GREECE AND TURKEY
Understanding the Past, Anticipating the Future
Panayotis J. Tsakonas
University of the Aegean
A threatened Greece attempts to balance a threatening Turkey
 From the restoration of Greek democracy in 1974 onwards the Greek political discourse has been
dominated by the strong belief – which has also been reflected in a remarkable continuity of the
views of all successive Greek governments – that Turkey constitutes the gravest external
threat to Greece’s (even Hellenism’s) survival or, in the least, a major security concern
 Successive Greek administrations have embarked since the mid-1970s upon a series of
balancing strategies whose basic element has been deterrence of the perceived Turkish threat.
For balancing threats to its security, Greece has traditionally relied on a combination of
‘internal’ (strong Armed Forces) and ‘external balancing’ (participation in all West European
security and political organizations).
 European Union and NATO allies were viewed as ‘security-providing’ hegemons or as levers of
pressure to deter Turkey from potential adventures in the Aegean. Especially, the EU was for a
lengthy period of time viewed as a precious instrument of a [state] ‘strategy of conditional
sanctions’ with regard to Turkey’s European vocation or a strategy of ‘reinforcement
by punishment’
Socialization: What is it?
• Socialization is the process by which new
members come to adopt a society’s preferred ways of
behaving
• One of the most common and large-scale processes
of international socialization began after the end of
the Cold War when the Western community of
states embarked – through its main international
organizations, i.e. the European Union and NATO –
on the socialization of the former
Communist states.
Socialization in IR Theory I
REALISM
 Socialization is the process of
reconciling states’ (especially
revolutionary states’) individual
aspirations to generally accepted
standards
 The construction of a stable
international order is dependent
upon the successful linkage of
state interests to international
legitimizing principles
NEOLIBERALISM
 The transnational transmission
of ideas matters
 Liberal variables define the
conditions under which high rates of
communication and transaction
alter state behavior.
Socialization in IR Theory II
.
CONSTRUCTIVISM
 International institutions transmit --through the ‘process of socialization’-their norms, rules, beliefs and standards of appropriate behavior (and the
subsequent internalization of the institutions’ rules and norms) into their
members as well as to prospective member-states.
 International institutions cannot simply affect states’ behavior or strategies;
 they can succeed in changing states’ preferences and even their identities by
promoting a ‘common/collective security identity’
EU: An example of effective international
socialization by an institution
 The
socialization
strategy
of
‘intergovernmental reinforcement’
the
European
Union
=
The EU offers the government of a target state positive
incentives – rewards such as financial assistance or institutional
ties/membership – on the condition that the state adopts and
complies with the EU’s norms, namely the basic liberal norms of
human rights and democracy.
The high material incentive of membership is what distinguishes
the socialization activity of the EU from that of other European
organizations such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe
The mechanisms institutions use
• ‘Logic of Appropriateness’ (do what is deemed appropriate)
 ‘Cognitive Mechanism’ [teach domestic actors what is deemed
appropriate in a given situation]
 ‘Normative Mechanism’ [seek to convince states of their norms]
• ‘Logic of Consequentiality’ (based on a cost/benefit analysis
actors choose the action that maximizes their individual utility)
 ‘Rhetorical Mechanism’ [institutions use social-psychological
rewards for compliance and punishment for non-compliance]
 ‘Bargaining Mechanism’ [institutions use material threats and
promises either directly to coerce a state to follow its norms or
indirectly to alter the domestic balance of power in favor of actors
that support its norms]
Can a state pursue socialization strategies?
• COMMON KNOWLEDGE
• International socialization is a strategy which is being developed by
international institutions with the aim to socialize states to international
norms and rules.
• NEW KNOWLEDGE: WHAT GREECE’S POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY
SUGGESTS?
• States can also pursue socialization strategies --through the use of
international institutions-- with the aim to better balancing other more
threatening states and/or to transform their behavior
The EU Summit in Helsinki
• Greece lifts its veto and the EU grants Turkey the official status
of a candidate state.
• Progress on Turkey’s candidacy/membership in the EU was
linked to the resolution of its border disputes with an EU
member.
• Thus, the –peaceful-- resolution of outstanding border disputes
was established as a community principle as it was made clear to
Turkey (as well as to the EU member, Greece) that they have
four years –until the end of 2004—to resolve their conflict. This
in turn meant that for the first time in the history of the two
states’ conflict, there was a clear reference to a particular timeframe (2004 was identified as the deadline) and to the final
forum and/or mechanism the two states should use for
resolving/ending their long-standing conflict, namely the
International Court of Justice in The Hague.
