Success or Failure?
A Critical Evaluation of the
Transnational Strategies Used to
Combat Mexican Drug Cartels
Dan Somerfield - MA TOC - Dissertation
Presentation - Jan/12
Outline of Presentation
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Introduction…………………………...................................................3
Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime……………………………..4
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & Mexican-U.S. Relations……12
 1914-1947...................................................................................13
 1947-1985 …………………………………………………………..18
 1985-2000…………………………………………………………...22
 2000-Present………………………………………………………..31
Analysis of Mexican-U.S Strategies to Combat Drug Trafficking....39
Dissertation Research………………………………………………….51
Sources……………………………………………………………….....53
2
Introduction
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This presentation examines drug trafficking from Mexico to the United
States. My interest in this topic is a personal one as I have visited Mexico
on many occasions and my wife is from Saltillo, Coahuila, in northern
Mexico. There, I have witnessed masked soldiers of the Mexican army
patrolling the streets in pickup trucks mounted with .50 calibre machine
guns and have heard fear in the whispered voices of those who dared
speak of the Zeta drug cartel.
I have examined various aspects of drug trafficking and Mexican drug
cartels in my courses in Staffordshire University’s M.A. Transnational
Organized Crime program. It is now the subject of my dissertation.
First, drug trafficking is introduced as a transnational crime. Second, the
history of drug trafficking in Mexico and U.S.-Mexican relations are
explained. This is followed by some analysis of the strategies used to
combat drug trafficking. Finally, some questions for my proposed research
are identified.
3
Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime
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Efforts at controlling drugs on an international level have existed for
more than a century. International conventions tend to reflect the
values of the more powerful states and the drug control conventions
are no exception.
The U.S. has been a dominant force in drug control from the
beginning and has been a leading proponent of prohibition based on
a crime control model. “This stringent position has reflected the
desire and capacity of the U.S. to impose its drug-related norms on
the rest of the world” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006: 45).
4
Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime
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Drug trafficking is defined as “the illegal movement, across one or
more national frontiers, of psychoactive substances controlled under
three instruments of international law known as the drug control
conventions” (Chawla & Pietchmann, 2005: 160).
Transnationality is an unavoidable and essential element of the
definition as drugs from source countries are moved to other
countries where the illicit drugs are in demand.
Drug trafficking did not exist as a crime until the early twentieth
century when the international conventions determined which drugs
were legal and illegal (ibid: 160).
5
Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime
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Although drug trafficking is transnational in nature, early efforts to
control it were not. Most attempts at controlling drug trafficking
were on a national level since the international drug control system
was primarily geared to controlling the licit trade in drugs (ibid:
176).
For example, the Harrison Act of 1914 was a unilateral action by the
U.S. to curtail drug trafficking and consumption (Recio, 2002: 39).
While it “drastically reduced the consumption of narcotics in the
U.S.” (Lyman, 2011: 47), it also had the unintended consequence of
increasing drug trafficking from Mexico.
6
Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime
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The ratification of the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit
Traffic in Dangerous Drugs in 1936 put drug trafficking on the
international level for the first time. Its purpose was “to stem the
illicit drug traffic and harshly punish traffickers through criminal
sanctions” (Sinha, 2001: 15; Chawla & Pietchmann, 2005: 161).
In spite of its lofty objectives, this treaty had a negligible effect on
drug trafficking as few countries ratified it with others, including the
U.S., considering bi-lateral treaties with like-minded states to be the
better option (McAllister, 2000: 123).
However, it did make one important contribution to the
international drug control regime. “All of the previous treaties dealt
primarily with the regulation of ‘legitimate’ drug activities whereas
the 1936 Trafficking Convention now made such activities an
international crime subject to penal sanctions” (Sinha, 2001: 15-16).
7
Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime
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With drug control under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.) in
1946, the international community began consolidating the various
drug control treaties. The result of these negotiations was the 1961
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This convention replaced all
of the previous existing drug control treaties except one.
The 1936 Trafficking Convention was not included as there was a
lack of agreement regarding which provisions to include in the
Single Convention (McAllister, 2000: 207-208).
With the Trafficking Convention remaining in force, little attention
was paid to this aspect of drug control in the Single Convention.
Section 35 of the Single Convention encourages cooperation
between states including the use of extradition and Section 36
requires signatories to develop adequate punishments for drug
related offences including trafficking and designates them as
punishable offences (Sinha, 2001: 21; Chawla & Pietchmann, 2005:
176).
8
Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime
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The administration of the international drug control treaties was
transferred to the newly created International Narcotics Control
Board (INCB) of the U.N. in 1968 (Sinha, 2001: 23; Neuilly, 2010:
375).
President Richard Nixon’s declaration of war on drugs in the late
1960s focused attention on the international drug control
conventions. In order to expand control over a greater number of
drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances was passed
so that drugs such as LSD, amphetamines and barbiturates were
controlled. The convention was formulated in response to the
increased use of these drugs during the 1960s (Thoumi, 2009: 78).
The resulting Single Convention Protocol in 1972 “strengthened the
functions of the INCB by clearly stating that they included the
prevention of illicit trafficking in drugs” (ibid: 31-32).
9
Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime
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In addition, efforts led by the U.S. government resulted in the Single
Convention Protocol in 1972 which “strengthened the functions of the INCB
by clearly stating that they included the prevention of illicit trafficking in
drugs” (Sinha, 2001: 31-32).
The international community became concerned in the early 1980s about
the limited attention to trafficking in the existing international drug
conventions and the U.N. began working on a convention to address this
issue.
The 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances brought various precursor chemicals used to
manufacture drugs under international control and sought to “reduce the
incentives for drug trafficking by increasing risks such as imprisonment as
well as reducing benefits through the confiscation of profits” (Chawla &
Pietchmann, 2005: 160 & 177). It was ratified in 1990 and re-established
the focus on fighting international drug trafficking that first began in1936
(ibid: 177 & 180).
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Drug Trafficking as Transnational Crime
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The 1988 Trafficking Convention, designed as an instrument of
