EGYPT
A National Critical Intelligence Estimate
Presented by, Section 31
For Approval by, Professor R. Nichols
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Section 31
Jay Kippen, Team Leader
Kristell Havens, Executive Officer
Political
Economic
Brendan Kinchla- Team Lead
Kristina Anderson
Darcy Pitkin- Team Lead
Naveen Kumar
Military
Intelligence/Cyber Security
Dan Routier- Team Lead
Ekow Ocran
Enzi Jauregui
Jeff Sperry- Team Lead
Kyle Leisner
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Agenda
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Egypt NCIE#2
Executive summary
Political
Economic
Military
Intelligence
Foreign relations
Key judgments
Possible outcomes
ACH
Conclusion
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Executive
Summary
Presented by, Kristell Havens and Jay Kippen
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Egypt
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Agenda
Definitions
Identification of U.S. Interests
Executive Summary
Indicators
Predictions-Key Judgments and Possible outcomes
Intentions
Capabilities
State Snapshot
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Useful Definitions
U.S. Foreign Aid Distributions
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Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
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Tool for promoting U.S. interests abroad
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Provides financial backing
Improvement of key foreign militaries to aid U.S. in achieving
goals
Economic Support Funds (ESF)
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Tool for promoting political and economic stability abroad
Used in areas of strategic importance for U.S.
Funds are disbursed using grants
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Military and infrastructure use
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Useful Definitions
U.S. Foreign Aid Distributions
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International Military Education and Training Fund
(IMET)
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Used to train foreign militaries on U.S. weapon systems and
military management (over 2,000 courses available)
Assistance comes in the form of grant money
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs (NADR)
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Funding provided by U.S. to support resources to security
objectives in foreign countries
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Useful Definitions
U.S. Foreign Aid Distributions
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International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE)
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Supports programs aimed at curbing transnational crimeincluding anti-terrorism programs
Fills in the gaps of jurisdiction between enforcement agencies
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Useful Definitions
U.S. Foreign Aid Distributions
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(BRICS) Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
Group
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The acronym was developed by Goldman Sachs- they suspect
that these 5 economies will come to dominate by 2050
They meet annually during an economic summit
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Useful Definitions
U.S. Foreign Aid Distributions
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NAM-Non Aligned Movement
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September 1961- First conference held in Belgrade
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25 countries were represented
Developed out of concern that arms race was developing out of
control between Soviet Union and U.S.
The countries involved with this group are not formally aligned
with either side
Hope to curb colonialism, arms race and maintain sovereignty
for states
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Identification of U.S. Interests
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Strategic U.S. Interests
Maintaining access to the Suez Canal for the global
distribution of oil, and global commerce
Deterrence of Iranian military involvement in the region
Key asset for projection of U.S. military power in the
Middle East (ME) region
 Access to the Suez Canal
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 Access to Egyptian Air Bases and U.S. overflight rights
Egypt’s military acts as a regional stabilizing force in the
Middle East
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Identification of U.S. Interests
Continued
U.S. Geopolitical Interests
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Ensure Egypt's economy remains stable
Continued U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation
Regional political stabilizing force in the Middle East
region
Maintaining peace with Israel
Anti-terrorism assistance
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Key Indicators
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Post Mubarak and Morsi Regime
Egyptian foreign affairs ministry’s authority was
regulated to GIS the Egyptian foreign intelligence
service
Egyptian economy is on the verge of collapse
Needs a cash infusion from the IMF of $5 billion
U.S. is still wary of the Morsi regime
April 2012 Egypt state-owned gas company terminated
exports to Israel
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Executive Summary
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Egypt’s geo-political atmosphere is unique in relation to
U.S. strategic and political interests
Government transitions over the past several years has
