UPDATES ON GPH-NDFP
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
-- the NDFP Perspective
Prepared by
Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center
for the
Sulong-CARHRIHL General Assembly
16 July 2013
Brief flashback: Resumption of GPH-NDFP
Formal Peace Talks
October 2010- Reconstitution of GPH Panel for the GPHNDFP negotiations
December 2010 - Meeting in Hongkong between GPH
Panel Chair Alex Padilla and NDFP Panel Chair Luis
Jalandoni paved the way to the resumption of formal
talks
January 2011 – Informal talks in Oslo, Norway; NDFP
sends letter to Aquino with a proposal for alliance and
truce and has been acknowledged even by previous
GPH panels (eventually called the “special track”)
February 2011 – Resumption of formal talks in Oslo,
Norway (no response to special track proposal)
GPH derides The Hague Joint Declaration
framework agreement
• At the February 2012 formal talks, the GPH
formalized its “qualifications” with regard to the
Hague Joint Declaration, describing it as a “document
of perpetual division”.
• The NDFP replied that on the contrary, the Hague
Joint Declaration has effectively served as the
framework and foundation agreement, has made the
negotiations move forward, and made possible the
other major agreements such as the JASIG and the
CARHRIHL. Previous GPH panels have acknowledged
this as fact.
GPH non-compliance with JASIG and
other bilateral agreements
• GPH failed to comply with the agreement to release “most if not
all” of the 14 detained NDFP consultants and other JASIG-protected
persons before the scheduled June 2011 formal talks.
• NDFP postponed the formal talks to give time to the GPH to comply
with its commitments. GPH insisted on verification of JASIG
protection as condition for release
• The attempt to verify the Documents of Identification of the
detained consultants and other JASIG-protected persons failed
because the encrypted files of the DIs stored in the safety deposit
box could not be decrypted. The decrypting keys were apparently
corrupted while in the possession of the Dutch police who had
seized all the electronic files found in the raided offices and
residences of the NDFP panel members, consultants and staff.
• GPH refusal to comply with JASIG or “on the basis of humanitarian
and other practical reasons” has caused the non-resumption of the
formal talks, or the impasse in the “regular track”.
GPH initial response to proposed special track
September 2011 - NDFP received the first concrete response to
the proposed “special track” or “Proposal for Alliance and
Truce” in the form of a brief draft “General Declaration”.
December 2011 – GPH representative met with NDFP
representatives for special track, but did not carry any
improved draft but proposed that a long ceasefire be held
during the Christmas season, during which the GPH will
release four or five detained consultants and JASIG-protected
persons , enough to pave the way to the resumption of formal
talks in January or February 2012.
January 2012 – Despite the long ceasefire materializing, GPH did
not release any of the detained consulants
GPH response to PEPP offer to serve
as custodians for ROR
February 2012 – PEPP offers to be collective and individual
guarantors or custodians for the release on recognizance
(ROR) of detained NDFP consultants “for humanitarian and
practial reasons”, as per Feb 2012 Joint Statement, and to
remove the obstacle to the resumption of formal talks
GPH sets conditions for ROR of consultants which the PEPP
deemed unreasonable and which eventually the consultants
deemed unacceptable.
June 2012 – In the GPH-NDFP informal talks, GPH unilaterally
casts aside the long-standing mechanism or process for
facilitating the release of detained consultants, saying the
PEPP proposal for ROR shall be the mechanism to secure the
releases
GPH response to NDFP proposal for
alliance and truce (special track)
• With the regular track stalemated, the special
track appeared to be an opening to keep the
peace talks alive and revive the formal talks.
• October 2012 - GPH special representative,
deemed to be the GPH principal’s emissary,
proposed “historic moments” similar to the GPHMILF developments that led to the signing of the
Framework Agreement.
• GPH and NDFP agreed again to improve on and
exchange their drafts Declaration.
December 2012 GPH-NDFP meeting on special track
Press Communique
December 18, 2012
The Special Representatives of the Government of the
Philippines (GPH) and the National Democratic Front of the
Philippines (NDFP) in pursuance of the special track of the
GPH and NDFP peace negotiations met in The Hague on
December 17-18, 2012.
The Royal Norwegian Government hosted and facilitated
the meeting.
• The GPH Special Representatives were Secretary Ronald Llamas,
Presidential Adviser for Political Affairs, GPH Negotiating Panel
Chairperson Alexander Padilla, Efren Moncupa, GPH Panel Member,
Undersecretary Chito Gascon (OPAPA) and Director Maria Carla MunsayacVillarta, GPH Panel Secretariat Head.
