The New Global Picture and the EU
- Polarity & Global (Im)Balance of Power
- Military Realm
- Economic Sphere
-Soft Power Realm
(i.e. ideational sway & influence revisited:
EU Power of Example and Attraction, the
‘shadow of the Eagle’ and Hollywood,
Bollywood, Confucius Institutes, ‘Brand
China’ & the ‘Beijing Consensus’)
© Pavlos Efthymiou
Polarity
• 1900-1920 (WWI): Multi-Polarity, Competition
of Many Great Powers
• 1945-1989 (CW): Bi-Polarity, Competition and
Antagonism of two Superpowers, two large
poles with their ‘blocs’ (US/NATO –
USSR/Warsaw Pact), Nuclear Balance, hence
‘bipolar stability’
• Post-CW to 2000s: Unipolar System. One
Superpower, the US (and its allies).
• Today? We are getting, increasingly a more
complicated picture. Let’s see:
© Pavlos Efthymiou
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
The end of Unipolarity? What
Implications for the EU (I)
• 9/11 (superpower vulnerability),
• Wars in Afghanistan & Iraq (US military & economic
overstretch; limits to US power),
• Russo-Georgian War (Geopolitical backlash & limits to US
reach) (e.g. Kober, 2008)
• Financial Crisis (starting from US, slowing down US)
• War on Terror (and the difficulty of winning a war against
an amorphous enemy, US alienation of friends and allies,
• Rise of China and implications,
• Re-emergence of Russia, (not least in the new ‘Great
Game’)
• The overall the shift of politico-economic power from the
West to East and from State to Non-State actors.
See for example Layne 2006 “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited”
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
The end of Unipolarity? What
Implications for the EU (II)
• US Security Umbrella, underlined by American presence in
Europe, was catalytic for EU evolution,
• The ‘Pacific Tilt’ along with the shifts in the global hard
power balance and hence recalibration of American
interests and shift of focus away from Europe, to East Asia,
Eurasia and the Pacific,
• Which in turn suggests that the American/NATO umbrella
will not be as ‘accessible’ and utilisable at EU mS’
convenience (e.g. F),
• Hence perhaps the renewed speculation regarding a
potential ‘upgrade’ of the CSDP to a more holistic and
comprehensive security umbrella,
• We have even seen American pressures for higher
investments in European military capacities, including a
debate on whether in recognition of the ‘tilt’ the CSDP
should evolve into a more European Collective Security Org.
Military Power (I)
• Traditional schools of IR see military power as
the prime indicator of a state’s importance.
• Most analysts now agree that it can no longer be
seen in isolation from economic power
(including energy resources), one’s network of
allies & partners, and, increasingly, soft power
resources.
• Although there is a massive shift in military
expenditure, with Asia now stepping up its
spending (Arms Race?), the facts in the realm of
military might provide a very clear picture:
© Pavlos Efthymiou
Military Power (II)
© Pavlos Efthymiou
Military Power (III)
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
Military Power (IV)
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
Military Power (V)
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
Map of Major Political & Military Alliances
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
US Military Lead in Perspective (I)
• The 2012 budget is 6–7 times larger than the $106 billion
military budget of China, and is more than the next
twenty largest military spenders combined.
• By some accounts US conventional military power is
greater than that of the next 10 most powerful states
combined (most of which America’s friends & allies).
• The US has the greatest power projection capacity
globally, commanding 11 fully-functional aircraft carriers.
• The US has more operational aircraft carriers than all the
other nations combined. No great power currently has
more than one aircraft carrier. France, UK & China have
one each (Brazil also). China launched its first Aircraft
Carrier, the Liaoling in 2012 and India its first this
August.
© Pavlos Efthymiou
US Military Lead in Perspective (II)
• The US has a network of over 800 military bases
globally, dramatically enhancing its hard-power
projection capacity and influence (be it in the
form of military diplomacy, provision of security
or potential for ‘arm twisting’).
• The US also heads the most powerful military
alliance in the world, NATO.
