22-7-99 accepted and to be published in Netherlands Journal of Social Science
A Note on Rational Choice Theory, Historical Sociology and the Ceteris Paribus
Assumption
by Axel van den Berg
McGill University
and
The Amsterdam School for
Social Science Research
Draft
Not for Citation
Comments Welcome
June 1998
In a recent exchange about rational choice theory in the pages of The Netherlands'
Journal of Social Sciences(de Swaan 1996; Goudsblom 1996; Lindenberg 1996), Abram de
Swaan makes some statements that, to this reader at least, are a bit startling. "[H]istorical
sociology, and certainly Elias' brand of it," he claims, "essentially presupposes a process
theory, whereas rational choice theory and methodological individualism are incorrigibly
static, at best passing off iterative and cyclical models as dynamic constructs. At bottom,
formal theory1 implies a ceteris paribus assumption: whatever is not explicitly introduced as a
variable is assumed to remain constant" (de Swaan 1996: 6). And, "[i]n formal theory
construction, only a few quantities are treated as variables; most others are defined as
parameters, held constant for the sake of the analysis, while still other entities do not even
enter the argument as quantities that might change over time" (ibid.). Rational choice theory
misses the "'slow moving variables'" because "[s]uch developments usually remain entirely
outside formal models, but often do find their way into historical sociological theories of the
process type" (ibid.: 7). Finally, "what most deeply separates rational choice theorists and
historical sociologists is the tendency of the former to think in terms of steady states versus
the predilection of the latter for a process perspective" (ibid.: 12).
De Swaan appears to make two related claims here with respect to rational choice
theory in comparison to historical sociology of the Eliassian variety. First, he maintains that,
unlike historical sociology, rational choice theory must hold many variables constant, and
ignore many others altogether. Second, as a result of this, rational choice theory cannot really
handle dynamic historical processes satisfactorily, it being "incorrigibly static."
Both claims are, I believe, mistaken. First, all accounts, no matter how selfconsciously "processual," must necessarily leave huge numbers of variables out, the number
of variables that could potentially be brought in being literally infinite. Moreover, the number
of concrete "entities" that must be overlooked for the sake of rendering the story manageable
and digestible rises dramatically with the story's scope, that is, the length of time and the
numbers of people covered by it. Second, explanations used in historical accounts (without
which the accounts would be barely intelligible in any case) do necessarily employ theories
that hold only ceteris paribus. Third, there is no obvious a priori reason for thinking that
rational choice theory is less capable of providing the explanatory frame for an historical
account than any other theory. Let us consider two examples, both taken from Elias, to
illustrate these points. As I shall be concerned with neither the empirical validity of the
Eliassian arguments, nor the accuracy of their representation, I will rely almost exclusively on
As far as I can tell, de Swaan uses "formal theory" and "rational choice theory" as
virtually interchangeable terms. This may be a peculiarity due to the Dutch social scientific
debates in which the two have been unusually closely associated with one another.
1
the authoritative accounts by Mennell (1989) and Mennell and Goudsblom (1998).
First, take what Elias calls the "civilizing process." No doubt it is a process of infinite
complexity and subtlety, but I do think it is fair2 to summarize its gist as follows. The basic
idea is, I take it, that historically for a variety of reasons social networks are becoming more
extended and varied and that, as a result, the individual is compelled to learn to control and
suppress his/her immediate impulses in favour of more formal, internally controlled patterns
of behaviour. The stabilization of a configuration that entails manifold relations with people
from varied cultural backgrounds and varying expectations, so the reasoning seems to go,
requires a high degree of formalization of manners and speech to avoid constant
misunderstandings, tensions and conflict. To master such formalized codes, the individual
must learn to suppress or at least control his/her impulses and to adopt such control as an
internalized "second nature."
Thus, Mennell presents the process as an interaction between "the structure of
development of social interdependencies, including the division of social functions and state
formation" (the "sociogenetic thread") and "the civilizing of behaviour and changes in
personality structure" (the "psychogenetic thread") involving increasing control over
impulsive and aggressive drives (Mennell 1989: 232 and 237). Mennell and Goudsblom
(1998: 18) put it this way: "...as webs of interdependence spread, more people become
involved in more complex and more impenetrable relationships. Less abstractly: more people
are forced more often to pay more attention to more people, in more varying circumstances.
