Product Design and Product Bundling:
Evolving Monopolization Standards in the
U.S. Courts
Mark S. Popofsky, Co-Head, Antitrust Practice Group
April 2010
ROPES & GRAY LLP
Introduction
• Monopolization law in the United States is in flux.
Outside of certain discrete areas, the applicable legal
tests are literally “up for grabs.”
• One source of instability is the quite different tone struck
by the seminal Microsoft decision, on the one hand, and
the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in
Trinko, linkLine, and Twombly on the other.
• Today, I will explicate this tension and demonstrate how
it plays out in two areas of monopolization law:
– Bundled Discounts.
– Product Design.
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Background: The Microsoft Revolution
• U.S. courts decided relatively few monopolization cases
in the U.S. courts in the years leading up to United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (per curiam).
– Many cases involved conduct that presented “easy” judgments.
For example:
– Courts held above-cost pricing per se legal.
 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209 (1993) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury
resulting from a rival’s low prices must prove that the prices
complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival’s
costs.”).
 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir.
1983) (refusing to condemn above-cost pricing even when such
pricing has no purpose except to exclude rivals and raise prices).
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Background: The Microsoft Revolution
– Courts condemned termination of dealings with rivals only when
unprofitable in the short term and lacking any justification.
• Compare Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585 (1985) (sustaining liability under Section 2 when
monopolist discontinued joint marketing program with rival without
legitimate business justification) with
• Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Section 2 liability rejected when monopolist pointed to
legitimate reasons for ceasing to sell rival’s product).
– Courts permitted new product introductions that created options
for consumers.
• Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979) (holding, among other things, that company did not
contravene Sherman Act merely by simultaneously introducing new
film and new camera).
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Background: The Microsoft Revolution
– These decisions, broadly, led to a view in the U.S. antitrust
community that Section 2 only condemned conduct that lacked
any legitimate justification.
– Put differently, these decisions generally led to a view that if a
monopolist’s unilateral conduct
• (i) enhanced its own output, and
• (ii) would have been taken even absent market power, then
• (iii) the conduct was per se legal.
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Background: The Microsoft Revolution
– United States v. Microsoft Corp. changed all that.
• Microsoft held that monopolization analysis involves “balancing”
pro- and anticompetitive effects. See 253 F.3d at 58-59. Thus,
under Microsoft, a monopolist cannot avoid liability merely because
its conduct improved its own product and the improvement would
have been undertaken even if the defendant lacked monopoly
power.
• Notably, the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft condemned certain “product
design” decisions (comingling browser code with operating system
code; removing Internet Explorer from the “Add/Remove Programs”
function). See 253 F.3d at 67.
• And, just as notably, the court held that Microsoft’s intellectual
property was not an absolute defense to the monopolization charge.
See 253 F.3d at 63.
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Background: The Trinko Counter-Revolution
– Since Microsoft, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a number of
opinions that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to sustain viable
antitrust claims in the U.S. federal courts.
• Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398 (2004), held that it was not unlawful monopolization to
refuse to deal with a rival even when a regulatory framework
compelled such dealing.
• Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), held that
antitrust plaintiffs must plead facts in their complaint that plausibly
suggest liability, rejecting the Supreme Court’s prior statement that a
complaint suffices “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.”
• Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, 129 S. Ct.
1109 (2009), held that a company that has no antitrust duty to deal
with rivals at the wholesale level, and sells its product above-cost at
retail, cannot be liable to its rivals for “price-squeeze.”
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Background: The Trinko Counter-Revolution
• The impetus for the Supreme Court’s recent antitrust activism
does not lie principally in concerns rooted with the substance
of antitrust law, but rather with the coercive impact of U.S.
private treble damages actions.
– The Court made clear in Twombly that rigorous pleading
standards are necessary to prevent antitrust plaintiffs from
coercing settlements from innocent firms that fear the
extraordinary expenses associated with discovery. See 550 U.S.
at 558-59.
– The Court expressed similar concerns in Trinko. See 540 U.S. at
414 (noting the danger that mistaken condemnation of
legitimate, competitive conduct may “chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect”).
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Background: The Trinko Counter-Revolution
• But the message of the Trinko trilogy is that narrowing substantive
antitrust laws is one solution to the problem.
– For instance, linkLine narrowed substantive antitrust law by
refusing to endorse a new, “price-squeeze” theory of liability.
129 S. Ct. at 1122.
• Narrowing substantive law, of course, is not the only response to
what is perceived as an excess of private treble damages class
actions.
