A Matrix Approach to Comparing and
Contrasting Some Differing Perspectives on
Emergency Management and
Homeland Security in a Post-9/11 World
and
Some Suggested Reference Materials
Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D.
Presentation
FEMA Higher Education Conference,
Emmitsburg, Maryland, June 6 - 9, 2011
Using a Matrix Approach to Analysis to
Enhance Understanding
• of different perspectives concerning some of the
major challenges facing those in roles of public
responsibility for homeland security and
emergency management;
• of a range of different ways of looking at the role
of the Federal, State, and local governments in
recent major disasters, with an emphasis on
Hurricane Katrina; and
• of some possible explanations concerning the
basis of widely varying perspectives and some of
the possible consequences of major differences in
perspectives.
2
Some Differences Among
Those in Positions of Responsibility
in Hurricane Katrina
• Differing levels of knowledge, experience, and skills with regard to
addressing a moderate hurricane, let alone a catastrophic
hurricane.
• Differing levels of knowledge, experience, and skills in emergency
management.
• Differing views concerning what constitutes a catastrophe and
what makes a catastrophic event exponentially more difficult to
deal with than a disaster of lesser magnitude.
• Differing expectations concerning how effective emergency
management efforts can be when all of the major elements of the
critical infrastructure are in a state of failure in a 92,000 square
mile area.
3
Comparing and Contrasting Some Differing
Perspectives of a Few Actors and Analysts
with Regard to a Variety of Parameters
• Don Kettl's views (as found in his book System under
Stress ~ Homeland Security and American Politics)
• The common view points found in the major government
after action reports
• Michael Brown's views, including his February 11, 2006
Deposition
• General Honore's views
• One’s own views
(The list is short in order to accommodate the time frame for the presentation.)
4
Some Typologies, Concepts, and Tools
Used in this Matrix Analysis
•
•
•
•
Todd Stewart’s Counter-Terrorism Strategic Model:
Similarities between this depiction
of the homeland security cycle
and the emergency management cycle
Paula Gordon’s All-Hazards Adaptation of Stewart’s Model
A Typology of Emergencies of Differing Levels of Severity
The Homeland Security Impact Scale and its
Applicability to an All-Hazards Approach to
Emergency Management
5
The Nature of the Approach Being Taken
Are the actors or analysts taking a
comprehensive or a less than holistic approach to
emergency management and homeland security?
Are they taking a realistic approach?
Do they understand the differences between a
medium scale disaster and a catastrophe?
Are they expecting that the response to a
catastrophe can be micromanaged?
6
Todd Stewart’s
Counter-Terrorism Strategic Model:
• Todd Stewart's model is helpful in depicting a
comprehensive approach to preventing as well as
preparing for and responding to potential
terrorist-related events.
• A model that helps clarify key similarities and
differences between the homeland security cycle
and the emergency management cycle
• A model that importantly includes mitigation.
7
Todd Stewart’s
Counter-Terrorism Strategic Model
Identify & Characterize
Threats
Recovery &
Reconstitution
Post-Event
Response
Deterrence
TERRORISM
EVENT OR
CAMPAIGN
Forensics &
Attribution
Prediction
Prevention
Crisis
Management
(Pre-emption)
Mitigation
Detect &
Characterize
(Preparation
and Protection)
8
Paula Gordon’s All-Hazards Adaptation
of Todd Stewart’s Strategic Model:
• The following adaptation of Todd Stewart's model
is helpful in depicting a comprehensive approach
to preventing as well as preparing for and
responding to potential events involving all
hazards, whatever their origin may be.
• A model that helps clarify key similarities and
differences between the homeland security cycle
and the emergency management cycle.
• A model that importantly includes preparedness
mitigation, and situational awareness.
9
Recovery &
Reconstitution
Plus Mitigation &
Preparedness
Measures
for the Future
Post-Event
Response
Crisis
Management
& Event
Response
Identify, Assess, &
Characterize Hazards
Preparedness
AN ALLHAZARDS
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
CYCLE
Situational Awareness & Assessment
When & If the Event is Foreseeable or
Imminent & When the Event Occurs
Remediation,
Protective
Measures, &
Mitigation
Contingency
Planning &
Continuity of
Operations Planning
Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D,
http://gordonhomeland.com 5/20//2011
Modeled Loosely on an Adaptation of Todd Stewart’s Counter Terrorism Strategic Model
A Typology of Emergencies
of Differing Levels of Severity
•
A typology that is pertinent to an all-hazards
approach to emergency management as well as
to a natural hazards approach to emergency
management.