This produces pressures toward greater consideration of the consequences of one's own
actions for other people on whom one is in one way or another dependent. Moreover, if the
power ratios become more even, this gives an extra impulse toward an increase in "mutual
indentification"" (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998: 18).
In his most celebrated work, Elias attempts to document this civilizing process by
tracing the evolution of European elite manners with respect to various "natural functions"
from the 13th to the 19th century, by means of contemporary good manners manuals and other
sources and by connecting these with the process of state formation over the period (Elias
1978 and 1982). Subsequently, his followers have endeavoured to extend the analysis to a
wide variety of other times and places.
Now, the first thing to note about Elias' "processual" approach is that it obviously
leaves out of consideration infinitely more than it includes. Surely the taming of a few
rambunctious knights into the proper deployment of fork and knife is not the only notable
thing that happened in Europe since the late Middle Ages. Not only could the same period be
characterized under any number of other master trends that can lay claim, prima facie at least,
to as much empirical reality as the civilizing process. In addition, there is literally an infinite
number of events and processes that occurred at the same time and place but that is left out of
the account as not particularly relevant to the principal thesis, and quite rightly so.
Furthermore, Elias was also forced as well to leave out huge chunks of reality that
presumably are quite relevant to his thesis, such as the growth of commerce, the role of the
Church(es), and so on.
One could easily go on listing the ways and respects in which Elias' account of the
civilizing process necessarily only scratches the surface of an infinitely more complex
empirical reality. This is by no means meant as a criticism. To the contrary, any account of
any empirical occurrence, no matter how simple and restricted in scope, must necessarily
abstract and simplify, even ruthlessly so, if it is to be half-way coherent and intelligible at all.
As do the forementioned authoritative expounders of Elias' ideas whom I follow very
closely here.
2
3
And this holds a fortiori, of course, for accounts of geographically and historically vast
processes such as Elias's. As Mennell (1989: 257) concedes in his explication of Elias's
"processual" approach: "[o]bviously, the painstaking mapping out of social interconnections
between individual people becomes impractical if the object of interest is a wider society of
hundreds, thousands or millions of members." Quite, and it could hardly be otherwise. But if
this is granted it is not obvious anymore in what sense the "processual" approach is any less
forced to ignore "entities [that] do not even enter the argument as quantities that might change
over time" than rational choice theory is.
Now let us turn to de Swaan's claim that "formal theory," unlike historical sociology,
"implies a ceteris paribus assumption: whatever is not explicitly introduced as a variable is
assumed to remain constant." As already suggested, the central causal linkage posed by Elias,
that between the spreading interdependence and formalization of behaviour, is clearly meant
to hold in contexts other than just those studied by Elias. By all accounts, the same
mechanism would be expected to hold at other levels of society, and at other times and places
as well. That is, the hypothesis that there is a causal connection between social network
extension and individual impulse suppression can be generalized to, and thus tested in, any
number of other social, cultural and historical settings. Mennell and Goudsblom in fact say
so quite explicitly when they discuss the "link between social and personality changes arising
from the necessity of coordinating more and more complicated sequences of activities...this
link should hold in all cultures" (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998: 18).
Again, there is nothing inherently wrong with this ambition to generalize this link,
least of all from a rational choice perspective. But unless one is willing to claim that it holds
always and everywhere, no matter what else is occurring as well, that is, unless one is willing
to claim that there are no conceivable historical events or forces that could possibly interfere
with this causal connection, one has to posit it, it seems to me, with a ceteris paribus clause,
tacitly or explicitly. In other words, one has to say that the extension of network figurations
forces people to learn and employ highly formalized idioms of interaction barring any major
countervailing forces.
This may not be immediately obvious when a particular hypothesis is initially
presented on the basis of the empirical evidence that inspired its formulation to begin with.
On its own "home ground," so to speak, the hypothesis will necessarily be confirmed and
there may, as a result, appear to be little need for any qualifications to its validity such as a
ceteris paribus clause. But as soon as any apparently contradicting evidence is brought to our
attention the need for such a qualification must be confronted.
