Long-termed determinants of party choice:
Social structure and value orientations
Lecturer:
Oddbjørn Knutsen,
Department of Political Science,
University of Oslo
Department of Political Science
1
Disposition of the lecture
Social structure
Concepts
The Lipset-Rokkan model
The four cleavages
New structural cleavages/conflicts
Gender
Sector employment, and cultural specialists versus technocrats
Education
Total explanatory power of the structural model
Value orientations
Various points
Department of Political Science
2
In this lecture I include in particular two comparative works of my
own.
A cumulative file of Eurobarometer data from the early 1970s to
the late 1990s. The countries included are Belgium, Britain,
Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy and the
Netherlands (Knutsen 2004; 2006).
A cumulative file of the three first rounds of European Social
Survey to show the comparative pattern strength of the various
social cleavages in 2002–6. The empirical analysis is based on 24
countries. So far only paper for conferences
Not mention single-country works, apart from a couple of
illustrations from my own country, Norway
Department of Political Science
3
Concepts
Cleavages or conflict lines
Previously «cleavages» was used to be identical for the impact of
social structure on party choice.
The cleavage concept has been much discussed since Bartolini
and Mair’s (1990) important work.
Cleavages more deep-seated than just having a structural
anchorage.
An empirical, a normative and an organisational component.
Should involve a) social structure, b) values and c) the party, d)
could also be an organisation that is closely related to the party
The concept “conflict lines” do not imply that the relationships is so
deep-seated, and can therefor be considered as a more general
concept.
Department of Political Science
4
“Freezing of party alignments”.
With few but significant exceptions, the party systems of the 1960s
reflected the cleavage structure of the 1920s (Lipset & Rokkan
1967: 50–54).
The freezing hypothesis is basically explained by a strong
relationship between the socio-structural variables which Lipset
and Rokkan emphasise and party choice.
An example of stable alignment.
Dealignment means that the impact of the structural cleavage has
become smaller. The increased instability in the party system is
caused by the fact that voters do not vote according to their
location in the social structure to the same degree as previously.
Department of Political Science
5
Realignment implies the eclipse of old cleavages and the rise of
new ones. There is first a dealignment from the old cleavages
followed by an alignment related to the new cleavage structure.
Sectorial realignment: New structural cleavages and value based
conflicts have become more important determinants of party
choice.
Ecological realignment: Changes in party support follow directly
from the changes in social structure. Ecological realignment
contributes also to changing political agenda and party strategies.
Parties try to appeal to some of the new expanding social groups.
Department of Political Science
6
The Lipset-Rokkan model
The National-Religious Revolution
1) The centre–periphery cleavage which was anchored in
geographical regions and related to different ethnic and linguistic
groups as well as religious minorities.
2) The conflict between the Church and the State which pitted the
secular state against the historical privileges of the churches and
over control of the important educational institutions. This cleavage
has more specifically polarised the religious section against the
secular section of the population.
The Industrial Revolution
3) The conflict in the labour market which involved owners and
employers versus tenants, labourers and workers.
4) Finally, the conflict in the commodity market between buyers
and sellers of agricultural products, or more generally, between the
urban and the rural population.
Department of Political Science
7
Centre-periphery: The changing impact of region
on party choice
Lipset and Rokkan: It was a "conflict between the central nationbuilding culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically,
linguistically and religious subject population in the provinces and
peripheries" (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 14 – emphasis in the original).
It was a conflict along a territorial axis during the nation-building
process where we found "local oppositions to encroachments of
the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their
bureaucracies: the typical reaction of the peripheral regions,
linguistic minorities and cultural threatening populations to the
pressure of the centralising, standardising and 'rationalising'
machinery of the nation-state" (1967: 10).
Department of Political Science
8
Rose, Richard & Derek Urwin (1975): Regional differentiation and
political unity in western nations. London and Beverly Hills: Sage.
Rose and Urwin (1975): the first broad-based comparative study of
regional differences in party support based on aggregate data, i.e.
electoral results in the regions.
19 Western democracies and 108 political parties covering the
early post-war period (1944–49 for the first election in different
countries) to the early 1970s (1969–73).
Department of Political Science
9
Caramani (2004): The impact of the territorial cleavage from the
first democratic elections to 1999 by using data on electoral results
in general elections from territorial units.
Main finding: The long-term weakening of the territorial cleavage, a
change consistent with hypotheses about the nationalization of
party politics.
