The ways in which the sciences are and are not value free
The paper below is a later version.
Presented at the conference, "Value Free Science:
Illusion or Ideal?", Center for Ethics and Values in the
Sciences, University of Alabama at Birmingham,
February 23-25, 2001.
Impartiality, Neutrality and Autonomy:
Three components of the idea that science is value free 1
Hugh Lacey
Swarthmore College
hlacey1@swarthmore.edu
ABSTRACT:
The idea that science is value free is well captured by the thesis: Impartiality, neutrality and autonomy
are, and ought to be, constitutive values of scientific practices and institutions. Impartiality affirms that
theories should be accepted in the light of criteria that are completely distinct from commitments with
respect to social and moral values; neutrality that applications of established theories do not especially
favor any particular value perspectives; and autonomy that social and moral values have no place within
scientific methodology, and that science should be conducted free from interference derived from value
commitments. These three ideas, and their presuppositions, are analyzed in detail - enabling us to explore
fruitfully the ways in which the sciences are and are not value free.
I identify three distinct ideas: impartiality, neutrality and autonomy, that are in play in discussions of
science as value free. Provisionally, (1) science is impartial: there is no proper role for moral, social and
any other non-cognitive values, alongside the cognitive (or epistemic) values, in the appraisal of the
soundness of scientific understanding;2 (2) well conceived scientific practices produce a body of
understanding that is neutral among contending value-outlooks: neither cognitively nor in practical
applications do they favor the claims or interests of any particular value-outlooks; and (3) its research
practices are autonomous: their methodologies should be unencumbered by political, religious and other
non-cognitive interests. I submit that the view of science as value free, that is integral to the selfunderstanding of the modern scientific tradition, is well captured by the thesis:
Impartiality, neutrality and autonomy are, and ought to be, constitutive values of
scientific practices and institutions.
Note that this thesis is consistent with moral and social values playing many roles within science , e.g., in
motivating research interests, in setting the direction and determining the legitimation of applied research and
applications, even in making judgements about the adequacy of available evidence and assessing the testimony of
scientific experts — and in many other ways.3 Proponent of science as value free have never denied this. They
hold only that at its core — where theories are accepted and research directions of basic research are set — moral
and social values (unlike cognitive values) have no proper role, and that no viable value-outlook should be especially
favored by the advances of scientific understanding. Too often, science is value free has been dismissed by pointing
to the legitimate play of values at the periphery rather than at the core of scientific practices.
According to my thesis science as value free represents a value of scientific practices and
institutions. A particular account of the nature of values underlies my argument, which unfortunately
there is no time to develop in this paper. I believe that the discussion of science as value free has too
often been marred by uncritical endorsement of non-cognitive accounts of values. I have proposed an
account in which values of various kinds (personal, moral, social, etc) are held together in valueoutlooks.4 These are complex sets of values, rendered coherent, ordered and rationally worthy of being
held by certain presuppositions about human nature (and nature) and about what is possible. Since
suppositions about human nature and the possibilities of things are open to some measure of empirical
investigation, it follows that the outcomes of scientific inquiry may contribute to support or undermine
the rational credentials of a value-outlook. I will say that a value-outlook is viable provided that its
presuppositions are consistent with soundly accepted scientific knowledge. Viability is a necessary
condition for the rational adoption of a value-outlook. Not all value-outlooks that have been entertained
are viable, but the advance of science leaves open a range of viable ones. That is why it is coherent to see
scientific developments as having played a significant rational role in (e.g.) the demise of the value-outlook of
medieval Christendom, while also maintaining that science is impotent to adjudicate the great moral disputes of our
age5 — and it perhaps explains why normally no incoherence is recognized when the modern scientific
tradition endorses both science as value free and the primacy of progress.6
*******
I will now explicate the three component values of science as value free and their respective
presuppositions.7
Impartiality
Impartiality presupposes that cognitive and other kinds of values can be distinguished.8
It designates the value that:
A theory is accepted of a domain of phenomena if and only if it manifests the cognitive
values to a suitably high degree (according to the highest standards) in the light of
available empirical data; and a theory is rejected if and only if a theory inconsistent with
it has been soundly accepted.
Accordingly there is no proper role for moral and social values (and the practical uses to which theories
may be put, and by whom) in the judgments involved in choosing theories; and neither is there a role for
religious dogma, political ideology or metaphysical commitments.
A theory may be soundly accepted in accord with impartiality and at the same time be an object
of social value (e.g., be useful on application for particular social interests). Impartiality forbids a role to social
values only in grounding the judgments involved in choosing theories, not in making judgments of their
significance for a value-outlook on application, where a theory is significant for a value-outlook if it may be
applied so as to further the manifestation of (some) component values of the outlook, without (on balance)
undermining the outlook as a whole.9
Impartiality is presented as a value of scientific practices and institutions, even though it is well
known that in actual fact numerous theories have been accepted in violation of it. Nevertheless, such
lapses (of great importance to "anti-science" criticisms) are consistent with impartiality being genuinely held
as a value in scientific practices provided that there are plenty of exemplary cases that do manifest it
highly, that attempts are made to identify the mechanisms that can cause violations of it and steps are
taken to prevent their actual operation,10 and that the trajectory of scientific practices points to more and
a greater variety of theories being accepted in accord with it.