This is, it seems to me, exactly what has happened in the wake of various empirically
based criticisms of Elias's thesis. Thus, for instance, some anthropologists have pointed out
the existence of stateless societies where the level of (self-)constraint, in particular regarding
violence, is nevertheless quite high, in apparent contradiction of Elias's thesis. To such
criticisms Elias's admirers have responded by arguing that those instances were either the
result of colonial and post-colonial regimes that had produced the low incidence of violence,
or of relative isolation and egalitarianism which might account for the absence of sources of
conflict (see Mennell 1989: 239-41). Whatever the empirical merit of these arguments, they
sound an awful lot like the invocation of a ceteris paribus clause. For while the original
linkage may be reasserted it is in effect made conditional on the absence of countrevailing
forces such as the interference by colonial powers or isolation and egalitarianism.
4
Similarly, there has been a considerable amount of debate about the so-called
"barbarization" argument, that is, the argument that there are many instances of regression
towards dramatically less "civilized" forms of human interaction that do not seem to be the
result of any major changes in the "webs of interdependence" (see Mennell 1989: 246-50).
Instances of such "barbarization" unfortunaly abound: Nazi Germany, South Africa under
apartheid, the Pinochet rgime in Chile, the "killing fields" of Kampuchea, and so on and so
forth. As part of his rejoinder to such criticism, Mennell (1989: 247) concedes that
"[c]ertainly there seem to be short-term fluctuations in violence, in response to rising and
falling tensions, often connected with migration and other established-outsider relationships."
Mennell and Goudsblom put it thus:
The balance may, however, be tipped back if the level of danger that people face in
their everyday lives increases and becomes less calculable. The operation of selfconstraints will not remain the same if changes take place in the patterning of external
constraints--especially the behavior of other people...During times of crisis--military
defeats, political revolutions, rampant inflation, soaring unemployment, separately or,
as happened in Germany after the First World War, in rapid sequence--fears rise
because control of social events has declined. (1998: 21)
Again, such replies have got ceteris paribus written all over them, it seems to me.
They say, in effect, that the state-formation-civilization link holds except where it is
temporarily suspended by "rising tensions," "times of crisis," loss of "control of social
events," and so on.
A final example is the debate over the so-called "permissive society" argument
(Mennell 1989: 241-6). According to this line of criticism, the marked informalization of
manners, codes of behaviour and social intercourse that appears to have occurred since the
1960s directly refutes Elias' thesis. In response to this, Elias himself and his defenders have
insisted that the phenomenon was really "a highly controlled decontrolling of emotional
controls" (cited by Mennell 1989: 242). In other words, some behavioural codes may have
become apparently looser but this could only happen because of the unprecedented levels of
internalized self-restraint that prevent such loosening from producing serious tensions and
conflicts. Again, Mennell and Goudsblom are worth quoting at length on this point:
While it is clear that at an outward, behavioral level certain trends have been
reversed...nevertheless, at a deeper level informalization processes in general seem to
represent an unequivocal continuation of the historic trends toward diminishing
contrasts, increasing varieties, and more "all-roundedness." Because they involve a
less tyrannical form of conscience formation and more conscious deliberation, it is
easy to overlook how far the new, more liberal standards presuppose an extremely
reliable capacity for controlling one's impulses and an high level of mutual
indentification. They do not, in general, appear to involve a switch backward in the
balance from self-constraint toward external constraints. (1998: 21)
Once again, it seems to me, in the guise of a re-assertion of the criticized thesis a
ceteris paribus clause is effectively entered. Now the argument is that the formalization of
5
outward behaviour proceeds indefinitely unless and until it is reversed by a combination of
egalitarianism and exceedingly high levels of internalized impulse control and mutual
identification.
Alternatively, one might say that the original thesis has been modified here by means
of adding something of a "threshold effect." Outward behaviour is subject to a process of
formalization up to a certain very high level of self-control, after which the process may be
reversed. This way of putting it points, it seems to me, to just the kind of 'slow moving
variable'--the interaction between rising egalitarianism and exceedingly high levels of selfrestraint, say-- that Elias' approach is, according to de Swaan, particularly well-equipped to
take into account. In this case, however, it was initially apparently overlooked. Contrary to the
impression given by de Swaan, a properly formulated ceteris paribus clause might have been
quite useful here.
