HUMAN CAPITAL:
EDUCATION
AND EARNINGS
1
Hewi-Lin Chuang, Ph.D.
2010/04/08
台灣1000大企業最愛大學生調查
文／吳永佳 2010年3月 Cheers雜誌
長期作為企業與人才之間的橋梁 ，《Cheers
》雜誌14年來執行「1000大企業人才策略與
最愛大學生」調查 ﹕

調查對象﹕2009年《天下》雜誌 1000大企業人資主管

有效樣本﹕寄出1,192份問卷，回收628份，回收率53％

調查期間﹕2010年1月14日~2010年2月6日

調查執行：《天下》雜誌調查中心
2
表1﹕1000大企業最愛大學生總排名
排名
學校
2009年
2009年排
排名
名
2008年
2008年排
排名
名
排名
學校
2009年
2009年排
排名
名
2008年
2008年排
排名
名
1
1
台灣大學
1
1
1
1
11
11
中央大學
11
11
13
13
2
2
成功大學
2
2
2
2
12
12
中原大學
12
12
11
11
3
3
交通大學
3
3
3
3
13
13
輔仁大學
13
13
14
14
4
4
清華大學
4
4
4
4
14
14
東吳大學
14
14
16
16
5
5
政治大學
5
5
5
5
15
15
台北大學
15
15
19
19
6
6
台灣科大
7
7
8
8
16
16
中興大學
18
18
18
18
7
7
中山大學
6
6
9
9
17
17
元智大學
17
17
12
12
8
8
淡江大學
8
8
7
7
18
18
東海大學
19
19
17
17
9
9
台北科大
9
9
6
6
19
19
中正大學
16
16
15
15
10
10
逢甲大學
10
10
10
10
20
20
文化大學
--
--
3
表2﹕1000大企業最愛私校與技職排名
私校排名
整體排名
學校名稱
技職排名
總排名
學校
1
8
淡江大學
1
6
台灣科大
2
10
逢甲大學
2
9
台北科大
3
12
中原大學
3
21
高雄應用
4
13
輔仁大學
4
23
雲林科大
5
14
東吳大學
5
24
高雄第一
6
17
元智大學
6
28
南台科大
7
18
東海大學
7
30
高雄餐旅
8
20
文化大學
8
31
屏東科大
9
22
銘傳大學
9
34
朝陽科大
4
10
26
世新大學
10
36
文藻外語
看人才，態度面最重要，最擔心的是穩定度
企業最重視新鮮人的能力﹕

「學習意願與可塑性」（73.5％）

「穩定度與抗壓性」（65.7％）

「專業知識與技術」居第3（56.5％ )
企業認為新鮮人最待加強的能力﹕

「穩定度與抗壓性」（67.0％）

「解決問題的能力」 （51.3％）

「具有國際觀與外語能力」（38.9%）
資料來源﹕
http://www.cheers.com.tw/doc/page.jspx?id=40288abc276148df0127ae79cce833e8&
number=1
5
新世代最嚮往100大企業
文／史書華 2010年4月 Cheers雜誌
《Cheers》雜誌第五年「新世代最嚮往100大企業
」大調查﹕

調查對象﹕全台灣160個大學科系應屆畢業生(包含大學77.98％ 、
研究所22.02％ )

有效樣本﹕寄出4200份問卷，回收2,834份 ，回收率67.48%

調查期間﹕2010年1月5日~2010年3月5日

調查方法﹕根據教育部公佈98學年度各大專院校的人數與科系分
佈狀況，採分層比例抽樣法進行郵寄問卷調查

調查執行：《天下》雜誌調查中心
資料來源﹕
http://www.cheers.com.tw/doc/page.jspx?id=40288abc276148df0127ae6fdb1a33de&number=1
6
科技業退位，服務業竄前
 歷經一場全球經濟風暴後，今年調查共有3大改
變、3大發現﹕