Neutrality
Neutrality presupposes first impartiality, second that scientific theories do not entail that any particular
values should be adopted, and third that the body of soundly accepted scientific theories leaves open a
range of viable value-outlooks.
Then, neutrality designates the value that:
Each viable value-outlook is such that there are soundly accepted theories that can be
significant to some extent for it;
and applications of soundly accepted scientific theories can be made evenhandedly, so
that overall there is no viable value-outlook for which the body of theories should have
favored significance.
Neutrality expresses that scientific research provides, as it were, a menu of soundly accepted theories,
among the items of which (in principle) each value-outlook may have its tastes for application (good or
bad) catered to.11 Note that the significance of a theory for a value-outlook cannot be inferred from its
being acceptance in accordance with impartiality.
Like impartiality, neutrality can be maintained as a value of scientific practices despite actual
lapses, provided that conditions parallel to those I listed for impartiality are in place. Within a wide range
of mainstream scientific practices the trajectory is indeed in the direction of the higher manifestation of
impartiality — and it is easy to point to exemplary cases of theories that are soundly accepted of certain
domains. But, in the case of those same practices, a similar trajectory towards higher manifestation of
neutrality is not discernible with the same ease; and, within them, I do not think this can be reversed. Rather
than being applied in an evenhanded way, the body of soundly accepted theories of modern science tends
overwhelmingly (and often unabashedly) to be significant for value-outlooks that nourish technological
progress and "modernization" [that contain what I call below "the modern valuation of control"], so that
the actual practices of application provide little evidence that the theories of modern science can be
significant to a comparable extent for many other viable valueoutlooks that contest modernization,
especially in its current form of "globalization".12
Autonomy
Autonomy presupposes first that there is a reasonably clear distinction between basic and applied
scientific research, and second that the practices of basic research aim to bring about higher and more
widespread manifestations of impartiality and neutrality.13
I express it as the value that:
The characteristics of scientific methodology, the adoption of strategies in research, and
the priorities and direction of basic research are set, without "outside" interference, by
cognitive interests alone.
I think that it is clear that the manifestation of this value to a reasonable extent in scientific practices rests
upon a further presupposition that may best be stated as a complementary value:
Basic research practices are conducted in autonomous communities, supported by
autonomous institutions — i.e., communities and institutions whose priorities are set
without interference from "outside" interests, powers and values (political, religious,
economic, personal); consequently the priorities and directions of basic research are set
so that the interest, to heighten the manifestation of the cognitive values in the theories
of the domains under investigation and to extend research into domains not currently
within their compass, is not subordinated to other interests.14
*******
Now I will offer my appraisal of the components of the thesis with which I have expressed science as
value free.
I begin with autonomy. Can the ideal that basic scientific research effectively be "driven by" the
cognitive values alone, play a regulatory role in scientific practice? Autonomy might appear to follow
from accepting that the aim of science is "to gain understanding of the world — (or) to generate and
consolidate theories manifesting the cognitive values highly, and progressively of more and more
domains of phenomena and possibilities".
Appealing to the aim of science stated like this, however, can provide no direction to scientific
investigation, since it does not — for any domain — point to the relevant kinds of empirical data to
procure and the appropriate descriptive categories to use for making observational reports, and to the
kinds of theories to posit so that they can be put them into contact with the data. In order to pursue such
an aim the "right" kinds of data and theories must be brought into contact, so much so that (logically)
antecedent to engaging in inquiry (what I call) a strategy must be adopted;15 where the key roles of a
strategy are to constrain the kinds of theories that may be entertained — and thus to specify the kinds of
possibilities that may be explored in the course of the inquiry — and to select the kinds of empirical data
that acceptable theories should fit. Without adopting a strategy we cannot address coherently and
systematically: what questions to pose, what puzzles to resolve, what classes of possibilities to attempt to
identify, what kinds of explanations to explore, what phenomena to observe, measure and experiment
upon, what procedures to use.
My notion of strategy has affinities with Hacking's notion of "form of knowledge." In each case questions can be
asked about its adoption as a frame for research (logically) prior to the appraisal of any theories developed within the
frame. Hacking says:
By a form of a branch of scientific knowledge I mean a structured set of declarative sentences that stand for possibilities, that i
In my language, a strategy identifies the general features of the range of possibilities that may be explored within a
research program; and, if its claims become hegemonic in a society, that will set limits to the "thinkable" in that
society, so that questions that make sense in one frame may be unintelligible in another.17 Hacking's and my
emphases are different: he emphasizes how a form of knowledge may be altered by radically new inventions),18 I
that commitment to conflicting value-outlooks may lead to the adoption of different strategies, though Hacking is
sensitive to the contingency of the adoption of a form of knowledge and the role of social factors in explaining their
adoption.
