Towards Taming PrivilegeEscalation Attacks on Android
S. Bugiel, L. Davi, A. Dmitrienko, T. Fischer, A.-R. Sadeghi, and B. Shastry
in 19th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2012).
[Online Available]
Yoonyong Shin
yshi091
4889476
Summary
 Problem: Confused deputy attack and Collusion attack in Android.
4/13/2015
By Yoonyong Shin
2
Summary
 Problem: Confused deputy attack and Collusion attack in Android.
 Aim: Create a practical security framework that can defend against both Confused
deputy attack and Collusion attack.
4/13/2015
By Yoonyong Shin
3
Summary
 Problem: Confused deputy attack and Collusion attack in Android.
 Aim: Create a practical security framework that can defend against both Confused
deputy attack and Collusion attack.
 Method: Heuristic analysis of Android’s system behavior.
4/13/2015
By Yoonyong Shin
4
Summary
 Problem: Confused deputy attack and Collusion attack in Android.
 Aim: Create a practical security framework that can defend against both Confused
deputy attack and Collusion attack.
 Method: Heuristic analysis of Android’s system behavior.
 Solution: System-centric, Policy-driven and runtime Monitoring security framework.
4/13/2015
By Yoonyong Shin
5
Summary
 Problem: Confused deputy attack and Collusion attack in Android.
 Aim: Create a practical security framework that can defend against both Confused
deputy attack and Collusion attack.
 Method: Heuristic analysis of Android’s system behavior.
 Solution: System-centric, Policy-driven and runtime Monitoring security framework.
 Remedy: Different types of profile. ( Default < Basic < Advanced < Strong)
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By Yoonyong Shin
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Good
“…framework which can capture all variations of application-level privilege
attacks, as opposite to previous works targeting attack subclasses.”
by Sven Bugiel et al.
Contribution to the Android security field
4/13/2015
By Yoonyong Shin
7
Good
“…framework which can capture all variations of application-level privilege
attacks, as opposite to previous works targeting attack subclasses.”
by Sven Bugiel et al.
Contribution to the Android security field
 Broad problem domain. (Linux Inter Process Communication, File System,
Unix Domain, Internet Sockets and Inter Component Communication)
4/13/2015
By Yoonyong Shin
8
Good
“…framework which can capture all variations of application-level privilege
attacks, as opposite to previous works targeting attack subclasses.”
by Sven Bugiel et al.
Contribution to the Android security field
 Broad problem domain. (Linux Inter Process Communication, File System,
Unix Domain, Internet Sockets and Inter Component Communication)
 Persistent and Motivation for Android security development. (Detail plan of
future works. E.g., extensive user tests, more application test, binder level
ICC call-chain verification and SELinux integration)
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By Yoonyong Shin
9
Bad
“Our evaluation results show that our framework is efficient, effective and
usable.”
by Sven Bugiel et al.
Effectiveness and Usability
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By Yoonyong Shin
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Bad
“Our evaluation results show that our framework is efficient, effective and
usable.”
by Sven Bugiel et al.
Effectiveness and Usability
 50 popular applications representing 600,000 Android applications.
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By Yoonyong Shin
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Bad
“Our evaluation results show that our framework is efficient, effective and
usable.”
by Sven Bugiel et al.
Effectiveness and Usability
 50 popular applications representing 600,000 Android applications.
– More number of permissions combination is required.
4/13/2015
By Yoonyong Shin
12
Bad
“Our evaluation results show that our framework is efficient, effective and
usable.”
by Sven Bugiel et al.
Effectiveness and Usability
 50 popular applications representing 600,000 Android applications.
– More number of permissions combination is required.
Consequence: incompatibility to legacy application
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Bad (Cont.)
Usability
 System-centric framework on Android 2.2.1 (Froyo) require update every now
and then. (Most updated version is 4.1.X Jelly Bean)
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By Yoonyong Shin
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Question
Within Smartphone features we discussed
so far, How much would you restrict usability
over better security?
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