The Double Challenge:
Laboratory Safety in Academia
Robin M. Izzo, M.S.
Assistant Director for Laboratory Safety
An Unfortunate Truth
• Researchers need to know a lot about a few things.
They go around learning more and more about less
and less until they know everything about nothing
• Administrators need to know a little about a lot of
things. They go around learning less and less
about more and more until they know nothing
about anything.
• Safety professionals start out knowing everything
about everything and end up knowing nothing
about anything because they have to deal with
researchers and administrators.
The Academic Challenge
• Inexperienced lab
workers
• High turnover
• Academic Freedom
• Decentralization
• The “Institutes”
• Variable Funding
• Research Focus
• Foreign Students
Inexperienced Lab Workers
• Graduate Students
– Direct from
Undergrad
– Industry experience
• Undergraduates
• Faculty
– Academia vs.
Industry
High School Students
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Summer study
Part-time study
Science Fair projects
NJ Child Labor Law
Paid vs. Unpaid
High Turnover
• Graduate Students
– 2-6 years
• Undergrads
– 1-2 years
• Checkout Problems
– Chemicals left behind
– Unusual labeling
– Old equipment
Training
• EHS Training
– General Lab Safety
– Specialty
» Rad, Laser, LOTO, BBP, Live Virus, Animal,
Respirator, MRI, Noise, Hoisting/Rigging
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Graduate Students
Undergrads
Post-docs
PI Responsibility
Academic Freedom
• Academic Freedom ≠
Freedom from
Responsibility
• Who is responsible for
safety?
• Freedom vs. Security
– US PATRIOT Act
Lab Supervisor Training
• “Briefing” rather than “Training”
• Personal meeting with me
• Responsibilities for safety, environment and
security
• University Expectations
• Available resources
– Health and safety-related
– Other, e.g., power, security, registration
• Lab Profiling
Profiling Tool
• Series of questions relating to lab operations
• Determines which health and safety programs apply
• Training Matrix
Are machines or mechanical systems (e.g. materials handling equipment, internal combustion engines,
pressurized systems) or powered tools used?
Program Codes: 7, 9
Do individuals work on or near exposed electrical circuits?
Program Code: 6, 7
Do individuals work from elevated surfaces (greater than four feet above the surrounding surfaces),
ladders or conduct work on the roof of a building?
Program Codes: 10, 11
Does your facility contain spaces that must be entered by personnel that are not intended for normal
occupancy and that have limited means of entry (e.g. tanks, vessels, pits, etc.)
Program Codes: 12, 7, 10
Do individuals perform cutting, welding, brazing, torch soldering, etc.?
Program Codes: 13
Do individuals perform work that involves rigging or hoisting operations?
Program Code: 14
Can you reasonably anticipate that individuals might have exposure to human blood or other body fluids?
Program Code: 22
Decentralization
• No central purchasing
• No central receiving
• No central waste
storage/pickup area
• 12 Science and
Engineering
Departments
How to Deal?
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Department Safety Managers
Chemical Hygiene Officers
Safety Manager Breakfasts
Safety Committees
Lab Managers
Listserves
Waste Paper
The “Institutes”
• New research trend
– Mix researchers from several different disciplines
»
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Computer science
Biological sciences
Engineering
Chemistry
– One main focus
» Integrative Genomics
» Material Science
» Nanotechnology
– One building for many types of research
Institute Challenges
• Whose department is it anyway?
– Each researcher is from one major department,
but part of the Institute
– Host department and institute do not always
communicate
• Building Design
– Must be changeable
– Open design most common
Open Lab Design
• Open to promote
“bumping into each
other”
• Common spaces, food
courts, etc.
They don’t
know how to
share!