Most of modern science tends to adopt virtually exclusively various forms of (what I call)
materialist strategies:19 theories are constrained to those that represent phenomena and encapsulate
possibilities (the abstracted possibilities of things) in terms of their being generated (or generable) from
underlying structure, process, interaction and law, abstracting from any place they may have in relation
to social arrangements, human lives and experience, from any link with value, and from whatever social,
human and ecological possibilities that may also be open to them.20 Reciprocally, empirical data are
selected, not only to meet the condition of intersubjectivity, but also so that their descriptive categories are
generally quantitative, applicable in virtue of measurement, instrumental and experimental operations.
What are the rational grounds on which the modern scientific community has adopted materialist
strategies almost exclusively? [Why, looking ahead, has it been more interested in exploring the
possibilities of agro-biotechnology than of agroecology?] I pose this question because I am assuming that
in order to explore important classes of possibilities the use of materialist strategies is indispensable, that
there is in general no good reason to think that the possibilities of things are exhausted by their abstracted
possibilities, and that there are forms of systematic empirical inquiry in which "non-abstracted"
possibilities can be investigated. I will — perhaps contentiously — call any form of systematic empirical
inquiry a form of "science."21
One common answer to the question draws upon materialist metaphysics:22 Science aims to
understand the world as it is — the material world — independently of its relations with human beings.
Materialist strategies (and only them) provide categories appropriate to this aim. A second answer can be
drawn from Kuhn:23 Not the nature of "the material world," but the current historically-contingent stage
of our research practices, demands the adoption of materialist strategies. Adopted in the first place
(rationally) because they helped to solve puzzles that had remained anomalous under old strategies, they
have continued to predominate because of their fruitfulness: under them the range of theories that have
become soundly accepted is large and variegated and it continues to become more so. That is sufficient
for the current privilege of materialist strategies for, according to Kuhn, the historical practice of science
proceeds best when the scientific community pursues a strategy single-mindedly until its potential is
exhausted.
Having criticized these two answers elsewhere.24 I will proceed directly to a third, the one I take
to be most compelling.25 This answer draws (rationally and not just causally) from a mutually reinforcing
interaction between research conducted under materialist strategies and commitment to a set of widely
held and embodied social values — modern technological and economic values, the values of
"modernization"; I have in mind particularly (what I call) the modern valuation of control, the distinctive
role played by control of natural objects and the way in which it is valued in modernity: its scope,
centrality in daily life, relative insubordination to other social values, and the deep sense that control is
the characteristic human stance towards natural objects, so that the expansion of technologies into more
and more spheres of life and into becoming the means for the solution of more and more problems is
highly valued.
[Passage taken from Lacey (forthcoming).]It is often assumed that any value-outlook rationally held today must
include certain values connected with the control of natural objects and with technological advance, values that
together constitute (what I call) the modern valuation of control. Thus, e.g., those who cite the value of organic
farming over that of the agricultural practices spawned by recent innovations of genetic engineering tend to be
dismissed on the ground that they run counter to the trajectory being shaped by the modern valuation of control
("globalization"). But that dismissal does not follow from currently soundly accepted scientific knowledge. That a
value-outlook rests uneasily with the current centers of power implies neither that adopting it violates canons of
rationality, nor that it is rendered non-viable.
Let me dwell a little on the modern valuation of control and, at the same time, illustrate my contention that
value-outlooks gain rational acceptability in light of presuppositions that serve to make them coherent. Valuing
control of natural objects is, of course, not unique to modernity. The distinctness of the way in which control is
valued in modernity lies in the extent of its reach and its mode of relationship with other values. Here is my attempt
to identify the central components of the modern valuation of control:
• The instrumental value of natural objects is dissociated from other forms of value; then the exercise of control over
natural objects tends to become per se a social value not systematically and generally subordinated to other social
values.
• Expanding, and embodying widely in institutions, human capabilities to control natural objects, and especially
creating new scientifically-informed technologies rank high as values.
• Control is the characteristic human stance to adopt towards natural objects. Exercising control and, above all,
engaging in the research and development projects in which our powers to control are expanded, are essential and
primary ways in which we express ourselves as modern human beings, in which are cultivated such personal
"virtues" as creativity, inventiveness, initiative, boldness in the face of risks, autonomy, rationality and practicality.
Thus, an environment which is shaped so that many and varied possibilities of control may be routinely actualized in
the course of daily life, one dominated by technological objects, is highly valued, as is the spread of technology into
more and more domains of life and the definition of problems in terms of their having a technological solution.
• The values that may be manifested in social arrangements are, to a significant extent, subordinate to the value of
implementing novel technologies, which has prima facie legitimacy so that a measure of social disruption may be
tolerated for its sake, and whose side-effects may be addressed largely as "second thoughts".
The modern valuation of control is highly manifested throughout the world today and endorsed by
predominant economic and political institutions. It is capable of much higher manifestation — in more societies, in
more domains of life; and we may expect that the trend to its higher manifestation will continue for quite some time.
