Government
to repudiate the judgment and retain its physical occupation of the Peninsula, as the
judgment is unenforceable
Since the judicial sad news of l0/10/2002 by way of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment ceding the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, our
nation has once again been thrown into judicial mourning after, with respect, the
Onshore/Offshore Judgment of 5/4/2002….
However, like its municipal counterpart (the onshore/offshore judgment),
the Bakassi judgment might as well be incapable of enforcement. Pragmatism,
they say, is usually the enemy of principles. There is no problem in delivering
judgment or decisions, but rather in their enforcement. It is therefore to the
unenforceability of the International Court of Justice judgment that I now turn.
The Bakassi Peninsula The Bakassi Peninsula is an area of some l,000 km
of mangrove swamp and half submerged islands protruding into the Bight of
Bonny (previously known as the Bight of Biafra). Since the 18th Century? The
Peninsula has been occupied by fishing settlements most of whose inhabitants
are Efik speaking.
Historical Perspective of the Conflict
In addition to the above, the Punch Newspaper of 12/10/2002 at page 4 in its
meticulous analysis of these events captioned "How it all started" provided thus:
"June 1884: The German government proclaimed a protectorate over the
Cameroon
region.
_October 1884: The German government notified other European powers and
the United States of America (USA), in general terms, of the extent of the
Peninsula.
_ June 23 and September 10, 1884: The kings and chiefs of Old Calabar signed a
treaty placing their territories under the protection of Great Britain. Also in
September, other kings and chiefs of the region, including those of Bakassi,
signed treaties, acknowledging that their territories were subject to the authority
of Old Calabar and were therefore also under British protection.
_1885: The Berlin conference recognized the validity of the British claim to the
Bakasi area as the Oil Rivers Protectorate.
_1893: Bakassi became part of the Niger Coast protectorate.
_1900: Southern Nigeria, still including Bakassi Peninsula, came under the
administration of the Colony of Lagos.
_March 11 and April 12, 1913: Agreements signed redefined the maritime
boundary of Akpayofe River, placing the entire Bakassi Peninsula under the
German authority. But the kings and chiefs and of the Old Calabar protested to
the British parliament that it had no right to sign away their territories. They,
however, received the assurance that there was no intention of doing so.
Nevertheless, it appeared that the demarcation of the new boundary went
ahead…….
167
Nigerian experts speak on the unenforceability of the judgment.
In his contributions, the quintessential Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Chief
Afe Babalola, SAN, who for this purpose deservedly earned himself a slot on the
"Quotes of the Week" section of the Punch newspaper of 13/10/2002 at page 12,
observed thus: "The World Court's decision is only advisory, it is not binding
and cannot be enforced. The World Court has no enforcement powers. It is not
like a Nigerian municipal court whose decisions can be enforced by agencies of
the state."
Speaking in a similar vein. Prof. Emmanuel Akanki in the Vanguard
Newspaper of 13/10/2002 at page 2, stated that: "....the ICJ decision was more of
an advice to both countries and not like a decision of a municipal Court which
had stern penalties attached to its default."
From the old testament to the new testament in international law, the
above position remains the same. Thus, the legal colossus, (L. Oppenheim in his
book "International Law: A Treatise" 8th Edition of 1967 at page 440), says that
members of the United Nations are obliged: "...to avail themselves of the
advisory jurisdiction of the Court (ICJ). This is perhaps the reason why the
decisions of the International Court of Justice were not followed and enforced in
the Corfu Channel case - ICJ Rep, 1948 p.15, Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, ICJ Rep,
1951 p.128, interim measures in Anglo-Iranian Oil case - ICJ Rep, 1952 p.93 and
Nuclear Test cases - ICJ Rep, 1960 p.6 (For more, see Introduction to International
Law, 2nd Edition by Prof. U.O. Umezurike at page 197).
Security Council must consent before the judgment can be enforced.
Indeed, for Cameroon to enforce this judgment of the International Court
of Justice, it must get the approval of the Security Council. Thus, Article 94(2) of
the UN Charter provides thus: "2. If any party to a case fails to perform the
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the
other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give
effect to the judgment."….
…….Nigeria should also learn to lobby. You don't just sit down
and be playing politics and cleriving money in Abuja They should
learn some diplomacy and diplomacy does not just mean running
round from capital to capital but actually working out positions
Having people, intellectuals, think tanks to work out these
positions and lobby for these positions. There can still be a political
settlement, which can still protect the interests of the people in the
Bakassi, protect the interests of the people in Cross River State and
protect the integrity of the Nigerian nation through political
lobbying.
168
Implications of the judgment.
It lucidity means that that portion of Bakassi Peninsula as appended to the
map of Nigeria with all its rich natural resources both mineral and agricultural,
will become that of Cameroon. That portion will be excised from Nigeria. Above
all, Nigerians occupying that territory will now owe allegiance to the President
of Cameroon, as they remain politically bastardized.
In addition, the 1999 Constitution has to be amended to remove Bakassi Local
Government from Cross River State as listed in the First Schedule, Part One of
the 1999 Constitution. Thus, the Local Government Areas in Cross River State
will be reduced from 18 to 17. Above all and more devastating is the one
described by the erudite Prof. Bola Akinterinwa, a Senior Research Fellow at the
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)……
The way forward for Nigeria.
(a) Revision of the Judgment……
(b)Diplomacy…….
(c) Self help as a last Resort………
Constitutional duty of all Nigerians in this matter.
The Constitution in Section 24 lists out the duties of Nigerian citizens to include
inter
alia:
"(c) help to enhance the power, prestige and good name of Nigeria, defend
Nigeria and render such national service as may be required."
It specifically obliges us to:
"Respect its ideals.....the National Flag, the National Anthem, the National
Pledge…….”
Conclusion
The Federal Republic of Nigeria and its citizens must therefore rise up to the
occasion to defend her territorial integrity by any means necessary. Indeed, it is a
duty we owe ourselves since we all:
"Pledge to Nigeria our country, To be faithful, loyal and honest, To serve Nigeria
with all our strength, To defend her unity, And to uphold her honor and glory.
So
help
us
God!"
_ Mr. Odje, is the Special Assistant on Constitutional Matters to the Hon. Deputy
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Abuja.
20. Footprints of Potential Confict in the Gulf of Guinea over the sovereignty
of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons):
The Take-Over of Cameroun Embassy in Germany, October 1, 2002.
On Sat, 23 Nov 2002 14:10:18, Valentin Oben in Germany wrote of the Taking
over of Cameroun Embassy in Germany by Militant Youths of the Southern
169
Cameroons Youth League (For more details, see
admin@indymedia.org).
imc-ambazonia-contact-
Well Frank. As October approached we in Germany were trying to figure-out
what could be done. I had recieved some more information about the private
hospital in Baden-Baden. So the discussion was a demonstration either in BadenBaden or in Bonn at the embassy. It was at this level that probably Ayaba told
Smith about things and I remember Ayaba told me Smith thought the hospital
was
a
better
choice
for
a
demonstration.
Background
I attended a meeting of a foundation for support for refugees. And there I had a
discussion with a collegue about how we are are going to continue the work for
refugee rights on country-by-country bases. When we got to Ambazonia (ExBritish Southern Cameroons) and Cameroon. The collegue stated that from his
point of view the German government was going to continue handling the
situation of refugees from both countries with thesame indeference. His reasons
were that the government had interest in the investments of Mr.Biya than on the
case of refugees and also that the general German public is not informed about
the political situation down in the territory. Thus the discussion got into how to
get the German public aware of the political situation down in the territory. That
is how the occupation idea got into the discussion. From here I met with another
collegue who had been an intermediary between the occupiers of the green party
office in Hamburg and the goverment. She explained basically the legal frame on
which these things work. Getting intermidiaries ready before the action and preaction presswork.
Ayaba and myself met in meeting in Dotmund and discussed the issue further
and arrived at the decision the embassy was to be occupied, after all when
countries that are in a union seperate they share jointly aquired property and
Cameroun seceded in 1984 with their law declaring the reinstatment of La
Republique du Cameroun. The next thing was how to mobilise our folks out here
and how to get the necessary press coverage. We agreed for meeting in Ayaba's
house with everybody involved in the SCNC group here. We were both
supposed to write to the mailing list.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SCMG-NOTICEBOARD/message/405
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SCMG-NOTICEBOARD/message/406
May be you want to read this reply that came from Smith at the time. I had given
him a ring to ask him to get information from France about the Baden-Baden
Hospital, as I was hinted that there was enough information in France about this
issue.
170
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SCMG-NOTICEBOARD/message/407.
Friends from a group in France called "No passarant" had written enough about
this whole elf-swindle and I called Smith at one point, gave him the number and
address of "no passarant" office for him to go there for material and contact. He
never did and all I know was Ayaba once said Smith does not like to have to deal
with left-wing people.
At The meeting at Ayaba's home the group out here was hearing the things for
the first time and we tried to discuss the implications and the details of how all
will go. We were able to get details form others who know better how the
embassy is arranged-working hours and others. I had proposed that we make a
video, which will be distributed to the press during the action in this video I had
proposed that we get a lady (traditionally dressed), with the flag behind her
reading a press release that was to be written by us. Paper copies of what she is
reading will be given to the press as well.
Ayaba and I had made earlier drafts and as we started discussing what name
should be used in the text I got seriously offended by a young man who is the
Vice-chairman of the SCNC. This guy has not been doing any political work to
try to push the cause out here if I can put it that flat. He said in the text it will
"Southern Cameroons" and when I ask what makes him think what he said was
the final word he answered me that he was the Vice-Chairman of SCNC
Germany. I got angry about this mistake of duty and power, and I then resigned
like the secretary General of SCNC Germany. When I was about to leave Ayaba
asked me for my own version of the text for the declaration, which I gave him; he
had sent his own text to me by mail. At the meeting it was agreed that we meet
in Kaiserlautern for the last preparation. In Kaiserlauten after the discussions
started we got back to the issue of name. There was disagreement and as it was,
Mr. Vice-Chairman started threatening some young man who tried to give their
opinion on the issue simply because this youngman asked for asylum in the
name of an Organisation called "mountain moaners" for which the SCNC ViceChairman
is
the
President.
Then people started talking about we voting which I saw like a kid’s joke. We
already had an International Conference Organized by SCNC Germany on the
name issue. Here is the link to the online forum that was set-up to permit those
who could not come to Germany share their view.
http://pub65.ezboard.com/bfrankfurtconference
I got angry with all of that and left the group in Kaiserlauten. Yet it was clear to
all seating in the hall that it was a great show to take the embassy. I had already
negotiated with some friends in the media on how to deal with it. "Junge welt"
the second most read left newspaper in Germany had an article in it's first week
171
of September about the political situation in Ambazonia to prepare their readers
for the report of the action when it happens on October first.
I had gone down to Baden-Baden made a video and prepared the feature that is
still on our website (http://ambazonia.indymedia.de) so that if the press wanted
background information they could click in and the German public will know
about the support of their goverment to Biya. That will deter the tendency to use
too much brutality to stop the occupation. For the other news agencies that I
knew but did not have trusted people in them I took an appointment to call them
on October 1 so that I could just call and relay what was happening.
As I left I decided not to go the extra-strains to call this press there or that but I at
least did the feature on the site, rang a few friends with media connections and
informed them when the action started. While they where in the embassy
building and when the police took them from the building I had to ring the lady
from Amnesty and a few political comrades who could spread the word around
the refugee support community (as most of them were refugees). Although I was
out of the issue these were my comrades and this was an action that I conceived.
I remember how I called some people and told them to be there because the
situation was going to have a direct bearing on their rights to be here (in
Germany). That night I wrote an article about the situation, which I sent around a
couple of mailing list:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SCMG-NOTICEBOARD/message/491. And
guest what? The Gentleman who knew about the action at one point or another
in the evolution of the plan suddenly became spokespersons and wrote emails
insulting me. I have enough web time to write as many emails as possible to
make them look stupid. But the question is what benefit does that do to the
whole struggle? I decided not to reply to those two mails because I did not see
how I owe the two guys a response. Just that Smith permitted himself to write
the mail he wrote here in the way he did. I have recieved dozens of mails and
personal phone calls about the issue but I always thought it was not worth
spending time on that incident especially in a public venue. We are along way
from freedom.
V
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: A BAKASSI PHASE II?
From the above analyses, can one safely conclude that even with the
resolution of the Bakassi Dispute by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) many
loopholes were left unfilled and so it is possible that there is going to be a Bakassi
Phase II?
Researchers on international conflict and students and tasked here to find
out these loopholes stating how strong they are and what would be the likely
172
outcome of resolving the dispute the way the Court did in the near future given
the geopolitics of the Gulf of Guinea. Students especially are tasked to draw
conclusions that reflect the demands of international peace and stability giving
reason why this is or is not important.
CONCLUSION
The articles enclosed in this chapter are intended to shed more light as to
how pre-emptive diplomacy from belligerents raise and defend their stakes,
while at the same time seeking meaningful solution to the dispute or conflict
under question. However, between the various claims, there are certain
measurements of historicity, combined with legal and diplomatic endeavors,
which culminate in granting judgment that stands the test of time. Much of the
analyses above are lacking in this perspective, but on the whole, all suggest
dissatisfaction with the ruling of the Court, perhaps with the exception of the
Cameroun side, which is happy to have won and contented, but for how long?
A careful review of evidence, especially from the Ambazonia claims does
suggest that there is every indication to believe that the UN did a poor job in
decolonizing the territory once known as the “United Nations Trust Territory of
the Southern Cameroons Under United Kingdom Administration,” herein as
Ambazonia Republic, and that this is indeed the core of why the ruling will
continue to be under question, unless otherwise, the UN diplomatic endeavors
redress the situation between Ambazonia and Cameroun.
From the pre-emptive diplomacy by the Republic of Ambazonia aimed at
striking some relationship with Cameroun which would avoid a future conflict
of sovereignty and forced annexation between them to the pre-emptive
diplomacy undertaken by the UN Secretary General in bringing Cameroun and
Nigerian Presidents in dialogue, through to the intense reaction from all the
camps after the Judgment was pronounced, there is every indication that in these
tenets full of claims and counter claims, there is the making of a future conflict as
there is the resolution of a current one. What is even more glaring is the fact that
future conflicts may result or come as after-shocks from the ruling of the ICJ,
thus putting the very judgment that is being hailed by some as Just under
scrutiny and doubt, to be challenged and readdressed.
Whatever the onset or continuous escalation from current disputes may
produce in the near future, one thing that came across very clear today was the
fact that colonial treaties, especially those between the British, the Germans, and
the French which demarcated the boundaries between most sub-Saharan states
are still the main instrument of border dispute resolution. In this regard, the
mistakes of the Court in taking into account a treaty that is under breach as
grounds for justifying Cameroun’s claims is definitely what would put the future
of the region into yet, more instability—for the Cameroun Ambazonia boundary
treaty between Britain and France in 1916 has not been addressed, given the
failure of the 1961 Plebiscite for the formation of the Cameroon Federation.
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CHAPTER NINE
EVALUATION
DECISIONS
OF
LEGAL
PROCEDURE
AND
It is an error to imagine that civilization and savage cruelty are antitheses.
On the contrary, in every organic process, the antitheses always reflect a
unified totality, and civilization is an organic process. Mankind never
emerged out of savagery into civilization. Mankind moved from one type
of civilization…to another. In our times the cruelties, like most other
aspects of our world, have become far more effectively administered than
ever before. They have not and they will not cease to exist. Both creation
and destruction are inseparable aspects of what we call civilization.
History.1
I
-R. L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of
SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
The Cameroun versus Nigeria case has evoked a lot of memories—much of
which is not only thought provoking to students and researchers of conflict but
also painful especially to those who hail from that part of the world known as
Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons). From the conspicuous disappearance of
Kamerun through two World Wars and the developments of international law
along with it, it is hard to swallow or pretend on some of the findings in this
work. So far, Chapter one while introducing us to the problem and disputants
under study and how we went about tackling the problem, gave chapter two the
good base for take-off that gave us insights on the nature of international border
disputes, and how these disputes can be resolved by resorting to international
law—in treaties, charters, maps, acts, declarations and conventions.
Overall, this work was structured in such a way as to provide a
comprehensive understanding of the nature of the disputes and conflicts in
general, their historical evolution from onset through escalation, resolution and
arbitration, and above all else, their relationship to the political leadership threats
and international law, as they relate to claims made by disputants. Thus the
work blends conflicts, international law and the contemporary political realities
of the disputants in an effort to establish who should exercise sovereignty over
the Bakassi peninsula. The blend that comes out of the methodology and
statement of problem, together with the central role of Cameroun to this dispute
equally makes the Republic of Ambazonia Interpleader to play a central role in
highlighting evidence and arguments which when contrasted with those of the
two leading belligerents—Nigeria and Cameroun, succeeds to booster the
position of the ICJ and its Judges in their effort to resolve the disputes. The work
has equally not shied from presenting a gruesome picture of the human rights
situation in both Nigeria and Cameroun, which in effect, supports the argument
174
that the disputes are driven by elitist greed, regional and ethnic tensions and not
by the national interests of both nations.
Chapter two then drew on many examples of precedent, treaty
interpretation, and evaluation of claims of disputants. Evidently, the most
striking case was that of the Temple of Preah Vihear. The example showed the
importance of pre-existing agreements to the resolution of any border dispute.
More specifically, it gave credence to treaties as important instruments in
international law. Worth noting also is the literature review, (implicitly) which
gives the reader a base for understanding the seemingly intricate arguments
advanced by the disputants. An analysis of the claims of the disputants was done
in relation to the position of the Judges on how best to defend and apply
international law and conflict literature. Analysis of conflict from an African
perspective added more flare to this.
Chapter three dwelt on the contribution of colonialism to the conflict
under study. In tracing the development of international law, it focused on the
ICJ as the adjudicator of most border disputes. The link between colonialism,
self-determination, border disputes and international law was established and
examined to show how principles of international law are used to supplement
the dispute resolution process.
The fourth chapter focused on the evolution of the Bakassi peninsula
dispute from the onset to escalation point. The chapter also linked historical
issues to efforts aimed at delimitation, punctuated by armed incidents that show
the potential development of a protracted conflict. In highlighting the various
treaties that demarcated the boundaries during the colonial era, the chapter also
hints on contemporary post-colonial influences that shape the dispute—notably
the role of the French. The Anglo-German treaty of 1913 emerged as the most
important document on which the ICJ may have to rely. The treaty also shed
some light on how Ambazonia came to exist and upholds the premise that a
"material breach" of the plebiscite treaty by Cameroun occurred and that this
breach is at the core of the current disputes, irrespective of Nigerian claims.
Chapter five took us many steps backwards in time as we examined
philosophical analyses of “Truth” and “Justice” and the purpose of it when we
are confronted with problems between nations or between the governors of
nations and their inhabitants, as of the magnitude we have examined herein. The
literature presented from philosophers of old to modern day servants of truth
and other intellectuals are the bases of arguments in chapter nine which debunks
positions raised by articles and the weakness of the ICJ Judgment in chapter
eight.
While chapter six gave us a contrasting three-sided story of claims, it
nonetheless lends credence to the historic treaties examined especially in the
fourth chapter. Claims of disputants were examined in relation to international
175
law literature. The work specified the basis of claims of each disputant—whether
they were based on cession, prescription, contiguity, discovery or conquest—
though none of these determinants can singularly be used to grant claims of title
to territory.
Chapter seven then took us a step further by tackling the legal aspect of
the dispute. It emerges with the contention that there is a legal dispute in the
Bakassi peninsula and all else is secondary—notably the Lake Chad area and the
delimitation of the maritime boundary between the States. A notable
development (which is equally secondary) is the argument presented by Nigeria
on the possible involvement of a third state, which as we have noted, has
emerged in the person of Equatorial Guinea. The chapter also laments on the fact
that the efforts of Ambazonia to become a party to the case are being
undermined by the ICJ. Finally the chapter shows that the dispute over Bakassi is
secondary to that over the sovereignty of Ambazonia as a whole. Thus the focus
in this last chapter is not only to respond on the ICJ ruling and the barrage of
counter-charges emanating from the Press, especially those of Nigeria, but also to
evaluate the claims of disputants in terms of legal arguments they raised, as
opposed to the judgment and the Ambazonia Republic response that follows
below. This would, I believe, shed more light to the fact that the claims of
Ambazonia Republic should have been taken much more seriously that the
Court seemed to have performed.
Chapter eight in presenting pre-Judgment initiatives by Ambazonia and
the UN Secretary General to ensure peaceful co-existence between the
belligerents, especially Nigeria and Cameroun, also presents the Judgment itself.
In addtion post-judgment UN diplomacy by Secretary General Kofi Annan is
treated as postings with other articles from concerned observers—some in the
public service of their nations and others as simple reporters. Others clamor for
the disrespect of the ICJ Judgment while others in showing the consequences of
disobedience on the part of the vanquished suggest alternatives such as the
intervention of the UN Security Council to moderate the ruling. Unfortunately,
misrepresentations and misperceptions continue to abound as we expose them in
this conluding chapter. For the most [part, our arguments here are critical of the
Judgment, the role of the ICJ Judges and some of its officials in influencing that
particular outcome and the UN position, regardless of post and pre-Judgment
literture. Central to the critical analyses are the Interpleader Summons of the
Republic of Ambazonia suppressed by the Court from becoming part of the bulk
of arguments raised in claiming sovereignty of the unfortunate peninsula.
As we would equally see after the Ambazonia Republic response to the
ICJ ruling, the position adopted by Ambazonia is supported by legal arguments
from Judges, political actors, scholars and arguments backed by the UN Charter
and the ICJ Statute. Furthermore, the remainder of the chapter is as informative
and reflective of chapter five and the position taken by philosophers and
176
Nigerian Learned Judges, Journalists and other high level officials committed to
serving the world with truths for the good of all mankind.
II
THE RESPONSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AMBAZONIA FOLLOWING
THE ICJ RULING ON BAKASSI PENINSULA BORDER DISPUTE
REPUBLIC OF AMBAZONIA
(UN TRUST TERRITORY OF THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS)
AMBAZONIA PEOPLES EMANCIPATION COUNCIL (APEC)
WASHINGTON, D.C., P. O. BOX 148
Washington, D.C. 20044-0148
November 24, 2002
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan
3520 Secretariat Blg.,
Ist Ave., New York, NY, 10017;
US Secretary of State Colin Powell
US State Department,
2201 C St., NW,
Washington, D.C. 20520
Your Excellency,
MEMO:
REACTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AMBAZONIA ON UN DIPLOMACY
FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA FOLLOWING THE
ICJ RULING ON BAKASSI
Service to the re-colonized peoples of The Republic of Ambazonia (UN
Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons Under United Kingdom
Administration) demands that we again draw your attention to the most potent
threat to peace in the Gulf of Guinea sub-region, wherein lies the Bakassi
Peninsula on which the ICJ recently ruled—the Sovereignty question
surrounding the illegal annexation and occupation of Ambazonia by Cameroun
(La Republique du Cameroun du 1er Janvier, 1960!). We applaud your endeavors to
ensure that Nigeria and Cameroun abide by that ruling, whatever its
shortcomings—for the ruling was in line with our historic boundary with
Nigeria. We however demand that the UN take urgent and dissuasive measures
to equally ensure that beyond the boundary issues which Cameroun has with
Nigeria, the Bakassi ruling apart, Cameroun should equally respect their
boundary with Ambazonia as from the Anglo-French Treaty of 1916 up till
whence she became independent without Ambazonia on January 1, 1960.
177
Your Excellency, the ICJ Ruling gave the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to a
certain Cameroon Republic—perhaps as per “a certain Western Cameroun”? by
which Cameroun claims in her Application to the ICJ, she went into union
following the UN-Sponsored Plebiscite of February 11, 1961. While it does not
beat our imagination which “a certain Cameroun” Cameroun republic was
referring to, it certainly does when the ICJ follows the lie, blindly without any
cross-examination to determine its efficacy. The obscurity of that ruling and the
French-sponsored intrigues that masterminded it, we are afraid would
jeopardize every effort you are making to ensure peace and security in the Gulf
of Guinea, to the very least, between Cameroun and Nigeria, unless such efforts
defuse the eminent Ambazonia War of Liberation against Cameroun. The
regional implications are stark and for now unimportant or secondary to the
sovereignty question over Ambazonia Republic.
In anticipation of your upcoming meeting with the Head of States of
Nigeria and Cameroun, we again wish to draw your attention to serious
discrepancies, which befall the ICJ ruling, and which leaves to interpretation
issues which surround the dispute between Cameroun and Ambazonia. Rightly,
the Court ruling which centered on the Anglo-German treaty of 1913 was
preposterous, supposedly shoving into our throats some imaginary Cameroon
Federation or what? It was lacking in it dedication to truth in the service of
Justice, unbiased: the said treaty does not tell by which treaty Ambazonia
became a Protectorate of Cameroun! Given that German Kamerun is defunct—
thanks some more to French incredulity—for they violated the Mandate System
laws by unilaterally annexing portions of Kamerun to Chad, Central African
Republic the Congos and Gabon on the Eastern and Southern borders of
Kamerun. Kamerun boundaries while remaining the same with Nigeria, changed
due to the said Plebiscite Treaty of October 30, 1960, by which a Constitutional
Order-in-Council had been promulgated into law at Buckingham Palace,
England in anticipation of the imposed union of British Cameroons (Southern
Cameroons or Ambazonia and Northern Cameroons via the tautology of “Two
Alternatives”) with either of their neighbors! Since the Anglo-German Treaty
was between British-ruled “Nigeria” and Kamerun, Nigeria’s boundary with
Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia ought and should be the determining factor
as to how the boundaries of the successive states, Cameroun, Ambazonia and
Nigeria were altered, to the effect that Cameroun leaves her boundary at
independence to claim Bakassi is ridiculous! Lets be clear on that.
Following the defeat of Germany by a combined French and British force
during World War I, another treaty between the victors or conquerors divided
Kamerun between themselves (Anglo-French Treaty of 1916). This treaty was the
basis upon which Cameroun attained separate independence and was admitted
to the UN as such on January 1, 1960, leaving the fate of the UN Trust Territory
of the Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia Republic) and Northern Cameroons
which had not even attained self-government, to be decided by a UN-sponsored
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Plebiscite on February 11, 1961, which results were approved by yet another UN
effort, UN Resolution 1608 of April 21, 1961.
When Cameroun submitted to the Court that it should exercise
sovereignty over Bakassi by way of the said plebiscite, Ambazonians believed,
and service to Justice demands that the Court examines that evidence. La
Republique du Cameroun, which instituted the case against Nigeria, is a fraud in
modern imperialism if the recent ICJ ruling that grants the peninsula to
“Cameroon” is taken to mean “Cameroun.” How could it claim bilingualism and
yet submit to the Court documents only in French—leaving Nigeria to translate
them into English, pointing out hundreds of errors in them, yet claiming that her
right to exercise sovereignty comes as a result of the merger of “a certain Western
Cameroun”—Anglo-Saxon Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) with Cameroun?
Did Cameroun, the UN, and Administering Authorities of the Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons) honor the terms of the post-plebiscite UN Resolution
1608?
The answer to the above questions is NO, a thousand million times NO!
Therefore, the legally just thing to have done would be to not only begin
understanding this multi-facet dispute by examining the terms of the AngloFrench Treaty of 1916 and the true boundaries of Cameroun thereof, but also the
claims of Cameroun that the plebiscite was the legal instrument that gave her
sovereignty over Bakassi and preposterously, over all of Ambazonia (Southern
Cameroons). The ruling of the Court is ambiguous and open to ridicule unless
otherwise the UN Security Council re-examines the ruling and ensures that:
1. Cameroun respects that said plebiscite,
2. Withdraws from Ambazonia to her boundary at independence,
3. Re-instates the Government of the Cameroon Federation and
4. Make necessary payments for illegal annexation and exploitation of
Ambazonia now for forty-one years, during which all Ambazonian
corporations have been destroyed or under threat of destruction, creating
a dependency atmosphere by which Ambazonians pass as subjects of
Cameroun but are treated worse than Serfs in pre-revolutionary France.
No such humiliations have been of recent memory than that as late as last
month when trucks loaded with Cameroun citizens were transported to
the Ambazonian city of Victoria (Limbe for Camerounization concept)
where Cameroun has been mining our riches with impunity, to work at
the refinery in the face of applicants from Ambazonia who were not only
beaten but humiliated in front the entire world; and that,
5. Unless otherwise we all agree that by breach of treaty arguments,
Cameroun should totally withdraw from Ambazonia so that we could all
consider the said treaty as terminated! Let Cameroun make the choice
now.
Cameroun is not, will never be a colonial master of Ambazonia. We decry
the silence of the UN over this matter and state here, clearly, without pretense
179
that Cameroun Republic is security-threat-nation to the peace and security of the
Gulf of Guinea and that unless humbled, as humble as we want Iraq and North
Korea to become, there is every indication of a long and protracted conflict
brewing in the Gulf of Guinea sub-region—for the simple fact that the
decolonization process of the Republic of Ambazonia went bad from the date
which Trusteeship was terminated. To the above facts, we testify thus:
That Trusteeship was terminated on October 1, 1960 and that by
Trusteeship laws and UN Charter and Resolutions in favor of Colonial and Other
Peoples (1514-xv) Ambazonia was supposed to attain unfettered independence
on the same date;
That the UN abandoned Ambazonia for Cameroun to annex with ease by
a string of deliberate errors and today ruling or claiming that Bakassi belongs to
Cameroun; this is not only humiliating but insulting to academics and the law of
nations;
That Cameroun having destroyed the government of Ambazonia in
breach of the Treaty of Union went ahead and imposed a United Republic of
Cameroun on our people in May of 1972 and that reverted to her name at
independence in 1984—the Republic of Cameroun, as indicated by her
Applications to the ICJ, which sparked unprecedented revolt by Cameroon Bar
Association President Fon Gorji-Dinka as being unconstitutional and by it also
came the creation of, and the formalization of the independence of The Republic
of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons), to say less of Albert Mukong as Prisoner
Without a Crime for which Cameroun has made reparation via Human Rights
Court in Geneva for stating similar facts;
That this Revolt of Ambazonia (1985 March –July 11) earned Fon GorjiDinka the 1986 Prisoner of Conscience award, especially since he was the first to
be tried and set free by Cameroun’s Military Tribunal in 1986, by which action
Cameroun authorities and legal system admitted that Cameroun had by
reverting to the name Republic of Cameroun effectively seceded from the
Cameroon Federation, regardless of the shortcomings of the Federation itself;
That Ambazonia did propose renewal of the terms of union with
Cameroun, (See The New Social Order, March 1985) but that continuous
harassment of Ambazonians including and especially their elite, forced Fon
Dinka to institute a case against Cameroun in the Bamenda Cameroun High
Court and won by default of an uncontested Estoppel (HCB/28/92);
That Twelve elites of Ambazonia equally secure a legal victory against
Cameroun’s ICJ Claims via Nigeria’s High Court, under the banner of Southern
Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO). The case was instituted against
Nigeria’s behavior with Cameroun (failing to say the facts as they are and
instead falling to Cameroun lies that Ambazonia is part of Cameroun) and the
judgment ensures and demands that Nigeria should stop treating Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons) as part of Cameroun (FGN/ABJ/CS/30/2002);
180
That given that these cases and events pre-date the ICJ Judgment, the
Court ruling over Bakassi is therefore under serious threat of misinterpretation
by all parties concerned, inasmuch as there is no dispute from the Ambazonia
Republic over the utilization of the 1913 Treaty, there is one over the
unimplemented UN Resolution 1608 of April 21, 1960 following the plebiscite by
which results Cameroun claims and is awarded Bakassi;
That Ambazonia Peoples Emancipation Council (APEC) again wrote to
the Special Committee on Decolonization, Fourth Committee and UN Security
Council copying your Office, the President of the ICJ, UNHRC, Her Majesty The
Queen of England, German Chancellor, US States Department, Amnesty
International USA, US Foreign Relations Committee on January 29, 2002, seeking
audience and drawing their attention to the facts herein and the security threat to
the Gulf of Guinea on which Ambazonia Republic happens to find herself;
That the UN should find evidence of intrigue and abuse of international
law from the fact that the Republic of Ambazonia’s Interpleader Summons to the
ICJ through the Good Offices of the UN was forced out of the case illegally and
in breach of Court Status and rules;
That testimony to this French-ICJ President Conspiracy exist in exchange
of letters between Ambazonia and the Registrar of the Court Edwardo ValenciaOspina who in suppressing the Interpleader claimed to be “acting on behalf of
the President of the Court” of July 18, 1994, and September 9, 1994; US
Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright to Congressman Tim Penny of July
13, 1994 and September 14, 1994; American University Law School Students to
the ICJ in 2000 demanding the re-instatement of Ambazonia Republic’s
Interpleader Summons;
That more evidence does exist in the UN terms of “The Two Alternatives”
to the peoples of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) during the plebiscite days,
from American and British Declassified documents concerning the Trust
Territory of the Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia), Reports of visiting Missions
to the Trust Territory, which all show evidence of treacherous and malicious
behavior by parties concerned with decolonization of Ambazonia, all in bad
faith;
That the oil-riches of Bakassi, which are part of the motivating factors for
Nigerian and Cameroun claims notwithstanding, the rule of law ensure that the
territory should belong to the rightful owners and that Cameroun occupation is a
vice which begs on Ambazonia for a War of Liberation. The UN should do all in
its power to ensure that this does not happen: Cameroun will leave only after
war kills close to half of Ambazonia’s population or more. As for leaving the
territory, they will, they must and it is a matter of when, not how;
That we again draw the attention of the United Nations to the call by both
Attorney David J. Scheffer (January 23, 1992) and His Serene Highness Prince
Hans-Adam II Von und zu Liechtenstein, Head of State of the Principality of
Liechtenstein (September 26, 1991) who submitted separate memoranda to your
181
offices calling for the revision of the Trusteeship Council due to the growing
concerns of self-determination—prompted for the most part by glaring
discrepancies that exist in the decolonization of many states, such as the case of
the Republic of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons);
Sir, to these facts we testify without fear or favor, while our masses rot in
circumstances imposed on them by international political and legal
misrepresentations: Bakassi is a moral conflict and the law demands a restoration
of such high level of morals from both belligerents to Adjudicators and Judges.
