International Control of Climate Change:
Current Barriers and New Approaches
USC School of International Relations
November 11, 2013
Edward A. (Ted) Parson
Dan and Rae Emmett Professor of Environmental Law
Faculty Co-Director, Emmett Center on Climate Change
and the Environment
UCLA Law School
parson@law.ucla.edu
Climate change: Five things we know
1.
The Earth is heating up – rapidly
2.
Human emissions of CO2, other gases, are the dominant cause
3.
Changes will continue and probably accelerate
4.
Impacts?
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5.
Diverse, Variable, Uncertain, Less well understood
Plausible outcomes range from “no big deal” to “civilization-threatening catastrophe”
Most recent new is bad … Disconnect between popular perception and
reality is vast and growing.
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Scientific uncertainties: Real, some large, but DO NOT undermine
these points
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Recent political attacks on climate science have raised NO points that
deny or significantly modify this knowledge
What to do about it? Three types of response
• Limit climate change by reducing net emissions
• Adapt to changes we can’t avoid by reducing
vulnerability
(and back on the agenda after a long absence …)
• Engineer the Climate: modify global processes
to unlink emissions and climate change.
1. Limit climate change by cutting emissions

A global problem: Must limit world emissions

A century-scale problem: Start now, sustain through slow
transition to non-fossil energy system: Steering a supertanker
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Many feasible options, available and in the pipeline
(All needed – no magic bullet, no pre-exclusions)
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Innovation not enough – need massive deployment
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Not enough “no regrets” options – Need Incentives from
policy and law
How much must we cut to limit risks?
Avoid most severe impacts of climate change
~↓
(approx expert judgments)
Limit global-average Δ T to ~ 2 º C (now ~ 0.8)
~↓
(~ 50% chance)
Limit atmospheric GHGs to ~ 450 ppm CO2-eq (now ~ 400)
~↓
(pretty confident)
Cut world emissions 50 – 85% by 2050
~↓
(political judgment and bargaining)
Cut emissions in rich countries at least 80% by 2050
Policies to Achieve Emission Cuts
• Economy-wide measures to put a price on emissions
• Emission taxes, tradable permits, or combinations
• Start modestly, increase stringency over time –clear signal to new investment
• Support for energy R&D
• Targeted sectoral measures
• Where energy market incentives are weak
• For large near-term targets of opportunity
• Large government decisions: e.g., infrastructure,
• Plus … processes for adaptation and learning as we go
International Climate Law
Major landmarks
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Framework Convention (1992)
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Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility
• Defined “Annex 1” countries (ICs plus former Soviet bloc)
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Kyoto Protocol (1997)
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Modest near-term emission limits for Annex 1 countries
Defined on basket of 5 gases, 2008-2012
Compliance range: from squeaker (EU) to train wreck (Canada)
International Climate Law
Recent efforts
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Bali (2007)
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Copenhagen (2009)
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First undertaking for mitigation “actions” by non-Annex 1
Two negotiating tracks: Kyoto (for parties), LCA (for all)
Deadlock, procedural blockage (again)
Last-minute political accord – significant advances, but far short of need
Post-Copenhagen fizzle: Cancun, Durban, Doha, Warsaw (starting today)
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Durban program: negotiate new instrument by 2015, in force by 2020
Doha: establish (fictitious) KP 2nd commitment period, abolish two Bali tracks
Overt collapse avoided each year, but ~ zero progress
Prospects so dim, Saudi Arabia has refrained from further procedural obstruction
The Current Deadlock: Summary

UNFCCC/Kyoto Process: Universality + formal procedures +
consensus decision-making = deadlock
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National Actions:
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US: Legislation blocked since 2010, no current prospects
Executive action: EPA regulation under Clean Air Act, etc.
EU: Early leadership, strong targets, implementation failure
Signs of strong action in emerging economies, esp. China
Sub-national: California, British Columbia, Regional efforts
Nothing remotely proportional to the needs
Science:
• IPCC – New assessment coming, influence declining
• Political campaign against climate science is winning

Dangerous “New line” in debate (not new)
• “Tech Breakthrough” school without incentives – magical thinking
Ways Forward?
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Shift from UN Universality back to Great-Power Diplomacy?
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Old heresy ~ new consensus: 12 to 20 at the table: Major Economies,
G8+5 – G-20
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Long-standing informal practice in larger forums (until Copenhagen)
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Several Track II exercises mapped potential “global bargain”
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Needs: Heads of Govt, broad agenda, institutional continuity, support
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Biggest challenges: burden-sharing, implementation and MRV
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Reality-check: Promising direction, but no serious action yet in these
Attention-forcing event:
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Serious debate on Geoengineering:
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More evident disruptions  More pressure for Action
But what type of event? (Nothing so far has done it)
With what result: Flip from nothing to panic, search for blame?
Wild-card: Politically toxic now, may be essential
Big benefit, big risk: Will need international governance
The Chinese Solution:
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Chinese Empire solves the problem in 50 years
Our fecklessness (on this and other issues) has made us irrelevant
Ways Forward?
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Private “smart-money” leadership
• Not enough by itself … but might set off virtuous circle: what
innovations can get toe-hold, expand rapidly enough?
• Most likely: some technologies grow rapidly, some people get very
rich, but small contribution to problem (but what’s the
alternative?)

