Rawls for
Dummies
1. What is Rawls’ political philosophy?
“Justice as Fairness”
“Political Liberalism”
2. Is such a political philosophy a suitable
foundation for a free society?
-- Three problems.
EARLY: “JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS”
 A Theory of Justice (1971)
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TRANSITIONAL
“Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”
(1980)
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LATE: “POLITICAL LIBERALISM”
 Political Liberalism (1996, 2005)
 The Law of Peoples (1999)
 Collected Papers (1999)
 Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001)
“Justice as Fairness” (1958 Essay)
Theory of Justice –
a mistaken development
of the basic ideas
Political Liberalism – a more
authentic development
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Seriousness of purpose. The earnestness and
single-mindedness of his thought. (A counter
weight to Marxians.)
Integration: His concern to develop and realize
several important intellectual traditions (social
contract, Kantian).
Rigor: His attempt (failed) to exploit developments
in theoretical economics.
Critique of utilitarianism.
Autonomy. A foundation for democracy and
morality which looks autonomous.
Progressive thought in an unalarming and highly
“institutionalized” form.
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“The fundamental idea in the concept of
justice is fairness.”
Two principles which give the content of
justice. (JUSTICE)
Agents fairly situated who would accept those
two principles. (FAIRNESS)
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The more ____ someone is, the better judge he is of
an ethical difficulty.
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E.g. Impartial, compassionate, informed.
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Therefore, the best judge of an ethical difficulty is
that which would be chosen by someone who was
ideally impartial, compassionate, informed, etc. (an
“Ideal Observer”).
The best principles for resolving ethical difficulties
would be those chosen by an Ideal Observer.
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Suppose a society of ideal observers associating
with one another –not simply “observing” but
“relating” to one another “as free and equal”.
What principles would they choose?
The only constraint is that they have to be
“principled” (Rawls: a “morality”)—that is, any
principle that one of them wished to adopt as now
binding on another, he has to accept as binding on
himself later, even if this was in conflict with his
perceived self-interest.
Rawls says that ideal “observers”/”agents” so
situated would choose the Principles of
Justice.
That they would shows that “justice is
fairness”.
 Maximal,
 Equal
equal liberty for all
opportunity for all
 Inequalities
benefit everyone
“First, each person participating in a practice,
or affected by it, has an equal right to the
most extensive liberty compatible with a like
liberty for all;
and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless
it is reasonable to expect that they will work
out for everyone's advantage, and provided
the positions and offices to which they attach,
or from which they may be gained, are open
to all.”
“Each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others.” (TJ)
“Each person has the same indefeasible claim
to a fully adequate scheme of basic equal
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the
same scheme of liberties for all.” (PL)
“Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and
(b) attached to positions and offices open to
all.” (TJ)
“Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy
two conditions: first, they are to be attached to
offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit
of the least-advantaged members of society
(the difference principle).” (PL)
“The principles of justice may, then, be
regarded as those principles which arise
when the constraints of having a morality are
imposed upon parties in the typical
circumstances of justice.”
“Arise” is vague. Do they follow by some kind
of argument or process of deliberation?
“So while justice does not require of anyone
that he sacrifice his interests in that general
position and procedure whereby the principles
of justice are proposed and acknowledged, it
may happen that in particular situations,
arising in the context of engaging in a practice,
the duty of fair play will often cross his
interests in the sense that he will be required
to forego particular advantages which the
peculiarities of his circumstances might permit
him to take.”
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This too is vague.
Exactly what is this “general position”, and
how does it differ from the “particular
positions” that each of us finds himself in?
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The “General Position” gets called the
“Original Position”
That the deliberators are both equally related
to one another, and that they are “principled”,
is insured by the “Veil of Ignorance”.
An argument is given connecting the Original
Position to the Principles of Justice.
1.
2.
3.
4.
The parties are ‘representatives’ of others
and exercise a fiduciary trust.
They lack envy.
Most importantly, they are placed under a
‘veil of ignorance’.
They ignorant of the social positions;
particular comprehensive doctrines; race;
ethnic group; sex; and natural endowments
of those they represent.
