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SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS
Ira Kohlberg
Kohlberg Associates, Inc.
11308South Shore Road
Reston, VA 20190
KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR
COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN
ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS
October 27, 2011
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Threat: Historical Evidence
• EMP damages and disrupts electronics—does not directly harm people
Observed EMP Anomalies During
USSR Atmospheric Testing (circa 1960)
Overhead Transmission Line and Telecommunications Disconnection and Damage
Overhead
transmission line
Malfunction
of radiolocation
1000 km
Long line problems due
to EMP “long tail”
Overhead
signal line
Ground
zero
Puncture,
temporary
disconnection of
transmission line
Loss of
communications;
many examples
Diesels found
damaged, “later”
600 km
600 km
Power supply
breakdown
Safety devices
burning
Spark gaps
breakdown
400 km
600 km
Signal cable line
Figure presented by General Loborev,
Director, Central Institute of Physics and
Technology, June 1994
Amplification
location unit
Power supply
breakdown
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Threat: Nature and Magnitude of EMP Threats
HOB = 500km
HOB = 100 km
Surface
Zero
• Wide area coverage
– A million square
miles
• Intensity depends on:
– Weapon design
– Height of burst
– Location of burst
• Broad frequency range
• Threat to all electronics
in exposure
EMP May Produce Simultaneous, Widespread
Failure Of High Reliability infrastructure
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Vulnerability of Power Grid Components to E1
• The US power grid is
comprised of three
interconnected
systems, the eastern
interconnect, the western,
and Texas
• A relatively modest yield
burst over the eastern US
can affect 70% of the total
national power generation
E1 footprint for a 30kT detonation at 100km altitude east of Chicago (unclassified version)
A single relatively small weapon can have a radius of impact of nearly 1,000 miles, affecting nearly
70% of the population and industrial production of the USA and Canada, the financial centers and
seat of governments.
But Everything Depends on Everything Else:
Vulnerability of US National Infrastructure
• One or a few high-altitude nuclear
detonations can produce EMP,
simultaneously, over wide geographical
areas
• Unprecedented cascading failure of our
electronics-dependent infrastructures
could result
– Power, energy transport, telecom, and
financial systems are particularly
vulnerable and interdependent
Oil / Gas
Compressor Station
Fuel Supply
• Without adequate protection recovery
could be prolonged—months to years
Electric Power
Communications
Switching
Office
End Office
Substation
Traffic
Light
Transportation
Water
Transport
– EMP disruption of these sectors could cause
large scale infrastructure failures for all
Banking & Finance
aspects of the Nation’s life
• Both civilian and military capabilities
depend on these infrastructures
Power
Supply
Power
Plant
Reservoir
Substation
Hospital
Ambulance
Bank
Check ATM Federal
Reserve
Processing
Center
Emergency
Services
Fire
Station
Legislative
Offices
Pension/Service Payments
Treasury Dept.
Emergency
Call Center
Military
Installations
Government
Services
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SCOPE OF PRESENTATION
MODELING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN POWER
AND TELECOMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURES FOR A
HEMP ATTACK
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Electromagnetic terrorism and potential infrastructure
failures has become an extremely serious matter that may
be viewed as embracing three major issues:
•Terrorist targets of interest
•Effect on civilian and military populations
•National response
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Effect on Civilian and Military Populations
•Civilian
•Susceptibility of Infrastructures
•Survivability of Infrastructures
•Response of Infrastructures
•Military
•Survivability of hardware
•Communication survivability
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Dynamics of Recovery of Coupled Infrastructures
•Approach To Understanding How Coupled Infrastructures Work
•State Variable Theory
• linear approximation
• small perturbations
• infrastructure containing N components
• stability and susceptibility
• recovery time
• Recovery for a realistic segment of the public telephone
• Recovery model for coupled telecom and power infrastructures.