Ambazonia is the challenging factor to international law and community that
will more than determine to what extent, reasons and level nations abide by
international law and how they serve each other. Any failure on the part of the
UN to consider the Ambazonia Interpleader Summons now in attempting to
hold Nigeria and Cameroun to be at peace with each other will boil down to
what Eric Hobsbawn (1994) in Age of Extremes calls “photo exercise-summits,”
and will fail to serve the cause of humanity, the peace and security of nations and
how they relate to one another properly—for a War cloud hangs over
Ambazonia-Cameroun Relations more than it does or ever did over Bakassi. The
morality of international law demands that for crimes against other nations and
peoples, such as breaches of treaties, breaches of peace, acts of aggression and
threats to peace, (Art. 39 of The Charter) nations ought and should be
punished—Nullum Crimen Sine Poena—No Crime Without Punishment: Cameroun
Republic must not be an exception!
By Justice M. Mbuh
Secretary General, Ambazonia Peoples Emancipation
Council (APEC), Washington, DC, USA.
ambazonia@indymedia.org; ambasos@yahoogroups.com;
scmg.noticeboard@yahoogroups.com; www.ambazonia.com
bscnation@yahoogroups.com
III
NEW EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY OF THIRD CLAIMANT'S CASE
Perhaps it is important to reexamine the Third State's argument to refute
the notion that not only States should be actors in the ICJ. Fitzmaurice Gerald
(1960), an international law expert, has argued that there is no single definition
that can be used to identify third parties for all purposes. Thus, he noted in the
Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties that: "Admittedly, this term (third state/party) is
not in itself a very satisfactory one. It is imprecise, and strictly inappropriate only
for the case of bilateral treaty."2 This means that third party can be any body or
person outside a bilateral relationship, either when there is a treaty or “at the
commencement of some legal proceedings, or occurring through events such as
the outbreak of armed conflict.”3 Thus, in line with international law, the third
party can either be “an individual or group of individuals, whatever view is
preferred, where a state has entered into a treaty on behalf of an individual, or
182
group of individuals, it is self-evident that those individuals have an interest in
its performance or non-performance.”4
Accordingly, one may argue that the defendants at Nuremberg were third
parties to the treaty of London that established and granted jurisdiction to the
military tribunal. Given that the defendants at Nuremberg were individuals
who were representatives of a defunct state and government, it is hard to see
how this cannot apply in the case of Ambazonia, given her historic evolution. In
this light, the Court is not right to have hampered the effort of Ambazonia to
become a third or even fourth claimant to the case, on the basis that only states
are actors.
Christine Chinkin (1993), a scholar of international law, has argued that in
the event of conflict over a treaty, a third party can either object to having its
interpretation or non-interpretation imposed on it. Third party objections can
and usually are strong in:
The areas of treaty law, international judicial and arbitration
procedures, and responsibility for an international wrong with
particular reference to armed conflict…at first sight, these may
seem rather disparate areas for the drawing of generalized
conclusions… these areas of law illustrate the importance of the
degree of coercion as between the parties inter se, and between the
parties and a third party in determining the appropriateness of
third party responses. Third party responses may in fact be what
distinguish consensual and coercive relationships between states.5
In addition, Chinkin argues, “an unwilling respondent may claim that the
dispute is wider than that presented to the forum, in that third parties are
involved, and that the claim should not be considered in their absence. 6
Admission of Ambazonia's case is guided by the fact that as a state that already
exercised limited sovereignty, as opposed to, and besides Trusteeship status
prior to the unfulfilled promise of granting of independence, international
organizations and the most powerful nations on earth conducted discussions and
signed treaties protecting it as an entity. Therefore the breach of such
international agreements and treaties makes it incumbent on parties that were
involved to respect them or be forced to abide by the failure of the process by the
international organizations and legal body. These are facts that other parties to
the Bakassi peninsula dispute have failed to present and which can only be
brought to the attention of the ICJ by Ambazonia to aid it in establishing a
holistic picture of the case—for the establishment of a truly Just and
unchallengeable decision. Should that not become the ultimate demand from
those who pursue and uphold the law?
Alternatively, the Ambazonia Interpleader can be seen as partly
mediational and partly self-assertive. Mediationally, the Interpleader is a call to
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both Cameroun and Nigeria to disarm, disengage each other’s army and fall back
to their respective boundaries at independence. Alternatively, the Interpleader
asserts Ambazonia’s new image as an international personality, legally and
democratically distinctive from the state that once was subjected to a nonfunctional Federation with Cameroun, and the desire to become a nation on its
own. This is due to the failure of the UN proposed federation to truly care for the
needs of its subjects, or to successfully live up to the terms of the Federation
Treaty or Plebiscite Pact. This position is supported by the documents of the
Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG) in Cameroun, headed by Albert Mukong.
On the Ambazonia problem they write,
The “Southern Cameroons” are a people and were created as such
by the UN…Hence the Plebiscite of 1961 on self-determination. It
cannot be said that the whole issue was foreclosed in 1961…Quebec
in the Canadian Federation…on the issue of separation even after
over 200 years since the existence of the Canadian Federation. The
attitude towards the “Southern Cameroons” stinks of racial
discrimination.7
In citing Article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), which states, "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality," Mukong lamented that “Southern
Cameroonians,”
Were arbitrarily refused the right of their nationality by questions
put forward in the plebiscite… They have been forced into a
nationality, which they never opted for. Indeed the Republic of
Cameroun was only a partner in the Federation they desired to
form and which was partially realized in 1961. At no time did they
even contemplate becoming citizens of La Republique du Cameroun,
least of all…an assimilated colony of La Republique du Cameroun.8
Ambazonia's case presents what one could rightly term “suppressed
evidence,” which is not only directly related to the Bakassi peninsula dispute,
but is also challenging to Cameroun as a nation state, the UN as the proponent of
peaceful resolution of disputes (according to Article 1 of the Charter), and a
challenge also to the ICJ and all the Treaties, Declarations, Conveentions,
Agreements and Proclamations that propagate the use of international law to
settle disputes of this nature. It was and is by such embodiment of laws—the law
of nations—that Ambazonia has lived since colonial times, grown and secures
her uniqueness amongst states, represented or unrepresented.
From the heated exchanges between the Ambazonian Delegate-General in
North America and the ICJ Registrar (that we saw in chapter seven especially), it
is not hard to understand the reasoning of the Ambazonians and their charges
that the International Court of Justice was or is in breach of the statute for either
184
attempting to, or has successfully precipitated or suppressed vital evidence,
which if taken into consideration, could have long settled the disputes with
greater ease, clarity and certainty. Nothing supports the Ambazonian position
more than the provision of the Statute of the International Court of Justice itself.
Ironically, the Registrar and perhaps the President of the Court had either
deliberately or mistakenly avoided the portions of the Statute that were most
relevant to the Ambazonian case. The Registrar, on July 18, 1994 in a
communiqué to the Republic of Ambazonia cited Article 62 and 63 of the statute
in denial of Ambazonia’s right to Interplead. On September 9, 1994, the Registrar
vehemently stated the position of the ICJ on the Ambazonia Interpleader,
claiming to be acting on behalf of the President of the Court, he said that the
Court will no longer respond to any correspondences from Ambazonia or any
affioliated groups from thence hence.
IV.
EVALUATION OF ICJ STATUTE
The Statute of the International Court of Justice is divided into four
chapters: (I) Organization of the Court, (II) Competence of the Court, (III)
Procedures, and (IV) Advisory Opinions. Each of the chapters is divided
according to their distinct functions. Chapter One deal with the election of
judges and composition of the Court—from members of the Court, to the
President, Judges—emphasizing their relationship with each other and with the
General Assembly and the Security Council. It also sheds light on the
relationship of states which are non-members of the UN to States which are, and
their role in given cases. With the exception of Articles 22(2), 24(1), (2) & (3),
most decisions to be arrived at shall be so done by the Court and not the
President of the Court. In Articles 22 & 24 where the President is given special
powers, the exercise of these powers is limited to his relationship with the Judges
and the Court. Specifically, these Articles note,
22. (2) The President and the Registrar shall reside at the seat of the
Court.
24. (1) If for some reason, a member of the Court considers that he
should not
take part in the decision of a particular case, he shall
so inform the President.
24. (2) If the President considers that for some special reason one of
the members of the Court should not sit in a particular case, he
shall give him notice accordingly.
24. (3) If in any such case the members of the Court and the
President disagree, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the
Court.9
Chapter II is of even greater interest to the Interpleader of Ambazonia.
Under this chapter, the competence of the Court is discussed. Articles that
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immediately come to mind in strengthening the Ambazonia case include Articles
34(3), 35(2), 36(2), 37, and 38(1). However, Articles 34(3) & 37 come across more
strongly than the others in that they relate the case of Ambazonia to its origins,
while Article 38(1)(d) accord the Ambazonian leader, Fon Gorji-Dinka, by virtue
of his qualifications as the Doyen of lawyers of Cameroun and Ambazonia, the
right to singularly intervene and be heard by the Court.
Specifically, Article 34(3) states,
Whenever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public
international organization or of an international convention
adopted thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the
Registrar shall so notify the Public International organization
concerned and shall communicate to it copies of all written
proceedings.10
This is revamped by Article 37, which states that,
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a
matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of
Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be
referred to the International Court of Justice.11
Both articles stress the idea that because Ambazonia, by every indication,
is a question that emanated from the League of Nation’ Mandated Territory and
things were made worse by the interpretations given to the right to selfdetermination by the United Nations General Assembly and the Trusteeship
Council and how best to terminate the trust to Britain, Ambazonia has not lost its
rights as a state upon which the international organizations have to deliberate.
Ambazonia cannot be blamed for the badly terminated Trusteeship of the
“Southern Cameroons” or even worse, the non-implementation of the UN
Resolutions pertaining to the union with Cameroun, which uses it to claim the
Bakassi Peninsula falsely. What this calls for is not continuous neglect and
attempts at suppressing vital evidence, but that as per Articles 34(3), the Court
and the President of the Court should have referred the Ambazonia Interpleader
to the UN Security Council or as per Article 50, “entrust any individual, body,
bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of
carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion.”12
Similarly, under the procedure of the Court, nowhere is there mention
that the Registrar of the Court, can “acting on the instructions of the President of
the Court” determine the admissibility of any case, let alone tell any Applicant
whether or not their Applications or Summons are communicable, admitable or
and acceptable. Thus, the Ambazonian leader acted both in his capacity as leader
of a movement legally recognized by the Cameroun government and legal
system (Ambazonia Movement and Cameroun High Court Case with default
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Judgment HCB/28/92 and by the failed plebiscite treaty and the statues of
“Southern Cameroons” as a UN Trust Territory), and as per the provisions of
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute, which states that, “subject to the provisions of
Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the
rules of law,” shall be taken into consideration.
Therefore, what is at stake here is not how Ambazonia interpleaded,
which is what the President and Registrar of the Court want us to believe, but
rather, the manner by which they handled the Interpleader. According to the
Statute, the Court and not the President and the Registrar of the Court should
have deliberated upon the matter. By handling the matter the way they did, they
certainly drew our attention and gave room for their actions to be interpreted as
a deliberate attempt to suppress vital evidence in breach of the Statute and Rules
of the Court. If the Court had made the decision not to admit the Interpleader, we
believe that such a decision or denial would have been accompanied with a
Court Order stating explicitly why they turned down the Interpleader, and not
leaving such a situation at the mercy of both an incomputent or coerced Court
Registrar to decide based on some imaginary theory and so leaving researchers
to second-guess on the issue. Besides, rejection could have been on certain
grounds and does not, by itself, constitute a neglect of the evidence the
Interpleader contained. In other words, the matter has many other avenues by
which it could have been addressed, short of a cheap and unnecessary apology
from the Court Registrar.
The problems posed by the Ambazonia question must have been
envisaged when the conditions of admission of a state to membership in the
United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter) became the subject of Advisory Opinion
of 28th May 1948. From the said Advisory Opinion, we note,
The Court is not called upon to define the meaning and scope of the
conditions in Article 4 of the Charter, on which admission is made
dependent. It must merely state whether these conditions are
exhaustive. If they are, a member is not legally entitled to make
admission depend on conditions not expressedly provided in the
article. The meaning of a treaty provision has thus to be
determined, which is a problem of interpretation.13
Though this opinion was made in terms of admission of a new member to
the UN, the interpretation goes even further when we link it to the reasons for
turning down Ambazonia’s Interpleader in the Case before the Court. What we
deduce from this Advisory Opinion goes beyond attempts to answer the
question posed to it in terms of the meaning and scope of Article 4, to the fact
that in trying to answer the question, the Judges tried as hard as possible to make
a functional link between all organs of the UN as to the fact that disputes arising
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from interpretation and issues surrounding the UN itself could be solved by
approaching a wide array of openings—from the judgment of the Security
Council and the General Assembly, to the very last resort, the Members of the
Organization. Precisely, the Opinion noted,
It does not, however, follow from the exhaustive character of
Article 4 that an application is precluded of such circumstances of
fact as would enable the existence of the requisite conditions to be
verified. The Article does not forbid the taking into account of any
factor, which it is possible reasonably and in good faith to connect
with the conditions laid down. The taking into account of factors is
implied in the very wide and elastic nature of the conditions. No
relevant political factors, that is to say, none connected with the
conditions of admission is excluded.14
We have drawn on these arguments to show that by basing the denial of
Ambazonia’s intervention on the fact that the state, even though it claims legality
from the Cameroun High Court, is not a member of the UN and as such not a
signatory to the Statute, the Registrar and President of the Court upon whose
behalf she/he acted, erred. Could their error be interpreted therefore, as
meaning that Ambazonia is still a Trust Territory, or that since Cameroun did not
honor the Plebiscite treaty, (an act that constitutes a legal breach of treaty), it
(Ambazonia) is still part of Cameroun and if so, under what circumstances? The
functional link between the political organs and the legal organ of the UN have
been established in such a way as to enable the legal organ to be flexible in giving
interpretations and searching for answers to international disputes. In this
regard, the Advisory Opinion concludes, “there is no conflict between the
functions of the political organs and the exhaustive character of the prescribed
conditions.”15
Therefore, what Ambazonia’s Interpleader presents is its antecedent rights
against those of States, which are currently members of the UN and parties to the
Statute. Clearly, and from every argument presented thus far, the Court has
moved far, too far to the left, and by so doing, it is transforming the international
legal institution into some kind of dictatorship, which completely fails to address
the issue surrounding conflicts for the sake of rendering unbiased justice, and for
the sake of promoting and ensuring international peace and security. There is
every indication, especially upon reflecting on the charges by the Ambazonia
Delegate-General, that international law, in spite of all its provisions, has not
moved forward even one tiny bit in the direction of addressing justice. The
international legal system is thus heavily flawed by political allegiance and or
partial influence of the Judges. And even worse, the fact that the UN fought so
hard to prevent or better still suppress the issue of Self-Determination as raised
by the Principality of Liechtenstein (Statement at the Forty-Sixth Session of the
General Assembly of the UN) of September 26, 1991. No other case supports that
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position and expose the glaring attempts at suppressing UN wrongs than that
which is presented by the Republic of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) on
behalf of her peoples now walloped by Cameroun’s oppressive and curroption
promoting polity.
The importance of the Ambazonian intervention cannot be undermined in
this case, especially since the Plebiscite Treaty, with all its malice, made the very
remarkable distinction between the union of the Northern Cameroons with
Nigeria and the union of Southern Cameroons, (herein as Ambazonia) with
Cameroun. We recall that the former was a union that absorbs the other party
and the latter a union that protects the sovereignty of the “two equal” states
(Southern Cameroons and Cameroun) in a confederal structure. Accordingly,
this work has confirmed the Ambazonia position that the dispute over her
sovereignty is at the core of the Bakassi peninsula dispute and resolution of this
dispute is primordial in determining who should exercise sovereignty over both
the peninsula and the entire Ambazonia territory. Note should be taken that all
the maps (see Appendix I-X) together with the treaties place Bakassi in the
territory of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia). How well Nigeria and Cameroun
lay claims to this territory is the pending question in this work, still unanswered
even with the ICJ verdict.
For example, appendix VI indicates that the demarcation of the
international boundary between former Southern Cameroons and Nigeria ended
between King Point, as its western border on the Nigerian side and Bakassi Point
on its eastern border on the Southern Cameroons side. Logically, the
demarcation of the maritime boundary will follow from where this treaty of 1913
line ended, through the thelweg strait down the Calabar River Estuary with
James Town and West Point (see appendix VIII) as its western end and Bakassi
Peninsula as its eastern end, with the boundary running equi-distant between
them, then into the Atlantic Ocean, without any curves. What this does is that it
confirms the historic fact that Bakassi belongs to the Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia). Similarly, Appendix V, a French Map, does indicate that the
international boundary between Cameroun and Southern Cameroons at the time
of the Plebiscite in 1961 ended where the River Mungo empties into the Atlantic
Ocean or better still into the River Wouri Estuary near the City of Douala, at the
eastern flanks of the Ambas Bay from which the Republic of Ambazonia got her
name, as opposed to River Wouri or the “river of prawns” (Rio dos Cameroes)
from which Cameroun got hers.
How then can the questions of how Cameroun’s boundary extended to
Bakassi and King Point not become central in its claims over the Bakassi
Peninsula? In other words, any attempts at answering this question will put the
Court and disputants right into the heart of the suppressed Ambazonia
Interpleader, which holds more evidence than the Nigeria and Cameroun
Applications put together. Therefore, until the disputing parties, the UN, and the
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ICJ recognize the identity of Ambazonia, the ruling of October 10, 2002 that gave
the peninsula to “Cameroon” definitely sowed the seeds for Ambazonia now to
embark on a war of independence with Cameroun Republic. Consequently, one
should not be surprised if tomorrow the ICJ decision is moderated by an
Advisory Opinion from the UN Security Council to put to an end the case
between Ambazonia and Cameroun by admitting the former as a new member
of the UN General Assembly, with or without the restoration of the Cameroon
Federation. From every angle of analyses herein, the ruling that the peninsula
belongs to “Cameroon” can be interpreted to mean to the “Trust Territory of the
Southern Cameroons Under United Kingdom Administration” or the Republic of
Ambazonia. Cameroun has still not proven her case right.
V.
IMPORTANT OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In going through the arguments presented by the parties to the case, this
work comes up with the following observations and recommendations:
We have observed that by the use of the name "Cameroon" the Court in
their October 2002 ruling is either discounting the seriousness of the relationship
of the Cameroon Federation to this case over the Bakassi peninsula, or
deliberately playing it down, while at the same time giving room for the
development of a more deadly conflict. It should be noted however, that the
Federation, though it only lived a short political life for some eleven years,
neither had a constitution that was duly approved by the Assemblies of the two
Cameroons as was required by the Plebiscite Treaty of October 13, 1960, effected
by the votes of February 11, 1961, nor had the endorsement of parties named in
UN Resolution 1608 (xv) of April 21, 1961 that approved the results of the
plebiscite in the UN General Assembly. Thus, the Republic of Cameroun having
seceded from the Federation on two instances (its name-changing tactic) cannot
lay claims on territory, which is supposed to have been protected by Federal
Authorities or which lies on the other side of its original borders at independence
on January 1, 1960. The Federal authority, as far as Ambazonia and Cameroun
are concerned, does/did not exist. Therefore the use of "Cameroon" instead of
"Cameroun," which is the name Cameroun's Application to the Court bears, is
preposterous—being seen as based on the assumption that Cameroun is that
“Federal” or “United Republic” that was supposed to have been the outcome of
the treaty of union—and by implication stating that the matter has not yet come
to closure.
Similarly, we should not fall pry to the lie that the present Cameroun
practices bilingualism and so it is all right to use either spelling. In legal terms,
there are no such links! Cameroun thrives on falsehood and fraudulent behavior
and its leaders must not be taken seriously. For instance, if Cameroun were truly
bilingual, why did they not present their Case to the Court in English since they
were dealing with an English-speaking country (Nigeria)? Or why did they not
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equally produce an English version of their Application? The Court must not
continue to buy this falsehood.
We have equally seen that the Ambazonia case is not new: it is well
documented in tens of petitions now on file at the UN and in the Courts in
London, where the Ambazonian leader in exile, Fon Gorgi Dinka, took Britain to
task in his immigration case, and in Cameroun's legal system which passed a
judgment recognizing Ambazonia and demanding that Cameroun withdrew its
troops from the said territory. We can also see traces of a future conflict in the
region coming from the Nigeria High Court in Abuja, where the Southern
Cameroons National Council (SCNC) equally secured a victory against Nigeria
that it should stop treating Southern Cameroons as part of Cameroun Republic.
Another development includes the fact that many Ambazonians are now in jail
for participating in a Signature Referendum sponsored by the Cameroon
Anglophone Movement (CAM), which upheld the position that Ambazonia
should be independent of Cameroun, since the latter seceded from the federation
of “two equal states.”
The case in the Cameroun High Court which recognized Ambazonia in
1992 (Judgment No. HCB/28/92) ordered Cameroun to withdraw its forces of
occupation from Ambazonia or be forcefully expelled. Therefore, the judgment
(HCB/28/92) is central to the claims of Ambazonia that Cameroun has no
boundary with Nigeria over the Bakassi area and that the case should be
dismissed as a fraud. As the Ambazonia Interpleader has shown, Ambazonia has
petitions pending in the United Nations against Cameroun, and that until the
UN decides the fate of the Ambazonia territory, both Nigeria and Cameroun
should be seen as trespassing on international organizations' property.
Cameroun High Court Judgment No. HCB/28/92 States inter alia,
i) That the failure to organize a referendum to approve the draft
Federal (Cameroon) Constitution had rendered the said draft
invalid, and so the act of union between Cameroun and Ambazonia
was null and void ab inito,
ii) That Cameroun is guilty of aggression for illegally and forcibly
occupying Ambazonia,
iii) That all persons whose presence in Ambazonia derives
authority from Cameroun are expelled from Ambazonia, and
iv) That Ambazonians (who now form about 27% of the Cameroun
civil and military service) are with effect from the Day of Judgment,
discharged of any duty of obedience to Cameroun, and the
Judgment makes them answerable only to the Ambazonian Head
of State thereafter.16
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Another finding which came across very strongly through out this work
was the fact that from the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913, the Anglo-French treaty
of 1916 & 1919, the Mandate to Trusteeship Systems and accompanying
Agreements, through to when these were supposed to be terminated by the
Trusteeship Council and the Plebiscite Treaty of 1960 (distinct from the actual
Plebiscite which held on February 11, 1961), Bakassi has always been part and
parcel of Ambazonia (see maps of Appendix I-VIII). Nigeria having been part of
the process through which the Ambazonian state evolved, and having had other
disputes with the said boundary, should have been one of the first witnesses to
denounce this dispute involving Cameroun as illegal, given that the terms of the
Plebiscite protected the international boundaries of Ambazonia. This means if
Nigeria has problems along the Bakassi border area that need redressing, the
right authorities to deal with are those of Ambazonia and not Cameroun, which
by virtue of its violation of the plebiscite and the judgment of its own High Court
is not supposed to maintain any presence in the said territory.
Nothing is in support of this trend of argument more than the fact that
Nigeria, in contesting the Obudu Cattle range at the time of independence had
no such legal dispute or claims over Bakassi whose sovereignty was well known
to be part of then Southern Cameroons. At the time Nigeria contested the Obudu
cattle range, the Bakassi peninsula was not part of Nigeria and the Nigerian
authorities knew this. Contesting Bakassi after 1980 is supportive of the fact that
oil and many other vital resources have been discovered in the area, and that this
action (conquest) is not allowed by international law.
In these regards this work recommends that it would be prudent if
Nigeria should recognize Ambazonia (even based on the HCB/28/92 Judgment
of the Cameroun High Court) and submits an Interim Order to the ICJ to that
effect. That way the case may automatically come to a close.
We can also observe from the findings of this work that the Cameroun
authorities can be seen accusing Nigeria for denouncing her commitments in
agreements such as the Maroua Declaration—but coming to terms with the
discussions in this work, Cameroun presented to the Court treaties against and
together with Nigeria after the collapse of the Plebiscite Treaty, or when such
treaties are under serious breach, for Cameroun, because of her own desire to
become an expansionist power westward, deliberately failed to implement. The
plebiscite was an international treaty. Thus between the plebiscite (between
Cameroun and Ambazonia or Southern Cameroons) and the Maroua Accord
(agreements between Cameroun and Nigeria over Bakassi), which is more
important? If Cameroun cannot honor the Plebiscite treaty, which came first, and
which is of greater international significance, what makes her to think that
Nigeria must honor its engagements with it? The plebiscite treaty was an
international understanding born at the United Nations while the Maroua
Accord was simply a bilateral treaty with very little international significance, to
192
say less of its ungentlemanliness—for Gowon now denounces it as having
nothing to do with Bakassi but rather the Southern Cameroons! Ridiculous, is it
not? In addition, does not the simple fact that Cameroun manipulated and
violated the Plebiscite Treaty (which has implications on its claims over Bakassi)
make it questionable as to how both nations developed their claims for the
territory given that at independence neither nations had Bakassi nor all of
Ambazonia as part of their territory?
Conversely, Cameroun should recognize Ambazonia, then restore the
federation as of 1961 or some form of a loose confederation, with a bilateral
agreement to defend the territories of both states, before proceeding with the
case against Nigeria. That, (in recognition of the findings in this work) is the only
other alternative that falls short of Nigeria recognizing Ambazonia, and
demanding that the Judgment of the Court which favors Cameroon
ambiguously, should be interpreted to become signioficant as far as Ambazonian
charges are concerned. That is the surest way of ensuring peace and stability in
the Gulf of Guinea. It would be a delusion for all other observers and Cameroun
authorities in particular, to think that because the Ambazonia versus Cameroun
dispute has not met with counter military responses from the Ambazonia side,
this means that the Ambazonians are not aware of, or are incapable of
undertaking the military alternative in defense of the severity of their case.
Concerning the Court's ruling (that Cameroun and Nigeria should
withdraw their forces to positions held when Cameroun first brought the case to
the Court's attention), after the February clashes, it is regrettable that one may
see this action as instead promoting and prolonging the conflict. In other words,
the ruling seems to suggest that the Court has indirectly ruled that already
conquered territory belongs to the conquerors. The legal interpretations of this
action makes it to be questionable as to how this will eventually translate into a
lasting peace or provide answers to other questions that surround the dispute
(such as the sovereignty of Ambazonia). On the contrary, the most legally and
prudent thing the Court should have done would have been to rule that both
nations should withdraw their forces to their boundaries before or at their
separate independence. We recall here that Articles II, 1 (c & d) and III, (3) of the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity stresses the maintenance and
defense of these international boundaries inherited from colonialism. It does not
in any way ascribe to conquest and illegal occupation or manipulations of the
laws and treaties as a viable option for acquiring legal title to territory; for
expanding or reducing the size of any African nation.
Nothing more than justifies the illegal involvement of the two leading
belligerents in Bakassi than the argument advanced by Cameroun at the close of
its Application when it charged, on March 15, 1996, that the Federal government
of Nigeria has violated and is violating international law, or better still, the
fundamental principles of respect for frontiers inherent from colonialism (uti
193
possidetis juri). This is more of a contradiction on the part of Cameroun
authorities, besides being a testimony on behalf of Ambazonia’s Interpleader
Summons.
The results of a ruling demanding a return of belligerent forces to their
borders at independence would have done two things:
1. Created a vacuum of Ambazonia's territory, Bakassi inclusive 9United
Nations Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons Under United
Kingdom Administration—which Trusteeship was poorly terminated as
the pleiscite not only compromised the territory’s independence but also
was directly in contradiction of UN Charter Article 76b, and Trusteeship
Agreements for both Southern Cameroons and Cameroun, the questions
of the Plebiscite Treaty, which Cameroun singularly violated apart, and
2. Uphold the law as the only reliable option for resolving the dispute—a
lesson to other similar disputes all over the world, and by which we
strengthen, not weaken the role of the UN and her affiliated organs in
conflict resolution and adjudication.
This would have made it obvious that Cameroun, which attained separate
independence in 1960, has no boundary with Nigeria south of the territory of
former Northern Cameroons under British administration. The logical and
legally viable result would have been the end of the dispute and perhaps a
renewed effort by Nigeria and Ambazonia to resolve the matter of delimitation
of their common border through bilateral talks, or attempts by Cameroun to
redefine and try building another Federation—which of course is not a legal
imperative.
Furthermore, the question of a maritime boundary between Cameroun
and Nigeria will equally be neutralized, and the delimitation could also resume
normal bilateral talks involving the states that share a common boundary, and
not under conflict or even legal conditions or terms. It is disturbing, however,
that the countries presently seen as primary parties to this dispute seem not to
care much about the international waters between them. Taking Ambazonia and
Equatorial Guinea, (outsiders) for instance, it is well understood that the distance
from Limbe or Victoria in Ambazonia to Malabo, capital of Equatorial Guinea by
sea is about 40 nautical miles. Would it not be blatant disregard of international
law if States fail to come to a simple understanding over such a small stretch of
water, or is it the small power-big power competition that is troubling them?
While Cameroun thinks Nigeria is muscling her, Equatorial Guinea and
Ambazonia think the same of Cameroun. Certainly some nation is causing
trouble in that Sub-Saharan region!
We have equally established that delimitation of the Maritime boundaries
between the disputants (Cameroun, Nigeria, Ambazonia and Equatorial Guinea)
could best be done after the situations between Cameroun and Ambazonia and
194
that between Cameroun and Nigeria have been clarified. Already, we have
observed that settlement of the dispute between Ambazonia and Cameroun
could greatly reduce the tensions over the maritime and land boundaries because
not only would the length of the borders between Cameroun and Nigeria be
reduced but the same also holds true for the maritime boundary between
Cameroun and Equatorial Guinea.
This work has equally established that the border dispute between
Cameroun and Nigeria is now an opportunity to either redress the entire
situation between the Cameroons or let the Cameroun government use it as a
design to completely neutralize the existence of the state of Ambazonia. This will
be the case in that once the Court rules that Bakassi belongs to either Nigeria or
Cameroun, or should it come up with some compromise solution of either
sharing the peninsula or joint exploitation of the resources, or that a referendum
be held, as Nobel Laureate, Professor Wole Sonyinka, proposed in his October
16, 1998 speech at a rally in Lagos, (when he returned to Nigeria from exile),
Cameroun's claim of sovereignty over the entire Ambazonia territory would
have been sealed. This would raise more questions as to the efficiency of the
international legal system and plunge the region in to greater conflict rather than
resolve them.
Any compromise solution may be seen as a victory for the Cameroun
authorities, which is more interested in exploiting the resources of the
Ambazonia territory than have genuine national interest at heart. If Cameroun
authorities were true pan-Kamerunians—regardless of whether the term is
limited to only the union of Cameroun and Ambazonia, they would never have
focused their attention only on the western border with Nigeria and Ambazonia;
they would have questioned and decried, at independence, the modality by
which the French singularly violated the Mandate system by carving out
portions of the Kamerun territory for its satellite states in Central Africa.
