Regimes: Non democratic,
Presidential, and Parliamentary
Democracies and non democratic regimes



Rousseau and the general interest ( against
Arrow theorem results)
Schumpeter: “The democratic method is that
institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power
to decide by means of competitive struggle for
the people’s vote”.
Downs , Sartori and the effects of the
competition
Democracies and non democratic regimes

Dahl (5 requirements for Democracy) :
1.
Effective participation: Before a policy is adopted by the
association, all he members must have equal and effective
opportunities for making their views known to the other
members as to what the policy should be
Equality in voting:When the moment arrives at which the
decision about policy will finally be made, every member must
have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and all votes
must be counted as equal
Gaining enlightened understanding: Within reasonable
limits as to time, each member must have equal and effective
opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies
and their likely consequences
Exercising control over the agenda: The members must
have the exclusive opportunity to decide how and, if they
choose, what matter are to be placed on the agenda
Inclusion of adults:
All, or at any rate most, adult
permanent residents should have the full rights of citizens that
are implied by the first four criteria
2.
3.
4.
5.
Democracies and non democratic
regimes

Przeworski and the democratic stability: even
if losers and winners were not determined by a
competition but by a lottery, under certain
conditions the losers in an “election” may prefer
to wait until the next round rather than to revolt
against the system .
Presidentialim and Parliamentarism
Stepan & Skach:

A pure parliamentary regime in a democracy is a system
of mutual dependence:
1.
The chief executive power must be supported by a majority
in the legislature and can fall if it receives a vote of no
confidence.
2.
The executive power (normally in conjunction with the
head of state) has the capacity to dissolve the legislature
and call for elections.

A pure presidential regime in a democracy is a system of
mutual independence:
1.
The legislative power has a fixed electoral mandate that is
its own source of legitimacy.
2.
The chief executive power has a fixed electoral mandate
that is its own source of legitimacy.
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and
democratic stability

1.
2.
Linz: “while parliamentarism imparts flexibility to the political
process, Presidentialism makes it rather rigid”
In the Parliamentarisms once elections are held either there is a
majority party that forms the government, or the different parties
enter into negotiations about government formation. The result of
these negotiations is a government that is supported by
parliament and anytime this support is undermined or
challenged, a confidence vote resolves the issue.
In presidential systems however, there is no mechanism for the
resolution of conflicts between the executive and the legislative
““Replacing a president who has lost the confidence of his party
or the people is an extremely difficult proposition. Even when
polarization has intensified to the point of violence and illegality, a
stubborn incumbent may remain in office. By the time the
cumbersome mechanisms provided to dislodge him in favor of a
more able and conciliatory successor have done their work, it
may be too late.”
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism ,democratic
stability and other features



Shugart & Carey: “strong presidential powers (both legislative
and non-legislative) are more likely to lead to
breakdown”.Regimes with legislatively strong presidents have
one additional veto player, so policy stability increases. As a
result of increased policy stability the regime may be unable to
provide policy changes when needed, which may lead to
breakdown.
Strom:“parliamentary regimes may be better equipped to deal
with problems of adverse selection… at the expense of another
[problem], moral hazard”
Diermeier & Federsen :”it is the confidence relationship, the
threat of being voted out of office and losing agenda setting
powers that makes parties more cohesive in parliamentary than
in presidential systems; in fact interparty cohesion in
parliamentary systems should be greater than intra party
cohesion in presidential systems.”
The Veto players Angle

1.
2.
3.
4.

In order to understand the differences not only between
democratic and non-democratic regimes, but also between
presidentialism and parliamentarism, one has to focus on the
process of law production:
-How are veto players selected?
-Who are the veto players? (who needs to agree for a change of
the status quo)?
-Who controls the legislative agenda? (who makes proposals to
whom and under what rules)?
-If these players are collective, under what rules does each one
of them decide (simple majority, qualified majority, or unanimity)?
Democratic and non democratic regimes: What distinguishes
democratic fron nondemocratic regimes is whether the veto
players are decided by competition between elites for vote or by
some other process, and there is no necessary distinction in
terms of representation or in terms of the actual number of veto
players.
Who are the veto players:


Institutional veto players: individual or collective veto players
who are specified by the constitution. The number of these veto
players is expected to be constant but their properties may
change. For example, they may be transformed from collective to
individual (if one institution, deciding by simple majority, is
controlled by a disciplined party) and vice versa. Also, their
ideological distances may vary, and one or more of them may be
absorbed.
Partisan veto players: the veto players who are generated
inside institutional veto players by the political game. For
example, the replacement of a single party majority by a two
party majority inside any institutional veto player transforms the
situation from a single partisan veto player to two partisan veto
players. Both the number and the properties of partisan veto
players change over time. Parties may lose majorities, they may
split, and they may merge and such transformations may have an
effect on the number of partisan veto players.
Who are the veto players:

Institutional veto players: examples




Eduskunta
Bundestag e Bundesrat
Camera e Senato
House of Representatives, Senate, President
State
Lower Chamber
Upper Chamber
Bicameralism (Lijphart, 1999)
Austria
Nationalrat
Bundesrat
2,0
Belgium
Chambre des Représentants
Sénat
3,0
Denmark
Folketinget
1,0
Finland
Eduskunta
1,0
France
Assemblée nationale
Sénat
3,0
Germany
Bundestag
Bundesrat
4,0
Greece
Vouli Ton Ellinon
1,0
Iceland
Althingi
1,0
Ireland
Dáil Éireann
Senate
2,0
Italy
Camera
Senato
3,0
Luxembourg
Chambre des Députés
Netherlands
Tweede Kamer
Norway
Stortinget
1,5
Portugal
Assembleia da Republica
1,0
Spain
Congreso
Sweden
Riksdagen
Switzerland
Nationalrat
Ständerat
4,0
UK
House of Commons
House of Lords
2,5
after 1953
after 1991
1,0
Eerste Kamer
Senado
3,0
3,0
1,0
after 1970
Five party parliament in a unicameral
parliamentary system. According to the
constitution, legislation is enacted when a
majority of this parliament agrees to
replace the status
quo. Assume that the five parties are
cohesive and that any three of
them control a majority. The situation
specified by the constitution is a single
institutional collective veto player.
The status quo SQ we can identify the
(majority) wincircle. This is the lightly
shaded circular area in the figure. We can
also identify the exact set of points
that defeat SQ (the darker shaded area
W(SQ)).
Now consider that not all coalitions are
possible but that three of the parties A, B,
and C form a government. This alliance
makes sure that none of them enters into
coalitions with parties D or E.
This additional information alters the
number of partisan veto players as well as
the expectations of the feasible solutions.
The only points that can defeat SQ are
located in the deeply shaded lens.
Therefore, the new information
transformed the analysis of the political
system from one collective veto player
to three individual ones and reduced
the winset of the status quo.
Steps to analyze specific political situations



1) we locate institutional veto players in a
multidimensional space.
2) we proceed to disaggregate them into the partisan
players they are composed of in order to identify the
individual or collective veto players inside each one
of them.
3) we apply the absorption rules to this system: if
some of the veto players are located in the unanimity
core of the others, we can eliminate them because
they do not restrict the winset of the status quo.
A new (not influential) veto player
Since D is
inside the core
of A,B e C, the
core does not
increase, and
the winset does
not reduce
B
A
D
E
C
Same for E
SQ
These veto players are absorbed
15
Number and nature of the vetoplayers
depend on :
The constitutions

the political circumstances

the kind of law making under observation
Examples
1. U.S. law making process
2. German Bundesrat role
3. French laws and French government
decrees

Who controls the legislative agenda?


1.
2.

