ARGUMENTATION
Hello Itchy, are you going to observe Grice’s
Principle of Cooperation
today?
SUCKER
Only if you observe the
Principle of Charity
Argumentation requires at least two people
One of these people is arguing for some position
about which there is some dispute or controversy
This is sometimes called the standpoint.
She gives reasons in favour of her standpoint.
The respondent may argue against the standpoint,
perhaps by offering reasons of his own.
Or he may direct critical questions
at her reasoning to reveal its flaws.
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SCHEMES
This should cause the defender of
the standpoint to clarify her
reasoning. Clarification could be:
i) Adding new reasons that are
independent of the ones before.
This is convergent argumentation.
ii) Filling in unexpressed premises
iii) Using an argumentation scheme.
iv) Separating into two concepts
what was previously just one.
v) Combining into one concept
what was previously two.
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES
There are more ways than one to argue for a standpoint
The arguer has to judge from the audience what needs to be said
explicitly and what should be taken for granted, what can be left
unexpressed.
Redundant argumentation is not merely time-consuming but could
actually be seen as suspicious by the audience, with a corresponding
fall in the persuasiveness of the argument. Lawyers have to very
A and B give different support to C. If
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if Aarguing
is conclusive on its own,
careful what arguments they use and when they use them.
the respondent manages to rebut A,
then adding B seems like a
against
an
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suggest
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it
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more
importance
then the arguer can still appeal to B. In
confession that it is not conclusive.
than it really
at the
the sense that the respondent
musthas. Normally, the main arguments are presented
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beginning
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instead
argumentatations
middle. This support is weaker (at least for the audience
in force each one has.
one, this structure isthe
stronger.
persuasive
question) but independent of the main points.
The argumentation-structure looks like this.
This argumentation-structure is called convergent.
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES
There are more ways than one to argue for a standpoint
Deductive argumentation is linked, since
the premises A and B only support the
conclusion C when combined according
to a rule of inference.
Usually more than one rule will need to
be applied, so the premises only
support a subconclusion, which
together with the premises supports the
standpoint. For instance…
The pragma-dialectical view sees linked and
Some philosophers consider all linked
convergent structures as forms of complex
structures to be deductive argumentation,
argumentation that can be analysed into single
but others like Thomas, and Pinto and
argumentations; these are interrelated
Blair, allow inductive
Thisargumentation.
argumentation-structure is called linked ordifferently
subordinative.
when the premises are
interdependent.
This argumentation-structure is called serial.
ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES
This is not the only way to diagram argumentation.
Below we have a diagram illustrating the Toulmin model.
One interesting thing to note is that the rebuttal does
entail rejection of the claim, but only a qualification of it.
Another is the distinction between warrant and backing.
The warrant says simply “From this data, you can infer
that”. The backing is the grounds of the warrant, the
reason for accepting it. This could be more observational
data, or it could be something like a legal statute.
fallacies
dialectics
The traditional view of fallacies was that they
looked like valid arguments, but were not.
Barth and Krabbe took Hamblin’s lead and created
a formal model of argumentation.
However, many fallacies, e.g., petitio principii,
are valid arguments according to classical logic.
Influenced by the dialectics of Barth and Krabbe
and the critical rationalism of Popper, the pragmadialecticians consider the ability to handle fallacies
to be a crucial test of their theory.
Others are not arguments at all, e.g., the
fallacy of many questions.
In 1970, Charles Hamblin wrote a
book “Fallacies” that highlighted the
inadequacy of classical logic to deal
with the fallacies. His work is widely
considered to be devastating. Some
have considered that logic books and
teaching logic should exclude fallacies
altogether. Hamblin’s own approach,
though, still seems to be essentially
logical, although not truth-valued
logic. Fallacies were better understood
dialogically as something like illegal
moves in a game. This led to things
like formal dialectics.
Their approach is characterized by the idea that
certain rules have to be obeyed for a discourse to
aim at the rational resolution of disagreement.