international criminal law (Sinha, 2001:33), elevated drug trafficking
to a criminal offence unlike the 1961 Single Convention’s reference
to it as a punishable offence (Neuilly, 2010: 374).
“It acknowledged that huge profits from drug trafficking allowed
transnational criminal organizations to contaminate and corrupt
governments, business and society” (Carstairs, 2005: 62).
Therefore, drug trafficking clearly belongs in the realm of
transnational organized crime.
11
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations
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Drug trafficking in Mexico can be traced to the early twentieth
century. Astorga (2002: 8) describes its development over four
periods:
“1) 1914-1947 which witnessed the birth of drug trafficking and its
connections to political power; 2) 1947-1985 where the army and
the police are created as structural mediations between the political
power and the drug traffickers; 3) 1985-2000 where the one party
monopoly on power begins to lose power over its mediating
institutions and there is greater pressure from the U.S. than in
previous times; 4) 2000 to the present where political power shifts
from Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to the opposition
party, Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and the significant changes in
the relations between the political power and drug trafficking.”
12
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1914-1947
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A divergence in laws around the prohibition of drugs in the two countries
acted as a catalyst for drug trafficking. Opium and its derivatives, morphine
and heroin, were strictly controlled in the U.S. through the enactment of the
Harrison Act of 1914 and by 1922, these drugs were totally prohibited
(Recio, 2002: 26). This was not the case in Mexico. According to Craig
(1978: 108), Mexican “opium was only grown for personal use prior to
World War I but trafficking to the U.S. began during the war when the
traditional world trade was interrupted.”
Marijuana and the opium poppy were legal substances in Mexico until 1920
and 1926 respectively (Astorga, 2002: 10). Therefore between at least
1914 and 1926 what was considered drug trafficking in the U.S. was
considered legal enterprise in Mexico (ibid: 4). In spite of the divergence in
law, there was some early cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico in
drug interdiction. For example, collaboration resulted in the capture of
opium shipments between Chihuahua, Mexico and El Paso, Texas in 1912
(Recio, 2002: 33).
13
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1914-1947
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Mexico continued to import opium despite being a signatory of the
1912 International Opium Convention. However, given that this
convention did not come into force globally until 1919, it was legally
not in contravention of it. Since this was during the Mexican
Revolution of 1910-1920, Mexican leaders were more concerned
about their political survival than controlling opium (ibid: 3).
Political uncertainty caused by the revolution was advantageous to
drug traffickers. For example, it allowed Colonel Esteban Cantú, the
governor of Baja California, to take advantage of his political
autonomy and distance from Mexico City to create ‘the kingdom of
Cantú’ where from 1915 to 1920 he profited from drug trafficking
and the bootlegging of alcohol to the U.S. (Sandos, 1984: 208).
The U.S. government was aware of Colonel Cantú’s activities and
pressured the Mexican government to take action.
14
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1914-1947
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This early relationship between political power and drug trafficking
following the Mexican Revolution would become a characteristic of
Mexican governance for more than seven decades. In essence from
its inception, drug trafficking was “watched over, administered or
controlled by the political power, forming a special field in the illegal
economy whose most profitable aspects were subject to the
goodwill of the governing class” (Astorga, 2002: 9).
Taking advantage of the prohibitionist atmosphere in the U.S. and
the lucrative black markets that resulted from it, drug traffickers in
the 1920s began planting opium in several states (Recio, 2002: 39).
Drug traffickers also became more organized during these years. In
response to Mexico’s more stringent drug laws, drug traffickers
rearranged their distribution routes and took advantage of
improvements in transportation by using trains and airplanes to
transport their products within Mexico and to the U.S. (ibid: 40-41).
15
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1914-1947
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There is conflicting information in the literature regarding the
amount of drug trafficking during the interwar years. On one hand,
Astorga (1999: 4), indicated that marijuana production was
significant and drug traffickers amassed fortunes smuggling opium
in the 1930s whereas on the other, Craig (1978: 108) said “traffic in
Mexican opium abated during this time and was revived in 1939”.
What is certain is that links between drug traffickers and politicians
were common. Reports abounded about drug traffickers being
protected by politicians as well as by the police whose function was
to combat drug trafficking (Astorga, 2002: 11).
16
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.
Mexican Relations: 1914-1947
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Mexico’s anti-drug policy was the responsibility of the
Health Department until 1947 when it was transferred to
La Procuraduria General de la República (PGR), the
Attorney-General Department (Astorga, 2002: 12).
That same year, another important element in Mexico’s
drug control policy was also formed. The Dirección
Federal de Seguridad (DFS), Federal Security
Department, was an intelligence agency that was
responsible to the President and had the authority to
intervene in anti-drug policy (ibid: 12). However, the
U.S. was aware that its leaders had links to the drug
trade (ibid: 12).
17
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1947-1985
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Mexico began ‘La Campaña Permanente’ (The Permanent
Campaign) in 1948 as a nation wide response to drug trade
consisting mainly of occasional raids on marijuana and opium
cultivation and the interdiction of drugs (Craig, 1978: 108). La
Procuraduria General de la República (PGR), the Attorney-General
Department, was responsible for La Campaña Permanente.
A portion of the Mexican army was permanently assigned to the
PGR and their primary function was the eradication of opium
poppies and marijuana plants. However, “limited resources in
personnel and equipment, as well as corruption hampered their
efforts” (Craig, 1978: 116-117). The acquisition of aircraft and
other equipment in the early 1960s dramatically increased
eradication results but these results were short lived once traffickers
developed counter-strategies (ibid: 109). Drug interdiction was the
responsibility of the Federal Judicial Police (FJP).
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History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1947-1985
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President Richard Nixon was elected on his platform of a declaration of war
on drugs in 1968. Throughout the 1960s, Mexican heroin and marijuana
continued to enter the U.S. unabated and the U.S. government grew
increasingly frustrated with what seemed to be half-hearted efforts against
drug trafficking by the Mexican government. American criticisms against La
Campaña Permanente were numerous and included: a lack of seriousness
due to inadequate funding, failure to send forces to key areas, failure to
extradite Mexican traffickers, corruption, and a failure to use defoliants
(ibid: 122-127).
As a result, the Nixon administration launched Operation Intercept on
September 21, 1969 without advising the Mexican government. It involved
“the physical searching of every person, regardless of status, that crossed
the 1945 mile border as well as intensified land, air and sea surveillance