Its expression, then, in the behavior of increasing numbers of people is readily explained. But the rational grounds
for adopting the modern valuation of control, as distinct from the factors that explain its widespread adoption, rest (I
suggest) in large part on the following diverse set of presuppositions:
a) Ongoing technological innovation serves the well-being of human beings in general since it is indispensable for
"development", and thus a prerequisite for a just (or free) society.
b) Technological solutions can be found for virtually all problems, including those occasioned by the "side-effects"
of technological implementations.
c) The modern valuation of control represents a set of universal values, part of any rationally legitimated valueoutlook today, whose further manifestation is de facto desired by virtually all who come into contact with its
products.
d) There are no significant possibilities for value-outlooks, that do not contain the modern valuation of control, to be
actualized in the foreseeable future.
e) Natural objects are not per se objects-of-value, and they only become such in virtue of their places in human
practices; per se they can be completely understood in terms of the categories of underlying structure, process,
interaction and law abstracted from any value they may derive from their place in human practices. When we
exercise control over objects, informed by sound understanding articulated with these categories, we are dealing with
objects as they are in themselves as part of "the material world" — and that is why projects shaped by the modern
valuation of control have been so spectacularly successful.
I cannot make the argument here, but I think it is quite clear that if a number of these presuppositions cannot
be sustained, then the rational grounds for endorsing the modern valuation of control dissolve — regardless of its
widespread embodiment in contemporary social structures and the support it gains from the current hegemony of
"globalization".
Why have materialist strategies been granted almost exclusive privilege? — There is a mutually
reinforcing interaction between research conducted under materialist strategies and commitment to the
modern valuation of control.26
Generalizing from the third answer, we get the following picture: When one adopts a strategy, in effect
one lays out in the most general terms the kinds of phenomena and possibilities chosen to be
investigated; in the case of materialist strategies, the abstracted possibilities of things (which, in certain
spaces, may exhaust the possibilities of phenomena). Subject to fruitfulness being a necessary condition
for continuing rationally to adopt a strategy, there is nothing logically improper about social values
strongly influencing which strategy one adopts. Then, the acceptability of theories generated under the
strategies is judged in the light of the data and the cognitive values.27 The important thing is to allow no
role to social values where only cognitive values have proper play.
The different roles of social and cognitive values reflect different (logical) moments in the
appraisal of theories. At one moment, when we ask: "What characteristics must theories have to be
provisionally considered?", we are asking about what strategy to adopt, and here social values may play a
key role. Logically such a role for social values is played out first. Then (logically) at the second
moment, when we ask: "Which (if any) of the theories, that fit the strategy's constraints, are to be
accepted?", the play of the cognitive values alone, in the light of the empirical data and other accepted
theories, should be decisive. Values (non-cognitive) have no legitimate role at the second moment acting
alongside the cognitive values; but at the first moment a strategy may be adopted because of mutually
reinforcing relations it has with values, for theories developed under it are expected, on application, to
have significance.28 Whereas a strategy lays out the general features of the possibilities desired to be
encapsulated, a soundly accepted theory encapsulates what the genuine possibilities are.
Since the grounds for adopting (and continuing to adopt) a strategy must appeal to factors
distinct from and additional to the cognitive values, it follows that autonomy cannot (even in principle)
be well embodied.
On the picture I am offering the success of research conducted under materialist strategies contributes to
the social consolidation of the modern valuation of control and to its influence in more and more spheres
of life, and this may largely explain why it is relatively little contested. But the picture is consistent with
there being a multiplicity of fruitful strategies, each one in interaction with a particular value-outlook,
each one exploring a different class of possibilities, and each one generating theories that become
soundly accepted; so that each one enables the reliable encapsulation of possibilities of interest for its
related value-outlook.
Consider agricultural research. Under one strategy — a materialist one — the possibilities for
agricultural practice opened up by research on genetically modified organisms are explored; under
another — a non-materialist one — the possibilities of improving organic farming methods by
developing "traditional" local agroecological methods — where, quoting one of its foremost exponents:
The agroecological approach regards farm systems as the fundamental units of study,
maximizing production of a particular
system, but rather with optimizing the agroecosystem as
a whole. This approach shifts
the emphasis in agricultural research … toward complex
interactions among and
between people, crops, soil and livestock.29
The issues raised here are complex. On the one hand, if both strategies were to turn out to be
fruitful it would seem to be an unambiguous gain, enabling us to identify additional classes of
possibilities, thus furthering the aim of gaining understanding of "the natural world." On the other hand, it may
not be possible to actualize together two genuine possibilities: implementing agricultural methods that
use genetically modified organisms on a large scale tends to undermine the conditions for agroecology,
and vice versa.30 So, while the picture permits a multiplicity of strategies, it also helps to explain why
there may be pressures against actually multiplying them. These pressures do not negate that theories
accepted under the dominant strategies may be accepted in accord with impartiality (as an ever increasing
number of theories accepted under materialist strategies are), but they put barriers in the path of movement
towards neutrality, and lead to the temptation to treat accord with the dominant strategy as effectively another
cognitive value and (e.g.), in violation of impartiality, to reject claims made by agroecologists simply because
they arise under competing strategies.
The issues become even more complex. It does not seem to be coherent even to aim to explore
wholeheartedly (let alone attempt to implement simultaneously) all the possibilities of "the natural world".
