The Functional and the Dysfunctional in the Comparative Method of Law: Some
Critical Remarks
Antonios Emmanuel Platsas
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I.
Introduction
This article briefly explores the leading principle in the comparative method of law:
functionality of comparisons. It will be shown inter alia that functionality serves as a
common, unifying and mutually intelligible denominator amongst comparative lawyers
around the world, even though not necessarily in a dogmatic fashion. Furthermore, both the
rise of the principle and its main criticisms will be noted. The article concludes that
functionality remains the epicentre of the comparative method of law and that its drawbacks
remind us that the principle is susceptible to further refinement in the future.

LLB, LLM, PhD, Lecturer in Law (University of Derby). The usual disclaimer in relation to personal omissions
and errors applies.
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II.
Definition: Maintaining the Orthodoxy
The vibrant heart of the comparative method1 in the most dynamic2 branch of law,
comparative law, dances to the tune of functionality of comparisons. By all means, if there is
one principle that the method adheres to, it is functionality.3 Normally, functionality is indeed
referred to as a principle,4 not as a method or a technique. Calling such a principle a ‘method’
would present us with a clear paradox, a paradox which is to be avoided at all costs for the
sake of epistemological clarity: If comparative law primarily encapsulates a method, the
comparative method of law, then it cannot be superimposed on another method, the
‘functional method’, for – arguably – such a thing as a sui generis functional method does not
exist.5 At the very least, we can be certain that a comparative method occurs but it is not at all
certain whether, in turn, a functional method occurs. Therefore methodologically, and as a
matter of mere legal pragmatism, a comparative method is used, which guides the subject of
comparative law under the principle of functionality. Thus, the principle of functionality
governs the comparative method of law and in turn the comparative method governs what we
generically call ‘comparative law’.
With regard to defining functionality, especially as a tertium comparationis,6 all that
can be said is that as long as in law things fulfil the same function, then they are normally
comparable.7
With regard to the choice for the ‘orthodox’ definition of functionality, what can also
be said is that when a way of business works, we should be sceptical of the introduction of a
new way of business; even more so when nothing viable is on offer as a new way of business.
Also, it is to be noted that such a definition is a particularly flexible one, by reason of the fact
1
O Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject (Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford 1965) 4. Also, L
Constantinesco, Traité de droit comparé, Volume I (L.G.D.J., Paris 1972) 176-205; BS Markesinis, Foreign Law
and Comparative Methodology: a Subject and a Thesis (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1997) 25; K Zweigert and H
Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998) 2, 34, 36 and JH
Merryman, The Loneliness of the Comparative Lawyer (Kluwer International, the Hague/London/Boston 1999)
1. Cf. M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies:
Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 101.
2
Lord Goff, ‘The Future of the Common Law’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 745, 747-748. See also, more recently, G
Samuel, ‘Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and Social Sciences’ in M Van
Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland
Oregon 2004), 35f and M Andenas and D Fairgrieve, ‘Introduction: Finding a Common Language for Open
Legal Systems’ in G Cavinet, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law Before the Courts (British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 2004) xxvii. On the ‘march of comparative law from the
law libraries into the courts themselves’, as M Freedland points out in the introduction to the last work see H
Muir Watt, ‘Of Transcultural Borrowing, Hybrids, and the Complexity of Legal Knowledge: An Example of
Comparative Law Before the French Courts’ and B Rabatel, ‘Liaison Magistrates: Their Role in Comparative
Law Before International Judicial Cooperation’ in G Cavinet, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds), ibid.
3
M Kiikeri, Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 2001)
28 (quoting K Zweigert, ‘Methodological problems in Comparative Law’, (1972) 7 Israeli Law Review, 465 and
A Pizzorusso, Corso di diritto Comparato (Giuffrè, Milano 1983) 79).
4
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34.
5
Ibid. Cf. R Michaels and M Graziadei’s approach on the matter, who argue in favour of a ‘method’ as opposed
to the orthodox approach speaking of a principle. See M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand
and R Munday (eds) (n 1) 100ff and R Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in M Reimann
and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006).
Note that Michaels admits that the term ‘functional method’ can be a misnomer.
6
M Bogdan, Comparative Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation, Deventer 1994) 60.
7
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34.
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that it is not formalistic or legalistic. In other words, the focus under functionality is not on
what the formal requirements of the comparable in foreign law are but rather on how foreign
law operates in the area of law in question.8 In close relation to this, Zweigert and Kötz argue
that the comparatist may often have to go ‘beyond purely legal devices’ to seek functional
equivalents.9 Accordingly, we should be scrupulous in our analysis as to why we should
proceed with the resurrection of other, now largely deceased, approaches. Most certainly, with
all its drawbacks, all its abstraction and peculiarities, functionality has served comparative
law circles well, especially when there is no clear alternative in sight. Besides, why should we
abandon the safest and quickest way to comparative law in the absence of such an alternative?
Life itself points to functionality; why should we ever have a different approach in the
comparative method law? Graziadei is illuminating on this:
We constantly resort to functional comparisons in daily life, to play, to work, to teach
and learn, and, yes, to communicate with people who share beliefs about the world
very different from our own.10
Of course, there are other approaches11 as to how to compare, but these, unlike functionalism,
do not constitute a concrete methodological pattern in their own right.