(Craig, 1980a: 566).
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History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.
Mexican Relations: 1947-1985
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The rationale behind Operation Intercept was threefold. Publicly, its
intention was to stop the flow of drugs from Mexico but its hidden
agenda was to promote the war on drugs and to pressure the
Mexican government into compliance (ibid: 556). It was poorly
planned and had some unintended consequences. Operation
Intercept lasted twenty days and while some drugs were
intercepted, it negatively affected the economies of both countries
and created a serious diplomatic incident (ibid: 567-573).
Despite the significantly negative consequences, Operation
Intercept achieved its objectives. High level talks between the U.S.
and Mexico smoothed relations and resulted in Operation Intercept
changing to Operation Cooperation (ibid: 577).
20
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1947-1985
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Operation Intercept was considered a success by the U.S. government
primarily due to the Mexican government’s renewed zeal for their lagging
Campaña Permanente (ibid: 579). The U.S. was particularly concerned
about the amount of heroin entering the country. Successful anti-drug
efforts in Turkey in the early 1970s resulted in Mexico becoming the U.S.’s
primary source of heroin (Reuter & Ronfeldt, 1992: 93).
This shift can be explained by the balloon effect. Just as “squeezing a
balloon forces the air to move to another area so it is with drug trafficking
where increased enforcement efforts shift drug trafficking operations to
weaker jurisdictions and force greater organizational sophistication”
(Lyman, 2011: 136). Given that the amount of drugs interdicted by the FJP
from 1973 to 1976 was described as being particularly impressive (Craig,
1978: 120), this must have alleviated U.S. government concerns somewhat.
While the Operation Intercept debacle had a positive outcome, it also had a
significant impact on future Mexican-U.S. relations. It was the “unilateral
imposition of Operation Intercept that ended Mexico’s special relationship
and introduced drug trafficking as a new issue on the bi-lateral agenda”
(Chabat, 1996: 373-374).
21
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1947-1985
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Mexico’s revitalized Campaña Permanente led to a period of success
against drug trafficking. A significant shift in Mexican drug control
policy occurred in November 1975 when the Mexican government
addressed a major U.S. criticism by immediately reversing a
previous decision against the use of chemical defoliants (Craig,
1980b: 346).
As a result, eradication was expanded to a year round basis and
increases in funding, greater cooperation between various levels of
government within Mexico and with the U.S. government as well as
seriously addressed corruption and the use of modern technology
resulted in a very successful 1975-76 anti-drug effort that was
known as Operation Condor (ibid: 347).
22
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1985-2000
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The election of President José López Portillo in 1976 resulted in an even
greater commitment and successes against drug trafficking. In January
1977, Operation Condor was directed against the opium poppy fields of
Sinaloa, the core of Mexico’s heroin industry, and although there was
violent resistance by the traffickers, a significant number of opium fields
were eradicated (ibid: 351-358).
While Craig (1980b) portrayed Operation Condor as a highly successful
anti-drug campaign, Astorga’s (1999) depiction was noticeably less
favourable. The social costs of Operation Condor were not considered.
While many lives, including high level drug traffickers, were disrupted by
being forced to flee to other states, those who suffered arrest, jail and
torture tended to be low level players in the drug trade (Astorga, 1999: 10).
Overall, the mid 1970s was a successful period for Mexican anti-drug
efforts. U.S. drug enforcement officials were delighted to see significant
reductions in Mexico’s share of the American drug market from1974 to
1979. Mexican heroin and marijuana accounted for 30% and 20%
respectively of the U.S. drug market in the late 1970s (Craig, 1980b: 358359; Reuter & Ronfeldt, 1992: 94). However, the successes in Mexico’s
anti-drug efforts did not last and U.S.-Mexican relations also suffered.
23
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1985-2000
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The U.S. government took a harder stance against drug trafficking
in the 1980s and much of the attention was focused on Mexico.
Initially, the U.S. government assumed that Mexican efforts against
drug trafficking were sufficient under La Campaña Permanente but
by the mid 1980s they began to have serious doubts of this
assessment (Chabat, 1996: 399). There are several reasons for
this.
First, by the mid 1980s drug exports rebounded and drug traffickers
developed counter-strategies that made aerial spraying of defoliants
less effective (ibid: 107).
Second, successful interdiction efforts in the Florida-Caribbean
region against Columbian drug cartels led to a balloon effect with
Mexico becoming the primary transportation corridor for cocaine
(Lyman, 2011: 136 & 287). This opportunity benefited Mexican
drug cartels.
24
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1985-2000
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Over time, the Mexican cartels demanded cocaine instead of cash as
payment and by the end of the 1980s they were firmly entrenched
in the wholesale cocaine market dominating the Western half of the
U.S. (ibid: 13-137). Marijuana from Mexico also replaced
Columbian marijuana due to the closing of the Caribbean corridor
(Chabat: 1996: 377).
Third, the U.S. government was outraged by the abduction, torture
and subsequent assassination of Enrique Camarena, a U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent in Guadalajara, Mexico on
February 7, 1985 by drug traffickers that was done with the
complicity of several high ranking FJP and DFS officials (Walker III,
1996: 395).
25
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1985-2000
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As a result, there was increased pressure on Mexico to do more against
drug trafficking. The Mexican government responded by disbanding the
DFS (Astorga, 2002: 15). The U.S. government launched a second
Operation Intercept ten days after Camarena’s murder as a response
(Chabat, 1996: 378). This was followed by another significant drug
interdiction effort on the U.S.-Mexico border in 1986. According to Lemus
(1996: 423), Operation Alliance was in direct response to the shift to
Mexico as a primary drug source following the successful interdiction efforts
in the Florida/Caribbean region.
Fourth, the U.S. government escalated the war on drugs in the 1980s.
President Ronald Regan’s amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act in 1982
militarized the war on drugs by allowing military involvement in civilian law
enforcement (Grayson, 2003: 151-153). He then declared the drug trade
to be a threat to national security in 1986 (Walker III, 1993: 39; Reuter &
Ronfeldt, 1992: 110).
26
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1985-2000
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That same year, the certification process as a drug control strategy
was implemented. As a result, the U.S. President was “legally
obligated to inform Congress annually about which drug producing
or drug transit countries had fully cooperated with U.S. drug control
efforts during the previous year in order for them to avoid a series
of aid and trade sanctions” (Storrs, 1998: 1).
Certification is based on the following criteria: “1) a budget
dedicated to fight drug trafficking, 2) seizures and eradication of
shipments, 3) the number of arrests, 4) legal and institutional
reforms aimed to strengthen the fight against drugs, 5) the signing
of international drug agreements, and 6) acceptance of U.S.
collaboration” (Chabat, 2002: 7).
Although Mexico was fully certified every year from the beginning of