This work has also established that decisions of previous cases do affect
both the process and legal material or evidence in future cases. This is in
response to the argument that was advanced when Nigeria demanded that the
decision of Right of Passage Case should be revised. The question should be
whether the decision did serve the interests of the disputants and that of peace,
rather than that the decision should be revised simply because it will serve
Nigeria's interest in the case against Cameroun. Doing so would be
unprecedented.
This work, in upholding the premise that precedence does matter to
future cases, stress that if this were not the case, the judges of the ICJ and the ad
hocs judges representing Nigeria and Cameroun would be wasting precious time
and resources digging up evidence and arguments from previous cases. The
arguments and evidence from previous cases, regardless of how they affected the
195
belligerents at that time, are an important characteristic of the efficacy of
international law, and so are extremely important.
Lastly, this work establishes that there is a striking resemblance of the case
of Cameroun versus Nigeria to the case of the Mandate for Namibia. The Bakassi
peninsula dispute is primarily a question of the sovereignty of the UN Trust
Territory of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) before that of legal title over the
Bakassi Peninsula. In this light, the Bakassi crisis is not just a turning point to the
dispute over Ambazonia's sovereignty but is also an opportunity to put all
questions surrounding the Cameroun-Nigeria border to rest. If we have to be
frank (and this author and Philosophers examined in chapter five think we
should), then if the Court takes the Namibia case as a platform from which to
proceed attempting settling the multi-fold disputes established in this work, it
would meet with very little obstacles. South Africa violated the Mandate
entrusted to her by the World body, and was threatened with sanctions and
evidently ejected out of Namibia. We recall also the striking resemblance
between the case of Ambazonia versus Cameroun and that between Ethiopia and
Eritrea—Africa's newest Republic.
Eritrea had suffered a similar fate during decolonization. In examining
the role of international law in the Eritrea case, H. Salessie (1989) charged that the
seeds of conflict were sown by the United Nations General Assembly with
resolution 390 A (V). The panel of Jurists had agonized over the constitutional
incompatibility of a democratic state wedded to a more powerful, federal empire;
but they had to work out a constitutional scheme within the resolution. So, too,
was the case of Southern Cameroons when the infamous "Two Alternatives"
contained in the Plebiscite Treaty, ignored the option of Southern Cameroons
becoming an independent nation on its own. Not only was Ambazonia a
democracy and a much more open and progressive society compared to
Cameroun, which was and still is a dictatorship, but it is also clear today that
only some form of autonomy, beyond Federation (perhaps a loose
Confederation) can resolve the multi-fold disputes between the Ambazonians
and Cameroun authorities.
This seems to be the logical solution to the crisis between the
Ambazonians and Camerounian authorities when it comes to questions
surrounding the plebiscite that supposedly united the two states. Such a ruling
would also make it easy to convince Nigeria that Bakassi belongs to the
Ambazonia. This is because there is every indication that Nigeria is driven by the
fact that Cameroun violated the Plebiscite Treaty and seems to be getting away
with it, while at the same time exploiting the resources of Ambazonia with
impunity.
If the management function of international law were to take another look
at the situation in the Cameroun and Ambazonia, it would be observed that there
196
is every indication of a potential militarized conflict developing pretty soon. H.
Starr (1995) in invoking the Principle of Reciprocity, which examines law and
morality in international conduct, notes that individuals should calculate and
take the interests and reactions of other states into account, as well as longerterm collective interests, because failure to do so may meet with retorsion in the
"shadow of the future." On the behavior of states, Starr further cautions,
States must be aware that short-term gains from breaking rules that
they helped create may be offset by future costs imposed by other
states. International law is based on a "golden rule" principle—
rule-based behavior to others will beget rule-based behavior,
whereas defection or noncompliance will beget noncompliance…
The "shadow of the future" is expected to constrain rule violation,
or defection.17
We recall that Southern Cameroonians (Ambazonians) voted themselves
out of Nigeria in 1953-1954; and Cameroun authorities were stricken by the
success of Ambazonians when in May of 1990, the people duly exercised their
democratic will by not only launching the Social Democratic Front (SDF) Party,
but also their legal rights by instituting cases against Cameroun and Nigeria in
their respective High Courts to disprove them using their own domestic
jurisdictions. The shocks of this wind of change were felt throughout Africa—
especially in the French-speaking states. Since then, the Cameroun dictators
sabotaged the process of reforming Cameroun by proliferating multipartism; the
number of political parties created by government exceeding 120 in fewer than
seven years (1990-1997). This is certainly a record in world politics, especially if
we are to visit the resistance, which the government staged in attempting to deny
the birth of multipartism, especially the formation of the SDF party in May 1990.
The failure to reform Cameroun has been a primary reason for Ambazonia's bid
for greater autonomy or total independence [See Justice M. Mbuh (2003) Inside
Contemporary Cameroun Politics for more details]. Thus if this bid becomes
militarized, not only would the international system be to blame but Nigeria and
Cameroun would equally share responsibility, and perhaps feel the
consequences—refugee crises, breakdown of public order, senseless killings,
growing acts of terror, and much more.
The best advice one can give Nigeria and Cameroun is that it is time for
the leaders of both nations to do some serious house cleaning. While this would
help Nigeria to secure its leadership role in Africa—a role that has been tarnished
by decades of Dudan Barrack adventurism in the name of military and countermilitary coups—such house cleaning would give that nation the honor it
deserves. This is what is required, perhaps, when it comes to intervening in the
affairs of other warring nations, for such intervention to be received with honor,
instead of pointing to Nigeria's own internal decay as being a reason for
disrespecting and drumming charges of double-standard or hypocrisy on her.
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For Cameroun, the house cleaning is even more evidently needed in that it
stands the chance to lose the case over the Bakassi peninsula because of its past
deeds concerning the state of Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia. Cameroun’s
ethnic composition, together with the abuses that the present regime has inflicted
on both the western parts of Cameroun and the Grande Nord, is likely doomed to
a nasty civil war should Ambazonia break off because of the intransigence of the
too-tribalistic Paul Biya administration. We recall here that at the time of
independence, one of the fatal errors of the international community was that it
advocated a union between democratic and multiparty Ambazonia (Southern
Cameroons) with a Cameroun that was going through civil war, and thus
naturally, in a state of emergency. There should be no surprise therefore that
democracy till date, is a scary word to the regimes and that multipartism is seen
as divisive. That was the experience of Cameroun, and it was different from that
of Ambazonia, which left Nigeria democratically and elected two governments
with multiparty elections before the fateful union with Cameroun. Since then
only terror has reigned for the entire territory, as not only has their economy
been totally destroyed, but also Ambazonia basically has no government in its
capital. In fact, as someone commented to me in January 1999 when I last visited
Cameroun, "it is like living in a dream…the things that have happened to
Ambazonians, as unbelievable as they may sound, are their own reality of life
here on earth, and for sins they are yet to commit or comprehend."
VI.
FLASKBACK ON CONFLICT LITERATURE
The above scenario takes us back to international relations literature and
the causes of conflict. The Bakassi peninsula dispute and the various angles from
which it has been examined, is a classic case whereby First Image threats seem to
be more responsible for escalation than any other causes. Many authors on the
border and the dispute itself hold different positions as to the causes but not who
owns the peninsula. For example, Jim Newton, (1999) sets out investigating
whether,
The recurrent border dispute between Cameroun and Nigeria are
as a result of attempts by both countries to establish ownership,
control, or access to ownership of resources, can be attributed to
deteriorating domestic political conditions…or because of the
pursuit of their national political and economic interests by political
actors.18
In conclusion, Newton confirms the latter, noting that "the existence of
resources along the border was not confirmed during the early years of
independence was also acknowledged as a possible contributing factor."19 This
notwithstanding, Newton advocates that "a more accurate way of measuring the
varying degrees or levels of political instability and economic conditions be
established."20
198
However, this work has shown that the problem with both countries has
to do more with corrupted, unaccountable and intransigent elitist politics and
their struggle to stay in power because of the exploits of the national economy
that would remain at their disposal. This should not, in any way, be confused
with what is known in the Western world as “national interest,” because there is
none to be commented upon here. This author for one, does not understand nor
see any basis for talking about the national interest of Nigeria or Cameroun,
especially in light of the Bakassi peninsula dispute, because in both nations,
those concerned about national interest as history shows, have almost always
been targets of elimination, blackmail, and jail. The concept of national interest in
most “Third World” nations is an abuse of the very necessity of the concept itself,
translated more into a higher form of self-interest.
Another example has to do with Ian Brownlie who uses the AngloGerman Treaty of 1913 and its pillars of demarcation, especially along the
Ambazonia—Nigeria portion of the border, to show that there is no dispute
along the Cameroun-Nigeria border. What should we expect when today
Brownlie is sitting on the bench on the Nigerian side in order to provide
evidence that the peninsula belongs to Nigeria? The academic should have been
called in by the Court and not by any disputant party especially given the
conclusion he holds in his work African Boundaries. Thus, is it possible that
Brownlie, of all other authors, can provide some new evidence that contradicts
the work he has done on the border or is it just a matter of "strictly for cash?"
On the Cameroun side, it is very ironic that Cameroun politicians such as
Douala Mutome was quoted in The Herald for accusing Nigeria of unilaterally
altering the colonial boundaries by “redrawing fictitious maps in Abuja, which
included Bakassi as part of Nigeria,” especially noting, “such acts are
internationally unlawful."21 In the same paper, Martin Belinga, Cameroun's
permanent representative to the UN, boasted, "Cameroun has nailed Nigeria
given Cameroun's firm and unchallengeable arguments." The paper presented
only Cameroun's side of the dispute and rushed to paint Cameroun's President
as "an astute politician who preferred preventive diplomacy" to open war.22
It is not true that Cameroun’s arguments are unchallengeable. The
question one may ask is this: if Cameroun's position on Bakassi were so
transparent as far as international law goes, why has preventive diplomacy on its
part, not addressed the question and charges surrounding the Plebiscite Treaty?
Why then should one not question by what right Cameroun’s government
should have to exercise authority over the entire territories of Ambazonia,
Bakassi inclusive? Are Cameroun authorities not missing something here or are
we the ones failing to understand the nature of politics and the law? Why have
Cameroun authorities refused to respond in like manner to the charges of
malpractice, breach of treaty of union and the glaring fact that it is militarily
occupying Ambazonia? How else should one see the dispute with Nigeria other
199
than that it is illegal, unnecessary, except that it permits Cameroun to illegally
maintain its active military presence in Ambazonia?
As far as the Bakassi peninsula dispute goes, whether we move from the
particular to the whole or vice versa, the logical and resounding position or
opinion is that Cameroun and Nigeria do not have a case against each other
when we take into consideration the Ambazonia arguments. Conversely,
Cameroun would have had a case against Nigeria—and a good one for that
matter, only if the Federation of "two equal states," with Ambazonia having all
the powers to manage her own internal affairs, were restored. Evidence
examined this far suggests that Nigeria only wants a piece of the cake or a piece
of the vacuum of "no man's land" that Cameroun has kept under its control since
May 20, 1972. Ambazonia has certainly undergone a period of dormancy and it is
not surprising that it is awakening again, and this time it is necessary that their
demise be given proper attention.
VII.
CLAIMANTS, JUDGES, AND RESEARCHERS: FRIENDS OR
ENEMIES OF THE LAW?
In concluding this work, it will be wise to clearly identify the enemies of
the law and state clearly that their actions, which deny justice to peoples and
nations, are responsible for escalating disputes. This work has shown that neither
Cameroun nor Nigeria should have sovereignty over Bakassi because their
claims are baseless, especially when the Ambazonia sovereignty question comes
into play. The work also shows that title to territory based on conquest only
(Nigeria), and prescription and contiguity (Cameroun), cannot stand the scrutiny
of the law. Conversely, the work reveals that there is a string of events (from the
Scramble for Africa through the First World War and Second World War, till the
period of granting independence) that when taken into consideration, with a
careful scrutiny of the treaties and maps, would ease the process of determining
who has legal title to not only the Bakassi peninsula but also the entire territory
of Ambazonia.
It is expected therefore, that the worst of results that Ambazonia can get is
that the Bakassi peninsula and the entire territory of Ambazonia is still a UN
Trust Territory to be decolonized correctly by granting her total independence
from the oppressive and unprogressive regimes of Cameroun. These arguments
are intended to prove that after May 20, 1972, it dawned on Ambazonians more
than ever before that they and the people of French-speaking Cameroun were
terribly at odds with one another and that not withstanding, they had been
mortgaged by covert and even more strangulating neo-imperialism of double
proportions than what transpired under Germany and Britain from 1884-1961,
with the French and British conspiracies against Germany and lastly the French
as the “big boss” and Cameroun as the “small boss,” conspiring against
Ambazonia.
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Today, the one time Federal Republic of Cameroon and even the United
Republic of Cameroon, which used to be Africa's darling or sun-child, especially
in 1982, is now a wreck, politically, socially, morally and economically.
Cameroun earned the world's number one position in corruption and bribery
scandals in August 1998 according to a survey by Transparency International.23
Perhaps the only way of redeeming the situation is for Cameroun and
Ambazonia to have a legal divorce even though they never really got married
legally.
From the above arguments it is obvious that leadership threats play a
major role in these crises. The violation of the UN and the OAU Charters
concerning the respect of boundaries inherited from colonialism, disrespect of
the principles of peaceful coexistence with neighbors, disrespect of international
treaties such as the Plebiscite and the Trusteeship Agreement, all point to the fact
that the major cause of the Bakassi crises lies more in leadership crises than
economic, or national interest, as some of the theories discussed in this work
seem to suggest.
Man and especially the leaders are to blame for the atrocities inflicted on
others in the name of war and other human rights abuses. Emmanuel Kant
observed, "out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made, nothing
entirely straight can be built."24 Professor Beres also argues in like manner that
the world legal order can never be improved by rules alone, and that the record
of civilization points unambiguously towards indignity and willful
destructiveness—that the remediation of human barbarism in armed conflict
necessarily requires reformation of human nature.25 Concerning the
implementation of international law, Beres believes that the real problem of its
enforcement "is not that of hostis humani generi, or 'common enemy of mankind,'
but rather the normal human being—the one who adheres closely to societal
expectations while secretly dreaming of corpses."26
However, the position established by the President of the Court seems to
give us reason to continue to hope. In a speech to the plenary meeting of the
General Assembly in 1996, when lobbying for more funding of the ICJ, he noted:
The International Court of Justice is endowed with both a
privileged institutional status and procedural instruments whose
potential is frequently underestimated…its actions in the service of
peace suffers from certain limitations over which it has scant
control. Some of these are structural, deriving from the very
essence of the functions of the Courts and also from the essence of
contemporary society… The others are material resources made
available to the Court. Whereas the former limitations are constant
and could only in principle, be removed at the expense of distortion
of the judicial function or a profound transformation of the political
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environment in which it is performed, the latter are reversible,
but…unpredictable.27
Further, the President of the Court lamented that "the law is always an
instrument and never constitutes an end in itself," and that "the law cannot claim,
by virtue of its instrumental dimensions, to apprehend all aspects of the real." He
noted that in every society there are tensions, which to a greater or lesser extent,
are diffuse or apparent, chronic or acute and which, when they have no clearly
defined object, pose a threat to the social order.28
Nothing can be more supportive of the arguments summarized in this
concluding part of this work than such words from the President of the Court
himself, and the "Learned" Professor Beres. With these in mind, we cannot help
but insist that the evidence provided by the Ambazonia claims, though not yet
part of the case, greatly undermines the cases of both Cameroun and Nigeria and
the judgment rendered by the ICJ in October 2002. Beres has argued for a new
paradigm of international law, wherein, the behavior of individuals is absolutely
primary. He further stressed that the evolution of international law and world
order requires an improvement of human behavior, and that the feasible
elements of such improvements must now be explored and understood.29
Truly, the Court in dragging its feet on the matter may be doing a good
service in keeping the peace—but that is only as far as Nigeria and Cameroun are
concerned. The real victims here are the sons and daughters of Ambazonia, who
even with guns firing in Bakassi feel safer in Nigeria than in Cameroun. The real
master-minders of the dispute remain the French and Cameroun, who in the first
place have no right to be fighting over territory that does not belong to either of
them.
The French, as if the troubles that their overbearing influence in the
federation affair has caused Ambazonia are not enough, think the best thing to
do is fund a war against Nigeria so that the bulk of Ambazonians there may be
thrown out. But they are mistaken. The case over Bakassi will not be decided
without Ambazonia's case against Cameroun playing central role. If the illegal
operations that surround the 1961 plebiscite have been tolerated thus far, it does
not mean that all is well, or that the present situation of exchange of fire and
killing cannot be reversed or expanded the October 2002 Court ruling
notwithsatnding. The illegal operations may have escaped the eyes of the
international community for over three decades, but not any more. No matter
what the ICJ has decided in this case, it will come to be known that a vacuum
does exist over the territory of Ambazonia. When this is said, both the case and
the judgment will come under greater scrutiny, and the imposed dictators who
are stage-managed from Paris will realize that evil-mindedness cannot endure
forever. The Cameroun-French relationship has been shown in this work as an
example of a "dangerous Dyad" whose longstanding ills have now been given
the opportunity to be espoused, questioned, deliberated upon, challenged,
202
condemned, and rectified by the Bakassi peninsula dispute and the sovereignty
questions surrounding Ambazonia Republic.
Bakassi is thus an antithesis—a turning point for the Cameroun
authorities, which for almost four decades has done very little good as far as the
union with Southern Cameroons goes. This turning point is one that would
either send Cameroun tumbling and crashing like a China plate, or forced to
dump its pile of illegalities and take onto a new road—one on which the rule of
law and respect of human dignity will become the banner of its domestic and
foreign policies. As a torn-State, Cameroun has just these two choices. For
Ambazonia, the Bakassi peninsula dispute is a turning point because more than
ever before, the illegalities that this territory and its peoples have been subjected
to will not only be exposed to the world but also possibly come to an end.
The evidence provided in the Case of the Maritime and Land Boundary
between Cameroun and Nigeria is so important that it is an abuse of law, deliberate
neglect of facts, lopsidedness, and blatant fraud on the part of the judges of the
ICJ, for failing to make this connection either by inquiry or by direct pursuit of
evidence. The evidence is so important that even if Ambazonia does not become
an active participant, it ought to have been taken into consideration before a
ruling was made. Again, the maps (in the Appendices) are a testimony on their
own that irrespective of the fact that Cameroun continues to behave as if it has
no serious problem with Ambazonia, that there is a very serious problem—one
that greatly threatens international security and world order. How serious would
the Ambazonia problems become before both the Cameroun and international
authorities give them serious attention?
It is hard also to comprehend the duty of the international organizations
charged with the resolution of disputes peacefully. It seems from the overall
study of the Bakassi peninsula dispute that the blunders of the international
system, either selectively or intentionally, or perhaps even by the error of
judgment, created the present problem when self-determination of previously
colonized territories was totally misinterpreted or badly implemented in the
Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons). One would assume therefore, that with the
much publicized protests and agitation that Ambazonian citizens and leaders
(collectively and individually) have shown concerning the manner by which the
Cameroun authorities interpreted and implemented the Treaty of Union between
the two Cameroons, that the different organs of the UN would be conversant
with the situation. But contrary to this expectation, the piles of petition
submitted to these organs have largely been ignored.
One wonders how they can resolve the present dispute over the Bakassi
peninsula without acknowledging (and without terming such acknowledgment
as unfortunate) that there is a bigger problem in the region—that of the
sovereignty question of Ambazonia. Others may argue that the provision of the
203
Trusteeship Agreement (in accordance to Article 79 and 80; and the Trusteeship
Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under British
Administration, 1946) gave the governing authorities the right to redraw the
boundaries of the territories in such a way that would ease their administration.
But this was to last only as long as the Trusteeship did. Thus if the French and
British did redraw the boundary between Southern Cameroons and Cameroun,
does not the fact that their international nature remained even after
independence? Besides, does not the fact that Cameroun was given separate
independence, and the other fact that it got a separate seat at the UN fortify
Ambazonian arguments rather than negate them? Southern Cameroons was
never given a seat at the UN and its government was implored to opt for
federation—a higher form of government, which should never be interpreted as
forfeiting its independence and sovereignty. The Declaration on the granting of
Independence or self-government to Colonial Countries and Peoples came into
being on December 14, 1960. We recall here that the Declaration recognized,
The passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and
the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their
independence, aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the
denial…of the freedom…which constitute a serious treat to world
peace…convinced that the continued existence of colonialism
prevents…development of dependent peoples and militates against
the United Nations ideals of Universal Peace…convinced that all
peoples have the inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise
of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,
solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.30
One can only hope that when it comes to an in-depth evaluation of
evidence presented by the disputants over Bakassi that the UN and ICJ will be
able to realize even after the flawed October 2002 ruling, the connection of the
case to the continuous colonialism that Ambazonia has been subjected under the
union with Cameroun. Ambazonians still hold the UN (and the Trusteeship
Council) to task. How convinced are they today that the proclamation made in
the declaration to grant independence actually protecting the rights of the people
of Ambazonia? Does not the Ambazonia Interpleader adequately address this
problem to reveal to the international community the intrigues and malice who
the enemies of international law and order are? Is it not a contrasting fact and a
glaring truth that the continuous association of the peoples of Ambazonia with
Cameroun can take place only if the Plebiscite Treaty were respected? How in
the world can these two peoples continue to live under the lie of Cameroun
unity, the way it is today, if such togetherness is not a compromise of the values
for which Ambazonians have cherished all their lives? Otherwise, can anyone
say with any degree of certainty and truth that Cameroun politics and
204
leadership, as it is today, represents advancement in the peoples’ quest for the
freedom, peace and development that Ambazonian masses continue to yearn
for?
The arguments advanced in this work are based on the assumption that
all humans possess reason, which should guide us towards correct behavior and
progress. However, this assumption of reason is contradicted by a terrible
century in which man and governments are guilty of killing over 203 million
humans in wars and other acts of barbarism.31 With the end of the twentieth
century and the wave of agitating masses of many unrepresented and poorly
represented peoples demanding for the most part, the restoration of their selfgovernment and independence, there can be no greater evidence of continuous
oppression and the urgent need for action that grants hope to these peoples than
despair. That "Reason has yielded to pure irrationality and visions of cosmopolis
human oneness are overwhelmed by power eruptions of fragmentation and
disunity" is far less true than the real picture. We must erect legal hopes and
expectations that defeat incorrectness to give international law the productivity
and respect it deserve. The international legal system must still be based on that
ancient principle of Nullum crimen sine poena, “no crime without punishment,”
especially when it comes to treaty violations.
The evidence and arguments examined and advanced in this work
suggest that three parties (Nigeria, Ambazonia and Equatorial Guinea) charge
Cameroun for not respecting the rights of its neighbors. Ambazonia's case clearly
lends more credence to this premise. One cannot help but have great pity for the
regime in Cameroun, which does not grant the slightest chance of justice to its
own citizens but puts on a holy fathers’ rob to seek justice from the International
Court.
The quest to seek justice by Ambazonians is not limited to Cameroun
only. Already, heated correspondences with the ICJ suggest that Ambazonians
will go beyond the ICJ to seek justice for their people. As this work equally
shows, the President of the Court acting through the Registrar demonstrated that
Ambazonians have a right to be unhappy with the way international law
continues to be applied to matters that concern its people, to the very extent of
showing that international law is being constantly manipulated when questions
of the plebiscite and its implementation come under scrutiny—this, to the very
disadvantage of the spirit of international security and cooperation and the
pacific settlement of disputes of this nature. The UN and the Court should do the
right thing and redress the situation rather than continue to attempt to suppress
it. As far as this work goes, the Bakassi peninsula dispute has given them that
opportunity and they should utilize it without hesitation.
In the case of Bakassi, the leadership crisis, and the corrupted nature of
elitists politic leads them to defy international law (the evidence of treaties and
205
maps as sources, instruments and rights and obligations of the law) to lay claims
to territory that does not belong to either of them (Nigeria and Cameroun) just
because they want to exploit the resources of the territory and benefit from their
actions as individuals hiding under nations’ sovereignties. This is why
Cameroun wants sovereignty over all of Ambazonia and also why Nigeria wants
Bakassi, a piece of Ambazonia. Nothing can be more appealing than a call to the
Judges of the ICJ to look into the Ambazonia Interpleader, for what they would
see will, in the words of Professor Charles Kegley, Jr., “explains the situation in
its totality.”29
Ambazonia's title to the Bakassi peninsula cannot and should never be
challenged by either Nigeria or Cameroun. Especially concerning Ambazonia's
relationship with Cameroun, principles of international law do suggest that the
superiority of a state that succeeds another becomes questionable when it
violates the collective rights of its subjects. Ambazonians saw this as their
historic future when they opted to be separate from Nigeria; and the same holds
true when it comes to examining the over forty years of purgatory-like
association with Cameroun.
Similarly, provisions governing the operation of a Federal system do also
suggest that if a state by a treaty entered into with another state submits to the
national laws of the other—or any other—state, it ceases to be subjected only to
international law and hence ceases to be a state in the sense of international law.
What this has meant for Cameroon unity is that Cameroun subjugated
Ambazonia and as the case with Nigeria suggests, is now bent on legalizing its
annexation. But the question becomes this: would Ambazonia cordially
acquiesce to its annexation by Cameroun especially since the Bakassi case fails to
become the turning point of its relationship with Cameroun? Since this has
become the case, should Ambazonians see the ruling in favor of Cameroun as
serving justice and even more, promoting the peace, stability and prosperity of
the entire region or will it destabilize it further? These are questions we should
bear in mind when we re-evaluate this entire work.
From the standpoint of this author and the evidence of contemporary
Cameroun politics, the answer to all questions that ask whether Nigeria or
Cameroun should exercise sovereignty over Bakassi is a definite no! Again this
stand is backed by treaties cited and maps drawn by the Germans (Appendix I),
Cameroun (see notes on Appendix III), Nigeria (Appendix III), Britain (Appendix
III, VII & VIII), the United States (Appendix III, VI & VIII), Russia (Appendix IV),
and the French (Appendix V) and West Cameroon and Cameroon federation as
of 1971 and 1972 by J. A. Ngwa (Appendix IX & X). Nothing more than confirms
the position of these maps than the study on the British Colonies, Protectorates
206
and Possessions in Africa by Sir E. Hertslet (see Appendix VII), which shows the
boundary of German Kamerun with the British prior to the Anglo-German and
Anglo-French Treaties of 1913 and 1916, respectively. The interesting thing is that
both treaties did not alter the German maps of the boundaries, especially as
regards the portion under disput—the Bakassi area.
That people would stream into the ICJ to give evidence to this case as to
the effect that some portions of Bakassi or the entire peninsula, or even the entire
territory of the Southern Cameroons belongs to either Cameroun or Nigeria is
what has come under scrutiny in this work. The aspects of international law
examined in this work have shown that conquest, subjugation and annexation
are a violation especially when pre-existing treaties protect the interest of the
weaker state. It is on this premise that Ambazonia seeks to be heard by the
international community. Therefore, any Judges, international personalities,
leaders or nations that fail to see the seriousness of the violations of international
law and natural law presented by the Bakassi peninsula dispute represent the
enemies of the law and should be held accountable.
CONCLUSIONS
The treaties that created Ambazonia's international boundaries with
Cameroun and Nigeria have survived two World Wars to become part of
international legal material (see Boundary Treaty of Ambazonia Cameroun
boundary in appendix herein). We recall here, the article in West Africa and the
question of “Bakassi, whose Bakassi?” According to this work, the answer is and
will remain Ambazonia's Bakassi—thanks to international law and the power of
argument and evidence against that of force! If one were asked whose war are
Cameroun and Nigeria fighting? The right answer is that they are fighting the
war of a corrupted elite who are caught up in a double tragedy (of a mass
struggle for proper representation, accountable governance and legality) aimed
at eroding their power and depriving them of the means of their easy making of
wealth by exploiting national revenues and other national revenue opportunities.
This struggle will do well when it restores or develops a feeling of servitude in
those who serve the nations of Africa, thereby developing national interest as
opposed to personal interest.
The changing formulas of oppression cannot endure the growing
consciousness that the international community is gaining as every day goes by.
The much-cherished values of democracy, freedom, equality, fraternity and
justice for all will continue to be embraced and sought by Ambazonians, and the
truth and peculiarity of their demise in Cameroun shall come to pass. With these
Bakassi will certainly not go to those who claim it illegally by force and
falsehood. Bakassi has emerged as the final episode of the long quest of
Ambazonians for freedom, justice and a reliable identity.
207
The Ambazonian Interpleader is the antithesis of the claims of Cameroun
and Nigeria over Bakassi. It presents a case which in its totality addresses not
only the whole of International law as it came to maturity (1884-2000), but also
appeals to the best of the reasoning of those charged with conflict resolution
processes that they should think carefully how the final decisions on the Bakassi
peninsula dispute are made. Nothing gives more significance to the Ambazonian
claims than the fact that the notion of “distant future” affects and renders
redundant claims from Nigeria, while at the same time the challenge to show
cause as to how Cameroun became the protector of Ambazonian territory places
Cameroun in the hottest spot of international inquiry that it has ever been. The
developments that have taken place in international law, which are most relevant
to this case since the advent of colonialism,30 have punctuated the evolution of
Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) and made her right to re-assert its
sovereignty to be at the forefront of any resolution attempts to be made over the
Bakassi dispute. To allow claims that pre-date the period of 1884-2000, as is the
case with the submissions of Nigerian, would be to reverse the tides and
accomplishments of international legal development; and to allow its blatant
violation, as is the case with the lawless Cameroun claims, will equally not be to
the good of the future of international legal matters and attempts at resolving
disputes peacefully.
If international law is to be anything worth continuous respect, then the
truth of the arguments of the two primary disputants must be dismissed for lack
of reliable evidence rather than substituted by the power of force and money—all
based on lawlessness. The peculiarity of the Bakassi peninsula dispute is a
glaring example of a case where the forces of deceit and demagogy are
struggling to overcome the truths that bound law and society in this era. This
must not happen now, it must not happen in the future. As Richard B. Bilder has
observed in a book review on international law concerning the right of conquest
as a means to acquire title to territory, this right is under serious challenge by the
right to self-determination, and the prohibition of the use of force, thus moving
intentional law away from the traditional practices.31
While we all join Bilder to worry about the hypocrisy that has
characterized the selective applications in international law to contemporary
standards, we hope that with the facts pulled in the case of Bakassi and in
support of arguments by Ambazonia, that the right of conquest was gone after
the Mandate System and that the right for sovereignty should be accorded the
rightful indigenes of any territory. Nothing morethan provokes the international
system as it is now glaring from the Ambazonian charges that Cameroun is in
208
breach of the Plebiscite Treaty and thus has been presenting false evidence to the
World Court, and that it is illegally occupying Ambazonia. The treaty that put
the two Cameroons together was a “real treaty” as opposed to any private
initiatives that could have taken place between Southern Cameroons elite and
Cameroun authorities over the years. Such “private treaties” as we already
noted, are not a basis on which to claim sovereignty over a territory, let alone
abolish the government of a people. The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda
challenges Cameroun to show why Ambazonia should not hold it in breach and
abuse of international law.
Since “international law is no longer the fragile fantasy of a few lawyers
and scholars,” collective application and collective enforcement must accompany
the rulings and interpretations given to situations of conflict or disputes to secure
and ensure greater respect for international law. The Bakassi peninsular dispute
and its relatedness to the Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) question has
displayed analyses of the evolution of international disputes and conflicts, pitted
against a wall of redundant or inflexible international law, which as far as the
people of Ambazonia are concerned, played no minor role in creating the onset
of their problems. The right of acquiring legal title to territory as opposed to
conquest over Bakassi that this work has explored has challenged the
interpretation of the history, maps, politics and contemporary discuss over the
issue with a view of shading more light to its understanding. The changing
discuss on sovereignty, territory and force, colonialism, decolonization and their
effects on the lives of the people of the disputed territory has come under
scrutiny with the hope of offering and ensuring a promising future for
international law, which as Bilder notes, remains “a set of rules with origins and
applications, but as a history of people with institutional, polemical and political
projects.”32 This indeed is what is at stake over Bakassi and the Ambazonia
question, whether international law is functionally viable and reliable or not.