The large decline in the impact of the territorial cleavage took
place in the period up to World War I, and the period since the
1920s was characterised as a stable territorial configuration.
In a long-term perspective, the period since the World War II has
been a period of fundamental stability of territorial configurations.
Caramani's findings therefore support the Lipset and Rokkan
hypothesis of ”freezing of party alignments” from around the
1920s.
Department of Political Science
10
Table 1 The strength of the territorial cleavage
A. Based on Rose and Urwin's data from 1968-73
Average standard scores
Switzerland
2,09
Belgium
1,18
Britain
1,18
Finland
0,18
Norway
0,06
Iceland
-0,04
France
-0,34
Netherlands
-0,50
Austria
-0,54
Germany
-0,54
Denmark
-0,89
Italy
-0,90
Sweden
-0,95
Mean
0,00
The table is based on Rose and Urwin (1975: 39, Table 5).
The three measures Rose and Urwin used to tap the regional cleavage had very
different scales and standard deviations.
The measures were therefore transformed to standard scores.
The figures are then the average of the standard scores for the three measures.
Department of Political Science
11
B. Caramani's data
1945-1999
Std. dev
IPR
Switzerland
98,30
57,20
Belgium
78,12
Finland
1990s
Std. dev
IPR
Belgium
102,91
68,91
56,67
Switzerland
102,02
57,84
66,06
47,75
Finland
67,82
47,34
Spain
56,67
38,05
Spain
57,58
36,57
Germany
55,67
42,40
Italy
55,82
41,41
Italy
48,25
37,61
Germany
55,08
40,86
Britain
47,37
40,56
Britain
53,95
43,90
Portugal
42,35
38,09
Ireland
44,19
37,74
Netherlands
37,74
36,56
France
34,20
32,19
Iceland
37,47
38,59
Iceland
31,87
35,57
Norway
34,29
36,23
Norway
28,52
33,03
France
34,23
31,61
Netherlands
28,52
31,41
Ireland
32,88
32,08
Portugal
26,11
30,48
Greece
29,12
30,56
Austria
24,60
31,27
Denmark
28,41
31,88
Denmark
23,28
28,41
Austria
24,86
31,68
Sweden
22,28
29,12
Sweden
24,32
30,27
Greece
18,90
24,92
Mean
45,65
38,69
Mean
45,74
38,29
Source: Caramani (2004: 86, Table 3.2)
Source: Caramani (2004: 89, Table 3.4)
Department of Political Science
12
Why does the electorate in different regions vote for different
parties?
Knutsen (2010): Survey data from 15 West European countries
(European Values Study 1999–2000)
Three groups of variables were used as intermediate explanatory
variables:
a) other structural variables,
b) various value orientations and
c) territorial identities along a local-national and supranational
dimension.
Department of Political Science
13
Figure 1. Causal model for explaining the impact of region on party choice
Territorial
identities
Region
Valueorientations
Other structural variables:
Religious denomination
Social class variables
Urban-rural residence
Party choice
Department of Political Science
14
The major findings were:
a) The three intermediate variables could explain a large portion of
the correlations between regions and party choice in the various
countries.
b) Of the three types of variables other socio-structural variables
played the most significant role in explaining the regional variation
in voting behaviour, while value orientations had the second
strongest role.
c) The class variables seem to play a somewhat more important
role in explaining the regional cleavage than the religious structural
conflict (religious denomination) or urban-rural residence.
d) Old Politics values (economic left-right and religious-secular
values) played a somewhat larger role than New Politics values in
this respect.
Department of Political Science
15
e) The role of territorial identities was also considerably less
important for explaining the regional cleavage than social structure
and value orientations.
f) There was some evidence that values and territorial identities
were more important explanatory variables in three of the
countries where the regional cleavage has increased since the
1970s, Belgium, Italy and Spain.
Department of Political Science
16
Religious voting: The impact of religious
denomination and frequency of church attendance
The Protestant Reformation
The French Revolution:
The Christian forces versus the liberals and the socialists
The various aspects of religious voting:
1. Belonging: Religious denomination
2. Behaving, practice of faith: Church attendance
3. Believing: accepting religious tenets and doctrines
1 and 2 has traditionally been consider as social structure, but 2 is
a bit problematic.
3 belongs to values and beliefs.
Department of Political Science
17
A somewhat paradoxical situation related to the importance of
religion in politics.
