Information asymmetry in politics
and the ideal-types of corruption
Zoltán Szántó – István János Tóth
Corruption Research Center, Corvinus University of Budapest
ANTICORRP 2nd Meeting
Berlin, 18-21 October 2012
Introduction

The presentation (based on a manuscript with the same title) argues in favour of
employing in political science the concept of information asymmetry – its
mechanisms among the players of the political market may have negative effects
on the operation of a democratic political system (as information asymmetry among
economic actors has on the efficiency of market competition).

The presentation sheds new light on the phenomenon of adverse political selection,
and goes on to deal in detail with the appearance of moral hazard and
principal/agent relations in politics – and four idealtypical corruption transactions
are explicated in terms of principal/agent/client model.

The presentation touches also on the appearance in politics of mechanisms –
signalling and screening – that economists suggest for reducing information
asymmetry.
The distorting effects of information asymmetry
on market competition (1)

Literature on information economics discusses the two basic scenarios of
information asymmetry in their own merit:
1. adverse selection stands for the consequences of hidden and false information
(„hidden information”),
 2. moral hazard stands for the – previously unrecognized – hidden motivation that
develops after selection („hidden action”)


Adverse selection takes place when one of the parties (for example, a car buyer,
an employer or a voter) is unable to recognize an important characteristic (for
example, well-preparedness, actual intention or level of integrity) of the other party
(for instance, a used car seller, an employee, or a political candidate) (Akerlof
1970):

As a result, the former may fall victim to the misleading behaviour
of the latter - the mechanism of adverse selection kicks in - morally
correct used car sellers, trustworthy employees and good politicians
become increasingly harder to find.
The distorting effects of information asymmetry
on market competition (2)

Moral hazard develops when players who are difficult to observe and monitor are
motivated by a number of factors to behave in the opposite way than we have
previously expected – e.g.: insurance companies have observed the common
phenomenon, whereby people’s behaviour significantly changes after signing the
insurance agreement:
On the one hand, they are less cautious (they are less careful when handling matches
after they have taken out fire insurance or drive less cautiously with collision insurance
in their pocket, etc.),
 On the other hand, when the damage does occur, they are inclined to exaggerate its
extent (in case of household fire, a faded rug suddenly becomes a Persian carpet, or, in
a collision situation, the value of the damaged car skyrockets).


These two scenarios are referred to as


ex ante and
ex post moral hazard.
The distorting effects of information asymmetry
on market competition (3)

Principal-agent relationships constitute a unique scenario of moral hazard: one
party (agent) acts in the interest of the other (principal) - agents are usually better
informed of their own abilities, intentions and actions, since these can never be
known or monitored to the fullest extent by the principal.

Thus, it becomes possible for agents to exhibit
behaviour that goes against the interest of the principal
– e.g.: the employee after signing the employment
contract – with his or her own interests in view – will
exhibit a tendency for slacking off, as the employer, for the most part, is not able to
closely observe and monitor his/her work habits.
Protection against adverse selection
and moral hazard on the market (1)

In order to diminish information asymmetry, it is in the interest of the sellers of highquality used cars to indicate (signalling) the actual quality of their merchandise,
and perhaps also offer a warranty - while this may be an expensive option, this is
the only way to increase their chances of selling the car at a good price - signalling
only works if those involved spend less on it than the profit from the price margin.

The theory of signalling in the labour market was first introduced by Spence [1973]:
he studied whether, and to what extent, information asymmetry could be decreased
between employers and applicants during the hiring process if applicants present
documentation attesting to their qualifications (e.g. transcripts, recommendation
letters) in order to authentically signal abilities, competence and intentions that the
employer is not aware of.
Protection against adverse selection
and moral hazard on the market (2)

In order to avoid adverse selection, according to economists, buyers can use a
different approach: they can vet sellers (screening) by making an offer that forces
them to show their true colours.

For instance, by offering a very low price for the merchandise, they can vet out
crooked dealers and pay a higher price to the dealer who sells better quality cars.