the program, it was a source of tension between the two countries.
Mexico considered the certification process as a challenge to
sovereignty (Walker III, 1993: 41) and the granting of full
certification to Mexico was not without its critics in Congress (Storrs,
1998: 2).
27
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1985-2000
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Also in 1986, the DEA retaliated for the Camarena killing by sponsoring the
kidnapping of René Verdugo Urquidez who was involved in this crime
(Chabat, 1996: 378). This was an obvious violation of Mexican sovereignty.
U.S.-Mexican relations were normalized in 1988 with the elections of
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and U.S. President George H.
Bush (ibid: 389). President Salinas declared drug trafficking as a national
security threat that same year. Its purpose differed from that of the U.S.
since the Mexican military was involving in combating drug trafficking from
the 1940s. Rather, it seemed to be for political reasons in order to rally
support for the government’s efforts (Reuter & Ronfeldt, 1992: 111 & 115).
A longstanding and important issue for the Mexican government has been
the issue of sovereignty. Relations between the two countries deteriorated
again in 1990. The DEA’s sponsored rendition of Dr. Humberto Alvarez
Machain, a suspect in the Camarena killing, and a 1992 ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court that rendition was an acceptable method to ensure
prosecution even if it violated international law further tested relations
between the two countries (Storrs, 1998: 5; Chabat, 1996: 382; Walker III,
1993: 50).
28
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1985-2000
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The Mexican share of the U.S. drug market increased during the 1990s. In
1991, Mexico was responsible for 33% of the heroin, 70% of the foreign
grown marijuana and more than 50% of the cocaine in the U.S. (Storrs,
1998: 2). The demise of the Columbian cartels was a factor in Mexican
drug cartels becoming more powerful in the mid 1990s (Finckenauer,
Fuentes & Ward, 2001: 3). From 1995 to 1997, Mexico’s share of the U.S.
drug market was between 20 to 30% for heroin, 80% for marijuana,
between 50-60% for cocaine and 80% for methamphetamine precursor
chemicals (Storrs, 1998: 2).
The increase can be attributed in part to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) which came into force in early 1994. “The explosive
growth in transborder commercial activity under NAFTA and the increase in
human and merchandise traffic” provided more opportunities for drug
cartels to smuggle their products into the U.S. (Miro, 2003: 3).
Mexican cooperation with the U.S. in anti-drug efforts was renewed
following the election of Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo in 1994. Under
his administration, the army took on a new role in addition to its eradication
work, that of law enforcement, to fight drug traffickers (Chabat, 2002: 5).
29
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 1985-2000
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Although there were an increasing amount of drugs entering the
U.S. in the 1990s, the U.S. government was confident that President
Zedillo was sincere about combating drug trafficking. For example,
Mexican eradication efforts during this period yielded greater results
than earlier in the decade (Storrs, 1998: 3).
While the U.S. viewed these efforts as positive, critics continued to
be concerned with the level of corruption within Mexico. In order
to increase collaboration in anti-drug efforts between the two
countries, a High Level Contact Group for Drug Control was
established in 1996 to address such issues (Finckenauer, Fuentes &
Ward, 2001: 15).
During this period there was also a gradual shift in Mexican politics
at both the state and federal levels with the ruling party losing
government posts to the opposition thus reducing the power of the
government and its power over drug traffickers (Astorga: 2002: 16).
30
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 2000-Present
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Mexico began a new political era in 2000 with the election of
President Vincente Fox of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) thus
ending Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s (PRI) seventy-one year
rule. Although the various Mexican PRI administrations made efforts
to combat drug trafficking it appears that they were more selective
than comprehensive. There is consensus in the literature that the
PRI government tolerated and protected drug trafficking in some
areas while making arrests and eradicating drug crops in others,
suggesting an overall policy of accommodation (Beittel, 2011: 4).
U.S.-Mexican relations improved significantly with this shift by
President Fox’s administration.
Fox’s campaign platform promised a “war without mercy on
organized crime” (ibid: 3) which represented a significant change in
Mexican government policy towards drug trafficking. The transfer
of power from “PRI to PAN, changed the Mexican government’s
stance from acquiescence and even tacit support for the drug trade
to confrontation with the traffickers” (Williams, 2009: 2).
31
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 2000-Present
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The election of President Felipe Calderón (PAN) in 2006 resulted in a
significant escalation of the Mexican government’s war on drugs because of
his strategy of direct confrontation.
It has been implemented by deploying 50,000 military and federal police for
anti-cartel operations in various locations, often replacing local police due to
fears of corruption. Some examples are: Operation Secure Mexico (2005)
sought to combat drug violence and police corruption in specific cities;
Northern Border Initiative (2006) involved the deployment of 800 federal
police to Neuvo Laredo as well as Platform Mexico Initiative (2008) which
was designed to improve communication between various levels of law
enforcement and to create a nationwide database on drug cartels (Cook,
2008: 15).
As a consequence, drug violence has escalated to an unparalleled level as
the cartels engage in “turf” wars and use various methods to target police,
military, politicians, public officials and civilians. These methods include
“massacres of young people and migrants, the killing and disappearance of
journalists, the use of torture, beheadings, and car bombs” (Beittel, 2011:
1). The latest Mexican government data indicated that there were 47,515
drug related deaths from December 2006 to September 2011 (BBC: 2012).
32
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 2000-Present
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According to various sources, eight major drug cartels are currently
operating in Mexico although discrepancies exist between sources (Miro,
2003; Cook, 2008; BBC, 2011b; Beittel, 2011). These discrepancies are
likely due to cartels forming from loose networks with new groups and
resulting splits within organizations or by shifting alliances among cartels.
The differences in the maps (BBC, 2011a; BBC, 2011b) listed below
illustrate how fluid Mexican drug cartels are and demonstrate inter-cartel
conflict through changes in territory controlled. Mexican drug cartels evolve
as necessary either to counter new government strategies or to seize new
opportunities to increase profit. In 2001, they were considered to “work
almost exclusively in the drug market” (Finckenauer, Fuentes, & Ward,
2001: 5) yet within the past ten years, “Mexican drug cartels have become
poly-criminal organizations engaging in a wide variety of criminal activities
in addition to selling illegal drugs” (Beittel, 2011: 6).
The two most powerful groups are the Sinaloa and Zetas cartels (Associated
Press, 2011). The former is older and reportedly controls 45% of the drug
trade in Mexico (Beittel, 2011: 8). The latter originated in the late 1990s
and was associated with the Gulf cartel as enforcers but separated to form
an independent cartel in 2009 (ibid: 10).
33
Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.-Mexican
Relations: 2000-Present

