Cyber Security as a Complex Cognitive System

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Umbrella Presentation
Theme C: Cognitive Science of
Cyber SA
ASU (Cooke)
Cyber Security as a Complex Cognitive
System
PSU (McNeese & Hall) Computer-aided
Computer-Aided Human Centric Cyber
Situation Awareness
1
Cognitive Models & Decision Aids
• Instance Based Learning Models
Software
Sensors,
probes
Automated
Reasoning
Tools
Information
Aggregation
& Fusion
• R-CAST
•Plan-based
narratives
•Graphical
models
•Uncertainty
analysis
• Transaction
Graph methods
•Damage
assessment
Computer network
Real
World
Multi-Sensory Human
Computer Interaction
•
•
•
Data Conditioning
Association & Correlation
• Hyper
Sentry
• Cruiser
• Simulation
• Measures of SA & Shared SA
• Enterprise Model
• Activity Logs
• IDS reports
• Vulnerabilities
System Analysts
Testbed
•
•
Computer
network
•
2
Situation Awareness
Endsley’s Definition:
the perception of elements in the environment
within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection
of their status in the near future
Perception
Comprehension
Projection
Cyber Situation Awareness is
Inherently Human
SA is not in the
technology (e.g.,
visualization); it is
in the interface
between humans
and technology
4
Team Situation Awareness
A team’s coordinated perception and action in response to a
change in the environment
Contrary to
view that all
team members
need to “be on
the same page”
5
Cyber SA is
Distributed and Emergent
Detector
Responder
Threat Analyst
Perception
Comprehension
Projection
Cyber SA is
Distributed and Emergent
Detector
Responder
Threat Analyst
Perception
Comprehension
Projection
Cyber Security as a Complex Cognitive System
N.Cooke, P. Rajivan, M. Champion, G. Dube, V. Buchanan, S. Jariwala
Cognitive Science
Top-down
Theoretical Foundations
Cyber Defense
Interactive Team Cognition/
Sociotechnical Systems Theory
Distributed Research
Simulations
Observation
Observe
Fields of Practice
Cognitive Systems
Engineering
CyberCog & DEXTAR
Tools &
Methods
Metrics &
Measures
Communication & Coordination
Team Situation Awareness
Agent-Based & EAST Modeling
Bottom-Up
Cyber Security as a Complex Cognitive System
N.Cooke, P. Rajivan, M. Champion, G. Dube, V. Buchanan, S. Jariwala
Theoretical Foundations
Human-Centered
Interactive Team
Cognition/Sociotechnical Systems
Theory Workload
Distributed Research
Simulations
CyberCog & DEXTAR
Specialization
Teams vs Groups
Team and
Organization Models
Actual
Experimental
Studies
Conducted
Computer-Aided Human Centric Cyber
Situation Awareness
M. McNeese, D. Hall, N. Giacobe,
V. Mancuso, D. Minotra, and E. McMillan
Cognitive Science
Top-down
Theoretical Foundations
Cyber Defense
Situated Cognition
Distributed Research
Simulations
teamNETS
Observation
Observe
Fields of Practice
Cognitive Systems
Engineering
Tools &
Methods
Metrics &
Measures
Visual Analytics
Testbench Complex
Event Processing
Bottom-Up
Computer-Aided Human Centric Cyber
Situation Awareness
M. McNeese, D. Hall, N. Giacobe,
V. Mancuso, D. Minotra, and E. McMillan
Theoretical Foundations
Human-Centered
Situated Cognition
Distributed Research
Simulations
teamNETS
Attention/Disruption
Memory / Access Awareness
Team Cognition
Embedded Model
of the Threat
Actual
Experimental
Studies
Conducted
ASU/PSU Objectives
PSU Objectives
ASU Objectives
•
To develop theory of team-based SA to
inform assessment metrics and improve
interventions (training and decision aids)
•
To understand Individual and Team
cognition of Situation Awareness in CyberSecurity domains
•
Iterative Refinement of Cyber Testbeds
based on cognitive analysis of the domain
– Cybercog
– DEXTAR
•
Refine and implement evaluation
environment to support evaluation of new
analysis models, cognitive tools, and
adversarial team cognition via hidden
knowledge profiles
•
Conduct experiments on Cyber TSA in the
testbed to develop theory and metrics
•
Develop new tools for practice based on
field- and laboratory-based findings
•
Extend empirical data through modeling
12
Cyber Security as a Complex
Cognitive System
Nancy J. Cooke, PhD
Prashanth Rajivan, MS
Michael Champion, MS
Shree Jariwala
Geneviève Dubé, Université Laval, Québec
Verica Buchanan
Arizona State University
October 29, 2013
This work has been supported by the Army Research Office
13
under MURI Grant W911NF-09-1-0525.