*Interestingly: The total land area occupied by US bases &
facilities is 15,654 sq mi (> than Washington, Massachusetts
& New Jersey) combined!*
© Pavlos Efthymiou
US Military Lead in Perspective (III)
• Strategists in Washington often cite in discussions that even if there
could be an imagined scenario where all the conventional armies of
the world mobilized simultaneously against the US, the US would
still survive the attack.
• Overall, the US military lead – not least in military
technology - is so vast that in terms of military power
we can safely conclude that the world remains unipolar.
• What is also true however now, is that an increasing
numbers of regional powers are investing in military
power, notably in Eurasia and Asia-Pacific shifting the
balance.
• If one also takes into account the scaling down of the
American military presence in Europe and the shift of
politico-military focus to the Asia-Pacific region, these
© Pavlos
trends all have important implications for the EU.
Efthymiou
The Realm of Force and the EU (I)
• With steadily declining m-S defense budgets, further
challenged by the crisis and austerity,
• An ongoing overreliance on American capacities,
leadership and technology (e.g. Kosovo, Libya, Mali..),
• Ongoing inability/incapacity (e.g. strategic airlift?) to
carry out independent operations (and esp. conflict
management ops.),
• Renewed instability in Europe’s proximate milieu(s),
• The EU seems to remain unprepared (unfit) for the
Challenges of the 21st century.
• As the number of aspiring ‘security providers’
proliferates with rising powers maximizing their hard
power projection capacities (CH, I, RF) a rethink of
the Union’s approach to hard power – not least for
status and influence purposes.
© Pavlos Efthymiou
The Realm of Force and the EU (II)
• But ceteris paribus, in spite of the Union’s extensive
‘latent’ military power, unless the intra-EU / inter-mS
pooling and sharing efforts act catalytically to
reinvigorate EU Grand Strategic Thinking, the EU will
unlikely rise as a powerful military pole in the shortmedium run.
• This does not mean however that the EU cannot
become an important actor in the military / hard
security sphere.
• Potential for Permanent Structured Cooperation
• This has a lot to do with the changing nature of
violent conflict & related security threats:
© Pavlos Efthymiou
The Realm of Force and the EU (III)
The type of force needed: a new purpose for hardpower?
• “Throughout the Cold War, force was needed to deter the other side from doing bad
things outside its borders. Today, force is needed to compel the other side to do good
things inside its borders.” “Deterrence is a military task; compellence is a police
function.” (C.W. Maynes 1999, ‘Squandering Triumph:..” FA). This assertion regarding
the use of force in the Post-CW word has been vindicated since in numerous instances
(Libya, Iraq x2).
Absence of Global Central Government to Ensue or Escalate
• To the extent that actors outside the EU sphere still (if not increasingly) conduct
power politics / ‘games of thrones’ on the global chessboard, it is unlikely that the
UNSC will be able to break the impasses associated with the interests of the P5 (or 23 of the 5). Hence high expectations regarding a potential reform - transformation of
the UN / UNSC into a global ‘Leviathan’ in the realm of hard security would be
unfounded.
Europe Alone?
• As it becomes more and more evident that other actors will not rush to solve the security
problems of Europe, Cooper’s (2004) observations are ever-relevant: ‘[The EU] needs to
get used to the idea of double standards.’ ‘We may not be interested in chaos, but chaos is
interested in us.’ (Failed states & Terrorist Threat, O.C. and weapons trafficking & so-called
Mega-terrorism risk’). ‘Chaos [in the form of terrorism’ can become a serious threat to the
whole international order’. Hence the EU needs to have the capacity to use credible
targeted force to maximize its security in an era of increased insecurity and uncertainty
(exacerbated by the transformation of the international system and the increased web of
interconnectedness between modern and pre-modern actors).
© Pavlos Efthymiou
The Realm of Force and the EU (IV)
• “Therefore, some critical thinking regarding the EU’s
capacity to act when faced with the complex threats
emanating from the failed / failing / fragile / unstable(/premodern) states is quintessential.
• Arguably, the EU can make a difference as a military actor if
it develops such capacities which ensure that it can play a
critical role in ‘compellence’ operations: conduct coercive
diplomacy, conflict management & peace-enforcement ops
along with its peacekeeping capabilities.