Contextual approaches12 based on localisms here and there are not to be discarded
altogether in research but they are by reason of their peripheral character in the comparative
method not the main dish; in effect, they are mere side-orders. Accepting contextual
approaches to the detriment of functionality in the comparative method would be like
discarding the constitution of the method, when contextual approaches have only the
analogical effect of subordinate legislation to the method. Hence, at its heart the comparative
method hides a unified, overriding and powerful principle, the principle of functionality of
comparisons. Ultimately, however, the question of accepting other considerations to the
detriment of functionality in the comparative method is a question of ambition and agenda:
whose agenda is more undesirably ambitious13? The agenda of functionalist comparatists who
merely seek similars in the various jurisdictions as a matter of practicality for their thinking
and working methods;14 or the agenda of ‘comparatists’ who want us to be something of a
functionalist, a sociologist, a historian, a political scientist and a contextualist at the same
8
Ibid 34-35.
Ibid 35, 38.
10
M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds) (n 1) 113, quoting J Gémar,
‘Seven Pillars for the Legal Translator: Knowledge, Know-How and Art’ in S Šarčević (ed), Legal Translation:
Preparation for Accession to the European Union (Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka, Rijeka 2001) 111 and
121-125. Cf. M Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ in M Van Hoecke (ed) (n 2) 173.
11
Except for functional comparisons, there are also historical comparisons, evolutionary comparisons, structural
comparisons, thematic comparisons, empirical and statistical comparisons. See VV Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to
Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2004) 4 Global Jurist Frontiers 2
<http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?context=gj&article=1126&date=&mt=MTE1OTczNjUxNg%3D
%3D&access_ok_form=Processing...> accessed 1 February 2008.
12
Referring to one such approach, the historical approach, Graziadei calls it a ‘tradition’. See M Graziadei, ‘The
Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds) (n 1) 100.
13
On the question of ambition and unrealistic perfectionism in comparative law, Van Hoecke noted recently:
‘Strong epistemological pessimism has a perfectionist view on understanding. If you do not fully understand
something, you do not understand anything. In practice this means that almost nobody can understand almost
anything. A rather frustrating conclusion, especially for those whose professional life is centred around teaching
and publishing’. See M Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ in M Van Hoecke (ed) (n 2) 173.
14
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34.
9
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time?15 Certainly, as the latter ‘comparatist’ is not a comparatist stricto sensu, the preference
for the former is an obvious one. Again, to avoid misunderstandings, contextualism in
‘comparative law’ is very welcome16 indeed but the proposition is that this is to occur only
upon the recognition of the primacy of the principle of functionality in the comparative
method.17
Kahn-Freund once said we will teach our students of comparative law to be proud and
we will teach them to be humble.18 However, if there is a division between functionalists and
contextualists in the comparative method, even though we are not sure who is the prouder, we
can without doubt be certain that contextualists are not as humble as functionalists. Their
excessively ambitious agenda (stretching to almost anything in the theoretical disciplines)
causes great problems to theoreticians19 as well as practitioners of comparative law, making
their approach not only unpopular but also weak to the point of obsoleteness.
Academics such as Palmer are, therefore, correct in maintaining that ‘to move into the
courtroom and into the halls of the legislature will require methods which are not only
enlightening, but feasible and non-threatening.’20 Consider, for example, the complications
that a pro-hermeneutics kind of a comparative method in law might result in. Not only is such
an approach threatening to the unsuspected judge or practitioner by reason of the pedantic
nature of such an approach but also to most comparatists or rather to mainstream
comparatists. In other words, why are we to adopt a pro-hermeneutics approach, when
practitioners would feel uncomfortable with it, in addition to the academic comparatists who
already feel uncomfortable with it?
The main problem which the contextualists have yet to satisfactorily address is not so
much whether we should seek the ‘contextual whys’ in our method, if at all, but rather why
and how we should seek these ‘whys’, especially when our primary purpose is comparing
equivalents per se. Then, it could be maintained that contextualists may argue in a felix qui
potuit rerum cognoscere causas fashion.21 This may be acceptable but again function can be
detected without resort to the contextual ‘why’, notwithstanding the fact that the felix qui
potuit rerum cognoscere causas may be the way for comparatists to shut themselves in the
proverbial ivory tower; thus, it is not necessarily the primary concern in comparing to detect
the ‘why’. For example, if we compare cars on the basis of luxury and choose to purchase
something between a Mercedes-Benz and a BMW of the same engine capacity, we may do so
without pedantically referring to the history of the two companies; indeed, we may not even
have to know how long it takes for each car to be produced in the assembly lines, nor why it
takes so long, nor what it takes for the companies to actually produce a unit of each of the two
E.g. P Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 LS 232, at 236 citing J Law, ‘Introduction: Monsters,
Machines and Sociotechnical Relations in ibid (ed) A Sociology of Monsters[:] Essays on Power, Technology
and Domination (London 1991) 18.
16
BS Markesinis (n 1) 26. Also, M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds) (n
1) 101; G Samuel, ‘Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and Social Sciences’
in M Van Hoecke (ed) (n 2) 39 noting that ‘Concepts and rules need to be contextualised within a range of
factual situations so that their function can become evident’ and M Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’
in M Van Hoecke (ed) (n 2) 167. Cf. M Graziadei in the work stated in this note at pp. 110-111.
17
The question of function precedes that of context. See Rabel’s approach as described in AM Glendon, MW
Gordon and C Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions (West Publishing, St. Paul, Minn., 1994) 11.
18
O Kahn-Freund (n 1) 30.
19
E.g. Rabel’s approach justified in the past that the practical needs override the need of the comparatist to refer
to philosophy or history. To this effect see B Markesinis, Comparative Law in the Courtroom and Classroom
(Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon, 2004) 13.
20
VV Palmer (n 11) 3.
21
Kiikeri states ‘culture’ based considerations are a matter of cognition. See Kiikeri (n 3) 33.