(BBC News, 2011a: February 1)
34
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 2000-Present

(BBC News, 2011b: August 26)
35
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 2000-Present


A strategy of decapitation, the targeting of leaders, has also been
used in an attempt to weaken the cartels (Miro, 2003: 4). The
Mexican government has since “replaced this strategy with one that
focuses more on networks rather than just the leaders” (FelbabBrown, 2010, 2). In addition, the Calderón government has used a
strategy of focusing on specific cartels at different times. The
reason for this is “to break the cartels into smaller more
manageable pieces in an effort to change them from a national
security threat into a local security problem” (Rios & Shirk, 2011:
18).
Mexico is also taking steps to deal with corruption. Attempts to
counter corruption within the police include: ballistic checks on
weapons, purging of 284 federal police commanders, reforming
hiring practices including regular financial checks, drug and
psychological testing, and better police salaries (Cook, 2008: 13).
36
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 2000-Present


President Calderón’s government has displayed “an unprecedented
willingness to collaborate with U.S. on joint counter drug issues” (Beittel,
2011: 18) and this is demonstrated in part by the extradition of numerous
drug cartel leaders to the United States (Cook, 2008: 3-4 & 16). Although
U.S.-Mexican relations were quite good, they were not without their
problems. For example, following President George W. Bush’s decision to
build a fence along the border President Calderón said “it complicated U.S.Mexican relations and denounced it at the Organization of American States”
(Ribando Seelke, 2011: 10). While this fence may give the U.S. a sense of
security, it seems to be a false one. Drug cartels are using tunnels to
smuggle drugs across the border as a counter-strategy.
The U.S. government’s level of trust in the Mexican government has
progressively increased following the elections of Presidents Fox and
Calderón due to their aggressive strategies towards the drug cartels. As a
result, financial aid for Mexican counter narcotics operations for the period
2007 to 2012 through the State Department’s International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) account totals $947,976,000 (Just the Facts,
2011: 2).
37
History of Drug Trafficking in Mexico & U.S.Mexican Relations: 2000-Present