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We compose a list of candidate principles to
be used as a standard for criticizing society:
 utilitarianism;
 perfectionism;
 The two principles of justice.
These are presented two-by-two to the
parties in the Original Position.
Rawls in TJ thinks the parties in the Original
Position should use the “Maximin Principle”
in deciding among these candidates.
“\When choosing among alternatives, identify
the worst outcome of each, and then adopt
the alternative whose worst outcome is better
than the worst outcomes of any alternative.
e.g. 10, 5, 7, 8, 9, 9 is favored over
10, 9, 9, 9, 10, 3
1)
2)
3)
When no probabilities may realistically be
assigned to the various possible outcomes.
When the best-worst outcome is highly
satisfactory, so that little more would be
gained by risking the loss of this.
When the worst outcomes other than the
best-worst are very bad indeed.
1.
2.
3.
Because of the Veil of Ignorance,
probabilities cannot be meaningfully
assigned to possible outcomes.
The worst outcome (worst position) in a
society governed by the Two Principles of
Justice would be very satisfactory.
The worst outcome in societies governed by
utilitarianism or perfectionism is
catastrophically bad.
Suppose you have to choose a society in which
to live.
Since you don’t know what position you will
occupy, you have to take seriously that you
could end up anywhere.
Thus you would choose that society in which
the worst you could do would be satisfactory.
And you would avoid at all costs as society in
which the worst position was miserable.
“Justice as fairness”—“The fundamental idea in the
concept of justice is fairness.”
The two principles of justice are those which would
be affirmed for adjudicating disputes, by persons
who were fairly situated to one another.
Fairness= Treating others as you would wish to be
treated. Not “forcing” claims upon others. Not
taking advantage of a temporary or incidental
position of greater power.
Abiding by the two principles of justice just is
what it means to be fair.
Abiding by those principles captures what
fairness means.
Abiding by those principles expresses what it
means to treat others as equal persons.
 When stated in this way, no “argument” is
needed to connect fairness to (Rawlsian)
justice.
The “argument from the original position”.
Deliberators under a “veil of ignorance”, and
relying upon the “maximin” principle, would
not choose to enter into a society which
would permit subordination or slavery (First
Principle).
They wouldn’t choose to enter into a society
in which it was possible that some did not
benefit from some greater advantage enjoyed
by another. (Difference Principle)
Why?
This “wouldn’t be fair”.
The most important event in Jack’s
childhood were the loss of two younger
brothers, who died of diseases contracted
from Jack.
The first of these incidents occurred in 1928,
when Jack fell gravely ill. Although Bobby,
twenty-one months younger, had been
sternly told not to enter Jack’s room, he did
so anyway a few times to keep Jack
company.
Soon both children were lying in bed with
high fever.
Because the family physician initially misdiagnosed
the disease, much time passed until it was finally
discovered that both were suffering from
diphtheria. The correct diagnosis and antitoxin
came too late to save Bobby.
His death was a severe shock to Jack and may have
(as their mother thought) triggered his stammer,
which was a serious (though gradually receding)
handicap for him for the rest of his life.
Jack recovered from the diphtheria, but the
very next winter, while recovering from a
tonsillectomy, caught a severe pneumonia,
which soon infected his brother Tommy.
The tragedy of the previous year repeated
itself. While Jack was recovering slowly, his
little brother died in February 1929
“I have often wondered why my religious beliefs
changed, particularly during the war. I started
out as a believing orthodox Episcopalian
Christian, and abandoned it entirely by June of
1945….
“Three incidents stand out in my memory: Kilei
Ridge, Deacon’s death, hearing and thinking
about the Holocaust. …
“The second incident—Deacon’s death—occurred
in May, 1945, high up on the Villa Verde trail
on Luzon. Deacon was a splendid man; we
became friends and shared a tent at Regiment.”
“One day the First Sergeant came to us looking for
two volunteers, one to go with the Colonel to
where he could look at the Japanese positions, the
other to give blood badly needed for a wounded
soldier in the small field hospital nearby. We both
agreed and the outcome depended on who had the
right blood type. Since I did and Deacon didn’t, he
went with the Colonel.