• A typology that helps clarify the differences in
impacts of emergencies of differing levels of
severity and the implications of those differences
for the emergency management cycle.
11
A Typology of Emergencies
Size of
Emergency
Number
of Dead &
Injured
Roles of
Approach
Government
Characteristics
of Care
Skill &
Training
Needs
Small Scale
Scores
Local, State,
and Regional
Surge of
capabilities
Manageable
Surge capability
Medium
Scale
Hundreds
All levels of
government
Modified
Normal to
minimal
Networked
surge
capability
Large
Scale
Thousands
All levels of
government
Modified
to
makeshift
Normal to
minimal
Networked
surge
capability
Catastrophic
Scale
Millions
All levels of
government
Mostly
makeshift
Minimal or
worse
Make do
capability
MegaCatastrophe
Multimillions to
billions
Remaining
vestiges of
government
Totally
makeshift
Minimal if
existent
Improvisational
skills
Adapted from P. Gordon " Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis: Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina,"
Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006 (http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options/Analysis.html )
12
The Homeland Security Impact Scale: Its
Applicability to an All-Hazards Approach to
Emergency Management
• The Homeland Security Impact Scale provides a
common frame of reference that can be useful in
considering and arriving at a consensus
concerning the impacts of disasters.
• The Homeland Security Impact Scale provides a
common frame of reference that can be useful in
considering actions that can be taken to mitigate
the impacts of disasters or emergencies of
differing levels of severity or to address and help
reverse them once they have occurred.
13
Homeland Security Impact Scale
• 0 -- No real impact on national security, economic security, or
personal security
• 1 -- Local impact in areas directly affected
• 2 -- Significant impact in some areas that were not directly
affected
• 3 -- Significant market adjustment (20% plus drop); some
business and industries destabilized; some bankruptcies, including
increasing number of personal bankruptcies and bankruptcies of
small businesses, and waning of consumer confidence
• 4 -- Economic slowdown spreads; rise in unemployment and
underemployment accompanied by possible isolated disruptive
incidents and acts, increase in hunger and homelessness
• 5 -- Cascading impacts including mild recession; isolated supply
problems; isolated infrastructure problems; accompanied by
possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts, continuing
societal impacts
14
Homeland Security Impact Scale
(Continued)
• 6 -- Moderate to strong recession or increased market volatility;
regional supply problems; regional infrastructure problems
accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts;
worsening societal impacts
• 7 -- Spreading supply problems and infrastructure problems
accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts,
worsening societal impacts, and major challenges posed to elected
and non-elected public officials
• 8 -- Depression; increased supply problems; elements of
infrastructure crippled accompanied by likely increase in
disruptive incidents and acts; worsening societal impacts; and
national and global markets severely impacted
• 9 -- Widespread supply problems; infrastructure verging on
collapse with both national and global consequences; worsening
economic and societal impacts accompanied by likely widespread
disruptions
• 10 -- Possible unraveling of the social fabric, nationally and
globally, jeopardizing the ability of governments to govern and
keep the peace
15
Homeland Security Impact Scale
(Continued)
• "Disruptions" and "incidents" can include demonstrations, work
stoppages, strikes, organized or spontaneous vandalism, looting,
and riots. Also included are sabotage and terrorist acts and
attacks. (The scale and these notations have been adapted by
Paula D.Gordon from the Y2K Impact Scale developed by Bruce F.
Webster of WDCY2K and sent by him to the membership of
WDCY2K on March 4, 1998.)
• "Supply problems" and "infrastructure problems" may include food
shortages; availability of potable water; degradation of water
purity, water distribution and/or waste management; fuel/heating
oil shortages, disruptions in utilities (power, gas,
telecommunications), disruption in the financial sector, disruptions
in transportation (airlines, trains, trucking, ports, ships);
pharmaceutical shortages; disruption of health care services or
emergency medical services; disruption of fire and public safety
services; disruptions or inadequacies, or overwhelming of public
works operations and services.