As de Swaan puts it ("whatever is not explicitly introduced as a variable is assumed to
remain constant") it seems as though invoking a ceteris paribus clause implies the tacit
assumption of the actual fixity of the variables involved. But in fact quite the opposite is the
case. If anything, the ceteris paribus clause calls attention to the fact that contexts change and
that they sometimes do so in ways that necessitate a thorough re-examination of the causal
linkage being posited. Thus, had Elias's hypothesis of the linkage between state formation and
increasing formalization of outward behaviour explicity been couched in ceteris paribus
terms, this could, I believe, only have facilitated the discovery of threshhold effects and
interfering factors such as those discussed. At the very least, it would have helped to dispel
the impression of many of the critics that Elias' defenders have been engaged in a series of ad
hoc efforts to immunize the theory against all contrary evidence.
Now let me proceed to de Swaan's other major claim, viz., that rational choice theory
cannot adequately deal with dynamic historical processes. For this, let us turn to Elias' other
magnum opus. In The Court Society (1983), Elias argues that the pomp, ceremony and
intrigue at the French royal court, culminating in the reign of Louis XIV, forced the members
of the French nobility to waste enormous amounts of time and resources on their standing and
appearance at the court, thereby dissipating the energy and resources they might have been
able to employ to resist the centralization of power in the hands of the absolute monarch (for
a summary see Mennell 1989: Ch. 3).
How are we to understand the link between the pomp at the court and the nobility's
response? Why did the aristocrats feel compelled to lavish such large amounts of time and
wealth on such ephemera as clothes, parties and galas? Elias' own answer is, roughly, because
this was the only way they could gain the attention and win the favour of the King and his
immediate entourage. And they sought that attention and favour so assiduously because the
King and his entourage were in a position to bestow upon them, or deprive them of, their
wealth and aristocratic privileges. For the nobility, the apparently wasteful social life was a
necessity "in that it was the direct instrument of their career, the medium of their rise or fall"
(Mennell 1989: 83). Thus, over time the King and the Court succeeded in using their
originally relatively modest powers to create a system of rewards and sanctions which forced
the French nobles into a fierce and immensely wasteful competition for royal favour, thereby
setting off a long-term development in which the nobility became ever more dependent on an
ever more powerful and centralized absolute monarchy.
A more straightforwardly rational choice story is hard to imagine. The nobles wanted
6
things like power, wealth, official positions, and above all status. These things could only be
obtained from the King. Given the way the Court was organized, the aristocrats had to
participate actively in a complex of pomp and pageantry requiring them to spend much time
and wealth to get the King to pay attention to them. So they did. Their behaviour, then, is
explained by what their aims were (protect or enlarge their own status, power and privilege)
and by what seemed to them the best way to realize those aims at the time. All this is exactly
and entirely in keeping with the standard rational choice explanatory approach. In fact,
perhaps somewhat ironically, it employs the rather more exacting version of rational choice
theory, the "thick" variant (Hechter and Kanazawa 1997: 194-5) that assumes not only that
actors are instrumentally rational in the pursuit of their goals, but also that those goals are
essentially selfish.
Elias himself almost puts it in these terms when he contrasts "bourgeois economic
rationality" to aristocratic "court-rationality:" "Bourgeois-industrial rationality is generated
by the compulsion of the economic mesh; by it power-opportunities founded on private or
public capital are made calculable. Court rationality is generated by the compulsion of the
elite social mesh; by it people and prestige are made calculable as instruments of power"
(Elias 1983: 111). According to Mennell, "[e]very detail of the elaboration of etiquette,
ceremony, taste, dress, manners and even conversation was an instrument in the struggle for
status and power...the competitive struggle for prestige with vital interests at stake" (Mennell
1989: 85 and 86).
The example just given suggests, I think, not only that rational choice theory is
perfectly capable of providing explanations for historical sequences and processes. It also
suggests that most attempts to explain such things are likely to use some rational choice
reasoning somewhere along the line.3 It is in fact hard to imagine any explanation of any
historical event, process or trend that does not somewhere employ at least a "thin" version of
rational choice theory, that is, that does not refer at some point to people who strive to realize
some preferred state of the world and who try to do so in the way that seems most likely to
them to do the job.4
But then, de Swaan might well accept this point. He himself in fact recommends the
application of rational choice theory to transitional situations in which actors need to resolve
newly arising dilemmas of cooperation (ibid.: 9, 11). As far as de Swaan is concerned,
"historical sociology should make pragmatic use of rational choice theory, adopting its key
notions as search strategies and 'sensitizing' concepts." His article ends on this conciliatory
note: "For these reasons, historical sociologists will profit greatly from using rational choice
concepts and using them as they see fit" (ibid.: 12).