When the Somalians were caught in in-house fighting, the escalated
conflict reached a point where only external intervention could have and did
relieve the situation, averting untold human suffering. Somalis and academics of
conflict had long requested the international community to intervene but they
waited too long—too long that when intervention eventually became effected, it
met with such barbaric resistance that showed total lack of understanding from
both the perspectives of the interveners and the natives, to the extent that the
world was more horrified by intervention than with the continuous Somali
crises. Mohamed Sahnoun, in Somalia: The Missed Opportunity, summed the
situation thus:
209
Early intervention, both political and humanitarian can save
hundreds of thousands of lives and avoid a disaster that might
affect a whole generation of people in many ways…It is my belief
that if the international community had intervened earlier and
more effectively in Somalia, much of the tragedy that unfolded
could have been avoided.33
The Bakassi peninsula dispute utters an even bigger call to the
international community. Even more so, the Bakassi peninsula dispute is a direct
confrontation of the UN and the international legal systems. It demands both
Justice on the one hand and the restitution of the right to self-determination of
the Ambazonian people on the other—a call that makes it impossible to redress
one problem without doing the same to the other. In other words, the Law of
Transitivity comes in handy—(that is, if Bakassi is part of Ambazonia, (and not
Nigeria or Cameroun) then settlement of the Bakassi peninsula dispute requires
resolution of the Ambazonian question)—either way, this Law of Transitivity
lays siege on the international community. In responding to this call, the
international community, through its dignitaries (world leaders, diplomats,
judges and scholars) should do so by taking all relevant political and legal factors
in to consideration, and without fear or favor.
NOTES
CHAPTER ONE
1A.
I. Applbaum, Knowledge and Negotiation: Learning under Conflict,
Bargaining under Uncertainty, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1987), pp. 1314.
2In 1998, estimates of the population of Cameroun by the United Nations,
stood at about 14 million inhabitants.
3Victor, T. Le Vine, “The Cameroun Federal Republic,” in Carter, M.
Gwendolen (ed.) Five African States, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p.
268.
4Ibid.
5West Africa, “Southern Cameroons, Autonomy Bid.” August 21-27, 1995,
pp.1317-1318.
6Richard Akinjide, “Bakassi? Whose Bakassi?” West Africa, 18-24 April
1994, pp. 686-687.
7The Bakassi Peninsula: This peninsula is one of a long-standing dispute
between the Cameroons and Nigeria. It is located at the southern-most tip of the
almost two thousand kilometer border that separates Nigeria and Cameroun,
210
right at the edge of the Atlantic Ocean, and comprises a group of small islands,
east of where the Rio Del Rey meets the Atlantic Ocean (see map as appendix III).
8In 1990 Ambazonia filed a case in the Cameroun High Court demanding
that the Cameroun President Paul Biya, should answer charges that Cameroun
seceded from the Union that created or should have created the Cameroon
Federation (See Bamenda High Court, HCB/28/92). Similarly, on 22nd June 1995,
an immigration case instituted against the United Kingdom, under the Geneva
Convention demanded automatic British citizenship for the Ambazonia leader in
exile, and by implication, restoring Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) to
Trusteeship Status. The case was adjudged at the Crown Court in London (see
CO 2146/97 for details). Both judgments are in favor of Ambazonia. For details
see Court records in the Bamenda High Court of Cameroun, the Crown Court in
London, and The Ambazonia papers with the Ambazonia Mission, Washington
D.C., USA.
9S. F. Forlemu, Nation Building in a Multi-ethnic State: Cameroon as a
Case Study, (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1995). Masters Work traces
and uses voting behavior of the ethnic groups since the Plebiscite to show
internal ethnic divisions and conflicts.
10In exploring the dialectical development of the Anglophone problem in
the Cameroons, in stating that “it is widely believed in Anglophone circles that
Nigeria’s positive attitude towards admission (of Cameroun in the
Commonwealth) may have been due to the ‘deal’ made by Biya and Sani Abacha
to defend each other against international criticism of their regimes,” they fail to
recognize the fact that during this same period, the clashes over Bakassi had long
started. Conversely, I would argue that the two leaders supported each other in
avoidance of their domestic troubles.
11J. Newton, The Nigeria-Cameroon Border Dispute: Causes and
Consequences of Political Intransigence in Bilateral Relations, (Columbia:
University of South Carolina). Ph.D. Dissertation tracing the root causes of the
numerous conflicts spots along the Cameroon Nigeria border, starting from Lake
Chad to the Atlantic Ocean).
12For more details, see J. E. Omotunde, “Economic Integration in Africa:
Enhancing Prospects for Success” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 29,1,
1991, pp. 1-26.
13For details see H. B.Weston, R. A. Falk and A. D’ Amato, International
Law and World Order, (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1990), p.345355; A.O. Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1967), P. 28-95; F. Kratochwil, Peace and Disputed
Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict over Territory, (University Press of America,
1985) p.34-44; J.R.V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, (London: Uuwin
Hyman Ltd., 1987).
14See General Aseembly Resolution1514, UN GAOR, 15th Session, Supp.
No. 16, at 66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960).
211
15See
Editorial Comments by Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. “The Degrees of SelfDetermination in the United Nations Era.” The American Journal of International
Law, 88, 1994, pp. 304-310.
16Ibid, p.310
17H. B. Weston, H. Burns et al, Supra note 11, p. 430-432.
18R. Yin, Case Study Research, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc.,
1994), p.ix.
19Ibid, p. 1.
20Ibid, p. 80.
CHAPTER TWO
For details of these treaties, declarations and conventions see B. H.
Weston, Falk, A. R. Falk & A. D’Amato, Basic Documents in International Law
and World Order, Second edition, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company
Ltd., 1990).
2 Statements of Canadian Minister of External Affairs Joe Clark, Sept. 10,
1985 in the House of Commons. See also, “Breaking the Ice: The CanadianAmerican Dispute over the Arctic Northwest Passage,” Columbian Journal of
Transnational Law, 26:337-1988.
3 Supra note 2, “Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-America Dispute over the
Arctic Northwest Passage,” p.355.
4 Ibid, p. 362 & 366.
5 Ibid.
6 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, Revised Edition: Robert W.
Tucker, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), p.323.
7 Ibid, p.366-367; see also The Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (UK versus. Alb.),
1949 ICJ 4 (Judgment of April 9). See also, M. F. Higginbotham, “International
Law, the Use of Force in Self-Defense, and the Southern African Conflict,”
Columbian Journal of International Law, 25/529, 1987, p.552.
8Weston Burns, et al International Law and World Order, p. 337.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, p.338.
14See Report of the International Law Commission covering its 34 th Session
(UN Doc. A/37/10;YBILC, 1982-II).
15 ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16 at 47, para.94-95.
16 Ibid.
17 Supra, note 14, p. 19.
1
212
I. I. Dore, The International Mandate System and Namibia, (Boulder,
Colorado: West View Press, Inc., 1985), p.152-153.
19 Ibid, p.135.
20 Ibid.
21See K. K. Ndiva, “Cameroon and its Foreign Relations,” Africa Affairs,
80, 1981, p. 197.
22 For more details on Status or Rank Discrepancy Theory, see G.
Cashman, What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International
Conflict, (San Francisco, Cal.: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1993) pp. 228-232.
23Ibid, p. 230.
24Valenta Jiri, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of
Decision, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 4.
25H. N. A. Enonchong, “The Position of the Cameroon State in Litigation,”
ABBIA, No. 11, November, 1965, p. 59.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Emmanuel Chaibi, The Making of Modern Cameroon, A History of
Nationalism and Disparate Union, 1914-1961. Vol. 1., (Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, Inc., 1997), p. 209.
29Ibid, p. 221.
30Ibid, p. 219.
31Victor J. Ngoh, A Hundred Years of History, (1884-1985) (Yaounde:
SOPECAM, 1988), p. 297.
32Kenneth N. Waltz, Man the State and War, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), p.160.
33Ibid, p.159-186.
34G. Cashman, What Causes War? …p. 238.
35Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dean G. Pruitt and Sung H. Kim, Social Conflict:
Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement. 2nd Edition (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, Inc.,
1986) p. 100-108.
36Ibid, p. 100.
37Ibid, p. 130.
38Ibid, p. 131.
39Johan Galtun, “A Structural Theory of Aggression.” Journal of Peace
Research, No. 1, 1964, p. 96.
40Ibid, p. 102.
41Ibid, p. 107.
42Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory
to the Study of International Conflict.” Paper presented at The Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 143.
43Ibid, p. 144.
18
213
44F.
Kratochwil, Peace and Disputed Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict
Over Territory, (New York: Columbia University Institute of Peace Studies,
Summer 1985), p. 34-35.
45Ibid, p. 35.
46Richard B. Bilder, “The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory
by Force in International Law and Practice,” (Book Review), The American
Journal of International Law, 1997, 1, p. 745.
47Arthur A. Stein, “When Misperceptions Matters,” World Politics, vol. 34,
4, 1982, p. 505-526.
48Ibid, p. 525.
49Ibid.
50See details of Cameroun’s foreign relations in Ndiva Kofele-Kale,
“Cameroon and its Foreign Relations,” African Affairs: Journal of the Royal
African Society, Vol. 80, no. 319 (April 1981); Victor J. Ngoh, A Hundred Years of
History (1884-1985)…, p. 278-300; Mark DeLancey, “Cameroon’s Foreign
Relations,” in Michael G. Schatzberg and I. William Zartman, (eds.), The Political
Economy of Cameroon (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 189-217;Gwendolen M.
Carter (ed.) Five African States: Responses to Diversity (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1963), p. 352-359; Emmanuel Chiabi, The Making of Modern
Cameroon: A History of Substate Nationalism and Disparate Union, 1914-1961
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997).
51See Ngoh, A Hundred Years of History, p. 283-285.
52Ibid, p. 295; see also Gwendolen M. Carter, Five African States, p. 352353.
53Emmanuel Chiabi, The Making of Modern Cameroon…, p. 101.
54M. DeLancey, Cameroon: Dependency and Independence, (Boulder,
Col.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 151.
55Ibid, p. 152.
56Charles De Gaulle conducted a referendum to enable France to
continuously influence the policies of its former colonies. Countries that voted
“no” such as Guinea (Conakry) were severely punished. See A. Mukong, The
Case For the Southern Cameroons, (Enugu: Chuka Printing Company Ltd, 1990),
pp. 8.
57Dateline, “Cameroon, French Mission Arrives,” West Africa, 1994, April,
pp. 105.
58Until Nigeria and Cameroun practice true democracy, at least at the level
at which Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) had already reached before the
betrayal of the Cameroon Federation, the intentions of the leaders of both
countries, whether claims are legitimate or not, will always be suspect.
214
CHAPTER THREE
1It
is important to note that these ideas (self-determination and liberal
democracy) were fervently preached and promoted by President Woodrow
Wilson. He blamed the old diplomacy and old balance of power system for
being the root cause of global instability. In one of his most popular remarks, he
noted that “Only a nation that determines its own destiny could be democratic, and
only a democracy could be trusted to love peace and to make a new world order work.”
For more details see, John M. Carroll, & C. G. Herring, Modern American
Diplomacy, (especially essay by Melvin Small, pp. 25-40, and W. Widenor, pp.
41-59), (Wilmington, Alb.: Scholarly Resource Inc., 1996).
2B. H. Weston, A. R. Falk & A. D’Amato, International Law and World
Order, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990), p.1
3See The Fourteen Points Speech in W. Woodrow War and Peace:
Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers (1917-1924). R. S. Baker &
W.E. Dood (Eds.) (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970) p.155.
4See Map in Appendices III.
5 H. Morton, D. J. Scheffer & P. Small, Self-determination in the New
World Order, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990) pp.16.
6Ibid, pp. 16-17.
8Ibid, p. 18; see also P. Michla, “The United States and Self-determination:
Perspective on the Wilsonian Conception,” American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 70, 1976, pp. 4
9Ibid, p. 20.
10Ibid, p. 20-21.
11UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), Oct.24, 1970; See also H. Morton et al., SelfDetermination in the New World Order, supra, note5, pp.23.
12Ibid, pp.24. See also, M. G. Kaldaran Nayar, “Self-determination beyond
the Colonial Context: Biafra in Retrospect,” Texas International Law Journal, vol.
10, 1975, pp. 337.
13Ibid.
14W. Burns et al, International and World Order, Supra note 2, p.11.
15Ibid.
16Ibid, p. 12.
17Ibid.
18Supra note 11, p.35.
19M. Chemillier-Gendreau, “The International Court of Justice between
Politics and Law,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 11: 1996, Translated by Natalie Reid.
Note: The article is very critical of the ICJ, particularly the fact that nations
invoke its jurisdiction only when their national interest is at stake—thus justice is
either denied to the less powerful, or is not well served.
20Ibid, p.1
21Ibid, p.2.
22Ibid, p.3.
215
23See,
ICJ Decision in (Ethiopia versus South Africa) Collection of Decisions,
advisory opinions and ruling, July 18, 1966, p. 6. See also, M. ChemillierGendreau, The International Court of Justice between Politics and Law, Supra
note 69, p.2-3.
24Buergenthal, T. & Harold G., Public International Law in a Nutshell, (St.
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1985), p.2.
25Ibid, p.14-15.
26Ibid, p. 15.
27Ibid, p.16.
28Ibid, p.17.
29Supra note 2, p. 44.
30See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice; B. H.
Weston et al, International Law and World Order, Supra note 2, p. 75; B.H.
Weston et al, Basic Documents in International Law, (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1990), Doc. 1.6. pp. 33-38.
31Supra note 2, p. 77.
32Ibid, p.82-100.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR
1See
paragraph 1.67 of Cameroun’s Memorial of 16th March 1995; see also
Preliminary Objections of Nigeria (PON) of the Republic of Nigeria, Dec. 1995,
Vol. 1, p.8.
2Ibid, para. 6.21, and PON, p.8.
3See Preliminary Objections of Nigeria (PON) I, p.5 & 8.
4Ibid
5Africa Confidential, “Nigeria/Cameroon: Blundering into battle,” Vol. 35,
No. 8p.6, April 16, 1994, London.
6Ibid.
7Jeune Afrique, “Cameroun/ Nigeria…La guerre secrete,” No. 1871, 13-19
Nov. 1996, p.13.
8Hotline News, “Another Southern Cameroons Offensive,” No.0064, Dec.
1998, p. 3-4.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Southern Cameroons Information Bulletin, “More Anglophone Soldiers
Killed In Bakassi Skirmishes,” No. 96001, Friday, March 8, 1996, p.10.
12I. Brownlie, African Boundaries, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985),
p.553-555.
See also The Geographer, “Cameroon-Nigeria Boundary,”
International Boundary Study, Office of Research in Economics and Science, No.
92-Nov. 3, 1969.
216
13Ibid,
p.555-557.
p. 559.
15J. L. O. Ekpenyong, “Potentials of Nigerian Boundary Corridors as
Sources of International Economic Conflict,” in Borderlands in Africa, (Eds.) A.
Asiwaji, & P. O. Adeniyi, (Lagos: 1989), p.293-305.
16Y. Bologunin, “The Process of Cartographic Definition of Nigerian
Boundaries,” in Olayinka p. 201.
17See Weladji, C. (1975) “The Cameroon-Nigeria Border (2) Cross River to
the Sea,” in Abbia, 29/30, p.165. Note should be taken of the fact that even though
the Germans had signed a treaty with the King of Bimbia on 11th July, 1884, that
the British were still able to obtain yet another treaty on the 19 th of July 1884 with
the same King. Consequently, both the Douala and Bimbia area went to the
Germans.
18Ibid, p. 166.
19Ibid. Germany Surrenders St. Lucia in South Africa in exchange for
Victoria in the Cameroons, April 29, 1885 and May 7, 1885.
20Ibid, p.174-175.
21Ibid.
22Ibid, p. 177; see also Public Relations Office (PRO) (1893), London,
Foreign Office (FO) 403, No.187 (Confidential).
23Ibid, p.178.
24See Public Records Office, Directorate of Overseas Surveys, Doc. CO
554/2452, (Confidential) Signed, B. J. Greenhill, 9th May, 1961.
25See telegraph No.713 Confidential, addressed to Commonwealth
Relations Office, repeated Buea No.14, Enugu No.58 Savings, Lagos, May 2, 1961.
26See Nigerian Proclamation No. 126, of May 1954 for details.
27E. C. Burr, Correspondence No. WAF 441/110/01 of May 5, 1961.
28Ibid, May 8, 1961.
29B. J. Greenhill, Correspondence Ref. No. 503/3/4, of May 9, 1961,
confidential.
30D. W. S. Hunt, Correspondence Ref. No. NIG 40/240/1, May 10, 1961.
31J. Chadwick, correspondence Ref. No. CO 554/2452, June 6, 1961.
32Woods
33R. Akinjide, “Bakassi, Whose Bakassi?,” West Africa, April, 1994.
34T. A. Mbah, “Southern Cameroons Autonomy Bid,” West Africa, 21-27
August 1995, p.1316-1317.
35N. N. Susungi, “Cameroun-Nigeria: The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict,
Foncha and Muna did not
Betray
Southern Cameroons,”
@
WWW.africaserv.com/HISTORY/ conflict.html, 1999, p. 4-8.
36A. Mukong, Prisoner Without a Crime, (London: Calvert’s Press, 1990),
p.80.
14Ibid,
217
37Mungo
Beti, “Hidden Truth About Cameroon,” in Gaulist Africa:
Cameroon Under Ahmadou Ahidjo, (Ed) Richard Joseph, (Enugu: Fourth
Dimension Publishers, 1978), p. 95.
38See letter from Prison signed by five political detainees, addressed to The
Honorable Chairman of The National Commission for Human Rights, (The
Human Rights Defense Group) P. O. Box 359, Tel. 237-36-20-34, Bamenda,
Cameroun, dated 13/10/98, for original copies.
39See letter by 61 Anglophone Political Detainees, addressed to Albert
Mukong, Executive Director, Human Rights Defense Group, Bamenda,
Cameroun, signed by Tete Philip, Sept. 22, 1998.
40West Africa, “Damning Report,” 21-27 February 1994.
41Isaha’a Boh (www.boh.org) Cameroon Bulletin, No. 650, Sunday 24,
October 1999.
42This writer was a student in the department of Social Sciences at
Ahmadou Bello University (ABU), Zaria, where Wilmot taught Sociology before
he was given the 24 hour-marching order to leave Nigeria.
43Africa Confidential, Supra note, 5, p. 5.
44Ibid.
45N.N. Susungi (1999), Supra note 35, p.3 & 4.
46The Herald, “Betis mobilize to fight Biya following Discontent over the
death of Ayissi Mvodo and Arrest of Edzoa, Ze Meka,…,” No. 484, Yaounde,
Cameroun, July 14-15, 1997, p. 1.
CHAPTER FIVE
NOTES
See quote in Jerome Hamilton Buckley’s The Victorian Temper, (New
York: Vantage Books, 1951), p. 185.
2 Ibid, p. 195-96.
3 Details of Reformers fighting to defend and preserve Truth are contained
in large scale in the works of Ellen G. White, notably The Great Controversy,
Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1950.
4 Ostwald, Martin, in the introduction of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics,
(Indianapolis: The Library of Arts Press, 1962), p. xiii.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, p. xiv.
7Idid.
8 Ibid, p. 4.
9 Ibid, p. 4 -5 .
10 See Henry Sidwick, “The Utilitarian Theory of Justice,” in Frederick A.
Olafson , Justice and Social Policy, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961), p. 29-54.
11 Ibid, p. 32.
12 Ibid, p. 33.
218
Ibid, p. 35-36.
Ibid, p. 76-79.
15 Ibid, p. 78. See also, Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, p. 5 on ‘The
limitations of Ethics in politics.’
16 Ibid, p. 79.
17 Seyom Brown, The Causes and Prevention of War. (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1987), p. 24.
18 Ibid, p. 25.
19 Guardian, “Ambazonia Claims Bakassi,” June 19, 1994, p. 1-2.
20 Ibid, p. 2.
21 West Africa, “No Win Without Ambazonia,” March 20-25, 1995, p. 413.
22 Chinedu Munir Nwoko is a Historian, Author and Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of England and Wales by the time he wrote the article in 1995.
23 Cameroon: Chinedu Nwoko’s use of the English spelling should be
ignored. It is based on the premise that Cameroun (Cameroon Federation) is
bilingual. In the absence of the federation ever having existed according to the
treaty of union, it is hard to see how Cameroun hegemony should bear any such
inferences. Cameroun is still the Cameroun that attained separate in dependence
and was admitted to the UN as such on January 1, 1960.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Webster Noah, Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary.
Unabridged. 2nd Edition deluxe color. (William Collins & World Publishing co.
Inc., 1975), p. 1588.
27 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, (New York: McGraw-Hill
Edition), 1991, p. 1178.
28 The News, 21 March, 1994, p. 16.
29 Ibid, p. 17.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, p. 19
32 Ibid, p.22
33 Ibid, p. 25
34 The desire to avoid the confusion of names, their spellings and the
importance attached to them is why the Southern Cameroons leader, Fon GorjiDinka and a groups of elites came up with the name Ambazonia to represent the
Southern Cameroons.
35 Ibid.
36 Ngoh, A Hundred Years of History, p. 295. See also footnote 52 in
chapter two of this text for more details.
37For details of Equatorial Guinea’s intervention in the Bakassi dispute
and her complaints against Cameroun, see chapter seven of this text.
38 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1963), p. 272.
13
14
219
39Ibid,
p.432-435
CHAPTER SIX
1M.
Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979) p.89-90.
2Ibid, p.120.
3J. Z. Rubin, G. D. Pruitt, & S. K. Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate
and Settlement, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), p.179.
4W. W. Bishop Jr., International Law: Cases and Materials, (Boston: Little
Brown & Co.,1962), p. 347.
5Cameroun Government, “Declaration of the Cameroun Government on
the Border Dispute with Nigeria,” Yaounde, October 19, 1998, p.2.
6Ibid, p.3.
7Government of Nigeria, “Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria,” in Cameroun v. Nigeria, December 13, 1995, p.3.
8Ibid, p.5.
9Ibid, p.13.
11ICJ Press Communiqué 99/37, “The Court finds Nigeria’s CounterClaims admissible and fixes time-limits for the filing of further written
pleadings,” July 2, 1999, p.1.
12Ibid.
13Interpleader: Webster’s definition of it as a legal proceeding in which a
party of whom two or more adverse parties make the same claim, and who does
not claim the item in controversy for himself, compels those parties to litigate
among themselves and so relieves himself of the possible suits that they might
bring against him, is sufficient in helping us understand the Ambazonia case
14See details of the Ambazonia documents/cases and correspondence with
the ICJ at www.ambazonia.com
15See Hotline News, “Another Southern Cameroons Offensive,” December
1998, for details of the published text of the SCRM version of the Interpleader,
which express the position of Ambazonia on the Bakassi peninsula dispute
between Nigeria and Cameroun.
16For
details see “Ambazonia Interpleader Summons,” p. 6 at
www.ambazonia.com or contact Ambazonia Sovereignty Society-North America,
c/o Ambazonian Mission, P. O. Box 21094, Kalorama STN, Washington DC,
20009.
17Ibid, “Ambazonia Interpleader, Order to Show Cause,” p.7.
18Ibid, (Fon Gorji-Dinka adult Ambazonian, Barrister-at-law of the
Supreme Court of Great Britain, Solicitor and Advocate of the Supreme Court of
La Republique du Cameroun, President Emiretus of the Cameroun Bar Association,
and the Doyen of the indigenous legal practitioners within the Central African
Sub-Region), p. 8.
220
19See
“Ambazonia Interpleader,” 1994, p. 9, no. 10 & 11.
20Ibid.
21Ibid,
p. 10.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Ibid,
p. 11.
p. 12. Note: The Interpleader was Sworn to at 1801 Adams Mills Rd,
Washington DC, on the 16th May, 1994 in the Office and presence of Amalia
Perez, Notary Public, District of Columbia, USA.
25Ibid,
CHAPTER SEVEN
1ICJ
Press Communiqué, “Equatorial Guinea Requests Permission to
Intervene in the Proceedings,” in Cameroun versus Nigeria, June 30, 1999, p. 1.
2Ibid.
3See Munkman, “Adjudication & Adjustment—International Judicial
Decision and Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Dispute,” 46 BYBIL 1, (19721973), in W. Burns et al, International Law and World Order, (St. Paul: West
Publishing Company, 1990), p. 345.
4Ibid, p. 346.
5William W. Bishop, Jr., International Law (Cases and Materials) (Boston,
Mass.: Little Brown & Co., 1962), p. 344.
6Ibid, p. 348.
7Ibid, p. 350.
8Ibid, p. 350.
9ICJ Press Communiqué 96/13, “Order of the Court on Provisional
Measures, Mar. 15,” 1996, pp. 1-2.
10ICJ Press Communiqué 99/14 bis, “Summary of the Judgment of 25
March 1999” concerning the preliminary objections of Nigeria.
11Ibid.
See also “Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion,” ICJ Reports 1973,
p.212, para. 98.
12ICJ Press Communiqué 98/23 bis, “Preliminary Objections Summary of
the Judgment of 11 June 1998,” p.4.
13Ibid, p. 6-7.
14Ibid, p. 12.
15ICJ Registrar, Correspondence No. 91619, of July 18, 1994, p. 1. For
details see www.ambazonia.com
6Response of Ambazonia to the Registrar of the ICJ, see details on
www.ambazonia.com
7Correspondence of Congressman T. J. Penny to US Ambassador M.
Albright, on the Bakassi Pininsula dispute and the Ambazonia Interpleader, June
20, 1994. For details, see www.ambazonia.com
221
8Correspondences
of US Ambassador M. Albright to Congressman T. J.
Penny, July 13, 1994 & September 14, 1994. Also see www.ambazonia.com.
19ICJ Press Communique 96/13, supra note 9.
20M. Chemillier-Chanreau, “The International Court of Justice Between
Politics an Law,” Le Monde Diplomatic, translated by Natalie Reid, Paris, 1996,
p. 2.
21ICJ Case Summaries, (Provisional Measures) Order of 15 March 1996, p.
9-10.
22Ibid, p. 8.
23ICJ Press Release, “Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans,” 11 June 1998,
p. 4.
24ICJ Annex to Press Communiqué 98/23bis, “Separate Opinion of Judge
Oda,” p.13.
25Ibid, p.13-14
26Ibid, p. 16-17.
27ICJ, Press Release, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma,” 11 June 1998,
p. 3.
28Nwoko Chinedu Munir, “No Win Without Ambazonia,” West Africa, 2026 March 1995, p. 413.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1Ambazonia
Sovereignty Society North America, “Open Letter to
Cameroun President Paul Biya: Just Before the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute
Becomes a Disaster for Cameroun.” By Justice M. Mbuh, Spokesman, Ambazonia
Sovereignty Society North America (AMBASOS-NA), April 2001; See also The
Post newspaper, Cameroun, May/June 2001.
2Vanguard, “Nigeria, Cameroon Agree to Settle Dispute Through
Negotiations.” Lagos; See also AllAfrica.com, September 16, 2002.
3Daily News, “UN Chief meets with Nigeria, Cameroon leaders,”
Alexander G. Higgins, Associated Press Reporter, November 15, 2002.
4ICJ Press Release, The ICJ Final Judgment. October 10, 2002; See also,
www.icj-cij.com.
5Weekly Trust, “Aftermath of International Court Verdict: Will Nigeria go
to War?”
6Vanguard, “International Adjudication, The Bakassi Case and its
Aftermath.” Chidi Odinkalu, Lagos, November 15, 2002.
7Vanguard, “Nigeria and the Bakassi Magouille.” Bola A. Akinterinwa,
Lagos, November 13, 2002.
222
8This
Day, “Ita-Giwa to Bafarawa: Don’t Politicize Bakassi Issue.” By
Bature Umar, Abuja, November 13, 2002.
9This Day, “Bakassi: ICJ Judgment, Western Imperialists Gang Up.” Mary
Onwucheka, Lagos, November 12, 2002.
10Vanguard, “Echoes of Bakassi Peninsula.” By N.U.A. Nwagbara, Lagos,
November 4, 2002.
11This Day, “MASSOB Protests ICJ Decision on Bakassi.” By Okon Bassey,
Port-Harcourt, November 15, 2002.
12Vanguard, “ICJ Judgment on Bakassi Peninsula Per Incurian and
Faculty.” By Ejike Ume, Lagos, November 18, 2002.
13This Day, “Britain Responsible for Bakassi Debacle.” By Ofonago, Lagos,
November 18, 2002.
14BBC News, “Cameroon Awarded Oil-Rich Bakassi.” Francis Neba,
October 10, 2002.
15This Week, “Bakassi: Yaounde Has the Might for War.” Appolonia
Emeanua; Also see, www.globalpolicy.org/security/doc, February 21, 2002.
16Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), “The Bakassi Settlement.”
Press Release to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, send to author via e-mail,
November 18, 2002.
17Nigeria and Cameroon: Current SCNC Press Release, Reply by Elias
Bongmba on bscnation@yahoogroups.com, November 19, 2002.
18Associated Press, “UN Chief meets with Nigerian, Cameroon Leaders on
Dispute.” By Alexander G. Higgins, November 15, 2002.
19This Day, “ICJ Judgment: How Enforceable?” By Akpo Mudiaga Odje,
November 21, 2002.
20Take Over of Cameroun Embassy in Germany, October 1, 2002. On Sat,
23 Nov 2002 14:10:18, Valentin Oben in Germany wrote of the Take over of
Cameroun Embassy in Germany by Militant Youths of the Southern Cameroons
Youth League (SCYL).
21The
Response of The Republic of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons)
Following the ICJ Ruling on Bakassi Pininsula Border Dispute. Ambazonia
Peoples Emancipation Council (APEC), Washington, DC, P. O. BOX 148,
Washington, D.C. 20044-0148, November 24, 2002, in Chapter Nine.
CHAPTER NINE
1Richard
L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History. (New York: Harper &
Row, 1978), p. 92.
2G. Fitzmaurice, “Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties,” 2 YBILC, 83, 72107. See also Christine, Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law, (Oxford,
New York: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 1-17.
3C. Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law,… p. 7.
223
4Ibid,
p. 14.
5Ibid.
6Ibid,
p. 17. See also Chapter 8 of the case between Nicaragua and the
United States in Nicaragua versus United States, on conflicts in Central America
discussed widely in Damrosch L. “Multilateral Disputes in the International
Court of Justice,” in L. Damrosch, (ed.), The International Court of Justice at
Crossroads (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1987), p. 376-400.
7A. Mukong, “The Southern Cameroons Problem,” The Human Rights
Defense Group, Bamenda, Cameroun, 1999, p.11.
8Ibid.
9W. H. Burns et al, “Statute of the International Court of Justice,” Basic
Documents in International Law and World Order,… p. 34.
10Ibid, p. 35.
11Ibid, p. 37.
12Ibid.
13ICJ, Case Summaries, 28 May 1948, www.lawschool.cornell.edu, p. 1-2.
14Ibid, p. 2-3.
15Ibid, p. 3.
16See Judgment HCB/28/92 in the Case of Ambazonia versus Cameroun,
1992.
17H. Starr, “International Law and International Order,” in Controversies
in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, Charles
W. Kegley, Jr. (Ed.) (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) p. 306. See also,
Akehurst, Michael, A Modern Introduction to International Law, 6th Edition
(London: Allen &Unwin, 1987), p. 6.
18J. Newton, The Nigeria-Cameroun Border Dispute: Causes and
Consequences of Political Intransigence in Bilateral Relations, p. 2.
19Ibid, p.237.
20Ibid, p.267.
21Note: Douala Mutome and Martin Belinga were quoted in a Cameroun
weekly newspaper, The Herald, of March, 1998.
22Ibid.
23The State, (South Carolina State Newspaper) “Survey Calls Denmark
Least Corrupt,” by George Gedda, of Associated Press, September 23, 1998, p. P.
A. 29.
24See Louis Rene Beres, “Human Transformations and International Law,”
International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XV No. 3 Sept. 1998, p. 55.
25Ibid, p. 57.
26Ibid, p.59.
27ICJ Communiqué, (Statement of the President of the Court), “The
Limitations on the Contribution by the International Court of Justice to the
Maintenance of Peace,” October 15, 1996, p.3.
224
28Beres,
L.R. “Human Transformations and International Law,” supra note
23, p.69.
29Ibid.
30See
“Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Other Peoples,” Dec. 14, 1960.
31J. Rummel, “Death by Government.” (New York: Transaction Press,
1994), p. 1.
32C. W. Kegley, & E. R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and
Process, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 29.
33We can summarily list these developments from the First World War till
the end of the Gulf War, especially as pertaining to the territory of the Southern
Cameroons (Ambazonia) as including the Anglo-French Treaty of 1916, the Paris
Peace of 1918, the advent of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the United
Nations Charter, the trusteeship, the 1961 UN Plebiscite for the Cameroons, the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
of 1960, the pre-Plebiscite agreement between Cameroun President Ahmadou
Ahidjo and the judgment of the case of Ambazonia versus Cameroun, of 1992.
