Leen De Vreese leen.devreese@ugent.be
Erik Weber erik.weber@ugent.be
Jeroen Van Bouwel jeroen.vanbouwel@ugent.be
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science
Ghent University
Belgium

EXPLANATION
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Findings concerning the traditional debate on explanation
Alternative: pragmatic approach
Example: Challenger
CAUSATION
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Findings concerning the traditional debate on causation
Alternative: pragmatic approach
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
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Pragmatic approach: a toolbox and its manual
Pragmatic approach: why and when?
Something else a pragmatist can do?

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Central aim: giving an explication.
Different attempts:
All scientists...
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that are engaged in trying to understand the world should construct DN-explanations (and not necessarily something more specific, such as D-N explanations citing causes). (Hempel)
... that are engaged in trying to understand the world should construct K-explanations. (Kitcher)
... (except maybe in QM) who have understanding as an aim should seek CM-explanations (nothing more, nothing less). (Salmon)

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Bold normative (or descriptive) claims about all scientific explanations.
No arguments that can proof the universality of a particular explication.
The act of explaining remains an elusive one that, to this day, resisted any attempt to capture it in a single, unified theory.
Not interesting, not useful, and not practicable to focus on the one and only single, unified approach.
The observation of the failure of monist approaches and the plurality of successful explanations in scientific practice leads us to pragmatism and consequently, to pluralism: a philosophical reconstruction of explanatory practices must start from – and work with – the different kinds of explanation that we can find in scientific practice.

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 Make context-dependent descriptive claims and argue for them.
 Describe the explanatory practice of scientists in a certain discipline or research tradition.
 Make context-dependent normative claims and argue for them.
 Defend or criticize how scientists explain in specific scientific contexts (within certain disciplines, within certain research traditions,…).
 Providing guidelines for improving explanatory practices of scientists.

 The skies were clear and the sun shone on the cold freezing morning of January
28, 1986. Kennedy space Center in Florida was busy preparing the launch of the 25th space shuttle into space. Mission 51-L, the 10th flight of Orbiter
Challenger. This was one of the most publicized launches because it was the first time that a civilian, a school teacher, was going into space. The launch of
Challenger had been delayed five times due to bad weather, January 28 was the coldest day that NASA had ever launched a shuttle. The time had come, at 11:38
AM Eastern Standard Time, Challenger left Pad 39B at Kennedy. Seventy three seconds into flight, the Orbiter Challenger exploded, killing all seven of its crew.
Challenger exploded 73 seconds after launch, but what actually happened at launch? What mechanically caused the explosion? (Mahal, 1995)
 Richard Feynman:
 What went wrong with the Challenger that made it explode?
 What went wrong in the policy of the NASA that made this possible to happen?

 Causal-mechanical explanation:
There are other changes with the forces being applied to the
SRBs. The tang and clevis joints change shape and therefore the gap opening becomes bigger, thus the O-rings have a bigger gap to seal. If the O-ring does not follow the gap opening then the seal fails. From the above information the cause for the explosion was the failure of the right SRB aft joint sealing, most likely due to the extremely cold temperature on the morning January 2, 1986. Out of the two SRBs that were used, the one that was in the extreme cold was the one that failed. O-rings when they are cold do not move as quickly as ones that are warm. Therefore if the O-rings were nearly frozen in place during ignition, the gases burnt the Orings and produced the black smoke. Challenger left the launch pad and headed for space. During flight the O-rings continued to not seal the joint, and the gases leaked through the aft field joint.
The flame grew larger and later blew Challenger up. (Mahal,
1995)

 Interventionist explanation:
The original, very careful safety criteria were gradually and subtly relaxed - often on the basis of what at first sight seemed logical arguments. Although technicians were often very well aware of the growing risks, superiors greatly minimized the risks that were taken. This can be further explained by the conscious desire to show the perfection and success of the NASA in order to be sure of future support from the government. Or the superiors might really not have been aware of what happened, which would show a big communication problem between shop floor workers and superiors. (Feynman, 1990)

 Descriptive conceptual analysis :
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A “correct definition” which “fits the facts”.
Internally contradictory.
Factual description leads almost inevitably to plural view.
We do not want to exclude a priori the possibility that someone finds a “perfect” monist description, but chances seem very low.
Such a description would not necessarily imply that it fits the way we actually reason towards causes, seems plausible that this differs in different cases.

 Revisionist conceptual analysis:
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Denies the plurality of uses in favour of one privileged approach.
Presupposes the necessity of a monistic approach.
Presupposes good reasons to justify a choice.
Problem of arbitrariness.
 None of both approaches appreciate the fact that pragmatic factors might make it useful to be able to reason about causes in different ways. Practical use of these concepts in scientific contexts.

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 Make context-dependent descriptive claims and argue for them.
 Describe the causal concepts of scientists in a certain discipline or research tradition.
 Make context-dependent normative claims and argue for them.
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Defend or criticize how scientists conceptualize causation in specific scientific contexts (within certain disciplines, within certain research traditions,…).
Providing guidelines for improving scientists’ views on causation.

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“Pragmatic” :
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 instrumentalist attitude towards traditional models of explanation/causation use traditional models as tools in a toolbox to make contextdependent descriptive or normative claims take epistemic interests into account

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Find the tool(s) which give us a good insight in how, e.g., an explanation / causal relation is actually conceived of in a certain case in (scientific) practice.
 Writing the manual that comes with the toolbox:
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 to give theoretical underpinnings for the choices (that should be) made: what kinds of tools fit what cases for what reasons?
to get a grip on why a certain approach is the most accurate and adequate to use in a certain context.
 It is the task of philosophers of science to develop and refine different alternative tools, such that different ways to conceive of causation and explanation become clear, and to shed a light on why specific conceptions are preferred / approved of / rejected / etc. in a specific context or situation.

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Differences with traditional approach:
 No presumption of monism.
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Comparative point of view.
Recognize its own partiality.
Finds its starting point in scientific practice.
Advantages :
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Achievable and useful aims.
Complement the philosophy of the special sciences.
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Forum for the exchange of ideas.
Keep the tools together and write the manual.
When?:
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A pragmatic approach is probably defendable for the study of any topic in philosophy of science that is inherently tied to the daily practice and goals of scientists in different domains, e.g. explanation, causation, understanding, function, …
Reasoning from specific scientific contexts seems much more useful than aiming for a single, unified approach when tackling such topics.

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Answer metaquestions.
Analyse the foundations for and implications of a pragmatic approach.
E.g.:
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 causal realism versus causal perspectivalism reduction the role of unification in different kinds of explanations