Stiglitz [1977] was the first to use the concept of screening in connection with his
analysis of the competition distorting effects of information asymmetry in the
insurance market: he modelled a market where insurance companies didn’t have
sufficient information regarding the actual hazard level of their clients, so they tried
to reduce hazard by screening their potential clientele.
The consequences of information asymmetry
in politics (1)

Using the concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard
to explain political phenomena presupposes a game of incomplete
information



between political candidates running for election (agents) and
representative voters (principals).
In the process of electing agents, the principals would like to support politicians who
are competent, serve public interest, as well as follow the law and social norms the challenge may inspire a lot of candidates to run in the elections - there will be
some among them who are less suitable, even ill-intentioned, which can easily put
the mechanism of adverse selection into operation - good political candidates
could be elected instead of bad political candidates only if well-preparedness,
suitability and virtues were easy to observe and monitor.
The consequences of information asymmetry
in politics (2)

This situation constitutes a typical case of information asymmetry: the voters can
never be perfectly informed about the real abilities and intentions of the political
candidates - there will always be some degree of uncertainty with reference to the
characteristics of the political candidates.

Every candidate will advocate their own excellence and integrity during the
campaign - the uncertainty experienced by voters continues to grow - ill-intentioned
candidates - aside from the fact that they deceptively paint a false picture of
themselves - will not shy away from spreading misinformation about the others honest candidates do not employ this weapon – at least for now – because they
have faith in the voters’ well-informedness and sober thinking - these processes will
result in the honest candidates being forced out of the race (or a portion of them
breaking under the pressure and joining the game of dirty politics).
The consequences of information asymmetry
in politics (3)

Moral hazard becomes an issue in politics when, following elections, a portion of the
candidates assume power and take political control.

While exercising power, politicians are increasingly exposed to temptation - one of the
greatest temptations is for politicians


to use their position in service of their own ambitions instead of the promises they made during the campaign
and to use their status and influence to their own personal advantage, or to serve the interests of friends, family,
or business partners, while gradually forgetting about public interests.
If rent-seeking and corruption that originate from moral hazard become a political problem,
they can soon be expected to closely connect with three important factors of the system of
representation:



the degree of power,
the amount of extra profit, and
the length of time spent in office.
Representative democracy
as a chain of principal/agent relations – hidden
information and hidden action in politics (1)

In the representative system, a unique chain of power delegation
develops - power is delegated


1. by voters (as principals) to the elected representatives (as agents),
2. by the elected representatives (as principals) to the prime minister (as
agents),
 3. by the prime minister and his or her cabinet (as principal) to the
members of government (as agents),
 4. by the members of government (as principals) to state officials, civil
servants and their offices (as agents).

From the perspective of modern political economy these relations
can also be interpreted in the contexts of the principal-agent
model.
Representative democracy
as a chain of principal/agent relations – hidden
information and hidden action in politics (2)

The delegation of power in all its forms inherently contains the risk
that agents will not reliably follow the interests of the principal - if the
agent’s preferences and incentives are not in (complete) harmony
with the principal’s interests, the delegation of power will result in an
agency problem at every point of interaction in the abovementioned
chain.

In a hidden information scenario, the principal is not fully aware of
the abilities and preferences of the agent, and – as we have
previously seen – this can lead to the development of adverse
selection.
Representative democracy
as a chain of principal/agent relations – hidden
information and hidden action in politics (3)

In case of hidden action the principals are not able to precisely
observe the behavior of the agents, and this leads – as we have
pointed out before – to the proliferation of moral hazard.

The preferences and opportunities of the selected agent can be
directly opposite of the interests of the principal - in such a situation,
there is considerable chance that


representatives will go against the interests of citizens,
the prime minister and his or her cabinet will go against the interest of the
representatives,
 with a similar dynamic down the line between the members of government on
one side and the prime minister and his or her cabinet on the other,
 between state officials and civil servants on one side and members of
government on the other.
Signalling and screening mechanisms
in the world of politics (1)

Can well-prepared and honest candidates send out signals that can
help voters avoid the harmful consequences of adverse selection?

Will these voters be able to screen these candidates
– compelling them to show their true colours?

Perhaps it is those social norms, conventions and commitments that
can play such a role in politics, which signal mutuality, solidarity and
a cooperative attitude to voters in a manner that prevents dishonest
candidates from employing them

Taking trust-building steps, a safeguarding of honesty and a
deliberate commitment to legal (even constitutional) restrictions can
also improve the situation.
Signalling and screening mechanisms
in the world of politics (2)

Voters – albeit to a limited degree – do have screening methods at
their disposal:

the collection of proposal coupons (which were not originally intended for
screening purposes, but can nevertheless be used as such) or
 the pre-elections held during US presidential elections, for instance.