34Richard B. Bilder, Book Review, “The Right of Conquest: The
Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice,” By Sharon
Korman (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1996),
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 91, January 1997, p. 749.
35Ibid, p. 749.
36Quoted in Connie Peck’s The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement
System (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) p. 131. See also Mohamed
Sahnuon, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities. (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1994).
APPENDICES
A. TREATIES (Full Text):
1. Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 (Nigeria-Kamerun Boundary)
Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of the AngloGerman Boundary between Nigeria and the Cameroons
from Yola to the Cross River. With 8 Accompanying Maps.
Signed at Obokum, April 12, 1913
The undersigned, Captain W. V. Nugent, Commissioner of His Britannic
Majesty, and Oberleutnant H. Detzner, Commissioner of His Majesty the
German Emperor, being appointed by their respective Governments to mark out
a definite boundary between Nigeria and the Cameroons from Yola to the Cross
River, in accordance with the Agreement of the 6th October, 1909, have agreed to
adopt the boundary shown on the accompanying map [Not deposited. [Note by
225
the Registry].] in 8 sheets, subject to the subsequent approval of their
Governments.
A detailed description of the boundary line is given below.
1. From Pillar 1, at a point a quarter of a mile north-west of Pillar 17 (the last
pillar of the Yola-Chad demarcation), the boundary runs in a straight line
through Pillars 2 and 3 to Pillar 4, whence it runs in a straight line to Pillar 5,
distant about 480 yards south-east of Pillar 4. Thence it runs in a straight line to
Pillar 6, and from there in a straight line through Pillars 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
and 15 to Pillar 16 on top of the Tebeni Hill, whence it runs in a straight line
through Pillar 17 to Pillar 18, situated on the Maio M'Bulo (German Mao Bulo) at
a point where that river bends to the east, about 1 3/8 miles from Pillar 17.
2. From Pillar 18 the boundary follows the thalweg of the Maio M'Bulo upstream
until it reaches Pillar 19, at the junction of this river with the Maio Gerra
(German Djerra). Thence it follows the thalweg of the Maio Gerra upstream until
it reaches Pillar 20 situated near the head of this tributary.
3. From Pillar 20 the boundary runs in a straight line to Pillar 21 on the top of a
high hill Dakka, and thence south-west in a straight line to Pillar 22, close to the
main road over the Gambio Pass, and from here it follows the thalweg of one of
the tributaries of the Maio Kam to Pillar 23, where the same road crosses this
tributary. Thence it follows the thalweg of the Maio Kam to Pillar 24 at the
junction of the Maio Kirimi with the Maio Kam.
4. From Pillar 24 the boundary continues in a straight line to Pillar 25 on the top
of a hill about 2 1/4 miles distant from Pillar 24 in a south-south-easterly
direction, and from here in a straight line to Pillar 26, a large stone on top of a hill
Hos Jikussum (German Dschekussum) about 3 miles south-west of Pillar 25, and
from Pillar 26 on in a straight line to Pillar 27, a large stone on top of Hos Nagga,
a hill on the north bank of the Maio Moodu (German Mudu), and from there in a
straight line to Pillar 28 on top of a prominent isolated hill on the right bank of
the Maio Lumen.
From Pillar 28 the boundary runs in a straight line to Pillar 29 on the highest
point of the Shina ridge (German Hoss Schina).
From Pillar 29 the crest of the Shina ridge forms the boundary, which passes
through Pillar 30 to Pillar 31 on the south end of this ridge, and then runs in a
straight line to Pillar 32 on the top of a pointed foothill of Hos Tukurua (German
Tukorua), thence in a straight line to Pillar 33, the highest point of Hos Tukurua
itself, from there in a straight line to Pillar 34, the highest point of Hos
226
Shekussum, and from this point in a straight line to Pillar 35 on top of Hos
Pabun.
5. From Pillar 35 the boundary runs in a straight line in a south-westerly
direction through Pillar 36 (distant about 3 miles south of the isolated hill
Kunassim) to Pillar 37 on top of the hill, trigonometrical point 1352.
6. From Pillar 37 the boundary runs in a straight line through Pillar 38 on the
Maifula-Karbabi road, Pillar 39 on the north bank of the River Teraba (German
Taraba), Pillar 40 on the south bank of this river, Pillar 41 on the Beli-Karbabi
road, to Pillar 42 on the summit of the great isolated mountain Hos Kun (Dushin
Beli) (German Hoss Bali).
7. From Pillar 42 the boundary runs in a straight line through Pillar 43 near the
junction of the roads Beli-Abaschirschir and Bakundi-Gaschaka, to Pillar 44 on
the north bank of the Maio Gazabu (German Abaschirschir).
8. From Pillar 44 the boundary follows the thalweg of the Maio Gazabu for about
1 1/2 miles to Pillar 45 at the junction of the Maio Mum with the Maio Gazabu,
and from here follows the thalweg of the Maio Mum to a point near its source,
where is Pillar 46.
9. From Pillar 46 the boundary runs in a straight line through Pillar 47, on a
plateau about 1 mile north-east of Damia, to Pillar 48 on top of the same plateau.
10. From Pillar 48 it runs in a straight line through Pillar 49 on the Didon
(German Didan)-Kwossa road, and from there in a straight line through the
Pillars 50, 51, 52 and 53 to Pillar 54 on the north bank of the Maio Sung, about 1
3/4 miles east of Oodi Hill, thence in a straight line to Pillar 55 on the Maio Tati, at
a point where that river bends in a south-south-westerly direction.
11. From Pillar 55 the boundary follows the thalweg of the Maio Tati to Pillar 56
at the junction of that river with the Rafin Donga (Donga River), and from here it
follows the thalweg of the Rafin Donga to Pillar 57 at the junction of the Maio
Tutua with the Rafin Donga, and from here it follows the thalweg of the Maio
Tutua up-stream, passing the Pillar 58 on the Kentu-Donga road, and the Pillar
59 on the Kentu-Takum road, to Pillar 60 on top of the isolated foothill of the
Wanya Mountains (German Wanga-Gebirges) between the two head-waters of
the Tutua River.
12. From Pillar 60 the boundary runs in a straight line across the Wanya
Mountains to the source of a small tributary of the Gamana River. It now follows
the thalweg of this tributary, passing Pillar 61 on a small road running along the
227
foot of the Wanya Mountains, Pillar 62, and Pillar 63 on the Kentu Lissam road,
to Pillar 64 at the junction of this tributary with the Gamana River.
13. From Pillar 64, on the north bank of the Gamana River, the boundary runs in
a straight line, through Pillar 65 on the south bank of the same river, Pillar 66 on
the top of the most westerly spur of Hos Ningua, Pillar 67 where it is crossed by
a southern tributary of the Gamana River, Pillar 68, on the Burba-Takum road,
Pillar 69 on the eastern spur of a large isolated hill, Pillar 70 on top of a
prominent high rocky point, Pillar 71 on a road between Burba and the Lissam
country, Pillar 72 on a road between Lissam and Big Lutu (German Gross-Lutu),
Pillar 73 on a low hill which is a prominent landmark, Pillar 74 at the fork of the
Lissam-Big Lutu and Takum-Big Lutu roads, to Pillar 75 on a road running in a
westerly direction from Big Lutu.
14. From Pillar 75 the boundary runs in a straight line to Pillar 76 on top of a high
ridge and from there in a straight line to Pillar 77 on top of a high hill close to the
Little Lutu (German Klein-Lutu)-Chippon (German Schüpon) road, and from
there in a straight line to Pillar 78 on the Big Chippon (German Gross-Schüpon)Ngadi road, and from there in a straight line to Pillar 79 on top of the high
mountain range north of the Katsena Valley, and from there in a straight line to
Pillar 80 on the Ngadi-Small Chippon (German Klein Schüpon) road, and from
there in a straight line to Pillar 81 on the north bank of the Katsena River.
15. From Pillar 81 the boundary runs in a straight line through Pillar 82 on the
south bank of the Katsena River, to Pillar 83 on top of the hill, trigonometrical
point 1627.
From Pillar 83 the boundary runs in a straight line through Pillar 84 on the
Gaiama (German Gayama)-Ngadi road, Pillar 85 on another road between Ngadi
and Gaiama, Pillar 86 on a road along the north bank of the River Wom, to Pillar
87 on the Wom River itself.
16. From Pillar 87 the boundary follows the thalweg of the River Wom to Pillar
88 at the junction of the Rivers Wom and Imba (German Metschum), and thence
it follows the thalweg of the Imba (Metschum) River up-stream to Pillar 89 at the
point of junction of this river with a tributary called the Mazan River.
From Pillar 89 it follows the thalweg of this tributary up to Pillar 90 near its
source, crosses a small watershed, and then follows the thalweg of the River Awa
to its junction with the Maquari River (German Mequer), then along the thalweg
of the Maquari River itself to Pillar 91 at the place where the Rivers Maquari
(Mequer) and Morn (German Moan) meet and form the Tunga River. Thence it
228
follows the thalweg of the River Morn (Moan) up-stream to Pillar 92 at the
junction of this river with the Ihi River.
17. From Pillar 92 the boundary runs in a straight line through Pillar 93 on the
Iturubu-Habe road, Pillar 94 on top of a flat hill 1 3/4 miles south-west of Pillar 92,
Pillar 95 on a ridge 1 3/4 miles south-west of Pillar 94, to Pillar 96, at a point on
the Mokamon (Nkwam) River, where this river bends to the north and is joined
by a tributary from the east.
From Pillar 96 the boundary runs in a straight line to Pillar 97 on top of a high
hill, trigonometrical point 2341, and from there in a straight line through Pillar 98
on the Maiatura-Ndiri (German Ndile) road, Pillar 98A on the Maiatura-Ngale
road, Pillar 99 on the Maiatura-Aningay (German Aninge) road, to Pillar 100 at
the junction of the Amiri and Mahana (German Mahane) Rivers.
18. From Pillar 100 the boundary follows the thalweg of the Amiri River upstream as far as the source of its western headwater, crosses the watershed and
then follows the thalweg of the Magbé River, passing the Pillar 101 where the
Aliketti (German Aligetti)-Okwa road crosses this river, to Pillar 102 at the
junction of the River Magbé with the River Oyi (German Oji).
19. From Pillar 102 the boundary runs in a straight line through Pillar 103 on the
Okwa-Obonyi (German Oboni) road, to the highest point of a large twin-peaked
hill, which is a natural boundary-mark, and from here in a straight line through
Pillar 104 on the left bank of the Oyi (Oji) River to Pillar 105 on the Anebir
(German Anjibir) River, at the point where the Obonyi (Oboni) Bashu (German
Baschu) road crosses this river.
20. From Pillar 105 the boundary follows the thalweg of the Anebir (Anjibir)
River to Pillar 106 on its left bank. From Pillar 106 the boundary is a straight line
through Pillars 107, 108 on the Bashu (Baschu)-Bodam road, to Pillar 109 on the
left bank of the Okon River, and thence it runs in a straight line through Pillar
110 on the Abo-Bodam road, Pillar 111 on the North Danare-Bodam road, Pillar
112 on the South Danare-Bodam road, Pillar 113 on the Baje (German Badje)Danare road, to Pillar 113A about 6 miles distant from Pillar 113.
21. From Pillar 113A the boundary runs in a straight line to Pillar 114 at a bend in
the Cross River about 2 1/2 miles up-stream from Obokum on the north bank of
this river.
All the pillars consist of iron poles cemented into concrete blocks, each block
being marked with the number of the pillar, the date, and arrows showing the
directions of the next pillars.
229
In case the above description of the boundary does not agree exactly with the
boundary as shown on the maps accompanying the present Agreement, and
which are regarded as forming an integral part thereof, it is expressly understood
that the position of the boundary as shown on the maps shall decide any dispute.
Signed in duplicate originals, each being in English and German, at Obokum,
this twelfth day of April, 1913.
H. DETZNER, Oberleutnant,
Deutscher Kommissar.
W. V. NUGENT, Captain,
British Commissioner.
2. Anglo-French Treaty of 1931, Modified from Anglo-French Treaty of
1916 on the British Cameroons-French Cameroun boundary and also
on the Ambazonia or Southern Cameroons-Cameroun boundary in the
lower end. Note: By this time, portions of Cameroun had already been
annexed to Chad, Central African Republic, Congos, and Gabon by the
French!
Declaration and Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and France,
dated 9 January 1931 (Treaty Series No. 34 (1931) [Cmd. 3936])
Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
and the French Government respecting the Boundary between British and French
Cameroons
No. 1
M. DE FLEURIAU TO MR. A. HENDERSON
[Translation]
French Embassy,
London, January 9, 1931
Monsieur le Secrétaire d'État,
I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency herewith the text of a Declaration
[See p. 96.] signed recently by the High Commissioner of the French mandated
230
area of the Cameroons and the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria. It relates to the frontier between our respective spheres of the mandated
territory of the Cameroons.
Your Excellency will no doubt have received the text of the same Declaration and
will certainly have observed that it concerns a preliminary survey only. This is
intended to describe the line to be followed by the Delimitation Commission,
more exactly than was done in the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919.
However, the first Declaration mentioned above does in substance define the
frontier in question, and the Government of the Republic has the honor to
confirm by the present note the implicit acceptance of the Declaration. If it is
similarly confirmed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the
definitive delimitation can be undertaken by the commission provided for in
Article 1 of the Mandate.
Accept, etc.
A. de FLEURIAU
No. 2
MR. A. HENDERSON TO M. DE FLEURIAU
Foreign Office,
January 9, 1931
Your Excellency,
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of to-day's
date on the subject of the delimitation of the boundary between the British and
French spheres of the mandated territory of the Cameroons, and to inform you
that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have, as you surmised,
received from the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria the text of
the Declaration recently signed by the High Commissioner of the French
Republic in the French mandated area of the Cameroons and himself.
2. His Majesty's Government agree that this Declaration is, as you point out, not
the product of a boundary commission constituted for the purpose of carrying
out the provisions of Article 1 of the Mandate, but only the result of a
preliminary survey conducted in order to determine more exactly than was done
in the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919 the line ultimately to be followed by the
boundary commission; that, none the less, the Declaration does in substance
231
define the frontier; and that it is therefore desirable that the agreement embodied
therein shall be confirmed by the two Governments in order that the actual
delimitation of the boundary may then be entrusted to a boundary commission,
appointed for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the
Mandate.
3. His Majesty's Government note that the French Government by their note
under reference confirm, for their part, the agreement embodied in the
Declaration; and I have the honor in reply to inform your Excellency hereby that
His Majesty's Government similarly confirm this agreement.
4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accordingly concurs with
the French Government that the actual delimitation can now be entrusted to the
boundary commission envisaged for this purpose by Article 1 of the Mandate.
I have, etc.
Arthur HENDERSON
No. 3
DECLARATION MADE BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE COLONY AND
PROTECTORATE OF NIGERIA AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE FRENCH
CAMEROONS DEFINING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN BRITISH AND
FRENCH CAMEROONS
The undersigned:
Sir Graeme Thomson, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Governor of the Colony
and Protectorate of Nigeria,
Paul Marchand, Governor of the French Cameroons, have agreed to determine
the frontier, separating the territories of the Cameroons placed respectively
under the authority of the British and French Governments, as is traced on the
map [See, in the pocket at the end of the present publication, map 8. [Note by the
Registry.]] annexed to this declaration and defined in the description also
annexed hereto.
The boundary starts from the junction of the three old British, French and
German boundaries at a point in Lake Chad 13º05' latitude north and
approximately 14º05' longitude east of Greenwich. From there the boundary has
been determined as follows:
(2) On a straight line as far as the mouth of the Ebeji.
232
(3) Thence from this mouth along the course of the River Ebeji, which bears on
the upper part the names of Lewejil, Labejed, Ngalarem, Lebeit et Ngada, as far
as the confluence of the Rivers Kalia and Lebaiit.
(4) Thence from the confluence of the Rivers Ngada, Kalia and Labaiit along the
course of the Rivers Kalia or Ame as far as its confluence with the River Dorma
or Kutelaha (Koutelaha).
(5) Thence from the confluence of the Rivers Kalia and Dorma or Kutelaha along
the course of this last river as far as a point to the south of the village of Segage
where it meets a marsh stretching towards the south.
(6) Thence by a line through the middle of this marsh to where it meets the road
from Segage towards a marsh named Sale.
(7) Thence following the road to a point about a kilometer and a half to the north
of the said marsh.
(8) Thence passing about a kilometer and half to the west of the marsh as far as a
point about a kilometer and a half to the south of the marsh on the road leading
to the village of Gourgouron.
(9) Thence following this road to a point situated about 2 kilometers to the northeast of the village of Gourgouron and passing through a marsh nearly a
kilometer to the north of this village to a point situated about 2 kilometers to the
west on the Gourgouron-Ferfarti road, leaving the villages of Sale, Mada and
Gourgouron to France.
(10) Thence following this road and meeting a number of waterholes (shown on
Moisel's map under the name of Amjumba) to a point situated about a kilometer
from the village of Ferfarti and entering a marsh situated 500 meters to the north
of this village which is still assigned to France.
(11) Thence turning to the west, south-west and south as far as the bed of a
defined river and following the bed of this river in a south-westerly direction to a
large marsh named Umm Jumba (Amjumba), leaving the villages of Galadima
Jidda, Abu Kharaza and Ulba to England.
(12) Thence following a line through the middle of this marsh, passing the bed of
a small stream which is frequently lost in the marsh, as far as a water-hole named
Diguilaba and a confluence with another line of marsh running more to the south
in the direction of Wasa rock.
233
(13) Thence going on and meeting the bed of a better-defined stream crossing the
marsh of Kulujia and Kodo as far as a marsh named Agzabame.
(14) Thence crossing this marsh where it reaches a river passing quite close to the
village of Limanti (Limani) to a confluence at about 2 kilometers to the northwest of this village.
(15) Thence following the Limanti-Wabisei (Uagisa) road as far as a brook
situated about a kilometer to the east of Wabisei and passing through the middle
of the villages of Bangimami and Imchide, and leaving the village of Djarandioua
to France.
(16) Thence following this brook as far as a marsh situated about 3 kilometers to
the west of Wabisei.
(17) Thence crossing this marsh to a point where it meets the River Kolofata and
following this river as far as its confluence with the River Gwanje or Keraua.
(18) Thence following the Keraua as far as its confluence in the mountains with a
river coming from the west and known by the "Kirdis" inhabiting the mountains
under the name of Kohom (shown on Moisel's map under the name of Gatagule),
cutting into two parts the village of Keraua and separating the two villages of
Ishigashiya.
(19) Thence it runs from this confluence as far as the top of Mount Ngosi in a
south-westerly direction given by the course of the Kohom (Gatagule) which is
taken as the natural boundary from its confluence as far as its source in Mount
Ngosi; the villages of Matagum and Hijie being left to France, and the sections of
Uledde and of Laherre situated to the north of the Kohom to England; those of
Tchidoui (Hiduwe) situated to the south of Kohom to France.
(20) Thence on a line in a south-westerly direction following the tops of the
mountain range of Ngosi, leaving to France the parts of Ngosi situated on the
eastern slopes, and to England the parts situated on the western slopes, to a point
situated between the source of the River Zimunkara and the source of the River
Devurua; the watershed so defined also leaves the village of Bugelta to England
and the village of Turu to France.
(21) Thence in a south-south-westerly direction, leaving the village of Dile on the
British side, the village of Libam on the French side to the hill of Matakam.
(22) Thence running due west to a point to the south of the village of Wisik
where it turns to the south on a line running along the watershed and passing by
234
Mabas on the French side, after which it leaves Wula on the English side running
south and bounded by cultivated land to the east of the line of the watershed.
(23) Thence passing Humunsi on the French side the boundary lies between the
mountains of Jel and Kamale Mogode on the French side and sunning along the
watershed.
(24) Thence passing Humsiki, including the farmlands of the valley to the west of
the village on the French side, the boundary crosses Mount Kuli.
(25) Thence running due south between Mukta (British) and Muti (French) the
incorrect line of the watershed shown by Moisel on his map being adhered to,
leaving Bourha and Dihi on the French side, Madogoba Gamdira on the British,
Bugela or Bukula, Madoudji, Kadanahanga on the French, Ouda, Tua and
Tsambourga on the British side, and Buka on the French side.
(26) Thence the boundary runs through Mount Mulikia (named also
Lourougoua).
(27) Thence from the top of Mount Mulikia to the source of the Tsikakiri, leaving
Kotcha to Britain and Dumo to France and following a line marked by four
provisional landmarks erected in September 1920 by Messrs. Vereker and Pition.
(28) Thence along the course of the Tsikakiri, as it exists in reality and not as it is
shown on Moisel's map, to its confluence with the River Tiel.
(29) Thence the course of the Mayo Tiel as far as its confluence with the Benue.
(30) Thence along the course of the Benue upstream as far as its confluence with
the Faro.
(31) Thence along the course of the Faro as far as the mouth of its branch, the
Mao Hesso, situated about 4 kilometers south of Chikito.
(32) Thence along the course of the Mao Hesso as far as landmark No. 6 of the
old British-German frontier.
(33) Thence a line starting from Beacon 6, passing Beacon 7, finishing at the old
Beacon 8.
(34) Thence from this mark 8 placed on the left bank of the Mao Youwai, a small
stream flowing from the west and emptying itself into the Mayo Faro, in a
straight line running towards the south-west and reaching the summit of Wamni
Range, a very prominent peak to the north of a chain of mountains extending
235
towards the Alantika Mountains, and situated to the east of the old frontier mark
No. 10.
(35) Thence the frontier follows the watershed from the Mao Wari to the west
and from the Mao Faro to the east, where it rejoins the Alantika Range, it follows
the line of the watershed of the Benue to the north-west and of the Faro to the
south-east as far as the south peak of the Alantika Mountains to a point 2
kilometers to the north of the source of the River Mali.
(36) Thence from this peak by the River Sassiri, leaving Kobi to France and Kobi
Leinde to Great Britain, Tebou and Tscho to France, as far as the confluence with
the first stream coming from the Balakossa Range (this confluence touches the
Kobodji Mapeo Track), from this stream towards the south, leaving Uro Belo to
Great Britain and Nanaoua to France.
(37) Thence the boundary rejoins the old boundary about Lapao in French
territory, following the line of the watershed of the Balakossa range as far as a
point situated to the west of the source of the Labidje or Kadam River, which
flows into the River Deo, and from the River Sampee flowing into the River Baleo
to the north-west.
(38) Thence from this point along the line of the watershed between the River
Baleo and the River Noumberou along the crest of the Tschapeu Range, to a
point 2 kilometers to the north of Namberu, turning by this village, which is in
Nigeria, going up a valley north-east and then south-east, which crosses the
Banglang range about a kilometer to the south of the source of the Kordo River.
(39) Thence from this point on a straight line running towards the confluence of
the Rivers Ngomba and Deo until the line meets the River Kolob.
(40) Thence along a line parallel to the Bare Fort Lamy Track and 2 kilometers to
the west of this track, which remains in French territory.
(41) Thence a line parallel to and distant 2 kilometers to the west from this road
(which is approximately that marked Faulborn, January 1908, on Moisel's map)
to a point on the Maio Tipsal (Tiba, Tibsat or Tussa on Moisel's map) 2 kilometers
to the south-west of the point at which the road crosses said Maio Tipsal.
(42) Thence the course of the Maio Tipsal upstream to its confluence with the
Maio Mafu, flowing from the west, to a point some 12 kilometers to the southwest of Kwancha town.
(43) Thence a straight line running southwest to the highest peak of the Hosere
Jongbi (Dutschi-n-Djombi of Moisel's map).
236
(44) Thence the watershed between the basins of the Maio Taraba on the west
and the Maio Deo on the east to the second from the north of the four peaks of
the Hosere Bakari Be (Dutschi-n-Bertua on Moisel's map). These four peaks run
from north to south parallel to and about 3 kilometers to west of the road from
Bare to Fort Lamy.
(45) From this second peak issues the Maio Tapare which, flowing east to the
Maio Deo, forms the boundary between the Districts of Kwancha and Dodeo.
This peak is the source of the Maio Tapare, and is 2 miles due west of the Maio
Tapare Rest-house. This line leaves the villages of Mafou and Kounti in French
Territory.
(46) Thence following the watershed between the Maio Tapare (and its affluents)
and the Maio Deo (and its affluents) along, successively, the two remaining
peaks of the Hosere Bakari Be (running from north to south), the three peaks of
the Hosere N'Yamboli, the two peaks of the Hosere Maio Baji, Hosere Lainga.
These three little groups of Hosere N'Yamboli, Hosere Maio Baji and Hosere
Lainga run southwest and form the Bapai range. Behind the Bapai range is the
Sapbe Kauyel, which is in British Territory.
(47) Thence across the saddle connecting the Bapai range and the imposing
Genderu Mountains. From this saddle the frontier climbs to the first prominent
peak in the Genderu Mountains (known as Hosere Jauro Gotel or as Hosere
Jagam), thence along the remaining three peaks of Hosere Jauro Gotel (or Hosere
Jagam), thence along the four peaks of Hosere Sangoji to Sapbe M'Bailaji. These
last three groups of hills constitute part of the watershed between the Maio
Taraba and the Maio Yin.
(48) Thence to Hosere Lowul, which is well over 2 kilometers from the KwanchaBanyo main road. This peak (Hosere Lowul) lies on a magnetic bearing of 296
from the apex of the Genderu Pass on the above-mentioned main road. From this
apex, which is distant 3½ miles from Genderu Rest-house, and which lies
between a peak of Hosere M'Bailaji (to the west) and a smaller hill, known as
Hosere Burutol, to the east, Hosere M'Bailaji has a magnetic bearing of 45 and
Hosere Burutol one of 185.
(49) Thence a line, crossing the Maio Yin at a point some 4 kilometers to the west
of the figure 1,200 (denoting height in metres of a low conical hill) on Moisel's
map E 2, to a prominent conical peak, Hosere Gulungel, at the foot of which (in
French Territory) is a spring impregnated with potash, which is well-known to
all cattle-owners in the vicinity. This Hosere Gulungel has a magnetic bearing of
228 from the point (5 miles from Genderu Rest-house, which is known locally as
237
"Kampani Massa" on the main Kwancha-Banyo road where it (Hosere Gulungel)
first comes into view. From this same point the magnetic bearing to Hosere
Lowul is 11. The Salt lick of Banare lies in British Territory.
(50) This peak, Hosere Gulungel, is the first of six forming the little chain of the
Hosere Golurde (not "Gorulde" as on Moisel's map E. 2). The frontier runs along
these six Golurde peaks, thence to a little isolated peak (Hosere Bolsumri)
leaving the Bolsumri potash spring on the British side. The magnetic bearings
from Maio Lelewal (otherwise known as Yakuba) Rest house are: to Rosere
Gulungel 356, to the sixth peak of Hosere Golurde chain 323, and to Hosere
Bolsumri 302. Hosere Bolsumri, the nearest peak on the frontier to the KwanchaBanyo road, is over 2 kilometers from this road.
(51) Thence along the chain of hills known as Hosere N'Getti, which form the
watershed between the Maio Gangan and the Maio Yin (and Taraba), and which
ends in a high flat peak on a magnetic bearing of 248 from Maio Lelewal (or
Yakuba) Rest-house.
(52) Thence a line over a high plateau, crowded with mountaintops, forming the
watershed between the Maio Gangan to the west (British) and the Maio Dupbe to
east (French) and the Maio Banyo to west (French). These two last-named rivers
flow into the Maio M'Bamti. The whole of this line is entirely uninhabited for
fully 5 miles on either side, and it extends for some 13 or 14 miles in length. It is,
moreover, impassable at the very height of the rains. It lies on a very lofty and
desolate plateau, and, starting first in a southerly direction, swings to the southwest as it winds among a sea of mountain-tops forming in succession the groups
known locally as Hosere N'Yamn'Yeri, Sapbe Bnokni, Sapbe Pelmali, Sapbe
Wade, Sapbe Gallal and Sapbe Sirgu.
(53) Sapbe Sirgu, known to the local Pagans as "Yajin", and called loosely "Gotel
Berge" on Moisel's map E. 2, is the last part of the watershed between Maio
Gangan and Maio Banyo. The Banyo-Gashaka-Ibi road climbs steeply up this
Sapbe Sirgu and cuts the Frontier at the apex of the pass 6 miles to the northwest
of the Gandua Rest-house (the last rest-house on this road in French Territory).
(54) Thence to a point at the southwest end of the Sapbe Sirgu, 2 kilometers to the
north of the letter "i" in the word "Tukobi" on Moisel's map E. 2. This point is on
the common watershed between the three sets of headwaters of the Maio
Gashaka (British), the Maio Donga (or Kari), British, and also of the Maio Teram
(French).
(55) Thence a line running, generally, due south, to cross the Banyo-Kuma road 2
miles to west of the 1,630 meters hill on Moisel's map E. 2.
238
(56) Thence the Frontier swings to the east, following the watershed between the
Maio Donga (or Kari) and the Maio Taram, thence to the southeast, among the
Hosere N'Tem. Leaving the Sabri Potash spring in the Gashaka District in British
Territory. Thence south-south-west through, successively, the crests of the
Hosere N'Dangani, Hosere Kewal, Hosere Wajuru, and the Hosere Bangaro,
which last lie to the west-north-west of the Pagan village of Bangaro, to a point
on a saddle which connects the more westerly of the two parallel ridges forming
the Hosere Bangaro with the higher Sapbe Ma (still further to the west). This
saddle forms the watershed between the source of the Mai N'Gum (French),
which later joins the Maio Teram 6 miles south of Banyo Town, and the source of
the Maio Kemme, which is one of the headwaters of the Maio Donga. The Maio
Kemme was traced for 6 miles from its source as it flowed east towards the large
Pagan village of Kabri. The above-mentioned saddle is 4 miles from Bangaro
village, and is on the Banyo-Kabri path. Thus the prominent rocky bluff, Hosere
Tongbau, lies entirely in French territory.
(57) From this saddle the Frontier follows the watershed to a prominent peak, the
second of the Sapbe Ma group of mountains. This peak is on a magnetic bearing
of 215 from the above-mentioned point where the Banyo-Kabri path cuts the
watershed between the Maio N'Gum (French) and the Maio Kemme (British).
(58) Thence the watershed runs generally south-west along, in succession, the
peaks of the Sapbe Ma, the Hosere Jin (in front of which range is a very
prominent, detached, fang-like, rocky peak — also called Jin — visible for many
miles from the north, east and south, which is entirely in French Territory), the
Hosere Maio Dalle and the Hosere Gesumi. In front of, and parallel to, the
Hosere Gesumi is the chain of the less lofty Hosere Ribao. These Hosere Ribao
are close to, and overlook, the Ribao Rest-house (the third rest-house from
Banyo) and are wholly in French Territory.
(59) Thence the Frontier continues amongst the peaks of the Hosere Gerumi,
following the watershed between the head-waters of the Maio Donga to the
north, and the Maio Kwi (French) to the south, and the Maio Mabe (French) to
the south. These head-waters of the latter two (French) rivers emerge from
between the Hosere Chemo, the Hosere Lu, the Hosere Atta and the Hosere
Songkorong, which, in succession, form the foothills to the loftier Gesumi range
behind them to the north-west north of Songkorong village, which is on the
Banyo-Kumbo-Bamenda road, these Hosere Gesumi are called by the local
Pagans Hosere Hambere.
(60) Thence the Frontier follows the watershed amongst these Hosere Hambere
(or Gesumi) to the north of the sources of the Maio Kombe, Maio Gur and Maio
Malam to a fairly prominent, pointed peak which lies on a magnetic bearing of
239
17º from a cairn of stones, 8 feet high, erected on the 15th September, 1920, on the
south side of the above Banyo-Kumbo-Bamenda road at a point 1 mile from
N'Yorong Rest-camp and 8½ miles from Songkorong village.
(61) From this peak in the Hosere Hambere (or Gesumi), which is situated just to
the east of the visible source of the Maio M'Fi (or Baban), the Frontier follows the
watershed, visible all the way from the Cairn, between the Maio Malam to east
(French) and the Maio M'Fi (or Baban) to west (British), till it cuts the BanyoKumbo-Bamenda road at the Cairn. This Cairn is immediately under the highest
peak of the Hosere Nangban, which is shown on Moisel's map F. 2 as Hosere
Jadji, but Jadji is really the name of the Pagan head of N'Yorong village.
(62) Thence the Frontier ascends this highest peak of Hosere Nangban, following
the watershed between the Maio Monchar and the Maio Nimaju, which are both
to the east and which both flow into the Maio Malam (French), and a series of
little burns on the west which flow into the Maio M'Fi (or Baban), British.
(63) Thence the Frontier, following this watershed up and over this highest peak
of the Hosere Nangban to its far, or southwest side, at once strikes the source of
the Maio Mafu.