Only a small number of political issues clearly follow the
religious/secular conflict line.
By the same token, there are very few issues that are completely
divorced from them.
Despite the paucity of explicitly religious issues and the lack of
religious themes in most campaigns, religious beliefs have proven
to be a strong predictor of party choice in many West European
democracies.
Gordon Smith: the religious cleavage as a passive rather than an
active force in shaping political behaviour.
Department of Political Science
18
The religious cleavage
reflects deeply-held human values which have a great potential for
influencing behaviour.
religious values are related to a wide range of social and political
beliefs: work ethics, achievement aspirations, life-style norms,
parent-child relations, morality, social relations, attitudes toward
authority and acceptance of the state.
Religion signifies a Weltanshauung that extends into the political
area (Dalton 1990: 86).
Department of Political Science
19
Empirical research
Rose, Richard & Derek Urwin (1969): “Social cohesion, political
parties and strains in regimes”, Comparative Political Studies 2: 767.
Rose and Urwin (1969) conducted one of the first comparative
analyses of the topic, examining the social basis of party support
in 16 western democracies.
Their finding was that, contrary to conventional wisdom, “religious
divisions, not class, are the main social basis of parties in the
Western world today” (Rose and Urwin 1969: 12).
In a comparative study that included most West European
countries, Rose (1974: 16–18) compared the impact of religion,
social class and region on left-right voting on the basis of data
largely from the 1960s, and found that religion was much more
important in all the Catholic and religiously mixed countries.
Only in Britain and the Scandinavian countries was social class the
most important predictor for Department
left–right
partyScience
choice.
of Political
20
Comparative studies of changes in religious voting over time:
The main findings from these studies:
There has been a considerable change in the distribution of the
religious cleavage variables in the direction of a more secular
mass public
The correlations between religious variables and party choice has
shown a surprising persistence at a high level. For example,
Dalton (2008: 159) compares the impact of religion on voting with
the impact of social class in a comparative longitudinal study and
concludes that “the trends for religious voting do not show the
sharp drop-off found for class voting”.
See also Elff (2007)
Department of Political Science
21
However, my own longitudinal study of eight West European
countries from the early 1970s to the late 1990s based on
Eurobarometer data showed a considerable decline in the impact
of religion on party choice in the countries where the religious
cleavage had been most pronounced in the 1970s – Belgium,
France, Italy and the Netherlands.
Due to this decline there was a trend towards convergence in the
impact of the religious variables on party choice at a somewhat
lower average level than in the 1970s. There were, however, also
signs of a considerable persistence in the impact of religion in the
other countries (Knutsen 2004: chap. 2, 3, 234-236).
Department of Political Science
22
Table 2 Party choice and religious variables
A. Religious denomination
B. Church attendance
CV
Eta
Netherlands
0,289
Netherlands
0,560
Switzerland
0,274
Slovenia
0,474
Belgium
0,223
Norway
0,445
Austria
0,213
Finland
0,398
Spain
0,211
Switzerland
0,392
France
0,202
Czech Rep.
0,378
Norway
0,199
Austria
0,346
Finland
0,198
Belgium
0,341
Portugal
0,194
Slovakia
0,338
Slovenia
0,188
Sweden
0,318
Luxembourg
0,163
Poland
0,303
Czech Rep.
0,163
Spain
0,297
Sweden
0,158
Luxembourg
0,267
West Germany
0,155
Italy
0,260
Estonia
0,150
Ireland
0,255
Slovakia
0,149
France
0,254
East Germany
0,148
East Germany
0,250
Italy
0,137
Greece
0,245
Poland
0,134
Denmark
0,244
Denmark
0,133
Portugal
0,236
Ireland
0,118
Hungary
0,224
Greece
0,114
West Germany
0,211
Hungary
0,111
Estonia
0,092
Britain
0,099
Britain
0,069
Mean
0,172
Mean
0,300
Regional means
Regional means
Nordic
0,172
Nordic
0,351
Central West
0,217
Central West
0,339
South
0,164
South
0,260
Islands
0,109
Islands
0,162
East
0,149
East
0,294
CV = Cramer's V
Data souce: Cumulative file of European Social Surveys 1,2 and 3 (hereafter ESS 1-3)
The division of countries into regions
Nordic
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
Central West
Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg
South
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Island
Britain, Ireland
East
Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia
Department of Political Science
23
Class voting
Social class represents the classic structural cleavage in industrial
society.
