GLOBAL TURMOIL: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM TODAY Benjamin J. Cohen University of California, Santa Barbara Remarks prepared for presentation at a Conference on the BRICS and Asia, Currency Internationalization, and International Monetary Reform, Hong Kong, December 1011, 2012 LIVING WITH TURMOIL The int’l monetary system faces multiple threats Europe’s sovereign debt crisis Weakening US dollar Dimming growth prospects “Currency wars” Volatile capital flows Is worse to come? In my opinion, No. Governments will muddle through. Modest reforms are possible – but not more. Outlook: We have to learn to live with a certain amount of monetary turmoil. OUTLINE OF MY REMARKS 1. The central challenge: governance 2. The four key elements of global monetary governance Adjustment Liquidity Confidence Leadership 3. Implications for the BRICS and Asia THE CENTRAL CHALLENGE: GOVERNANCE Governance: arrangements for the formulation, implementation, and enforcement of the “rules of the game” In short, who’s in charge? GLOBAL MONETARY GOVERNANCE “Governance without government” No central authority: governance must rely on cooperation among sovereign governments Two problems Compromises are inevitable; the rules will always be sub-optimal Violations are likely: behavior will be imperfect, too GLOBAL MONETARY GOVERNANCE Four critical elements: Adjustment: management of exchange rates Liquidity: management of the supply of balance-of-payments financing Confidence: maintenance of trust in principal instruments of liquidity Leadership: exercise of power for the common good BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM Design was state-centric: key decisions to be made by governments or their agents (IMF). Rules were clear and transparent Adjustment: par-value system Liquidity: International Monetary Fund Confidence: US dollar was “as good as gold” Leadership: the United States THE SYSTEM TODAY Two major changes Revival of global financial markets Exchange rates now determined by markets Financing is also market-determined Greater risk of destabilizing shifts of confidence among major currencies Result: a sharper risk of systemic crises Diffusion of power among states Deadlocked leadership Can matters be improved? ADJUSTMENT Amendment of IMF charter (1978) Exchange rates free to float Subject to IMF surveillance But surveillance has been ineffective States have been free to do what they want Result: risk of “currency wars” Reason: Demands of national sovereignty Unlikely to change LIQUIDITY With revival of financial markets, liquidity supply has become hostage to investor sentiment Behavior is often pro-cyclical Thus tendency toward repeated crises Failed responses by governments Repeated promises to strengthen rules In practice, little accomplished Example: Europe’s sovereign debt crisis Reason: again, demands of national sovereignty Again, unlikely to change CONFIDENCE Toward a “leaderless” currency system Dollar’s dominance is weakening But there is no obvious alternative Heightened risk of sudden shifts of confidence – destabilizing capital movements Good or bad? Good? Greater discipline on the US – no more “exorbitant privilege” Bad? Others will also seek to enjoy an exorbitant privilege LEADERSHIP Effective leadership rests on two critical factors: Consensus on basic principles Concentration of power Most conspicuous today by their absence. Consensus has broken down Power is more diffused (especially autonomy) IMPLICATIONS FOR BRICS AND ASIA Revival of global financial markets Advantage: ready access to finance Disadvantage: vulnerability Policy option: capital controls? Diffusion of power among states Gain to date: autonomy Potential gain: influence Policy option: build a “winning coalition”? Problem: still no consensus on what is needed AGENDA FOR BRICS AND ASIA Adjustment: prepared to accept IMF surveillance? Liquidity: prepared to submit domestic finances to int’l rules? Confidence: prepared to forego an “exorbitant privilege”? Leadership: prepared to share the responsibilities of governance?