Small policies (California, etc.)
• Not enough … but might set off a virtuous circle
• Interaction between small policies and smart-money leadership –
more promise than either alone
Serious action by a small group (2 to 20)?
Three Challenges
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Allocation of efforts, burdens within group
Any viable group will include wide GDP/cap range
• Burden-sharing can be implicit but can’t be avoided
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Monitoring and verification of commitments
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Sharpest conflict, most progress at Copenhagen
Emissions leakage
Policies raise costs  Energy-intensive production moves
• Lose competitiveness and employment, weaken envt goal
• Size, speed may be over-stated, but still real concern
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Response to Emissions Leakage
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Make the group bigger
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Embed incentives for rapid expansion
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Anticipated expansion weakens incentive for investment shift
Enact border adjustment measures
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Assess embedded emissions in traded goods
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Charge equivalent policy burden on imports, Rebate on exports
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Easy for fuels, harder for emissions-intensive products
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In US legislation, EU proposals
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WTO-permissible?
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Not yet attempted, challenged, or adjudicated – but probably …
Easier in context of MEA (how many?)
Depends on form of policy (Carbon tax, Cap-trade, Sectoral?)
No trickery in design or implementation
Procedural recourse
Extra Slides
Atmospheric CO2: Direct measurements since 1958
The Earth is heating up: 100-year history
(NASA GISS)
Recent heating in 2000-year context
(Copenhagen Diagnosis, 2009)
Northern Hemisphere reconstructed temperature change since 200AD
Projected Temperature:
Next 100 vs. Past 1500 years
Emission Scenarios for Stabilization
2. Adapt to Unavoidable Changes to Limit Harm
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A Multi-scale problem, from local/regional to global
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Ironies of adaptation:
• Long-standing conspiracy of silence
• Common presumption it’s easier – with no evidence
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Adapting, Limiting are Linked: Limit less  Must adapt to more
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Necessary, sure … but Easy?
• Current evidence – Mal-adaptation even to current conditions
• Serious adaptation – Multiple hard legal/political problems
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Build robustness to variable conditions  Higher costs
Zoning, Planning, other limits on development
Manage and pool risks: Public insurance, emergency prep, public health
Reducing vulnerabilities: Resource transfers, domestic and international
3. Engineer interventions to limit climate change
• Two ways: alter Carbon cycle, or Sunlight – High vs. Low leverage
• Fast: Cool Earth ~ 1 year, vs. decades for mitigation or C-capture
• Cheap: Offset 21st-C heating for ~ $Bn/year, dropping – call it zero
• Imperfect:
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Direct environmental harms (the least of the problems?)
Imperfect climate offset:
• Global-average: Temperature vs. water
• Regional and seasonal effects
• Achieve regional tuning? Oops, it’s a weapon
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Non-climate effects of CO2: oceans, ecosystems
• Sharp dilemma: Raise big new risks, but we might need them
• Governance and control? Severe challenges to Law and Institutions
How to cut emissions this much?
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Transform world energy system to climate-safe sources in ~ 100 years
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Climate-safe technologies? the usual suspects
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Available now (but much room for advances)
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More distant prospects (but plausible over decades)
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Efficiency (huge room for improvement)
Renewables (incl. biofuels and geothermal)
Nuclear fission
Carbon capture and storage (extends usable lifetime of fossil fuels)
Space solar
Nuclear fusion
Cost?
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Stabilize 450 ppm: ~ 1-10% future loss (from baseline 7-15X real growth by 2100)
Marginal costs: ~ $200-2,000 per tonne Carbon
Climate Change Response:
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992)
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~ All nations are parties, including USA
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Ratified by Bush Sr. administration
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Broad structure for subsequent management, no concrete
commitments
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Objective: “… stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system … ”
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Various Principles, including “Common but Differentiated
Responsibility”
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Defines classes of parties (mainly Annex 1 vs. non) for distinct
obligations – a rigidity now problematic
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Weak hortatory target for Industrialized countries: back to 1990
emissions levels in 2000 (almost none met it, no consequences)
Climate Change Response:
Kyoto Protocol (1997)
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1995 Berlin mandate set agenda: QERLOs for Annex 1 Parties as first
step
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~ 190 parties (USA only significant non-Party)
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Key implementation questions resolved in Bonn (2001)
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Entered into force Feb 2005, after Russian rat’n achieved 55% threshold