Since research requires material and social conditions, and the conditions needed for research under
different strategies may be mutually incompatible, even to conduct research exploring one class of
possibilities may preclude probing exploration of another class. Research practices can be deeply
incompatible, so much so that they cannot be conducted together with integrity in the same social
environment.31 Then, the values highly manifested and embodied in society can be decisive in accounting
for what kinds of systematic empirical understanding actually comes to be gained, and thus to be
available for application.
Today there is an imbalance between the resources devoted to research in the genetic engineering
of plants for agricultural use on the one hand and research in agroecology on the other. While this does not
undermine the positive discoveries obtained from the former, it makes it less likely that we will come to
gain adequate knowledge pertaining to agroecological alternatives and to the ecological "side-effects" of
using genetically modified organisms and especially their social ones (e.g., that seeds become ever more
fully turned into commodities)32. Theories that inform successful implementations of genetic engineering
in agriculture may be accepted in accordance with impartiality, and so we may expect that the
and in th
implementations will have the expected outcomes (at least in the short run): high crop yields, fewer inputs, more
nutritious crops, etc. The research supports the efficacy of the applications; and, where the modern
valuation of control is highly manifested and embodied, efficacy may be taken practically to suffice for
legitimation. But legitimation does not derive from efficacy alone but from contribution to human wellbeing; and so, in the present case, it presupposes the absence not only of over-riding undesirable "sideeffects," but also of "better" agricultural alternatives, presuppositions that have been challenged by (e.g.)
environmentalists and agroecologists.33
For many the picture I have sketched is profoundly disquieting. True, it denies moral and social values a
role connected with accepting theories. But, according to it, the pursuit of basic scientific research does
not stand outside of value disputes: the virtually exclusive privilege granted materialist strategies (e.g.) is
only as rational as the adoption of the modern valuation of control. This poses no rational obstacle
(subject to fruitfulness) to the adoption of alternative strategies in view of their having mutually
reinforcing interactions with value-outlooks that contest the modern valuation of control — apparently
opening choice of strategy to the possibility of contestation similar to that currently found about matters
of values. Be that as it may; granting privilege to materialist strategies cannot be adequately grounded
empirically. My picture pushes us to broaden the horizons for empirical inquiry.
How does it do this? Well, recall the question: Why grant privilege to materialist strategies? The
answer is: because they are fruitful and they interact in mutually reinforcing ways with the modern
valuation of control. Why hold the modern valuation of control? Part of the answer involves appeal to its
presuppositions, which include proposals such as: The modern valuation of control represents a set of
universal values, part of any rationally legitimated value-outlook today, whose further manifestation is de
facto desired by virtually all who come into contact with its products; and
there are no significant possibilities for value-outlooks, that do not contain the modern valuation of
control, to be actualized in the foreseeable future. But, for the most part, these presuppositions
themselves cannot be investigated empirically under materialist strategies, and so research conducted
exclusively under these strategies cannot feed back and provide them with support or criticism. We need
multiple strategies for that.
Earlier I defined impartiality, a value of scientific practices: accept theories if and only if they manifest
the cognitive values to a high degree. Commitment to neutrality involves extending the range of domains
in which we consolidate theories accepted in accord with impartiality — towards, I suggest, the ideal that
any belief that plays a role in informing or legitimating any salient contemporary social practice be
subject to appropriate empirical scrutiny. When research is conducted virtually exclusively under
materialist strategies, we gain numerous soundly accepted theories that inform numerous efficacious
applications, but rarely does it speak directly to the presuppositions that legitimate the modern valuation
of control, or (e.g.) agricultural practices that are expressions of it. Must we then conclude that covertly these
presuppositions are accepted because they serve to legitimate the modern valuation of control — that social values
are in play alongside or in place of the cognitive values, and thus that the presuppositions are not accepted in
accordance with impartiality, and thus that they are ideological?
Ironically, or paradoxically, this impasse might be cut through by permitting research under
multiple strategies. But the conditions required to carry out such research may not be readily available
where the modern valuation of control is highly manifested, so that to carry it out may already involve
commitment to a value-outlook that contests the modern valuation of control. Nevertheless, unless
research is conducted under multiple strategies, any value-outlook must rest upon key presuppositions
that have not been accepted in accordance with impartiality. Then, neutrality will not be an approachable
ideal.