In 2007, the Mexico and the U.S. governments agreed on a counter-drug
and anti-crime assistance package consisting of equipment and training
from 2008 to 2010. Known as the Merida Initiative, it had four goals: 1)
“break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; 2) assist the
Mexican government in strengthening border, air and maritime controls; 3)
improve the capacity of Mexico’s justice system; 4) curtail gang activity in
Mexico and diminish drug demand in the region” (U.S. Committee on
Foreign Relations, 2010: 3).
In response to rising drug violence in Mexico, the Office of National Drug
Control Policy updated the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics
Strategy in June 2009. This document differed from the previous version
by placing a greater emphasis on reducing the flow of drug profits and
weapons across the Southwest border (National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy, 2009: 25 & 34).
Beyond Merida, enacted in 2011, “broadens the scope of bilateral security
efforts and focuses more on institution building than on technology and
equipment transfers” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010: 4). Like its
predecessor, it is based on four pillars: 1) “disrupting organized crime
groups; 2) institutionalizing the rule of law; 3) building a 21st century
border; 4) building strong and resilient communities” (Council on Foreign
Relations, 2010: 4; Beittel, 2011: 19).
38
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


The Mexican government’s current strategy of direct confrontation has
resulted in an increase in the levels of violence towards government and
civil society (Rios & Shirk, 2011: 18). For example, there were 8901 drugrelated killings in six years under President Fox’s administration compared
to 34,550 in the first four years of President Calderon’s administration (ibid:
1). The nature of the drug-related violence has more to do with staying in
business than turning Mexico into a failed state as some would suggest.
The state is no longer supporting drug traffickers and the violent backlash
by the cartels is “about the control and protection of the illegal drug
business rather than an attempt to overthrow the state” (Williams, 2009:
3).
Although the Mexican government has “successfully removed key leaders in
all the cartels, this is misleading as their replacements may be more violent
than their predecessors” (Carlsen, 2010: 1; Beittel, 2011: 1 & 18). While
the Mexican government regrets the violence, it also sees it as an indicator
of success. The U.S. government also shares this view.
39
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


However, critics cite the rise of human rights abuses from using the
military to perform police functions in addition to the mounting drug
violence (ibid: 3). Human Rights Watch completed a two year
investigation this past November into the Mexican army abuses in
the fight against drug trafficking and found numerous cases of
extra-judicial killings, disappearances and torture (BBC: 2011a).
In spite of the human rights abuses, the Mexican army continues to
have the support of most Mexicans. Currently, 83% of Mexicans
endorsed the government’s use of the army to fight drug traffickers
and this figure has been fairly consistent in 2010 and 2009 (Pew
Research Center, 2011: 16). When asked if the army had a positive
impact on Mexico’s situation, those who agreed were 76% in 2002,
76% in 2007, 77% in 2009 and 62% in 2011 (ibid: 14). Given the
amount of corruption in Mexico, the public was less confident in the
police. Survey results were only 35% in 2009 and 30% in 2011
(ibid: 15).
40
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


