From Food Politics: How the Industry
Influences Nutrition and Health
Marion Nestle
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To understand how
food companies are
able to exert
disproportionate
influence on
government
agricultural and
nutritional policy
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Any legal attempt by individuals or groups to
influence government policy or action
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Promoting views of special-interest groups
Attempting to influence government laws, rules or
policies that might affect those groups
Communicating with government officials or their
representatives about laws, rules, or policies of
interest
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Provide federal officials with well-researched
technical advice about proposed legislation,
regulation, and public education.
Establish personal contacts through meetings
and social occasions
Arrange campaign contributions
Stage media events
Organize public demonstrations
Harass critics
Encourage lawsuits
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1787—James Madison concerned about
“mischiefs” caused by special-interest groups
1911—lobbying made legal. Lobbyists must
register and disclose sources of funds.
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BUT Unenforceable
1995 –lobbyists defined as people who spend at
least 20% of their time lobbying, have contact
with government officials or staff, and are paid
more than $5,000 in a six month period for this
work.
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BUT all three criteria had to be met
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In 1995, House rules:
barred lobbyists from
buying meals for members
or aides (with an exception)
 small gift items still
acceptable.
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Senate rules:
cannot accept paid travel
to recreational events
 or gifts and meals worth
more than $100 from any
one individual in a year
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In 1998, an estimated $1.42 billion spent on lobbying…
Each of the 100 senators and 435 representatives contacted by 38 paid
lobbyists spending $2.7 million on each legislator to do so.
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After WWII food producers, USDA officials
and members of the House and Senate
Agricultural Committees closely united
1970s—system begins to break down as new
constituencies demanded influence
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Consumers
Large processing and marketing companies
Advocates for the poor
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In 1970s Congress expanded jurisdiction of
agricultural committees
Not only: agricultural production, marketing,
research and development
 But also: rural development, forestry, domestic food
assistance, aspects of foreign trade, international
relations, market regulation, taxes, and nutrition
advice to public.
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Resulted in huge upswing in lobbying
activities
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1950s—25 groups of food producers dominate
agricultural lobbying
Mid-1980s –84 groups
Late-1990s—1000s of groups, including
businesses, associations, law firms, and
individuals
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Frequent job exchanges
between lobbyists and
federal officials
(revolving door)
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Transfer of funds from
lobbyists to federal
officials through donations
of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ money
as well as gifts
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Job exchanges
between lobbyists and
USDA, FDA common
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The curious case of
Mr. Taylor
Presents dilemma:
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Valuable expertise or
conflict of interest?
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“Hard Money”
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Governed by legislation (Election Campaign Act)
Limits amount of individual contribution to $1000 and
PACs to $5000
Does not restrict number of candidates, nor number of
PACs to which individuals may contribute
Political Action Committees (PACs)
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Collect “voluntary” contributions from members for
donation to political campaigns
Most do not contribute equally to parties (Republicans
receive more)
Funds go where they will benefit the donors (House
and Senate Agriculture committees)
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“Soft Money”
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Election Campaign Act only
restricts contributions for federal
elections, neglecting to mention
state and national political
organizations.
This loophole allows
contributions to support
campaigns indirectly, come
from any source, be in any
amount, and do not need to be
disclosed.
In the ‘97/98 election cycle agribusiness corporations
made soft-money donations of $1.3 million to Democrats
and $1.4 million to Republicans
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Research suggests a strong correlation between
contributions and desired outcomes
Case study: Sugar
Largest contributions from sugar PACs went to members
who voted for subsidies; the larger the PAC contribution,
the more likely members were to support industry
positions
 In 1991 42% of sugar subsidies went to 1% of growers
 Fanjul Family
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 Controls 1/3 of Florida’s sugar-cane production
 Collects $60 million annually in subsidies
 Contributed more than $350,000 to political parties in ‘97/98
 Political Influence: As seen in the Starr Report
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The job of food lobbyists:
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Ensure that the government does nothing to impede clients
from selling more of their products
Do as much as possible to create a supportive sales environment