Such rules had already been suggested
by philosophers such as H.P. Grice and
Jurgen Habermas.
Fallacies are violations of these rules.
When arguers argue fallaciously, they are
no longer pursuing a rational resolution of
disagreement, but any resolution in which
they win. Van Eemeren calls this “strategic
maneuvering”
Habermas also stresses that language should be
used communicatively and not strategically.
PRAGMA-DIALECTICS
AND FALLACIES
Van Eemeren is a
critical rationalist.
Disputes are to be
resolved by rational
argumentation, and
both protagonist and
antagonist must be
committed to this
kind of resolution.
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In the meta-level
dispute between
pragma-dialectics
and other theories of
argumentation, the
crucial experiment is
the handling of the
fallacies.
PRAGMA-DIALECTICS
AND FALLACIES
There are 10 rules for critical discussion and fallacies. If the protagonist or antagonist break
these rules then they are no longer committed to resolving the dispute rationally, but are
engaging in strategic maneuvering. This is reminiscent of Habermas’ distinction between
communicative and strategic action, and his rules of discourse.
1. Freedom rule
6. Starting point rule
2. Burden-of-proof rule
7. Argument scheme rule
3. Standpoint rule
8. Validity rule
4. Relevance rule
9. Closure rule
5. Unexpressed premise rule
10.Usage rule
Freedom rule
• Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward
standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints
• Violations of rule 1 by the protagonist or the antagonist
at the confrontation stage
– Placing limits on standpoints or doubts
• Fallacy of declaring standpoints sacrosanct
• Fallacy of declaring standpoints taboo
– Restricting the other party’s freedom of action
• Putting the other party under pressure
– Fallacy of the stick
– Fallacy of appeal to pity
• Attacking the other party’s person
– Fallacy of depicting the other party as stupid, bad, unreliable, etc.
– Fallacy of casting suspicion on the other party’s motives
– Fallacy of pointing out a contradiction in the other party’s words or
deeds
Burden-of-proof rule
• A party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked
to do so
• Violations of rule 2 by the protagonist at the opening stage
– Charging the burden of proof to the other party
• In a non-mixed difference of opinion, instead of defending his or her own
standpoint the protagonist forces the antagonist to show that the
protagonist’s standpoint is wrong
– Fallacy of shifting the burden of proof
• In a mixed difference of opinion the one party does not attempt to defend his
or her standpoint but forces the other party to defend their standpoint
– Fallacy of shifting the burden of proof
– Escaping from the burden of proof
• Presenting the standpoint as self-evident
– Fallacy of evading the burden of proof
• Giving a personal guarantee of the rightness of the standpoint
– Fallacy of evading the burden of proof
• Immunizing the standpoint against criticism
– Fallacy of evading the burden of proof
Standpoint rule
• A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that
has indeed been advanced by the other party
• Violations of rule 3 by the protagonist or the antagonist at all the
discussion stages
– Attributing a fictitious standpoint to the other party
• Emphatically putting forward the opposite standpoint
– Fallacy of the straw man
• Referring to the views of the group to which the opponent belongs
– Fallacy of the straw man
• Creating a fictitious opponent
– Fallacy of the straw man
– Misrepresenting the other party’s standpoint
• Taking utterances out of context
– Fallacy of the straw man
• Oversimplifying or exaggerating
– Fallacy of the straw man
Relevance rule
• A party may defend his or her standpoint only by
advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint
• Violations of rule 4 by the protagonist at the
argumentation stage
– The argumentation has no relation to the standpoint under
discussion
• Fallacy of irrelevant argumentation
– The standpoint is defended by means other than argumentation
• Non-argumentation
– Fallacy of playing on the sentiments of the audience (pathetic fallacy)
– Fallacy of parading one’s own qualities (ethical fallacy)
Unexpressed premise rule
• A party may not falsely present something as a
premise that has been left unexpressed by the
other party or deny a premise that he or she has
left implicit
• Violations of rule 5 by the protagonist or the
antagonist at the argumentation stage
– Adding an unexpressed premise that goes beyond
what is warranted
• Fallacy of magnifying an unexpressed premise
– Refusing to accept commitment to an unexpressed
premise implied by one’s own defence
• Fallacy of denying an unexpressed premise
Starting point rule
• No party must falsely present a premise as an accepted
starting point, or deny a premise representing an
accepted starting point
• Violations of rule 6 by the protagonist or the antagonist
at the argumentation stage
– Meddling with the starting points by the protagonist by falsely
denying that something is an accepted starting point
• Fallacy of falsely denying an accepted starting point
– Meddling with the starting points by the antagonist by falsely
presenting something as an accepted starting point.