In Lipset and Rokkan’s work the class cleavage was first and
foremost a cleavage in the labor market between owners and
employers on the one side and tenants, laborers and workers on
the other.
It sprang out of the Industrial Revolution and proved much more
uniformly divisive than the other major cleavages they focused
upon.
While the center-periphery and the state-church cleavage lines,
tended to generate national developments of the party systems in
divergent directions, the owner-worker cleavages moved the party
system in the opposite direction. "... the owner-worker cleavage
tended to bring the party system closer to each other in their basic
structure
Department of Political Science
24
The Russian Revolution, however, also brought about a more
divisive party structure caused by the conflict in the labour market
(Strong versus weak communist parties)
Department of Political Science
25
Generations of class voting and different types of class voting:
Here different types:
1) “Traditional (left-right) class voting” examines the left-right
division of parties and only two social classes (the manual/nonmanual division)
2) “Overall or total left-right class voting” examines the left-right
voting of all social classes
3) “Total class voting” considers class differences (based on a
detailed class schema) in voting between all the parties in the
party system
The party choice variable has (nearly) always been dichotomized
into Left–Right in class voting research (1 and 2).
This division can be questioned in advanced industrial societies.
Major development: The social basis of the New Left and the New
Right
Department of Political Science
26
The first generations of class voting used a traditional two-class
schema between manual workers and all other classes
(Nieuwbeerta 1995).
More recent class voting studies: More detailed class schemas.
Prominent among these schemas is the so-called
Erikson/Goldthorpe (hereafter EG) class schema
Department of Political Science
27
Table 8. The Erikson/Goldthorpe class schema
Higher-level service class
Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials, managers in large
industrial establishments, large proprietors.
Lower-level service class
Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials, higher-grade
technicians, managers in small industrial establishments, supervisors of nonmanual employees
Routine non-manual employees
Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce, sales
personnel, other rank-and-file employees
Self-employed /petty bourgeoisie
Small proprietors with and without employees
Skilled workers
Lower grade technicians, Supervisors of manual workers, skilled manual
workers
Unskilled workers
Semi- and unskilled manual workers, agricultural workers and other workers in
primary production
Farmers/self-employed in the primary Farmers and small-holders, other self-employed in primary production
sector
Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 38-39, Table 2.1).
Department of Political Science
28
Trends in the sizes of the various social classes in Norway
based on the Erikson-Goldthorpe class scheme. Data from the
Election surveys, 1957-2005. Percentages.
60
53
49
50
48
45
44
45
44
42
38
40
34
29
30
22
20
14
12
11
11
10
0
1957
18
19
17
13
12
11
9
8
1965
1969
34
31
30
23
21
Workers
29
22
Rutine non-manuals
25
23
24
21
24
21
19
18
Service class
21
20
Employers
Self-employed prim.
14
13
10
8
1973
1977
9
7
1981
9
7
1985
9
6
1989
9
5
1993
Department of Political Science
8
4
1997
7
9
3
2
2001
2005
29
Measurements of class voting
The Alford index: the percentage difference (PDI) in support for the
Left or socialist parties between the manual and the non-manual
social classes.
The Thomsen index: log-odds ratios (lor) are a better measure of
(relative) class voting. This measure, in contrast to the Alford
Index, is insensitive to changes in the overall support for parties or
party groups.
For analyses of more parties and social classes:
The kappa-index: The kappa index calculates several log-odds
ratios between a reference category on the class variable and
each of the other classes and uses the standard deviation of these
log-odds ratios as a measure of class voting.
Multinomial logistic regression
Department of Political Science
30
Table 9. Class voting according to the three generations of class voting.
Results from the pooled analysis of all countries.
A. The two parties and two classes model
Workers
Non-left parties
Left parties
Sum
N
58,0
42,0
100,0
20369
Other
classes
66,7
33,3
100,0
45469
Total
64,0
36,0
100,0
65838
PDI
Lor
8,7
0,37
B. The two party groups and the all class model
Non-left parties
Left parties
Sum
N
Hi serv
class
68,3
31,7
100,0
10728
Lo serv
Rout
class non-man
65,5
62,4
34,5
37,6
100,0
100,0
14924
12609
Petty
bourg
72,4
27,6
100,0
4753
Skilled Unskilled
workers
workers
58,5
57,6
41,5
42,4
100,0
100,0
8492
11877
Farmers
Total
78,1
21,9
100,0
2455
64,0
36,0
100,0
65838
Department of Political Science
kappa
0,321
31
C. The all parties and all class model
Communist pf.