“They must have been spotted by the Japanese,
because soon 150 mortar shells were falling in
their direction. They jumped into a foxhole and
were immediately killed when a mortar shell also
landed in it. I was quite disconsolate and couldn’t
get the incident out of my mind.”
“The third incident is really more than an incident as
it lasted over a long period of time….We went to
the Army movies shown in the evening and they
also had news reports of the Army information
service. It was, I believe, here that I first heard
about the Holocaust, as the very first reports of
American troops coming upon the concentration
camps were made known.”
“These incidents, and especially the third as it
became widely known, affected me in the
same way. This took the form of questioning
whether prayer was possible. How could I
pray and ask God to help me, or my family, or
my country, or any other cherished thing I
cared about, when God would not save
millions of Jews from Hitler?”
“When Lincoln interprets the [American] Civil
War as God’s punishment for the sin of
slavery, deserved equally by North and South,
God is seen as acting justly.
“But the Holocaust can’t be interpreted in that
way, and all attempts to do so that I have
read of are hideous and evil. To interpret
history as expressing God’s will, God’s will
must accord with the most basic ideas of
justice as we know them. For what else can
the most basic justice be? Thus, I soon came
to reject the idea of the supremacy of the
divine will as also hideous and evil.”
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Concerned with agreement among citizens on
principles of justice given radical differences
in religion and philosophy.
Two approaches to finding agreement:
◦ A shared minimum of truth: “something
we can all agree upon”, e.g. “The Deist
Minimum”
◦ Denial that truth is relevant to political
association at all: “it’s reciprocity rather
than truth which is important about our
mode of association”
Political Liberalism is conceived of as a
condition placed on political theories.
A political theory advances political
liberalism=
It endorses the use of the coercive power of
the state only as regards matters that all
reasonable and rational persons can agree to,
regardless of any great differences they may
have in religion and philosophy.
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“...our exercise of political power is fully
proper only when it is exercised in
accordance with a constitution the essentials
of which all citizens as free and equal may
reasonably be expected to endorse in the
light of principles and ideals acceptable to
their common human reason.”
A “comprehensive” doctrine is a doctrine
involving religion or philosophy.
Inevitably people will disagree, reasonably,
about “comprehensive doctrines” (the “fact of
legitimate pluralism”).
It would be unfair to coerce or to compel
someone to do something, on reasons which
make sense only given some comprehensive
doctrine which you hold but which that other
person (with good reason) does not accept.
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Thus (?), it would be unfair to coerce or to
compel someone to do something, on
reasons which make sense only given some
comprehensive doctrine, which someone
(sometime, somewhere) might with good
reason not also accept.
Thus, no appeal to any comprehensive
doctrine may be used as the basis for any
coercive measure in a liberal political society.
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The Principles of Justice can be agreed to by
all reasonable persons. (“No one can
reasonably reject them.”)
The Principles of Justice do not involve any
comprehensive doctrines but simply express
what it is to relate fairly to one another “as
free and equal persons”.
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“Overlapping Consensus”– different religious
and philosophical groups will justify the
Principles of Justice to themselves in different
ways (according to different “comprehensive
conceptions”).
The Principles of Justice are like “theorems”
which can be reached by any number of
different sets of “axioms”.
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“Public Reason” – In the public domain, no
interpretation of, or inference from, the
Principles of Justice is allowed, except what
all reasonable persons may agree to.
Citizens need to observe a distinction
between modes of reasoning about the
principles of justice that they accept
themselves, and modes which they may use
in discussions with other citizens, regarded
as citizens.
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Is it really possible to interpret and reason
about the Principles of Justice without thereby
accepting any “comprehensive doctrine”?
Isn’t belief in “original and equal liberty” a
“comprehensive doctrine” which some might
reasonably not accept?
[Rawls says some might not accept it, but then
they are not “liberal” and cannot participate in
liberal society.]
