Centre of Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism Fourth Generations of Modern Warfare (4GW) COL Engr. JÁNOS TOMOLYA Ph.D. HUN Army UNCLASSIFIED Chief of Capabilities 1/26 Subject : 4th GW Time : 20 minutes Classify : Unclassified Agenda : 1. Introduction; 2. Different classification of war (epochs, waves, forms); 3. Asymmetric Warfare; 4. Military cultures; 5. Fourth Generation of modern warfare; UNCLASSIFIED 2/26 The Next War? How can we avoid being like the French knights at the Battle of Agincourt? 3/26 Future Warfare 4/26 Or this one? 5/26 UNCLASSIFIED 6/26 támadások száma attacks NumberTerrorista of terrorist 2003-2011 14443 14435 11023 11727 11595 2008 2009 10999 3251 200 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010 7/26 Military Expenditure UNCLASSIFIED SIPRI: 1531 billions USD in 2009 8/26 9/26 1. Different classification of war: Epochs Dr T. Lindsay Moore and Robert J. Bunker : 4 epochs, based on energy sources human energy animal-based energy mechanical energy Advanced technology warfare post-mechanical energy: Non-Western UNCLASSIFIED warfare 10/26 Waves Alvin and Heidi Toffler developed a theory of warfare based on the economic and societal changes of civilization. Agricultural war Industrial-based war (late of 17th century) Knowledge-based war (from 1980s) UNCLASSIFIED 11/26 Forms of warfare Symmetric Dissymmetric Asymmetric /Eric Walters/ After WWII more than 160 armed conflicts; 75% of them were asymmetric UNCLASSIFIED 12/26 Symmetric In symmetric conflicts, the two opposing adversaries dispose of armed forces that are similar in all aspects such as force structure, doctrine and assets and have comparable tactical, operational and strategic objectives. UNCLASSIFIED 13/26 Dissymmetric A conflict is dissymmetric when one of the opposing forces is superior by means of force structure, doctrine and assets, but both parties are striving for similar political and military objectives. UNCLASSIFIED 14/26 UNCLASSIFIED 15/26 2. Asymmetric Warfare (AW) One of the opponents is unable or unwilling to wage the war with comparable force structure, doctrine and assets and has different political and military objectives than his adversary. 16/26 Asymmetric Warfare (AW) What is it? David and Goliath warfare Unsophisticated vs. the sophisticated (technologically) Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entities Threat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or Afghanistan) Often state sponsored/supported Attacking opponent via indirect means such as Terrorism Critical infrastructures Avoids combat w/ conventional forces Tends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always the case Misc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies, exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion. 17/26 3. Military cultures Clausewitz: „War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.” The way of application of force depends on the military culture. UNCLASSIFIED 18/26 Kinds of Military Cultures Material-centric; Movement-centric; Guerilla warfare Orthodox warfare Forms: terrorism, guerilla warfare, orthodox warfare; Types: anarchism; equality-based; traditionbased; pluralist; secessionist; divider; reformer; Used methods: coup d’état; exhausting, focus on military, warfare in build-up areas; UNCLASSIFIED 19/26 Material-centric Indirect approach Strategy of „indirect approach” Characteristics: Daggering wars; Defence; Strategic objective: exhausting of enemy Indirect warfare- not only with military means Main services: air force, navy UNCLASSIFIED Preferred by: maritime powers 20/26 Movement-centric Strategy of approach” Characteristics: „direct Blitzkrieg; Offence; Strategic objective: destroy the enemy Direct warfare- decisive maneuvers Main services: land force, Preferred by: continental powers UNCLASSIFIED 21/26 Guerilla warfare Strategy of „indirect approach in irregular form” Supported by people Characteristics: UNCLASSIFIED Hit and run actions; Offence; Strategic objective: exhausting of enemy, provoke a collapse internally Media Indirect warfare- not only with military means Main services: land 22/26 force 4. Generations of Warfare COL BOYD Non-linear warfare Focuses on moral-mental-physical portions of enemy & as single entity Focus on the enemy and environment Knowledge of strategic environment Interact w/ environment appropriately UNCLASSIFIED 23/26 New dimensions UNCLASSIFIED 24/26 Trinity Clausewitz: „the war is monopoly of the state” government society army UNCLASSIFIED people 25/26 1GW= Age of Napoleon Massed manpower UNCLASSIFIED 26/26 2 GW= Age