Moral Responsibility
Themes in Ethics and Epistemology
Shane Ryan
s.g.ryan@sms.ed.ac.uk
16/10/13
Problem
• There's a compelling case that we don't have
free will. But if we don't have free will then it's
hard to see how we can have moral
responsibility.
• And if we don't think that people can have moral
responsibility then it's hard to see how we can
morally praise or blame anyone. But if we can't
morally praise and blame, then we can't laud
people such as Gandhi or condemn people such
as Hitler.
Structure
1. Free Will
2. Determinism and Indeterminism
3. Positions on Free Will
4. Moral Responsibility
5. Frankfurt’s compatibilist argument
6. Strawson's Pessimism
1. Free Will
Case 1:
John is struggling to finish writing an essay. The
essay has to be submitted in the next day. He
gets an sms from a girl he likes inviting him to a
party taking place that very evening. John can
choose to continue to work on his essay or go to
the party. John chooses to continue to work on
his essay.
It looks like John has exercised his free will.
1. Free Will
Case 2:
Lena is an international student who has just
completed her MA. She has lived away from
home for the last four years. She enjoys living
abroad but she knows that her family would like
her to move back home. Lena also knows that
she could continue living abroad. Lena faces a
choice between moving back home and
continuing to live abroad. She chooses to
continue living abroad.
It looks like Lena has exercised her free will.
1. Free Will
• But some philosophers deny that people have
free will; therefore they would deny that John
and Lena have exercised free will. (And that
John and Lena can be said to have made a
choice in the sense in which people using the
word ordinarily mean.)
• But what reason could they have for denying the
common sense claim that we have free will?
1. Free Will
• But first we should try to get clearer on what is meant by
free will.
• Is exercising free will just wanting something and doing
it?
• Suppose as part of an experiment a team of
psychologists had brainwashed John into wanting to
work on his essay above all else.
• If this were the case, then it would seem mistaken to say
that John exercised his free will in the case described.
1. Free Will
• Some attempts at a provisional definition:
• Timothy O’Connor (2011): “Free Will” is a
philosophical term of art for a particular
sort of capacity of rational agents to
choose a course of action from among
various alternatives. Which sort is the free
will sort is what all the fuss is about.”
(Emphasis added.)
1. Free Will
• Michael McKenna (2009): “[A]s a theory-neutral
point of departure, free will can be defined as the
unique ability of persons to exercise control over
their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for
moral responsibility. Clearly, this definition is too
lean when taken as an endpoint; the hard
philosophical work is about how best to develop
this special kind of control. But however this
notion of control is developed, its uniqueness
consists, at least in part, in being possessed
only by persons.”
1. Free Will
The main components mentioned:
• A particular sort of capacity to choose.
• Free will involves control of an agent over
her action or conduct.
• It requires a level of control necessary to
allow for moral responsibility.
• It is only possessed by rational
agents/persons.
2. Determinism and
Indeterminism
The Classical Formulation of the free will problem:
1. Some person (qua agent), at some time, could have acted otherwise
than she did.
2. Actions are events.
3. Every event has a cause.
4. If an event is caused, then it is causally determined.
5. If an event is an act that is causally determined, then the agent of the
act could not have acted otherwise than in the way that she did.
(McKenna, 2009.)
2. Determinism and
Indeterminism
Determinism and indeterminism
• Timpe (2006): “Causal determinism... is the thesis that
the course of the future is entirely determined by the
conjunction of the past and the laws of nature.”
• Timpe asks us to imagine a proposition that
comprehensively describes the universe at some point in
the past, and a proposition that expresses each of the
laws of nature. Determinism is the view that given these
two propositions there is only one possible future.
2. Determinism and
Indeterminism
Determinism and indeterminism
• This not the view that finite beings are able to
predict exactly how the universe will turn out.
• Neither is it the fatalistic view that something
(say passing your exams) is bound to happen
regardless of what you do.
2. Determinism and
Indeterminism
Determinism and indeterminism
• Two kinds of ways the world might not be deterministic:
- If the laws of nature are indeterministic or probabilistic.
- If some entities are not completely governed by the
laws of nature.
• Doesn’t quantum theory claim that the world isn’t
deterministic? The standard interpretation of quantum
theory claims that events at the micro-particle level are
indeterministic. But even if there is quantum
indeterminacy, that doesn’t show that larger objects, like
us, aren’t subject to deterministic laws. (Timpe, 2006)
2. Determinism and
Indeterminism
Determinism and indeterminism
• So even if we have reason to reject
determinism, “near determinism” may still
be true; much of our universe including
ourselves are governed by deterministic
laws.
(Timpe, 2006)
3. Positions on Free Will
• Determinism and indeterminism are theses
about the nature of our universe.
• Traditionally the truth of either claim is taken to
have implications for free will.
• Incompatibilists think that free will is
incompatible with determinism
• Compatibilists think that free will is compatible
with determinism.
3. Positions on Free Will
• Incompatibilist positions: Hard determinism and
libertarianism.
• Hard determinism:
P1. If determinism is true then we don’t have
free will.
P2. Determinism is true.
C. We don’t have free will.
- When John stays in to work on his essay he
has not exercised his free will.
3. Positions on Free Will
• Libertarianism:
P1. If determinism is true then we don’t have
free will.
P2*. We do have free will.
C*. Determinism is not true.
- When Sarah stays abroad she has exercised
her free will.
(The libertarian needs indeterminism to be true
for it to be true that we have free will.)
3. Positions on Free Will
• Compatibilists hold that free will and
determinism are compatible. They don’t
think that one rules out the other.