Left Soc. pf.
Green pf.
Soc. dem. pf.
Liberal pf.
Agrarian pf.
Ethnic-reg. pf.
Christian pf.
Conserv. pf.
Radical Right pf.
Other pf.
Sum
N
Hi serv
class
0,9
3,7
4,9
27,1
16,7
3,9
1,1
14,3
19,4
3,8
4,2
Lo serv
class
1,3
4,0
7,1
29,2
13,5
3,4
1,0
15,0
16,0
4,5
5,0
Rout
non-m
1,2
3,9
5,6
32,5
11,0
3,7
0,9
14,5
17,1
4,8
4,7
Petty
bourg
1,7
1,6
2,7
24,3
14,6
3,9
1,7
13,5
25,2
6,8
4,0
100,0
10728
100,0
14924
100,0
12609
100,0
4753
Skilled Unskilled
workers
workers
2,3
2,6
3,0
2,8
2,3
2,1
36,2
37,1
11,7
10,0
4,2
4,3
1,2
1,6
12,8
12,5
15,0
15,9
6,5
6,7
4,7
4,6
100,0
8492
Farmers
Total
kappa
1,3
1,2
1,1
19,4
8,2
15,8
1,4
18,5
24,9
5,4
2,8
1,6
3,3
4,4
31,1
12,6
4,3
1,2
14,1
17,6
5,3
4,5
0,349
0,435
0,641
0,297
0,254
0,546
0,232
0,143
0,249
0,220
0,186
100,0
2455
100,0
65838
100,0
11877
Hi serv class = Higher-level service class
Lo serv class= Lower-level service class
Rout non-man = Routine non-manual employees
Department of Political Science
32
Trends in Class Voting
The debate about trends in class voting: British and American
researchers who studied their own country, versus researchers
who used comparative data.
Absolute versus relative class voting: Percentage difference
measures versus log odds ratio (lor) or more general (multinomial)
logistic regression.
Nieuwbeerta’s (1995) pioneering work is the most extensive
analysis of class voting in a comparative perspective.
Nieuwbeerta studied class voting in 20 countries over time, and,
based on 324 class voting tables in the time span 1945-1990,
found that the correlation between the Alford Index and the logodds ratios (Thomsen Index) was 0.97.
Clear decline in class voting based on Alford and Thomsen index
and also kappa index with the EG (P)-classes.
The same was my conclusion based on analyses of trends in 8
countries from the late 1970s to the late 1990s (Knutsen 2006).
Department of Political Science
33
Department of Political Science
34
Table 3 Party choice and different measures for social class
A. Traditional class voting
B. Total left-right class voting
D. Total class voting
The Alford index
The kappa index
Weighted kappa
Finland
27,1
Denmark
1,056
Finland
0,905
Sweden
22,6
Finland
1,028
Denm ark
0,735
Czech Republic
19,3
Netherlands
0,871
Austria
0,712
Britain
17,6
Sweden
0,826
Sweden
0,657
Austria
15,7
Austria
0,806
Netherlands
0,617
Spain
13,9
Switzerland
0,779
Switzerland
0,540
Portugal
12,9
Luxem bourg
0,667
Norway
0,532
Denmark
12,3
Belgium
0,617
Belgium
0,528
Luxembourg
12,1
Estonia
0,607
France
0,517
Netherlands
11,9
Czech Republic
0,547
West Germany
0,490
Belgium
10,6
West Germany
0,489
Luxembourg
0,469
West Germany
10,1
Slovenia
0,449
Spain
0,457
Italy
7,7
Spain
0,438
Czech Republic
0,446
Hungary
7,6
Portugal
0,434
Poland
0,440
Ireland
6,3
Ireland
0,431
Portugal
0,411
Greece
3,7
Britain
0,421
Britain
0,411
Slovakia
3,4
East Germany
0,356
Estonia
0,409
France
1,2
Norway
0,348
Slovenia
0,400
Norway
0,7
France
0,347
Italy
0,348
Switzerland
-1,1
Italy
0,290
Slovakia
0,340
Poland
-1,6
Poland
0,281
East Germany
0,329
East Germany
-3,2
Slovakia
0,270
Ireland
0,305
Estonia
-3,8
Hungary
0,222
Hungary
0,273
Slovenia
-7,5
Greece
0,161
Greece
0,236
Mean
0,531
Mean
0,480
Mean
8,3
Regional means
Regional means
Regional means
Nordic
15,7
Nordic
0,815
Nordic
0,707
Islands
12,0
Central West
0,654
Central West
0,553
South
9,5
Islands
0,426
East
0,377
Central West
8,6
East
0,390
South
0,363
East
2,0
South
0,331
Islands
0,358
Data source: ESS 1-3
Department of Political Science
35
The conflict in the commodity market: The voting
pattern of the peasant class and urban–rural
contrasts
The other class cleavage: the conflict in the commodity market
between peasants and others employed in the primary sector and
those who wanted to purchase products from the primary sector,
particularly the urban population.