• The NDFP Special Representatives were Prof. Jose Maria Sison, Founding
Chairman of the CPP, NDFP Negotiating Panel Chairperson Luis Jalandoni,
Fidel Agcaoili and Coni Ledesma, NDFP Panel Members. They were
assisted by Vicente Ladlad, Political Consultant, Edre U. Olalia, Legal
Consultant, Ruth de Leon, NDFP Panel Secretariat Head, and Rosario
Agcaoili, staff.
• The Royal Norwegian Government as facilitator was represented by His
Excellency Ambassador Ture Lundh who was accompanied by Senior
Adviser Sverre Johan Kvale and Adviser Linn Kaja Rogstad.
1. The GPH and NDFP Special Representatives agreed to carry on the discussions
pertaining to the following subjects:
1.1 Common declaration of national unity and just peace
1.2 Further upholding national independence, democracy and human rights
1.3 Committee for National Unity, Peace and Development
1.4 Agrarian reform, rural development and national industrialization
1.5 Truce
2. As earlier agreed upon, they confirmed the nationwide ceasefire from December
20, 2012 to January 15, 2013.
3. They agreed to meet again early next year.
Authenticated by:
(Sgd.) Ambassador Ture Lundh
Special Envoy of the Royal Norwegian Government
to the GPH-NDFP Peace Negotiations
(excerpts from NDFP Panel report to the NDFP council
on why the talks on the special track broke down)
• The priorly agreed purpose of discussing the above
subjects was to craft a mutually acceptable paragraph
under each subject for incorporation in a joint press
communique to be issued on the occasion of what
Secretary Ronald Llamas, political adviser to the GPH
President, proposed and described to the NDFP
Delegation as the “first historic meeting” between the
GPH President and the Founding Chairman of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in Hanoi in
the early part of 2013. Secretary Llamas likened said
meeting to the Aquino-Murad meeting in Tokyo in
August 2011.
• Secretary Ronald Llamas as head of the GPH delegation
submitted to the NDFP delegation the draft below,
“Common Declaration for National Unity and a Just Peace”,
dated December 17, 2012. The NDFP delegation received
and subsequently critiqued it point by point.
• The NDFP presented its own initial draft Declaration, but
the GPH delegation refused to discuss this, saying it had
no mandate to do so and that the GPH principal did not
want to form a “special team on the special track”
• The NDFP raised the issues of release of political prisoners,
detained consultants and JASIG-protected persons and the
investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances of consultants. The GPH delegation again
said they did not have the mandate to discuss these.
• NDFP issued its own press statement on what happened in
the December 2012 meeting.
February 25-26 - GPH and NDFP representatives met
again in Amsterdam Sheraton, in accordance with the
previous GPH-NDFP agreement to meet in early 2013.
• To prepare for the projected first historic moment between
the GPH President and CPP Founding Chairperson, the
NDFP Delegation crafted the Draft Communique for the
Hanoi Meeting dated February 23, 2013. It gave said draft
to the GPH Delegation on February 24, 2013.
• But at the very first session of the Amsterdam meeting on
February 25, the GPH Delegation refused to discuss this
draft, declaring that they did not have the mandate to do
so.
• GPH presented a draft Declaration proposing immediate,
unilateral, indefinite multiple ceasefires in place of the
truce proposed by the NDFP. GPH subsequently withdrew
this draft and yet put on record its contents.
• It became clear that the GPH or Llamas proposal to
have an Aquino-Sison meeting in Hanoi, with Alan
Jazmines attending, was not a serious offer but a mere
ploy or bait to entice the NDFP to agree to the
aforesaid GPH draft General Declaration in just one or
two meetings. The NDFP Delegation had to point out
that it took 6 months to forge the Ceasefire Agreement
of 1986. It will certainly take more than 6 months to
agree on a mutually acceptable truce agreement in
view of the diametrically opposite positions of the GPH
and the NDFP, as manifested by the GPH draft of
February 20, 2013.
•
NDFP’s general conclusions (from “How the GPH
Scuttled the February 25-26 Amsterdam Meeting”)
• The GPH has long paralyzed the regular track in the peace
negotiations by declaring The Hague Joint Declaration as a
document of perpetual division and the Joint Agreement on
Safety and Immunity Guarantees as inoperative and useless
in protecting NDFP consultants, staff, security officers and
others.
• The GPH has deliberately refused to comply with its
commitments in agreements forged with the NDFP, despite
the full knowledge that compliance would immediately
break the impasse and cause the resumption of the formal
talks of the GPH and NDFP Negotiating Panels.
• By its actuations during the Amsterdam meeting on February 25 and 26,
2013, the GPH has exposed itself as not really interested in any truce and
cooperation arising from a special track. The GPH President has earlier
refused to form the GPH team for the special track and allowed OPAPP
and Secretary Teresita Q. Deles to obstruct and practically kill the peace
negotiations, whether it is the special track or the regular track.
• Indeed, the GPH wants nothing but the pacification and capitulation of the
revolutionary forces of the Filipino people through indefinite unilateral
ceasefires without the basic reforms required by The Hague Joint
Declaration and subsequent agreements.