Neutrality cannot be highly manifested unless the likelihood that one value-outlook dominate the
direction of scientific research is minimized.34 The mainstream tradition has thought that the way to
achieve this is to conduct research under materialist strategies, which permit no value-laden terms to be
deployed in theories. My alternative is to multiply strategies so that the interests of numerous valueoutlooks can come to be informed by the sound results of scientific research, and so that key
presuppositions of value-outlooks that influence the adoption of particular strategies can be investigated
empirically.35
Consider, e.g., one of the presuppositions of the modern valuation of control: there is now no
genuine possibility for the high social embodiment of value-outlooks that do not contain the modern
valuation of control. It is backed by various more specific assumptions: e.g., those often deployed to
legitimate the accelerated utilization of genetically modified plants in agriculture: "utilization of
genetically modified plants occasions no lost possibilities; apart from it, not enough food will be
produced to feed the world's expanding population."36 Now, research under materialist strategies perhaps
can produce answers to questions like: "How can we maximize food production under material
conditions that can be widely replicated?" But not to questions like: "How can we produce food so that
all the people in a given region will gain access to a well-balanced diet and so that local social and
ecological stability will be sustained?" But "no lost possibilities" can gain no empirical support apart
from attempts to address empirically questions like the second one. Thus unless strategies (of
agroecology) are defined under which these questions become addressed in systematic empirical ways,
assumptions like "no lost possibilities" must remain essentially ideological in character. Strategies of
agroecology, which typically draw upon knowledge gained under materialist strategies in major and
indispensable ways, aim to grasp farming practices and their possibilities without abstracting from the
social and ecological relations into which they enter (what are the possibilities of productive and
sustainable agroecosystems?)— and they may well exhibit continuity with the "traditional knowledge" of
a culture.37 They might not turn out to be fruitful, but we cannot know that in advance of engaging in
research under them.
The definition and development of such strategies would further neutrality,38 and also involve
mutually reinforcing interactions with various value-outlooks that contest the modern valuation of control
— those of some environmental groups and, of particular interest to me, grassroots movements in some third
world countries that aim to enhance the values of "local well being, agency and community" and, if they
were to prove fruitful their products would contribute to furthering the manifestation of these values —
providing further grounds for challenging the modern valuation of control. The pulls of neutrality and the
modern valuation of control are in opposite directions.
*******
Is science value free? It will now be apparent that a "yes or no" answer would be misleading. Rather we
need to discern the extent to which the three component values can and cannot be further embodied in
scientific practices. Here is my conclusion: Autonomy is not realizable. Neutrality is susceptible of fuller
embodiment in the practices of science (systematic empirical inquiry), but their current mainstream
trajectories do not promise to bring about that fuller embodiment, so much so that one may query
whether mainstream scientific practices are committed to the furtherance of neutrality. But impartiality
remains a key value of all research practices conducted under any strategy.
The ground has now been cleared to permit us to keep at the center of attention the question: How should systematic
empirical inquiry (science) be conducted and institutionalized today so as to be of greatest service to furthering the
well-being, in all of its dimensions, of as many people as possible? In turn, this question will become interpreted
concretely as related questions are posed:39 How widely should we multiply strategies — in response to what range
of value-outlooks, expressive of what range of conceptions of human well-being, articulated by what range of social
and political movements? How exactly do current scientific practices (and their forms of institutionalization)
contribute to furthering and diminishing human well-being? What anticipatory alternatives might be worth exploring
more fully?40 Compare with Dupré:
… the most important topic in the philosophy of science, the relation of science to human values.
What contributions can or should science make to human well-being? … … If there is one
conclusion of overriding importance to be drawn from the increasing realization in recent times
that science is a human product, it is that, like other human products, the only way it can ultimately
be evaluated is in terms of whether it contributes to the thriving of sentient beings in the
universe.41
And with Kitcher:
Reflective people … want to know whether research in various areas is skewed by the values of
particular groups and, at the broadest level, how science bears on human flourishing. …… It has
been obvious for about half a century that research yielding epistemic benefits may have damaging
consequences for the individual or even the whole species. Philosophical stories about science
have been narrowly focused on the epistemic. Faced with lines of research that have the capacity to
alter the environment in radical ways, to transform our self-understanding, and to interact with a
variety of social institutions and social prejudices to affect human lives, there is a much larger
problem of understanding just how the sciences bear on human flourishing.42
These questions can no longer be brushed aside on the ground that values have no proper place in setting
the direction of scientific research. One way or the other, some values (or metaphysics) must play such a role,
ensuring that understanding gained under a strategy is primed to be significant for value-outlooks containing these
values. Better that the role played be a consequence of discussion and deliberation, rather than a covert one played in
subtle dialectical interaction with the reigning values of the age. Of course, it is important that the role be played at
the right (logical) moment, that of adoption of strategy, and never at the expense of impartiality. Recognizing this
should not obscure there are rich dialectical interactions among the questions: "How to conduct scientific research?",
"How to structure society?" and "How to further human well-being?" Science may be appraised, not only for the
cognitive value of its theoretical products, but also for its contribution to social justice and human well-being.
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NOTES
1. This paper is a considerably revised version of Lacey (forthcoming). It builds upon and clarifies material in Lacey
(1999a), which I will refer to throughout as "SVF". Because of time constraints I cannot recapitulate here the
arguments for all the views that are integral to my argument. Where I introduce a view without argument here I give
references to the argument in SVF (or other recent writing). The paper has been prepared with the partial support of
NSF (SES-9905945) relating to a project," Biotechnology and Agroecology: in the light of competing moral and social
values."
2. For a detailed discussion of cognitive values, see SVF: ch. 3, and for a defence of the distinction between
cognitive and other kinds of values, SVF: 216-223.
3. SVF: 12-19. See also the document "Some of the Conference Issues" on the conference website
(http://www.uab.edu/ethicscenter/theissues.html).