– Twombly effectively raised pleading standards (and expressly
acknowledged that tightening pleading standards would reduce
plaintiffs’ leverage over defendants in hold-up suits).
– U.S. courts have tightened the standards for class certification. See,
e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir.
2008) (holding that trial courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to
ensure that the Rule 23 requirements for a class action are met,
including resolving any relevant legal or factual disputes).
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Implications?
• Yet, in solving the antitrust class action problem through narrowing
substantive antitrust law, the Trinko trilogy creates a potential
“spillover” issue:
– Is “narrowing” substantive antitrust law desirable if the problem with treble
damage class actions can be solved other ways?
– What are the implications of the Trinko trilogy where substantive antitrust
doctrine is unsettled?
• As courts address these questions, they confront the very different
messages sent by Microsoft on the one hand and the Supreme
Court on the other:
– Microsoft: balance pro- and anticompetitive effects to determine whether conduct
is unlawful.
– Trinko: Section 2 does not give courts “carte blanche” to force businesses to
operate differently merely because an alternative course might create more
competition.
• Two areas involving U.S. monopolization law – bundled discounts
and product design – illustrate how U.S. courts are reacting to these
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mixed messages.
Bundled Discounts
• What is a bundled discount?
– Most simple form: a seller offers a discount on Product A only if the customer
purchases a certain quantity of Product B.
– An example: a tape manufacturer might give a $10 million year-end discount on
tape if customers increase their purchases of other products by 10% over the
prior year’s purchases.
• What are the antitrust concerns? Roughly, there are two opposing
views in the U.S.:
– Benign unless predatory:
• Bundled discounts are a form of price competition.
• Thus, this point of view runs, bundled discounts ought not be condemned
unless “predatory” – i.e., unless the discounts result in products being sold
at prices below cost where the seller can recoup its investment in below-cost
prices.
– Potentially exclusionary cost-raising conduct:
• Bundled discounts can disadvantage single-product rivals.
• Under this paradigm, it is argued, bundled discounts ought to be subjected
to Rule of Reason “balancing” of effects.
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Bundled Discounts
• These two views find expression in a circuit split in the American
federal courts.
• LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc):
– Strongly influenced by Microsoft, one court of appeals
condemned a bundled discount and expressly rejected the
argument that such arrangements are legal unless predatory.
– However, the court did not articulate a clear test. The court
appeared to impose liability because (i) a monopolist weakened
a rival; and (ii) without legitimate justification.
– LePage’s created significant backlash. The presidentiallyappointed Antiturst Modernization Commission (“AMC”) strongly
disagreed with LePage’s, and suggested a cost-based screen.
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Bundled Discounts
• Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir.
2008):
– Another court of appeals parted ways with LePage’s and largely
adopted the AMC-suggested predatory pricing approach.
– Cascade applied a modified predatory pricing test: is the
“competitive” product (i.e., the product that a hypothetical
competitor also sells) in the package sold below cost, taking into
account any “discount” on other products. This is called the
attribution test.
– This standard is designed to make the defendant’s bundled
discounts legal unless the discounts “have the potential to
exclude a hypothetical equally efficient producer of the
competitive product.” 515 F.3d at 906 (emphasis omitted).
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Bundled Discounts
• For example:
– Suppose a defendant sells its products, M and C (with C as the
“competitive” product), for $5 each on a stand-alone basis.
– Further suppose C costs $4 to produce.
– And suppose the seller offers M and C together for $8.
– Under the attribution test, there is a $2 implied discount for taking C
from the defendant, making the sale below cost:
• The incremental revenue from C is $3 (if M were sold alone,
revenue would be $5; and revenue from the package is $8).
• The incremental cost of C is $4.
– Such bundles can be anticompetitive under certain conditions, the
theory goes, because a hypothetical competitor that produced C just as
efficiently (at a cost of $4), but did not produce M, could be excluded.
– As a practical matter, it is hard to demonstrate below-cost pricing under
this test, and thus hard to demonstrate that a bundled discount is
anticompetitive, particularly for a high-fixed cost, low variable-cost
industry.
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Bundled Discounts
• Although addressed by a few district courts since, the
Cascade approach appears to be prevailing over that of
LePage’s; and the reason may reflect, in part, the
influence of the Trinko trilogy.
– Indeed, the same court that decided Cascade (the 9th Circuit)
recently applied linkLine to hold conduct that effectively took the
form of a bundled discount, but was challenged as unlawful
“monopoly leveraging,” lawful.
– See John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2009)
(company that offered a standalone product to its competitors at
a high price, while selling a combination of that product and
another product at a low price, did not violate Section 2 absent
allegations of below-cost pricing).