•
• It is not interested in addressing the roots of the armed
conflict through negotiated social, economic and political
reforms. It has used peace negotiations only as a means of
psywar within the US-directed Oplan Bayanihan. It pays lip
service to peace negotiations in order to reach a just peace
but puts all the obstacles to prevent the progress of said
negotiations.
• The US-directed Aquino regime has systematically acted to
poison and destroy the ground and atmosphere for peace
negotiations in order to give way fully to Oplan Bayanihan.
It aims in vain to crush the revolutionary movement mainly
through brutal military campaigns. The revolutionary forces
of the Filipino people are hereby forewarned.
• The GPH has the burden of showing that it is sincerely
interested in continuing the peace negotiations in
accordance with The Hague Joint Declaration and
subsequent agreements. The NDFP also challenges the
GRP to respond to the NDFP Draft to Formulate the
General Declaration and NDFP Initial and Partial Draft
General Declaration on National Unity and Just Peace,
both dated February 26, 2013 and show its willingness
to work out a general declaration for the purpose of
effecting truce and cooperation.###
•
Special track was not meant to replace or supplant the
regular track but to facilitate and complement it.
Regular track
Special track
Just and lasting peace
Immediate just peace;
Alliance and truce – builds
confidence and goodwill for
regulat track
Cooperation on major doable
projects – inputs for regular
track
Hostilities/fighting stop
Reforms that address the roots
of the armed conflict
End of hostilities, disposition
of forces
GPH eyes “new approach” to peace;
tells NPA to stop inflicting violence
• Government of the Philippines (GPH) peace panel chair Alexander Padilla
on Friday said that the P-Noy administration is considering a “new
approach” to peacefully resolve the armed conflict with the Communist
Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front
(CPP/NPA/NDF) amid the 22-month impasse in the negotiations and the
mounting violence inflicted by the NPA on soft civilian targets.
• “We cannot wait forever for the other side if they continually refuse to go
back to the negotiating table without preconditions,” he said. “The
government will be taking a new approach to pursue peace.”
• Padilla said, “We have always been open to resume formal negotiations
with them, but they keep on insisting on preconditions, such as the
release of their detained consultants. Discussions under the Special Track
have also been closed since they have come up with new demands.”
• Padilla related that when the parties resumed the Special Track meeting
on February 25-26, 2013, “Instead of discussing the Sison draft, the NDF
proposed three new documents that backtracked from their original
position on a Draft Declaration, particularly on ceasefire, which they now
subjected to preconditions. They also reverted to the prolonged and
untenable process of the Regular Track.”
Apart from the demand to free their detained consultants, the CNN also
demanded that the GPH abolish its peace and development programs,
such as the Conditional Cash Transfer, PAMANA and Oplan Bayanihan.
“These demands are just preposterous. We don’t want to engage in a
negotiation where the other party is clearly fooling us,” Padilla said.
“The ball is now in their hands, They were the ones who initiated the
Special Track and they were the ones who ended it.” He added, “The GPH
doesn’t want to return to the regular track (formal talks) because it has
been going nowhere for the last 27 years.”
‘New approach’ to address issues on
the
table
and
on
the
ground
-Deles
•
• “The peace panel is conducting consultations with stakeholders
nationwide, side by side with inter-agency discussions and workshops
within government, to be able to bring in everyone's input,” Deles said.
• “This (approach) will seek to address concerns both on the peace table
and on the ground, especially among the communities most affected by
the conflict. We are not ready to give details at this time,” she said.
• The Secretary added that “the government remains committed to end all
internal armed conflict through a multi-track approach.
• “The CPP/NPA/NDF killed their own initiative and the government does
not want to return to the regular track which has been protracted and has
not brought us any closer to peace,” Padilla added. Thus, the government
is looking at a new approach that will finally put an end to the decadeslong violent struggle.
•
posted on OPAPP website, Tuesday, 30 April, 2013 - 15:18
• Meanwhile, the government would continue
to carry out its anti-insurgency campaign,
Lacierda said. “The Oplan Bayanihan
continues. It is a plan to win the hearts and
minds of the rebels in the mountains, in the
rebel-infested areas.”
May 9 – Padilla modifies GPH
statements, position
• In a statement posted on the OPAPP website:
• The truth is we have not terminated the talks. We have simply stated the
fact that the regular track is stalled and the special track has been
effectively stymied by the NDFP. At this point, therefore, there is no track
to pursue.
• The fact is, it is the CNN that has brought the talks to its present impasse.
They stalled the formal talks (Regular Track-RT) after its promising reopening in February 2011 by demanding the release of captured
combatants, who they subsequently alleged to be NDFP consultants,
before the talks could resume. This went beyond the letter and spirit of
the Oslo Joint Statement of 2011 that re-established the talks.