• Therefore a compatibilist is committed to
rejecting P1 (If determinism is true then we
don’t have free will.)
3. Positions on Free Will
1. Some person (qua agent), at some time, could
have acted otherwise than she did.
2. Actions are events.
3. Every event has a cause.
4. If an event is caused, then it is causally
determined.
5. If an event is an act that is causally determined,
then the agent of the act could not have acted
otherwise than in the way that she did.
(McKenna, 2009.)
3. Positions on Free Will
• Within this framework the compatibilist would
have to deny (5).
• Similarly the incompatibilist would have to affirm
(5).
• Of the incompatibilist positions:
- The hard determinist will reject (1).
- The libertarian might reject (3) or (4).
• All might question whether (1) correctly
represents what free will is.
(McKenna, 2009.)
3. Positions on Free Will
• Why might we think that (1) correctly represents what
free will is?
• The Garden of Forking Paths Model
• In John’s case what seems important in order to say
that he has free will is that he had the ability to
choose between at least two alternatives, that
different paths lay open to him. He has the ability to
either stay and work on his essay or go to the party.
• But remember that determinism is the claim that there
is only one possible future.
3. Positions on Free Will
•
An argument against the Garden of Forking
Paths Model
(P1) If a person acts of her own free will, then
she could have done otherwise.
(P2) If determinism is true, no one can do
otherwise than one actually does.
(C) Therefore, if determinism is true, no one
acts of her own free will.
(McKenna, 2009.)
3. Positions on Free Will
Source Incompatibilist Argument
• We might think what’s important is not that John actually had two
possible paths open to him but that his action came from him in the
right way; that he “chose” makes him the source of what happened
in the right kind of way.
• John wanting to do well in his essay was the source of his action. It
is that which means it makes sense to say that he exercised his free
will.
• But now we might worry that that source itself has a further source
that lines outside of John.
3. Positions on Free Will
•
Again accepting determinism seems to rule out the
possibility of free will.
•
Source Incompatibilist Argument:
(P1) A person acts of her own free will only if she is its
ultimate source.
(P2) If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate
source of her actions.
(C) Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her
own free will.
(McKenna, 2009.)
4. Moral Responsibility
• Free will seems at the least to be a necessary condition
for moral responsibility. If we don’t have free will then it
seems that we can’t have moral responsibility.
• What is moral responsibility?
- A morally responsible person is one who is able to do
morally right or wrong action and “is accountable for her
morally significant conduct.” Such a person may aptly be
morally praised or blamed. (McKenna, 2009.)
4. Moral Responsibility
• Galen Strawson (1994: 9) provides a more
colourful explanation of moral responsibility:
“As I understand it, true moral responsibility is
responsibility of such a kind that, if we have it,
then it makes sense, at least, to suppose that it
could be just to punish some of us with (eternal)
torment in hell and reward others with (eternal)
bliss in heaven.”
4. Moral Responsibility
• We want to say that people like Gandhi
are morally praiseworthy, while people like
Paul Pot are morally blameworthy.
• More mundanely, we want to say that
someone who stops another person being
bullied is morally praiseworthy, while
someone who cheats in exams is morally
blameworthy.
4. Moral Responsibility
• Why does claiming that we don’t have free will
appear to imply that we don’t have moral
responsibility either?
• If Paul Pot didn’t have free will then how can we
blame him for what he did?
• Similarly, why should we praise Gandhi if he
wasn’t acting on the basis of free will?
5. Frankfurt’s compatibilist
argument
Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities (PAP).
PAP: A person is morally responsible for
what she does do only if she can do
otherwise.
5. Frankfurt’s compatibilist
argument
Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of
Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. However,
Black is concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to
shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if
Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot
Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black
will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones
will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through
with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No
one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered
Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith.
Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never
intervened.
(McKenna, 2009.)
5. Frankfurt’s compatibilist
argument
In the case described, Jones couldn’t have done
otherwise. He couldn’t have not shot Smith.
Nevertheless, intuitively Jones is still morally
responsible for his action. (McKenna, 2009.)
Determinism may still be incompatible with the sort
of free will that involves a capacity to do otherwise,
but Frankfurt’s argument suggests that we don’t
need that for moral responsibility.
6. Galen Strawson’s Pessimism
Pessimism:
Neither determinism nor indeterminism can result
in us having moral responsibility. Pessimists
believe that free will of the sort necessary for moral
responsibility is impossible, even though they
might accept certain compatibilist formulations of
freedom.
(Galen Strawson, forthcoming.)
6. Galen Strawson’s Pessimism
(1) It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of
heredity and early experience.
(2) It is undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be
held to be in any way responsible.
(3) One cannot at any later stage of one’s life hope to attain ultimate
responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one
already is as a result of one’s heredity and previous experience.
For one may well try to change oneself, but
(4) both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change
oneself, and the degree of one’s success in one’s attempt at
change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of
heredity and previous experience.
6. Galen Strawson’s Pessimism
(5) any further changes that one can bring about only
after one has brought about certain initial changes will in
turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity
and previous experience.
(6) This may not be the whole story, for it may be that
some changes in the way one is are traceable to the
influence of indeterministic or random factors.
But
(7) it is foolish to suppose that indeterministic or random
factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way
responsible, can in themselves contribute to one’s being
truly or ultimately responsible for how one is.
(Galen Strawson)
6. Galen Strawson’s Pessimism
The implications
Every detail of how you are is a matter of luck.
Whether you behave like Paul Pot or Gandhi is also a matter a luck.
If your behaviour is a matter of luck, then you are not morally
responsible.
The same is true of everyone and therefore Jones is not morally
responsible for shooting Smith.