Survey of safety regulations used
in major ‘named’ US races
By Dan Nolan and Evans Starzinger
January 27, 2012
Draft 1
Summary:
• Safety regulations are fragmented among a
handful of regional constituents and become
complex
• Safety regulations focus primarily on
‘minimum equipment requirements’, which
are NOT core factors in recent safety incidents
• Opportunity = unify and simplify SRs to make
them easier for sailors while refocusing on
core safety issues
SR’s used by offshore & coastal races
US Sailing has 57% share
5%
5%
ISAF SR with US SAILING prescriptions
8%
ISAF SR with US SAILING prescriptions with
SFOYRA Prescriptions
36%
ISAF SR not US SAILING prescriptions
PIYA requirements
10%
custom
YRA of LIS
10%
PHRF Category 2 Standard Equipment List.
Mackinac Safety Regulations
26%
Sample size: 44 major ‘named’ races
SR’s used by buoy races
US Sailing has 13% share
Anecdotal Prime reason for “ISAF but Not US Sailing Prescriptions” is requirement for PDF when starting/finishing
Sample size: 17 major ‘named’ races
Wide Range of SR complexity
Monohull Cat 1/2
ISAF + US Sailing + BROC
13270
ISAF with US Sailing
10252
Pac cup (ISAF + USS + Pac cup)
10032
ISAF with US Sailing with SFOYRA
7830
Mackinac
4097
ISAF
2998
PIYA
2604
SSS
1821
PHRF
828
RYA LIS - PHRF Cat A
468
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
Word count of SR
10,000
12,000
14,000
Modification of SRs, among those using ISAF OSRs
Few Races use OSR’s ‘as is’, but most with limited modifications
27
1
Number of SRs Modified in NOR
25
Newport to Bermuda Race
0
20
3
Pac cup, Lightship & Spinnaker
15
10
10
Many OYRA SF
1
5
7
0
2
0
2
4
6
Number of Races
8
10
12
Summary:
• Safety regulations are fragmented among a
handful of regional constituents and become
complex
• Safety regulations focus primarily on
‘minimum equipment requirements’, which
are NOT core factors in recent safety incidents
• Opportunity = unify and simplify SRs to make
them easier for sailors while refocusing on
core safety issues
Actual Safety incidents
not related to equipment requirements
US Offshore incidents over the past decade
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
2013 Island’s race, two broken rudders, one boat lost & one Fatality
2012 Ensenada race, navigation and watch keeping errors, 4 deaths (minimal local
SR’s)
2012 Farallon’s race, seamanship judgment and race course layout, 5 deaths (ISAF
SR’s with local modifications)
2012 Clipper race, weather routing & heavy weather tactics, 2 serious injuries
(MCA/SOLAS commercial SRs)
2012 Bermuda return, broken rudder, boat abandoned
2012 Bermuda return, severe injury, crew helo evaced
2011 Chicago Mackinac, wind induced Capsize, 2 deaths (Mac SRs)
2011 Annapolis to Newport, severe grounding at 12kts (ISAF SRs)
2008 Galveston, TX Regatta de Amigos, keel broke off 1 death (ISAF SRs)
2002 Block Island Race, unconscious MOB, 1 dead (ISAF SRs)
2002 Newport to Bermuda, rig and prop strut failed in large waves – Andrew 70
(ISAF SRs)
Back-up:Longer list of incidents
2013 Island’s race, two broken rudders, one boat lost & one Fatality
2012 Ensenada race, navigation and watch keeping errors, 4 deaths (minimal local SR’s)
2012 Farallon’s race, seamanship judgment and race course layout, 5 deaths (ISAF SR’s with local modifications)
2012 Clipper race, weather routing & heavy weather tactics, 2 serious injuries (MCA/SOLAS commercial SRs)
2012 Bermuda return, broken rudder, boat abandoned
2012 Bermuda return, severe injury, crew helo evaced
2011 Fastnet, keel broke off, boat lost all crew safe (Rambler 100)
2011 Chicago Mackinac, wind induced Capsize, 2 deaths (Mac SRs)
2011 Annapolis to Newport, severe grounding at 12kts (ISAF SRs)
2011 Passage from Selsey Bill West Sussex, MOB (drown while tethered with spinlock PFD), one fatality (Lion)
2011 UK school vessel, Poor heavy weather management, one serious Injury during gybe (Liquid Vortex)
2008 Galveston, TX Regatta de Amigos, keel broke off 1 death (ISAF SRs) (Cynthia Woods)
2008 South China Sea race, keel lost (poor fit of the replacement keel into the hull socket, movement fatigued keel bolts),
boat saved (TP 52 Strewth)
2007 Coastal passage from Plymouth, keel broke off (due to fabricator modifications to the design), one fatality (Hooligan)
2006 Day sail (with paying guests) in sheltered waters, two accidental gybes resulting in two injuries (Roaring Meg)
2003 Delivery from Hamble, MOB Fatality (Pastime)
2002 Block Island Race, unconscious MOB, 1 dead (ISAF SRs)
2002 Newport to Bermuda, rig & prop strut failed in heavy seas – Andrew 70 (ISAF SRs)
