Non-cognitivism in religious
faith and language
Michael Lacewing
enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk
Non-cognitivism
‘The door is in the corner’ - true or false;
factual belief; can be known (cognition)
 A different kind of belief: ‘I believe in
love’ - expression of a value I hold, not
something I know (non-cognitive)
 Is religious language like the first or the
second?

Søren Kierkegaard


Religious faith is not a
philosophical system or set of
beliefs; it is held passionately.
To believe that God exists, but
to treat this as just another fact,
about which we feel nothing, is
not to have faith. Faith isn’t
(just) a matter of what, but of
how, we believe.
Objective uncertainty

The commitment that characterizes faith
requires a decision, a ‘leap’. This leap
requires objective uncertainty.
 Objective certainty will not have the same
impact on one’s life as faith in the face of
uncertainty - perhaps God prevents certainty
for this reason.
Is faith irrational?
Faith is ‘incomprehensible’, but it is not
irrational: we ‘cannot believe nonsense
against the understanding… because the
understanding will penetratingly perceive that
it is nonsense and hinder [us] in believing it’.
 Religious faith in its trust and commitment is
‘incomprehensible’ in that it lies outside the
limits that reason can reach for itself.

Is Kierkegaard a noncognitivist?
There are facts about God, but we
cannot know these facts using reason.
 Religious faith must involve an
emotional response.
 So religious language is expressive, not
merely fact-stating.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Language can be
compared to games

Quic kT ime™ and a
T IFF (Uncompres sed) decompres sor
are needed to s ee this picture.


Both are guided by rules
- what you can do, what
words mean
The meaning of words
lies in how they are used
Cp. ‘the peace of the
Lord passes
understanding; ‘the car
passes the house’
‘Language games’
Examples: asking, thanking, cursing,
praying, greeting
 A language game is the spoken aspect
of a ‘form of life’; a form of life is a whole
collection of cultural practices, but
Wittgenstein also emphasises its
biological basis

Religion
Religion involves many language
games, but not a whole form of life
 A distinctive part of a distinctively
human form of life; rooted in natural
human responses

Religious language

Religious language governed by quite
different rules, e.g. asking God and asking
your boss for prosperity
 ‘God exists’ - God is not a ‘thing’
 ‘a religious belief could only be something like
a passionate commitment to a system of
reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s
really a way of living, or a way of assessing
life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this
interpretation.” (Culture and Value 64)
 Religious language is not descriptive, but
expressive
Phillips: defending
Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein isolates religion from all rational
criticism

‘Religion has something to say about… birth, death,
joy, misery, despair, hope, fortune, and misfortune.’
If religion doesn’t help us make sense of these, we
are right to reject it.
However, religion cannot be criticised as ‘not
true’ - it does not make factual claims.
Religious language takes its meaning from
religious life.
 To think ‘God’ is the name of a thing or exists
independently of religion is a ‘monstrous
illusion’

Objection
Non-cognitivism is a reinterpretation of
religious belief and language, not an
analysis of it - religious believers think
‘God exists’ is a fact, likewise that they
will exist in heaven after death
 Religious language could have both
cognitive and non-cognitive aspects - it
can be both factual and expressive
