COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN ITALY:
BETWEEN PATH DEPENDENCY AND
CHANGES
Dr. Salvo Leonardi
September 26, 2013
Bruxelles
Timeline and changes 2009-2013
2009
January 22; Separate framework
agreement on the new industrial
relations system (without the CGIL)
New system to calculate the inflation rate;
longer duration of the 1st level collective
agreements; opening clauses and
decentralisation; restrictions to strike
2010-2011
Separate agreements at the FIAT
plants; national agreement for the
whole group, out of the metal workers
national agreement
Harder working conditions; restriction to the
right to strike; NewCo; exit form the national
industry-wide agreement
2011
June 28; New unitary Framework
agreement on the industrial relations
system
Two-tier system; primacy of the national
one; eligibility criteria to be admitted at the
National CB; opening clauses; restrictions to
strike
2011
August 3; Letter of the ECB
to the Italian Government
Request to decentralise collective
bargaining; freezing civil servant pay;
pension and labour market reform
2011
September; Law n. 148 on decentalization of collective bargaining
(art. 8) Company agreements can derogate
unfavourably even from laws
2011
Reform of the age for pension
Prolonged to 66-67 in the next ten yars
2012
Springtime: reform bill of labour
market and redundancy rules
Marginalization of the right to be reinstated
if unfairly fired; new crisis shock absorbers.
2013
May 31; New unitary Framework
Certification of trade unions
representativeness Vs. binding national
agreements
agreement on the industrial relations;
The Italian system of industrial relations
High level of voluntarism and ‘abstention of law’ (public sector excluded);
• trade unions pluralism, without laws to rule it (representation; collective
bargaining; participation; strikes)
• minimum wage is not fixed by law, but through collective bargaining,
as "fair pay”, based on the principles of "sufficiency" and
"proportionality" for a dignified quality of life of the workers and his/her
family (art. 36 Cost.)
Industrial relations regulated by tripartite or inter-confederate agreements.
Comparatively medium-high level of trade union density
High level of collective bargaining coverage
Trade Union Density and
Collective Bargaining coverage
The “qualitative” problems of
the Italian trade unions
1)
The gap between the trade union power and recognition
(membership, CB coverage) and the general quality of social
outcomes (wages, inequalities, precariousness, welfare state).
2)
The problems among unions about models of unionism and
collective bargaining (de-centralization; democracy, servicing,
crisis management): the season of the separate agreements
3)
The crisis of traditional voluntarism in the field of industrial
relations is provoking juridical uncertainty and disputes
4)
The recent, unprecedented, marginalization of social concertation
before the new State interventionism on the main social issues,
collective bargaining included
The Italian ways to
collective bargaining decentralisation
1.
Organized decentralization: the tripartite framework
agreement of 23/7/1993
2.
Weakly organized: the (separate) framework
agreement of 22/1/2009
3.
Totally disorganized: the Fiat and the art. 8 (law no.
148/2011) models
4.
Coordinate de-centralization: the bipartite framework
agreements (Confindustria) of 28/6/2011 and
31/5/2013
1) Organized de-centralization:
the framework agreement of July 1993)
Government
CGIL, CISL, UIL,
(3) + others
Sectoral
Federations
(12-18)
Interconfederate
agreements
1° level
Industrywide
collective
agreements
(456)
Confindustria, Confapi,
Confartigianato, Legacoop
(>10)
Employers
Federations
(> 200)
2° Level
Workplace
Reps/
Territorial
Federations
• enterprise/firm/group
•(medium-large)
Employer/
management
• territorial
(small units)
Territorial employers
association
2) Weakly organized de-centralisation:
the framework agreement of 22/1/2009
Reform of the collective bargaining machinery: experimental for four years
Signatory parties: CGIL didn’t agree and didn’t sign it
1) First level (National)
Duration:
3 years, incorporating either the normative and economic parts, differently scheduled in the past
Salary and cost of living:
new method to calculate increases
- a new indicator “Harmonised Consumer Prices Index” (HCPI), calculated by a neutral institutional
agency, replaces the old “Planned Inflation Rate”, fixed through tripartite concertation
- the restore of the purchasing power will be not programmatically full, since the new indicator
excludes the imported energy costs
2) Second level (company)
To enhance a decentralisation through:
a) opening clauses from sectoral agreements at company level,
b) incentivation through fiscal and social contributions reductions linked to productivity
c) minimum wage guarantees for the small firms, short of decentralised agreements
The European interventionism influence on collective
bargaining and wage setting system
The « secret » letter of the ECB of the 3 August 2011 asked the Italian
Government:
« to reform the system of wage bargaining at the enterprise level
agreements (..) with adapting the wages and working conditions to
the specific needs of companies (..) and make these
agreements more relevant than other levels of negotiation ».