15
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models under comparison.22 Why should we know in comparative law the context of law,
when in life itself context (as opposed to function) hardly comes into play? Alternatively, a
contextualist might wish us to focus our research on Aristotle’s first lesson, as Markesinis
calls it: rounded knowledge (in one’s discipline).23 This too seems to be worthy of critical
scrutiny; this occurs by reason of the fact that even though in theory rounded knowledge and
in our case a contextualist approach to comparative law is to be sought, in practical terms
‘Beyond a certain point, narrowing one’s focus is essential in order to sharpen it.’24
Also, the comparatist who seeks the contextual causes of his comparables may deviate
from his main task: comparing. Obvious as the point may be, comparing (and contrasting) per
se is the primary task of the comparatist.25 On the other hand, comparing and contextualising
is acceptable, as long as the purpose of contextualising in the comparative method is defined.
The question that such a comparatist has to address is: in addition to comparing functionally
equivalents, why am I to additionally detect the contextual ‘whys’ behind my comparables?
More interestingly and in relation to this last point, however, some comparatists argue that the
contextual ‘whys’ lead us to good comparisons. The problem with this point of view is that
these comparatists present us with no concrete method. It is not automatic that knowing the
causes of comparables leads us to good comparisons. Contextualists ask from mainstream
comparatists to seek ‘contextual whys’ but they fail to tell us, let alone convince us, why we
should embrace their approach. The same people who ask us to seek the whys in our method,
fail to concretely tell us why and how we should do so.26
In short, if the comparatist is to compare, functionalism suffices; if he is to compare
and in a rather peculiar, if not pedantic fashion, to compare and to discover other things, e.g.,
mentalités in his comparables, he may have to resort to other tools of an extra-legal nature
(e.g., history, economics, politics).
A.
‘Incomparables cannot usefully be compared’27
The comparatist will always be haunted by this memorable and magical expression:
‘incomparables cannot usefully be compared’. It will puzzle our minds forever, for we are
seekers of the truth, our truth being good comparisons or, to use professional jargon,
‘meaningful comparisons’ in the realm of law. Somehow, it could be argued, this expression
summarises our discipline. However, simple and self-evident as the proposition may seem, we
cannot always readily detect the comparable. Yet the answer to our question is to concentrate
on the word ‘usefully’. Other comparatists have described ‘usefully comparable’ as
sufficiently comparable, reasonably comparable, fruitfully comparable or meaningfully
comparable.28 In essence, the compromise reached in comparative law is that normally
comparables have to be governed by a denominator of usefulness.
For Zweigert and Kötz things that are essentially usefully comparable are ones which
fulfil the same function.29 Even though this is largely true, at other times we may wish to base
our analysis on use, a telos, a purpose in the employment of functionality.
22
Cf. Graziadei (n 16) 125.
On this (though in a different context) see BS Markesinis (n 1) 25.
24
Ibid.
25
VV Palmer (n 11) 2.
26
Most certainly, Van Hoecke is correct in arguing that the ‘comparative lawyer is lost’ in this respect. See M
Van Hoecke in M Van Hoecke (n 16) 167.
27
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34.
28
E Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2004) 29.
29
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34.
23
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III.
Functionality Is Based on the Essence and the Telos of Comparables
In my own teaching of comparative law I have often felt that, like Bagehot’s monarch,
I had a duty to warn and a duty to encourage. To teach students not to be lured by
homonyms and not to be afraid of synonyms.30
In principle, comparing one thing to any other thing is possible,31 though in all probability not
very useful unless, of course, the purpose of such an endeavour is defined from the outset.32
Academics are somehow divided on the matter. Graziadei, for instance, has criticised as naïve
the approach that ‘it is possible to compare the incomparable.’33 Örücü, on the other hand,
successfully argues, however, that ‘Even identicals must be compared in order to determine
that they are in fact identical.’34 Even so, the fact that something is readily permissible in
science and more generally in life does not always make it a preferable option. In the
comparative method this is the approach taken. The method’s comparisons have to be dictated
by some sort of unifying language of application; by some common denominator. Obviously,
different objects may have different functions but as Örücü argues ‘all things are comparable
even if unique.’35 Indeed, there must be an infinite number of comparisons in abstracto in life.
But as in the real world, what matters in the exciting microcosm of the comparative lawyer, is
that he reaches comparisons that are not only valid but that they serve some purpose. In
Academia the name of this purpose is called knowledge,36 or at least the pursuit to reach it. In
the national legislatures the name of the purpose can be law reform, whereas in legal practice
such a purpose may be enhanced knowledge of legal solutions in other legal systems.
It is ‘like for like’ (similia similibus) that normally suffices in comparing.37 However,
as will be seen below, sometimes atypical comparisons may suffice for the purposes of the
comparative method.
Names in comparisons do not matter a great deal. Homonyms may not always offer us
‘meaningful’ comparisons. However, the opposite is also true: apparently disconnected
notions, concepts or areas of law may well be relevant to each other as a matter of a
comparison.38 But synonyms are not always to be discarded as a starting point for
comparison. In this regard, the pairs of comparison Van Hoecke offers in a recent work are
particularly illuminating.39 So, for instance, the terms ‘Interprétation – Interpretation or
Construction – Auslegung’ respectively in French, English and German are a perfectly valid
comparative trio (all words basically refer to the same intellectual activity).40 Similarly, the
terms ‘Contrat or Convention – Contract – Vertrag’ refer to the same subject matter (all
words basically refer to the same reality).41 These are therefore prima facie comparable
concepts, even though one must state for the sake of balanced argument that the contract laws
of France, Germany and England do not necessarily coincide in remit, approach and typology
with one another.