1.
2.
With respect to financial bills, the initiative belongs to the executive in
both presidential and parliamentary systems.
With respect to non financial bills however, as a general rule:
In parliamentary systems the government makes a proposal to
parliament to accept or reject.
In presidential systems, parliament makes a proposal to the
executive to accept or veto.
the roles of agenda setting are reversed in the two systems. The
names used for each one of these systems do not reflect the legislative
reality: one expects presidents to be powerful in presidential systems,
and parliaments in parliamentary. However:
if parliament is strong in parliamentary systems it is not because of
legislation; it is because it can withdraw its support from the
government and replace it.
If the president is strong in presidential systems it is not because of his
power to legislate, but because of executive decrees and the power to
make decisions on foreign policy and other matters.
Who controls the legislative agenda?
If the Government moves
first GP as final outcome.
If the Parliament moves
first then PG as final
outcome.
SQ
GP
G
PG
P
Who controls the legislative agenda?
However the power of
agenda setter does not
nullify the role of other
veto players…
SQ
G1
PG
GP
G
PG1
P
Wincircle
Radius= d+2r
winset
yolk
wincircle
Cohesion of collective veto players
Radius r of the yolk indicates the level of
cohesion of the collective veto player – i.e.
how much the majority is represented by the
point Y
As the wincircle grows with r :
Conjecture : Policy stability increases as the
m-cohesion of a collective veto player
increases (as the radius of the yolk decreases)
Veto Players cohesion in Presidentialism
and Parliamentarism
1.
2.
3.
Parties are more disciplined in parliamentary
systems than in presidential ones, above all if the
electoral system does not allow the preference
vote. (open list)
The internal cohesion of collective veto players
affects the size of the area within which the winset
is located. The lower the party cohesion, the lower
is policy stability.
Coeteris paribus presidential systems have lower
policy stability. This is a very strong ceteris paribus
clause because it is probably impossible to keep
everything else equal.
Effects of many veto players
Differences in classifications between
regimes, party systems, and veto players
Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation
(Strom)

1.
2.
3.
Why Delegate?
Capacity (time, transaction costs, namely
costs in reaching, implementing and
enforcing policy decisions )
Competence
Social Choice and Collective Action
problems (i.e. the problem of the
Commons)
The principal-agent framework

1.
2.
3.

1.
2.
3.
Assumptions behind the model
The Political Community is given and bounded
The Preferences of principals and agents are
exogenously given
Principals face information scarcities and
information is critical.
Agents may “misbehave” in different ways:
Policy divergence
Leisure-shirking
Rent seeking
Political accountability

1.
2.

1.
2.
a)
b)
c)
An agent is accountable to his/her principal if
He/She is obliged to act on her/his behalf
He/She is empowered to reward or punish
him/her for his/her performance
Accountability implies that principals have to
kind of rights:
Right to demand information
Capacity to impose sanctions
Veto (or amend) power
Deauthorize the agent
Impose specific penalties
Delegation and accountability
under Presidentialism and Parlamentarism(ideal types)
Ministry Head
District
Median
voter
Representatives
Prime minister
& Cabinet
Ministry Head
Delegation
Accountability
National
Median
voter
State
Median
voter
District
Median
voter
President
Secretary
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Upper house
Secretary
Lower house
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Civil Servant
Features of a parliamentary democracy
(Westminster ideal type)



Indirect Delegation: few agents are directly
elected by (and accountable to) the citizens
Singularity: each principal employs a single
agent.
The length of the delegation chain and the
impossibility to rely on agents to check one
another (the singularity) increase the risks of
agency loss. To counteract these dangers the
Parliamentarim relies on the Party
government, namely centralized, cohesive,
policy oriented political parties
Political Parties in the Parliamentary
Chain of Delegation
Political Parties: what are and under which
conditions they work
Political parties are complex collaborative devices
for mutual gain, useful for both the candidates for
public offices and for the voters.
Two incentive conditions must be satisfied:
1.
Parties have to provide sufficient inducements for
political office holders to submit to the discipline
(policy cohesion) they impose
2.
This policy cohesion (discipline) must be sufficient
for the voters to find party label informative and
useful.