• In two letters dated May 18 and 28, 2011, the NDF postponed the
scheduled June meetings "until such time the releases of NDFP
consultants and JASIG-protected persons are carried out." Hence, the
impasse.
... and repeated some of its allegations
• “They also closed the avenue of the Special Track (ST), effectively
terminating it, when Joma Sison, who authored the ST, reneged on his
original proposal for an indefinite ceasefire and imposed demands that
would have placed the ST on the protracted and difficult track of the RT.
• “With the regular track on an impasse before we could even commence
discussing the substantive issues, and the special track effectively
terminated, there is no track at the moment that will realistically lead to a
final negotiated peace settlement of the 44 year internal armed conflict.
• “Without terminating the peace talks, the GPH is developing a new
approach to peace talks that is time bound, agenda bound, with no
preconditions and based on earnest consultations with the people who
decry the fact that the violence has gone on for too long and demand that
both sides heed their call for a peaceful resolution of the issues that they
consider important and wish to put on the table.”
NDFP responses & position
•
•
•
•
•
NDFP considers the negotiations ongoing and all bilateral agreements binding and
effective despite GPH collapsing it and bringing it to the brink of termination
NDFP remains open to the resumption of talks on both the special and regular
tracks provided GPH complies with bilateral agreements it has signed. Compliance
is an obligation, not a precondition.
NDFP deplores the lies and distortions by the GPH that attempt to throw the
blame for the collapse of the negotiations on the NDFP.
It is not true that the regular track “has gone nowhere”, has not even commenced
discussing the substantive agenda, The Hague Joint Declaration, is a “document of
perpetual division. On the contrary, this framework agreement has made the
negotiations possible and produced bilateral agreements such as the CARHRIHL
which is the first substantive agenda
It is the GPH, not the NDFP, that has caused the impasses and the current
breakdown in talks by violating bilateral agreements such as the 1992 The Hague
Joint Declaration, JASIG and CARHRIHL , and imposing preconditions such as
prolonged, indefinite ceasefire during the talks.
Facts belie claims of GPH officials on
termination of peace talks
• A presentation of the facts which transpired at the 2526 February 2013 meeting in Amsterdam between
representatives of the government of the Philippines
(GPH) and National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(NDFP) belies the claims of GPH officials that the GPH
terminated the formal peace talks and that the NDFP
“killed” the special track. OPAPP Secretary Teresita
Deles, GPH Negotiating Panel Chairperson Alexander
Padilla and GPH Presidential Spokesperson Edwin
Lacierda have made such claims.
•
PRESS STATEMENT By LUIS G. JALANDONI
Chairperson, NDFP Negotiating Panel
03 May 2013
GPH, not NDFP, killed the Special Track
• On the morning of 26 February, there was a
discussion of the inputs by the GPH
representatives coming from their 20 February
2013 draft. This draft insisted on indefinite,
simultaneous and unilateral ceasefires. It also
declared that land reform and national
industrialization were “ideologically charged”
concepts. After that discussion, the GPH
representatives abruptly left the meeting
room.
• Immediately, Royal Norwegian facilitator Ambassador Ture Lundh
called for a sidebar meeting between him, Secretary Ronald Llamas
and Professor Jose Maria Sison. Ambassador Ture Lundh asked both
delegations to reconvene. Prof. Sison said the NDFP side would
probably agree to reconvene if they would be able to present the
NDFP Draft Agreement to Formulate the General Declaration.
However, Secretary Ronald Llamas said he wanted to consult his
principal. When Ambassador Lundh said he also wanted to consult
his principal, Prof. Sison had to agree. He then gave copies to
Llamas and Ture Lundh of the above-mentioned NDFP draft and
the NDFP Initial and Partial Draft General Declaration on National
Unity and Just Peace, both dated 26 February 2013.
OPAPP Sec Deles drags RNG
facilitator to GPH side
• “In our discussion with our Norwegian
facilitator [Lundh] last month when he was
here in Manila, we mutually established that
the NDF killed the special track that they had
themselves proposed and that we are not
going back to the regular track which is going
nowhere.”
• OPAPP Sec Deles, “Is Aquino to blame
for scuttled peace talks?” Manila Times
May 4, 2013
Talks have not been terminated-- NDFP
• There was absolutely no talk about termination of the peace talks.
Nor was there talk of the special track being killed GPH
Presidential Spokesperson Lacierda's insistence that the NDFP has
been informed of the termination of the peace talks is contradicted
by the facts. He exposes his ignorance of the provision of the Joint
Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) which
stipulates that a written notice of termination must be given. No
such notice of termination has been given to the NDFP, which is
the proper addressee of such notice of termination.