16
Some Parameters Used to Compare and
Contrast the Views of the Actors and Analysts
• Characterization of the individual's general
perspective;
• Stance with regard to Typology of Emergencies in
and assumptions concerning the level of severity
of Katrina and what constitutes a catastrophe;
• Stance with regard to the Homeland Security
Impact Scale and perceptions concerning the
impacts of Katrina on all key elements of the
critical infrastructure near term and long term;
• Capabilities and skills needed by those in various
levels of public responsibility and assumptions
concerning the capabilities and skills of those
17
involved in Katrina.
Some Parameters Used to Compare and
Contrast the Views of the Actors and Analysts
(Continued)
• Views concerning what went wrong and who or
what was responsible for what went wrong
• Degree of realism in assessing the capacity of
any or all levels of government to deal with
Katrina;
• Recognition of the existence of a cultural divide
between homeland security and emergency
management and DHS and FEMA;
• Understanding of the problems between DHS and
FEMA before, during, and after Katrina.
18
Some Parameters Used to Compare and
Contrast the Views of the Actors and Analysts
(Continued)
• Perceptions concerning the nature of the
intergovernmental challenges in Katrina;
• Perspectives concerning the suitability of the
National Response Plan at the time of Katrina and
the suitability of presently planned approaches to
a revised NRP to potential catastrophic events in
the future;
• Perspectives concerning whether or not the NRP
was applicable at the time of Katrina,
understanding of the extent to which the NRP
was ignored or worked around.
19
Some Parameters Used to Compare and
Contrast the Views of the Actors and Analysts
(Continued)
• Assumptions concerning who's in charge or who
should be in charge; and
• Views concerning lessons learned and where we
go from here.
20
The Matrix
Actors &Analysts
1) General Perspective
A)
Don Kettl's
views
Wide-ranging assessment of
DHS/FEMA and Katrina featuring
historical and organizational analysis
with some emphasis on lessons
learned and recommendations
concerning some current challenges
Less wide-ranging assessment than
Kettl's based on a more limited
problem definition with less
attention to historical and
organizational analysis and with
different prescriptions for change
Realistic assessment of emergency
management challenges rooted in
comprehensive all hazards approach
to emergency management and the
emergency management cycle and
an understanding of the evolution of
emergency management challenges
since 9/11
B) Common viewpoints in reports
C)
Michael Brown's views
D)
General Honore's views
Extremely realistic assessment of
emergency management challenges
presented by natural catastrophes
2)
Stance
re
Typology
of
Emergencies
Katrina viewed in part as a Large
Scale Emergency and in part as an
Emergency of Catastrophic Scale
Similar to Kettl
Katrina was Katrina was an
unprecedented Emergency of
Catastrophic Scale impacting
millions in a 92,000 square mile
area
Similar to Brown's stance
with even greater emphasis on the
impact of the failure of all major
elements of the critical
infrastructure
21
The Matrix (Continued)
Actors &Analysts
A)
Don Kettl's
views
Likely rating
impacts: 5-6
Likely rating
impacts: 3
of
near
of
long
Likely rating
impacts: 5
Likely rating
impacts: 1-3
of
near
of
long
B) Common viewpoints in reports
C)
Michael Brown's views
D)
General Honore's views
4) Capabilities
and Skills
3) Stance re Homeland
Security
Impact Scale
Possible
impacts:
Possible
impacts:
Possible
impacts:
Possible
impacts:
rating
5-10
rating
3-5
rating
5-9
rating
3-4
of
near
of
long
of
near
of
long
Focus on improving processes,
term developing capabilities useful for
large scale emergencies and
term "building nimble organizations
capable of flexible response" that
are needed for larger scale
emergencies
term Focus on improving logistics
coupled along with the need to
term improve capabilities (primarily
those best suited to Large Scale
Emergencies)
Focus on the need to improve
term skills and capabilities across the
board, including those involving
term planning and preparedness
Honore's Eleven Quick
Fixes focus on problem solving
term skills and proactive approaches
that would mitigate impacts
term
22
The Matrix (Continued)
Actors &Analysts
A)
Don Kettl's
views
5) What went wrong and who or
what
was responsible
6) Realistic assessment of govt's
capacity
Focus on correctable failures of
government at all levels and the need
for government to improve processes
and develop a capability for "flexible
response"
More realistic than most
Focus on the failure of government at
all levels, particularly the Federal
