Participation, Transparency and
Accountability:
South Korea, Brazil and the Philippines
Brian Wampler
November 2, 2013
bwampler@boisestate.edu
S
Rebuilding state institutions:
incorporating both participation and
transparency mechanisms
S What is the “PROBLEM” that participation is meant to solve?
S Institutional development will vary significantly based on
moment of intervention in policy cycle
S Policy formulation
S Policy implementation
S End-of project-Auditing
S Carefully linking the political and policy interests of government
officials (supply-side) and citizens (demand-side).
Supply-side
S What types of authority are government officials willing to
delegate to citizens? What is the level of risk acceptable to
government officials?
S Key issues to be considered:
S Use of multi-channel forums (in-person, online; consultative, binding)
S Engage citizens and CSOs at multiple stages of the budgetary cycle
S Cover a range of policy issues (education, basic infrastructure)
S Interlocking Institutions (Federal, across policy arenas, multi-channel
S Retrain public servants and technical experts to work directly with citizens
S Reward local Governments and country-level agencies to work directly with
citizens
Demand-side
S Demand-side: How will citizens and CSOs be able to use newly
delegated authority? Can citizens simultaneously pressure and
partner with government officials?
S Citizens have formal opportunity to exercise some combination
S
voice, vet, vote and veto
S Include citizens and CSOs in discussions about the problems that the
new institutions is designed to solve
S Build capacity among CSOs
S Provide meaningful feedback loops
S Auditing and Monitoring can be carried out by citizens and CSOs
Range of participation
S Voice: The ability of citizens to express ideas, preferences, and
opinions within and parallel to formal state-sanctioned bodies. Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs) can also represent citizens’ voice
S Vet: The ability of citizens and CSOs to review documents and
information provided by government officials. Better quality vetting
produces more informed voice
S Vote: Citizens vote on policy proposals that emerge from civil
society or from the government. A “binding” vote would be the
strongest form of vote; it entails a public vote being translated into
direct action. A “consultative” vote might be on general policy lines.
S Veto: Citizens and citizens have the authority to reject policy
proposals, year-end reports, and audits.
Open Budget Survey, Participation Indicators
2006
2008
2010
2012
Brazil
50
60
60
36
Croatia
33
33
40
36
El Salvador
33
53
47
14
Indonesia
0
7
7
19
Jordan
0
27
13
11
Kenya
17
33
73
39
Mexico
33
27
53
25
Philippines
50
47
67
53
South Korea
84
80
93
92
Tanzania
0
40
0
14
UK
50
67
67
56
US
84
87
87
58
Ethiopia
Moldova
S
South Korea, Brazil, Philippines
S South Korea: Institutional Restructuring and Expert-
based participation
S Brazil: Mass-based participation and multi-channel
state-building
S South Korea: Rebuilding the state with mixed forms
Participation and Oversight
Open Budget Survey, 2012
Participation
South Korea
Brazil
Philippines
Overall Score on Index
75
71
48
Participation Score
92
36
53
Formal requirement for public
participation
Exists and is
strong
Exists but could
be improved
Exists but could
be improved
Mechanisms developed by the
executive for participation during
budget planning
Exists but could
be improved
Exists but could
be improved
Exists but could
be improved
Mechanisms developed by the
executive for participation during
budget execution
Exists and is
strong
Does not exist
Exists but could
be improved
Feedback by the executive on use
of inputs provided by the public
Exists but could
be improved
Does not exist
Exists but is
weak
Key Similarities
South Korea
Brazil
Philippines
Year of new
Constitution
1988
1988
1988
Decentralization
1995
1988
1991
Renewal of civil
society
Labor and
student
opposition during
late 1980s
Mass-based
opposition to
military regime
during 1970s and
1980s
Mass-based
opposition to
President Marcos
during 1980s
Key Differences
South Korea
Brazil
Philippines
State Capacity
Strong
Mixed: Significant
variation in state
capacity across
regions and policy
sectors
Mixed: Significant
variation in state
capacity across
regions and policy
sectors
Social cleavages
Low
Moderate to High
High
HDI, 2012
.909
.730
.654
Civil Society Technical
Capacity at time of
Democratic Transition
Moderate to low
Moderate to Low
Low
Current Civil Society
Technical Capacity
High
Moderate
Mixed—Small
cluster of NGOs with
high capacity
South Korea:
Institutional Restructuring and Expert-based
participation
Three Plus One Fiscal Reform (2004)
S
South Korea:
Distinguishing Features
