Systemic risk in derivatives markets A pilot study using CDS data Nicholas Vause (joint work with Robleh Ali and Filip Zikes) 23 September 2014 Outline • Trade repository data • Indicators of systemic importance – Contracts traded • Indicators of systemic risk – Market values of contracts traded • Further work Trade repository data • Pittsburgh summit of G20 leaders (2009): “All OTC derivatives contracts should be reported to trade repositories” • Implemented in Europe under EMIR • Reporting began in February 2014 Trade repository data in Europe • 26 counterparty fields – name, sector, region – market value and collateral posted (from August 2014) • 59 common fields – product, notional amount, maturity – class-specific data (e.g. reference entity for CDS) • All classes – Interest rates, credit, FX, equities and commodities • 100,000s legal entities Pilot study data • • • • • • • • CDS data from DTCC’s Trade Information Warehouse UK reference entities (66 single names) Jan 2009 – Dec 2011 Market participants: 300 Gross notional: €600bn Net notional: €25bn 2% of global CDS market Gross market value: €15-50bn Net market value: €1.0-2.5bn CDS preliminaries MV = €0 S S sells protection on R to B Notional amount = €10mn B MV = €0 B MV = -€50K B MV = €0 Premium = 80bp MV = +€50K S S sells protection on R to B Notional amount = €10mn Premium = 60bp Variation margin = €50K MV = €0 S S sells protection on R to B Notional amount = €10mn Premium = 80bp +/- 30bp Initial margin = €75K Initial margin = €75K Network preliminaries • Directed weighted networks Buyers Y 3 6 Sellers 1 X Z 2 0 0 2 3 0 6 0 1 A 0 Systemic importance – network of contracts traded All participants (out degree) Proportion of participants Top 25 participants Number of connections Systemic importance – centrality measures • Degree centrality (DC) • Eigenvector centrality (EC): Ax = x (highest ) • Betweenness centrality (BC) Highest DC Highest BC Highest EC Systemic importance – most important institutions Out strength (sold notional, €bn) Left eigenvector centrality Betweenness centrality • • High correlation between measures Similar results for purchases of credit protection Systemic stress – market values • Positions valued using end-of-day prices Blue = in the money Red = out of the money Arrows point from ‘debtors’ to ‘creditors’ • But collateral Modelling changes in market values CDS curves (1, 3, 5, 7, 10) PCA Level factors AR(2)-GARCH(1,1) Slope factors t-distributed residuals Univariate models of factor changes t-copula (correlations linked to industry factors) Joint model of level changes Joint model of slope changes • Jointly simulate residuals • Compute factor changes (conditional on starting point) • Compute CDS changes and, hence, change in market value Individual probabilities of gains / losses (€ millions) 0.03 0.100 Var1 N(s=17.9) 0.075 0.02 0.06 Var2 N(s=5.34) Var3 N(s=9.35) 0.050 0.01 0 100 0.03 -25 0 25 -50 0.15 Var5 N(s=19) Var6 N(s=3.58) 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.05 -100 0.3 0 100 Var9 N(s=1.92) 0.15 0 50 -20 Var7 N(s=3.15) 20 Var8 N(s=8.5) 0.050 0.025 0.05 -20 0 20 -20 0.20 Var10 N(s=2.23) 0.2 0.15 0 20 Var11 N(s=2.96) -50 0.10 0.10 0.1 0.1 0 50 Var12 N(s=4.45) 0.05 0.05 -20 0 -20 Var13 N(s=5.83) 0 0.50 0.025 0.25 20 Var14 N(s=0.541) 0.75 0.050 -50 -25 0 -50 Var15 N(s=2.37) 0.2 0.02 -25 0 25 -5 0 5 -25 0 25 Var16 N(s=22.1) 0.01 0.1 -50 0 0.10 0.2 0.075 Var4 N(s=2.26) 0.1 0.02 0.025 -100 0.2 0.04 0 20 40 -100 0 100 Joint probabilities of losses • Joint probabilities of pairs of dealers each breaching their 95% VaRs – Independence = 0.25% (i.e. 5% x 5%) – Perfect dependence = 5% D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D7 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15 D2 0.13 D3 0.00 3.03 D4 2.13 0.03 0.00 D5 0.00 2.46 3.78 0.00 D6 0.66 0.06 0.05 0.94 0.08 D7 2.44 0.32 0.08 1.43 0.04 0.81 D8 0.00 2.80 3.88 0.01 3.56 0.07 0.11 D7 2.06 0.81 0.49 1.00 0.45 0.31 1.78 0.47 D10 0.63 0.02 0.01 0.94 0.05 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.15 D11 0.65 2.13 2.04 0.25 2.07 0.07 0.51 1.86 1.75 0.10 D12 4.08 0.13 0.00 2.09 0.00 0.64 2.65 0.00 2.07 0.38 0.64 D13 3.74 0.10 0.00 2.41 0.00 0.77 2.04 0.01 1.71 0.90 0.55 3.74 D14 0.59 1.44 1.06 0.31 0.76 0.19 0.98 1.27 0.96 0.01 0.99 0.69 0.58 D15 0.00 1.61 1.63 0.03 1.25 0.07 0.17 1.97 0.28 0.00 0.82 0.01 0.01 2.36 D16 4.35 0.11 0.00 2.43 0.00 0.75 2.53 0.00 1.94 0.71 0.60 4.27 4.05 0.61 0.01 Stress test – variation margins • • Stress test = all 66 CDS premiums rise by 100bp Variation margin from payer (rows) to receiver (columns) in € millions Stress test – initial margins • • Stress test = volatilities rise from March 2010 to May 2010 levels Initial margin requirements in € millions Bilateral positions Centrally-cleared positions Future work • Combine derivatives data with financial accounts • Contagious default or CVA losses in network of exposures • Depends on capital cushions • Much less potent given collateral reforms • Contagious liquidity strains in network of margin payments • Depends on liquidity cushions • Increasing in likelihood given collateral reforms