government, and the need to make
organizational changes and significantly
improve technology and emergency
management processes
Somewhat realistic, but rooted in a
definition of the nature and scope of the
challenges and of what is needed that is
somewhat limited
Recognition well before Katrina of the
government's failure to be adequately
prepared and belief that far more
adequate preparation for potential
catastrophic events along with a far
more viable FEMA pre-Katrina could
have made a difference
Far more realistic than most
Recognition of the catastrophic nature
of Katrina and focus on dealing as
effectively as possible with future
challenges
Extremely realistic
B) Common viewpoints in reports
C)
Michael Brown's views
D)
General Honore's views
23
The Matrix (Continued)
Actors &Analysts
A)
Don Kettl's
views
B) Common viewpoints in reports
C)
Michael Brown's views
D)
General Honore's views
9) Intergovernmental
challenges of Katrina
10) Suitability of the National
Response Plan (NRP) for
Katrina
Viewed largely in terms of the Not addressed in his book, only
need to make significant changes mentioned in passing on page 69
in process
The NRP was not sufficient (The
Reflective of varying views
relevance to catastrophes of the
concerning what the nature of
yet to be completed revised
version remains to be seen.)
relations should be between
Federal, State, and local entities,
particularly in a worst case
catastrophe
Unable using best efforts to
The NRP was not suitable for
Katrina.
develop effective working
relationships with State and local
governments in
Was freer than Michael Brown to Not a matter addressed directly
develop
effective
working but some recommendations for
relationships in that he was not changes can be found in his list
constrained in the same ways of Eleven Quick Fixes
that Brown was
24
The Matrix (Continued)
Actors & Analysts
11) The NRP at the time of Katrina
& the extent to which it was used
A)
Don Kettl's
views
Kettl does not appear to recognize that
the version of the NRP in place at the
time of Katrina was "worked around"
and not fully implemented and that it
would have been impossible to
implement that version of the NRP since
it is not possible to "manage" an
emergency the magnitude of Katrina
using prescriptions that are inapplicable
to catastrophic events
The authors of the earliest published
reports do not appear to recognize that
the version of the NRP in place at the
time of Katrina was "worked around"
and not fully implemented and that it
would have been impossible to
implement that version of the NRP since
it is not possible to "manage" an
emergency the magnitude of Katrina
using prescriptions that are inapplicable
to catastrophic events
Brown decided to work around the NRP
based on his perception that the August
2005 version of the NRP was
inapplicable in a catastrophic event
(See Michael Brown's Deposition.)
The NRP was not apparently a concern
of General Honore’s perhaps owing to
the fact that he had considerable
flexibility to do what needed to be done.
B) Common viewpoints in reports
C) Michael Brown's views
D) General Honore’s views
12) Who's in charge & who should
be
Dealt with in very general terms
Question of when the military should be
involved in catastrophic events raised
and discussed. Plans concerning how
potentially catastrophic events are to be
handled in the future are as yet unclear
The military should be called out to
deal with a catastrophic event.
Apparent recognition that the military
should be called out to deal with a
catastrophic event.
25
The Matrix (Continued)
Actors &Analysts
A)
Don Kettl's
views
B) Common viewpoints in reports
C) Michael Brown's views
D)
General Honore's views
7) Cultural divide between HS
& EM, DHS & FEMA
8) Current DHS/FEMA
Efforts
Some
recognition
of
some Appears to be only somewhat
aspects of the cultural divide
aware of the nature and extent of
the cleavages within DHS and
between DHS and FEMA
Little recognition of the nature
and scope of the cultural divide
and how it might be bridged
Far less aware than Kettl of the
nature of the cleavages within
DHS and between DHS and FEMA
Considerable insight into the
basis for and the manifestations
of the cultural divide (See
especially the testimony of
Michael Brown and his
Deposition)
Not apparent the extent
to which he may be following
current efforts
Far more focused on doing what
needs to be done than on
analyzing organizational and
professional cultural challenges
Not apparent what his interests
might be in such matters
26
Some of the Value in
Using a Matrix Approach to Analysis
• The use of this kind of matrix approach to
analysis can help deepen understanding of
different perspectives, backgrounds, and
experience that key actors have.