Consequences of Partisanship
(in the Westminster ideal type)


1.
2.
Powerful device of ex ante screening pratically in
each ring of the delegation chain.
..but ineffective ex post Oversight :
Ex post accountability depends almost entirely on
electoral competition and the election dates can be
partially manipulated.
Between elections accountability is tenuous mainly for
the following reason: Parties strongly help the
alignment of policy preferences along the chain of
delegation. However such alignment means that
members of the parliamentary majority have no
meaningful incentive to scrutinize the behaviour of
their fellow party members in the executive branch
Parliamentary democracies different
from the Westminster model



Multiparty government can work differently
from the ideal type of parliamentarism
Also the type of party system dynamic
makes the difference:
Pivotal party system versus
Alternational party system
Even in the parlamentarisms is possible to
find powerful institutional constraints
Policy divergence under different regime types and
preference configuration (Strom 2004)
Parliamentary Democracy
A1
Choose
x 1
accept
accept
A2
P
reject
reject
RP
A=Agent
P=Principal
X
RP (reverse
point or
status quo
Collegial Presidential Democracy
accept
Delegate
agenda
A1
Choose
x 1
accept
A2
P
reject
reject RP
RP
P
accept
Delegate
agenda
X
A2
Choose
y 1
Y
accept
A1
P
reject
RP
reject RP
Competitive Presidential Democracy
Delegate
agenda
A1
Choose
x 1
P
Delegate
agenda
X
P
A2
Choose
y 1
Y
RP
The policy divergence in this complete information model
represents the so called agency loss. This loss is measured as the
distance between the outcome and the principal’s ideal point.
Example
A1
Parliamentary democracy:
A1 propose 0P that is just
marginally closer to P
than 0. A2 accepts and
also P.
|P- | is the agency loss
A2
0P

P
0 or SQ or RP
The different democratic regimes make the difference even when
the preferences are located in the same manner
A2
P
A1
parl
Parliamentary
democracy:
A1 propose its ideal point
that is nearer to P and to
A2 than 0. | P- parl. | is the
agency loss
0
The different democratic regimes make the difference even when
the preferences are located in the same manner
A2 0A1 P
pres.coll
Collegial
Presidentialism:
P delegates agenda to A2.A2
proposes 0A1 that is just
nearer to A1 than 0. | Ppres.coll| is the agency loss.
| P-pres.coll|< | P- parl. |
A1
0
Policy divergence (agency loss) under different Regime types
Preference configuration
Parl.
system
Competitiv Collegial
e
Presidenti
Presidential al
1
0.67
0.33
0
A1
A2
P
RP
0.32
0.32
0.32
A1
P
A2
RP
0.02
0
0.02
A1
P
RP
A2
0.34
0
0.34
A1
RP
A2
P
0.67
0.33
0.67
A1
RP
P
A2
0.34
0
0.34
A2
A1
P
RP
0.32
0.32
0.32
A2
P
A1
RP
0.34
0
0.02
A2
RP
A1
P
0.67
0.33
0.67
P
A1
A2
RP
0.35
0.33
0.33
P
A2
A1
RP
0.67
0.33
0.35
General results from a comparison among
different regimes (games)


Parliamentary regime is susceptible to
greater agency loss than either presidential
model.
Competitive presidentialism generally
minimizes policy divergence; collegial
presidentialism is in between.
Other types of agency loss different from
the policy divergence


Leisure shirking
Rent seeking (Bribe, useless regulation
etc)
Advantages and disadvantages of
Parliamentary systems (ideal type)

1.

1.
2.
3.
Pro:
Efficiency (policy , administrative and
incentive)
Against:
Lack of transparency
Moral Hazard problems
A singular chain of delegation is only strong
as its weakest link
Advantages and disadvantages of
Presidential systems (ideal type)

1.
2.
3.

1.
Pro:
Transparency, (more ex post oversight)
Stability in the outcomes
More Learning (because of higher level of
heterogeneity)
Against:
Lack of efficiency
Regimes forms and agency loss
Forms of Agency Loss
Regime Form Policy
Westiminster
Parl.
Divergence
Leisure
Shirking
Rent
Seeking
Dominant
Agency
Problem
High
Low
Moderately
High
Moral
Hazard
Pivotal
Moderately
Parliamentarism High
Moderately High
High
Moral
Hazard
Constrained
Moderate
Parliamentarism
Moderate
Moderate
Moral
Hazard
Collegial
Presidentialism
Moderately low
High
Low
Adverse
Selection
Competitive
Presdientialism
Low
Moderately Moderately
low
low
Adverse
Selection