Outline
•
•
•
•
•
•
Overview of Project
Definitions and Theoretical Drivers
Empirical Study on Teams vs. Groups
Agent-Based Modeling
Two Case Studies and EAST Models
Next Steps
14
Overview of Project
15
ASU Project Overview
Objectives:
Understand and Improve Team Cyber Situation Awareness via
• Understanding cognitive /teamwork elements of situation awareness
in cyber-security domains
• Implementing a synthetic task environment to support team in the
loop experiments for evaluation of new algorithms, tools and
cognitive models
• Developing new theories, metrics, and models to extend our
understanding of cyber situation awareness
Department of Defense Benefit:
• Metrics, models, & testbeds for assessing human effectiveness and
team situation awareness (TSA) in cyber domain
• Testbed for training cyber analysts and testing (V&V) algorithms and
tools for improving cyber TSA
Scientific/Technical Approach - Year 4
• Explore the role of teamwork in cyber defense
through:
• Empirical work in CyberCog testbed
• Agent-Based Modeling
• Case Studies and EAST Modeling
• Further refine team metrics and testbeds
Year 4 Accomplishments
• Found an empirical benefit of cyber teaming
• Replicated this benefit in an agent-based model
• Compared two cyber defense organizations
• Refined team metrics and cybercog testbed
Challenge
Struggle to maintain realism in testbed scenarios while
allowing for novice participation and team interaction –
now addressing with CyberCog and Dextar
PUBLICATIONS
Summary of FY 13
ASU Accomplishments
Cooke, N. J., Champion, M., Rajivan, P., & Jariwala, S. (2013). Cyber Situation Awareness and Teamwork. EAI Endorsed
Transactions on Security and Safety. Special Section on: The Cognitive Science of Cyber Defense, 13.
Cooke, N. J. & McNeese, M. (2013). Preface to special issue on the cognitive science of cyber defence analysis. EAI
Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety. Special Section on: The Cognitive Science of Cyber Defense, 13
Rajivan, P., Champion, M., Cooke, N. J., Jariwala, S., Dube, G., & Buchanan, V. (2013). Effects of teamwork versus group
work on signal detection in cyber defense teams. In D. D. Schmorrow and C.M. Fidopiastis (Eds.), AC/HCII, LNAI 8027, pp.
172-180., Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Rajivan, P., Janssen, M. A., & Cooke, N. J., (2013). Agent-based model of a cyber security defense analyst team.
Proceedings of the 57th Annual Conference of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Santa Monica, CA: Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Champion, M., Rajivan, R., Jariwala, S., Cooke, N. J., & Buchanan, V. Understanding the cyber security task. Poster
presented at ASU's Sixth Annual Workshop on Information Assurance, May 1, 2013, Tempe, AZ.
STUDENTS SUPPORTED
• Prashanth Rajivan (PhD)
• Verica Buchanan (UG)
PROJECTS SUPPORTED FY 13
•
•
•
•
•
CyberCog and metrics development
CyberCog study
Agent-based models of cyber teaming
Agent-based models of cyber warfare
Case Studies and EAST models
COLLABORATION
•
•
•
Coty Gonzalez – IBLT and Agent-Based Modeling
Sushil Jajodia – DEXTAR
Several MURI partners on an ARL proposal
TECH TRANSFER
•
•
•
•
Working with Charles River Analytics and AFRL on team
measures of cyber defense
Working with SA Technologies on cyber visualization
Presentation to ASU Information Assurance
Presentation to General Dynamics – The Edge
AWARD
Prashanth Rajivan wins HFES 2013 Alphonse Chapanis Award for
best student paper!!!
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Definitions and
Theoretical Drivers
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Theoretical Drivers
• Interactive Team Cognition
• Sociotechnical Systems Theory/
Human Systems Integration
19
Interactive Team Cognition
Team is unit of analysis = Heterogeneous
and interdependent group of individuals
(human or synthetic) who plan, decide,
perceive, design, solve problems, and act
as an integrated system.