【改變1】統一企業擠下去年榜首中華電信和科技業霸主鴻海


【改變2】「工作穩定」仍是選擇企業首要標準，但「搶抱鐵
飯碗」開始退燒


1. 統一企業，2. 誠品，3. 統一星巴克(參見表1)
畢業後打算至公營企業比例﹕2006年(36.5%)，2007年(52.0%)，2008
年(66.8%)，2009年(81.4%)，2010年(70.7%)
【改變3】數位新媒體超越傳統徵才管道，成為新鮮人認識企
業的重要來源

數位新媒體﹕如YAHOO!奇摩知識+、PTT (4)

傳統徵才管道﹕企業徵才活動(9)就業輔導單位(10)徵才網站(11)
(參見表2)
7
表1﹕新世代最嚮往企業Top 10
表2﹕大學生認識企業的重要依據排名
2010年排名
2009年排名
企業名稱
排名
選項
1
2
統一企業
1
企業知名度
2
3
誠品
2
企業形象／產品廣告
3
7
統一星巴克
3
產業前景
4
5
鴻海精密
4
社群網路（如YAHOO!奇摩知識+、
PTT）
5
1
中華電信
5
師長、親友評價
6
13
台灣積體電
路
6
企業門市與產品
7
4
中國鋼鐵
7
企業的營運數字
8
6
華碩電腦
8
看企業CEO是誰
9
21
王品台塑牛
排館
9
企業徵才活動
10
就業輔導單位
奇美電子
11
徵才網站
10
10
8
註：群創光電3月18日已與奇美電子、統寶光電合併為「奇美電子」
科技業退位，服務業竄前

【發現1】新鮮人什麼都懂，就是不懂企業


【發現2】：大學生自認「身價不只22,000」


超過4成的受訪者表示「不認識」自己筆下選填的企業
新鮮人自評身價﹕研究所應屆畢業生(33,734)，大學應屆畢業生
(27,701)
【發現3】：新世代最愛企業家：王永慶蟬連兩年 ，林百
里重新進榜

1.王永慶 2.郭台銘 3比爾‧蓋茲（Bill Gates）
資料來源：
http://www.cheers.com.tw/doc/page.jspx?id=40288abc276148df0127ae6fdb1
a33de&number=1
9
HUMAN CAPITAL: EDUCATION
AND EARNINGS
 Wages
will vary among workers because workers
are different. We each bring into the labor market
a unique set of abilities and acquired skills, or
human capital.
 We
begin our study of human capital by focusing
on the decision to acquire formal education. The
skills we acquire in school make up an
increasingly important component of our stock of
knowledge.
10
INTRODUCTION
 People
bring into the labor market a unique set of
abilities and acquired skills known as human
capital.
 Workers
add to their stock of human capital
throughout their lives, especially via job experience
and education.
11
EDUCATION: STYLIZED FACTS
 Education
is strongly correlated with:

Labor force participation rates

Unemployment rates

Earnings
12
1. EDUCATION IN THE LABOR MARKET:
SOME STYLIZED FACTS
單位：%
表一 勞動參與率與教育程度
教育程度
七十年
七十五年
八十年
八十五年
九十年
九十五年
九十七年
九十八年
九十九年
(一、二月)
國中及以下
56.69
58.89
56.55
53.00
47.71
44.34
42.87
41.67
41.45
高中（職）
54.76
57.87
60.22
60.53
61.34
63.52
63.64
62.61
62.23
大專及以上
63.13
66.19
67.27
67.97
66.82
67.38
68.18
68.40
68.78
表二 就業者與教育程度
單位：%
教育程度
七十年
七十五年
八十年
八十五年
九十年
九十五年
九十七年
九十八年
九十九年
(一、二月)
國中及以下
69.31
64.05
54.26
44.34
35.64
27.40
24.75
23.27%
22.80%
高中（職）
20.08
23.85
29.89
33.69
35.97
35.91
35.38
34.55%
34.18%
大專及以上
10.61
12.11
15.85
21.96
28.39
36.70
39.87
42.18%
43.02%
13
表三 失業率與教育程度
單位：%
教育程度
七十年
七十五年
八十年
八十五年
九十年
九十五年
九十七年
九十八年
九十九年
(一、二月)
國中及以下
0.70
1.63
0.98
1.83
4.59
3.21
3.76
5.84
5.36
高中（職）
1.95
3.89
2.05
3.00
4.65
4.36
4.34
6.19
6.15
大專及以上
1.23
2.93
1.78
2.41
3.20
3.98
4.21
5.57
5.57
表四 薪資與教育程度
教育程度
八十五年
九十年
單位：元 (平減95年CPI)
九十一年
九十二年
九十三年
九十四年
九十五年
九十六年
九十七年
九十八年
國中及以下
29,035 28,119 27,866
27,244
27,423
27,410
27,294
27,235
26,739
24,597
高中（職）
31,390 31,217 31,059
30,858
30,523
30,363
30,123
29,773
28,709
27,820
大專及以上
43,925 44,396 43,882
43,905
42,942
41,851
41,409
40,510
39,241
38,223
14
2. THE SCHOOLING MODEL
 What
factors motivates some workers to remain
in school while other workers dropout before
they finish high school? We assume that
workers acquire the skill level that maximizes
the present value of lifetime earnings.
15
2. THE SCHOOLING MODEL
 Real
earnings (earnings adjusted for inflation).
 Age-earnings
profile: the wage profile over a worker’s
lifespan.
 The
higher the discount rate, the less likely someone
will invest in education (since they are less future
oriented).
 The
discount rate depends on:

the market rate of interest.

time preferences: how a person feels about giving up today’s
consumption in return for future rewards.
16
(1) PRESENT VALUE CALCULATIONS
 Present
value allows comparison of dollar amounts
spent and received in different time periods. (An
idea from finance.)
 Present
Value = PV = y/(1+r)t

r is the per-period discount rate.

y is the future value.

t is the number of time periods.
17
The present value of the earnings stream if the worker
only gets a high school education is:
PVHS  wHS
46
wHS
wHS
wHS
wHS


 ... 

2
46
t
1  r  1  r 
1  r  t 0 1  r 
(1)
The parameter r is the worker’s rate of discount. There
are 47 terms in this sum, one for each year that elapses
between the ages of 18 and 64.
18
The present value of the earnings stream if the worker gets
a college diploma is:
PVCOL
wCOL
wCOL
wCOL
H
H
H
 H 




 ... 
2
3
4
5
1  r  1  r  1  r  1  r  1  r 
1  r 46
Direct Costs of Attending College
3
 
t 0
46
H
1  r 
t

t 4
wCOL
1  r 
t
Post-College Earnings Stream
(2)
The first four terms in this sum give the present value of
the direct costs of a college education, while the remaining
43 terms give the present value of lifetime earnings in the
19
post-college period.
We assume that a person’s schooling decision maximizes the
present value of lifetime earnings. Therefore, the worker attends
college if the present value of lifetime earnings when he gets a
college education exceeds the present value of lifetime earnings
when he gets only a high school diploma, or:
PVCOL  PVHS
Dollars
wCOL
(3)
Goes to College
wHS
Quits after High School
Age
18
22
65
-H
FIGURE 1 Earning Streams Faced by a High School Graduate
20
(2) THE WAGE-SCHOOLING LOCUS
 The
salaries firms are willing to pay workers
depends on the level of schooling.
 Properties
of the wage-schooling locus.

The wage-schooling locus is upward sloping.

The slope of the wage-schooling locus indicates the
increase in earnings associated with an additional year of
education.