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Binding emission targets for developed countries, avg. 5.2% below 1990
• EU 8%, Japan, Canada 6%, Russia 0%, USA 7%
• Defined over 2008-2012 commitment period
• For weighted “basket” of 6 greenhouse gases
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Flexibility mechanisms: What, when, where – US pushed
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Emissions trading – Concern with Russian “hot air”
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Domestic implementation not specified; Self-reporting of national
performance
Kyoto Protocol:
Progress and Problems, 1997-2007
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Hypnotized by numbers, last-minute horse-trading (incl.
reversal of domestic deals in US, Canada)
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Key implementation issues deferred – mostly resolved 2001,
but …
• Substantial weakening
• Lost the US (if they ever had it), no chance for re-engagement
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Late entry into force, political weakness: Most will miss 1stround targets
• Formal success overall depends on massive credit from Russia “hot
air”
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Targets: too strong now (high costs), nothing long-term when it
matters
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~ No progress on further cuts post-2012: negotiations
obstructed by front-loading debts from 1st-round exceedence
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~ No progress engaging Developing Countries on future
emissions commitments
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until Bali, 2007 …
Bali Mandate, 2007:
(Episode IV: A New Hope?)
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Major DCs: First acceptance of responsibility for
action
New structure to negotiate commitments: IC
“commitments” vs. DC “actions” – First step to reengage USA
Two tracks to Copenhagen: AWG-LCA and AWG-KP
But … (Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back?)
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Immediate return to deadlock: Tracks separate or
linked?
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No progress through mid-2009, lowering
expectations:
Copenhagen 2009:
Revealing the Limits of Universality
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Key Issues:
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Further IC emission commitments
DC mitigation actions
Short and long-term finance
Governance structures
Misc issues: REDD, bunkers, etc.
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Proposals for new Protocols  Procedural blockage
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Informal groups – progress only on REDD (solvable with $)
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“Danish text” proposals  angrily (disingenuously) rejected
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Last-day head-of-govt negotiations: 5 nations, then 28 
“Copenhagen Accord”
Copenhagen Accord
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Another non-binding “political agreement” (as expected)
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Several significant advances:
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Sought, but missing:
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Explicit statement of existing IC 2020 targets
Date of peak global emissions, explicit target for DCs
MRV: “Unsupported” DC actions have only domestic MRV, with “International
consultation and analysis”
Intense final-night plenary:
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States 2°C warming target
Emission cuts to do this: 1990 – 50% globally by 2050, “at least 80%” by ICs
Careful provisions for MRV (biggest US-China conflict, biggest advance)
Large increase in $: $10B/yr, 2010-2012, $100B/yr (multiple sources) from 2020
Review by 2016: Consider tightening target to 1.5°C
Denounced by several nations (incl Sudan, probably China proxy) – blocked adoption
“Took note” – Individual registration of support, commitments (most big have)
Status as basis for future negotiations – to be contested
Broader negotiations under FCCC and KP tracks remain blocked
Follow-up:
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~ 140 nations “indicated support” for Copenhagen accord
~ 80 “provided info on” emission reduction targets or other mitigation actions (Nothing
new)
Cancun 2010
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Reprise of conflicts, obstructions, from Copenhagen (at lower
volume)
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Relationship between KP (rich) and LCA (everyone)
• Japan “bombshell”: Won’t
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Inscribe its existing commitments in amended KP Annex B
Accept decision to extend first KP commitment period or establish a second
I.e., Merge the tracks, discuss commitments for everyone together
DCs have consistently refused in FCCC/KP discussions
Issue by Issue: progress and importance perfectly correlated
(negative)
• More promising: Adaptation, technology, capacity-building
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And REDD … (Remains a N-S conspiracy to fake progress)
• Less promising: Mitigation, Finance, MRV, Legal form (all the big ones)
• Maybe we’ll get HFC controls under the Montreal Protocol …
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How dim are the prospects?
• So dim, Saudi Arabia didn’t bother to exercise its usual procedural
obstruction
Managing Climate Change:
Easy or Hard? A Paradox

Easy:
• Not the end of rich industrialized democratic societies
• Just (mostly) a technical problem: how we get, convert, and
use energy
• Cost of major (not total) risk reduction:
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~ 0.1 – 2% loss of future (very high) GDP
Hard:
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Scientific uncertainty and disagreement …
Which can’t readily be characterized in decision-relevant terms
And which is widely subject to partisan misuse
E.g., What’s the probability distribution of climate-sensitivity?
Inability of science (alone) to define “policy-relevant”
questions
• Distribution of costs – Losers (thus far) able to block
• Ability to deploy ideology and symbolism to resist change
(especially but not exclusively in the US)