Cognitive activity at the team level= Team
Cognition
Improved team cognition  Improved
team/system effectiveness
Heterogeneous = differing backgrounds,
differing perspectives on situation
(surgery, basketball)
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Interactive Team Cognition
Team interactions often in the form of explicit
communications are the foundation of team cognition
ASSUMPTIONS
1) Team cognition is an activity; not a property or product
2) Team cognition is inextricably tied to context
3) Team cognition is best measured and studied when the
team is the unit of analysis
21
Implications of Interactive
Team Cognition
• Focus cognitive task analysis on team
interactions
• Focus metrics on team interactions
(team SA)
• Intervene to affect team interactions
22
Cyber Defense as a Sociotechnical System
• Cyber defense functions involve cognitive processes
allocated to
– Human Operators
– Tools/Algorithms
• Human Operators
– Different roles and levels in hierarchy
– Heterogeneity (Information, skills and knowledge)
• Tools
– For different kinds of data analysis and visualization
– For different levels of decision making
• Together, human operators and tools are a sociotechnical
system
– Human System Integration is required
Scaling Up Complexity
Findings: Cyber Security Defense Analyst
Teaming
• Cyber analysts work as a group – Not as a team
– Collaboration among cyber operators is minimal
– Little role differentiation
– Bottom-up information flow
• Possible Reasons
– Cognitive overload
– Organizational reward structures
– “Knowledge is Power”
– Lack of effective collaboration tools
25
Empirical Study on
Teams vs. Groups
26
Hypotheses
• Reward structures conducive to team
work in cyber defense analyst groups
performing triage level analysis will lead
to higher signal detection performance.
• Improving interactions between analysts
(micro level) can improve overall cyber
defense performance (macro level
emergence)
27
CyberCog -Synthetic Task
Environment
• Task: team based triage analysis using
the CyberCog simulation.
• Synthetic Task Environment
– Simulation environment
– Recreate team and
cognitive aspects of the task
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CyberCog STE
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The Experiment
Training
Practice
Scenario 1
TLX
Scenario2
•
3-person teams/groups in which each individual is trained to specialize in
types of alerts
•
2 conditions:
– Team Work (Primed & Rewarded for team work)
–Group Work (Primed & Rewarded for group work)
•
6 individuals at a time
– Team Work - Competition between the 2 teams
– Group Work - Competition between the 6 individuals
•
Experimental scenarios:
– 225 alerts
– Feedback on number of alerts correctly classified - constantly
displayed on big screen along with other team or individual scores
Simulates knowledge is power for individuals group condition
Measures
•
•
TLX
Questionnaire
Signal Detection Analysis of Alert Processing
Amount of Communication
Team situation awareness
Transactive Memory
NASA TLX – workload measure
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Results
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Cyber Teaming is Beneficial for
Analyzing Novel and Difficult Alerts
• Working as team helps when alerts are novel and
involves multi step analysis, not otherwise.
• Signal Detection Measure: A' as performance
measure
• A' ranges from values 0.5 and 1 with 0.5 indicating
lowest performance possible and 1 indicating highest
performance possible.
32
Sensitivity to true alerts
Cyber Teaming Helps When the Going
Gets Rough
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F(1,18) = 5.662, p = .029** (Significant effect of condition)
Groups that Share Less Information Perceive
More Temporal Demands than High Sharers
• NASA TLX Workload Measure: Temporal Demand
• Measures perception of time pressure
• Higher the value higher the task demand
Statistically significant across scenarios and conditions
(p-value = 0.020)
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Groups that Share Less Information Perceive
Work to be More Difficult than High Sharers
• NASA TLX Workload Measure: Mental Effort
• Measures perception of mental effort
• Higher the value, more mental effort
required
Statistically significant across scenarios and
conditions (p-value = 0.013)
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Conclusion
• Break the “Silos”
• Use the power of human teams to tackle
information overload problems in cyber
defense.
• Simply encouraging and training analysts to
work as teams and providing team level
rewards can lead to better triage
performance
• Need collaboration tools and group decision
making systems.
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Agent-Based Modeling
37
Introduction
• Human-in-loop experiment
– Traditional method to study team cognition
• Agent based model
– Macro emergence
– A complimentary approach
• Modeling computational agents with
– Individual behavioral characteristics
– Team interaction patterns
• Extend Lab Based Experiments
38
Model Description
•
•
•
•
Agents: Triage analysts
Task: Classify alerts
Rewards for classification
Cognitive characteristics:
– Knowledge and Expertise
– Working memory limit
– Memory Decay
39
Model Description
• Learning Process: Simplified – Probability based
– 75% chance to learn
– Cost: 200 points
– Payoff: 100 points
• Collaboration: Two strategies to identify
partners
– Conservative or Progressive
– Cost: 100 points for each
– Payoff: 50 points for each
• Attrition
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Model Process
Recruit if
needed
Assign
alerts
Team?