This is then essentially an urban–rural conflict. Such conflicts did
not invariably prove party-forming. They could be dealt with within
broad party fronts or could be channelled through interest
organisations into more narrow arenas of functional representation
and bargaining.
There are generally two aspects of the commodity market conflict:
a) How the class of farmers (and other self-employed in the
primary sector) vote compared to other social classes, and
b) the differences in voting behaviour between the urban and the
rural population
Department of Political Science
36
Rokkan’s model of electoral fronts for Norwegian
and Nordic party politics
Rokkan developed a more elaborate model based on the two
economic cleavages in an important work on the Norwegian cleavage
structure (Rokkan 1966: 89–105).
Pole L: The workers and their unions
Issues/concerns: Wages, pensions, social security, welfare
Organisations: Trade unions and their union confederations
Parties: Labour/Social Democratic P.
Pole F: Farmers (and self-employed in other primary industries) and their
organisations
Issues/concerns: Prices, subsidies, toll protection and restrictions on import of
provisions/food
Organisation: Farmers' League
Parties: Agrarian/Centre Parties in Finland Norway and Sweden, Agrarian
Liberals in Denmark, Progress Party in Iceland.
Department of Political Science
37
Pole B: Trade and industry/employers
Issues/concerns Prices, taxes and fees, economic regulations
Organisations: Trade/employer associations and their confederations.
Parties: Conservative P., Independence P. in Iceland
Source: Rokkan (1966: 92-94, Figure 3-3).
Department of Political Science
38
Figure 1. Rokkan's model of electoral fronts: The functionaleconomic axis
Struggle for the vote of the new
middle class
Pole L: Labour
Pole B: Business, Employers
Struggle for the vote of
Smallholders,
fishermen
Struggle for the vote of the
rural middle classes
Pole F: Farm
Department of Political Science
39
Outside the Nordic countries: The population in rural areas is
generally more conservative and religious than the urban
population, and vote for Christian and also Conservative parties.
They have traditional and Christian values
As to the urban–rural contrasts in voting behaviour, the
conclusions of my eight-nation study: the strength of the urbanrural cleavage was declining somewhat but was still of
considerable importance in West European countries.
Christian parties gain their strongest support from farmers
compared to all other social classes gaining (50-70 %) (Knutsen
2006: 53-66) and in the Nordic countries the Centre parties are
clear class parties in accordance with Rokkan’s model of electoral
fronts (Knutsen 2004: 65–73)
Department of Political Science
40
Table 4 Party choice and urban/rural residence
Eta
Finland
0,370
Norway
0,298
Poland
0,269
Austria
0,240
Slovenia
0,234
Switzerland. 0,232
Slovakia
0,224
Belgium
0,213
Ireland
0,211
Nether.
0,207
Sweden
0,176
Estonia
0,175
East Germany0,169
Denmark
0,162
Italy
0,152
Greece
0,152
Britain
0,152
Hungary
0,151
France
0,131
West Germany
0,130
Portugal
0,127
Czech Rep. 0,109
Luxembourg.0,107
Spain
0,063
Mean
0,186
Regional means
Nordic
0,251
East
0,177
Islands
0,182
Central West0,152
South
0,149
Data source: ESS 1-3
Department of Political Science
41
Gender: From the traditional to the modern gender
gap
The traditional gender gap:
Women were more inclined to vote for religious and conservative
parties and less inclined to vote for socialist parties.
Explanations: Private” orientations associated with religion and
family responsibilities were identified as the basis for these
differences.