S Digital Brain: Leveraging IT to provide timely and easy to manage
information
S Extensive formal opportunities for expert-based participation
S Participation largely involves policy experts and NGOs appointed
by government officials
S Local governments, encouraged by President Roh (2003-2008),
promote “ordinary citizen” participation. Participatory Budgeting
is used by local governments
Korea: Key Outcome
Brazil:
Mass-based participation and multi-channel
state-building
S Participatory Budgeting (Subnational, mainly municipal)
S 100+ cities adopt; billions of US dollars spent on PB projects
S Public Policy Management Councils (Federal in structure)
S 65,000 with 300,000 elected citizens-volunteers
S Policy Conferences (Federal in structure)
S 83 since 2003; 6-7 million participants
S Multi-year Planning process (Federal, state, municipal)
S 19 national councils + 350 civil society
Brazil:
Distinguishing features
S Multi-channel approach; wide diversity of issues
S Mirrors Brazil’s Federal structure
S Mass-based participation; elections used to select civil
society representatives
S Limited formal access to federal budgetary processes
Brazil: Outcomes
S Participatory Budgeting
S Increase in spending on health care, sanitation; decrease in infant mortality;
Effects grow stronger over time (Touchton and Wampler, forthcoming)
S Public Policy Management councils
S National-level councilors shape Federal policies, both at proposal and
implementation stages (IPEA 2012)
S Policy conferences
S Holding conferences increases Presidential Decrees is policy arena
(Pogrebinschi)
S Multiyear Planning Process
S Projects proposed by CSOs are included 4-year Planning document (Teixeira)
Philippines:
Rebuilding the state with mixed forms
Participation and Oversight
S Cabinet Cluster on Good Governance and Anti-corruption
S Seal of Good Housekeeping (Race to the Top for municipalities)
S Budget Partnership Agreements (Agency-CSO agreement)
S Bottom-up Budgeting Approach (Poverty reduction
S Citizens’ Participatory Audits CSOs
Philippines:
Distinguishing Features
S Mix of citizens and policy expert participation
S Reform at both local and country-level
S Effort to empower citizens and CSOs
S Participatory Auditing is important; Extensive effort to limit
corruption
Philippines: Outcomes
S Recent reform efforts: Too new to evaluate
Earlier reforms
S Community-Driven Development (World Bank)
S Increased participation
S Empowerment-oriented
S Monitoring programs led by CSOs
S Reducing corruption
S Local level (Naga city)
S Increases in Participation
Voice, Vet, Vote and Veto
South Korea
Brazil
Philippines
Voice
Expert; Policyoriented
Mass-based + elected
volunteers
Vet
Robust
Exists and is getting
stronger
Mass-based + elections
of CSOs + Expert
CSOs
Exists and is getting
stronger
Vote
Exists for policy
experts;
Exists but is very
weak for ordinary
citizens
Exists at local level
(PB);
Consultative vote in
councils and
conferences
Exists at local level
Veto
Non-existent
Exists but is weak
Exists but is weak
4 Key lessons
S Political Will: Election of political reformers to presidency is crucial
because it creates necessary political will to implement reform; In all three
countries, the president’s political coalition established the contours of
reform.
S Civil Society: Renewal (increased density + new actors and issues) of civil
society increases attention on basic governance issues; Engaged CSOs
provides necessary partners for government reformers
S State Capacity: The degree of state capacity strongly affects the type of
reform undertaken and the pace of reform. We should expect more limited
measurable effects when state capacity is weak.
S Direction of change: The shape of institutional rebuilding is strongly
affected by the political and geographic source of reform. Topdown/Center-periphery reforms are distinct from bottom-up/perhipharycenter reforms.
Key Lessons: Demand-side
S Elite-based model
S Improves quality of debate; produces more equal negotiating partners; Allows
government and civil society to check power of entrenched business groups and
bureaucrats
S Key problem: Selection of policy experts; Independence of policy experts
S Mass-based model
S Expands public debate and range of issues discussed; Promotes empowerment
but CSOs remain at information and knowledge deficit
S Key problem: General debate rather than specific details
S Mixed model
S Empowers citizens and CSOs; allows for a variety of venues to participate;
promotes a wide-range of actors
S Key problem: What is the basis for different types of representation?
Key Lessons: Supply-Side
S Governments and CSOs need to first identify the “so-what”
problem that participation and transparency-oriented reforms
would solve.
