Preliminary observations
about a framework to measure the impact of targeted sanctions
Rico Carisch, Member and Coordinator of UN Expert Panels and Groups (Somalia, Liberia, DRC, Sudan)
28/9/2009 Draft Memo
Field experience over the past 6-7 years does not support the assumption that targeted
sanctions as practiced in the context of Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Iran,
North Korea, and Al Qaida/Taliban is a relevant tool of intervention in cases where
international peace and security is threatened. In the case of counter-terrorism
measures and sanctions regimes against Sierra Leone and Liberia, where the argument
for some success of targeted sanctions could theoretically be made, the specific cases
need to be analyzed in more detail before drawing conclusions regarding the broader
context.
The common sense test of effectiveness is whether the functioning of a targeted
sanctions regime results in demonstrable progress towards elimination of the causes
which led to the imposition of such sanctions. No evidence for such success exists for
Somalia, Sudan, Iran or North Korea, and in the cases of the DRC progress is more likely
due to factors other than the imposition of targeted sanctions.
Yet, multilateral targeted sanctions are being written into Security Council resolutions
seemingly without concern for the widening gap between the intended objectives and
their effectiveness. In the day-to-day field experience, the level of impunity for those
who disregard sanctions has risen, targeted financial sanctions are now as much a
detriment to violators as they offer competitive advantages to violators and their
supporters. States who oppose such measures use their opposition to curry favour with
violators and their political allies. UN arms embargos mean nothing to most suppliers of
ammunition and arms to African conflicts because no one can recall the last credible
enforcement action against a violator. Transporters remain as untouched as any other
providers of services to embargo violators – again, because enforcement is not a reality
these violators have to deal with.
True, post 9/11 anti-terrorism measures had forced the global financial industry into
adopting far-reaching compliance mechanisms. But the world has moved on, the major
political powers of today’s world disagree on almost every point that comes to a vote
and all the belligerents in Eastern Congo, in Mogadishu, in Darfur or Teheran bank on
the internal dissent of the Security Council. Today’s sanction monitors are being laughed
at and dismissed as the eyes and ears of a Security Council that lacks unity, purpose and
power. The frequent and open dissent among the P-5 members, combined with strong
anti-Western currents among Middle-Eastern and African member states of the Security
Council leaves plenty safe havens from which sanctions violators can operate.
It is therefore inevitable that parallel to the effort of defining performance criteria for
targeted sanctions an analysis of what is politically “doable” must commence. The result
of these considerations will also deliver the criteria for measuring the success or failure
of targeted sanctions.
The following list of factors is a work-in-progress and is neither complete nor definitive.
It is suggested that a broader sampling of views and experiences should be taken to
arrive at a list that can be accepted globally. Most likely such consultations must be an
ongoing effort in order to take account of evolving circumstances and the nature of the
conflicts and threats with which the international community is confronted.
I. Nature of conflict
The success of addressing conflicts with targeted sanctions depends partly on the level
of investment of the parties in winning the conflict. The more complex their
motivations, the more numerous the factors in play, and the challenging will be any
attempt at measuring the success of targeted sanctions. An amorphous conflict
situation, such as prevails in Somalia where clan interests combine with religious,
cultural, and economic factors, requires much more complex responses than the
focused power struggles observed in Sierra Leone, Liberia or Cote d’Ivoire. In Somalia, a
combination of political and financial sanctions, possible strengthened with a carefully
selected economic restriction, must be supported with credible military and law
enforcement actions. In West Africa, cutting off political and economic opportunities is
an adequate response.
On the other hand, competition for control over natural resources (DRC, Sudan) that are
usually complicated by ethnicity and identity issues, must be confronted locally and
nationally with targeted sanctions while at the same time coercive force must also be
applied internationally to prompt public and private sector actors to help create an
environment that does not provide competitive advantages to sanction violators. The
performance of targeted sanctions can be identified relatively easily by measuring the
degree to which natural resource production, trade and export are returned to a
legitimate state and belligerents are deprived of those revenues.
Conflicts that involve questions of global security (Iran, North-Korea) require the
implementation of a coherent and cohesive policy by all major political, military and
economic
actors.