Less integrated into the work force and the working class
organisations
Main explanation in empirical studies: religiosity
Modern gender gap:
Women vote more leftist and radical than men
Explanations:
Structural factors: Work force participation, low wage, location in
the class structure, sector employment )public)
Department of Political Science
Cultural factors: Value orientations
42
Inglehart and Norris (2000; 2003: chap. 4): a developmental theory
of the gender gap or of gender realignment.
According to this theory there will be
a) systematic differences in the gender gap between societies
based on their level of political and economic development,
b) within societies there will differences between generations,
and
c) the explanations of the gender differences will be found in
structural and cultural factors.
The modern gender gap in advanced industrial societies, cultural
factors seems to explain the gender gap better than structural
factors (Inglehart and Norris 2000: 453-457).
Department of Political Science
43
A comparative longitudinal study based on election data from the
three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden)
from the 1970s to the late 1990s, focused on the working
population (Knutsen 2001):
Women increasingly supported the Left Socialist and Green
parties more so than men.
On the other hand, men disproportionally and increasingly
supported the Conservative and Radical Rightist parties.
In a causal analyse,
social class and sector employment intermediate variables to
explain the gender gaps,
from 30% to 75% of the gender gap for voting for the left socialist
and rightist parties could be explained by the fact that women
worked in the public sector to a much large degree than men.
Sector employment, not class location, explained the gender
voting gap (Knutsen 2001: 338-344).
Sector employment was, however, a much larger determinant of
party choice in the Scandinavian countries than gender.
Department of Political Science
44
Figure 2 Trends in gender gap in eight West European countries
10.0
5.0
France
0.0
1970-74
Belgium
1994-97
2002-06
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
Denmark
Ireland
-5.0
Britain
Mean
-10.0
-15.0
Department of Political Science
45
Table 5 Gender and left-right party choice
PDI
Norway
8,9
Denmark
8,0
Finland
6,5
Switzerland
6,3
West Germany
6,2
East Germany
5,7
Netherlands
5,5
Belgium
4,6
Austria
4,5
Italy
3,5
Sweden
3,4
Estonia
2,7
France
2,5
Slovakia
2,2
Britain
1,2
Portugal
0,0
Hungary
-0,1
Slovenia
-0,5
Spain
-0,8
Greece
-1,5
Poland
-2,0
Luxembourg
-2,2
Czech Republic
-4,0
Ireland
-4,6
Mean
2,3
Regional means
Nordic
6,7
Central West
3,9
South
Islands
East
0,3
-1,7
0,6
Data source: ESS 1-3
The PDI index is the percentage of women minus the percentage of men who support the leftist parties.
Department of Political Science
46
Sector employment/ social and cultural specialist
and the technocrats
Sector employment
public versus the private sector location
The structural basis for the sector conflict:
The different economic interests of employees in the two sectors:
the financing of wages and the organisations
Cognitive conditions connected with different educational
backgrounds and occupational experiences.
“Trilemma of the service economy”, between wage inequality,
budgetary restrains and employment
put forward by Iversen and Wren (1998)
The neoliberal model, problem with equality
The Christian or conservative model: problem with employment
The social democratic model: problem with budgetary restrains.
Department of Political Science
47
From the above discussion that the following may be expected.
a) Sector employment will have an impact on party choice. Public
employees will vote for the parties of the left, and primarily left
socialist and green parties.
b) The impact of sector will be largest within the higher educated
and the service class.
- awareness of social problems
- professional ethics and educational background
c) The impact of sector will be largest in social democratic welfare
regimes due to the higher level of political conflict coupled with the
welfare services in these countries.
General support for these hypotheses in comparative research.
Department of Political Science
48
My own study (Knutsen 2005) of the impact of sector employment on
party choice in eight West European countries based on data from
1988 to 1994 strongly supported these expectations.
Similar findings have been made in studies which are based on the
Bureau Voting Model (BVM):
Government employees will:
a) have more leftist economic attitudes,
b) vote more frequently for leftist parties and
c) have a higher level of electoral participation than those in the
private sector.
Considerable support for the model,
However: It is not public administration employees who contribute to
the overall sector cleavage; but
the largest segment in the public sector, those in public health and
education, and also those in public service production that do so.
Those who work in public administration do not differ from the
private employees with regard to leftist attitudes and voting
behaviour.
Department of Political Science
49
Social and cultural specialists versus the technocrats
The theory of division between so-called social and cultural
specialists versus the technocrats.