• The JASIG stipulates that only 30 days after receipt of the written
notice, is the termination in effect. Furthermore, all immunity
guarantees contained in the JASIG remain in full force even after
such termination.
• In view of the continuing statements of the Aquino regime, in particular
GPH Presidential Spokesperson Edwin Lacierda and OPAPP Secretary
Teresita Deles, about terminating the peace talks with the NDFP, I reiterate
the NDFP position that the GPH has not given any written notice of
termination of the peace talks to the NDFP, which is the proper addressee
of such notice. This is stipulated in the Joint Agreement on Safety and
Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) of 1995.
•
• Neither has the Royal Norwegian Government, the official Third Party
Facilitator of the GPH-NDFP peace negotiations been informed by the GPH
of any termination of peace negotiations with the NDFP. In an email letter
to me in the afternoon of April 30, 2013, Ambassador Ture Lundh of the
Royal Norwegian Foreign Ministry stated: “Let me be absolutely clear in
stating that the GPH has neither officially nor unofficially informed me of
any termination of peace negotiations with the NDFP.”
- Luis Jalandoni, NDFP Negotiating Panel Chair
50 days after the GPH virtually
terminated the negotiations:
• GPH has not sent a formal notice of termination to
the NDFP nor to the RNG
• GPH has not given details nor clarified what “new
approach” or “another framework” it intends or
proposes for the negotiations. It has not gone farther
nor deeper than mentioning the following
– Local consultations
– Local peace talks
– Peace zones
Are these really “new approaches”?
• If “local consultations” are “new” does it mean that all the
while GPH has not been consulting the grassroots? Whatever
happened after the NUC consultations in 1992-93?
• “Local peace talks” were used by the GRP/GPH in the past to
use amnesty and rehabilitation as bait for surrender, and to
use fake surrenderees to make money. NPA local commands
have declared they will abide by the NDFP policy that peace
negotiations can only be held on the national level.
• Peace zones have always been opposed by the military first of
all because they think these favor the NPA more than the
government
Deles: “addressing the roots of the armed
conflict on the ground”
• The “new approach” and “new framework”
purportedly aims to “address the roots of the
armed conflict on the ground”. Does it mean
that it is only now that the GPH will start
undertaking reforms that will address poverty,
inequitable distribution of wealth, lack of
democracy and social injustice on the ground?
Is this not what GPH should have been doing
from the start?
“addressing the roots of armed
conflict on the ground”?
• There is nothing wrong with “addressing the roots of
the armed conflict on the ground” if it means
knowing the real situation and problems of the
masses by integrating with them and joining them in
their struggles.
• This will necessarily entail linking their struggles with
the struggles of other sectors and communities, and
linking the local problems – and solutions – to the
national problems and solutions, instead of dealing
with these in a piecemeal and isolated manner.
Linking local situations to the whole
• This is the challenge- and the opportunity --that
faces you now. As you address the human rights
and IHL situations and problems in your various
sectors and communities, it is all the more
important and imperative now to grasp how these
are related to the national crisis, to the social,
economic and political situation and problems
outside your communities, and how your struggles
can become or already are an integral part of the
entire struggle of our people to address these
problems and attain genuine freedom, democracy
and social justice.
“Time to move the talks!”
• We, concerned peace advocates from Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao earnestly call on the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines (GPH) and the National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (NDFP) to immediately resume the stalled
peace talks.
• We view with deep concern the breakdown in the peace
negotiations due to unresolved issues in both the regular and
special tracks. The regular track which involves the formal
talks on the substantive agenda has been on an impasse
mainly over the release of detained NDFP consultants. The
special track, which involves talks on a proposal for alliance
and truce and is parallel and complementary to the regular
track, is likewise stalled.
•
• We believe that consistently honouring signed agreements builds on the
trust imperative and the kind of peace architecture both Parties had
mutually envisioned. Hence, we call for the immediate resumption of the
formal peace talks in accordance with the Hague Joint Declaration and
other bilateral agreements. The implementation of JASIG would provide
conditions conducive to the resumption and continuation of the GPHNDFP talks, specifically, safety and immunity guarantees for all those who
participate in the talks, from either side. The full implementation of
CARHRIHL and the reactivation of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC)
will help mitigate the impact of the armed conflict, deter human rights
violations, provide redress to the victims and end the climate of impunity.
•
• We are aware of the pressing need for social and economic
reforms, which is the second item in the substantive agenda
of the peace talks, geared to addressing the continuing
hardships of our people, especially the poor and the
oppressed. It is incumbent on both Parties to immediately
return to the negotiating table and work at reaching an
agreement on these urgent reforms. The two Parties are
therefore urged to find ways and to take measures to resolve
the issue on the release of detained NDFP consultants and
thus break the current impasse.
• We likewise urge the GPH and NDFP to
resume talks on the special track to explore
immediate and practical areas of cooperation
such as upholding national sovereignty,
agrarian reform and national industrialization
alongside the cessation of armed hostilities.