The wage-schooling locus is concave, reflecting
diminishing returns to schooling.
21
(2) THE WAGE-SCHOOLING LOCUS
The wage-schooling
locus gives the salary
that a particular worker
would earn if he
completed a particular
level of schooling. If the
worker graduates from
high school, he earns
$20,000 annually. If he
goes to college for 1
year, he earns $23,000.
And so on.
Dollars
30,000
25,000
23,000
20,000
0
12 13 14
18
Years of
Schooling
22
 Defn.
The Marginal Rate of Return to Schooling
The percentage change in earnings resulting from
one more year of school is defined to be the
marginal rate of return to schooling.
23
(3) The Stopping Rule, or When Should I
Quit School?
Suppose that the worker has a rate of discount r that
is constant; that is, it is independent of how much
schooling the worker gets. The stopping rule that
maximizes the worker’s present value of earnings
over the life cycle is given by:
Quit school when the marginal rate of return to
schooling = r
24
This stopping rule maximizes the worker’s present
value of earnings over the life cycle.
Rate of interest
r’
r
MRR
s’
s*
Years of Schooling
25
FIGURE 3 The Schooling Decision
SCHOOLING AND EARNINGS WHEN WORKERS
HAVE DIFFERENT RATES OF DISCOUNT
Rate of
Interest
Dollars
wHS
rAL
wDROP
PBO
PAL
rBO
MRR
11
12
Years of
Schooling
11
12
Years of
Schooling
26
SCHOOLING AND EARNINGS WHEN
WORKERS HAVE DIFFERENT ABILITIES
Rate of
Interest
Dollars
Z
Bob
wHS
Ace
wACE
wDROP
r
PACE
MRRBOB
11
12
MRRACE
Years of
Schooling
11
12
Years of
Schooling
Ace and Bob have the same discount rate (r) but each worker faces a different wageschooling locus. Ace drops out of high school and Bob gets a high school diploma.
The wage differential between Bob and Ace (wHS - wDROP) arises both because Bob
goes to school for one more year and because Bob is more able. As a result, this wage
differential does not tells us by how much Ace’s earnings would increase if he were to
complete high school (wACE - wDROP).
27

3. IS EDUCATION A GOOD INVESTMENT?
(1) Is Education a Good Investment for Individuals?
The rate of return typically estimated for the U.S.
generally fall in the range of 5-15 percent.

At first glance, an investment in education is
about as good as an investment in stocks, bonds,
or real estate.
28
EDUCATION AND THE WAGE GAP
 Observed
data on earnings and schooling does not
allow us to estimate returns to schooling.
 In
theory, a more able person gets more from an
additional year of education.
 Ability
bias: The extent to which unobserved ability
differences exist affects estimates on returns to
schooling, since the ability difference may be the true
source of the wage differential.
29
ESTIMATING THE RATE OF RETURN
TO SCHOOLING
 A typical
empirical study estimates a regression of
the form:
Log(w) = a·s + other variables

w is the wage rate

s is the years of schooling

a is the coefficient that estimates the rate of
return to an additional year of schooling
30
31
資料來源：中央產經論文-台灣地區大學教育報酬率時間變化之分析 (邱麗芳)
32
資料來源：中央產經論文-台灣地區大學教育報酬率時間變化之分析 (邱麗芳)
A. The Upward Bias
The typical estimates of the rate of return on further
schooling overstate the gain an individual student
could obtain by investing in education because they
are unable to separate the contribution that ability
makes to higher earnings from the contribution
made by schooling.
i.e., Some of the added earnings college graduates
typically receive would probably be received by an
equally able high school graduates who did not
attend college.
33