• The use of a matrix approach to analysis
can also deepen our understanding of the
implications of those perspectives and to
understand in a new light the difficulties that
were faced in Katrina.
27
Some Selected Reference Materials
The following are materials, websites, videos, and DVD’s
that can be used in the development and implementation of
courses and curricula focusing on an all-hazards approach
to homeland security and emergency management.
Complete references for these materials can be found in the
“List of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
References and Resources” compiled by Paula D. Gordon
and posted at GordonPublicAdministration.com
(http://GordonPublicAdministration.com ). The 102 page
List of References and Resources includes twenty-two
categories and is posted in two parts in the File Section of
the GordonPublicAdministration.com website.
GordonHomeland.com (http://GordonHomeland.com) and
GordonPublicAdministration.com
(http://GordonPublicAdministration.com) include articles,
reports, publications, and presentations on homeland
security and emergency management and organizational,
managerial, ethical, and educational issues. The websites
have been developed by Paula D. Gordon and are provided 28
as a free public service.
Some Selected Materials
(Continued)
• “Principles of Emergency Management” from
FEMA:
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/emprincipl
es.asp .
• Principles of Emergency Management October 10,
2008, 1 page.
• Principles of Emergency Management Brochure.
September 11, 2007. 9 pages.
• Principles of Emergency Management Slide
Presentation. Developed by Jim Fraser, February
14, 2008. 18 Slides.
29
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Claire B. Rubin, editor, Emergency Management: The
American Experience 1900 – 2005, Public Entity Risk
Institute, (http://riskinstitute.org ), 2007.
• Claire B. Rubin, 4/9/08 Transcript of Forum Presentation:
Emergency Management: The American Experience,
1900 – 2005. View
at http://www.emforum.org/vlibrary/all.htm .
• David A. McEntire, Introduction to Homeland Security:
Understanding Terrorism with an Emergency
Management Perspective, Wiley, 2009.
30
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Stephen Flynn speaking on his book The Edge of Disaster ~
Rebuilding a Resilient Nation at the Houston World Affairs
Council, March 27, 2007. See video at http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/197358-1 .
• Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster, Random House,
2007.
• Secretary Mike Leavitt, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Emergency Preparedness Health Summit, National Press
Club, April 18, 2006. View online at http://www.CSPAN.org/videolibrary . ID#192090-1. 45 minutes.
31
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• April 2003 Frontline Program: Cyberwar (PBS) (Also see
archived program, transcript, and interviews online at
http://www.pbs.org .)
• Paula D. Gordon, "Infrastructure Threats and Challenges:
Before and After September 11, 2001". PA TIMES, Vol.
24, Issue 12, December 2001. Reprinted as a commentary
in the Journal of Homeland Security, April 16, 2002.
Also posted at
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/homeland_infra.ht
ml or see link at http://gordonhomeland.com .
•
Paula D. Gordon, "A Matrix Approach to Comparing and
Contrasting Some Differing Perspectives on the Federal
Government’s Role in Hurricane Katrina and in Potential
Catastrophic Events in the Future." Access at
http://GordonPublicAdministration.com .
32
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Critical Infrastructure Task Force. Washington, DC: Homeland
Security Advisory Council, January 2006 (50 pages). Access at:
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_CITF_Report_v2.pdf
• Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in
Homeland Security ~ Defending a Networked Nation,
Wiley-Interscience, 2006.
• Naval Postgraduate School Course Materials and videos on
radical extremism and the resources of the Homeland
Security Digital Library. Access at https://www.hsdl.org .
33
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• *General Russel Honore, Presentation on Hurricane Katrina,
a presentation before the Houston Forum on February 13,
2006. Access at http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/id/155435 .
• *General Russel Honore, September 9, 2005 CNN transcript
in which General Honore compares the crisis to a football
game in which you cannot expect to win any ground in the
first quarter.
• Michael Brown, Presentation on Hurricane Katrina and
Weather Emergency Preparedness, January 18, 2006
Video can be viewed at http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/id/153798 .