30
O Kahn-Freund (n 1) 19.
E Örücü (n 28) 19.
32
E.g. HE Chodosh, ‘Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology’ (1999) 84 Iowa Law Review 1025,
1066.
33
M Graziadei (n 16) 105.
34
E Örücü (n 28) 19. Emphasis added.
35
Ibid
36
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 15.
37
E Örücü (n 28) 20.
38
M Van Hoecke in M Van Hoecke (n 16) 175.
39
Ibid
40
Ibid
41
Ibid
31
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A.
Comparer des pommes avec des oranges and apples to oranges?
An idiom which has captivated the English-speaking world as well as significant parts of the
French-speaking is the one which asks people not to compare apples and oranges, they being
different in essence. ‘This response implies, first, that apples and oranges are incomparable,
and, second, that the incomparability of apples and oranges is itself comparable to the
incomparability of the two objects in the primary comparison.’42 This problem has been dealt
with and its proposition of incomparability has been proved to be a false one in the past43 but
arguably, comparing a red apple with an a green apple, when one seeks to distinguish the
colour quality of redness between the two does not make particular sense; yet if one compares
an apple with an orange when one seeks to compare their nutritional qualities, this should
arguably make good sense. This is very much true, as in the former case, we know a priori that
by definition a green apple has no qualities of redness; such a comparison is therefore
obsolete, as it would stress differences only, notwithstanding the fact that it would miss the
point of our comparison: the redness between two normally similar artefacts (similia similibus
doctrine). In the latter case, however, things are considerably more interesting; here, we have
two ‘different’ fruits, both of which, however, are spheroid, tasty, and belong to the same
scientific kingdom, division and class (plantae, magnoliophyta, magnoliopsida respectively).
Yet, there are differences, and the differences outweigh the similarities between the two:
apples are normally less bitter than oranges, though oranges can be sweet; apples are normally
never orange and oranges normally never red; so too, apples and oranges do not share the
same scientific order (rosales and sapindales respectively); hence they cannot be part of the
same family (rosaceae and rutaceae respectively) and indeed cannot be part of the same
genus (malus and citrus respectively). In other, scientific words, they are different species
(malus domestica and citrus sinensis respectively). Ultimately these are two different artefacts
with different nutrition qualities. Where does all this leave us in law?
In law things are broadly similar. And even though the author of this article wishes to
maintain that it is normally directly similar objects which should be compared, at other times
the focus need not be on the essence of the things compared so much as on the purpose of
comparison of two or more ‘different’ artefacts.44 That is not to say that broadly similar
artefacts cannot and should not be compared; on the contrary, it would seem that in such cases
comparisons are often not only less arduous but also more readily available. Theoretically,
any law could be compared with any other law, if some common denominator of a valid
comparison is found; yet the tendency – it would seem – in the comparative method of law is
that we compare ‘corresponding’ areas of law or what is called ‘comparison of equivalents’.45
On the other hand, it would be an omission not to state that confining purposes of
comparisons effectively amounts to the confining of tools in the comparative method. That
said, the comparative method can be a largely subjective exercise. In turn, subjective purposes
of comparison may well result in subjective tools to pursue such purposes.46
42
HE Chodosh (n 32) 1061-1062.
HE Chodosh (n 32) 1061-1063 citing JH Merryman, ‘How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries’
(1988) 61 Southern California Law Review 1865; also, CA Rogers, ‘Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the
Conundrum of Comparative Law’ (1998) 67 George Washington Law Review 149, 150-151, 163.
44
C Deligianni-Dimitrakou, Eisagogi sto Syncritiko Dikaio (Ekdoseis Sakkoula, Thessaloniki 1997) 24.
45
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 36.
46
D Kokkini-Iatridou, ‘Some Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law, The Third Part of a (Pre-)
Paradigm’ (1986) Netherlands International Law Review 158ff. Markesinis considers this a question of
predilection. See BS Markesinis (n 1) 25.
43
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B.
Comparing areas other than in substantive law (forms, techniques, styles)
Regardless, we may be tempted to consider the following. Let us argue that the legislator of
Ruritania, for instance, is in pursuit of modernising its intellectual property law as a matter of
form rather than as a matter of substance. In doing so, it wishes to refer to French law.
However, in referring to comparative law material, the legislator of Ruritania, a common law
country for the purposes of our example, wishes to refer to the Civil Code of France (as
opposed to French intellectual property law). The legislator made this choice, because it is in
pursuit of the ‘fresh and flexible’ spirit47 of the French Civil Code as a matter of form,48 so
that this is incorporated in the Ruritanian Act to be drafted, even if such an act deals with
intellectual property rather than civil law, as the French Civil Code does. Can the legislator do
so? Should it do so? This is open to argument but Örücü offers us the following provoking
example:
Could we not compare, for example, an English statute on taxation, town and country
planning or matrimonial causes with three pieces of German legislation on entirely
different topics if we were trying to establish how such documents are prepared and
how long or detailed they are in order to develop an understanding of such a source of
law? The examples could be infinite.49
Consequently, with regard to the identification of ‘functionality’ there are two variants
here: The one variant suggests that Ruritanian intellectual property law and French civil law
do not share the same function (i.e., they are not functionally equivalent), not only because
Ruritanian legislation uses verbose and old-fashioned language, whereas French civil law uses
flexible and fresh language, but also (and most importantly) because these statutes belong to
different substantive areas. Our comparison – technically speaking – is an invalid one.