(64) Thence the Frontier is formed by the median line of the Maio Mafu, going
downstream, to its confluence with the Maio Mabe (or N'Sang). This confluence
also marks the end of the Frontier between Yola Province (Kwancha Division)
and the circumscription of N'Gaundere.
(65) Thence the median line of the Maio Mabe going upstream to its confluence
with the River Nketitup.
(66) Thence the course of the River Nketitup upstream to its source at the foot of
Mount Batfang (Banso) or Kouetnana (Bamun).
(67) Thence a line south westwards to the ravine situated at the head of the pass
separating the two peaks of Mount Batfang (Banso) or Kouetnana (Bamun).
(68) Thence a line south-south-eastwards to the westernmost point of Lake
Keban (Banso) or Tamfi (Bamun) so as to leave this lake entirely to France.
(69) Thence a line southwards to the summit of Mount Fanangan.
(70) Thence a line south-south-westwards to the foot of Mount Bantiwan so as to
leave this hill entirely to Great Britain.
(71) Thence a line south-westwards to the summit of Mount Ngori.
240
(72) Thence a line westwards passing through the centre to the western edge of
the salt spring called by the Bansos Lip and by the Bamuns You.
(73) Thence a line west-south-westwards to the sudden bend towards the south
in the River Mbui (Banso) or Mvi (Bamun), which is shown on Moisel's map and
is situated at the exact point where this river enters the plain from between the
mountains of Zemboui to the south and Njamjom (Banso) or Mveng (Bamun) to
the north.
(74) Thence the River Mbui or Mvi upstream to its confluence with the River
Molier (Banso) or Nkou (Bamun).
(75) Thence the River Molier (Banso) upstream to a point 200 yards below the
ford on the path between the villages of Koubokam and Koutopi so as to leave
the Bamun village and plateau of Koubokam to France and the area called by the
Bansos Mbokum to Great Britain.
(76) Thence a line parallel to the Koubokam-Koutopi path on its northern side
until the stream Moinum (Banso) or Ketchouperin (Bamun) is reached, thus
leaving the Koubokam-Koutopi path wholly in French territory.
(77) Thence the stream Ketchouperin or Moinun until its junction with the River
Moinun (Banso and Bamun) or Upper Nun.
(78) Thence the Moinun to its junction with the River Nun.
(79) Thence the River Nun to its junction with the River Ngwanonsia or
Chawnga or Chawga.
(80) Thence the River Ngwanonsia upstream to the point where it is crossed by
the Nkwefu-Bambalang Road.
(81) Thence a line westwards through the swamp to the northern extremity of the
Island of Nkwefu (an elder of the Bagam village of Fombefu).
(82) Thence a line westwards through the swamp to the point where the
Fombefu-Nkwefu path cuts the River Ta or Tantam.
(83) Thence the River Tantam upstream to its confluence with the River Sefu or
Mekango.
(84) Thence the River Sefu upstream to its source.
241
(85) Thence a line south-westwards to the apex of the large isolated rock called
Ngoma Fominyam.
(86) Thence a line southwards to the source of the River Webinga near point 1300
in Moisel's map and to the east of it.
(87) Thence the River Webinga to its confluence with the Mbonso (Bali-Bagam) or
Momogo (Bagam).
(88) Thence the River Mbonso to its confluence with the River Mifi.
(89) Thence the River Mifi upstream to its confluence with the River Mogo or
Dochi.
(90) Thence the River Mogo upstream to its confluence with the stream Dugum
(Bali-Bagam) or Mousete-Fontchili (Bagam), which is slightly above where the
Bagam-Bali-Bagam road crosses the River Mogo.
(91) Thence the stream Dugum to its source, which is marked by a cairn of stones
on the eastern side of Mount Ngenkoa (Bali-Bagam) or Koungo (Bagam).
(92) Thence a line to a cairn of stones at the top of the defile between Mount
Ngenkoa in the south and Mount Tabira (Bali-Bagam) or Koumenou (Bagam) in
the north.
(93) Thence a line to the bend in the River Bingwa (Bali-Bagam) or Seporo
(Bagam), about 60 yards from the above-mentioned cairn.
(94) Thence the River Bingwa to its confluence with the River Mifi.
(95) Thence the River Mifi upstream to its confluence with the River Kongwong.
(96) Thence the River Kongwong upstream to its junction with the River Tooloo
or Ntoulou.
(97) Thence the River Tooloo to a cairn at the top of the waterfall about 1
kilometer above the confluence of the Rivers Tooloo and Kongwong.
(98) Thence a straight line on a magnetic bearing of 130º to the summit of a
circular peak immediately to the north of the defile Zemembi, through which
passes the Babadju-Bapinyi path.
(99) Thence the line of heights overlooking to the east the vale of Babdju and to
the west the valley of the Meso to the peak Asimi, where this line of heights ends.
242
(100) Thence a straight line to the centre of the marsh shown on Moisel's map as
Mbetscho and called Kifi by the natives of Babinyi, and Tchinbintcho by those of
Babadju.
(101) Thence the crest of the watershed between the Cross River on the west and
the River Noun on the east to a beacon in the centre of a small area of forest
named Mepong about 400 Metres south-east of Mount Lekonkwe or
Etchemtankou on the crest of the watershed.
(102) Thence the stream Tantchempong, which has its source about 25 metres
southwest of the above-mentioned beacon, to its confluence with the stream
Mintchemecharlee.
(103) Thence the stream Mintchemecharlee upstream to the point where it most
nearly reaches two small rocks named Tolezet, which mark the boundary
between the villages of Fossong Elelen and Fongo Tongo on the road between
those villages.
(104) Thence a line passing through the two rocks named Tolezet to the source of
the stream Monchenjemaw or Montchi Zemo.
(105) Thence this stream to its confluence with the stream Munchisemor or
Montchi Zemoua, which has its source about 50 metres west of the largest of the
three rocks called Melogomalee or Melegomele.
(106) Thence the stream Munchisemor to its source.
(107) Thence a line passing through the centre of the largest of the three rocks
called Melogomalee to the source of the stream Monchita or Montchi Monie,
about 100 metres south-south-east of the above-named rock.
(108) Thence the stream Monchita to its confluence with the River Bamig.
(109) Thence the River Bamig upstream to its source on a forest-covered hill
called Nkenchop (the point where the River Bamig crosses the Dschang-Fontem
Road is marked by a beacon).
(110) Thence a line through the crest of the hill Nkenchop to the crest of a forestcovered hill called Siambi.
(111) Thence a straight line to a beacon placed on the watershed at a point known
as Ntchoumgomo.
243
(112) Thence a line following the crest of the watershed between the Cross River
on the west and the River Nkam on the east through the summits of Mounts
Ngome and Jomen to the summit of Mount Wenmen.
(113) Thence a straight line running south-south-west to join the River Ngwe.
(114) Thence the River Ngwe for a distance of 3 kilometers to its affluent, the
stream Liplo.
(115) Thence the stream Liplo to a point 500 metres west of the Moangekam-Lo
track.
(116) Thence a line running parallel with this track and 500 metres west of it,
until this line reaches the crest of Mount Njimba.
(117) Thence a line along the crest of Mount Njimba to its summit, which lies to
the west of the French village of Moangekam.
(118) Thence a line through the summit of Mount Ngokela to the plain of Elung,
leaving the Muanya compound of Nyan in British territory.
(119) Thence a track cut across the plain and marked with posts so as to leave the
village of Nyan in British territory and the village of Po-Wassum in French
territory, until this track reaches the stream Edidio.
(120) Thence this stream until it is crossed by the Poala-Muangel track.
(121) Thence a line running south-south-west along the summit of Mount
Manenguba to the ridge surrounding the basin of the lakes.
(122) Thence a curved line along the eastward side of the ridge until the point
where the Muandon-Poala track crosses the ridge.
(123) Thence the Muandon-Poala track in a westerly direction down the slopes of
Mount Hahin and Mount Ebouye until it reaches the River Mbe.
(124) Thence the River Mbe which runs parallel with Mount Mueba, until a line
of cairns and posts is reached.
(125) Thence this line of cairns and posts, which marks the boundary between the
French villages of Muaminam (Grand Chef Nsasso) and the English villages of
the Bakossi tribe (District Head Ntoko) and the Ninong tribe (district Head
Makege), to the point where an unnamed tributary from the North joins the
River Eko.
244
(126) Thence a line touching the two westernmost points of the boundary of the
former German plantation of Ngoll to the crest of Mount Elesiang.
(127) Thence along the crest of Mount Elesiang to the northern-most point of the
tobacco plantation of Nkolankote.
(128) Thence a line running south-south-west along Mount Endon, so as to leave
the plantation of Nkolankote in French territory and the plantation of Essosung
in British territory, to the summit of Mount Coupe.
(129) Thence a straight line running south-south-west to a cairn of stones on the
Lum-Ngab Road at a point 6,930 metres along this road from the railway track.
(130) Thence a straight line in a south-westerly direction to the source of the
River Bubu.
(131) Thence the River Bubu to a point 1,200 metres downstream from a place
called Muanjong Farm.
(132) Thence in a straight line in a westerly direction to the source of the River
Ediminjo.
(133) Thence the River Ediminjo to its confluence with the River Mungo.
(134) Thence the River Mungo to the point in its mouth where it meets the
parallel 4º 2' 3" north.
(135) Thence this parallel of latitude westwards so as to reach the coast south of
Tauben Island.
(136) Thence a line following the coast, passing south of Reiher Island to Mokola
Creek, thus leaving the whole of the Moewe See in British territory.
(137) Thence a line following the eastern banks of the Mokola, Mbakwele,
Njubanan-Jau, and Matumal creeks, and cutting the mouths of the MbossaBombe, Mikanje, Tende, Victoria and other unnamed creeks to the junction of
Matumal and Victoria creeks.
(138) Thence a line running 35º west of true south to the Atlantic Ocean.
Signed: GRAEME THOMSON, Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria. MARCHAND Gouverneur, Commissaire de la République française au
Cameroun.
245
3. The Plebiscite Treaty of October 30, 1960 (The Two
Alternatives—preparing the British Cameroons for
attainment of “independence by joining either the
independent Republic of Cameroun or the Federation of
Nigeria).
SOUTHERN CAMERONS PLEBISCITE OF FEBRUARY 11, 1961
THE TWO ALTERNATIVES
CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGMENTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE DECISION AT THE PLEBISCITE
Southern Cameroons Plebiscite Order in Council, 1960 (SCLN 53 of 1960).
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations General Assembly, after hearing the statement made
by the representative of the of the Administering Authority, by the Premier of
the Southern Cameroons and by the leader of the opposition in the Southern
Cameroons House of Assembly, by Resolution 1352 (VIV) of 16th October, 1959,
decided that arrangements should be made for a plebiscite to be held in the
Southern Cameroons and that the two questions to be put at the plebiscite should
be:
a) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent
Federation of Nigeria?
b) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent
Republic of Cameroun?
On 31st May, 1961, the United Nations Trusteeship Council, by Resolution
2013 (XXVI), requested the Administering Authority to take urgent steps, in
consultation with the Authorities concerned, to ensure that the people of the
territory are fully informed, before the plebiscite, of the constitutional
arrangements which would have to be made, at the appropriate time, for the
implementation of the decision at the plebiscite.
This booklet is being produced in pursuance of the Trusteeship Council
Resolution referred to above and will be used to explain to the public of the
Southern Cameroons the constitutional implications of the two choices.
The implication of joining the Federation of Nigeria have been made clear
in undertakings given by Nigerian Ministers. Trusteeship would be terminated
at an early date and the Southern Cameroons would join the Federation with a
status of a fully self-governing Region equal in all respects with the other regions
in an independent Nigeria. The Federation of Nigeria already has a Constitution
which provides for regional governments and it is therefore, possible to set out in
detail the constitutional arrangements that would be made if the plebiscite
decision is in favor of the first alternative: these arrangements will be found
…below.
246
In sofar as the implications of joining the independent Republic of the
Cameroun are concern, Mr. Foncha, in his capacity as leader of the political party
advocating joining the independent Republic of Cameroun, has consulted
directly with the President of the Republic of Cameroun on the terms upon
which the Southern Cameroons might be united with the Republic if the results
of the plebiscite should be in favor of such a course. Her Majesty’s Government,
as Administering Authority, have on several occasions enjoined upon those
concerned the need for clarification of these terms. A number of meetings have
taken place in Yaounde, Douala and Buea at which Mr. Foncha and his
colleagues have discussed the question with President Ahidjo and members of
his government. These meetings have resulted in two point communiqués which
are reproduced in full…and which the Government of the Republic of
Cameroun, in response to a formal request by Her Majesty’s Government has
authorized for publication.
In November 1960, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Iain
Macleod) received, at the request of Mr. Foncha, a delegation representing the
Government and other parties in the Southern Cameroons. The main matter
discussed at the talk was the implication of the second choice in the plebiscite.
The Secretary of State said that in the view of Her Majesty’s Government, the
United Nations in adopting the two alternatives of joining Nigeria or the
Cameroun Republic, clearly ruled out a period of continuing Trusteeship or
separate independence for the Southern Cameroons. In her Majesty’s
Government view, therefore, if the plebiscite goes in favor of the Cameroun
Republic, arrangements would have to be made for the early termination of
Trusteeship. The Secretary of State had noted that the Premier of the Southern
Cameroons had ascertained from the President of the Cameroun Republic that
the Federal form of constitution would be accepted. The following interpretation
was proposed as being consistent with the second question, it being understood
that the association of the United Nations with the post-plebiscite conference
mentioned in the text below would subject to its arrangement:
A vote for attaining independence by joining the Republic of Cameroun
would mean that, by an early date to be decided by the United Nations
after consultation with the Government of the Southern Cameroons, the
Cameroun Republic and the United Kingdom as Administering
Authority. The Southern Cameroons and the Cameroun Republic would
unite in a Federal United Cameroun Republic. The arrangements would
be worked out after the plebiscite by a conference consisting of
representative delegations of equal status from the Republic and the
Southern Cameroons. The United Nations and the United Kingdom
would also be associated with this conference. During the short period
while the arrangements for transfer were being made the United Kingdom
would of course be ready to continue to fulfill their responsibilities under
Trusteeship.
247
The President of the Republic of Cameroun and Mr. Foncha have
endorsed the interpretation of the second plebiscite question set out above in the
terms of the communiqué quoted on page 15 (of the plebiscite two alternatives
pamphlet).
The Republic of Cameroun at the present time has a unitary form of
constitution. A federal form of constitution for the Federal United Republic of
Cameroun would be draw up after the plebiscite and when it is known what
states will form the Federation. The communiqués quoted in page 13 to 15 (of the
pamphlet) set out in outline the terms and conditions, as agreed by Mr. Foncha
and President Ahidjo and endorsed by the Government of the Republic of
Cameroun, upon which the Southern Cameroons would join the Republic in the
event of the vote in the plebiscite being in favor of such a course.
It will be observed from a study of the statements on page 7 to 15 (of the
pamphlet) that there are a number of matters, arrangement for which would fall
to be made after the plebiscite.
In the arrangements, which have been made for the plebiscite, GREEN is
the color, which has been allocated to the first alternative on which a vote can be
cast, namely, for achieving independence by joining the independent Federation
of Nigeria; and WHITE is the color which ahs been allocated to the second
alternative on which a vote can be cast, namely, for achieving independence by
joining the independent Republic of Cameroun. The ballot boxes to be used in
the plebiscite will be painted GREEN and WHITE respectively.
The day fixed for the plebiscite is Saturday 11th February 1961.
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS IN
THE EVENT OF IT ELECTING TO BECOME A PART OF THE FEDERATION
OF NIGERIA
I
Undertaking of the Nigerian Governments
In paragraph 70 of the Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional
Conference held in London in 1958 it was stated:
“The Conference confirmed that, if this proved to be the wish of the
people of the Territory, Nigeria would welcome the Southern Cameroons as part
of the Federation with the status of a full-self-governing Region equal in all
aspects with the other Regions in an independent Nigeria.”
This was confirmed at the Constitutional discussions between Nigerian
Ministers and Ministers of the United Kingdom, which were held in London in
May 1960. In the final communiqué issued after these discussions it was stated:
There was an exchange of views on the Cameroons under British
Trusteeship, which in accordance with the resolution of the United
Nations would be separated from Nigeria when Nigeria became
independent. It was noted the questions in the plebiscites to be held
earlier in 1961 posed a choice between joining Nigeria or joining the
248
Republic of Cameroun. It was agreed that if Southern Cameroons joined
Nigeria it would, as stated in paragraph 70 of the 1958 Conference report,
be with the status of a full self-governing Region equal in all respects with
the other regions. It was hoped to ascertain from the government of the
Republic of Cameroun the terms on which the Northern and/or Southern
Cameroons would enter the Republic.
II
The Federation of Nigeria would consist of the Regions of Northern
Nigeria (including the Northern Cameroons if it decided to join the Federation),
Western Nigeria, the Federal Territory of Lagos and the Region of the Southern
Cameroons.
The Federation and each of its components Regions is a parliamentary
democracy with Ministerial councils responsible to the legislatures and with a
Governor-General 9in the case of the Federation) or a Governor (in the case of a
Region) as Her Majesty’s Representatives.
III
The Federal Parliament consists of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. The Senate consists of twelve senators from each Region, four
from the Federal Territory of Lagos and four nominated by the GovernorGeneral on the advice of the Federal Prime Minister. The Southern Cameroons
would thus have twelve senators. The House of Representatives would consist of
320 directly elected members (including the Northern Cameroons if it decided to
join the Federation) the number of members from each Region being based on
the total population of the Federation. On this basis the Southern Cameroons
would have eight members in the Federal House of Representatives.
The Governor-General appoints as Prime Minister of the Federation a
member of the House of Representatives who appears likely to command the
support of a majority of the members of that House. The other Ministers are
appointed from among the members of the Senate and House of Representatives.
The principal matters in which only the Federal Parliament can legislate
(i.e., reserved exclusively to it) include:
Aviation and Meteorology
External borrowing, currency and coinage, exchange control
Copyright
Customs and excise, including export duties
Defense and Police (other than local government Police)
Certain Higher Educational Institutions
249
External trade
Immigration and emigration
Incorporation and regulation of companies
Insurance (other than purely intra-regional)
Shipping and Navigation
Mines and Minerals, including oil and natural gas
Naval, military and air forces
Nuclear energy
Patents and trademarks
Post, telegraphs and telephones
Railways
Trunk roads
Company taxes and sales taxes
Wireless broadcasting and television
In certain matters the Federal and Regional legislatures have concurrent
authority, i.e., they have equal right to initiate legislation, but if a Regional law is
inconsistent with a Federal law, the Regional law id void to the extent of the
inconsistency. The Principal concurrent subjects include:
Antiquities
Arms and ammunition
Bankruptcy
Census
Commercial and industrial monopolies, combines and trusts
Higher Education (other than the institution in the Exclusive list)
Industrial development
Labor, industrial relations
National monuments and parks
Prisons
Profesional Qualifications
Public safety and public order
Scientific and industrial research
Surveys and statistics
250
Tourism
Traffic on Federal trunk roads
Water power
All residual matters, i.e., those which are not specified as exclusive or
concurrent, would come within the sole authority of the Southern Cameroons
Government.
The Federal Supreme Court is the court of appeal from the High Courts of
the Regions and Lagos. It has no original jurisdiction except in disputes between
the Federation and Region or between Regions, and in questions as to the
interpretation of the Federal and Regional Constitution.
IV
Regional Structure
If the Southern Cameroons elected to join the Federation of Nigeria it
would become a full self-governing region with the Federation in all aspects
equal to and having the same powers as other regions. In particular, it would
have:
(a) A governor, who, as Her Majesty’s Representative would be bound to
act in accordance with the advice of his ministers except in respect t a
limited number of topics, e.g. dissolution of parliament, appointment
of the Premier.
(b) A legislature consisting of a House of Assembly elected by universal
adult suffrage and a House of Chiefs containing not less than
eighteen chiefs selected in accordance with special regulations. The
power of the legislature to make laws would be exercised by bills
passed by both Houses. A bill (other than a money bill, i.e., one
involving financial measures) may originate in either House, but a
money bill may originate only in the House of Assembly. The House
of Chiefs would have a delaying power only.
The legislature would be empowered to legislate on all concurrent
matters and on all matters not specified as concurrent or exclusive.
These residual subjects would include primary and secondary
education, agriculture, forestry, veterinary services, co-operatives,
local government, land, medical services, administration of justice
and roads (other than Federal trunk roads). The legislature would be
empowered to pass its own budget ad to raise revenue for all matters
within its competence.
(c)
An Executive Council consisting of a Premier appointed by the
Governor and other Ministers appointed on the recommendation of
the Premier. The Premeir would be the person who appeared most
251
likely to command a majority among the members of the House of
Assembly. The Premier and other Ministers would be members of the
House of Assembly but at least two of the Ministers would be
members of the House of Chiefs. The Executive Council would be
responsible for the Executive government of the Southern
Cameroons.
(d) A High Court of the Southern Cameroons with full jurisdiction in
Civil and Criminal matters. The Southern Cameroons would also
have its own system of Magistrates Courts and Customary Courts.
(e) A Southern Cameroons Public Service, distinct and separate from the
other public services in the Federation. The Public Service would be
controlled by a Southern Cameroons Public Service Commission
responsible to the Southern Cameroons Government and pensions of
retired officers of this Public Service would be a charge on Southern
Cameroons funds.
The Southern Cameroons Government would advance to the status of a
full self-governing Region in a sovereign Federation equal in all respects with the
Regions and its Government would consequently be supreme in all matters
within its competence. The Federal Government would have no overriding
powers in such matters, except that if the Federal Government and the Southern
Cameroons Government were both to legislate on a subject in the Concurrent list,
the Federal Law would, in the event of inconsistency, prevail.
V
The following are the provisions for the amendment of the Constitution:
(a) Federal Constitution—
(i)
Entrenched provisions: amendment requires a two-third
majority of all the members of each House of the Federal
Parliament and the concurrence, by simple majority, each
House of the Legislatures of at least two Regions. (The
entrenched provisions include such matters as human rights,
the operation of regional constitutions, the Federal
Parliament and its exercise of legislative power, the
Executive’s powers, judicial and the Exclusive and
Concurrent legislative lists).
(ii)
Ordinary Provisions: amendment requires a two-thirds
majority of all members of each House of the Federal
Parliament.
(b) Southern Cameroons (Regional) Constitution—Amendments would
require a two-thirds majority of each House and, in the case of
252
entrenched provisions, would also require the concurrence of the
Federal Parliament.
VI
Miscellaneous Provisions
Arrangements in respect of the following subjects would be broadly on
the same lines as those obtaining before October 1st 1960:
Defense National Defense is assured by the Federal Armed Forces recruited
from all parts of the Federation, which would include the Southern Cameroons.
Police The Federation is policed by a Federal police force recruited from all parts
of the Federation, which would include the Southern Cameroons.
Local Government would continue as at present.
The Legal System would continue as at present. There would be magistrates’
and customary courts and a High Court presided over by a Chief Justice.
Appeals from the High Court would be heard by the Federal Supreme Court,
which would hold sessions as necessary in the Southern Cameroons. Appeals
from the Federal Supreme Court would go to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.
Currency The present currency would continue to be used.
Education The following higher educational institutions are a Federal
responsibility:
The University Colege at Ibadan
The University College Teaching Hospital
The Nigerian College of Arts, Science and Technology
The West African Institute of Social and Economic Research
The Pharmacy School at Yaba
The Forestry School at Ibadan
The Veterinary School at Vom
Other Higher Education is a concurrent responsibility and the Southern
Cameroons would consequently be able to found institutions for Higher
Education itself; the remainder of educational matters is an entirely Regional
responsibility.
Official Language The language of legislature, the Courts and administration
would be English language.
Position of Native Rulers Chiefs recognized by Native law and custom as the
traditional rulers would be recognized by the Federal and Regional Governments
253
as provided by existing legislation and their representation secured in the House
of Chiefs.
Federal Public Service The Federal Public Service is open to citizens of all
Regions, which would include the Southern Cameroons. There are at the present
time thirty-eight Departments and services staffed by members of the Federal
Public Service, opportunities for advancement in which are equal for all
members whatever their Region of origin. The pensions of Federal officers are a
charge on Federal Funds.
Internal Tariffs There would be no internal tariffs (i.e., duties on the internal
movement of goods) and internal trade would be free.
Revenue Federal revenue is raised principally from the proceeds of Customs and
Excise, import and export duties, and sales taxes on certain commodities. Part of
this revenue goes into a pool of funds, which is shared out, on an agreed basis
amongst all the Regions, which would include the Southern Cameroons.
Regional taxes are collected in such manner as the legislature may
provide, e.g., Income Tax, direct taxation.
Membership of the British Commonwealth The Federation is a sovereign
independent member of the commonwealth and by joining the Federation the
Southern Cameroons would enjoy all the benefits of membership of the
commonwealth; being entitled amongst other things to the preferential treatment
for its exports as at present enjoyed and to other sources of aid available to
Commonwealth members.
Roads. Trunk roads and the expansion of trunk roads (but not the traffic on
them) would be an exclusively Federal responsibility to be paid for out of Federal
funds. Other roads would be constructed and maintained from regional funds.
Human Rights. Fundamental human rights (such as protection against
deprivation of life and liberty, freedom from discrimination, freedom of
conscience, expression and movement, the right of recourse to the courts and of a
fair hearing or trial) are written into the Federal Constitution and laws, which
contravene them, will not be enforced by the courts. All these constitutional
provisions covering fundamental rights are entrenched.
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS
IN THE EVENT OF ITS ELECTING TO BECOME
A PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROUN
COMMUNIQUE
CONSIDERING that in the application of the Republic at the 14th Session of the
United Nations a plebiscite is to be organized in February 1961 to allow the
254
people of the Southern Cameroons under British Trusteeship and the peoples of
the Northern Cameroons under British Trusteeship to declare whether they wish
to join the Federation of Nigeria or to be united with the Cameroun Republic,
CONSIDERING that in the event of the result of this plebiscite being in favor of
Reunification the application of this reunification on a federal basis allowing for
particular conditions of each group, could not be automatic but gradual,
CONSIDERING that the representatives of the Cameroun Republic and of the
Government Party of the Southern Cameroons vigorously reaffirm the desire of
their peoples to be reunited in one nation,
CONSIDERING that the political heads have already met twice to examine the
broad outlines of the Constitution of the Two Federated States, they have, at the
conclusion of their third meeting of the 10, 11, 12 and 13th October 1960, decided
to adopt the broad outlines of the Constitution which they will adopt in the event
of the plebiscite vote being favourable to them.
JOINT DECLARATION
The representatives of the Republic of Cameroun and the Government Party of
the Southern Cameroons under British Trusteeship met for the third time to
continue their discussions on the projected Constitution, which would govern
the reunified Cameroun.
At the conclusion of these talks, the Hon. J. N. Foncha, Prime Minister of the
Southern Cameroons, His Excellency M. Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the
Cameroun republic, and M. Charles Assale, Prime Minister and Head of the
Cameroun Government,
STATE:
1. That they wish to use every available means to bring to a successful
conclusion the task of national reunification which they have set
themselves;
2. That in no case will the United Cameroun be a part of either of the French
Community of the British Commonwealth;
3. That they wish to create a Federal Stae whose institutions could be
broadly outlined as follows:
The Federal United Cameroun Republic will be a democratic state.
It will have its motto, its anthem and its flag. The nationals of the
federated states will enjoy Camerounian nationality. The Federated
States in the first stage will have power to deal with matters listed
below as a minimum:
Public freedoms
255
Nationality
National defense
Foreign affairs
Higher education
Immigration and emigration
Federal budget
Post and telecommunications
A list of powers which would fall within the competence of the
Federal Government in the second stage will be set out in the
Constitution.
The Federal Authorities will be composed of:
A Federal Executive headed by the President of the
Republic, Chief of the Federal State, Federal legislature
consisting of a Federal Legislative Assembly and a Federal
Senate.
Certain Federal laws will only be enacted in such a way that no
measures contrary to the interest of one state will be imposed upon
it by the majority (system of second reading with a qualified
majority).
In the event of a conflict of laws between the Federal State and the
Federated States, the Federal law will prevail. In non-federal
matters, the authorities of each of the Federated States will have
exclusive competence.
Each of the Federated States will be ruled by a Government and
will have a Legislative Assembly.
A federal Court of Justice will have as its purpose to unify judicial
systems and to act as the Highest Court of Appeal of the Federated
States.
Federal services will be established to carry out federal
Administration.
Legislature (or systems of legislature in force) will remain valid
until the enactment of federal legislation.
4. The Federation will be created by the Cameroun Republic and the
Southern Cameroons under British Trusteeship. The two parties hope that
the Northern Cameroons under British Trusteeship will also enter into this
256
federation, either as a separate State, or as a part of the Cameroons at
present under British Trusteeship.
5. In the event of the Southern and Northern Cameroons voting in favor of
reunification, those entrusted with the responsibility of the affairs of the
United Cameroun would, through mutual agreement, specify the manner
in which the populations of the Cameroons would be asked to express
their opinion on the Federal Constitution.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
The representatives of the Government party of the Southern Cameroons
under British Trusteeship, led by the Hon. J. N. FONCHA, Prime Minister, on
their return from London where they had talks with the United Kingdom
Ministers for the Colonies on the future of their territory, had on the 1 st and
2nd December a fourth meeting with the delegation of the Cameroun
Republic, led by the President of the Republic, Ahmadou AHIDJO.
The two parties were in full agreement:
1. That the United Nations General Assembly has stated with clarity the two
questions which will be put at the time of the plebiscite on the 11 th
February, 1961, i.e.,
(a) Do you wish to attain independence by Unification with the
Independent Federation of Nigeria; or
(b) Do you wish to attain independence by Unification with the
Independent Cameroun Republic.
2. That the two delegations whilst in agreement with the interpretation of
the second question which was accepted in London, regret that the
representatives of the Northern Cameroons were not present at this
Conference and asked:
(a) That immediately after the plebiscite and in the event of the people
voting in favor of unification with the Cameroun Republic, a
Conference should be held attended by representatives of the
Cameroun Republic and the Southern Cameroons and Northern
Cameroons.
(b) That this Conference, at which representatives of the Trusteeship
Authority and possibly those of the United Nations would be
present, would have as its aim the fixing of time limits and
conditions for the transfer of sovereign powers to an organization
representing the future Federation.
Signed: FONCHA
AHIDJO
Signed:
257
for
for
Southern Cameroons
Republic
Cameroun
4. UN Resolution 1514: General Assembly Declaration
Granting Independence to All Colonial and Other Peoples
of December 5, 1960.
DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO
COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES. Adopted by the UN General
Assembly, Dec. 14, 1960. UNGA Res. 1514 (XV), 15 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1961).
Note: Bold sections/phrases are deemed by the author of current posting to be important;
underlined bold sections/phrases are deemed extremely important as far as the British
Southern Canmeroons Question goes.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the
Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedoms.
Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal
rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and
the decisive role of the freedom of such peoples, which constitutes a serious
threat to world peace.
Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in
the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitutes a serious threat to
world peace.
Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement
for independence for Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories.
258
Recognizing that the people of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism
in all its manifestations.
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development
of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and
economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United
Nations ideal of universal peace.
Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit,
and international law.
Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in
order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices
of segregation and discrimination associated therewith.
Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent
territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasing
powerful trends towards freedom in such territories, which have not yet attained
independence.
Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the
exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory.
Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations:
Declares that:
1. The Subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary
to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the
promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have a right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political statutes and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness
should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against
dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise
peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the
integrity of their national territory shall be respected.
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5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and Non-Self-Governing
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories,
without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely
expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or
color, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and
freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and the territorial integrity of a country is compatible with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present
Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the affairs of all States,
and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity
5. United Nations Resolution 1608 of April 21, 1961 which
approved the results of the Plebiscite and stated clearly the
modalities for the union of Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia) with Cameroun Republic.
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1608 (xv)
APRIL 21, 1961.
Resolution 1608 (xv) as submitted by the Fourth Committee, A/4737, and
as amended orally by Guinea and Liberia, adopted by the General
Assembly on 21 April 1961, meeting 994, by roll-call vote of 64 to 23,
with 10 abstentions, as follows:
Note: The following are countries that believed that the union of the two
Cameroons under a Federal system of two equal states would be a good
thing!
IN FAVOR:
Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian SSR,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya,
Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico,
Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
Phillippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, Union of South Africa, USSR, United
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Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yemen,
Yugoslavia.