The continual drug violence has left Mexicans unsure of who is
winning the war on drugs. A March 2010 poll in the Milenio
newspaper indicated that 59% believed that the drug cartels were
winning compared to 21% who thought the government was (U.S.
Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010: 2).
As a result, it was thought that the Mexican government will have a
more difficult time convincing the public that it is winning the war
on drugs as the body count grows. In spite of this concern, data
from a 2011 poll indicated that “45% of Mexicans thought President
Calderón’s government was making progress in its campaign against
drug cartels whereas 29% said the government was losing ground
(Pew Research Center, 2011: 1).
41
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking

It was also thought that President Calderón’s unprecedented level of
cooperation with the U.S. could also be a contentious issue for
Mexicans. “While the dramatic surge in violence is an expected
upshot of the aggressive campaign against drug trafficking
organizations, the risk is that political support for expanded
cooperation with the U.S. may not survive the daily news reports of
brutal homicides and kidnappings” (U.S. Committee on Foreign
Relations, 2010: 3). However, this concern does not seem to have
been realized as recent data suggests that continued cooperation
with the U.S. continues to be seen as positive. While the majority of
Mexicans are supportive of U.S. assistance through training,
supplying money and weapons, only a minority would support the
deployment of U.S. troops in Mexico (Pew Research Center, 2011:
17). Not surprisingly, sovereignty continues to be an important
issue for Mexico.
42
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking



In spite of escalating violence and drug related killings, public
support for the president and national government has generally
increased until this year. This suggests that Mexicans may be
growing weary of the escalating violence. 2010 was a particularly
violent year in terms of drug related homicides. Statistics show that
“killings related to organized crime increased by more than 40%
from 9, 614 in 2009 to 15,273 in 2010 (Rios & Shirk, 2011: 8).
President Fox was viewed as having a positive impact by “66% of
Mexicans in 2002 and for President Calderón, the figures were 70%,
75% and 54% for 2007, 2009, and 2011 respectively (ibid: 14).
Public support for the national government as a whole has generally
been less. Only 64% in 2002, 70% in 2007, 72% in 2009, and 54%
in 2011 of Mexicans believed the national government was having a
positive influence on Mexico’s situation (ibid: 14).
43
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


Mexico’s strategy of periodically targeting specific cartels over others has
led to criticism that the government is colluding with other cartels to
remove some of the competition (Cook, 2008: 11-12). Mexican police deny
these accusations. Although this strategy weakens the targeted cartel, it
also creates opportunities for rival cartels to expand their territory and to
take over trafficking routes (Freeman, 2006: 9). The strategy of removing
the cartel leaders has shifted Mexican army resources from eradication
duties thus resulting in higher cultivation and production of illicit drugs
(Beittel, 2011: 18).
Broader issues for Mexicans than the number of killings is the fear that is
instilled in the general population and the disruption caused to civil society
by the drug-related violence. Drug cartels seem to operate with impunity
resulting in a fear by innocent citizens becoming collateral damage
(Freeman, 2006: 6). Cartels have also killed journalists thus silencing the
media through intimidation (ibid: 6-8; Rios & Shirk, 2011: 14). Civil society
has been disrupted with a general mistrust of the police due to Mexico’s
pervasive corruption and a silencing of the media about drug trafficking
(Freeman, 2006: 4-8).
44
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


Although collaboration with the U.S. has benefited the Mexican government
by injecting massive amounts of financial aid into the economy, the Mexican
government has criticized U.S. counternarcotics efforts for failing to
seriously address the trafficking of arms and drug profits entering Mexico as
well as Americans’ demand for illicit drugs (Cook, 2008: 18). Illegal firearms
have fuelled the drug violence and profits from drug trafficking are used to
pay corrupt officials on both sides of the border. More than 62% of the
80,000 illegal firearms seized by Mexican authorities originated in the U.S.
and only 1% of the estimated $20 billion dollars in drug profits is smuggled
into Mexico (Beittel, 2011: 21). These issues were ignored in the Merida
Initiative (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010: 3).
In an attempt to address these criticisms, the U.S. government revised its
Southwest Border Strategy in 2009. It now benefits both governments by
dealing with arms smuggling and money laundering issues as well as
offering greater protection against drugs entering the U.S. While the
Merida and Beyond Merida Initiatives deal with important issues such as
institutionalizing the rule of law and reforming the justice system to assist
Mexico in dealing with drug cartels, it must be remembered that their goals
will take years, if not decades, to implement successfully (Beittel, 2011:
23).
45
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


