Revolution in Nuclear
Detection Affairs
Warren M. Stern
Nuclear Security
“The danger of nuclear terrorism remains one of the
greatest threats to global security…”
President Obama, March 2012
Hankuk University, Seoul, ROK
Material
Security
Detection
Interdiction
Render
Safe
Consequence
Mgmt.
Recovery
Nuclear Defense Spectrum
2
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA)
3
Challenges of Nuclear Detection
Radiation Emitted
by Material
Some materials selfshield their emitted
radiation
Radiation
Transmitted
through
Intervening
Materials
Energy Spectra
Radiation
Propagates
through
Environment
Sensor
Detects
Background
Radiation
Gross Counts x 104
Urban variations in background radiation
In urban environments local
variations can be large
5
Background Challenges: Signal to Noise
Background
Background + Source
Background + 4*Source (or Half
Distance)
• Black: natural background radiation
• Green : 1 mCi Cesium-137 source
at 300 ft from the detector
• Red: 1 mCi Cesium-137 source 150
ft from the detector
Can greatly impact a systems False Alarm Rate and
Minimum Detectable Source Activity
6
1. Make
Get
more
signal
with
a bigger detector
2.
Reduce
background
3.
thethe
source
brighter
Very large detectors
Same source,
Same
Source
source,
10x
10 x less
brighter
same
background
background, 30
(imaging or
times larger
spectroscopic
detector
detector)
Active interrogation
Quantum-dot
activated scintillator
and semiconductor
detectors
Event
Bring sensor closer –
distributed sensor nets
Revolution in Military Affairs
Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
defines a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA):
“RMA is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the
innovative application of new technologies which, combined with
dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational
concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military
operations.”
Revolution in Military Affairs
From the laboratory to the field
Revolution in technology & gamma spectroscopy
“Electronics” for a 1964 gamma ray spectrometer
26,000
bytes
in 1964
And an even more
capable
version
today
“Output” device for 1964 gamma ray spectrometerAnd an even more capable version today
32,000,000,000 bytes today
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Technology Deployments-DHS
 CBP: 1468 RPMs; 1631 RIIDS; 19432
PRDs
– 60 mRPMS or mobile systems
 USCG: 6,065 PRDs; 922 Handheld RIIDs
– 240 Wide-Area Search Backpacks
(RADPACKs),
– 8 Advanced RIIDs,
– 36 Handheld Radiation Monitors (HRMs),
– 12 Linear Radiation Monitors (LRMs)
 TSA-VIPR: 275 PRDs; 75 RIIDs; 50
Backpacks
12
Support to S&L and Securing the Cities
 DNDO provides technical assistance and program
support to state and local rad/nuc detection efforts
 There is a radiation portal monitor in Georgia,
 Mobile Detection Deployment Units
deployed to scan cargo trucks at a weigh station on
– Available
for S&L
Interstate
20.
– Each unit has 48 PRDs; 22 Backpack Systems;
RSI700 Mobile Radiation Search Systems; 8 NaI
RIIDs
 Securing the Cities Program (NYC-region)
– more than 5,800 pieces of detection equipment
– trained nearly 11,000 personnel
– conducted more than a hundred drills
13
Next and Future Generation Technology
Generation
Product
Area
Current
Next Generation
Spectroscopic systems
Improved radiography
Automated detection of
high-Z
Static systems:
Advanced Technology
Demonstration
Active systems for
detection of shielded
threats (SNAR)
Passive, automated
detection of shielded
SNM
Increased PD and
range, decreased FAR
Improved materialshigher resolution,
larger, lower cost
Portals and
Imaging
Detection “at speed,”
virtual tagging of
vehicles
Better capabilities
Increased detection
range
Mobile systems
Radiation Isotope
Identification Device
Hand-Held
Detectors
Exploratory Research
Radiation pagers
Better materials, better
range
Tracking and
localization
Improved materials –
room temperature
sensors approaching
HPGe, improved
electronics, solid
state neutron sensors
Directional highresolution
spectroscopic
handheld (IPRL)
Intelligent networked
sensor systems (IRSS)
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Detecting, Identifying, Locating, Tracking
Coded Aperture Image
Radiation
Image
Range
Data
Compton Image
Isotope ID
Range = 25m
Overlay
Co-60
Color Codes
 Threat – Red
 Suspect – Yellow
 Medical – Blue
 Industrial – Purple
 NORM – Green
15
Intelligent Radiation Sensor System (IRSS)
 Characterize the ability of a system of detectors to improve the
detection, identification, and localization of threats as compared
to the individual detectors
 Characterize the relative importance of individual detector
capabilities: NaI (2”x2”, 2”x1”), CZT (imaging and non-imaging),
LaBr3 (RadSeeker)
 Demonstrate search and monitoring capabilities across
complex operational environments
Detector PTU and
Measured ‘Heat’
Map
Reachback
Center
detector
node
base station
(optional)
network
device
rad
detector
Indoor Measurement Campaign
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Conclusion
 Radiation detection must be part of a broader nuclear security strategy
 Architecture should be defined by overall strategy
 Architecture options facilitated by technological developments
 Revolutionary changes in detection have occurred in the past two
decades
 Need to reinforce these changes with new technology and craft an
Architecture that takes advantage of these technological changes.
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