1992 Vendee delivery, keel bulb broke off, one fatality (Coyote)
Relatively few races with stability requirement
Despite ISAF SR 3.04.3 recommendation
Offshore races
Coastal Races
Cat 1/2/A
Cat 2/3/B/C
none
3%
3%
ORR stability index
11%
12%
LPS
none
ORR stability index
21%
62%
"Demonstrated
seaworthiness
appropriate for a
category 1 race"
class rules
89%
Stability requirements
Offshore races*
Race
Safety Rule
Cat
Stability
Transpac
ISAF SR with US SAILING
prescriptions
1
115
ORR stability index
Tahiti race (by transpac)
ISAF SR with US SAILING
prescriptions
1
115
ORR stability index
Royal Vancouver and Lahaina
Vic-Maui
ISAF SR not US SAILING
prescriptions
1
115
ORR stability index
Newport Bermuda race
ISAF SR with US SAILING
prescriptions
1
115
ORR stability index
Marblehead-Hailifax
ISAF SR with US SAILING
prescriptions
1
110
ORR stability index
Balbo YC Corona del Mar to
Cabo
ISAF SR with US SAILING
prescriptions
2
110
ORR stability index
Annapolis-Newport
ISAF SR with US SAILING
prescriptions
2
110
ORR stability index
Oregon Offshore
PIYA requirements
1
110
LPS
Swiftsure
PIYA requirements
1
110
LPS
Pacific Cup
ISAF SR with US SAILING
prescriptions
1
105
LPS
WVYC Southern Straits Race
PIYA requirements
2
100
LPS
Van Isle 360 Race
PIYA requirements
2
100
LPS
* Note: The ‘coastal’ Chicago YC race to Mackinac island has added a 103 ORR SI for 2012
Type
Distribution of ORR stability index
Cumulative percentage
100%
100%
92%
88%
90%
80%
80%
ORR cat 1
recommendation
70%
61%
60%
ORR Cat 2
recommendation
50%
2012 Mac Race
Cut-off
40%
39%
30%
18%
20%
10%
6%
1%
2%
2%
100
103
105
0%
36 ORR vessels < 103
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
+140
Stability measurement caution
No silver bullet in extreme conditions
• “ No yacht, no matter how stable, could consistently
resist capsizing when hit beam-on, with a 55% LOA
breaking Wave” (Wolfson research)
• “No correlation between yachts in trouble and any
stability measurement, except weak correlation with
boat size” (1998 Hobart race analysis)
• “There is a suggestion that shallow keel boats are
more resistant to capsize than deep keel boats in
extreme breaking wave conditions” (1994 Queen’s
birthday storm)
SR Header Numbers Most Modified
SR header number
6
Training
8
5
21
Personal equipment
4
47
Portable equipment and supplies
Structural features, stability and fixed equipment
3
2
11
1
1
0
148
Application & General Requirements
Fundamentals & Definitions
20
40
60
80
100
Number of times modified
120
140
160
Top 10 modified OSRs
2.03
General requirements
Toilet
3.18
Bilge pumps and buckets
3.23
Pulpits, stanchions, lifelines
3.14
Radar reflector
4.1
3.21
Drinking water and tanks
4.2
Life Raft
Engine, generator, fuel
3.28
Hatches & companionway
3.08
Com equipment.
Including AIS
3.29
0
5
10
15
20
Number of races modifying
25
30
35
Summary:
• Safety regulations are fragmented among a
handful of regional constituents and become
complex
• Safety regulations focus primarily on
‘minimum equipment requirements’, which
are NOT core factors in recent safety incidents
• Opportunity = unify and simplify SRs to make
them easier for sailors while refocusing on
core safety issues
A few main constituents for outreach
Invite members of each into an ‘OSR user advisory committee’?
• Specific races with significant modifications
–
–
–
–
Newport to Bermuda race committee
Pacific Cup
Spinnaker Cup
Lighthouse
• Associations with custom modifications or complete
standalone SRs
–
–
–
–
–
–
SF OYRA
PIYRA
YRA of LIS
PHRF
Mac
SSS
Focus on root causes of recent worldwide incidents
mostly not ‘minimum Equipment’ issues
1. Structural and design factors
Boat does not break
Boat does not stay upside down for a long time
2. Intense Weather
Forecasting and routing
Heavy weather tactics
Fatigue and attitude management
3. Higher risk taking offshore
Boat selection
routing
4. Navigation & groundings
Keep head out of boat
Chart plotters not 100% accurate
5. MOB
Most deaths have apparently been with unconscious MOB or trapped
Most boats NOT following current best practices on tethers/jacklines
6. Emergency voice communication equipment
Sat phone proven extremely helpful in offshore experience – ‘after the fact’
Next step key decisions:
• Can USSailing convince ISAF to support a
‘lite(r)’ and more focused SR? (probably not at
least in a short time frame)
• Does USSailing want to develop an SR
independent of ISAF?
• If so, will the various US constituents
participate in and support a unified and
simpler US SR?