* For particularly significant insights into the massive challenges relating to
catastrophic event planning, preparedness, mitigation, and response and
the Federal approach to Hurricane Katrina
34
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Michael Brown, February 11, 2006, Congressional
Deposition . Access at
http://katrina.hours.gov/brown/depo.doc .
• Paula D. Gordon, "Thoughts about Katrina: Responses to
Two Questions about Hurricane Katrina and America's
Resilience,“ December 1, 2005 (Prepared for the December
19-21, 2005 Forum on Building America's Resilience to
Hazards, sponsored by The American Meteorological Society
in collaboration with The Space Enterprise Council of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.) Access at
http://gordonhomeland.com .
35
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• *Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald, "Department's
Mission Was Undermined From Start", Washington Post,
December 22, 2005. Access at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/12/21/AR2005122102327.html .
• *Michael Grunwald and Susan B. Glasser, "Brown's Turf
Wars Sapped FEMA's Strength" Washington Post,
December 23, 2005. Access at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/12/22/AR2005122202213.html?nav=hcmod
ule .
* For extraordinary insights into the background Federal homeland
security efforts from after 9/11 through Hurricane Katrina.
36
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Paula D. Gordon, “Improving Homeland Security
& Critical Infrastructure Protection and Continuity
Efforts.” Access at
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/hsciprep
ort.pdf or use link at
http://gordonhomeland.com .
37
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Paula D. Gordon, Presenter, "Improving
Homeland Security - Continuing Challenges and
Opportunities," transcript of Emergency
Information Infrastructure Partnership (EIIP)
Virtual Forum, March 24, 2004. Posted at
http://gordonhomeland.com.
• Paula D. Gordon, "Transforming and Leading
Organizations," (Examples from disaster
management.) (Posted at
http://gordonhomeland.com. Also published in
Government Transformation, Winter 2004-05
issue.
38
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Paula D. Gordon, "Capabilities and Skills Needed
by Those in New Roles of Responsibility for
Homeland Security at the Federal, State, and
Local Levels of Government." Posted at
http://gordonhomeland.com and published in the
PA TIMES, Vol. 28, Issue 3, March 2005 (a
publication of the American Society for Public
Administration).
• Paula D. Gordon, "Comparative Scenario and
Options Analysis: Important Tools for Agents of
Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina,"
Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2,
2006. Posted at http://gordonhomeland.com or
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options
Analysis.html.
39
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Paula D. Gordon, “The Homeland Security Impact
Scale: An Alternative Approach to
Assessing Homeland Security and Critical
Infrastructure Protection Efforts and a Frame of
Reference for Understanding and Addressing
Current Challenges.” Access at
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/thehom
elandsecurityimpactscale.htm or use link at
http://gordonhomeland.com .
• Paula D. Gordon, “Strategic Planning and Y2K
Technology Challenges:Lessons and Legacies for
Homeland Security.” Access at
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/homela
nd_strat.html or use link at
http://gordonhomeland.com .
40
Some Selected Materials
(Continued)
• Paula D. Gordon, “Using E-Technology to
Advance Homeland Security Efforts.” Access at
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/etechnol
ogy.html or use link at
http://gordonhomeland.com .
• Paula D. Gordon, “A Common Goal for
Contingency Planning and Management,
Emergency Management, and Homeland
Security: Building a Disaster Resilient Nation.”
Access at
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/Commo
nGoal.html or use link at
http://gordonhomeland.com .
41
Some Selected Reference Materials
(Continued)
• Paula D. Gordon, "The State of Emergency
Management and Homeland Security," PA
TIMES, Vol. 30, Issue 8, August 2007. Also
posted at http://gordonhomeland.com or see or
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/stateofE
M.html .
• Paula D. Gordon, “Challenges for the Future of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Education,” PA TIMES, Vol. 31, Issue 8, August
2008. Also see http://gordonhomeland.com .
42
University Affiliations,
Contact Information & Websites
Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D.
•
Auburn University Emergency Management for Government &
Private Sector Certificate Program
• University of Richmond
• Eastern Kentucky University
E-Mail:
pgordon@starpower.net
Phone: (202) 241 0631
Websites: http://GordonPublicAdministration.com
http://GordonHomeland.com and
http://www.jhu.edu/pgordon
43