Freezing civil servant pay
+
A « careful review of the rules governing the hiring and firing of employees ».
Further action in the pension system.
3a) Article 8 of the Law no. 148/2011:
the “proximity agreements”
•
Aims: why to derogate? to enhance occupational levels, to manage
occupational and economic crisis, to support quality of employment
contracts, the workers’ participation, combating undeclared work, the level
of salaries, new investments, the setting up of new activities
•
Matters: what derogate? “Specific agreements” can derogate (in worst) on
a long list of matters: new technologies, work organization, classification
systems, short term contracts, working time, employment contracts,
consequences of dismissal (on ALL…. except union liberties and pension)
•
Scope: how much derogate? Not only from national sectoral agreements
and but also from the law, with the only limit of being not in contrast with
International or Constitutional fundamental rights/principles
•
Procedures: Who and how can derogate? Local or company collective
“proximity” agreements are binding, if approved by a majority of the
representative unions in the enterprise.
3b) Totally disorganized decentralization
The FIAT “American” model
1. Exit from the employers’
association and its system of
agreements
2. A “national first level agreement”
(for automotive), de-linked from
the metal sectoral agreement
3. Workplace representation and
rights: for signatory union
organizations only
•
Unions refusing to sign firm-level
agreements are excluded by any
representation (closed shop) within all
the FIAT workplaces
•
11.000 FIOM-CGIL members expulsed
by any right to representation. A wide
campaign and legal disputes
•
Constitutional Court stigmatized that it’s
not the unions’ real representativeness
(vote and/or members) to legitimate the
signature of a binding agreement but –
on the reverse – to sign whatever
agreement to legitimate a trade union to
be recognized and admitted.
•
A new law is needed to avoid such a
situations. Also FIAT claims for it now
4. All workers of Pomigliano’s plant
dismissed and hired again from a
formally “New Company” (No
CGIL-FIOM members hired)
5. Strike restrictions, with sanctions
for unions and individual workers
too (until dismissal) in case of
violation
12
4) The coordinated de-centralisation:
the framework agreements of 28/6/2011 and
31/5/2013
•
Certification of unions representativeness in order to take part at the national
bargaining rounds: threshold at 5% between votes and members
•
Two-tier bargaining system and primacy of the industry-wide CA
•
Possibility to negotiate “modifying agreements” at company level, which are
now erga omnes binding, in respect of the national CA limits, contents and
procedures
•
No derogation of law admitted
•
A national CA is binding when signed by unions which together represent
50+1% of the workers (majority principle), as a weighted average between
votes and members, collected and certified by independent agencies
•
Workers have to be timely consulted and their votes have to be taken in
consideration
•
Clauses on strike restrictions: mandatory for signatories unions only
13
What future for the Italian and European
collective bargaining and wage policy?
•
Multi-employer agreements: a fundamental tool against social dumping
•
Making collective bargaining more inclusive (atypical workers; very small enterprises)
through binding extention (alternative to the minimum wage setting)
•
Definition of a platform of non-derogable rights (employment relations, health and
safety, minimum wage, union rights) at firm-level collective agreement
•
Pure voluntarism doesn’t guarantee certainess/enforcability/reliblility. Legal rules on
employees representation and collective bargaining in the full respect of the social
partners options (see the Protocol of July ‘1993), are needed
•
More democracy for union revitalization, against membership decline
•
To change the European economic policies and narratives, with alternative
approaches also on wage policy and collective bargaining
•
To strenghten the attempts towards a European coordination of collective bargaining,
in order to prevent downward wage competition (priorities, criteria, syncronisation)