Yes
No
Adjust
Expertise
And
Remove
Analysts
No
No
Learn?
Yes
Add
Knowledge
Know?
Collaborate
with Agents
Yes
Get
Rewards
41
Model in Netlogo Software
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Agents in the Progressive/Teamwork
Condition Classified More Alerts
(replicates experiment)
p<0.001
43
Agents in Team of Six Classified More
Alerts
p = 0.004
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Irrespective of Team Size Agents in Progressive
Condition Classified More Alerts
45
Agents in Progressive Condition
Accrued Least Rewards
p<0.001
46
Agents in Small Teams Accrued
Most Rewards
p<0.001
47
Agents in Large Progressive Teams
Accrued Least Rewards
48
Conclusion
• Large progressive teams classified most
alerts
• Large progressive teams accrued least
rewards
• Big progressive teams
– Lot of collaboration
– Less learning
– Constant knowledge swapping
– More net rewards of 50 points
• However small progressive teams accrued
rewards on-par
49
Conclusions
• Small heterogeneous teams of triage
analysts could be beneficial.
• Agent based modeling
– Can extend lab based experiments
– Can be used to ask more questions quickly
– Can raise new questions and identify gaps
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Two Case Studies and
EAST Models
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EAST
Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork framework
(Stanton, Baber, & Harris, 2012)
• Integrated suite of methods allowing the effects of one set of constructs
on other sets of constructs to be considered
– Make the complexity of socio-technical systems more explicit
– Interactions between sub-system boundaries may be examined
– Reduce the complexity to a manageable level
• Social Network
– Organization of the system (i.e., communications structure)
– Communications taking place between the actors working in the team.
• Task Network
– Relationships between tasks
– Sequence and interdependences of tasks
• Information Network
– Information that the different actors use and communicate during task
performance
With Neville Stanton, University of Southampton, UK
Approach
• Interviews with cyber network defense leads
from two organizations on social structure,
task structure, and information needs
• Hypothetical EAST models created
• Surveys specific to organization for cyber
defense analysts developed
• Surveys administered to analysts in each
organization to refine models
53
Social Network Diagrams
of Incident Response/Network Defense Teams
Industry
Military
Cyber
Command
Responder
(6)
Analyst
1
Op
Team
Detector
(6)
Threat
Analyst
(1)
Analyst
4
Analyst
2
Analyst
3
Customer
Sequential Task Network Diagram
Industry Incident Response Team
Update
Servers
Training
Network
maintenance
Deeper
Classification
Alerts
From:
Unknown
Op
Team
Detector
(6)
Responder
(6)
Classify
Alerts
From:
Root
From:
Credit
Card
Certificate
Training
Credit
Card
From:
Modeling
Threat
Analyst
(1)
Hosting
Accounts
Root
Certificate
Training
Unknown
Hosting
Accounts
Sequential Task Network Diagram
Military Network Defense Team
Handoff
Customer
Assignment
Review
Events
Gather
Batch of
Reports
Cyber
Command
Review
Alerts
Customer
Dispatch
Information Network Diagram
of Incident Response/Network Defense Teams
Incident
Reports
Industry
Respond
er
Military
Web
Sites
Analyst
DDOS
Tools
Shift
Change
Meeting
On-Line
Help
In-house
software
Shift
Change
Meeting
IDS
IDS
Detector
Shift
Change
Meeting
Anti
virus
Dictiona
ry
Incident
Reports
Audio
Alerts
Reports
Workflo
w
System
IDS
Batches
of Alerts
Reporting
EAST Conclusions
• A descriptive form of modeling that facilitates
understanding of sociotechnical system
• Can apply social network analysis parameters to each
of these networks and combinations
• Can better understand system bottlenecks,
inefficiencies, overload
• Can better compare systems
• Combined with empirical studies and agent-based
modeling can allow us to scale up to very complex
systems
58
Next Steps
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Plan for FY 14
Cognitive
Task Analyses
and Theory
Development
FY 14
Refine theory
and models of
cyber situation
awareness
Testbed and
Scenario
Development
DEXTAR: Known vs.
Unknown vulnerabilities
& attack patterns;
Systematic increase of
data and difficulty
Experimentation
Explore teaming
possibilities and
structures in cyber
defense analysis
Models and
Metrics
Develop models from
empirical data and
extend to larger and
more complex teaming
Metric testing and
validation in DEXTAR
60
Questions
ncooke@asu.edu
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