An Analysis of the
Wombat Voting
System Model
By Eitan Grundland
The System Goals
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Integrity
Privacy
Transparency
Why Change to Digital?
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Computers are faster!
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Computers are more accurate!
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As days go by, digital interfaces are more intuitive
to the public!
The evolution in inevitable!
From Paper to Digital
From Paper to Digital
From Paper to Digital
From Paper to Digital
From Paper to Digital
Security
Components
Overview
Security Components
A weak identification procedure can
compromise the entire election
process.
Security Components
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Live CD OS
Encryption
Randomness Generation
Zero Knowledge 1 of L
Security Components
• Voter's Receipt
• Digital Signatures
Security Components
• Paper Ballots
• Serial Number
Security Components
• Threshold Encryption
• Hash for Tallying Verification
Security Components
Audit Ballot
Security Components
• Mixnet
• Mixnet Zero Knowledge
The
Participating
Parties
The Participating Parties
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Ballot Stuffing
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Voter Exposure
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Authentication Disabling
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Smart Card Forgery
The Participating Parties
Actions That Pose No Threat When Carried Out by
a Single Party
The Participating Parties
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False Results Publishing
The Participating Parties
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False Accusation
The Participating Parties
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Registration Frauds
The Participating Parties
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Vote Buyers Motivation
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Voter Exposure
The Participating Parties
Actions That Pose No Threat When Carried Out by
a Single Party
The Participating Parties
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Voter Exposure
Printing Subliminal
Channel
Booth Denial of Service
The Participating Parties
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Partial Voter Exposure
The Participating Parties
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Booth OS Built-in
Backdoor
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Altering Ballots
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Subliminal Channel
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Printing Subliminal
Channel
The Participating Parties
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Collecting External
Information
Threats
of Attackers
Collaboration
Attackers Collaboration
Registration Frauds
Attackers Collaboration
Repeating
Attackers Collaboration
Booth's OS CD
Manufacturers Capabilities
Identity
Attackers Collaboration
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Partial Exposure Voter
Voter Exposure by the
Ability to Decrypt the
Votes
Attackers Collaboration
Voter Exposure by the
Ability to Decrypt the Votes
Attackers Collaboration
Ballot Stuffing
Attackers Collaboration
Voter Exposure
Attackers Collaboration
Chain Voting
Attackers Collaboration
Chain Voting
Attackers Collaboration
Voter Exposure by the
Ability to Decrypt the Votes
Attackers Collaboration
Subliminal Channel
Attackers Collaboration
Voter Exposure by the
Ability to Decrypt the Votes
Conclusion
Identification Process
• People can vote anywhere
• Biometric identification
• Limit each scanned vote
to a single identification
by software.
Live OS CD
The CD should be
digitally signed
Booth Machine
The booth machine
should be checked for
suspicious components
Physical Stamp
Each stamp should
contain poll's digital
signature
Bulletin Board
A digitally signed
list of all the cipher
votes
Booth Machine Auditing
An audit every two
hours in each
booth
Ballot Scanning Authentications Auditing
A special
"authentication audit
ballot"
Conclusion
An audit OCR
program