divine command theory the euthyphro argument In some cases, there is no objective moral fact. In some cases, there is an objective moral fact. In every case, we should be strive to be tolerant, reasonable, and open-minded. conventionalism The Good consists in always doing what God wills at any particular moment. -Emil Brunner The Divine Imperative the divine command theory Subjectivism: “X is right” means “I approve of X.” Conventionalism: “X is right” means “My culture approves of X.” The Divine Command Theory: “X is right” means “God approves of X.” the divine command theory The Divine Command Theory: There are some objective moral truths. “X is right” means “God commands X”. “X is wrong” means “God commands against X”. The Divine Command Theory: There are some objective moral truths. For any right action X, X is right because and only because God commands X. For any wrong action X, X is wrong because and only because God commands against X. the divine command theory The Divine Command Theory: There are some objective moral truths. “X is right” means “God commands X”. “X is wrong” means “God commands against X”. The Divine Command Theory: There are some objective moral truths. For any right action X, X is right because and only because God commands X. For any wrong action X, X is wrong because and only because God commands against X. the divine command theory Subjectivism: There are no objective moral truths. “X is right” means “I approve of X”. “X is wrong” means “I disapprove of X”. Subjectivism: There are no objective moral truths. For any right action X, X is right because and only because I approve of X. For any wrong action X, X is wrong because and only because I disapprove of it. subjectivism The Divine Command Theory: There are some objective moral truths. For any right action X, X is right because and only because God commands X. For any wrong action X, X is wrong because and only because God commands against X. the divine command theory the divine command theory the divine command theory SOCRATES: Remember, then, that I did not ask you to tell me one or two of all the many pious actions that there are; I want to know what is characteristic of piety which makes all pious actions pious. You said, I think, that there is one characteristic which makes all pious actions pious, and another characteristic which makes all impious actions impious. Do you remember? EUTHYPHRO: Well, I should say that piety is what all the gods love, and that impiety is what they all hate. SOCRATES: Now consider this question. Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? the euthyphro argument 4. 5. Either (a) things are right because God commands them or (b) God commands things because they are right. If (a), morality is contingent and God is arbitrary. Morality is not contingent and God is not arbitrary. [So] (b). If (b), then DCT is false 6. [So] DCT is false. 1. 2. 3. the euthyphro argument