created political instability
Major world nations and Middle Eastern regional
nations are wary of unfolding political events in Egypt
Egypts socio-economic concerns continue to increase
everyday
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Executive Summary
Continued
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After Mubarak's ouster the military held open elections
President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) came
to power by a landslide victory
Instituted political and economic reforms designed to
consolidate authority
Reforms resulted in riots demanding his removal
Military stepped in again, (2nd time in 2 years) and
removed Morsi
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Executive Summary
Continued
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The Muslim Brotherhood key supporters of Morsi
staged demonstrations that turned violent
Military remained in control
New government formed
Riots ensued by Morsi supporters resulting in many
deaths
World nations quietly condemned the military coup
The future of Egypt is in question
Egypt's economy is on the brink of collapse and needs
assistance
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Key Indicators
Continued
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U.S. lawmakers have expressed discontent over Morsi’s
handling of the Egyptian economy
The IMF refuses to loan Egypt $5 billion
Since Morsi’s rise to power U.S. foreign investment has
dropped by ⅓
Morsi indicated he will honor current treaties
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Except stated the Egyptian-Israeli agreement may need to be
looked at again
Morsi reached out to U.S. adversaries for economic
assistance and military partnership agreements
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Key Indicators
Post-Morsi Regime
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After Morsi’s ouster Middle Eastern nations agreed to
provide financial support for Egypt’s failing economy
IMF loan is proceeding
Police returned to the streets
Food and fuel shortage was resolved
Key Egyptian and foreign investments are being revived
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Prediction One
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Key judgments and possible outcomes
post-Morsi regime
The military stays in control refusing to return Egypt to a
democratic state
The military continues to persecute the MB
MB launches an insurgency to regain power
The economy remains stable with the influx of foreign
cash from ME nations
U.S. influences the IMF for the Egyptian loan
The U.S. continues military aid in order to keep regional
stabilization
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Prediction Two
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Key judgments and possible outcomes
Morsi returns to power
The military under MB insurgency pressure turns control
back over to the Morsi government
U.S. refuses to intervene on behalf of Egypt to ensure
the IMF loan
U.S. keeps economic and military ties intact to ensure
regional stability
U.S. keeps the military and economic aid to Egypt
fearing economic collapse
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Prediction Two
Continued
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Key judgments and possible outcomes
Morsi returns to power
Other ME nations fear a rise in the MB- withhold
financial assistance
Feeling pressure from economic concerns and
mounting debt Morsi turns to U.S. adversaries for
economic assistance
Morsi continues pro-Islamic government policy limiting
military involvement in governmental affairs in order to
prevent further coups
Continues reform of military budget oversight
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Prediction Three
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Key judgments and possible outcomes
Morsi returns to power
Fearing political and economic chaos Morsi agrees to
IMF terms for loan
Continues political reforms designed to make Egypt a
democratic society
Continues economic reforms to make Egypt a freemarket society
Institutes reforms for military budget oversight
Continues to consolidate political power
Maintains current relationship with the U.S.
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Prediction Four
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Key judgments and possible outcomes
New Regime
Military relinquishes control over to the new interim
government
Slowly institutes specific political reforms designed to
ensure democracy while maintaining their own
autonomy
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Prediction Four
Key judgments and possible outcomes
New Regime
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Continued
Consolidates authority over the new government by
ensuring the military’s budget never receives oversight
Slowly institutes specific economic reforms designed to
ensure a free market economy while protecting their
Military Inc.
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Prediction five
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Key judgments and possible outcomes
Worst Case Scenario
Morsi returns to power
Al-Sisi and key SCAF officers are removed in favor of a
more Islamist general of MB choosing
Military falls in line with Morsi government
Morsi regime turns towards US adversaries for
assistance
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Prediction five
Key judgments and possible outcomes
Worst Case Scenario
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Continued
U.S. adversaries provide economic relief and military
cooperation
Egypt becomes openly hostile to the U.S.