Alternatively, however, we can argue that both the Ruritanian statute on intellectual property
and the French civil code share the same function as a matter of a law reform exercise, even if
the fact of the matter remains that the Ruritanian law to be reformed and the French civil code
to be compared with belong to different substantive areas of law. Either way, the result is an
unsatisfactory one, for in the former case we should not proceed (when we can as a matter of
form) with our comparison for absence of substantive provisions, whereas in the latter case
we would have to go to great lengths to imply functionality on the basis of form (as opposed
to a functionality of substance which is the established approach to date). If, however, the
latter approach is followed, then clearly it is all about the purpose of comparisons which
makes functionality reveal itself.
The telos therefore is the ultimate judge of comparisons. This notion of telos connects
well with the approach taken under mainstream comparative law, i.e., the comparative lawyer
is a person who engages in comparison for a purpose.’50 It also connects well with the
approach taken under mainstream functionality, i.e., ‘Functional inquiry also suits the
47
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 90, 91, 100 & 145. Zweigert and Kötz praise the Code Civil with the following
expressions: ‘The Code civil avoids the danger of being too detailed …often been praised for its clear and
memorable phrases, and for avoidance of cross-references and jargon …its language [is] forceful and thrilling,
free from heavy logic and detailed digression. In France …ordinary citizens may have a feeling of warm
affection, of closeness to their Code’.
48
M Bogdan, Comparative Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation, Deventer 1994) 57ff.
49
E Örücü (n 28) 20.
50
A Riles, ‘Introduction’ in A Riles (ed), Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford
2001) 11.
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utilitarian approach to comparative law.’51 However, even though telos and utility are not
quite exactly synonyms, the comparatist is free to define purposes and utility for his method.
In this respect, even though functionality is to this day the leading thesis, there is no
restriction to the comparatist’s research, as long as, of course, his purpose of research52 is
defined and such purpose bears connection with certain needs, especially practical needs. The
stress is on practicality because ‘In law, ideas and notions that cannot be put to practical use,
are likely to satisfy only those who spend their time devising them and then quoting each
other with self-satisfaction.’53
IV.
Functionality in Its Manifestations
Except for the manifestation of functionality as a tertium comparationis in the comparative
method of law, functionality, especially in the wider confines of comparative law as a whole,
can be said to be a polysemantic concept, a concept with many functions.
Seven distinct functions of functionality are recognised in comparative law.54 Thus, in
addition to the tertium comparationis function, there are the epistemological function of
functionality, the presumptive function (as in the praesumptio similitudinis), the formalising
function in the building of a system, the evaluative function (as a determinant of the ‘better
law’), the universalising function and, finally, the critical function.
V.
Functionality Serves the Identification of Both Differences and Similarities
One experiences a singular repugnance to think in terms of difference, to describe
discrepancies and dispersions.55
Because we cannot always be sure as to what amounts to a similar or a dissimilar in law, what
the exact methods to define such terms are and whether the assessment of the similars and the
dissimilars should be done in qualitative or quantitative terms or even in a subjective or an
objective fashion, we must consider that in principle the identification of both differences and
similarities should suffice for a comparative exercise as a whole. Also, it is to be noted that ‘It
goes without saying that comparative analysis will bring out the differences between actual
solutions.’56
Yet the comparatist is interested in proceeding with a workable solution for his
discipline – not to enquire in perpetuum into questions of philosophy, at least not for practical
purposes. In this respect, we must admit that the assumption of the 1900 Paris Congress57 is
still correct, i.e., it is similar things which are normally to be compared. In fact, in modern
legal interpretative scholarship the emphasis is on the identification of similarities rather than
51
E Örücü (n 28) 29.
Though on the context of comparing cases, Samuel asks that one’s object of comparison (or what is called
herein ‘purpose of comparison’) is defined. See G Samuel in M Van Hoecke (n 2) 37.
53
B Markesinis (n 19) 53.
54
R Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006).
55
Foucault as quoted in P Legrand, ‘What “Legal Transplants”?’ in D Nelken, and J Feest (eds), Adapting Legal
Cultures, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 67.
56
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 43.
57
E Örücü (n 28) 20.
52
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differences between legal systems.58 More interestingly, even international social theory
stricto sensu suggests that the ‘aim of cross-national research is to reduce unexplained
variance and find patterns and relationships.’59 Equally, it should be remembered that ‘to
accept comparability is, however, not the same as accepting similarity: the comparison can of
course demonstrate great fundamental differences.’60 Without doubt, however, it is the
identification of similarities that is more important to functionality (and hence comparability
as a whole). This is true by reason of the fact that we should search for equivalents in the
comparison embarked upon. To do so, we must normally be ‘freed from context’ and ‘the
solutions [to the same problem] we find in different jurisdictions must be cut loose from their
conceptual context and be stripped of their national doctrinal overtones.’61
The good comparatist will speak of the possible in his method, the better one will
speak of the desirable in his method. Of course, as already maintained, comparisons can be
infinite.62 It is possible as a matter of theory for one to compare any law to any other law. Is
this desirable? Arguably, the example of the Ruritanian reformer is another blow to the strict
application of the principle of functionality. Yet the fact that something is possible should not
always make it a desirable phenomenon. Again, the dichotomy of academic comparatists is a
matter of agenda: do we want in Academia comparatists who would be practice-oriented
minds and concentrate on similars in their comparative projects or do we want comparatists
whose work bears little relevance to practical needs but who are free to compare anything to
anything even for the sake of identifying differences in the main? The author of this paper
consciously opts for the former class of comparatists. Practical needs in comparative law by
far override theoretical ones. Surely, this choice does not mean that a comparison of
differences cannot be pursued, but even this has to bear relevance to practicality.