We have confidence that simultaneous
discussions on both tracks can mutually
enhance the prospects of reaching
constructive agreements.
• We believe that the resumption of the peace talks
between the GPH and NDFP will redound to
immediate as well as long term benefits for our
people. We therefore commit ourselves to
accompany the peace negotiations and contribute to
the discussions on the substantive agenda in both
regular and special tracks. We shall continue to
undertake and support all efforts towards the
attainment of a just and enduring peace throughout
the land.
Time is of the essence. End the prolonged impasse.
Resume the talks, now.
SIGNATORIES:
Sulong CARHRIHL
Pilgrims for Peace
Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform
Waging Peace Philippines
Generation Peace Youth Network
Women Engaged in Action 1325
Initiatives for International Dialogue – IID
Philippine Peace Center
Appendix 1: Rappler interview with Prof. Sison
RAPPLER (RAP): Rappler recently interviewed head government negotiator
Alexander Padilla. He said you want peace but not the CPP leadership in
PH. Your comment, please?
PROF SISON (JMS): The CPP, NPA and the NDFP are desirous of a just peace
and want the peace negotiations to progress in accordance with The
Hague Joint Declaration as framework agreement and with all subsequent
agreements.
• They take the position that in principle the peace negotiations are still
going on in the absence of any side giving a formal notice of termination
to the other side. However, it is the GPH side that has announced
repeatedly to the press since April that is has terminated the peace
negotiations with the NDFP.
• The CPP leadership has recently reiterated its trust in and support for the
NDFP Negotiating Panel in which Luis Jalandoni is the Chairperson and to
which I am the Chief Political Consultant. It is presumptuous for anyone in
the GPH to determine the relationship of the CPP leadership in the
Philippines with the NDFP Negotiating Panel.
RAP: Padilla also thinks that the peace process would never end,
"that it was a process actually intended not for peace but to
continue the war [and for them] to get concessions." At least on
social media, people tend to share the same sentiment. How do
you address this perception coming from a generation which is
not familiar with the complexity of the peace talks?
JMS: It is in fact the GPH that does not want the
peace negotiations to continue. The NDFP cannot
compel the GPH to go back to the negotiating
panel. If the GPH merely wants war under its USdesigned Oplan Bayanihan, the revolutionary
forces and people have no choice but to defend
themselves and defeat their enemy.
RAP: Perhaps the strongest reactions we gathered were related to the use of
landmines - recent incidents that killed cops and soldiers. Do you feel that it's
time to assess whether the NPA should continue using command detonated
landmines? There had been reports of civilian casualties, or at the very least,
they expose noncombatants to harm (i.e., if detonated along highways, roads)
• JMS: The use of command-detonated land mines by
the NPA does not violate the Ottawa Treaty and its
protocol. In this regard, the NDFP is well advised by an
International Legal Advisory Team composed of
prominent lawyers who are experts in international
law. You complain against command-detonated land
mines. But you do not complain against aerial bombs
and artillery fire which are monopolized by the AFP
and indiscriminately kill people.
RAP: Evelyn Pinated, mother of the slain SAF vehicle driver PO2 Elmark
Rodney Pinated said the “devils” took her son away, and she wants them
crushed. “The (NPA) must stop these senseless killings. They are killing those
who are serving our people,” Elmark had married his girlfriend Grace only last
October 8. She last talked to him over the celphone on May 20, her birthday,
when he greeted her. What's your message to the grieving women?
JMS: My message to any real or possible complainant against the NPA
is to present the complaint to the NDFP section of the Joint
Monitoring Committee (under the Comprehensive Agreement of
Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
(CARHRIHL) or to approach directly the people's democratic
government, particularly the people's prosecutors and the people's
courts.
The officers and men of the AFP, PNP and paramilitary forces
commit so many crimes against the people according to so many
victims and families, the NDFP section of the JMC and domestic and
international human rights organizations. You should also confront
the GPH about these crimes committed by its armed personnel.
RAP: So does it really mean the end of the peace talks
under the Aquino government? What will it take for
you to talk to them again for the sake of peace?
JMS: The absence of a formal notice of termination
from the GPH to the NDFP can mean either one
of two things: GPH arrogance and contempt for
the JASIG or GPH allowing itself space to resume
formal talks according to its own later judgment.
The NDFP will be receptive to any signal or
approach of the GPH or Aquino regime for
resuming the formal talks. The NDFP expects
from the GPH nothing more than compliance
with existing agreements and the desire to move
forward with the negotiations.
RAP: Padilla said "there is a constant fear on my part
that the next echelon of leaders might not even be
receptive to discussion or negotiations. Kung tatawagin
ko—utak pulbura." What do you feel about his
pessimism?