II. Language that defines targeted sanction - To be reviewed at a later stage
III. Political will of the enforcement community - To be reviewed at a later stage
IV. Organizational quality of the enforcement community – (For the community to
effectively enforce targeted sanctions all parties must willingly participate. This
involves not only the political parties, but also regulatory and oversight authorities,
along with professional and trade organizations and many industries who are most
likely going to be in contact with sanctioned individuals and entities.) To be reviewed
at a later stage
V. Nature of target
Measuring the success of targeted sanctions obviously relates directly to the nature
of the target. A State, enterprise or individual that operates independently from
international institutions and capital flows is much harder to affect than a target that
depends on international structures. Measuring the success of targeted sanctions must
therefore take into account the environment of a target and its ability to survive despite
sanctions (as frequently observed in Somalia, DRC, or the Sudan).
Each of the following characteristics opens up specific opportunities for imposing
more effective sanctions.
Country typology:
Small, poor, and monoculture developing country (Sierra Leone, Liberia)
Large, rich, multicultural developing country (Angola, DRC, Sudan)
Large, politically disorganized and multicultural country (Somalia)
Large, developed and affluent country (Iran)
Large, developed and poor country (North Korea)
Corporate typology:
Small enterprise, independent of capital markets, operating nationally (local mineral
or timber trader)
Small enterprise, dependent of capital markets, operating nationally (local bank or
transport enterprise)
Small enterprise, dependent on capital markets, operating multi-nationally (natural
resource trader, transport, communication)
Large enterprise, independent of capital markets, operating nationally (natural
resource trader, transport, communication)
Large enterprise, dependent on capital markets, operating nationally (bank, natural
resource trader, manufacturer)
Large enterprise, dependent on capital markets, operating multi-nationally (bank,
natural resource trader, manufacturer)
Individual typology:
Individual, no visible wealth, without affiliation to political, military or economic
organizations
Individual, wealthy, without affiliation to political, military or economic
organizations
Individual, wealthy, with affiliation to political, military or economic organizations
Individual, no visible wealth, with affiliation to political, military or economic
organizations
Individual, wealthy, leader or beneficiary of political, military or economic
organizations
Individual, no visible wealth, leader or beneficiary of political, military or economic
organizations
Government official
VI. Type of sanctions
Experience has shown that many sanctions regimes do a poor job of curbing
violations. Arms embargoes, for example, barely stopped the in-flow of arms into the
DRC, Darfur, or Somalia and even in relatively easy to monitor environments such as
small states with a few airports and a long coastal zone (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote
d’Ivoire) arms shipments arrived regularly. Sanctions to control abuses of human rights,
international humanitarian law, the abuse of children and women in conflict, are
imposed in the DRC and in the Sudan with almost no effect. These broad multilateral
sanction regimes frequently show little success because the individual violators are
either not identified, their precise mode of operations remain undiscovered, or their
ability to adapt improved concealment strategies are superior to the sanction enforcers’
capacity. This implies that sanctions cannot be targeted with sufficient accuracy.
The success of targeted sanctions also appears to be minimal if one compares the
numbers of sanctioned individuals and entities, versus assets frozen and travel
prevented.
However, real benefits result from targeted sanctions because they:
1. Increase costs and cause complications for sanctioned individual or entities.
2. Increase the threat of loss of reputation for legitimate actors who engage with
a sanctioned individual and entity.
3. Isolate the target.
4. Can cause serious economic disadvantages to parties who depend on capital
markets even if sanctions are merely a threat.
The well demonstrated power of financial sanctions indicates fertile opportunities for
further expansion. For example, an improved system of peer-enforced targeted financial
sanctions could help in recruiting powerful natural allies into targeted sanctions
mechanisms while at the same time helping curb unfair advantages to some actors.
VII. Nature of sanctions monitoring mechanism
Past experiences prove that professional sanctions monitoring can have a coercive
effect on its own and enhance significantly the value of sanctions.
Lack of professional monitoring on the other hand diminishes significantly the coercive
effects of sanctions since poor monitoring usually signals lack of interest in
enforcement. This perception problem is widely understood in many States where
targeted sanctions have been imposed. Telltale signs are when the Security Council
issues monitoring mandates but:
It is poorly designed;
The region that must be monitored encompasses literally thousands of kilometers of
land borders with no effective means to observe;
The political will does not exist to ensure full access to airports and other civil aviation
facilities;
Arms and ammunition that are turned in by disarmed combatants are improperly
registered or not registered at all;
Peacekeeping missions ignore their arms embargo monitoring mandate, and do not
keep track of individuals and entities who are subject of targeted sanctions;
Expert Panel and Groups are not properly trained, prepared nor given adequate
logistical support to ensure that they can distinguish themselves from activists or NGOs.