Effectively, whether functionality should stress similarities more than differences
reminds us of Schlesinger’s question between ‘integrative’ and ‘contrastive’ comparative
law.63 Integrative comparative law stresses the similarities amongst legal systems; contrastive
comparative law stresses the differences amongst legal systems. Schlesinger has maintained
that whilst the contrastive approach has found its way well into the second half of the 20th
century, he notes that ‘in the last two or three decades the pendulum has again64 began to
swing the other way’,65 i.e., the discipline has now reverted back to what is seen as the 1900
thesis. Schlesinger was convinced that the future of comparative law belonged to the
integrative approach.66 It must therefore be stressed that the importance of similarities in
comparative law might be the conscious or even unconscious expression of the idea that the
world is shrinking; that the interdependence of national economics (and therefore the
interdependence of legal systems) becomes day-by-day more prevalent; and that ultimately
R Cotterrell, ‘Seeking Similarity, Appreciating Difference: Comparative Law and Communities’ in A Harding
and E Örücü (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International, the Hague 2001) 38.
59
J Gould and WL Kolb (eds), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Tavistock Publications, London 1964) 116.
More recently, E Øyen, ‘The Imperfection of Comparisons’ in E Øyen (ed), Comparative Methodology: Theory
and Practice in International Social Research (Sage, London 1990) 1, 3.
60
M Bogdan, Comparative Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation, Deventer 1994) 21.
61
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 44.
62
E Örücü (n 28) 19.
63
RB Schlesinger, ‘The Past and Future of Comparative Law’ (1995) 43 American Journal of Comparative Law
479.
64
Emphasis added.
65
RB Schlesinger (n 63) 479. See also M Van Hoecke in M Van Hoecke (n 16) 172.
66
RB Schlesinger (n 63) 481.
58
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there exists unity of thought (and by extension unity of legal thought) in the human race, as
Hegelian idealism67 maintained.
VI.
Functionality as a Common Intellectual Denominator of Legal Thought
We are in the habit of positing a single Form for each plurality of things to which we
give the same name.68
In relation to the point raised in the last paragraph, Plato teaches us in his theory of ‘one-overmany’, a sub-theory of his theory of the forms, that human thought is unitary in essence; yet
the implementation of the Denken might differ in practice. According to this Platonic
doctrine, when we speak of, for example, horses, we may speak of a black horse, a brown
horse and a white horse. We may argue that a horse is strong and beautiful and that another
horse is weak and unattractive. We may perceive different qualities and surrounding notions
(in our case colours and exoteric qualities of horses) in a different and subjective fashion but
ultimately we speak of essentially the same thing: the species of horses. For Plato the
manifestations of the different did not matter so much, as he was convinced that a unitary,
eternal, indivisible and unchangeable essence is found beneath variable qualities of the same
thing.69 All points to the idea of the one. With regard to law, the theory of ‘one over many’ is
very much relevant to the law convergence thesis, a key area of what we generically call
‘comparative law’.
With regard to functionality the thesis here is as follows. Even though functionality in
comparative law does not necessarily pertain to the Platonic belief that there is unity of human
thought in abstract terms (except perhaps where the praesumptio similitudinis is apparently
applicable), there is relevance of functionality in modern comparative law with the Platonic
idea of one-over-many in that both seek similarities in the main. Thus, the scratching for
useful comparisons should probably pertain to the scratching of similarities in the main, as
functionality actively looks for unitary elements of thought rather than things that serve
different purposes. In turn, functionality, so it could be argued, aims at the discovery of unity
of comparable purposes, purposes which otherwise come in agreement with the Platonic
belief in a favour of a unity of human thought (Platonic One).
Let us now argue why the above might be true. First of all, Kahn-Freund’s thesis of 40
years ago still holds true:
One of the lessons comparative law has to teach is that even within one orbit of
civilization social needs may in one country be served by legal rules and decisions and
in neighbouring country by techniques of what Pound calls ‘social engineering’ which
are quite outside the law.70
67
E.g. RB Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-consciousness (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1989).
68
Plato, The Republic, 596a.
69
On this see Plato’s theory of the forms. The characteristics and functions of the forms according to Plato are: i)
unchangeable (Phaedo, 78c10-d9), eternal (Phaedo, 79d2), intelligible, not perceptible (Phaedo, 79a1-5), divine
(Phaedo, 80a3, b1), incorporeal (passim), causes of being (‘The one over the many’) (Phaedo, 100c), are
unqualifiedly what their instances are only with qualification (Phaedo 75b).
70
O Kahn-Freund (n 1) 22.
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Second, but in close relation to what Kahn-Freund argued earlier, there is the Zweigert and
Kötz’s thesis: the praesumptio similitudinis, according to which there is a presumption of
similarity of practical legal results amongst different legal systems. 71 Accordingly, the
comparatist normally discovers and realises that methods, techniques and approaches vary in
domestic laws; practical results are broadly similar.72 Certainly, it must be observed that this
presumption is not boundless, for such a presumption is not unqualified; as the fathers of the
concept agree such extensive areas of law as law related to moral values, the law of
succession or family law are automatically excluded from an endeavour in finding the
praesumptio.73 Third, in our world of globalisation, it is fair to argue that different legal
systems bear more resemblances to one another than to their own history.74
The idea of convergence, especially through the means of functionality, has been
attacked. Legrand, for instance, has argued that comparative law should not be seduced by the
idea of uniformity; it should rather support the ‘contrarian challenge’.75 Comparative law as
an academic subject should be strongly attuned to diversity.76 Yet, such a thesis is flawed.