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PHASE SPACE REPRESENTATION OF POWER AND
TELECOMMUNICATION RESPONSE TO HEMP
INITIAL STATE
OF SYSTEM
1.0
DENOTES POSSIBLE
TRAJECTORIES AFTER HEMP
POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PLANE
0.0
1.0
NORMALIZED TELECOMMUNICATIONS
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The following set of vu-graphs show the theoretically
derived conditions for the return to equilibrium.
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dT
T
 T T0 P0 T , P  ,
dt
dP
P
 PT0 P0 T , P  .
dt
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The following set of vu-graphs show the breakdown of a
large network (power and or telecommunications) caused
by a HEMP attack.
For illustrative purposes we show this as an evolutionary
process although it could happen relatively rapidly.
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To other nodes
E
Link
Node
D
B
C
A
A
(a) No attack
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To other nodes
E
Link
Node
D
B
Cluster
A
A
(b) Attack node C
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To other nodes
E
Link
Node
D
Cluster
Cluster
B
Cluster
A
A
(c) Attack node C and link
between nodes D and E
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The following set of vu-graphs show the recovery/ breakdown
of Probability-of-Call Blocking and electric power from of a
theoretical model of combined power and telecommunication
networks.
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POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION
INTERDEPENDENCY
a
b
PDN
PTN
Telecommunications Line
c
PDN
d
POWER
CONTROL
e
SCADA
d
c
PDN
e
PDN
PDN
f
f
PDN
PDN
a
Telecommunications Line
FUEL
SOURCE
b
Power Line
ELECTRICAL
POWER
GENERATION
POWER
TRANSMISSION
g
POWER
DISTRIBUTION
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Electric Power Response Time After the Onset of an Event
market price update
operator –initiated/
manual control
Data Source:
Consortium for Electric Reliability
Technology Solutions (CERTS)
ULTC voltage control
AGC
Grid of the Future
White Paper on Real Time Security
Monitoring and
Control of Powers Systems
governor control
underfrequency load
shredding
exciters and PSS
FACTS
protective system
10-2
1 cycle
10-1
1
10
100
response time after the onset of an event in seconds
1000
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Recovery for Power and Telecommunications
autonomous
recovery
development of
recovery strategy
end of back-up power
recovery process
30 minutes
4 hours
1 day
Telecommunications
10 days
autonomous
recovery
Power
operator assisted, control and recovery
6 minutes
beginning of interdependence
(when backup-up power ends)
time ( not to scale)
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Recovery for Power
and Telecommunications
Direction of
recovery for
telecommunications:
decreasing
probability of
call blocking
Probability of Call Blocking
100%
4 hours
100%
Probability of Call
Blocking, Pb
CASE-B
Power Transient
Possibilities
Backup Power
Ends
D
CASE-C
CASE-A
0
0.00001
Relative Power - Q/Qm
30 min
0
0.0001
0.001
0.01
Days
0.1
1.0
10.0
100.0
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Direction
of
recovery
for
power
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Interdependence between Power
and Telecommunications
Direction of
recovery for
telecommunications:
decreasing
probability of
call blocking
Probability of Call Blocking
100%
4 hours
Pb1
100%
Planning time for Recovery
of telecommunications
Jump in probability
of blocking Po
Basic
Basic response
response of
of
telecommunications
telecommunications
when
when 100%
100% of
of power
power
is
is available
available
Node recovery
Begins At 4 hours
Q*/Qm
D
Telecommunications
back-up power ends
at 1 day
Hypothetical
Hypothetical
power
power recovery
recovery
Autonomous response
For telecommunications
Interdependency
Begins here
0
0.00001
Relative Power - Q/Qm
30 min
0
0.0001
0.001
0.01
Days (to)
0.1
1.0
10.0
100.0
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Direction
of
recovery
for
power
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CONCLUSION
•Modeling the response of large networks that are heavily
dependent on electromagnetic effects is still in the formative
stage.
•Theoretical models can provide much insight into key
factors that influence resilience to terrorist attacks
•Ultimately, detailed models supported by experimental data
that predict component and subsystem behavior will be
required.
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