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Bundled Discounts
• Nonetheless, it is unclear how the conflict ultimately will
be resolved, particularly with a new administration that is
committed to litigating these issues.
– The FTC’s suit against Intel, In re Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C.
filed Dec. 16, 2009), challenges bundled and market share
discounts under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
– The Intel case will be tried before an ALJ in the Fall of 2010; it
will eventually be reviewed by a federal court of appeals.
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Bundled Discounts
• European Union law has undergone a parallel
development.
– EU Courts held that discounts designed to induce loyalty to the
monopolist required efficiency justification. See, e.g., Case T-203/01,
Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n, 2003
E.C.R. II-4071 (Ct. First Instance) (condemning loyalty-inducing rebates
to dealers based on sales targets); Case C-95/04, British Airways plc v.
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331 (Ct. Justice) (condemning airline’s loyaltyinducing reward system for travel agents).
– Recently, however, the European Commission adopted an approach
that focuses on whether a discount can exclude an equally-efficient
rival. See European Comm’n, Guidance on the Commission’s
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, COM (2009) 864 final
¶ 59 (Feb. 9, 2009) (multi-product rebates are likely illegal if they are “so
large that equally efficient competitors offering only some of the
components cannot compete against the discounted bundle”).
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Bundled Discounts
• European Union law has undergone a parallel
development (con’t):
– In the Intel matter, the Commission both applied the quasi-per se
rule of the case law and concluded that Intel’s loyalty discounts
were anticompetitive because they could exclude an equally
efficient rival. Case COMP/C/3-37990, Intel (May 13, 2009)
(Intel’s market-share rebate scheme condemned because an
equally-efficient rival would need to offer its product below
average avoidable costs to compete for contestable units and
because Intel evidenced no justification).
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Product Design
• Product design is yet another area where Microsoft and the themes
expressed by the Trinko trilogy lead courts in opposite directions.
– Some courts appear to apply a balancing test (as suggested by
Microsoft) in assessing “product design” decisions – for instance,
Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
• Abbott introduced a new formulation of a drug while simultaneously
withdrawing the existing formulation.
• Abbott, the court found, thereby impeded generic rivals, whose
medication only could be prescribed if identical to the marketed
branded drug.
• The court upheld the plaintiff’s complaint challenging the conduct as
unlawful monopolization and articulated a test of balancing pro- and
anticompetitive effects. 432 F. Supp. 2d at 422-23.
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Product Design
– Other courts apply a more lenient approach:
• Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group
LP, 592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010).
– Allied Orthopedic involved an antitrust challenge to
redesign of pulse oximetry monitors and sensors.
– The new monitors no longer worked with existing
sensors, including generic sensors.
– The new monitor/sensor system produced benefits while
lowering transition costs by enabling use of existing
monitors with new sensors.
– The Ninth Circuit held the conduct was lawful, without
balancing its pro- and anticompetitive effects.
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Product Design
– Like other courts, however, Allied Orthopedic recognized that a
monopolist’s discontinuation of old technology could violate
Section 2 if it “effectively forces consumers to adopt its new
technology.” 592 F.3d at 1002.
• Berkey Photo had previously suggested that a monopolist’s
withdrawal of an old product when introducing a new one
could be an anticompetitive use of monopoly power. 603
F.3d at 287 n.39.
• Indeed, Walgreens Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals L.P.,
which rejected a challenge to a new product introduction,
suggested that cases such as Microsoft and Abbott
concerned the elimination of consumer choice. 534 F. Supp.
2d 146, 151 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Product Design
• A number of high-profile product design cases are currently in
litigation in the U.S. courts, where we can expect to see the debate
between these approaches play out:
– In re Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. filed Dec. 16, 2009) (FTC
alleges that Intel unlawfully reduced the interoperability of its
interfaces so as to harm its rivals).
– Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV 09-5535 (N.D.
Cal. filed Nov. 20, 2009) (alleging that Microsoft deployed a
software update to Xbox 360 so as to disable a rival’s memory
cards).
– In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., No. C-05-00037 (N.D.
Cal. filed Jan 26, 2010) (alleging that Apple software unlawfully
creates incompatibility between iTunes and non-Apple MP3
players and unlawfully advantages iTunes in connecting with
iPods).
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Product Design
• The Commission’s Microsoft decision demonstrates that
distribution strategies that also could be labeled productdesign decisions are not immune from scrutiny under
European Community law.
– See Case T-201/4, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II3601 (Ct. First Instance).
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(202) 508-4624
Mark.Popofsky@ropesgray.com
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