• I.e.: going back to Mayne’s point regarding ‘Compellence’ as an
international police function in the realm of security, the EU must be
able to carry out, independently if necessary such ‘compellence’
operations against small-medium ‘international criminals/violators’
to guarantee above all mS security.
Coercive diplomacy involves using the threat of force, or limited force backed up by the threat of more to come,
to change a target’s behavior (in a sense use of force & deterrence/threat in tandem – here the credence of the
deterrence strategy is maximized as the readiness of the deterring actor has already been tested)
© Pavlos Efthymiou
Economic Power
• Global GDP Distribution: ‘EU 28’ lead (>23.0%),
US follows (22%), then China (>11.6%), Japan
(8.7%), Brazil (3.3%), India (2.7%)…
• Important parameter: GDP growth - China rapidly
catches up, EU and US have slowed down.
• Perhaps that’s the reason why US-EU are now
discussing the creation of a Free Trade Area
(Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership)
or an ‘Economic NATO’ (?)
• The rise of China and the so-called ‘rise of the
rest’ (BASIC / BRICs) is much more evident in the
Economic Sphere:
© Pavlos Efthymiou
Visualizing the Distribution of Economic Power (I)
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
(1) Canada, RF, AU, Mexico, S. Korea, TU, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Argentina and South Africa
Visualizing the Distribution of Economic Power (II)
© Pavlos Efthymiou
Economic Power Projections
• If not already there, in the economic sphere we
are rapidly entering a new, multi-polar order.
• By most accounts China will have fully caught up
with the US economic might by 2050 the latest.
• Traditional Schools of IR theory tend to argue that
economic power is latent military power. Hence
this may greatly affect the military balance too in
the near future.
• Arguably, the transfer of economic power from
West to East hence suggests that such far-reaching
shifts in the military balance could follow.
• One last image:
© Pavlos Efthymiou
The World in 2050 (?)
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
Making the most of the Union’s
Economic Power (I)
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
• The EU continues to get much less weight / gravitas
than its position of global economic preeminence
warrants.
• Overall it seems that EU ‘money’/ spending seem to
get less returns than the ‘currencies’ of other actors
such as US and China.
• Although the EU is the largest trading power globally,
it has not been using this potential level in such a way
as to actively transform the international system or
specific milieus advantageously.
• Similarly, although the EU and its mS are the largest
Aid Power in the world, they seem to get less returns
on their money than other donors.
Making the most of the Union’s
Economic Power (II)
© Pavlos
Efthymiou
• Hence going back to the conditionality debate we
had last week:
• It is central for the Union and its mS to collectively
strategize on how to maximize the impact of the
EU’s economic policies globally. (also relates to
power with IOs – ‘Transformative’)
• More coordinated action & policy, tighter
conditionality and more strategic use of its
consumer and exporter powers are imperative.
Global Soft Power Distribution (?)
• From Hollywood to Confucius Institutes (360+, in 6
continents) & the Beijing Consensus.
• The EU model, values and vision – and global
emulation? AU, ASEAN, SCO, MERCOSUR..
• As the soft power of the EU was intrinsically connected
to the ‘promise of intra-EU prosperity’ or the success of
the internal market and the euro, it is severely tested by
both the ongoing crisis and its handling and media
representation.
• The US model
• The Chinese model
• A discussion of the global competition for attraction of
friends and allies via attraction, inspiration & respect.
© Pavlos Efthymiou
Conclusions - Discussion
The world is:
• A) increasingly multipolar in the economic sphere, if you
accept the ‘EU 28’ and their internal market as the world’s
leading economy and because China is rapidly closing the
gap; (Is it?)
• B) is increasingly multipolar in the realm of soft power, as
different models of economic growth, development and
governance ‘compete’ on the international stage; (Or
maybe the West and the EU still hold the undisputed
moral/ethical/ideological high ground?)
• and C) will remain unipolar in the military sphere in the
foreseeable future due to the immense military lead of
the USA – although regional organizations like the EU will
have an increased role to play in various conflict
scenarios. (Or maybe not? A bi-multi-polar impasse?) © Pavlos
Efthymio