of Firepower Massed firepower... But still in lines UNCLASSIFIED 27/26 3 GW= Age of Maneuver UNCLASSIFIED 28/26 4 GW= Age of Independent Action Cells Asymmetric warfare in irregular form UNCLASSIFIED 29/26 4 GW= Age of Independent Action Cells 30/26 Role of Technology in 4GW UNCLASSIFIED 31/26 The “generations of war” model Peace of Westphalia Nuclear Weapons Proliferate Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu (and before) Fall of USSR state vs. state 2 GW 1 GW 3 GW States & nonstates wage war State-vs-state— only “legal” form of war New weapons & concepts New commo & transport networks 4 GW States & non-states wage war Nonstate armed groups: partisans, insurgents, anarchists, criminal organizations, etc. 1600 UNCLASSIFIED 1700 1800 1900 2000 32/26 Definition 4GW can be defined as a method of warfare that uses the following to achieve a moral victory: Formless and most deadly kind of war Undermines enemy strengths (this may seem obvious, but most of modern warfare has involved direct attacks on enemy strengths -- find the enemy army and destroy it). Exploits enemy weaknesses. Uses asymmetric operations (weapons and techniques that differ substantially from opponents). UNCLASSIFIED 33/26 Drivers The rise of 4GW is both a product and a driver of the following: The loss of the nationstate's monopoly on violence. The rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict. Globalization (via technological integration). UNCLASSIFIED 34/26 Characteristics Violent non-state actor (VNSA) fighting the state. lacks hierarchal authority lack of formal structure patience and flexibility ability to keep a low profile when needed small size VNSA’s forces are decentralized 35/26 Tactics 4GW is fought on the tactical level via: Rear area operations -- 4GW warriors do not confront a nation-state's military but rather it society. Psychological operations -terror. Ad-hoc innovation -- use of the enemy's strengths against itself Human shields 36/26 Tactics of 4GW Ethnic cleansing Attacking C4I networks Exploitation of rules of engagement (ROEs) and International laws of war (ILOW) Exploitation of humanitarian relief organizations i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc… Shift in focus from enemy’s front to his rear; Use the enemy’s strength against him 37/26 Differences Many of the methods used in 4GW aren't new and have robust historical precedent. However, there are important differences in how it is applied today. These include: Global -- modern technologies and economic integration enable global operations. Pervasive -- the decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open conflict into the 4GW mold. Granularity -- extremely small viable groups and variety of reasons for conflict. Vulerability -- open societies and economies. UNCLASSIFIED 38/26 Differences II. Technology -- new technologies have dramatically increased the productivity of small groups of 4GW warriors. Media -- global media saturation makes possible an incredible level of manipulation. Networked -- new organizational types made possible by improvements in technology are much better at learning, surviving, and acting. UNCLASSIFIED 39/26 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) Formless and most deadly kind of war 4GW ops are intelligence driven. Requires constant preparation and resourcefulness Distinguishing a combatant from a noncombatant (civil) can be extremely difficult Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything and anyone 40/26 Winning a 4GW conflict Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the moral bonds that allows the organic whole to exist -- cohesion. This is done by reinforcing the following (according to Boyd): Menace. Attacks that undermine or threaten basic human survival instincts. Mistrust. Increases divisions between groups (ie. conservatives and liberals in the US). Uncertainty. Undermine economic activity by decreasing confidence in the future. UNCLASSIFIED 41/26 Center of Gravity Is The People Leverage unconventional capabilities against insurgents. Become cellular like “them”. Defeat a networked threat with a network. Develop small independent action forces (SIAF). Establish disciplined, well trained and highly mobile, counter guerrilla forces. UNCLASSIFIED 42/26 Power of Perception & Influence As “Ammo” Money is ammunition Food is ammunition Medicine is ammunition Education is ammunition Fuel is ammunition Employment is ammunition Recognition is ammunition Respect is ammunition Information and knowledge is ammunition 43/26 Summary UNCLASSIFIED 44/26 Questions? UNCLASSIFIED 45/26