S Country-level government can incentivize improvements in
governance by rewarding local governments and agencies that
introduce new programs and policies
S Establishing formal institutions is first step; ensuring CSOs and
citizens can make meaningful use voice, vet, vote and veto is
step two.
S Participation can included at multiple stages depending on the
problem that government
Other Participation Reforms
S Community-Driven Development (World Bank):
S “An approach to local development that gives control over planning
decisions and investment resources to community groups (including local
governments).” CCD core course
S International Labor Organization Convention 169 (UN agency
S
S
Establishes Prior, informed consent for Tribal and Indigenous Populations over
local development issues
22 countries have ratified
S Audits: Participatory and Social
S Participatory Budgeting: Thousands of cities and districts across world
S Citizens directly engage each other and government officials in the
allocation of a small percentage of the government’s local budget.
Community-Driven
Development
S Indonesia (KDP)-:Villagers submit proposals to community coalitions
of nominated village facilitators. Participants vote for specific
projects. All transactions public with citizen engagement from
planning to implementation.
S Benin: Projects selected by elected management committees and tied
to ministries to direct in policy and information-sharing.
S Azerbaijan: Sub-projects proposed by local CSOs, community selects
for implementation. Regional coordination is half CSO and half
government for information, expertise, monitoring
Scaling-Up: Expanding CDD in
Indonesia
S Original Kecamatan Development Program expanded in 2007
National Program for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas
S Nation-wide coverage with over 5,000 kecamatans and over 34
million beneficiaries
S Since the first KDP has “financed over 109,000km of small roads,
17,000 bridges, 40,000 clean water systems
S Increased upward mobility in PNPM areas (2.1%), real per capita
consumption gains in PNPM areas (9.1%),
Participatory Budgeting
Peru
S Project Context
S 2003 national Participatory Budgeting Law requires all municipal-level
districts (1821) to use participatory budgeting processes
S Methodology
S National government spearheading PB well-positioned to innovate at
local level
S All districts form local coordination councils to implement participatory
budgeting programs; All Districts form Oversight committees, which is
geared toward enhancing social accountability over the implementation
phrase
S Results
S A few key districts (municipalities) have produced robust results. Most
districts have produced limited results due to limited civil society
participation; Most participation involves CSO representatives rather
than individual citizens
Source: A New Social Contract for Peru: An Agenda for Improving Education, Health Care, and the Social Safety Net
India’s 100-Day Work Plan
S 100 days of paid employment to adults who are willing to work for
minimum wage.
S Problem: (a) ghost employees, (b) individuals who are not properly
paid for their work, (c) resource leakage, and (d) poorly built public
works.
Project methodology
Social Audits: Local governments are required to post worksite boards
that list the activities being undertaken and the daily wage rate; List of
employees is included
India’s 100-day Work Campaign
S Project Context
S 100 days of paid employment to adults who are willing to work for minimum
wage.
S Problem: (a) ghost employees, (b) individuals who are not properly paid for
their work, (c) resource leakage, and (d) poorly built public works.
S Methodology
S Social Audits: CSOs trained to monitor implementation, Local governments
are required to post worksite boards that list the activities being undertaken, the
daily wage rate, and list of contracted employees
S Results
S
Initial reports indicate decrease in project-level corruption
S
Limited CSO capacity
Participatory Budgeting
Uganda
S Project Context
S Decentralization initiated in 1995
S DFGG Intervention and Methodology
S National government initiates three levels of citizen engagement
S Municipal officials meet with national government;
S Municipal governments meet with citizens;
S Municipal governments meet again with national government
S Projects must meet national development guidelines
S Results
S Initial results are reported as minimal, but mot important change is
opening budget to public scrutiny.
Source: Africa Good Governance Programme on the Radio Waves
Right to Information Campaign
Rajasthan, India
S Project Context
S
Local governments have control over resources to implement small and mediumsized public works projects; perceptions of corruption
S Methodology
S
CSO Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan organized demonstrations to pressure
local government officials to release information on public works programs due to
wide-spread perceptions of corruption
S
CSO obtained copies of publicly available contacts, bill, receipts pertaining to
project, which they then compared to actual practices
S
Public meetings are held to show to the community the extent to which the
implementation matches formal contracts
S Results
S
Scaling-up as program moved from local to state level;
S
Initial reports indicate decrease in project-level corruption
Source: Community Oversight of Construction
Final lessons
S Key opportunities
S Link type of participatory venue to so-what problem
S
Elite involvement
S
Empowerment
S
Expanding participation
S asd