• Fallacy of making unfair use of propositions in making assertions
• Fallacy of making unfair use of presuppositions in asking questions
• Fallacy of using an argument that amounts to the same thing as the
standpoint
Argument scheme rule
• A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively
defended if the defence does not take place by means of
an appropriate argument scheme that is correctly applied
• Violations of rule 7 by the protagonist at the
argumentation stage
– Using an inappropriate argument scheme
• Populist fallacy
• Fallacy of confusing facts with value judgments
– Incorrectly applying an argument scheme
•
•
•
•
•
Fallacy of authority
Fallacy of hasty generalization
Fallacy of false analogy
Fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc
Fallacy of the slippery slope
Validity rule
• The reasoning in the argumentation must be logically
valid or must be capable of being made valid by making
explicit one or more unexpressed premises
• Violations of rule 8 by the protagonist at the
argumentation stage
– Reasoning that treats a sufficient condition as a necessary
condition
• Fallacy of denying the antecedent
• Fallacy of affirming the consequent
– Reasoning that confuses the properties of parts and wholes
• Fallacy of division
• Fallacy of composition
Closure rule
• A failed defence of a standpoint must result in the protagonist
retracting the standpoint, and a successful defence of the standpoint
must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts
• Violations of rule 9 by the protagonist or the antagonist at the
concluding stage
• Meddling with the conclusion by the protagonist
• Fallacy of refusing to retract a standpoint that has not been
successfully defended
• Fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because it has been
defended successfully
• Meddling with the conclusion of the antagonist
• Fallacy of refusing to retract criticism of a standpoint that has been
successfully defended
• Fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because the opposite
has not been successfully defended
Usage rule
• Parties must not use any formulations that
are insufficiently clear or confusingly
ambiguous, and they must interpret the
formulations of the other party as carefully
and accurately as possible.
Circular arguments and “begging the question”
Van Eemeren
Hahn et.al
YES
Although Walton seems to
say that circular arguments
are not always invalid, any
error in the arguer is
trasmitted to the
“Beggingalways
the question”
argument.
is a pragmatic error
distinct from circular
arguments.
YES
Are these
the same
thing?
NO
Walton
If the arguer is bad, does this
mean that the argument is bad
?
Hahn
et et
al.al.
say
“the notion
Hahn
explain
the
that
a poor
argument
is
fallacy
using
Bayesian
pragmatically
probability:
the‘question
posterior
begging’
probability
of a conclusion
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the same labels
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prior
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her argument is poor
NO
They have a number of items in common:
• They are both influenced by formal dialectics
• They both want a rapprochement between
dialectics and rhetoric.
• They both see argumentation fundamentally as a
dialogue with moves made by “players”.
Conclusion
• They both see argumentation schemes as logical
tools The
to regulate
the dialogue.
“pragmatic”
approach of Douglas
and
“pragma-dialectical” model,
• TheyWalton
both use
thethe
“speaker-commitment”
approachthe
of Van
Eemeren
et al. are
the
thus avoiding
irritation
of having
to consider
worked
talked
about,
whattwo
themost
speaker
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havemost
meant
to say
and arguably the best theories of
• They are
both concerned
with the
argumentation
currently
out fallacies.
there.
Whose is the best, or are they equals?
