Writer’s Draft v1.0 – 4 February 2000
FM 34-10-6/ST
APPENDIX A
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INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
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The intelligence staff prepares the intelligence estimate as part of the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP). Mission analysis, facts and assumptions, and situation analysis (of area of
operations, area of interest, and the enemy, friendly, and support requirements) are the basis of
all staff estimates. Each staff estimate consists of significant facts, events, and conclusions
based on the analyzed data. The intelligence staff estimate recommends how to best use all
available ISR assets both organic and non-organic. Combined with other staff estimates, the
intelligence estimate forms the basis of course of action development, analysis, and
comparison. Failure to develop timely and accurate staff estimates can lead to flawed courses
action and decisions. The following describes each portion of the intelligence annex.
1. MISSION
Command’s restated mission resulting from the mission analysis.
2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
a. Characteristics of area of operations. Note: this is not a repetition of weather, terrain, and
local populace factors presented in mission analysis. Rather, this section highlights the impacts
of such factors on the conduct of friendly intelligence operations.
(1) Weather. How will the weather affect intelligence operations and assets? For
example, high winds and icing affects on UAV flight operations; severe turbulence and
low ceilings effects on Quickfix; freezing temperatures affecting PRD-12 operations.
(2) Terrain. How will aspects of the terrain affect intelligence operations and assets?
For example, dense vegetation on one flank of the AOR limiting the effectiveness of
GSR operations.
(3) Other pertinent facts. Analyses of political, economic, sociological, psychological,
and environmental infrastructure, as they relate to intelligence operations and assets.
For example, the proclivity of a particular ethnic/social group to provide false information
to US forces vis-à-vis another ethnic/social group. Also address non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and what relationship they may have with our forces.
b. Enemy Forces. Enemy disposition, composition, strength, capabilities, and COAs as they
affect intelligence operations and assets. This is not a repetition of the G2/S2 Mission Analysis
Briefing. Rather, it is a description of the affects of the above topics on intelligence operations
and assets. For example, the enemy’s strong ADA capabilities will prohibit Quickfix, Guardrail,
and ARL operations until the enemy’s air capabilities are neutralized.
c. Friendly Forces.
Writer’s Draft v1.0 – 4 February 2000
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Writer’s Draft v1.0 – 4 February 2000
(1) Friendly courses of action. (List friendly COAs)
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(2) Current status of resources within the G2/S2. For example, for a brigade S2:
Asset
Location
TRQ-32 (DS) AB111111
TLQ-17 (DS) AB222222
PRD-12 (DS) AB333333
IPW Tm (DS) AB444444
CI Tm (DS) AB555555
GSR Tm (attch 1-87)
REMBASS Tm (attch 1-87)
________________Status_________________
Personel
IEW Equip
Commo
Vehicle
Green
Amber
Green
Green
Green
Red
Green
Green
Green
Red
Green
N/A
Green
N/A
Green
Green
Green
N/A
Green
Green
Green: 80% or greater combat capability remains.
Amber: 60-79% combat capability remains.
Red: 40-59% combat capability remains.
Black: 39% or less combat capability remains.
(3) Current status of other resources that affect intelligence operations and assets. For
example, the Brigade S2 would monitor the status of key Division assets that will be
critical to answering Brigade PIR; for example, the status of a particular Division LRSD
team operating within the Brigade area of interest.
(4) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions. This is
a general comparison of requirements against capabilities; the more specific and
applicable comparison occurs during the analysis of the specific friendly COAs. At this
point it would be appropriate to highlight asset shortages common to all COAs, i.e. a lack
of sufficient GSS assets in the division’s task organization to the brigade.
(5) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability. Each G2/S2 will
determine their own evaluation criteria based on the situation and mission. Examples
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Movement: The ability to satisfy PIR and IR requirements with the least amount
of asset battlefield movements.
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Reliance on higher assets: The ability to satisfy PIR and IR requirements with
organic and DS assets, vice higher’s assets.
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Decision Point Timing: Time available for an asset to report a PIR at a NAI to the
decision-maker for a maneuver or fire support decision.
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Communications simplicity: The relative simplicity of the sensor-to-shooter
communications links.
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Flexibility: The ability to rapidly change asset coverage if the enemy situation
changes significantly.
Writer’s Draft v1.0 – 4 February 2000
Writer’s Draft v1.0 – 4 February 2000
FM 34-10-6/ST
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d. Assumptions. For example, Quickfix will be available (airborne) to assist in covering NAI 3 of
COA 2 at H+3.
3. ANALYSIS
Analyze each friendly COA using key considerations (evaluative criteria) to determine
advantages and disadvantages.
4. COMPARISON
Compare COAs using key considerations (evaluative criteria). Rank order COAs for each key
consideration. A decision matrix should visually support the comparison.
5. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS
a. Recommended COA based on the comparison (most supportable from the G2/S2
perspective).
b. Issues, deficiencies, and risks with recommendations to reduce their impacts.
Writer’s Draft v1.0 – 4 February 2000
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