To maintain that the sciences are not value free is often taken to express an "anti-science" position. Indeed many
who do maintain this wish to deny any special rational status to scientific knowledge, to undermine its authority and
to draw it into the domain of ideological conflict. Moreover, they sometimes think that their position is bolstered by
the identification of any roles that values play within science; but this is to mistake, using the words of Poincaré
(1920/1958: 12), the touch of science and values for their interpenetration. The touch of values and science is
ubiquitous, and must be, for science is first of all a human practice. Moral and social values play a role, e.g., in
motivating research interests, in setting the direction and determining the legitimation of applied research and
applications, even in making judgements about the adequacy of available evidence and assessing the testimony of
scientific experts — and in many other ways. The view that science is value free denies not the touch but the
interpenetration of science and values, or rather it endorses the interpenetration of values and science as an ideal
that is capable of further and richer embodiment in scientific practices. With my thesis I aim to capture what is
intended by the denial of the interpenetration of values and science and, at the same time, to provide a focus for
critically discussing science as value free for the sake of the improvement of both science and society (see final
paragraphs of this paper).
Then, current lapses from science as value free — current instances where science and values are interpenetrating
—may signify the need for improvements, not evidence that scientific practices cannot become more fully such that
science and values do not interpenetrate; and one might read the history of science as displaying a trajectory of this
kind.
4. SVF: ch. 2; Lacey (1997); Lacey (1998): ch. 2; Lacey & Schwartz (1996).
5. SVF: 74-79.
6. SVF: 4, 243-245.
7. The versions presented here are improvements upon those of SVF (especially in the way I separate explicitly the
components from their respective presuppositions) — but I have omitted some details, nuances, qualifications and
variations that are considered in SVF: chs 4, 10.
8. SVF: 216-223.
9. Anderson (1995, 1999); SVF: 15-16.
10. Longino (1990): 76; Lacey (1999e).
11. Often the neutrality of science draws upon such phenomena as that many results obtained in military research
also have valuable applications for peaceful ends (Hacking, 1999: 183-184). Such phenomena of course are
important. There are many items of scientific knowledge that are applicable more or less evenhandedly across
value-outlooks — and many that are not (Lacey, 2000a). [Later I will refer to research under agroecological
strategies drawing from the results of research under materialist strategies.] As I have characterized it neutrality
concerns the body of accepted theories, not individual accepted theories. I have considered other formulations of
neutrality (SVF: 74-82, 236-247) and left them aside in favor of the present view.
12. Lacey (1999b, 2000a)
13. See Longino (1999) for case studies that put the second presupposition into question.
14. For other aspects (and qualifications) that might be built into a richer characterization of "autonomy" see SVF:
82-87, 24, and for qualified defence of a weaker version SVF: 248-254; see also Lacey (1999e).
15. SVF: ch. 5 where the notion of strategy is developed in detail; also Lacey (1998, 1999c).
16. Hacking (1999): 170-171.
17. Ibid: 165
18. Ibid: 184
19. SVF: 68-69: also Lacey (1968, 1999c, d, e).
20. Lawfulness is at the core of materialist strategies, variations of which arise as additional constraints may be put
on what counts as a law or on the variables that are admissible in laws. My account of materialist strategies could
easily be re-expressed in terms of Giere's view of theories (Giere 1999) as abstract models (or sets of models) that
represent aspects of the world (phenomena and the possibilities they admit), where the components of the models
have quantitative properties and are structured in such a way that their processes and interactions exemplify
"mathematical principles." Then, mathematical principle rather than law is the core notion (Giere 1999: ch. 5).
21. Many objects— including experimental and technological phenomena — whose abstracted possibilities are well
grasped under materialist strategies are also social objects, objects of social value. Understanding them fully (SVF:
99-100) requires reference to the human/social descriptions that can also be given of their boundary and initial
conditions and of their effects — thus grasping the possibilities (non-abstracted) that these things have in virtue of
their relations with human beings, social conditions and (more broadly) systems of things. Elsewhere I have
identified some (anticipatory) strategies under which non-abstracted possibilities may be investigated: for research in
agriculture, strategies of agroecology (Lacey 1999b, 2000b, 2001); for research in psycho-socio-biology, feminist
strategies; and, prior to the dominance of materialist strategies Aristotelian strategies were dominant (SVF: ch. 8, ch.
9 and ch. 7 respectively).
22. SVF: 104-109.
23. Lacey (2001).
24. SVF: chs 6,7; Lacey (1999b, 2001).
25. SVF: ch. 6.
26. I have elaborated four dimensions of this mutually reinforcing interaction (SVF: 117-126):
• The furtherance of the modern valuation of control is dependent on the expansion of understanding
gained under materialist strategies.
• Engaging in research under materialist strategies fosters an interest in the fuller manifestation of the
modern valuation of control.
• Understanding, gained under materialist strategies, is gained from the perspective of control.
• Any values furthered by research under materialist strategies (e.g., those associated with the pursuit of
"basic" research) are manifested today within value-outlooks that also include the modern valuation of
control.