Methods to correct this bias:
a.
Separating effects of ability and schooling by
including the aptitude-test scores such as IQ.
b.
Controlling for all the unmeasured aspects of ability
by using data on twins.
 Part of earnings differentials associated with higher
levels of schooling are due to inherently abler
persons obtaining more schooling.
34
B. The Downward Bias
a.
Some benefits of college attendance are not
necessarily reflected in higher productivity.
b.
Most rate-of-return studies fail to include fringe
benefits.
 Fringe benefits, usually as a fraction of total
compensation, tend to rise as money earnings rise.
a.
Some of the job-related rewards of college are
captured in the form of psychic or nonmonetary
benefits.
35
C. Selection Bias
The measured rate of return on a college
education may understate the actual return for
those who choose to attend college. Likewise,
the measured rate of return may overstate the
return that would have been received by those
terminating schooling with higher school had
they instead chosen to attend college.
36
Measured benefit Bt: Bt  Ecc,t  Ehh,t
E cc,t : the earnings in a college-level job of those who
choose to go to college.
E hh,t : the earning in a high school-level job of those who
choose not to go to college.
Let E hc,t : the earnings in a high school-level job of those
who choose to attend college terminating
schooling at high school.
E hc,t is perhaps less than E hh,t
37
 Btc  Ecc,t  Ehc,t  Bt  measured benefit
E ch,t :the earnings in a college-level job of those
who choose not to attend college were to
alter their decisions.
E ch,t is perhaps less than E cc,t
 Bth  Ech,t  Ehh,t  Bt  measured benefit
→When abilities are diverse, the principle of comparative
advantage is an important factor in making choices
about schooling and occupations.
38
Rate of return to schooling
Rate of return to schooling
SCHOOL QUALITY AND THE RATE
OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
15
20
25
30
Pupil/teacher ratio
35
40
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
Relative teacher wage
Source: David Card and Alan B. Krueger, “Does School Quality Matter?
Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United
States,” Journal of Political Economy 100 (February 1992), Tables 1 and 2.
The data in the graphs refer to the rate of return to school and the school
quality variables for the cohort of persons born in 1920-1929.
39
台大「惠我良多」？
—論各大學畢業生初出校門的表現

運用「七十二年與七十三年專上畢業生調查」與「七
十三年與七十四年專上畢業生調查」資料，分析台灣
各大學院校初出校門的畢業生，在薪資決定、就業與
進修決擇上是否有顯著差異。

校際間的差異主要顯現在「就業比例」、「進修比例
」上，然而薪資水準並無顯著差異。

未控制「聯考最低錄取分數」這項能力指標下，台大
畢業生在勞動市場的表現相當優異，薪資水準高於多
數大學院校。

然而在控制「聯考最低錄取分數」下，台大畢業生在
勞動市場的表現並不甚佳，就業比例低於多數學校，
薪資水準亦未必優於他校。
40
台大「惠我良多」？
—論各大學畢業生初出校門的表現
41
台大「惠我良多」？
—論各大學畢業生初出校門的表現

若嘗試由「教育生產函數」理論提出解釋，由於台大畢
業生多屬聯考中的佼佼者，在未控制「能力」之下，可
能使得台大的貢獻被高估。

值得注意的是，此研究所使用的資料為「專上畢業生調
查」是自學校畢業或役畢未滿一年的樣本。依Farber
and Gibbons (1991) 的說法，初入勞動市場者的「薪資
」與「生產力」間無必然關係，因而各大學院校對初入
勞動市場者薪資的影響，未必能反映對生產力的影響。

資料來源：于若蓉, 朱敬一, “台大「惠我良多」? － 論
各大學畢業生初出校門的表現”, 《經濟論文叢刊》,
1998, 26: 65-89.
42
98年大專應屆畢業青年平均薪資
資料來源：行政院青年輔導委員會-98年大專青年就業力現況調查報告
43
98年大專應屆畢業青年平均薪資
44
資料來源：行政院青年輔導委員會-98年大專青年就業力現況調查報告
(2) Is Education a Good Social Investment?
Some critics have suggested that to a large degree,
education acts merely as a “sorting device”.
→Schooling does nothing to alter productive
characteristics. The education is simply as a filter
that has the effect of “signaling” which people are
likely to be most productive.
Note: Even if schooling were only a screening
device, it could have social value. Employers need a
reliable method by which to select employees.
Investment in schooling sends a signal to the labor
market that one has a certain level of ability.
45
→School would have net social value if the decision to
attend and the success one attained in school sent
accurate signals about productive characteristics to
employers in the least costly way.
Either education does enhance worker productivity or
it is a cheaper screening tool than any other that firms
could use. In either case, the fact that employers are
willing to pay a high price for an educated work force
seems to suggest that education produces social
benefits.
46
SCHOOLING AS A SIGNAL
 Education
reveals a level of attainment which
signals a worker’s qualifications or innate ability to
potential employers.
 Information
that is used to allocate workers in the
labor market is called a signal.
 There
could be a “separating equilibrium.”