Reality dictates otherwise.77 One is not sure first of all why functionality should not pursue
equivalents and ultimately similars and second but most important, whether in finding such
similars why not pursue convergence.
A poet once argued that ‘a difference …in everything keeps us apart’. This is very
much true in life and also in law, as for instance American anti-trust laws might be different
and perhaps more effective than anti-trust legislation in another country, only that it would be
hazardous to claim that because implementation of the same legal purposes differs, therefore
purposes are different and thus functionality is irrelevant in comparative legal analysis.
Indeed, the comparative lawyer, though stricken from the range legal, social, cultural,
economic, religious and political backgrounds in his endeavours to reach valid comparisons,
has always been reminded that national legal methods might vary but end results or legal
purposes not necessarily so. ‘Foreign law is not very different from ours but only appears to
be so.’78 Also, from a practical point of view, Curran is right to point that a ‘hypersensitivity
to difference …can become a liability when the comparatist also is a law-maker or is
preparing to advise law-makers.’79 It is a wholly different matter, a matter which does not
touch the core of functionality, whether the effectiveness of different national tactics on the
purpose of the same legal results reaches different levels of effectiveness. The fact that
business laws in system X are more effective and result in a more thriving economy than the
71
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 40.
Ibid
73
Ibid. Also, H Kötz, ‘The Trento Project and its Contribution to the Europeanization of Private Law’ in M
Bussani and U Mattei (eds), The Common Core of European Private Law (Kluwer Law International, the
Hague/London/New York 2003) 212. Kötz characteristically states that ‘the [praesumptio similitudinis] is a
rebuttable presumption, and rebutted it must be when there is evidence for doing so.’ For indicative criticisms to
the praesumptio see e.g. A Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law (Macmillan, London 1978) 53 and H
Collins, ‘European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States’ (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law
353, 353-365.
74
L Friedman, ‘Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law’, (1996) 32 Stanford Journal of
International Law 65; ‘Comments on Applebaum and Nottage’ in J. Feest and V. Gessner (eds.), The
Proceedings of the 2nd Onati Workshop on Changing Legal Cultures (Onati Institute, Spain, 1998), pp. 139-149.
75
P Legrand (n 15) 242.
76
P Legrand, Le Droit compare (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1999) 32-49.
77
G Alpa, ‘Foreign Law in International Legal Practice’ in G Cavinet, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds) (n 2)
209.
78
BS Markesinis (n 1) 41.
79
VG Curran ‚’On the Shoulders of Schlesinger: The Trento Common Core of European Private Law Project’
(2002) 2 Global Jurist Frontiers 8 as quoted in E Örücü (n 28) 27.
72
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functionally equivalent laws and the economy of system Z should not negate comparative
efforts, even though it might be argued (especially from the law reformer’s point of view) that
the laws of X are an example to be followed and the laws of Y an example to be avoided.
As stated above, we do not have to be comparatists to realise that our world is
shrinking. In fact, close to Plato’s unity of thought appeal, humanity realises day by day that
the things which unite us are more than the ones which divide us. ‘There is no such thing as
“German” physics or “British” microbiology or “Canadian” geology.’80 The obvious question
which has to be answered then is if knowledge and science as a whole are unconfused,
indivisible and inseparable, why should there be separate national laws in non-culturally
specific areas of law (as opposed to single convergent laws)? It therefore makes little sense in
law to stress differences, when differences are the direct offspring of a nationalist and
parochial approach to law. Finally, let it also be borne in mind that it is a more demanding
task to identify similarities (and hence pursue legal unity) in comparative law research than it
is to identify differences, which largely occur by reason of the very division of legal systems.
VII.
The Dysfunctional in Functionality
Nonetheless, the principle of functionality in the comparative method of law is not exactly
free from defect. Rather like the high level of abstraction and generalisation in Continental
legal systems,81 we cannot be absolutely certain how functionality in abstracto can always
serve practical needs and how this guiding principle can be applied in practice. In fact, there is
no such thing as a concrete guide as to what can actually be compared with what, e.g., in
judicial matters.82
Thus, the first major problem with functionality is the fact that it is more of an abstract
notion than a practical guide on how to compare. Equally, it may be argued that this is the
case as such a powerful principle has been literally bred and born in law Academia (as
opposed to legal practice). Yet the inescapable fact is that what may seem theoretically
obvious may not seem as obvious to practitioners. And even though functionality seems to act
as a liberating device for the legal scholar, the same notion may initially distance the
practitioner from comparative law.
Another critique against functionality seems to suggest that its presumptive and
universalising function may take away from comparative law all that is interesting83 about it.
Frankenberg has once argued that ‘The claim to universality forbids question of the purity of
[the comparatist’s] motives, the objectivity of her methods, or the correctness of her results.’84
80
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 15. The thesis of the unity of science comes in agreement with the modern
Vienna Circle of philosophy. For writings on the unity of science see e.g. L von Bertalanffy, ‘An Outline of
General System Theory’ (1950) 1:2 British Journal or the Philosophy of Science 134, 134-165; P Oppenheim
and H Putnam, ‘Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’ (1958) 2 Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, 3-36 as reprinted in R Boyd, P Gasper and JD Trout, The Philosophy of science, Cambridge (MIT
Press, Mass./London 1991) 405-427. Cf. J Fodor, ‘Disunity of Science as Working Hypothesis’ (1974) 28
Synthese 77, reprinted as ‘Special Sciences’ in Boyd and others in the work stated in this note at pp. 429-441 and
more recently, J Fodor, ‘Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years?’ (1997) 11 Philosophical
Perspectives 149-163.