27. Cf.: "I think that the 'form' our knowledge takes is contingent, but once we have asked the questions, they get
answered in a fairly predetermined way" (Hacking, 1999: 2333).
28. The second moment cannot be realized without the prior realization of the first; but its logic does not rest in any
way on the dialectical relations between strategies and values. Actually being able to recognize the logic in play at
the second moment may (psychologically) depend on engaging in research under the strategies. Note also that a
theory may not become accepted unless it is (potentially) significant, for it can only become accepted (second
moment) if relevant research (prior play at the first moment) is conducted, and — devoid of potential significance —
the research may not be conducted. It remains a serious error to derive the falsity of theories from their lack of
potential significance, or from their failure to fit the constraints of favored strategies.
29. Altieri, 1987: xiv-xv. See also SVF: ch. 8 and the many references listed there; Lacey (!998: ch. 6, 1999b, 2000a,
b, 2001).
Agroecological strategies may be considered as particular instances of general ecological strategies that frame
research on the relations and interactions between an organism and its environment, considered as a more or less
self-regulating "whole" of which the organism is an integral part, and thus that enable us to identify the possibilities
that things (e.g., seeds) have in virtue of their place in agroecological systems. They are intended to provide
knowledge that can inform the agricultural projects of movements who hold values, e.g., "local empowerment," that
compete with the modern valuation of control, who wish to subordinate the control of nature to their favored values.
Of particular salience to agroecology are generalizations that help to identify the possibilities for productivity and
sustainability of agroecosystems, where "sustainability" has been defined in terms of four interconnected
characteristics: Productive capacity: "Maintenance of the productive capacity of the ecosystem;" Ecological integrity:
"Preservation of the natural resource base and functional biodiversity;" Social health: "Social organization and
reduction of poverty"; Cultural identity: "Empowerment of local communities, maintenance of tradition, and popular
participation in the development process" (Altieri et al., 1996: 367-68).
30. Lacey (1999b, 2000a).
31. SVF: chs 7, 8.
32. SVF: ch. 8; Lacey (2000a, 2001); Kloppenburg (1988); Lewontin (1998); Lewontin & Berlan (1990).
33. Lacey (1999b, 2000a). For a highly controversial, but exhaustive, overview of these issues see Ho (2000).
34. Lacey (1999e).
35. On the impact of these considerations on the credibility of autonomy, see SVF: 248-254. Important questions
can be raised here about who are members of the communities engaged in systematic empirical (scientific) inquiry,
about whether they include only "professionals" with specified qualifications, and about whether it is also appropriate
to require that there be a spread among the members of the communities of value-outlooks that are held (Longino,
1990); also about the place of science in democracy (Anderson 1999).
36. Lacey (2000a); Kloppenburg (1988).
37. Altieri (1987).
38. SVF: 236-248.
39. SVF: ch. 10.
40Recent work in the social studies of science casts light on many of these questions though much
of it tends to ignore the separation of moments (strategy adoption/theory choice) that I have emphasized. Note that
Kitcher (1998) expresses an outlook which admits distinct places in the appraisal of science for both cognitive
considerations and sociohistorical analyses which address questions of the impact of science on "human flourishing"
(or "the quality of life", Kitcher 1997: ch. 13).
41. Dupré (1993): 244, 264
42. Kitcher (1998): 46.
Cf.: "To claim … that the sciences achieve certain epistemic goals that we rightly prize is not enough — for the
practice of science might be disadvantageous to human well-being in more direct practical ways. A convincing
account of practical progress will depend ultimately on articulating an ideal of human flourishing against which we
can appraise the various strategies for doing science. The extreme positions are clear … science, as practiced, is a
terrible thing, and that human beings want none of it; … science, as we have fashioned it, is already perfect. Neither
extreme is likely to be right. … … Given a clear view of the epistemic achievements and prospects of science, how
should we modify the institution so as to enhance human well-being?" (Kitcher, 1993: 391).
Also: "… being related to each other in lawful ways, [the entities unearthed by science] can be manipulated or
predicted by using these laws. There can be new combinations of them and new entities may in this way arise at the
phenomenological level. But these entities are important only if the resulting world is pleasant to live in, and if the
gains of manipulation more than compensate for the losses entailed by the losses of unscientific layers. The
objection that the entities and laws that connect them are 'real' and that we must adapt to them, no matter how
dismal the consequences, has no weight" (Feyerabend, 1999: 12). Cf. other remarks by Feyerabend (1993) on
criticizing science in the light of "humanitarian" and "democratic" considerations and his repeated suggestions
(Feyerabend, 1993, 1999) that following a single approach to science (conducted under materialist strategies?)
threatens human well-being (Lacey 2001).
Also: "Science is a river with two sources, the practical source and the theoretical source. The practical source is the
desire to direct our actions to achieve predetermined ends. The theoretical source is the desire to understand. But, I
do not consider one source as in any sense nobler than the other, or intrinsically more interesting. I cannot see why
it is nobler to strive to understand than to busy oneself with the right ordering of one's actions" (Whitehead, 1929:
103-104)