INTRODUCTION TO
EUROPEAN POLITICS
Dr Simona Guerra
simona.guerra@nottingham.ac.uk
IS THERE A EU DEMOCRATIC
DEFICIT?
 Yes, there is a democratic deficit/No, there
is no democratic deficit (EU as ‘regulatory model’,
catchword, trials and errors, lack of salient issue content) – EP
elections
 Comparing the EU?
 Referendums (Maastricht 1992, Nice 2001, Constitutional
Treaty 2005, Lisbon 2008) = Euroscepticism?
 EU 2010, EU 2020 and beyond
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT?
 As the only elected body of the EU, the EP:
is likely to be too weak;
it gives evidence of the distance between
citizens the EU institutions (too complex
policies);
policy drift;
vs. other institutions
http://no2eu.com
EP ELECTIONS
 EP elections look as neither European nor national
parliamentary elections.
 Defined as ‘second-order’ - where no actual
executive power was, and is, at stake (vs. national)
European elections:
 Are likely to be less salient to citizens – ie. turnout will be
lower;
 Motivations can be different from national elections – ie.
larger parties are likely to lose, smaller to gain;
 Citizens can feel free to express their own judgement on the
incumbent – ie. Incumbent government parties will lose
votes.
Electoral cycles can further affect the outcome of the EP
elections
EU REFERENDUMS
 Up to Maastricht: ‘permissive consensus’
 Danish Referendums (1992, 1993)
 Nice Treaty and Ireland (2001, 2002)
 Constitutional Treaty: Spain, Luxembourg,
France and the Netherlands (2005)
 Lisbon Treaty: Ireland (2008)
 Eurosceptic public opinion?
© European Union: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf
Licensed for REPRODUCTION ONLY: http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm
EUROSCEPTICISM
 Euroscepticism 'expresses the idea of contingent or
qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and
unqualified opposition to the process of European
integration‘ (Taggart 1998: 366)
 ‘Hard Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the
entire project of European political and economic integration
and opposition to their country joining or remaining members
of the EU’
 Soft Euroscepticism involves contingent or qualified
opposition to European integration and can, in turn be further
sub-divided into 'policy' Euroscepticism and 'national interest‘
Euroscepticism’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001)
DEMOCRACY IN THE EU
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_part2_en.pdf
(p. 31/320 democracy) (p. 53/320 trust)
 If EP elections (and referendums) are debated
at the domestic level;
 If citizens are distant from EU politics;
 If there is a EU lack of salience;
 If the EU does not have a term of comparison;
In Schmitter’s (2000) words – Why bother?
EU 2010, EU 2020 and beyond
 EU 2010: Lisbon Strategy, economic, social,
environmental pillars (towards a competitive,
dynamic, knowledge-based economy)
 EU 2020: future enlargements and wider Europe
(ENP), demographics, immigration, energy &
environment, new threats: terrorism and weapons
proliferation
 ‘Constraining dissensus’; the ‘Monnet method’,
spillovers between functionally related issue arenas
to advance the level and scope of integrative
institutions, has exhausted its potential’ (Schmitter
2000: 117)
REFERENCES
 Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2006) ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the
EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 533-562 (DD)
 Kroh, M., van der Brug, W. and van der Eijk, C. (2007) ‘Prospects for
Electoral Change’ in van der Brug, W. and van der Eijk, C. (eds) European
Elections and Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for
the Future, forthcoming, ch. 11 (SOE).
 Marsh, M. and Franklin, M. N. (1996) ‘The Foundations: Unanswered
Questions from the Study of European Elections, 1979 –1994, in van der
Ejik, C. and Franklin, M. N. (eds) Choosing Europe: The European
Electorate and National Politics in the Face of the Union, Michigan: The
University of Michigan Press, ch. 2 (SOE).
 Meny, Y. (2002) ‘De la démocratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New
Challenges’, Jornal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No 2, pp. 1-13
(DD).
REFERENCES
 Koepke, J. R. and Ringe, N. (2006) ‘The second-order Election Model in an Enlarged
Europe’, European Union Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 321-346 (SOE).
 Majone, G. (1998) ‘Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit: The question of Standards’, Europe Law
Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 5-28 (DD).
 Majone, G. (2006) ‘The common sense of European integration’, Journal of European
Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 607-626 (DD).
 Marsh, M. (1998) ‘Testing the Second-order Election Model after Four European Elections’,
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, pp. 591-607 (SOE).
 Moravcsik, A. (2006) ‘What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional
Project?’, Politische Viertrljahresschrift, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 219-241 (DD).
 Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980) ‘Nine Second-Order National Elections. A Conceptual
Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results’, European Journal of Political
Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 3-44 (SOE).
 Schmitt, H. (2005) ‘The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?’,
West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 650-679 (SOE).
 Schmitter, P. C. (2000) How to Democratize the European Union…And Why Bother?’,
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield (DD).
 Zweifel, T. D. (2002) ‘…Who is without sin cast the first stone: the EU’s democratic deficit in
comparison’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 812-840 (DD).