Whither Pragmatism in
Knowledge Organization?
Classical pragmatism vs.
Neopragmatism as KO Metatheories
Thomas M. Dousa
GSLIS, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
ISKO 2010
Rome, Italy
Pragmatism as a philosophical
position: Some basic Tenets
• Core Epistemological premise:
The meaning of a concept or the truth of a proposition is to be evaluated by considering the
“experiential or practical consequences of its
application” (Haack 2003, 774).
•Other basic features (cf. Jacob 2000):
* Fallibilism
* Contingency
* Social Embeddedness
* Pluralism
Classical Pragmatism and Neopragmatism
•Classical Pragmatism (hereafter, CP):
-- Primary Exponents:
* Charles Sanders Peirce (1839—1914)
* William James (1842—1910)
* John Dewey (1859—1952)
•Neopragmatism (hereafter, NP):
-- Primary Exponent:
*Richard Rorty (1933—2007)
CP and NP as KO metatheories:
Key questions
• How does NP differ from CP?
• Are the difference sufficient to make a
metatheoretical difference for KO?
• If so, is NP an advance over CP as a philosophical resource for KO?
CP and NP: Differences
According to Rorty (1999, 35 & 95), there are two
primary differences between CP and NP:
(1) CP’s epistemic point of departure = “Experience”
NP’s epistemic point of departure = “Language”
(2) CP: scientific method is a privileged form of inquiry.
NP: There is no privileged form of inquiry.
CP vs. NP: Epistemic point of
Departure for inquiry (I)
• CP:
-- Inquiry based on experience
* Purposeful interaction with the world
involving “pushes and pulls” as human
beings encounter, perceive, analyze,
manipulate, and test objects and ideas
to solve the problem to which inquiry is
addressed.
* Experience and inference therefrom provide epistemological warrant.
CP vs. NP: Epistemic point of
Departure for inquiry (II)
•NP:
Inquiry based on language:
* No prelinguistic referent by means of
which one can justify one’s conceptualization and belief.
* Epistemological warrant reposes entirely on intersubjective agreement.
CP vs. NP: Method of Inquiry (I)
•CP:
* Privileged method is “method of science”
or “experimental method”.
* This method involves:
hypothesis formation, manipulation of
objects, observation of responses,
deduction from observation, and
submission of results to one’s peers.
* Experimental method applicable, mutatis
mutandis, to all inquiries.
CP vs. NP: Method of Inquiry (II)
•NP:
* views inquiry not as a form of “experimental
method” but as a form of conversation.
* Emphasizes ethical norms of conversational reasonableness over epistemic norms.
* holds that “we should discard the metaphor
of inquiry, and human society generally, as
converging, rather than proliferating, becoming more unified rather than more
diverse
(Rorty 1987, 45).
Metatheoretical Consequences
of CP and NP (I)
•Do the metatheoretical differences between CP
and NP make a practical difference for KO
(meta)theory?
•With respect to KO design, …
NO
•With respect to KO research methodology …
NO
Metatheoretical Consequences
of CP and NP (II)
• There are cases where the differences between CP
and NP do have metatheoretical consequences …
e.g., CP, but not NP, accommodates Hjørland’s (1997) views
that
* scientific classifications should be based on the
“pure inquiry”, which constitutes “the pursuit of truth
for its own sake” (p. 83).
* “pragmatic realism” (pp. 81–82) is based on contributions from both the inquirer and the external world.
• … but may not have any practical import for the
resultant theory of KO design.
Metatheoretical Consequences
of CP and NP (III)
• The theoretical differences between CP and NP
may have consequences for KO’s self-conceptualization as a field.
* CP’s call for a general method of inquiry is likely
to lead to an integrative vision of KO.
* NP’s repudiation of any general method of inquiry
is likely to lead to a fragmented vision of KO.
• In this respect, CP may prove a more useful
metatheoretical option than NP.
References
•Haack, S. (2003). Pragmatism, in N. Bunnin & E. P. Tsui-James (eds.),
The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy (2nd. Ed.; pp. 774—789).
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
•Hjørland, B. (1997). Information seeking and subject represent
ation: an activity-theoretical approach to information science.
Westport: Greenwood Press, CT.
•Jacob, E. (2000). The legacy of pragmatism: implications for
knowledge organization in a pluralistic universe. In C. Beghtol,
L.C. Howarth, & N.J. Williamson (eds.), Dynamism and stability in
knowledge organization: Proceedings of the Sixth International
ISKO Conference, Toronto, Canada,10–13 July 2000 (pp. 16–22).
Würzburg: Ergon.
•Rorty, R. (1987). Science as solidarity. In J.S. Nelson, A. Megill, &
D.N. McCloskey (eds.), The rhetoric of the human sciences:
language and argument in scholarship and public affairs (pp.
38—52). Madison,WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
References
•Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and social hope. London/New
York: Penguin Books.