Walton refers to fallacies as illegitimate shifts from one
dialogue type to another. But it is only by some very creative
theorizing that some argumentation (e.g. in advertising where
the audience cannot question) can be construed as dialogues at
all. Is it really reasonable then to think that we can determine
what particular type of dialogue is being engaged in without
antecedently identifying the fallacies? Do dialogue shifts
explain fallacies, or do fallacies explain dialogue shifts? Is there
any sharp boundary between one dialogue type and another?
Like Van Eemerens “strategic maneuvering” the addition of
dialogue types to the core theory of argumentation schemes
poses more questions than it answers. Can we tell just from
what somebody says (i.e. their commitments) what type of
dialogue they take themselves to be involved in and what their
communicative goals are? Couldn’t a speaker pursue more than
one communicative goal at once, e.g. to persuade his
interlocutor and to reassure himself of his correctness?
Whereas
who sees
suchis rules
In suchHabermas,
maneuvering
agent
only
Van Eemerenthe
identifies
the
as trying
constitutive
of
rationality,
can say
to
win,
yet
we
may
suppose
fallacies as violations of rules that
thatheviolators
are simply
no longer
that
says exactly
the same
things
regulate
specifically
rational
“arguing”,
Van
Eemeren
has
to
try to
as he might otherwise,
thus
discussion.his
bring commitments
in “strategic maneuvering”
are the same.
Rhetoric came to be separated from dialectic
and treated with suspicion, partly because of
Plato’s criticisms of the Sophists. Rhetoric
seems concerned with persuasion rather than
truth. Not only would Sophists argue
fallaciously, but they would do so not
accidentally but with the express purpose of
persuading irrespective of rationality.
Dialectic consists of the canons of logic and
is concerned with how you should reason, for
which it sets up purely objective and rational
standards. By correct reasoning you can
reach the truth, and it seems to be further
assumed that by communicating that
reasoning, another rational being should be
equally convinced of the truth.
Argumentation is thus viewed by the
dialectician is persuading by the best reason
and to argue using fallacies is anathema.
Civic or
political
man, loyal
to the state
Logic is the art of thinking;
grammar, the art of inventing
symbols and combining them
to express thought; and
rhetoric, the art of
communicating thought from
one mind to another, the
adaptation of language to
circumstance.
Another description is:
Logic is concerned with the
thing as-it-is-known,
Grammar is concerned with
the thing-as-it-is-symbolized,
and
Rhetoric is concerned with
the thing-as-it-iscommunicated.
In medieval
universities, the
trivium comprised the
three subjects taught
first: grammar,
dialectic, and rhetoric.
The word is a Latin
term meaning “the
three ways” or “the
three roads” forming
the foundation of a
medieval liberal arts
education.
Walton seems to be the most
amenable to rhetoric because
he says that not everything
normally described as a fallacy
represents bad reasoning or
incorrect argumentation
I think that the “flexibility” of
Walton’s approach is actually a
problem. It is vulnerable to the
same kind of criticisms that Popper
aimed against psychoanalytic
theory of not ruling anything out
and explaining too much.
Although he talks about different
contexts and values, he fails to
explain how these are to be
modelled using a purely dialectic
system that operates with speaker
commitments. Any such analysis
will necessarily ignore the aspects
of performance that are central to
rhetoric. Arguing rhetorically is not
so much a question of what you say
as of how you say it.
He endorses value-based
argumentation, where one can
argue differently to different
audiences by taking into
account what is important to
them, what they value most.
Van Eemeren’s theory has the advantage of being obviously wrong,
but wrong in ways that are potentially revealing. In particular, I think it
shows the inadequacy of the speaker-commitment model. It also
assumes too readily that the best argument from a dialectical
perspective will also be effective rhetorically; he doesn’t seem to have
much to say if “bad” arguments are more effective other than that
higher-order conditions are not being met, such conditions presumably
meaning that argumentation is no longer taking place at all. This
seems to me a fairly empty consolation.