AGAINST:
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African
Republic, Chad, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville),
Dahomey, France, Gabon, Greece, Israel, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Niger, Paraguay, Senegal, Upper Volta, Uruguay.
ABSTENTIONS:
Columbia, El Salvador, Guatamala, Haiti, Italy, Panama, Peru, Portugal,
Spain, Togo.
“THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
“Recalling its resolution 1350 (XIII) of 13 March 1959 concerning the
future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom
administration in which the General Assembly recommended, inter alia,
that the Administering Authority take steps, in consultation with the
United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for the Cameroons under United
Kingdom Administration, to organize, under the supervision of the
United Nations, separate plebiscites in the Northern and Southern parts of
the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration, in order to
ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the territory concerning their
future, and that the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons be held about
the middle of November 1959 on the basis of the two questions set out in
paragraph 2 of the said Resolution,
“Recalling its resolution 1352 (XIV) of 16 October 1959 whereby it
decided, inter alia, that a plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons would be
held between 30 September 1960 and March 1961, on the basis of the two
questions set in paragraph 2 of the said resolution,
“Recalling further its resolution 1473 (XIV) of 12 December 1959 in which
the General Assembly, having considered the results of the plebiscite in
the Northern part of the Cameroons under United Kingdom
Administration, recommended the organization by the Administering
Authority, in consultation with the United Nations Plebiscite
Commissioner, of a further plebiscite to be held in the Northern
Cameroons under United Nations supervision between 30 September 1960
and March 1961, on the basis of the two questions defined in paragraph 3
of the said resolution,
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“Having examined the report of the United Nations Plebiscite
Commissioner concerning the two plebiscites held in the Northern and the
Southern Cameroons in February 1961 and the report of the Trusteeship
Council thereon,
Having heard the petitioners,
“1. Expresses its high appreciation of the work of the United Nations
Plebiscite Commissioner for the Cameroons under United Kingdom
Administration and his staff;
“2. Endorses the results of the plebiscite that:
“(a) The people of Northern Cameroons have by a majority, decided to
achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria;
“(b) The people of the Southern Cameroons have similarly decided to
achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroun;
“3. Considers that, the people of the two parts of the Trust Territory
having freely and secretly expressed their wishes with regards to their
respective futures in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1352
(XIV) and 1473 (XIV), the decisions made by them through democratic
processes should be immediately implemented;
“4. Decides that, the plebiscites having been taken separately with
differing results, the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946
concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration shall
be terminated, in accordance with Article 76b of the Charter of the United
Nations and in agreement with the Administering Authority, in the
following manner:
“(a) With Respect to the Northern Cameroons, on I June 1961, upon its
joining the Federation of Nigeria as a separate province of the Northern
Region of Nigeria;
“(b) With respect to the Southern Cameroons, on 1 October 1961, upon it’s
joining the Republic of Cameroun;
“5. Invites the Administering Authority, the Government of the Southern
Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun to initiate urgent discussions
with a view to finalizing, before October 1, the arrangements by which the
agreed and declared policies of the parties concerned will be
implemented.”
ORAL HEARINGS:
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General Assembly 15th Session (First and Second Parts).
Fourth Committee, Meetings 1004, 1010, 1012, 1066, 1086, 1096, 1097, 1098,
1105, 1108, 1120, 1127-1130, 1139, 1140, 1142, 1147.
A/C.4/445 and Add.1-3, A/C.4/469 and Add.1-8.
Requests for Hearings.
A/C.4/448. Note by Secretary General.
A/C.4/490. Additional statement by Namaso Mbile, Cameroons People’s
National Convention, Kumba Division, on Southern Cameroons.
A/C.4/495. Statement by S.T. Muna, Minister of Commerce and
Industries, Southern Cameroons.
A/C.4/96. Additional Statement by Mayi Matip, Chairmen of Union des
Populations du Cameroun Parliamentary group.
B. AMBAZONIA REPUBLIC: THREE LANDMARK DOCUMENTS
1. The New Social Order, By Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka, March 5, 1985
THE
NEW SOCIAL ORDER
“BEHOLD I MAKE ALL THING NEW”
-Revelation 21:5
DINKA & Co.
Solicitors, Advocats
P.O. Box 4045
Bamenda, Cameroon
Tel: 36-13-73
Fongum GORJI-DINKA, B.A., B-L
Of Lincoln’s Inn London
Solicitor & Advocate
Ex-President, Council of the Bar of Cameroon
Ex-Batonnier du Barreau du Cameroun
DATE: 20/3/1985
H.E. Comrade P. Biya
Bamenda Congress
Your Excellency
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Find enclosed an address which I had thought could be delivered at the
Congress, and which could transform the Congress into a forum for the
reconstruction of our own institutions, those of Ahidjo having been peacefully
swept away by God in his mysterious way. I would suggest you read Exodus 7:35, 9:16-17 and also 1 Samuel 18: 10, John 12:40-42 and see how he whom God
wants to destroy is first possessed buy an evil spirit sent by God to blind him or
make him engage in self protectionist arrogance.
So brother, be ware how you dismiss this. I am willing to discuss with you or any
of the commissions on this matter.
God be with you.
Yours Respectfully,
Fongum Gorji-Dinka.
NATIONAL INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION?
Our country, like many other African countries, is in reality a confederation of
interdependent ethnic, religious and cultural communities. National integration
of these communities is therefore a national objective, which is the duty of each
and every individual or section of the component communities.
For sometime now, there have been activities, which have put the entire concept
of integration in jeopardy. Individuals, groups, and even the government are
guilty of bringing us to the brink of total disintegration.
FROM FOUMBAN TO ZERO
You will remember, in August 1961, the Republic of Cameroun entered into
negotiations with Southern Cameroons for a union of the two states. This was in
the ancient Kingdom City of Foumban. The Republic of Cameroun delegation
was led by Ahmadou Ahidjo, and the Southern Cameroons by John Ngu Foncha.
The two states arrived at complete accord, which became known as the Foumban
Accord. Every detail of that Accord was so important that the entire Accord took
the form of, and became the constitution of the Union. This became known as the
Foumban Constitution.
Under the constitution, the two states submerged their respective identities and
became federated states of the union. The republic of Cameroon submerged its
identity and became East Cameroon. Similarly, Southern Cameroons submerged
its identity and became West Cameroon.
The constitution shared power:
(a) Territorially, i.e., between the states and the center
(b) Institutionally i.e. between the executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature
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(c) Personality-wise i.e. the Executive power was shared by the President and
the State Prime Ministers; while legislative power was shared by State
Deputies and Federal Deputies.
In this way the guarantee of security for the individual were institutionalized.
Article 47 of that Foumban Constitution set out the procedure for modifying or
revising the constitution. It stipulated that in order for any modification or
revision to be valid it must have been introduced into the Union Legislature,
(which was known as the Federal National Assembly) for debate, and must have
been approved by a special majority. That special majority was defined as that in
which a majority of the Federal Deputies from West Cameroon joined in voting
approval, along with a majority of the Federal Deputies from East Cameroon.
Consequently, if five of the ten Deputies then representing West Cameroon at
that time, voted against any proposed amendment, that was enough to block the
amendment.
AHIDJO’S COUP D’ETAT
So after the so-called Referendum of 20th May 1972, the entire country was
waiting for the text of Ahidjo’s proposed constitution to go before the Federal
National Assembly for debate in conformity with Article 47 of the Constitution.
But to the surprise of every one Ahidjo refused to obey our constitution. He
feared that his proposed constitution would be rejected by the Federal National
Assembly. So Ahidjo decided to stage a coup d’etat upon Cameroon.
He issued the notorious proclamation DF72-270 of 2/672 by which he:
(a) abrogated the Foumban Accord
(b) abolished the Foumban Constitution, and
(c) imposed upon us his own constitution which eh had secretly and
unilaterally drawn up.
Then, with that constitution, which became known as the Constitution of the
United Republic of Cameroon, alais Ahidjo Constitution, he assumed powers o
rule by ordinances as a dictator for one year. During this period, he demolished
all the institutions of the Federation, that is to say:
(a) the legislature and the government of East Cameroon
(b) the legislature, the government and the House of Chiefs of West
Cameroon
(c) the legislature and the government of the federation of Cameroon.
He then installed his so-called United Republic of Cameroon and the system of
government by which Cameroun, its people and resources became forfeited to
whoever becomes Head of State. He also set up institutions and men to operate
that system. And that is the system which we have today and which is now
disintegrating our people.
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Instead of government by dialogue, we have government by terror. Instead of
legislation by debate, we have legislation by ambush. Instead of law and order
by persuasion we have law and order by banditry and piracy. He Ahidjo himself
has since been referring to it as “Peaceful Revolution.”
A revolution of Coup d’etat, whether it be violent or peaceful, has only one
result. It sets aside the constitutional government and installs a junta in its place.
And a junta is defined as a government whose authority to govern, is derived
from force or the threat of force. Thus from 2nd June 1972, our country passed
from the era of constitutional government to that of a junta. Today’s government,
today’s institutions, today’s system and today’s style of leadership were installed
by a junta. And that is the junta system we must destroy otherwise it will destroy
us.
That Ahidjo Constitution plus the machinery of the peculiar style of one party
system, which we operate effectively, put in the hands of the President of
Cameroun:
(a) all the powers exercised by the State;
(b) all the powers exercised by the center,
(c) all the powers of the legislatures of the region, and
(d) all the powers of the Federal legislature.
Elections of any type have become a mere ritual. In fact, it is the president who
appoints people as councilors in Municipalities, appoints their chairman,
appoints members of Parliament, and appoints the Speaker. And he can dismiss
anyone just as easily as Musa Yaya was dismissed.
As for life itself, the system offers no security. Under the system, one could only
have guarantee of personal security if he was a friend of the president or his
tribesmen. And since no human being likes to live in a state of fear and
insecurity, what this system has done is to make an open invitation to each ethnic
group to fight to install its tribe’s man in power, so as to have guarantee of
personal security.
The first answer to that invitation came on 6/4/1984. Human lives in numbers
were lost and much misery and seething desire for revenge remains. Yet this is
only the first answer to that revenge. And it is a child’s play, when compared
with what will happen when the time bomb of this system explodes. And the
clumsy arrogance and greed of the ethnic group now in power has already
ignited the fuse leading to the bomb.
The daily exhortation of vigilance and the increased security tension mounting
daily, only confirm the fact that every one, government or the governed, in
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uniform or not, in town or village, everyone now lives in daily expectation of
that explosion.
That is he brink of disintegration to which the Ahidjo junta system has brought
us and unless we change this system at once, we must expect a violent total
disintegration, mass self-destruction. Is that what we want?
Then, why are we trying to prop up and sustain a system which we hate, and
which God has liquidated, first by banishing the architects and then abolishing
all its institutions?
ABROGATION OF THE FOUMBAN ACCORD
The most disastrous consequence of the Ahidjo coup d’etat was that by
abolishing the Foumban Constitution it ipso facto abrogated the Accord, which
held the two states together in union. The abrogation of that accord effectively
dissolved the Union. And the fact that the two states continue to camouflage as
the so-called “United Republic of Cameroun” did not change the fact that the
legal basis for the union had been brought to an end. From that day, the
relationship between the two countries has no legal basis. It is like a marriage,
which unknown to neighbors has been dissolved by the Court, but the man and
the woman continue to live together under the same roof.
Now from the moment the Foumban Accord was abrogated, the junta has moved
us from one illegality to another, from one constitutional act to another, and from
one invalidity to another, until we have arrived at the point, where we now do
not know any institutions that are legally valid, at all.
For on 21st July 1983, law No.83-11 of 21/7/83 was promulgated, amending the
Ahidjo Constitution. It repealed article 12 of the Ahidjo Constitution by which
the Deputies acquired their parliamentary mandate in May 1983. Elementary
principles of law require that when a new law repeals an old one, but still wants
to save something of the old one, then the new law should have stated that the
parliamentary mandate of our Deputies who were elected under the old law, had
been converted into a mandate under the new law. That would have saved their
mandate from repeal.
But either by design or neglect, no such clause was included. Consequently the
new law not only repealed the old law but also effectively put an end to the
mandate of our present Deputies, which rested on the old law. So law No. 83-11
of 21/7/83 effectively dissolved the National Assembly of the United Republic of
Cameroon, with effect from 21/7/83, the day of its promulgation.
267
We pointed this out to General Semengue, who advised us to submit a
memorandum, which he promptly delivered to President Biya. The
Memorandum pointed out to President Biya that Law 83-11 of 21/7/83 had
effectively dissolved the National Assembly and that only new elections can give
him valid parliament to work with!
Yet in November 1983 the same unmandated Deputies were convened to pass a
law, which President Biya promptly promulgated, giving himself the right to
organize the Presidential elections of 14/1/83. Then on 21/1/84, the same
unmandated Deputies were convened to another session to enable Comrade Biya
to take his second oath as President of United Republic of Cameroun. Then
followed more and more amendments to the Ahidjo Constitution by that invalid
assembly.
Of course, once Deputies have lost their mandate the National Assembly
becomes invalid and all laws passed by that National Assembly are absolutely
null and utterly void.
Now the final blow to the entire edifice of Ahidjo came on 4/2/84. On that day
Comrade Biya promulgated law No.84-001 of 4/2/84 abolishing the United
Republic of Cameroun whose President he was. Again either by design or by
default the law failed to include a clause stating that the institutions of United
Republic of Cameroun were to be retained as in situations of the newly revived
Republic of Cameroun. So the law abolished all the institutions of the United
Republic of Cameroun with it.
Since the revived Republic of Cameroun has not yet set up its own institutions, it
has neither a government nor a legislature nor any other institution of
administration. So Comrade Paul Biya is neither President of the United
Republic of Cameroun, which has been abolished not of newly revived Republic
of Cameroun.
So not only has God taken off the tyrant Ahidjo, but has also peacefully brought
down all the institutions set up by him. We thank God for this excellent work for
his people.
SECESSION AND ANNEXATION
We now come to the sad end of the story. By reviving the old Republic of
Cameroun, which the Foumban Accord had submerged in order to create a
Federation with Southern Cameroons-on-Ambas, the Republic of Cameroun has
irretrievably well seceded from the union. The frontiers of the Southern
Cameroons-on-Ambas are also internationally well recognized.
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So, unless a new Accord is concluded so as to create a basis for the union
between the two States, any claim by the Republic of Cameroun to govern
Southern Cameroons-on-Ambas, would simply mean annexation pure and
simple. That is international law. The fact that persons of Southern Cameroonson-Ambas are holding positions in the so-called government of the Republic of
Cameroun only corresponds to the French system of colonialism, by which
people of African colonies were appointed to the government and parliament in
France.
So, those who may have developed this diabolic annexationist plan want
Southern Cameroons-on-Ambas to be regarded and treated as a colony of the
Republic of Cameroun.
Now let it be stated very clearly that no one in his correct senses will ever accept
this annexation. Those who are behind this shameful plot will only succeed (in
making us a colony) over our dead bodies. There is a limit to which any human
being can go to accommodate insults, even from a brother. If the expression
“Southern Cameroons” has exposed us to any annexationist ambitions, then we
will henceforth call ourselves AMBAZONIA.
TWO OPTIONS
There are now two options before us in this respect. One of them is a violent
option, and the other I peaceful. The violent option is that which persists that
Southern Camerooninas-on-Ambas, alias Ambazonia has been annexed and so it
should be governed as a colony of the Republic of Cameroun. Any one who may
be contemplating such a violent option should take note that if they hope to use
the present forces of law and order they are mistaken. First, our forces are tired
and ashamed of being made to kill their own brothers. Secondly, by this very
expose any sensible man ought to know that a split along lines of nationalities
will paralyze the forces. No sane Anglophone will fire at his kith and kin for
refusing to accept colonial status. On the contrary, they will fight annexation on
hills, on housetops, in the villages, in the air, at sea and anywhere, until that
shameful monster called annexation is destroyed.
Let who ever thinks of a violent option remember that he is inviting foreign
intervention from mercenaries, from the notorious international gendarmes who
usually supply arms to both sides, whose hands we see behind this shameful
gambit. Finally, any hostilities here will certainly invite intervention from
neighboring countries, such as Nigeria.
Nigeria’s tight program of economic recovery is of such vital national importance
that the government of Nigeria will not sit idle and watch a meaningless
annexationist war here flood Nigeria with thousands of Nigerian residents and
English Speaking Cameroonian refugees—who together number more than two
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and a half million. So that is what the violent option implies. It there anyone here
in favor of the violent option? If there is any such person, let him stand up and be
counted. So the option now left is the peaceful one. The peaceful option admits
the facts as they have been stated.
(a) That the Ahidjo system has been dissolved and abolished by its own laws.
(b) That there is no legally valid system of government now neither for the
Republic of Cameroun, nor for Southern Cameroons on-Ambas alias
Ambazonia, nor of the union of the two states.
(c) That our task now is to set up machinery for bringing about a new system
of administration for our people.
The truth about life is that each and every one of us is a mere tool in the hands of
God. As you ac see, we may think we are in full command of a situation. But
indeed it is God who indeed is using us.
When Comrade Paul Biya and Ahidjo initiated the law L83-11 of 21/7/83, did
they know that they were initiating the liquidation of the institutions of Ahidjo
whom God had quietly overthrown? When Comrade Paul Biya initiated the Law
L84-001 of 4/2/84 did he know that he was signing his own exit from power?
That is the work of God.
Today we are answering the call, which as Comrade Paul Biya ably declared“History has been inviting us since 6/11/82 to bring about a profound change in
our national life style.” He specially invited the elite when he said: “The elite
must become the architect of the profound change—and bring about a new social
order.
God has heard the prayer of our people and has raised up the architects to build
the new order.
We have here with us the pillars of reconstruction and we are laying them down
in a foundation created by God.
“For except the Lord builds, they toil in vain who say they are building.”
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
We now have to fall back on natural law.
The people here present represent each and every part of the two states. As
natural juristic persons they can make any arrangements and conclude any
accord to keep the day-to-day administration functioning while the detail system
of government I being worked out.
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So this Assembly by natural law becomes what legal and constitutional lawyers
would call a Constituent Assembly of the “Confederation of Two States.” By
doing this we are assuming that we can agree on at least a confederal type of
Union.
While those of West of the Mungo become the Constituent Assembly of Southern
Camerons alias Ambazonia, those of the East of the Mungo River become the
Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Cameroun.
INTERIM ARRANGMENT
Now pending the arrangement on the exact terms of the union between the two
states we can at least agree on certain guide lines.
(a) Ethnic groups shall be carved into provinces and each province shall have
a government and a legislature to deal with subjects to be assigned to
provincial competence under the new constitution.
(b) The constitutional arrangements that operate in each of the States before
the Foumban Accord was concluded, would be harmonized with
necessary modifications, and would serve as interim constitution of each
state.
(c) On the Confederal level i.e. the union of two states—we propose that the
present administration continue as an interim set up, under the supreme
authority of this joint constituent assembly. The authority of the
assembly, for practical purposes will be vested in a Council of
Reconstruction of the Confederation (CORECO), which will consist of
nine persons from each side of the Mungo River.
(d) Three members of the forces of law and order will be added as advices to
each delegation.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
CONFEDERATION (CORECO).
(1) To assume with effect from here and now all the executive powers and
functions of the government, so that all Ministries and para-public bodies
now operate under its authority and become answerable to the CORECO.
(2) To set up interim administration for each state in accordance with the
interim constitution we have proposed.
(3) To gradually phase out the present system as the new systems comes into
operation.
(4) To set up a body to work out a detailed system of government based on
four steps:
The Municipal
The Provincial
The State
The Confederal
(5) To see to the installation of all these by electoral process that is reasonably
democratic.
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(6) To hand power over to the institutions and withdraw, within 6 months
from now.
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SYSTEM
REGIONAL STRUCTURE
1. The Two States shall each be divided into Provincial Governments. The
State of Republic of Cameroun shall have not less than Eight nor more
than Thirteen Provinces. The State of Southern Cameroons alais
AMBAZONIA shall have not less than Two and not more than Five
Provinces.
2. The two States shall together form a Union. The details of this shall be the
subject of negotiations and accords. Opportunity shall be made for the
admission of any neighboring state to the union. Any modification
necessary t preserve the identity of any such states seeking to join the
Union shall be so made.
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
3. PROVINCE
A Province shall have:
Legislative Council-LEGCO
(a) Executive Council-EXCO
4. THE STATE
A State shall have:
(a) Parliament-Legislature
(b) Government-Executive
5. CONFEDERATION
The Confederation shall have:
(a) Congress-Legislature
(b) Confedium-Executive
POWER STRUCTURE
6. PROVINCE
The following subjects shall be within the competence of the Province:
Rural and Community Development
Co-operative and Mutuality
Agriculture and Animal Breeding
Vernacular & Nursery Education
Rural Health and Preventive Services.
And such other subjects as the state may find more suitable to devolve on
the Province. The subjects under provincial competence shall not exclude the
responsibility or intervention of the State for the purpose of harmony and
efficiency of the services.
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7. THE STATE
All matters which do not fall within the Exclusive Competence of the
Confederation-Are within the competence of the State.
8. THE CONFEDERATION
(a) Exclusive Competence
Nationality, Monetary System, weights and measures, Customs, Post and
Telecommunications, Penitentiary Administration, External Defense and
Security, Inter-State Services and Conflicts, Judicial Organization and
Administration of Justice (except Customary Courts), Aviation,
Confederal Civil Service, and Skeleton Legislation co-ordinatory and
harmonizational in nature for guidance of State and Provincial authority.
(b) Concurrent with State Competence
Public liberties, State and Inter-State Defense and Security, Media,
Information, Commerce, Industry, Banking, Insurance, Roads, Transport,
Ports, Higher Education, Research, Public Accountability.
DESIGNATIONS
The following designations shall carry the meanings herewith attributed
to them:
CONFEDERATION
9. (a) The President-Head of State
(c) The Chancellor-Head of Government
(d) Minister-Minister of State in the Confederal Government
(e) Chancellor-President of the Congress.
10. STATE
(a) The Prior: Ceremonial Head representing the President
(b) The Prime Minister-Head of Government
(c) Secretary of State: Minister in the Service of the State Government.
(d) The Speaker: President of State Assembly.
11. PROVINCE
(a) The Delegate General: Head of the Province representative of Head of
State.
(b) The Commissioner-General: Head of the Provincial Government
(c) Commissioner-Minister in Provincial Government
(d) The Co-ordinator-The President of the Provincial Assembly.
There must be a question in your minds about what role Paul Biya is to
play in the new social order. The answer is simple. The principles we have
already adopted will decide a role for each of us. All of the two states and
us are placed at the disposal of the Constituent Assembly of the
Confederation whose Executive is the CORECO. CRECO will certainly
find a fitting role for every one willing to serve. To be sure, either by
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discrete silence or by action, Paul Biya and each of us have played the role
God has given us. So will each of us be given a role in the new order by
God. We thank our Father God for His Mercy. It imposes on us mercy on
each other and love for each other. So let us first constitute the Council for
the reconstruction of the Confederation (CORECO).
Note: An Organigram containing the above stipulations on the structures of the
Confederation was then attached to the New Social Order as its last page.
2. An Open Letter to Cameroun the L’ Etat-Major of
Cameroun: Defuse the Time Bomb, by Fon Fongum GorjiDinka, May 5, 1985.
Thro’
THE ANGLOPHONE SOLDIER
SUBJECT: DEFUSE THE TIME BOMB
By Fongum Gorji-Dinka:
May 5, 1985
Of Lincolns Inn London.
Barrister at Law
Advocate of the Supreme Court of England,
President (Emiretus) Cameroun Council of Bar,
President (Emiretus) National Union of Kamerun Students
UK.
Leader of NUCS UK Delegation to the UN Special Session
on Kamerun, March 1959;
Chairman Pan-Kamerun Students Conference for National
Reconciliation-August 1959;
National Legal Adviser and Member of the Central
Committee of the CNU 1966;
National Legal Adviser and Member of the Central
Committee of the CNU, 1966;
Leader of CUC Delegation to Counsel & Procure the
inauguration of CNU;
Ist President of CNU Sub-Section-Victoria and VicePresident of the CNU Section Fako.
Author of the New Social Order.
Dear Compatriots,
Addressing the Nation after the Army had recovered from the Republican
Guards putchists and handed it back to him, H.S. Paul Biya spoke for all of us
when he paid very warm homage to the Cameroonian Soldier for his meticulous
attachment to LEGALITY.
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H.E. Paul Biya by his vacillations, procrastinations and unpardonably bad
judgment, had plunged us in a bloody incident, which not only disqualified him
from further leading us, but had effectively put him out of power.
It is therefore only thanks to our armed forces attachment to legality that they
called on H.E. Paul Biya to once more take the leadership of our country. And no
one in this country can appreciate this attachment to legality more than I, the first
President of the Cameroon Bar, and the Doyen of Cameroon lawyers.
It is in this capacity, inter alia, that I am leading this appeal to you, the effective
custodian of our common good. We direct you to take a serious view of the fact
that our brother H.E. Paul Biya is dragging us through a series of illegalities,
unconstitutionalities and humiliating provocations, which are sure to bring us to
a violent explosion, which will totally disintegrate this country.
Enclosed is a document, THE NEW SOCIAL ORDER. It is self-explanatory. It
highlights the danger before us. It proposes a very effective way of neutralizing
the danger, to the satisfaction and happiness of the people of this country. But as
you must have by now established, H.E. Paul Biya either does not understand
the priorities of this country, or allows those whom he call “international
opinion” to impose their own priorities on Cameroon.
For example, after Ahidjo had openly declared himself in conflict with H.E. Paul
Biya, National interests dictated that a dangerous rich enemy like Ahidjo be
taken into custody and totally neutralized by all means at our disposal. Was H.E.
Paul Biya guided by National Interest when he preferred to organize the exit of
Ahidjo from Cameroon? Of course, H.E. Paul Biya knew that he was giving
Ahidjo the opportunity of having access to his ill-gotten financial resources and
friends abroad and with these resources he would organize efforts to topple or
destabilize our government. Today the whole country and especially our armed
forces live in perpetual alert in order to prevent Ahidjo’s agents from
assassinating H.E. Paul Biya, just to settle personal scores.
Make no mistake; neither change of party names, nor a thousand elections under
this Ahidjo’s system can ever change the fact that the Biya of today is a creation
of Ahidjo. And as long as Ahidjo lives and as long as Biya is ruling Cameroon,
Ahidjo demands unquestionable gratitude from H.E. Paul Biya. And he will get
it, like it or not, on his own terms.
If Ahidjo were in detention or house arrest, by the Cameroon authorities, we
would not have been in the state of insecurity in which we are now. But that is
the work of H.E. Paul Biya.
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Again look at the problem, which was posed by the Republican Guards. What
national interest was it that made H.E. Paul Biya to maintain at the Presidential
Security Service, all the Ahidjo men who formed 90% of the Republican Guards?
Was it not better in the national interest that at least 60% of these people be
transferred to other services rather than leaving them at the Presidency? H.E.
Paul Biya said in his press conference that he was afraid of what “international
opinion would say if he transferred Ahidjo’s people away from services as the
Republican Guards.
And so the obvious danger of letter the Republican Guards organize a coup
d’etat against our government was of no importance in H.E. Biya’s judgment of
priorities. What mattered to him was his relationship with his foreign friends
whom he calls “international opinion.” And we have had to pay with blood and
misery for this bad judgment. The coup has killed many, imprisoned more and
left many families miserable and crying for solace or vengeance. The Northerner
is now totally estranged from the nation. And who is responsible for this? H.E.
Paul Biya and his sense of priorities.
But it seems that H.E. Paul Biya is under the spell of an evil force, which seems to
make him prefer doing only those things, which are bund to provoke more and
more problems for us.
What else is it that motivated H.E. Paul Biya into reviving the old Republique du
Cameroun? He, as a lawyer, knows that by reviving the old Republique do
Cameroun he proclaimed the secession of that Francophone East Cameroun from
its union with Anglophone West Cameroon. He also knows that by so doing he
disqualifies every Francophone from legally ruling Anglophone Cameroon
unless and until an accord is signed between the two (the Republique du
Cameroun and Southern Cameroons alias “Ambazonia”). The existence of a
South Cameroun Province (Ebolowa) makes it necessary for us to use the
geographical expression Ambazonia to identify Anglophone Cameroon.
H. E. Paul Biya knows that in the absense of such a signed accord between
Republque du Cameroun and Ambazonia, he can only rule Ambazonia as an
annexed territory and as a colony of the Republique du Cameroun. He knows
that Ambazonians are not happy with the way Francophones treat them, even
though there are palace-living renegades who will lie to the contrary. H.E. Paul
Biya knows that the notion of colonialism is so humiliating and revolting to any
human that sooner or later Ambazonians will rise in revolt against the colonial
status which H.E. Paul Biya has now given them. Just why does H.E. Paul Biya
want to open up a second front of conflict, this time with Anglophones, when he
still has the North to contend with? No one can explain. This is the evil force
working to destroy Biya himself, if not Cameroon with him.
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We proposed a New Social Order and, every sensible man including foreign
diplomats admit that it is the best solution to the state of affairs in which we are.
But H.E. Paul Biya has not as much as acknowledged receipt of that document.
On the contrary, he has been more preoccupied with still more and more
illegalities.
H.E. Paul Biya knows that whoever renounces membership of a political party
automatically forfeits any posts he holds by virtue of his membership of that
party. This is what happened to comrade Moussa Yaya, when he lost his
membership of the Cameroon national Union (CNU). H.E. Paul Biya knows or
ought to have known that by renouncing membership of the CNU he and all
Cameroonians who held offices by virtue of their membership of the CNU
automatically lose their offices; so all posts except the Civil Services are now
vacant with effect from 24-3-85, the date of the birth of the RDPC.
Again CNU constitution forbids the discussion of any matter at the congress,
which is not listed on the agenda of the congress. And it is the Central
Committee meeting which fixes that agenda for the Congress. The change of
CNU into a new name was not listed in the agenda. Therefore, the change is null
and void.
If you call it a new party, then RDPC is still an illegal association since it has not
complied with the law on the formation of associations. The CNU has not been
dissolved and so its assets remain its assets. But illegal association called RDPC
ha already started claiming the people and property of the CNU.
Now, in the face of all this mess, chaos and illegalities mounting daily, we find it
imperative to call on the Cameroonian Etat Major to take action similar to that
which the French Generals took in 1959 to put an end to the chaos of the Fourth
Republic in France. The French Generals, rather than do the stupid thing of
seizing power and becoming involved in the controversy of governing, preferred
to withdraw support from the government of the Fourth Republic and enlisted
the services of a French Patriot Charles de Gaulle to start the reconstruction of a
new France. (Note: Charles de Gaulle was now a civilian living at ColombeyLesdeux-Ebglises).
This is the task before you, the Cameroon soldier today. The same attachment to
legality motivated you to put up a counter offensive against the coup of April
1984; the same notions of legality that made you hand power back to Biya, that is
the same notion of ;legality which now urges you today to peacefully bring this
chaos and illegality to an end.
We make this appeal especially through the Anglophone Soldier because for him
the question is not whether to bring this chaos to an end, but when to do so. We
prefer it now at this time when a peaceful solution can reinforce the bridges of
amity across the Mungo, rather than wait till a violent decolonization war is
unleashed by Ambazonians, which would naturally end with a wide chasm of
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enmity across the Mungo. That is the chasm of enmity to which H.E. Pual Biya is
leading us.
The notions of annexation and colonialism as such a revolting humiliation that
sooner or later the Ambazonians would prefer to seek dignity in death rather
than live in palaces as service renegrades for George Bernard Shaw put it rightly
when he said:
“Human nature is the same every where;
Put a man in the most palacial mansion ever,
He will never be as contented as the man in his novel
Who is able to say, this is my own.”
Colonialism being such an anathema and decolonization being the natural
antithesis to it, would it not be better to see that you enlist the cooperation of
your Etat-Major, for a peaceful reconstruction of a new social order, instead of
waiting until you are confronted with the difficult choice of having either to
shoot at your Anglophone kith and kin resisting colonialism, or to shoot at your
senior officer for ordering you to shoot down your own kith and kin?
That is why we are specially making this appeal through you the Anglophone
Soldier to the Etat-Major of Cameroon. We ask you to be once more guided by
the legality, which motivated you I April 1984. At that time you used bullets,
force and blood. But this time you need no such thing. All you need is courage,
firmness, honesty and a tongue to pursuade or pressurize, like the French
Military did in 1958. Is this too much for you the Cameroon soldier? We are
willing and able to place at the disposal of the Etat-Major all the legal and
constitutional expertise necessary for a peaceful and satisfactory national
reconstruction.