In fact, to the extent that successive Kings and their advisers were engaged in a more
or less conscious strategy, as Elias' account repeatedly suggests (see Mennell 1989: 82-88),
there are unmistakable hints of a game-theoretic explanation here. Elias himself actually
seems to have thought of the process in such terms (see Mennell 1989: 258-64). I would not
necessarily want to go so far as to claim that all historical explanations implicitly end up
employing game theory at some point along the line, but the idea might be worth thinking
about.
4 Hechter and Kanazawa (1997: 192) note that "many sociologists, like the character
in Molire's Bourgeois Gentilhomme who was startled to learn that he was speaking prose,
unwittingly rely on rational choice mechanisms in their own research."
3
7
But if this means that de Swaan would, in fact, endorse my rational choice reading of
Elias' line of argument in The Court Society, then one has to ask how he can nevertheless
maintain that "formal theory is constitutionally incapable of dealing with processes" (ibid.:
11). In what sense is the above rational choice analysis not dealing with processes that
"historical sociology" does deal with? De Swaan seems to have a some sort of subordination
of rational choice theory to the grander purposes of "historical sociology" in mind. The latter
is only to "use" the former "as it sees fit." But this presupposes that "historical sociology"
actually has some grander purpose over and beyond the commitment to explaining things
which it presumably shares with rational choice theory. That there is anything like a
consensus among practicing historical sociologists on such a purpose is far from self-evident.
As a matter of fact, most historical sociologists--as oppposed to historians-- whose
work I am familiar with seem to practice quite the opposite of what de Swaan suggests. If
anything, they "use" history as the raw material to test the validity or scope of sociological
theories, including at least some "thin" versions of rational choice theory (see e.g., Mann
1986; 1993; Hall 1985; Skocpol 1979; Moore 1966; Goldstone 1991; Lenski 1966;
Wallerstein 1974; Tilly 1990). I see as little wrong with this as with the common practice of
historians of "using" sociological theories, whether tacitly or explicitly, to help explain
specific historical events or processes. What does appear to me to be wrong-headed is to
single out rational choice theory for shortcomings that it shares with all attempts to make
some theoretic sense of the social world. Whatever its specific shortcomings may be, these do
not include, it seems to me, being incorrigibly static, inordinately dependent on ceteris
paribus assumptions, or particularly prone to abstract from the fullness of empirical reality.
8
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Historical Sociology." The Netherlands' Journal of Social Sciences. Volume 32. Issue 1.
3-15.
Elias, Norbert. 1983. The Court Society. Edmund Jephcott transl. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Goudsblom, Johan. 1996. "Rational and Other Choices. Comments on the Rational Choice
Model," The Netherlands' Journal of Social Sciences. Volume 32. Issue 1. 16-25.
Hall, John A. 1985. Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the
West. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hechter, Michael and Kanazawa, Satoshi. 1997. "Sociological Rational Choice Theory.
Annual Review of Sociology. Volume 23. 191-214.
Lenski, Gerhard E. 1966. Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Lindenberg, Siegwart. 1996. "Low Evidence Situations in the Social and Historical Sciences:
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32. No. 1. 26-34.
Mann, Michael. 1986. The Sources of Social Power, Vol.1: A History of Power from the
Beginning to A.D. 1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mann, Michael. 1993. The Sources of Social Power, Vol.2: The Rise of Classes and NationStates, 1760-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mennell, Stephen and Goudsblom, Johan. 1998. "Introduction," in Elias Norbert, On
Civilization, Power, and Knowledge: Selected Writings. Stephen Mennell and Johan
Goudsblom, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-45.
Mennell, Stephen. Norbert Elias: Civilization and the Human Self-Image. Oxford: Basil
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Moore, Barrington, Jr. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon
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Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
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Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 900-1990. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press.