11 Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2012 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Monopolistic Competition • Relatively large number of sellers • Differentiated products • Easy entry and exit • Advertising LO1 11-2 Monopolistically Competitive • Industry concentration • Measured by: • Four-firm concentration ratios • Percentage of 4 largest firms 4-Firm CR = Output of four largest firms Total output in the industry • Herfindahl index • Sum of squared market shares HI = (%S1)2 + (%S2)2 + (%S3)2 + …. + (%Sn)2 LO1 11-3 Low Concentration Industries (1) Industry (2) 4-Firm Concentration Ratio (3) Herfindahl Index (1) Industry (2) 4-Firm Concentration Ratio (3) Herfindahl Index 14 114 Asphalt paving 25 207 Metal windows and doors Plastic pipe 24 262 Women’s dresses 13 84 Textile bags 24 263 Ready mix concrete 11 63 Bolts, nuts, and rivets 24 205 Wood trusses 10 50 Plastic bags 23 240 Stone products 10 59 Quick printing 22 319 Metal stamping 8 31 Textile machinery 20 206 Wood pallets 7 24 Sawmills 18 117 Sheet metal work 6 25 Jewelry 16 117 Signs 5 19 Curtains and draperies 16 111 Retail bakeries 4 7 LO1 11-4 Price and Output in Monopolistic Comp • Demand is highly elastic • Short run profit or loss • Produce where MR=MC • Long run normal profit • Entry and exit • Inefficient • Product variety LO2 11-5 The Short Run: Profit or Loss Price and Costs MC ATC P1 A1 Economic Profit D1 MR = MC MR 0 Q1 Quantity LO2 11-6 The Short Run: Profit or Loss Price and Costs MC ATC A2 P2 Loss D2 MR = MC MR 0 Q2 Quantity LO2 11-7 The Long Run: Only a Normal Profit MC Price and Costs ATC P3= A3 D3 MR = MC MR 0 Q3 Quantity LO2 11-8 Monopolistic Competition: Efficiency • Inefficient • Productive inefficiency • P > ATC • Allocative inefficiency • P > MC LO2 11-9 Monopolistic Competition: Efficiency P=MC=Min ATC for pure competition (recall) Price and Costs MC ATC P3= A3 P4 Price is Lower D3 MR = MC Excess Capacity at Minimum ATC 0 Q3 MR Q4 Quantity Monopolistic competition is not efficient LO2 11-10 Product Variety • The firm constantly manages price, • LO2 product, and advertising. • Better product differentiation • Better advertising The consumer benefits by greater array of choices and better products. • Types and Styles • Brands and Quality 11-11 Oligopoly • A few large producers • Homogeneous or differentiated • • • LO3 products Limited control over price • Mutual interdependence • Strategic behavior Entry barriers Mergers 11-12 Oligopolistic Industries • Four-firm concentration ratio • 40% or more to be oligopoly • Shortcomings • Localized markets • Inter-industry competition • World price • Dominant firms LO3 11-13 High Concentration Industries (1) Industry Primary copper (2) 4-Firm Concentration Ratio (3) Herfindahl Index 99 ND (1) Industry (2) 4-Firm Concentration Ratio (3) Herfindahl Index Petrochemicals 85 2662 83 1901 Cane sugar refining 99 ND Small arms ammunition Cigarettes 95 ND Motor vehicles 81 2321 80 2515 Household laundry equipment 93 ND Men’s slacks and jeans Beer 91 ND Aircraft 81 ND Electric light bulbs 89 2582 Breakfast cereals 78 2521 78 2096 Glass containers 88 2582 Household vacuum cleaners Turbines and generators 88 ND Phosphate fertilizers 78 1853 Tires 77 1807 Electronic computers 76 Alcohol distilleries 71 Household refrigerators and freezers 85 1986 Primary aluminum 85 ND LO1 2662 1609 11-14 Game Theory Overview • Oligopolies display strategic pricing behavior • Mutual interdependence • Collusion • Incentive to cheat • Prisoner’s dilemma LO4 11-15 Game Theory Overview RareAir’s Price Strategy LO4 High Uptown’s Price Strategy • 2 competitors • 2 price strategies • Each strategy has a payoff matrix • Greatest combined profit • Independent actions stimulate a response A $12 Low B $15 High $12 C $6 $6 D $8 Low $15 $8 11-16 Game Theory Overview RareAir’s Price Strategy LO4 High Uptown’s Price Strategy • Independently lowered prices in expectation of greater profit leads to worst combined outcome • Eventually low outcomes make firms return to higher prices. A $12 Low B $15 High $12 C $6 $6 D $8 Low $15 $8 11-17 3 Oligopoly Models • Kinked Demand Curve • Collusive Pricing • Price Leadership • Reasons for 3 models • Diversity of oligopolies • Complications of interdependence LO5 11-18 Kinked-Demand Theory • Noncollusive oligopoly • Uncertainty about rivals reactions • Rivals match any price change • Rivals ignore any price change • Assume combined strategy • Match price reductions • Ignore price increases LO5 11-19 Kinked Demand Curve e P0 f D2 Rivals Match g Price Decrease 0 LO5 Q0 MR1 Quantity MR2 Price and Costs Price Rivals Ignore Price Increase MC1 D2 P0 e MR2 f MC2 g D1 D1 0 Q0 MR1 Quantity 11-20 Kinked Demand Curve • Criticisms • Explains inflexibility, not price • Prices are not that rigid • Price wars LO6 11-21 Cartels and Other Collusion Price and Costs MC P0 ATC A0 MR=MC Economic Profit Q0 LO6 D MR Quantity 11-22 Global Perspective LO6 11-23 Overt Collusion • Cartels - a group of firms or nations • • LO6 that collude • Formally agreeing to the price • Sets output levels for members Collusion is illegal in the United States OPEC 11-24 Obstacles to Collusion • Demand and cost differences • Number of firms • Cheating • Recession • New entrants • Legal obstacles LO6 11-25 Price Leadership Model • Price Leadership • Dominant firm initiates price • • LO6 changes • Other firms follow the leader Use limit pricing to block entry of new firms Possible price war 11-26 Oligopoly and Advertising • Prevalent to compete with product development and advertising • Less easily duplicated than a price change • Financially able to advertise LO7 11-27 Positive Effects of Advertising • Low-cost way of providing information • • • LO7 to consumers Enhances competition Speeds up technological progress Can help firms obtain economies of scale 11-28 Oligopoly and Advertising The Largest U.S. Advertisers, 2008 Company Advertising Spending Millions of $ Procter & Gamble $4831 Verizon $3700 AT&T $3073 General Motors $2901 Johnson & Johnson $2529 Unilever $2423 Walt Disney $2218 Time Warner $2208 General Electric $2019 Sears $1865 Source: Advertising Age http://www.adage.com LO7 11-29 Negative Effects of Advertising • Can be manipulative • Contains misleading claims that • LO7 confuse consumers Consumers pay high prices for a good while forgoing a better, lower priced, unadvertised version of the product. 11-30 Global Perspective LO7 11-31 Oligopoly and Efficiency • Oligopolies are inefficient • Productively inefficient P > minATC • Allocatively inefficient P > MC • Qualifications • Increased foreign competition • Limit pricing • Technological advance LO7 11-32 Oligopoly in the Beer Industry • The beer industry is now an oligopoly. • Changes in demand • Change in tastes • Consumed at home and mass • produced Changes in supply • Technological advance • Economies of scale 11-33