Criticism of U.S. drug control policies go beyond limiting the flow of
arms and drug profits into Mexico. In 2009, Mexico and other
countries involved in the Latin American Commission on Drugs and
Democracy concluded that “the U.S. led international drug control
regime emphasizing the criminalization of drug production and use
has largely failed” (Ribando Seelke, Wyler & Beittel, 2011: 24).
In fact, it seems that this model of drug control policy has
contributed to the problem. “Drug prohibition in the U.S. stimulates
and nourishes organized crime, both within and beyond U.S
borders” (Freeman, 2006:2). Plan Columbia, on which assistance to
Mexico is based, failed because drug production remained the same
and corruption increased (Carlsen, 2010: 1). Since Mexico has
experienced the same results, the American anti-drug efforts
represent yet another failure.
46
Analysis of Transnational Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


The Mexican government is also concerned about the U.S. reducing
demand for illicit drugs. However, this issue is not likely to be seriously
acted upon given the history of U.S. involvement in the international drug
prohibition regime. Concerns over domestic abuse became the impetus for
American involvement in negotiations for the 1912 International Opium
Convention (Nueilly, 2010: 35). The U.S. government has consistently
advocated for “punitive control systems in all countries” (Andreas &
Nadelmann, 2006: 49). It seems that the U.S. has at least made a token
gesture in this regard as there is “an increased focus on reducing U.S. drug
demand in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy” (Ribando Seelke,
Wyler & Beittel, 2011: 30).
U.S. assistance from the Merida and Beyond Merida Initiatives consist of
long-term goals. In particular, those related to institutionalizing the rule of
law and building stronger and resilient communities will not be
accomplished any time soon but will likely take decades to achieve. These
initiatives are also limited in focus. For example, the U.S. aid intended for
police reform is only directed at the federal level. The financial aid basically
ignores the more than 2000 state and local police forces throughout
Mexico, where greater problems with corruption, insufficient training,
compensation and equipment exist (U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations,
2010: iv).
47
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


The strategies employed by the Mexican and U.S. governments thus far
have been ineffective in dealing with the problem of Mexican drug cartels.
Mexican drug cartels have become so powerful that they are regarded as a
“threat to the Mexican state” (Cook, 2008: 15) and “the greatest organized
crime threat to the U.S.” (U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 2010: 9). Their share of the
American drug market continues to grow. Mexico is a major supplier for
heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine to the U.S. In addition, 95% of
the cocaine used in the U.S. enters through Mexico (U.S. Dep’t of State,
2011: 383).
A number of alternative strategies have been suggested. For instance, a
reduction in American drug demand could be achieved by providing drug
prevention/treatment programs (Freeman, 2006: 17; Carlsen, 2010: 2).
There could also be a strengthening of the regulations concerning the sale
of guns in the U.S. to make it more difficult to acquire firearms (Freeman,
2006: 19). Money laundering laws could be strengthened to reduce drug
profits returning to Mexico to support cartel activities (Carlsen, 2010: 2).
The least likely alternative strategy to be considered by the U.S. is to end
its policy of drug prohibition (ibid: 2).
48
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking


It has been suggested that the Mexican government needs a new strategy
that will win public support (Rios & Shirk, 2011: 20). A recent
announcement by the President’s National Security Spokesman who stated
that “Mexico’s drug policy is not a “war” against drug cartels but a
comprehensive strategy of the federal government to dismantle criminal
organizations while at the same time strengthening institutions” may be
indicative of such a shift (Romo, 2011). Perhaps a more effective strategy
would be to treat drugs and organized crime as separate issues (Astorga &
Shirk, 2010: 39)?
Mexicans are becoming increasingly less tolerant of their government’s
efforts against drug cartels (Miglierini, 2011). Mexico’s future as a viable
country depends on whether or not the Mexican government has the
political will and the public’s support to continue its struggle against the
drug cartels. Drug trafficking and the government’s response to it will
surely be prominent election issues when the next Mexican president is
chosen later this year.
49
Analysis of Mexican-U.S. Strategies to
Combat Drug Trafficking
20,000 protest against drug violence in Mexico City (Miglierini, 2011).
50
Dissertation Research


The above information is the background on which this research study will
be based. According to Wyler (2011: 18-36) U.S. foreign policy’s
counterdrug efforts consists of four components: 1) combating the
production of drugs at the source; 2) combating the flow of drugs in transit;
3) dismantling international illicit drug networks; 4) creating incentives for
international cooperation on drug control.
Given the 15,000 word limit of this study, the focus will be on the
transnational strategies used to dismantle international illicit drug networks,
specifically Mexican drug cartels. This component of drug control policy
uses the following strategies: “extradition, the freezing and blocking of
foreign criminal assets and building law enforcement capacity” (ibid: 3033). The primary focus will be on the role of the U.S. and international
organizations such as the U.N.’s Office of Drugs and Crime (UDOC) and the
Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD) assistance to the Mexican government in combating
drug cartels.
51
Dissertation Research


Therefore, the central research question of this study is: to what
extent have the transnational strategies, governmental and intergovernmental, used to combat Mexican drug cartels been a success
or failure?
Of particular interest is extradition. Not only has it been identified
as a major strategy at the international level in the various U.N.
Conventions relating to drug trafficking and transnational organized
crime but it has also been the focus of bi-lateral dialogue between
the U.S. and Mexican government. Extradition of drug cartel
leaders to the U.S. has been a significant element of President
Calderon’s strategy and has increasingly utilized since December
2006.
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