• JMS: The GPH or the Aquino regime has only
itself to blame if it offers no other possibility
than the continuance and intensification of
the civil war. It should see that the way is still
available for peace negotiations.
RAP: One of our interviewees, suggested a possible confidence-building step to
resuming talks: a moratorium or a calibrated reduction on the NPA use of commanddetonated landmines might be reciprocated by something just as significant (say a
moratorium or calibrated reduction on the AFP use of artillery fire and/or air strikes)
on the GPH side… Q: 1) Is this even feasible? ; 2) Would CPP/NPA/NDF be open to
study/explore the proposal?
JMS: The NDFP has long proposed to the GRP since 2005 to have an agreement of
truce and alliance on the basis of a general declaration of common intent to realize
full independence, democracy, and economic development through national
industrialization and land reform. Such agreement can be made while the peace
negotiations continue to take up the remaining three items in the substantive
agenda.
• If there is such an agreement, the armed conflict ceases and there is no more need
for land mines, aerial bombs and artillery fire or any other kind of weapon. While
there is still armed conflict, the NPA needs land mines to deter the AFP and PNP
from easily encroaching on the territory of the people's democratic government.
Land mines are a poor man's weapon. Aerial bombing and artillery fire are
weapons of those who oppress the people.
• Soliman Santos himself has written a number of times that command-detonated
land mines are not prohibited by the Ottawa Treaty on land mines. CARHRIHL does
not prohibit the same. And the people's democratic government (PDG) and its
revolutionary forces are not bound by GPH laws.###
RAP2: In view of the recent statements of Alex Padilla in
Rappler, are the peace talks already dead? Please comment on
his statements
• JMS: It is Alex Padilla who says that the peace talks are
dead. This may be true, especially during the Aquino
regime, which has the illusion that it can destroy the
revolutionary movement with the US-designed Oplan
Bayanihan. But I believe that peace advocates will
increasingly call for peace negotiations because of the
worsening economic and social crisis, the growing
strength of the revolutionary movement and the
intensification of the civil war.
RAP2: “After assessing the behavior or the process itself, I was convinced that
it was a process that would never end. That it was a process actually intended
not for peace but to continue the war [and for them] to get concessions in the
meantime,” Padilla said.
JMS: The Aquino regime, its peace advisor Deles and chief negotiator Padilla have ensured that
there are no more peace negotiations during the term of the regime because of the
following:
1. Since the first formal talks in February 2011, they have vilified The Hague Joint Declaration as a
"document of perpetual division" and have insulted the NDFP and previous regimes for
making more than ten agreements, which include the now world famous Comprehensive
Agreement of Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL).
2. They have always misrepresented the NDFP demand for GRP or GPH compliance with the Joint
Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) as preconditioning the negotiations
and have consistently refused to release under the JASIG any JASIG-protected political
prisoner.
3. They have insisted that the Aquino regime is not bound by any GRP agreement with the NDFP
and in effect it is useless to negotiate and make agreements with the GPH.
4. They always demand a kind of indefinite ceasefire that can allow the GPH to make
unnecessary the continuance of peace negotiations on the substantive agenda.
5. They are the ones who have finally terminated the peace negotiations since April 2013 and
have been so arrogant as not to give any formal notice of termination to the NDFP in
accordance with the JASIG.
RAP2: Padilla said they were supposed to further discuss the “general
declaration” in February when Sison gave the government panel a surprise: 3
new documents that pursued the “regular track,” which was the path that
had led to deadlocks in the past.
“After February, it was a complete impasse because Joma Sison wanted us to
first terminate the conditional cash transfer, to finish the Oplan Bayanihan of
the AFP, to stop all the Pamana efforts, to give land to 5 million landless
farmers, etcetera before we can even move on to that next level,” Padilla said.
•
•
JMS: The Amsterdam meeting of February 2013 was intended to pave the way for
the so-called first historic meeting in Hanoi between Aquino as GRP president and
myself as CPP founding chairman. This was supposed to be similar to the earlier
Aquino-Murad meeting in Tokyo in August 2011. Presidential political adviser
Ronald Llamas had proposed the Aquino-Sison meeting since November 2012 and
became the subject of several meetings, with the participation of RNG special
envoy Ture Lundh, before February 2013.
At the Amsterdam meeting of February 2013, it was enough for the GPH and NDFP
delegations to draft the communique for the projected Hanoi meeting. But the
GPH delegation ignored the NDFP draft communique and insisted on limiting the
discussion to the GPH draft declaration for "indefinite unilateral simultaneous
ceasefires" and to the NDFP initial draft general declaration. The NDFP delegation
immediately pointed out that the GPH demand for "indefinite unilateral
simultaneous ceasefires" was somewhat confused and baseless and was
diametrically opposed to the NDFP proposal for truce and alliance.