Making the EU act as a ‘framework’ and as
an ‘active player’
• Greece’s ‘socialization strategy’ viewed the EU as the factor which can act:
a. as a framework that can eliminate the bases of its long-standing conflict with a
threatening neighbor in the long-run by ‘socializing’ Turkey into the EU
institutional and normative environment through democratization and gradual
integration
b. as an active player which can impact on border conflicts through direct and
indirect ways. Thus the European Union appears as a [necessary] condition that can
have a direct (‘compulsory’ and/or ‘connective’) as well as an indirect (‘enabling’
and/or ‘constructive’) impact on the disputants’ – especially on Turkey’s – strategies
towards cooperation and, by implication, on the positive transformation of the two
states’ conflict.
The goals Greece’s socialization strategy
aimed at achieving
1
By viewing the EU as a precious instrument to and as an indispensable means towards
goals Greece aimed:
 at borrowing the ‘socialization power’ component of the EU, namely the
high degree of its normative persuasion (the EU appears as the best available forum
for enmeshing Turkey into its rule-based, institutionalized, and
normative context, by setting conditions and placing prerequisites)
 at using the EU to monitor and sanction compliance of Turkey (by putting
Turkey under the constant screening and monitoring process of certain EU
mechanisms and procedures, allowing thus for certain structural changes (i.e.,
democratization) to take place in Turkey in order for the European acquis to be fully
endorsed
 at exercising a certain amount of control over Turkey –which was also an
aspiring member of the EU
 at imposing obligations on Turkey such as the prohibition of certain modes of
behavior –both internally and externally– that do not comply with the rules, norms
and standards of the EU, of which it seeks to become a member
The goals Greece’s socialization strategy
aimed at achieving
2
 Link Turkey’s strong incentive for closer relations and stronger institutional
ties with –and eventual membership in– the EU with particular conditions,
which would facilitate the promotion and realization of Greece’s interests
These conditions are not, however, part of a strategy of ‘conditional sanctions’ vis-àvis Turkey, i.e. a strategy of hindering closer institutional ties between Turkey and
the EU unless certain conditions are first met, but part of a strategy of
‘conditional rewards’, i.e. one that gives Turkey material rewards in return for its
compliance with the norms and standards of the EU
 Engage Turkey in a short, medium and long-term process which would
better serve Greece’s balancing efforts, i.e. by passing part of the buck Greece
was traditionally obliged to pay to balance Turkey to Turkey’s fulfilment of particular
European rules and conditions.
Greece’s ‘socialization strategy’ was in fact a policy of ‘balancing engagement’ of
Turkey, which aimed to preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy while
deterring Turkey from becoming hostile.
EU and Greece’s socialization mechanisms
The main goals Greece’s active socialization strategy had achieved at the EU level concerned
Greece’s ability to ensure and further enhance the monitoring of Turkey’s behaviour
both internally (i.e. democratization) and externally (towards Greece and Cyprus)
by EU mechanisms
• Institutional (EU) Mechanisms
 The European Commission had published since 1998 annual ‘Progress Reports’ assessing
‘progress’ (or lack thereof) in Turkey’s alignment with EU requirements
 Beginning in 2001, the EU had also published Accession Partnership Documents
pinpointing the specific short and medium-term recommendations that Turkey should follow in
its attempt to meet the criteria.
 Since the Helsinki summit in 1999, the EU Councils had also expressed their views every six
months.
 The European Parliament had also voiced its views, through regular reports, on Turkey’s
progress towards meeting European norms and conditions, especially in regard to respect of
human rights and the rule of law
• State (Greece’s) Mechanisms
 Establishment of a Joint Task Force for facilitating Turkey’s alignment with the EU
acquis
Assessing the effectiveness of EU and Greece’s
socialization strategies
“The ‘success of socialization depends on the socializee’s domestic
environment/politics and its effect on its foreign policy style and substance”.
Successful socialization is expected to result in some level of behavioural
change on the part of the socializee (i.e. Turkey) vis-à-vis the socializers (i.e.
Greece and EU)
• Turkey’s EU path: the period 2001-2004 has been recorded as ‘the
golden years of the EU accession process’.
Assessing institutional effects
•
Turkey’s EU path: the period 2001-2004 has been recorded as ‘the golden years of the EU
accession process’. The normative and internalization effects of the EU on Turkey took place
on a series of levels:
•
At the ‘domestic institutions’ level, from 2001 to 2004 various political reform packages were
adopted in order to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria, while some big steps were also taken
for the regulation of the constitutional role of the National Security Council, and the fulfilment of
certain economic and legal conditions.
•
At the elite level, the civil-military elite, painfully but steadily entered a process of
‘de-securitization’. One may at this point stress the change in Turkey’s elite interests over the
Cyprus issue due to EU membership incentive and the EU’s normative impact on Turkey’s
political elite.
•
Most importantly, at the societal level, Turkey’s EU membership candidacy has empowered the
domestic actors in both Greece and Turkey who were in favor of promoting Greek-Turkish
cooperation. After 1999 a pro-EU coalition emerged which gradually and steadily gained ground
over another vocal “anti-EU” coalition.