Or admiration for the role of the French military in 1958 compels us to end this
memo with a citation of the French National Hymn, which we find most befitting
here:
Ye sons of (Cameroon) awake to glory
Hark! Hark! What myriads bid you rise
Your children, wives and grand sires hoary;
Behold their tears and hear their cry
Behold their tears and hear their cry
Shall hateful tyrants of mischief breeding;
A hireling host a ruffian band
A fright AND DESOLATE THE FATHERLAND
While peace and liberty lie bleeding;
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To………..To………..ye brave
The avenging……………………….
March on! March on! All hearts resolved
On victory or death.
May the Almighty God, whose spirit of Truth compels us to speak out at these
times of national crises, guide your action. “For we wrestle not against flesh and
blood but against principalities, against powers, against rulers of the darkness of
this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.” (Eph. 6:12)
Thank You.
Yours Truly,
Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka.
3.
THE REBELLION (REVOLT) OF AMBAZONIA
-By Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka
(Written from Cameroon Maximum Security Prison, Brigarde Mixte Mobil, BMM,
Yaounde, Cameroon, Issued, July 11th, 1985).
Reproduced from Original manuscript from the Archives of The Republic of Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons) without any serious modifications, whatsoever, by Justice M.
Mbuh, Secretary General, Ambazonia Peoples Emancipation Council (APEC),
Washington, DC, 8/10/2002.
INTRODUCTION:
Having been asked by the Authorities to propose a solution to the
Ambazonia Revolt, I find that no solution can be valid unless it is scientific. And
there can be no scientific solution unless it flows from a scientific analysis of the
revolt.
DEFINITION:
Where the West African Coast line meets the Southern African coastline, is
a bay of the Atlantic Ocean called AMBAS BAY. Geography identifies the
territorial zone around Ambas Bay as Ambas Zone since the 16th and 17th
Century. From Ambas Zone, we get Ambazonia. For example, Arizona, Amazon
both refers to Arid Zone and the zone around the Amazon River respectfully.
The inhabitants of Ambazonia—Ambazonians (geo-political unit) carries the
appellation AMBAZONIA.
To obviate the confusion by which “Southern Cameroons” or “West
Cameroon” may be mistaken for the Ebolowa Province and Bafoussam Province,
respectively, of the Republic of Cameroon, we will fall back on this geo-political
appellation AMBAZONIA whenever necessary.
CAUSES OF THE REVOLT
There are six causes, four of which are remote and two are immediate.
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REMOTE CAUSES:
1. Socio-Anthropological Differences
From 1884 to 1914 the German colonial administration set cut to create a
single state out of the arbitrary mixture of Bantus, semi-Bantus Negroid and
semitic races, which the Berlin Conference handed to Germany. The Germans
gave the area the appellation KAMERUN—a German spelling for Cameroes, the
Portuguese name for Shrimp, Cray Fish (Njanga).
When the British and the French threw out the Germans in 1914, they
partitioned the area between them. France created four states out of her own
portion. One of which was annexed to Gabon, the Second to Congo, the third to
the Republic of Central Africa and the fourth became the Republic of Cameroon
on 1/1/60.
Britain on her part created two states one of which was annexed to their
kith and kin in Northern Nigeria and the other became internationally known as
The UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons—under UK Administration. The
native name is Ambazonia.
French colonial administration developed the Republic of Cameroon
along its policy of cultural assimilation of France Outre-mer. Cameroonians were
encouraged to become Citoyens Francais (French Citizens).
The British on their part prepared the people of Southern Cameroons alias
Ambazonia by the policy of indirect rule for eventually self-government or
independence.
So while the German effort lasted only thirty years, the acculturation of
Ambazonia and Republic of Cameroon as separate and distinct countries went
for 47 years, 1914-1961, without any link whatsoever.
Each state therefore acquired a socio-anthropological identity that was
different in mentality and personality from the other.
It is by virtue of this socio-anthropological distinction created by Italian,
French and German colonial administration that the Helvetic people of
Switzerland found a Confederation as the only scientific approach to their
unification. The Foumban Accord linked the two countries till 1972. But distinct
administrations continued till 1972. So from 1914-1972 is 58 years of distinct
socio-political distinction.
This socio-anthropological distinction imposes a Confederal Union. Upon
Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) and Republic of Cameroon, as the only
workable basis of association.
The appellation Cameroon held no magic stronger than the appellation
Congo or Guinea, so as to turn Southern Cameroons and the Republic of
Cameroon into one country, while Congo Leo, now Zaire, and Congo
Brazzaville, or Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry remain distinct countries.
A study of the ethnic or other aspects across the boundary linking
Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon, shown that such links whether
they arise from ethnic identity, cultural similarity, linguistic affinity, commercial
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intercourse, or geographical propinquity, they apply strongly between Southern
Cameroons and Nigeria which shares 60% of Ambazonian frontiers.
Furthermore, while Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) had no links with
Republic of Cameroon for 47 years, all Southern Cameroons teachers, nurses,
pastors, priests, doctors, lawyers and administrative cadre, had their training
wholly or partly in Nigeria or from Nigerians, or Ambazonians formed in
Nigeria!
Yet Anglophone Southern Cameroons alias Ambazonia resisted
integration with Anglophone Nigeria. Nations like humans manifest selfpreservation very jealously.
THE UNIFICATION SLOGAN
UNIFICATION was imposed on Ambazonians by:
A. FACULTATIVE IRREDENTISTS:
Some of us believed that just by the fact that we were once called
Kamerun, every square inch of land that was Kamerun should be recovered, and
re-united (See my speech at the UN, March, 1959).
I even solicited the aid of UN members to insist that the three portions
annexed to Congo, Gabon and Central African Republic be brought back (Fon
Dinka probably forgot Chad!). But since these did not come within UN
Trusteeship agreement, there was no way of raising the matter at the UN.
B. ATTACHMENT TO ANCIENT HOMES:
French Cameroonians who escaped force labour and settled in Ambazonia
naturally wanted to unite their new homes in Ambazonia with their ancestral
homes in Republic of Cameroon where they usually insisted on being buried
even if they were born, bred, worked, owned property and died in Ambazonia.
In fact, the first unificationist Party, the Kamerun United National Congress
(KUNC), was led by a French Cameroonian, R.J.K. Debonge who was settled in
Buea.
C. INTERNATIONAL MANIPULATIONS:
Southern Cameroons was budgetarily autonomous and had reserves invested
abroad which amounted to over 180.000.000 francs CFA, as at 31/12/60. This
was what we used to buy planes and establish our Airlines—Cameroon Air
Transport, Cameroon Bank, West Cameroon Electricity Corporation, West
Cameroon Development Agency, etc.
The Republic of Cameroon on their part was budgetarily dependent on
France even up to about 1968-69!
But because the British very much wanted Southern Cameroons to be part
of Nigeria, they invented a story that Southern Cameroons, though it was ripe
for independence, was not viable to go it alone. They had hoped that with
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terrorism tearing Republic of Cameroon apart, Southern Cameroons would vote
in favour of Union with Nigeria rather than with Republic of Cameroon.
For us the facultative unificationists, this was a God sent excuse for Reunification with what we naively called “Our Brothers.”
For the above reasons we got the Re-Unification of Southern Cameroons
and Republic of Cameroon, purely on facultative reasons, and through the
manipulations described above by French Cameroon settlers.
From French Cameroon side there were no sentiments for Re-Unification
with Southern Cameroons at all. Not even one of the French Cameroon political
parties identified itself with unification by bearing the appellation Kamerun. Not
even the UPC, which claimed to be for it.
Again, the fact that there was no vocal opinion from the portions of
German Kamerun which had been merged with Gabon, Congo, and Central
African Republic even though these portions had more in common with
Francophone Republic of Cameroon and were under the same French
Administration with Cameroon, only goes to prove that the name Cameroon
alone was not a unifying factor, as some of us mistakenly believed then.
ABSENCE OF CONSENSUS AD IDEM
At the Foumban Conference the two countries were at cross-purpose on
the meaning of the word re-unification.
The Republic of Cameroon believed that it meant the beginning of a new
process of the annexation of the Southern Cameroons 9Ambazonia) by Republic
of Cameroon. Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) understood unification to mean
full de jure independence than the de facto independence, which they had since
1-10-60. So Southern Cameroons proposed a Confederation, with dual
nationality. Each State to keep his own nationality and both to enjoy a common
nationality as a united country.
The Federal structure which emerged from Foumban was therefore a
compromise solution. But it took pains to underline the fact that the two
countries, each with a separate nationality had federated. Article 1(a)
emphasized this separate nationality of each. It stated that Nationals of Southern
Cameroons, shall become citizens of the Federal Republic and thus enjoy
Cameroonian nationality.
But annexationist Francophone leaders have refused to respect even that
compromise. Ahidjo swept it off one morning by decree, claiming that the
gigantic fraud of 20th May 1972 had relieved him of treaty obligations to seek the
procedure of a Federal law of Parliament procedure.
Fouman Akame, while presenting his bill for the secession of Republic of
Cameroon in November 1983, declared that the word “United” was misleading
people to believe that two states had been united. That, according to them, there
was only a Republic of Cameroon, and Ambazonia has been part of it even
before the Foumban Accord. What falsehood!
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In other words, the Foumban Accord meant to the leaders of Republic of
Cameroon—a process of annexation of Southern Cameroons, where as to the
leaders of Southern Cameroons it was a process of co-existence between two
countries in a Confederation. In legal terms, there was therefore no consensus ad
idem between Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon leaders.
But this Confederation concept is what the UN accepts. That is why the
Foumban Accord is named in the UN records as INTER-PARLIAMENTARY
UNION!
ABSENCE OF TRUE REPRESENTATION
In a radio interview, soon after Ahidjo resigned, Pa Muna, the Speaker of
the Cameroun National Assembly was asked why he had not been candid to
Ahidjo about the Anglophone feelings, he Pa Muna replied, “Did you want me to
sign my own death warrant?”
This coming from the number 2 man of the country, and number 1
constitutional leader of the Ambazonians, proves that conspiratory hypocrisies
have been the characteristic of the handpicked Anglophone representatives. In a
word the truth about Ambazonia has had no conduit or channel to the leaders of
the Republic of Cameroon.
Had there been that remorseless candor which is expected of
representatives, the Ambazonian feelings would never have been allowed to
reach the present dimensions of revolt.
But in fairness to Pa Muna, the brutal treatment I am receiving by being
arrested and detained for speaking the truth confirms his fears. But the truth
would either come out of a human mouth like mine, or out of the barrel of the
gun.
ETHNOCENTRIC AND SPOILATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
The system of government established by Ahidjo, is still in practice
despite the proclamation of New Deal.
Participation in power and institutions is based on personal relationship and
tribe rather than on merit.
Consequently an Ambazonian no matter how qualified must fall in value
below his Francophone counterpart. He must fall below the Francophone whose
quality may even be far below that of the Anglophone.
Kept strictly within the peripheries of power and national endeavors—the
Anglophone Youth finds his future so bleak and frustrating that he is forced to
seek a violent redress to it. The US produces more Ambazonian graduates a year
than the University of Yaounde. Let alone Nigerian Universities, which put out
about three times this number per year.
When these intellectuals cannot get employed in their own country
because of a system that condemns them to a status of strangers in their own
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home, a case is made out justifying the ill feelings against the system. The
unfortunate thing about this spoilative and ethnocentric system of government is
that it is even shamelessly justified as “TRIBALISM ECLARE,
DEVELOPPEMENT-AUTO-CENTRE”—(Enlightened Tribalism, Auto-centered
development).
IMMEDIATE CAUSES
While the above long-standing grievances were biting into the
Ambazonian mind, the following immediate causes have brought the revolt into
near physical manifestation.
a) Humiliating Provocation:
The fact is that the average francophone in his heart of hearts does not
really accept the Southern Cameroons as part of Cameroon, nor the Anglophone
as a Cameroonian. This records with Article 1 (a) of the Foumban Accord.
Consequently, the Francophone prefers to call the Southern Cameroons “Les
Anglo-foul,” Les Biafrains,” Les assimiles,” “Les outré-moungos,” “Les etrangers.” The
name Cameroon must be qualified before it can apply to Ambazonia.
The questions,
“Est-ce que c’est nous qui vous avons invite?=”Did we invite you?”
“C’est vous meme qui etes venus nous jiondre. Vous n’avais qu’a supporter
tout!”
“You yourselves came and joined us. You just have to endure it!” tells the
mind of the Francophone.
Such humiliating provocation is quite revolting. For no human being, let
alone persons infused with a sense of British freedom can accept that unity
implied a surprise submission to arrogance and contempt from people whom
Ambazonians thought were fellow African Brothers.
It was therefore natural that the more impatient Ambazonians would look
for ways of ending this humiliation. For some, the answer lies in total severance
of Ambazonia from Republic of Cameroon with no talks of any new association.
For others the answer is for a Confederation in which the mutual sovereign
equality of the component parts would be fully protected from the Ahidjo style
of one-man coup.
Those who are abroad accusing every Ambazonian of conspiratory
treachery for collaborating with the regime of Cameroon must be from this first
category. And the training of Ambazonians for a liberation war against
Cameroon would therefore be of that category of those want n links again with
the annexationists.
SECESSION OF REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Every country that runs into a minority problem always runs into a
separatist movement, if the minority problem is badly handled. The Ambazonian
grievances therefore were a domestic minority problem as long as there was this
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legal fiction that the two countries were in “UNITED” Cameroon. But this legal
fiction was effaced on 4/2/84 by the Cameroun Restoration Law. This law
formerly legalizes the break up of the links, and formalized the secession of East
Cameroon and its restoration as La Republique du Cameroun.
The right of that Republic of Cameroon to rule territory, which falls
entirely outside the internationally recognized boundaries of the Republic of
Cameroon becomes an international issue. It is a violation of international law—a
breach to international peace and security.
There is no internationally accepted reason for Republic of Cameroon
ruling Ambazonia. It is annexation and colonialism. So Republic of Cameroon
has in effect declared itself the metropole, and degraded Ambazonia into a
dependency or province of the metropole. Hence the name “Cameroun outré
Moungo.”
a) This Restoration Law gives legislative legitimacy to the humiliating
names, which Francophones call Ambazonians—“Les assimilee,” “les
outré-moungos,” “les Biafrains,” “les etrangers,” “les anglo-fools.”
b) It elevates the Ambazonian struggle from the realm of a domestic problem
of minority into the international case of a people struggling to liberate
their country from the colonialism of the Republic of Cameroon.
Colonial status is too revolting to be acquiesced in by a people who had
attained a sophisticated system of Parliamentary Democracy. It has the effect of
swinging the feelings of the majority of right thinking ordinary Ambazonians
behind a liberation cause and a liberation leadership.
Finally it gives legal justification to external help for the liberation and
decolonization of Ambazonia. For, to both annexation and colonialism the UN
says NO, the OAU says NO, our neighbours—Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo,
RCA, Tchad, Libya, Nigeria each say NO! NO! NO! to colonialism. No country
can accept annexation.
DIMENSIONS OF A DECOLONIZATION WAR
As I see it, the following forces would be willing allies of the separatist.
a) Northern Cameroon Secession:
The francophone North had wanted to secede in 1957/58. It was the clever
trick of the Southern francophone politicians forming a national alliance with
Ahidjo as leader of the alliance, which stopped Ahidjo breaking the Northern
French Cameroon off.
So the price paid for keeping French Cameroon united was to have a
Northern Ruler. Now not only have they, the North lost that ruling position, but
recent events, the witch hunting and detention of Northern elites, have totally
estranged the average Northerner. It is therefore not beyond the realm of
probability that Northern elements within and without the Republic of
Cameroon would exploit an Ambazonian decolonization war to realize their own
secession.
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b) Northern Revenge:
Innocent Northerners were rounded up and killed or imprisoned for no
other reason than on suspicion of being sympathetic with the abortive coup of
April 1984. Ahidjo, like Shylock of “Merchant of Venice” is spoiling for a chance
to get his pound of flesh from nearest Paul Biya’s heart. The Northern families
suffer the loss of their breadwinners. The Northerner would not be expected to
fight to defend Yaounde if Ambazonians, the only friends of the Northerners
attack Yaounde, Cameroon.
It is therefore quite conceivable that the Northerner would morally and
materially support an Ambazonian war against Yaounde, so as to also precipitate
a secession of the North, and revenge for the death and treatment of Northerners
by Yaounde.
c) International Liberationists:
An Ambazonian decolonization war would be bound to enlist the aid of
those external groups and foreign countries who hold it as an article of faith that
to aid “peoples liberation wars” is their binding duty.
d) Anti-Biya:
There are persons within and without Republic of Cameroon who must be
anti-Paul Biya.
Such elements would not hesitate to help any cause, which they see as likely to
undo him.
e) Vital National Interest of Neighbouring States:
An Ambazonian decolonization war is bound to have repercussions on
neighbouring countries. It is therefore conceivable that for the purpose of
protecting its vital national interest a neighbouring country would intervene to
bring the fighting to a quick end. This was what prompted India to aid the
secession and creation of Bangladesh out of East Pakistan.
I repeat—what I stated in The New Social Order, that there is a course,
which the Nigerians, and the fact that the people now ruling are a group of nononsense men, are taking to reconstruct their economy. They would not sit idly
by and watch a senseless war provoked by annexationists Yaounde, when the
consequences of this war would adversely affect Nigeria’s reconstruction efforts.
Nigeria is engaged in the decolonization of Southern Africa. It cannot ignore
colonialism next door.
My accusers say I am a friend of Nigeria and my statement is an invitation
to Nigeria to wage war against the Republic of Cameroons. To this I say NO! My
statement is a prognosis based on a study of the attitude of the Nigeria of today
and its present priorities. What Nigerian leaders would like seeing hundreds of
thousands of Ambazonians and settler Nigerian population flood Nigeria,
because Yaounde wants to be a colonial power in the 21st Century?
CHANCES OF SURVIVAL OF REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
286
Against the foregoing conjuncture of forces we have a Republic Regime
invalidated by its own laws are tempting Cameroon.
a)
Its leaders by their own badly drafted laws (i) 83/11 of 21/7/83,
(ii) 84/001 of 4/2/84 have put an end to their own mandates and
so lost all legal authority to govern even Cameroun.
b)
Its armed forces are bound to be morally split between loyalty to
Ambazonians and to the Republic of Cameroun.
c)
Even what would be left of the Army of the Republic of
Cameroun would be further split if Northern Cameroon
secessionist offensive is launched to exploit the Ambazonian
decolonization war.
It is clear that out of any violent encounter between the Republic of
Ambazonia and the Republic of Cameroun, the chances of the Republic of
Cameroun further disintegrating are not an inconceivable probability. It is
therefore suicidal for Yaounde to try using force to counter the Ambazonian
Revolt. The Republic of Cameroon would certainly not survive such a violent
encounter.
SOLUTION
In the light of the foregoing analysis we are condemned to a peaceful
solution, and that must come out now before it is too late. Having agreed that we
are condemned to a non-violent solution, the choice is with those who are
effectively in power.
If reassertion of the identity of the Republic of Cameroun was an act
consistent with policies of self-preservation which is characteristic of every state,
the question then is: Why does the leadership of Republic of Cameroun believe
that the State of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) has lost this same urge of
self-preservation?
It is generally known that the average francophone is totally impatient
with this unification with Southern Cameroons, which has introduced an
imponderable element in his mental direction of national development.
Because this unification has been in fact facultative, it is clear that if the
Francophones had been asked to vote for or against unification, the majority
would have voted against it. The rivalry that has ensued between Ambazonia
and Republic of Cameroun over a share of the national cake has clearly justified
the Francophone objection to the injection of Ambazonia into their national
process. The logic of secession dictates that the Republic of Cameroun quietly
withdraws its administrative machinery from Ambazonia.
But if on the other hand the reassertion of Republic of Cameroun was not
intended to mean secession (even though it indeed does mean secession) then all
we need to do is to move immediately to undo what is now the unintended
consequences of unscientific legislation by Yaounde.
ANY NATIONAL INTEGRATION BETWEEN PEOPLES IS A NATURAL
EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, WHICH PRECEEDES OUT OF HARMONIOUS
287
CO-EXISTENCE OF DIFFERENT UNITS WITH MUTUAL RESPECT OF EACH
OTHER. The very fact of the word integration presupposes that several units
exist whose integration is desired. Force has never integrated any units. It has
always produced frictions.
If we can learn from recent experience, between Southern Cameroons and
Nigeria, we will see that the moment Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia
secured her identity, and seceded from Nigeria, there has been more harmonious
interaction between Nigerians and Southern Cameroons than while Southern
Cameroons was in Nigeria.
So a solution to the Ambazonia Revolt is to acknowledge that these are
two distinct countries and that any integration between them must be
evolutional and not revolutional.
CONFEDERATION
A scientific approach to unification imposes on Ambazonia and Republic
of Cameroun a Confederation. The advantage in this is that the Ambazonia
would enjoy its sovereignty, which is identical to, if not greater than what she
was as Southern Cameroons within the Federation of Nigeria. This will stop the
separatist seeking total severance between Yaounde and Buea.
Anything that gives Ambazonia a subservient status will not assuage the
present revolt and will play into the hands of the separatists.
C. MAPS:
NOTE: MAPS WILL ONLY BE AVAILABLE IN THE
PUBLISHED TEXT FOR NOW!
-Justice M. Mbuh
APPENDIX CI
GERMAN MAP OF KAMERUN AS OF 1913.
Note: All shaded areas lost to Chad, Congo, Gabon and Central African Republic
as a result of the Anglo-French Treaty of 1916. Southern Cameroons was born
same year.
288
APPENDIX II
THE CAMEROONS AND THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROUN AS
OF FEBRUARY 11, 1961.
APPENDIX III
BRITISH MAP OF THE BIGHT OF BIAFRA IN 1962:
Showing the boundary between the Cameroun Federation and Nigeria, with
both Bakassi peninsula and the Rio del Rey in Ambazonian Territory.
APPENDIX IV
RUSSIAN MAP OF WEST CAMEROON (AMBAZONIA) AS OF
1972:
Bakassi peninsula and Rio del Rey are within Ambazonia and its international
boundaries with Nigeria and Cameroun.
APPENDIX V
FRENCH MAP OF CAMEROUN BOUNDARY IN 1961:
Showing the Western boundary of French Cameroun in 1961, with no boundary with
Nigeria (except on the little stretch near Garoua in the North). 1961 Plebiscite and
Cameroun are thus significant in resolving sovereignty of Ambazonia and the Bakassi
peninsula border disputes with Nigeria.
APPENDIX VI
BIGHT OF BIAFRA/ AMBAS BAY
Note: Map shows that Bakassi Peninsula lies east of Bakassi Point as stipulated in the
Anglo-German Treaties of 1890 & 1913. (Source: US Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, The Cameroon-Nigeria Boundary, No. 92, Nov. 3, 1969).
APPENDIX VII
289
Anglo-German Boundary between Kamerun and British Nigeria:
From April 1903-February 1909. Extracted From Sir E. Hertslet’s The Map of
Africa by Treaty, 3rd Edition. Revised and Complete to the end of 1908 by R.W.Bryart
and H.L.Sherwood, Vol.1, No.1-94, British Colonies, Protectorates and Possessions in
Africa (Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.).
APPENDIX VIII.
Nigeria-Cameroonian Oil Platform Locations in the Gulf of Guinea:
Modified by adding James Town, West Point II substituted for West Point, which should
be Bakassi Point I (which was moved to present location west of Bakassi Point and King
Point upon discovery that the Akpa-Yafe River did not empty into the ocean (1913
Anglo-German Treaty) at Point Bakassi I (1890)—See appendix VI and also Defense
Mapping Agency, USA, Map 23 on Cameroun-Nigeria Border to understand the merger)
Original extract from J.O. Newton’s Ph. D. Dissertation: The Nigeria-Cameroon Border
Dispute: Causes and Consequences of Political Intransigence in bi-lateral Relations,
University of South Carolina, 1999.
APPENDIX IX
SOUTHERN CAMEROONS (UN TRUST TERRITORY OF THE SOUTHERN
CAMEROONS, WEST CAMEROON OR AMBAZONIA)
Administrative and Population: J. A. Ngwa, Editorial Adviser, Atlas for West Cameroon,
Longman Atlases, Collins Sons & Co. Ltd, 1971.
APPENDIX X
CAMEROON FEDERATION:
J.A. Ngwa, Atlas for West Cameroon, 1971. Notice there is no demarcation of the sea
boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, as in appendix IX.
LIST OF TREATIES
(TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, DECLARATIONS, RESOLUTIONS
AND REPORTS).
Arrangement between Great Britain and Germany, Relative to their
respective spheres of action in portions of Africa (Coast of Guinea; Cameroons;
Victoria, Ambas Bay; Santa Lucia Bay; Coast between Natal and Delagoa Bay;
Customs; etc.), April-June, 1885. British and Foreign State papers (BFSP), Vol. 76,
1884-5, pp. 772-778.
Agreement between Great Britain and Germany, respecting boundaries in Africa.
Berlin, November 15, 1893. BSFP, Vol. 85, 1892-93, pp. 41-43.
British Mandates for the Cameroons, Togoland and East Africa. January, 1923.
United Kingdom Command, 1994.
290
British Order in Council providing for the administration of the Mandated
Territories of British Cameroons. London, June 26, 1923. BFSP, Vol. 117,
pp. 60-63.
Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 26, 1945.
Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa, May 25, 1963.
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
UNGA, December 14, 1960.
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, October 24, 1974.
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1954.
Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties. YBILC 2, 72-107, 1983.
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Geneva, Sept. 26,1928.
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, September 26,
1928.
General Assembly Resolution 1514, UN GAOR, 15th Session, Supp. No. 16, at 66,
UN Doc. A/4684, 1960.
Order in Council providing for the Administration of the Nigeria Protectorate
and Cameroons under British Mandate. London, August 2, 1946. BFSP,
Vol. 146, 1946, pp. 298-303.
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, December 14, 1974.
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, December 14, 1974.
Report of the International Law Commission covering its 34th Session, UN Doc.
A/37/10; YBILC, 1982-II.
Statute of the ICJ, San Francisco, June 26, 1945.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, May 23, 1969.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1964.
Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy, Paris, August 27,1928.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide,
December 14, 1948.
The Universal declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition,
November 6, 1974.
The North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
291
The Anglo-German Treaty of March 11, 1913.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA, December 10, 1948.
UN Plebiscite Treaty, October 13, 1960
UNGA Resolution 2625 (xxv), October 24, 1970.
Uniting for Peace Resolution, November 3, 1950.
LIST OF CASES
Ambazonia versus Cameroun over the implementation of the Plebiscite Treaty of
1960.
Cameroun versus Nigeria in the Case concerning the delimitation of their Land and
Maritime boundary.
Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO) Versus Nigeria, Abuja, March 5,
2002 (Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/30/2002)
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua.
France Versus Turkey in the Lotus Case.
India versus Pakistan in the case over Jammu and Kashmir.
India versus Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch case.
South Africa versus Namibia in the Repudiation of the Mandate.
The Nowegian Fisheries Case.
The United Kingdom versus Albania in the Confu Channel Case.
Thailand versus Cambodia in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case.
The North Sea Continental Shelf Case involving Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands.
United States versus Canada over the Legal Status of the Northwest Passage and
the Waters of the Arctic Archipelago.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Ambassador M. K. Albright, Correspondence to T. J. Penny, June 20, 1994.
---Correspondence to Congressman T. J. Penny, July 13, 1994.
Congressman T.J. Penny, Correspondence to US Ambassador M. Albright, June
20, 1994.
---Correspondence to all US Congressmen/Congress Ladies, July 7, 1994.
292
---Correspondence to All Fifteen Judges of the ICJ, November 4, 1994.
Correspondence No. WAF 441/110/01, May 5, 1961, E. C. Burr (declassified).
Correspondence No. 503/3/4, May 9, 1961, B. J. Greenhill, (declassified).
Correspondence No. NIG. 40/240/1, May 10, 1961, D. W. S. Hunt (declassified).
Correspondence No. CO554/2452, June 6, 1961, J. Chadwick (declassified).
Declaration of the Cameroun Government on the Border Dispute with Nigeria,
Yaounde, October 19, 1998.
High Court of Cameroun Judgement in Ambazonia Versus Cameroun, Judgment
No. HCB/28/92, Bamenda, Cameroon.
Human Rights Defense Group: Letters from political detainees of the Yaounde
Maximum Security Prison, Kondengui, 10/13/98, signed by five of the
leaders in Jail; another signed on 8/22/1998 by Tete Philipe (for more
details and originals, see Albert Mukong of HRDG, Bamenda, Cameroun).
Hotline News, "Another Southern Cameroons Offensive," on the Interpleader of
SCARM to the ICJ, December 1998.
ICJ Reports, Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal Advisory Opinion, 1973.
ICJ Press Communiqué, 96/13, Order of the Court on Provisional Measures,
March 15, 1996.
ICJ, Statement of the President of the Court, "The Limitations on the Contribution
by the International Court of Justice to the maintenance of Peace." October
15, 1996.
ICJ Case Summaries, Order of the Court, March 15, 1996.
ICJ Press Communiqué 98/23bis, Preliminary Objections, Summary of Judgment
of June 11, 1998.
ICJ, Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, 11 June 1998.
ICJ, Annex to Press Communiqué 98/23bis, Separate Opinion of Judge Oda.
ICJ, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 11 June 1998.
ICJ, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, 11 June 1998.
ICJ Press Communiqué 99/14bis, Summary of Judgement of 25 March 1999,
concerning Preliminary Objections of Nigeria.
ICJ Press Communiqué, Cameroun versus Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Request
Permission to Intervene in the Proceedings, June 30, 1999.
293
ICJ, Press Communiqué 99/37, the Court finds Nigeria's Counter-claims
Admissible and fixes Time-limits for the filing of further written
pleadings, July 2,1999.
ICJ Registrar, Edwardo Valencia-Ospina, Correspondence in Response to
Ambazonia Interpleader Summons, ICJ No. 91619, July 18, 1994.
---ICJ Registrar, Correspondence to Ambazonia, No. 91782, September 9,
1994.
Isaha'a Boh, (www.boh.org) Cameroun Politics: "Freed Kondengui detainees say
they were subjected to inhumane treatment". Sunday 24 October 1999.
Jeune Afrique, "Cameroun-Nigeria…La Guerre secrete," No. 1871, 13-19
November 1996.
Report of the International Law Commission Covering the 34th Session (UN Doc.
A/37/10:YBILC.
Ngang, Edwin. Delegate-General, Ambazonia Sovereignty Society-North
America (AMBASOS-NA), Reply to ICJ Registrar of August 11, 1994.
---Ambazonia’s reply to ICJ, October 27, 1994.
Nigerian Proclamation No. 126, May 1954, Lagos.
Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Cameroun Versus
Nigeria, Dec. 13, 1995.
Public Records Office, Directorate of Overseas Surveys, Doc.CO554/2452, B. J.
Greenhill, May 9, 1961, (Declassified).
Public Records Office (PRO) Foreign Office, 403, No. 187, London, 1893
(declassified).
Report of the International Law Commission Covering the 34th Session (UN Doc.
A/37/10:YBILC.
Southern Cameroons Information Bulletin, "More Anglophones killed Bakassi
skirmishes," No. 96001, Mar. 1, 1996.
Southern Cameroons Plebiscite Order in Council, 1960. “Constitutional Position
of the Southern Cameroons in the event of it electing to become part of the
Republic of Cameroun,” Southern Cameroons Gazette, Buea, 27 January
1961.
Telegraph No. 713, to Commonwealth Relations Office, Repeated Buea No. 14;
Enugu No.58; Lagos, May 2, 1961 (declassified).
The Human Rights Defense Group, "The Southern Cameroons Problem,"
Bamenda, 1998.
294
The Herald, "Betis mobilize to fight Biya following discontent over death of Ayissi
Mvodo and Arrest of Edzoa, Ze Meka, etc." No. 484, Yaounde, Cameroun,
July 14-15, 1997.
---"Bakassi Case: Yaounde Accuses Abuja of Secret Agenda to Destroy
Cameroun." No. 583. Yaounde, Cameroun, Mar.13-16, 1998.
The Republic of Ambazonia: Interpleader Surmmons to the United Nations and
the International Court of Justice. “In Cameroun-Nigeria Border Dispute,
Intervening Party Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice,” May 15, 1994.
---“Order to Show Cause,” March 2, 1999.
UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, UN GAOR, 15th Session, Supp. No. 16, at
66, UN Doc. A/4684, 1960.
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna, 26
March-24 May, Official Records, Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, 1968.
---Second Session, Provisionary Summary Record of the Eight Plenary
Meeting, Vienna, 28 April, Doc.A/CONF.39/SR.8, 1969.
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