THE CYBER-TERRORISM THREAT:
FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF
RESEARCHERS
Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Lella Nouri (all Swansea
University)
Introduction

Report on findings from a recent survey on
cyberterrorism
 118
researchers, 24 countries
 Questions: definition, threat and response
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Aims:
 ‘State
of the discipline’ stock-taking exercise
 Explore potential explanations for the diversity of
responses received
 Chart areas of (dis)continuity with debates on terrorism
more widely
Academic literature

Cyberterrorism threat
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Concerned:
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Much contested
In part, a product of definitional differences
Debate between ‘the concerned’ and ‘the sceptics’
Destructive capacity of cyber- now matches physical.
Prospect of anonymity, and lower financial costs
Vulnerability of Critical Information Infrastructures
Socio-politico-economic dependencies on the Internet
Sceptics:
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Cyberterrorism as speculative fantasy
A substitute for now-outdated paradigms of threat and risk
Lack of theatricality and limited destructive capability
Other terrorist uses of the Internet more significant.
Our survey

Purposive sampling strategy:
 Targeted literature review
 Standing in the field/publication in core journals.
 Snowballing
 Mailing lists: BISA and TAPVA
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Limitations:
 Is no (bounded, fixed) (cyber)terrorism ‘research community’
 Academic time lags
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Responses:
 118 from 24 countries (out of 600); but 71% from US, UK, Australia,
Canada.
 86% permanent or temporary academic staff, or research student.
 50% Politics/IR.
 Parallels with other surveys of the terrorism literature
In your view, does cyberterrorism constitute a
significant threat? If so, against whom or what?
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Yes (58%):
 Governments/states (n=23); Critical Infrastructure/Computer networks
(n=19); Civilians/individuals (n=10); Private sector corporations (n=10)
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No (20%)
 Lack of precedents/empirical evidence
 Terrorist organisations lack capability to attack CII’s
 Lack of motivation amongst terrorist groups.
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Differences?:
 Different explanations of threat evident in responses: from ‘paralysis’ to
‘disruption’
 Different logics: some hypothetical, others extrapolated from recent events
 Competing conceptions of cyberterrorism (e.g. for some: obtaining classified
information; ‘online harassment)
 Different timescales
With reference to your previous responses, do you consider
that a cyberterrorism attack has ever taken place?
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110 responses: 49% yes and 49% no
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Examples (selected):
 Attacks on Estonia: n=11; Stuxnet, Iran: 6; Attacks on Georgia: 3
 India-Pakistan: 2; Anonymous: 2; PKK collapsing the Govt network: 1
 Wikileaks: 1
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No:
 Actor-specific definitions exclude state activities
 Lack of violence: “…no person has ever been killed or injured as the result of
an attack executed by using weaponised computer code”
 Differentiation between cyberterrorism, hacktivism and cybercrime
 No production of fear in a wider audience
 Lack of political or ideological motive for many candidates
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Primarily definitional > empirical
What are the most effective countermeasures against
cyberterrorism? Are there significant differences to more
traditional forms of anti- or counter-terrorism?
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Twelve counter-measures identified (including):
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Target-hardening (38%); Refusing to exaggerate the threat (9%);
Greater international cooperation (8%); Preventing radicalisation
(5%); Employing hackers (3%); Greater private sector involvement
(3%)
Disciplinary differences
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No countermeasures restricted to one disciplinary
background, but some trends:
 Engineering/Computer
Science: 57% of those arguing for
enhanced international cooperation
 Psychology/Anthropology: 67% of those arguing for
employing hackers.
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Politics/International Relations – more sceptical?
 69%
believed a cyberterrorist attack had not taken place
 67% of those warning against exaggerating the threat of
cyberterrorism
Conclusion
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Considerable disagreement:
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Obvious parallels:
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Threat, occurrence to date, how to respond
Frequently a product of definitional issues
Also, disciplinary differences
Academic literature, and broader debates on terrorism
However:
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50/50 split on whether it has occurred: surprising
The need for domain-specific responses posited by many
To find out more…
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Web: http://www.cyberterrorism-project.org/
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Email: ctproject@swansea.ac.uk
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Twitter: @CTP_Swansea
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Facebook: facebook.com/CyberterrorismProject
Thank you for your time!