Overall, these changes have had an apparent impact on the process, style and content of
Turkey’s foreign policy, leading thus towards a more rationalized and multilateralist stance on
foreign policy issues.
•
Types of Greece’s socialization strategy
• Active socialization
• It came into existence when Greece
realised that a more constructive
use
of
Turkey’s
European
vocation
 would better serve its balancing
efforts vis-à-vis the Turkish threat
 while it would also provide a way-out
of the long-standing GreekTurkish rivalry.
• It counts on the dual ability of the EU
to act both as a framework and as
an active player.
• It includes the compromise costs
a final agreement with Turkey may
entail.
• Passive Socialization
•
•
It calls for the emancipation of Greece’s
strategy from the commitments
entailed by the EU’s active role, namely
the responsibility of Greece to come to a
compromise solution with Turkey within a
particular time-frame.
It attempts to allow the EU factor to
only act as a framework that, by
contributing to the Europeanization of
Turkey en route to Brussels, would make the
future resolution of the Greek-Turkish
conflict more favorable to Greece’s interests
• What do ‘active’ and ‘passive’ socialization strategy have in
common?
• They both aim at the –smooth or painful-- integration of Turkey into the
binding commitments of the EU’s strategy of ‘intergovernmental
reinforcement’ and in joining the short, medium and long term benefits of
Turkey’s compliance with the EU norms and standards
• What distinguishes the two strategies?
• It the ‘active’ vis-à-vis the ‘passive’ dealing of the EU’s potential to become
the catalyst for the resolution of the long-standing dispute between the
threatened (Greece) and the threatening state (Turkey)
Change in Greece’s strategy: From ‘active’
to ‘passive socialization’
•
The Karamanlis government, which emerged from the parliamentary elections in March 2004,
opted for a transference of the resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute to the future.
•
At the December 2004 EU Summit in Brussels, the EU decided –obviously with Greece’s
concession—that the Helsinki timetable urging the two countries to solve their bilateral
differences or else agree, by December 2004, to refer them to ICJ, should be withdrawn.
Turkey –in addition to the Copenhagen criteria—was only asked by the EU to commit
to good neighborly relations and resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with
the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter,
including if necessary jurisdiction of the ICJ.
•
•
Progress on Turkey’s membership would no longer be linked to the resolution of its
dispute with Greece, with an obvious decrease on both disputants’, especially Turkey’s,
incentives to find a way of resolving their conflict. A resolution of the Greek-Turkish
conflict should, for the immediate future, be sought outside the EU context and be achieved
sometime in the distant future by a hesitant Greece and a –hopefully--increasingly Europeanized
Turkey en route to Brussels.
What impact on the EU’s socialization ability?
 Change in Greece’s socialization strategy had negative consequences for the ability of the EU
to act as ‘an active player’ (i.e. to constructively intervene and contribute to the resolution of
the Greek-Turkish conflict).
 EU’s ability to be viewed as ‘a framework’ with potential positive effects in the long-run was
also affected by a series of negative trends
(a) The EU-Turkey relationship:
 EU Commission added new requirements of “integration capacity” = enhanced Turkey’s
suspicions of the EU’s good faith
 Rise of ‘turko-sceptic’ governments in the engine-countries of the EU (Germany, France) and
suspicion of EU citizens towards the enlargement project has turned into clear opposition to
Turkey’s accession
 The freezing of Turkey’s accession process suggests a rekindling of the advancement of a
‘special or privileged partnership’ between EU and Turkey (see EU’s recent attempts to
develop a ‘positive agenda’ for Turkey)
(b) Within Turkey:
 Set-backs in the reform process –already evident since 2005
 the Turkish public support for EU membership at an all-time low (about 37%) since the
beginning of the accession negotiation (73%)
(c) In Turkey’s foreign policy: Less EU, more Middle East-oriented
Constraints
Incentives/Prospects
• Continuity of the status of ‘Rebilateralized’ relations between Greece
and Turkey
• The prospects for a resolution of the
Greek-Turkish dispute are dim
• The freezing of Turkey’s accession
process suggests a rekindling of the
advancement of a ‘special or privileged
partnership’ between EU and Turkey
(see EU’s recent attempts to develop a
‘positive agenda’ for Turkey)
• Greece’s economic crisis affects its
credibility as well as its ability to take
initiatives
• There is a direct reflection and linkage
between Turkey’s economic
development and its outward-looking
and dynamic foreign policy, especially
in regard to its immediate region, i.e.
the Middle East
• Since 2009 bilateral relations are
strengthened –especially in terms of
economic cooperation and trust
building--through the establishment
of the Greek-Turkish Council of
Cooperation, the signing of more than
20 agreements on various domains of
‘low-politics’ issues, CBMS etc.
• On ‘high-politics’ issues the Greek side
had revitalized the procedure of the
‘Exploratory Talks’