This theory claims that a “new” class of knowledge workers has
emerged and gained power in advanced industrial society. This
new class is differentiated from the old class of technocrats
(managers and administrators)
The social and cultural specialists generally work in the public
sector.
Their work tasks are relatively less controllable than the
technocrats.
The social-cultural occupations require skills to serve people’s
need and well-being in society.
Department of Political Science
50
The criteria for distinguishing between the new class of social and
cultural specialist and the “old” class of technocrats (Güveli et al
2007a: 132) are twofold.
The first criterion is difficulty in monitoring the task performance by
employee;
the second criterion has two components:
a) whether an occupation has a feature of social service, and/or
b) whether it needs social and cultural specialist knowledge to
perform the task well.
Occupations do not need to have both components to be classified
as social and cultural specialist; one is sufficient.
Department of Political Science
51
The empirical analyses which document the political
consequences of this differentiation are based on Dutch data from
1970 to 2003.
The main findings are the social and cultural specialists (within the
service class) are more inclined to vote for the leftist parties, and in
particular for the New Left parties than the technocrats.
The differences increase over time and persist when controlling for
education and sector employment (Güveli et al. 2007a: 139–141;
see also Kriesi 1998).
Department of Political Science
52
Education as the structural base for the New
Politics cleavage
New Politics conflicts contributes to structural dealignment and
realignment.
Libertarian/authoritarian values locate the working class and the
lower educated strata close to the authoritarian pole and the
service class and the higher educated strata close to the
libertarian pole.
Education is most important structural determinant along the new
value conflict
Libertarian/authoritarian values are the central explanation for the
new politics conflict dimension between the New Left (Greens and
socialist left parties) and the New Right (radical rightist parties)
Stubager work will be discussed in more details under value
orientations
Department of Political Science
53
Total explanatory power of the structural model
The decline of cleavage politics
Knutsen 1994:
Figure 7.4: The combined impact on party choice (nominal level
variable, all significant parties), Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) from
multinomial logistic regressions
Decline in the four countries where social structure had the largest
impact, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Italy, and in
addition France, but not in Britain, Ireland and Germany
Convergence
____
Figure 7.9: The combined impact on left-right party choice.
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) from logistic regressions
Stronger decline, on average about 50% from the late 1970s to the
late 1990s. Convergence, clearer patterns than for all parties
Department of Political Science
54
Figure 7.4
Trends in the impact of the total cleavage model on party choice measured by
Nagelkerke's R2
0.600
0.500
Belgium
0.400
Nagerkerke's R2
Britain
Denmark
France
0.300
Germany
Ireland
Italy
0.200
Netherlands
Mean
0.100
0.000
1975-79
1980-84
1985-89
1990-93
Department of Political Science
1994-97
55
Figure 7.9.
Trends in the impact of the total cleavage model on left-right party choice. The best fitted
model regarding the placement of the Greens.
0.400
0.350
0.300
Nagelkerke's R2
Belgium
Britain
0.250
Denmark
0.200
France
Germany
0.150
Ireland
Italy
0.100
Netherlands
Mean
0.050
0.000
1975-79
1980-84
1985-89
Department of Political Science
1990-93
1994-97
56
Literature (not outlined in the overview of the lecture)
Bartolini, S. 2000. The political mobilization of the European left,
1860-1980. The class cleavage. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Dalton, Russell J. (1990): 'Religion and party alignment', pp. 66-88
in Risto Sänkiaho et al.: People and their polities. Jyväskylä: The
Finnish Political Science Association.
Dalton, Russell J. (2008): Citizen politics. Public opinion and
political parties in advanced western democracies. 5th ed. CQ
Press
Erikson, Robert & John H. Goldthorpe (1992): The constant flux. A
study of class mobility in industrial societies. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Department of Political Science
57
Iversen, Torben and Anna Wren (1998): “Equality, employment,
and budgetary restraint. The trilemma of the service economy”,
World Politics 50: 507-546.
Knutsen, Oddbjørn (2001): “Social Class, Sector Employment and
Gender as Political Cleavages in the Scandinavian Countries. A
Comparative Longitudinal Study, 1970-95”, Scandinavian Political
Studies 24 (4) 2001: 311-350.
Rokkan, Stein (1966): “Norway: Numerical democracy and
corporate pluralism”, in Robert A: Dahl (ed.): Political oppositions
in Western democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rose, Richard (ed.) (1974): Electoral behaviour: A comparative
handbook. New York: The Free Press.
Department of Political Science
58