Low-productivity workers choose not to obtain X years of
education, voluntarily signaling their low productivity.

High-productivity workers choose to get at least X years
of schooling and separate themselves from the pack.
47
EDUCATION AS A SIGNAL
Dollars
Dollars
Costs
300,000
300,000
Costs
250,001 y
Slope = 25,000
200,000
200,000
20,000 y
0
y
Years of
Schooling
(a) Low-Productivity Workers
Slope = 20,000
0
y
Years of
Schooling
(b) High-Productivity Workers
Workers get paid $200,000 if they get less than y years of college, and
$300,000 if they get at least y years. Low-productivity workers find it
expensive to invest in college, and will not get y years. High-productivity 48
workers do obtain y years. As a result, the worker’s education signals if he is a
low-productivity or a high-productivity worker.
EDUCATION AS A SIGNAL

The low-productivity worker will not attend college if
$200,000  $300,000  ($25,001 y )
(6-16)
Solving for y implies that
y  3.999

(6-17)
The high-productivity workers get y years of college whenever
$200,000  $300,000  ($20,000 y )
(6-18)
Solving for y yields
y5
(6-19)
49
IMPLICATIONS OF SCHOOLING AS A
SIGNAL
 Education
is more than a signal, it alters the stock of
human capital.
 Social
return to schooling (percentage increase in
national income) is likely to be positive even if a
particular worker’s human capital is not increased.
50
4. POST-SCHOOL HUMAN CAPITAL
INVESTMENTS
 Some
important properties of age-earnings profiles:

Highly educated workers earn more than less educated
workers.

Earnings rise over time at a decreasing rate.

The age-earnings profiles of different education cohorts
diverge over time (they “fan outwards”).

Earnings increase faster for more educated workers.
51
AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES
Weekly Earnings
Men
2600
2300
2000
1700
1400
1100
800
500
200
College Graduates
Some college
High school graduates
High school dropouts
18
25
32
39
Age
46
53
60
52
AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES
Weekly Earnings
Women
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
College Graduates
Some college
High school graduates
High school dropouts
18
25
32
39
Age
46
53
60
53
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
 Most
workers augment their human capital stock
through on-the-job training (OJT) after completing
education investments.
 Two
types of OJT:

General: training that is useful at all firms once it is
acquired.

Specific: training that is useful only at the firm where it is
acquired.
54
IMPLICATIONS
 Firms
only provide general training if they do not
pay the costs.
 In
order for the firm to willingly pay some of the
costs of specific training, the firm must share in the
returns to specific training. Engaging in specific
training eliminates the possibility of the worker
separating from the job in the post-training period.
55
THE ACQUISITION OF HUMAN CAPITAL
OVER THE LIFE CYCLE
Dollars
MC
MR20
MR30
0
Q30Q20 Efficiency Units
The marginal revenue of
an efficiency unit of
human capital declines as
the worker ages (so that
MR20, the marginal
revenue of a unit acquired
at age 20, lies above
MR30). At each age, the
worker equates the
marginal revenue with the
marginal cost, so that
more units are acquired
when the worker is
56
younger.
AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES AND OJT
 Human
capital investments are more profitable the
earlier they are taken.
 The
Mincer earnings function:

Log(w) = a·s + b·t – c·t2 + other variables.

The “overtaking age” is t* and indicates the time
when the worker slows down acquisition of human
capital to collect the return on prior investments so
as to “overtake” earnings of those that did not
undertake similar investments.
57
THE AGE-EARNINGS PROFILE IMPLIED
BY HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY
Dollars
Age-Earnings
Profile
Age
The age-earnings profile is
upward-sloping and concave.
Older workers earn more
because they invest less in
human capital and because
they are collecting the returns
from earlier investments. The
rate of growth of earnings
slows down over time
because workers accumulate
less human capital as they get
older.
58