81
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 37.
82
On this see e.g. CH McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights: Transnational Judicial Conversations on
Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 499.
83
AM Glendon, MW Gordon and C Osakwe (n 17) 12.
84
G Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons Re-thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard International Law
Journal 424. More recently, see generally P Zumbansen, ‘Comparative Law’s Coming of Age: Twenty Years
after Critical Comparisons’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1073-1084.
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However, this is highly arguable. For one thing, functionality is not necessarily abortive of
contextual approaches; for another, most mainstream comparatists wish to make some
allowance for contextual inroads to functionality. In this respect, such critique can be
questioned. In relation to Frankenberg’s point, it could perhaps also be argues that his
approach clearly goes against the more traditional Saleilles 1900 thesis (emphasis on the unité
des résultats dans la diversité des formes juridiques d’application).85
Recently, it has been argued that functionality may bring about a presumption of a
common epistemological understanding of what is meant by ‘law’ between legal systems.86
This approach clearly approximates the problem of functionality as a universal apparatus of
cognition of problems and solutions. The problem is in a sense exacerbated by reason of the
fact that there is a multiplicity of legal systems and that for all the ubiquitous character of the
comparative method, there is no agreement amongst comparatists as to what amounts to ‘law’.
Also, a last critique towards functionality can be launched against its presumptive
character (and together with it against its universalising character). Here, the problem is not so
much whether the praesumptio similitudinis always occurs or not, but rather whether this
actually represents ‘ideological neutrality’ on the part of the forefathers of such a
presumption. As for whether the presumption is a rebuttable presumption, Kötz has recently
made it clear this is ‘a rebuttable presumption, and rebutted it must be when there is evidence
for doing so.’87 So, for instance, the more culture-specific the area of law, the more onerous it
is for the comparatist to detect functional equivalence. It is questionable, however, whether
the strict language used in the definition (‘[the comparatist] should be warned and go back to
check again whether the terms in which he posed his original question were indeed purely
functional, and whether he has spread the net of his researches quite wide enough’88) is free
from ideology. To this there can be no definitive answer. For one thing, similarities between
legal results in the various jurisdictions can indeed be detected; for another, the fact that Kötz
has come to slightly water down his earlier, strict approach may lead us to think that the
presumption is not so much a matter of ideology but rather a common-sense, empirical rule, a
rule that appeals to the legal senses. If this is true, we can in turn rebut the presumption that
the universalising character of functionality is of an ideological nature (as opposed to an
epistemological nature).
A.
An expansive principle
Reaching the last area of critique concerning functionality, all that could be said is that
functionality’s very strength emanating from its expansive nature in comparative law as a
whole is its very weakness. Comparative law – it would seem – has a more expansive
approach when it comes to functionality than any other discipline. Even though its tertium
comparationis function is understood to be the most central to comparative law, as we know
it, the other functions with which it comes simply cannot be ignored. In this respect, we must
acknowledge that functionalism in comparative law is convoluted and that Markesinis’ call is
still a contemporary one (even though some things in relation to this have improved) – our
discipline is still in search of an audience,89 and functionality is worthy of further
simplification or rather refinement. It is expected that this will breathe new life into the
R Saleilles, ‘Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé’, in Congrès international de droit comparé.
Procès verbaux I (1905), 167, 173 and 178.
86
G Samuel in M Van Hoecke (n 2) 61.
87
H Kötz in M Bussani and U Mattei (n 73) 212.
88
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 40.
89
BS Markesinis, ‘Comparative Law in Search of an Audience’ (1990) 53 MLR 1.
85
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theoretical part of the discipline and will further familiarise interested parties (e.g., judges,
practitioners, reformers) with the practical nature of the subject.
VIII. Conclusion
To conclude, even though the leading thesis in the comparative method should be taken to be
that of ‘functional equivalents’, at other times the comparatist may well benefit from
specifying the purpose of his comparisons. Functionality, however, is a flexible notion, not an
arteriosclerotic one. It liberates the comparatist; it does not restrict him. Expansive and
embracing as the principle is, we cannot disregard the fact that it can pertain to the
identification of both differences and similarities, yet it would be negligent not to stress that
functionality reminds us that there ultimately is unity of thought in the human race, that
despite different approaches of peoples and legal systems, problems, solutions and end results
are largely similar. For that reason, the universalising character of functionality cannot be
ignored. To be sure, there are disadvantages, but the advantages by far exceed them.
Most importantly, in the almost complete absence of a concrete and hence a viable
alternative to the much-abused notion of functionality in the comparative method of law, the
comparatist has to learn to live with it. The message is clear: Comparative law’s principal gift
to 20th century legal science,90 functionality, has a future, but it must be used with care and
respect and in a non-dogmatic and contextually inclusive fashion.91 In using functionality, as
Zweigert and Kötz have argued most successfully, we are to proceed both with discipline and
imagination.92
Cite as: Antonios Emmanuel Platsas, The Functional and the Dysfunctional in the Comparative Method of Law:
Some Critical Remarks, vol. 12.3 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, (December 2008),
<http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-3.pdf>.
90
AM Glendon, MW Gordon and C Osakwe (n 17) 11.
R Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (I)’ (1991) 39 The American Journal of
Comparative Law 1, 29; M Van Hoecke in M Van Hoecke (n 16) 191-192; VV Palmer (n 11) 29.
92
K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 36-37.
91
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