HEALTH SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE EU
(generic preparedness planning for public
health threats)
Charalambos Charilaou
MSc, Bed, BSc(Hons),DCN, RGN, Phd canditate
First Nursing Officer
Representative of Ministry of Health of
Cyprus in the HSC
Health Security Committee (HSC) mandate
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Exchange information on health-related threats from
acts of terrorism or any deliberate release of CBRN
agents
Share information and experience on preparedness
and response plans and crisis management
strategies
Be able to communicate rapidly in case of healthrelated crises
Share and coordinate health-related crisis responses
by Member States and the Commission
Facilitate and support coordination and cooperation
efforts and initiatives undertaken at EU and
international level
Health Security Committee
(HSC)
Generic Preparedness and Response
for public health emergencies
 Public health preparedness and
response to chemical, biological and
radio nuclear (CBRN) attacks
 Influenza preparedness and response

Priority Issues of HSC
Detection and communication
 Threat and risk assessment
 Preparedness
 Scientific advice
 Crisis management and testing of plans
 Cooperation
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Crisis
breaks
Is Member State
able to handle crisis
without external help?
No
Yes
MS evaluates
National action
No political
EU coordination
required
Political EU
coordination
required
RAS
SitCen
Agreements
Manual
Info
CCA
Political coordination in
Brussels in the event of a
breaking emergency or crisis
Information on
breaking crisis
SITCEN 24h
Number
+32-(0)2-281 5000
COMMISSION
(ARGUS)
GSC
Private Offices
SG/HR & DSG
PRESIDENCY
PRESIDENCY CONSULTS
Permanent
Representatives
of affected Member
States
Presidency decides whether to trigger coordination
arrangements in agreement with affected Member States
NO
YES
Message to stand down
All Member States informed
Member States
&
Council Secretariat
&
Commission
Crisis Steering Group
convened via
Council Secretariat
(Sitcen)
Information input
COREPER II
Council Secretariat
& Commission
assist Presidency
Generic Preparedness and Response for
Public Health emergencies
Generic Preparedness is about
developing and strengthening capacities
to respond rapidly to any kind of
emergencies affecting or likely to affect
Public Health in more than one EU
country
Essential components of Generic
Preparedness Planning
Information management
 Communications
 Scientific advice
 Liaison and command and control
structures
 Preparedness of the health sector
 Preparedness in all other sectors and
inter-sectorally
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Chemical, Biological and Radio
Nuclear (CBRN) threats
EU preparedness focuses on all types of
CBRN hazard (man made, natural,
accidental or deliberate).
e.g deliberate contamination of drinking
water, accidental radio-nuclear
contamination or the emergence of a new
infections disease icluding those that take
the form of pandemic.
Chemical, Biological and Radio
Nuclear (CBRN) threats
EU activities
 Crisis management arrangements and
strategies
 Communication systems linking up EU
countries
 Expert advice on prevention, treatment and
mitigation
 Health risk assessment
 Promoting research in CBRN related topics
Early Warning and Rapid Alert
Systems
EWRS (Communicable diseases
threats)
 RAS BICHAT (Deliberate release of
CBRN agents)
 RAS CHEM (Incidents including
chemical agents relevant to terrorism
and other events)
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EU CBRN Action Plan
Objectives
1. Ensuring that unauthorized access to
CBRN materials is as difficult as
possible (prevention)
2. Having the capability to detect CBRN
materials (detection)
3. Being able to efficiently respond to
incidents involving CBRN materials and
recover from them as quickly as
possible (preparedness and response)
Influenza pandemic
preparedness
An influenza pandemic can occur
whenever a new flu virus appears against
which humans have no immunity.
Pandemics can be severe and require a
high level of preparedness
Influenza pandemic
preparedness
Main objectives
Preparedness plans
Assessment of national preparedness
Exchange of best practices
Vaccination
Early Lessons learned from the 2009
H1N1 outbreak
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Investments in pandemic planning paid off
Public health departments did not have
enough resources to carry out plans
Response plans must be adaptable and
science – driven
Providing clear, straightforward information to
the public was essential for allaying fears and
building trust
Early Lessons learned from the 2009
H1N1 outbreak
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Even with a mild outbreak, the health care
delivery system was overwhelmed
Communications between the public health
system and health providers was not well
coordinated
WHO pandemic alert phases caused
confusion
International coordination was more
complicated than expected
Health Security Committee Work
Plan 2011-2013
Preparedness planning
 Influenza Preparedness and planning
 Risk assessment
 Risk management
 Risk communication
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References
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The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom,
security and justice in the European Union
(2005/C53/01)
EU emergency and crisis co-ordination arrangements
(15106/05, Limite, CAB 48,JAI 469, PROCIV 194)
Reinforcing the EU¨s emergency and crisis response
capacities (5228/06, Limite, CAB 1, PESC 21, JAI 12,
PROCIV 2)
Interim EU emergency and crisis coordination
arrangements in Brussels (8380/06, Limite, CAB 14,
JAI176, PROCIV 64
References
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Emergency and crisis coordination
arrangements in Brussels (CCA) – Internal
GSC standard operating procedures (SOPs)
8888/07, LIMITE, CAB18
Council conclusions on Lessons learnt from
the A/H1N1 pandemic – Health security in the
European Union, 13 September 2010
Council conclusions on Health Security
Committee, 22 February 2007
http:/ec.europa.eu/health/phthreats/bioterrorism/docs/keydo-bio-05-en.pdf
Thank you for your attention