If we succeeded in vetting out at least a portion of the bad political
candidates already at this stage, the situation can improve –
although plenty of room still remains for manipulation even in these
scenarios.
The ideal-types of corruption
in terms of principal-agent-client model
Following the argumentation
„information asymmety → moral hazard → principal/agent relationship →
corruption”
four idealtypical corruption transactions can be explicated:

bribery and extortion are described as two different types of agent-client
relationship,

embezzlement and fraud as two different types of principal-agent relationship
too.
The principal-agent-client graph:
the basic model (1)

Principal-agent-client triad (Lambsdorff 2007: 18-19)
The agent (ex.: an official who issues construction permits)
is entrusted with power by the principal (ex.: local government)

The principal





(i) delegates certain tasks to the agent,
(ii) determines the formal rules according to which the tasks are to be performed, and
(iii) offers renumeration to the agent for completing the tasks
The agent, in return,
(iv) remains loyal to the principal, which means s/he performs the tasks in accordance
with the rules that have been laid out,
 (vi) expectably respond to the client’s needs within the specified framework,
 (v) for example, an application for a construction permit

The principal-agent-client graph:
the basic model (2)
The principal-agent-client graph:
the basic model (3)

Corruption takes place when one of these players (in most cases the agent) breaks
the rules out of self-interest, thereby hurting the interest of the other players (in
most cases the interest of the principal and/or the client).

Based on the information asymmetry between the actors, four idealtypes of
corruption can be distinguished in the principal-agent-client model (Lambsdorff
2007: 18-19).

Within these four pure types, two subtypes of corruption relationships, between the
principal and the agent on the one hand, and between the agent and the client on
the other, can be explicated.
Bribery graph (1)
Bribery graph (2)

The client acts as a briber, and makes a payment (bribes) to the
agent (the bribee)

In return the client obtains an advantage (such as a service or a
license) (s)he is not entitled to obtain (for example a tax rebate or a
public contract)
Extortion graph (1)
Extortion graph (2)

The agent (as an extorter) uses her/his power to extract money (or
other benefit) from the client (the extortee)

The client (the extortee) may have to pay for a service, although
(s)he is legally entitled to obtain it without such a payment

The agent (the extortee) uses coercion,
violence, or threats to obtain this payment
Embezzlement graph (1)
Embezzlement graph (2)

Theft of public resources by the agent (the embezzler)

The disloyal agent (the embezzler) steals from the principal (the
embezzlee)
Fraud graph (1)
Fraud graph (2)

The agent is commomly better informed about details of her/his daily tasks and
her/his efforts devoted to their fulfillment.

(S)he can benefit from informational advantages.

The agent can also actively conceal information from the principal (swindle,
trickery, manipulation of information, facts etc.) .
Conclusion (1)

In modern political economy, it is those political institutions that provide the
incentive for an adequately functioning political system, which can limit
moral hazard, corruption and rent-seeking, as well as support transparency
and the accountability of elected politicians and civil servants

Political institutions, however, can only offer a partial explanation for the
differences in the quality of government between various countries, and
between different from one time period to the next.

According to another approach – which can be thought of as compatible
with the previous stance – the quality of policymaking depends on the
competence and decency of the political class.
Conclusion (2)

It seems that theoretical and empirical research that, in explaining the performance
of a political system, focuses on the players – their characteristics, motivations, and
the mechanisms of their election – is gaining ground.

There are increasing empirical research findings in support of the hypothesis,
according to which, political leaders, in addition to the political institutional system
and political culture, also play an important role in the formulation of competent
politics and, through that, the socioeconomic performance of the given country .
Thank you for your attention!
www.crc.uni-corvinus.hu
Recent publications of the members of the
Corruption Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest:
Local Government Corruption in Hungary. In.: Bruno Dallago - Chiara Guglielmetti (eds.): Local Economies and Global
Competetiveness. Palgrave MacMillan, UK. 2011. pp. 134-153.
Business Sector. In.: Petra Burai - Péter Hack (eds.): Corruption Risks in Hungary 2011 National Integrity Study.
Transparency International, Berlin, Germany, 2011. pp. 232-247.
The social and institutional structure of corruption: some typical network configurations of corruption transactions in
Hungary. In.: Balazs Vedres – Marco Scotti (eds.): Networks in Social Policy Problems. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
pp. 171-193.