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Doesn’t conceptual analysis (e.g. “the
principles of justice simply express what it
means to relate to one another fairly”) imply
accepting some “comprehensive doctrine”
about meaning?
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Doesn’t the identification of some views as
“comprehensive doctrines” itself require a
comprehensive doctrine? (E.g. why don’t the
participants in the Original Position know that
God exists?)
Compare the Verificationist Principle: “Only
statements verified by empirical evidence
have meaning.” What about that statement?
Some of the most fundamental questions of
justice involve not how to treat persons as
free and equal, but who counts as a person
so treated.
These questions are not procedural but
substantive.
There was a scholar of the law who stood up to test
him and said, "Teacher, what must I do to inherit
eternal life?“
Jesus said to him, "What is written in the law? How do
you read it?“
He said in reply, "You shall love the Lord, your God,
with all your heart, with all your being, with all your
strength, and with all your mind, and your
neighbor as yourself.“
He replied to him, "You have answered correctly; do
this and you will live."
But because he wished to justify himself, he said to
Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?“ Luke, chapter 10
I say to you, love your enemies, and pray for those who
persecute you, that you may be children of your
heavenly Father, for he makes his sun rise on the bad
and the good, and causes rain to fall on the just and
the unjust.
For if you love those who love you, what recompense will
you have? Do not the tax collectors do the same?
And if you greet your brothers only, what is unusual
about that? Do not the pagans do the same?
So be perfect, just as your heavenly Father is perfect.
Matthew, ch. 5
∀x∀(R(x,y)→R(y,x))
“Everything which bears R to something is
borne R back by that thing.”
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An important class of disputes about justice
and injustice, is when two parties disagree as
to whether some third party is to be treated
as an equal person or not.
This is not immediately an issue of
appropriate reciprocity.
Or, perhaps, one side takes it to be so, the
other not, because the one side understands
actions involving the disputed third party as
pertaining to himself. (“Identification”)
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Two German citizens in the Weimar Republic
arguing over whether a Jewish man is to be
treated as an equal person or not.
A resident of a slave-state in the US and a
resident of a free state in the US arguing in
1855 over whether a fugitive slave is to be
treated as an equal person or not.
Two persons today arguing over whether an
unborn child is to be treated as an equal
person or not.
An animal rights activist and an ordinary
citizen today arguing over whether a dolphin is
to be treated as an equal person or not.
Civil strife: a condition in which a single society
acts as though it is two societies with
essentially opposing interests.
When a society is divided over the subjects of
justice, it is ipso facto placed in a condition
of at least latent civil strife.
Thus, the resolution of such disputes is crucial
for the long-term unity and stability of a
society.
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A satisfactory theory of justice must have the
capacity to settle such disputes (once and for
all, if possible)—or else be supplemented in
such a way that it can.
Justice as Fairness seems incompetent to
settle such disputes.
Thus, Justice as Fairness (without appropriate
supplementation) seems not to be a
satisfactory theory of justice.
Every human being is to be conceived of as a
free and equal person.
A society that adopted such a principle would
be able to resolve disputes over the subjects
of justice (apparently once and for all).
(strong) Would a political society regulated by
Justice as Fairness be obliged to adopt this
principle?
(weak) Would such a society even be permitted
to adopt this principle?
Prima facie it would be obliged to adopt the
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principle. Why?
Each member of society would be engaged in
a “practice” in which he applies Original
Position type reasoning to every human
being.
Simply add to the society’s accepted “scheme
of basic liberties” the proviso that these apply
to every human being.
Preamble
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world,
…
Article 1.
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in
a spirit of brotherhood
1.
2.
Such a proviso imports a “comprehensive
conception”—which Justice as Fairness does
not allow.
Such a proviso implies a concern to get it
right—but this goes beyond the
conventionalism of Justice as Fairness.
On its face it does:
“All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
These are all disputable philosophical or
religious notions.
Historically, all such provisos have been
motivated by religious or philosophical
considerations.
Religious:
Then God said: "Let us make man in our image, after
our likeness. Let them have dominion over the fish of
the sea, the birds of the air, and the cattle, and over
all the wild animals and all the creatures that crawl on
the ground.” God created man in his image; in the
divine image he created him; male and female he
created them.