Lewis Sigler Institute for
Integrative Genomics
Lewis-Sigler Institute for
Integrative Genomics
Lewis-Sigler Institute for
Integrative Genomics
Open Lab Design
• Difficult to separate special functions
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Live viruses
Radioactive materials work
Particularly hazardous substances
Clean rooms
Select agents
Open Lab Design
• The “Lego” effect
– Today it’s a computer lab, tomorrow a laser lab
– Moveable walls
• Overhead utilities
• Interstitial spaces
Variable Funding
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Some PIs are better funded than others
May vary from year to year
Still the same safety issues
No central funding for safety (except
hazardous waste)
Research Focus
• New faculty may mean completely new
EHS challenges
– Dive officer
– Overseas research
» EHS in another country
– Need to become instant expert in some new
area of EHS
Pregnancy and The Lab
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No formal policy
Official Declaration of Pregnancy
Confidentiality
Lab Screening
Outcomes depend on the woman
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Lab work as usual
Restrict certain activities
Non-lab work
Leave of absence
Foreign Researchers
• English as a second
language
– Training
– Written materials
• Cultural differences
– Safety
– Environmental
– Personal
• US PATRIOT
– Background checks
Turning Lemons in to
Lemonade
Using Accidents and Incidents to
Your Advantage
Incidents and Accidents
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Not very common
Most are minor
The “bad” ones can always be a lesson
Incident reporting and investigation
– Root cause
– No blame
– Examples
Incidents and Accidents
• Use in training
– Makes it seem more important
– Use examples that happened right here at
Princeton University
– Do not use examples from completely unrelated
disciplines
– Anecdotes Section of Princeton University Lab
Safety Manual – most popular site
Chloroform Incident
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Chloroform under pressure
Misuse of fume hood sash
Wrong eye protection
Incorrect use of safety shower
Laser Incident - Electrical
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Opened housing
Bypassed interlock
Condensation problem
First aid/CPR
Defibrillation
Laser Incident - Eye
• Assumed low risk
• Jerry-rigged equipment
• Permanent damage to
eye
• Clear and critical vision
(Fovea)
Hey, This is Not Coffee!
• Buffer solution
• Coffee cup on lab
bench
• Chose the wrong cup
• Lucky is wasn’t
hazardous
Dartmouth Professor
• Tiny amount
dimethylmercury
• Wrong glove
• Death from mercury
poisoning
• Choose the right glove
Bursting Flask
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Sat in LN2
No vacuum
Looked for crack
Burst
Cryogenic liquid hazard
Flying Flaming Hexane
• Heat in beaker with
heat gun
• Vapors contacted
motor
• Threw across room
• Computer ruined
HF Incident
• Grabbed outside of
container
• Ungloved hand
• 3 hour delay
• Severe burn
Nitric Acid Waste Incident
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Methanol container
Nitric Acid waste
Burst
Miracle
LAH Fire
• Water reactive
• Lab coat
• Fire extinguisher
failure
Beyond Compliance
Fostering a culture that promotes
environmental stewardship
Step One - Compliance
• EPA Multimedia Audit
– Target colleges and
universities
– Very large fines
– RCRA and labs are not a
good fit
• Education
– Training and meetings
– Policy on Fines
• Inspections
Pollution Prevention
Source Reduction
Recycle/Reclaim
Treatment
Dispose
Promoting P2
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Check purchasing records
Watch waste
Pollution Prevention web site
Lab or operation assessments
Share successes
A little competition
Stress/share the financial benefits
Successes
• Waste reduction by more than
60%
• Microscale
• No chromium-based cleaners
• Mercury thermometer swaps
• Water-free pumps
• Chilled water loops
Questions?
Contact Information
• Robin Izzo
Assistant Director for Laboratory Safety
Environmental Health and Safety
Princeton University
262 Alexander Street
Princeton, NJ 08544
• 609-258-6259 (phone)
• 609-258-1804 (fax)
• rmizzo@princeton.edu
• http://www.princeton.edu/ehs
• http://web.princeton.edu/sites/ehs/labsafetymanual/index.html
(Lab Safety Manual)