• JMS (cont): The NDFP delegation declared that the most
the Amsterdam meeting could accomplish in two or three
days was to agree on the draft communique for the Hanoi
meeting and start discussing inputs for the general
declaration for truce and alliance which would entail
several months of negotiations after the Hanoi meeting. To
demonstrate to the GPH delegation how much more work
was to be done in forging a general declaration on truce
and alliance (or national unity and a just peace), the NDFP
delegation showed to the GPH delegation a more
developed NDFP draft of the aforesaid declaration. At this
point, the GPH delegation did not want the meeting to go
any further and declared that it would have to go back to
its principal first.
RAP2: “Definitely we don't want to return to the so-called
regular track and as far as government is concerned they have
killed the special track. So that's where we are right now,” Padilla
said.
JMS: The GPH cannot supplant the regular track of the peace negotiations
with the special track, without violating The Hague Joint Declaration. The
regular track is the sine qua non of the special track. The special track was
merely a supplement to the regular track. It was meant to deal with the
recurrent impertinent demands of the GRP or GPH for an indefinite
ceasefire, which was properly an issue for consideration under the fourth
and final item in the substantive agenda. The regular track can go on even
without the special track.
The NDFP has always made it clear since 2005 that it is willing to have a
truce and alliance with the Manila government anytime on the basis of a
general declaration of common intent to realise full national
independence, democracy, economic development through national
industrialization and genuine land reform and social justice. This offer was
reiterated to the Aquino regime in February 2011. The NDFP made it clear
that the offer can be realized on a special track, while the regular track of
negotiations continues in accordance with The Hague Joint Declaration.
RAP2: This is so unlike the peace process between the government and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), he noted.
“The MILF is an equally armed group, very strong, but they themselves believe
that the peace process is part of the modes of trying to achieve just peace. The
communists don't,” he explained.
“They have been very very consistent that the peace process is but a means to
an end and that end is to overthrow government and establish a national
democratic state leading to a communist state eventually,” Padilla said.
JMS: The NDFP and MILF have their respective outlooks, methodology and
programs of political action. The NDFP have the best wishes for the MILF in trying
to achieve a just and honorable peace for the benefit of the Moro people
through peace negotiations. But we have observed lately that the Aquino regime
is allowing Deles and the military to upset the GPH-MILF peace negotiations.
The NDFP will continue to support the MILF if and when it decides to resume the
armed struggle because the GPH does not comply with agreements. The MILF
has been worried publicly by GPH turning its back on crucial points in their
framework agreement. It still remains to be seen whether the Aquino regime
can really make peace with the MILF.
• RAP2: Padilla maintained that a “new approach” is
needed. “It should be addressed by good governance,
practically modernization, better roads, communications,”
he said.
• JMS: The “new approach” of the US-directed Aquino
regime is above all the combat, intelligence and psywar
operations under the US-designed Oplan Bayanihan. The
dole-out schemes and graft-ridden and delayed public
works projects are futile attempts at psywar. In the
absence of peace negotiations, the revolutionary forces
and broad masses of the people expect from the Aquino
regime more brutal campaigns of military suppression
and more deception through false claims of good
governance, peace and development.
RAP2: But Padilla said he fears that the CPP’s next generation of leaders would
become more violent.
“ ... There is a constant fear on my part that the next echelon of leaders might not
even be receptive to discussion or negotiations. Kung tatawagin ko—utak pulbura
(war freak), ” he said.
JMS: Padilla is correct in anticipating more resistance from the revolutionary forces
and their leaders. If there are no more peace negotiations because the GPH does
not want them, then indeed the revolutionary leadership and the masses can
concentrate on advancing the people's from the strategic defensive to the strategic
stalemate.
The worsening crisis of global capitalism and the domestic ruling system of the big
compradors and landlords like Aquino is inflicting terrible suffering on the people
and inciting them to fight for their national and social liberation. The New People's
Army has the critical mass to intensify and expand its tactical armed offensives. At
the same time, the organs of political power, the mass organizations and the local
branches of the CPP are growing fast.###
Appendix 2: The Hague Joint Declaration
1.
Formal peace negotiations between the GRP and the NDF shall
be held to resolve the armed conflict.
2.
The common goal of the aforesaid negotiations shall be the
attainment of a just and lasting peace.
3.
Such negotiations shall take place after the parties have reached
tentative agreements on substantive issues in the agreed
agenda through the reciprocal working committees to be
separately organized by the GRP and the NDF.
4.
The holding of peace negotiations must be in accordance with
mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty,
democracy and social justice and no precondition shall be made
to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace
negotiations.
The Hague Joint Declaration (cont)
5.
The substantive agenda of the formal peace negotiations
shall include the following:
1. Respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law;
2. Socio-economic reforms;
3. Political and constitutional reforms; and
4. End of hostilities and disposition of forces