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“For men being all the workmanship of one
omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into
the world by his order, and about his
business; they are his property, whose
workmanship they are, made to last during
his, not one another's pleasure.”
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“and being furnished with like faculties,
sharing all in one community of nature, there
cannot be supposed any such subordination
among us, that may authorize us to destroy
one another, as if we were made for one
another's uses, as the inferior ranks of
creatures are for ours.”
The proviso wishes to match practice to
underlying reality:
These beings deserve to be treated thus;
therefore, we should by law bind ourselves to
treating them thus.
To that extent, it acknowledges a priority of
natural over conventional justice. (Phusis over
nomos.)
Conventional justice. Antecedent to human
choice (decision, resolve, or intention), no
considerations of justice exist. Justice is
consequent to a choice to regard something as
just.
Natural justice. Human choice (decision, resolve,
or intention) is just or not, depending upon
whether it corresponds appropriately to some
prior reality. Justice is prior to the choice to
regard something as just.
The denial of the reality, or relevance, of
natural justice.
The view that all considerations of justice
depend upon some prior human choice,
decision, resolve, or intention.
Rawls concern is: ‘practices’ already engaged
in. But:
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Considerations of justice within a practice are
matters of conventional justice.
Considerations of justice involving the
critique of a practice are matters of
conventional justice. (Obvious.)
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A ‘practice’: structured form of cooperation
constituted by rules.
Because it is constituted by rules, no actions
of that practice are even possible outside the
practice.
Because the actions of a practice do not exist
apart from the rules, those actions may be
evaluated only with respect to those rules (or
higher order rules, already implicit in the
following of those rules).
“Our conduct toward animals is not regulated
by [the two principles of justice], or so it is
generally believed. On what grounds then do
we distinguish between mankind and other
living things and regard the constraints of
justice as holding only in our relations to
human persons? We must examine what
determines the range of application of
conceptions of justice. “
“That moral personality suffices to make one a
subject of claims is the essential thing. We
cannot go far wrong in supposing that the
sufficient condition is always satisfied [for
any human being]. Even if the capacity were
necessary, it would be unwise in practice to
withhold justice on this ground. The risk to
just institutions would be too great.”
“A being that has this capacity, whether or not
it is yet developed, is to receive the full
protection of the principles of justice.”
“Since infants and children are thought to have
basic rights (normally exercised on their
behalf by parents and guardians), this
interpretation of the requisite conditions
seems necessary to match our considered
judgments”.
“...for a Kantian these facts may appear to pose
a problem: [Kantianism] relies on a more
comprehensive pattern of identities and its
ideal of the person encourages stronger and
longer-lasting continuities [among separable
psychological experiences]. Thus we are led to
ask whether the conclusions of the philosophy
of mind and the shifting and sometimes shortterm character of mental connections favor the
classical utilitarian theory.”
“... the actual continuities and sense of purpose
in people’s lives is relative to the socially
achieved moral conception.
“Thus the essential point is whether the wellordered society corresponding to a moral
conception generates in its members the
necessary continuities and sense of purpose to
maintain itself. We also have to take into
account whether it is sufficiently stable, and
the like. But a utilitarian view would be
supported by the general possibility of
discontinuities only if social theory showed that
in the case of other conceptions the requisite
connectedness could never be brought about.”
Society as a fair system of cooperation over
time among persons conceived of as free and
equal.
This is not a matter of ‘getting it right’ (natural
justice).
Rawls simply provides an interpretation of our
practices towards those whom we regard as
free and equal.
He does not say which beings we should so
regard.
Justice as Fairness includes no considerations
of justice besides conventional justice.
The Principle of Inclusive Humanism, if it is
endorsed at all, is endorsed as a
consideration of natural justice.
Furthermore, the Principle of Inclusive
Humanism depends upon “comprehensive
doctrines”.
Thus, Justice as Fairness excludes the public
endorsement (that is, by political society) of
the Principle of Inclusive Humanism.