Closure of global economic asset the Suez Canal
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Prediction five
Continued
Key judgments and possible outcomes
Worst Case Scenario
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Continued
Egypt resumes military action against Israel
Hamas resumes attacks on Israel backed by Egypt and
the MB
U.S. and allies force the Suez Canal open through
military action and create a military zone around the
Suez
Open conflict between the U.S. and Egypt occurs
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Critical Intentions
Based on analysis of available data points it is believed:
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Morsi with the assistance of the Muslim Brotherhood
wanted to convert Egypt into an Islamic state
The Morsi/MB dynamic-duo will quietly remove the
power of the military in governmental affairs and the
economy through the legislative process
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Privatizing certain key military industries away from “Military
Inc.”
• Institute reform on military through legislative budgetary
oversight and reform
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Critical Intentions
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Morsi and the MB were to continue economic relations
with the U.S. and western allies in order to alleviate the
current economic concerns
Once these economic concerns were alleviated and the
Morsi/MB partnership further solidified their control over
the country their attention would turn to solidifying ties
with U.S. adversaries
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Estimated Capabilities
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Morsi and the MB did not have the essential capabilities
in place to exploit their election victory
Most likely scenario- they did not believe they had a
chance of winning
Morsi and the MB were caught off guard by their
election and unable to position key players in various
fields prior
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Military
Interior Ministry
Foreign Affairs
Legislative
Judicial
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Estimated Capabilities
• Because of the Morsi/MB unexpected victory they relied
on appealing to the masses by creating mass social
reforms designed to appease the Egyptian people
(winning their hearts and minds)
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Egyptian people wanted social and political reforms that
alleviated their plight
This was the promise given by, Morsi and the MB, they
were fully capable of instituting this action thru direct
use of key MB factions within the Egyptian population
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Egypt
State Snapshot
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State Snapshot
Geography, People and Society
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Strategically located for
controlling Suez Canal
"Slightly Larger than the
State of New Mexico"
2450 km of coastline
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Phosphates
Limestone
Gypsum
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Gaza Strip, Israel, Libya,
Sudan
Mediterranean Sea and
the Red Sea
Population
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Oil and Gas
Iron ore
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Natural resources
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Shares a border
85,294,388 (July 2013
est.)
Median age total: 24.8
years of age
Language-Arabic
Population
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85 million
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State Snapshot
Political and Economic
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Religions
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Muslim-90% Mostly
Sunni
Coptic-95
Christian-1%
Ethnic Groups
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Economic
Agriculture Products
Cotton
Rice
Corn
Wheat
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Egyptians-99.6
Other-0.4%
Urbanization
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43.5% Population
Major Urban Areas
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Cairo-12 Million
Alexandria-4.5 Million
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Illustration of Egypt's Strategic
Importance to Global Trade
Google Earth (Cartographer). (2013). Middle east map [Topographic map]. Retrieved from
https://maps.google.com/maps?q=middle+east+map&ie=UTF-8&hq=&hnear=0x157ec465
8142ffb7:0xa5b8320215ea72c,Middle+East&gl=us&ei=bEDjUcbaG87j4AOmmYDADA&ved=0CCw
35
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Political
Presented by, Brendan Kinchla and
Kristina Anderson
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EGYPT
POLITICAL
Agenda
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Summary
Key Indicators
Predictions
What If Scenario
Supporting History
Organization
Consequences
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Summary
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Egypt is undergoing a major socio-political shift
resulting in extreme political polarization
The current Egyptian political environment is in turmoil
Egypt has faced two successive coups in the past two
years
Economic challenges have heavily contributed to the
current political instability
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Summary
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Mubarak Ouster
The Egyptian people wanted Mubarak removed in favor
of a regime that addressed socio-economic factors
“April 6th Youth Group” responsible for Mubarak's
ouster
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The first time social media is used in Egypt to highlight their
cause
The U.S. secretly supported the rebel ‘April 6th
Movement,’ contributing to Mubarak's ouster in order to
promote Egyptian democracy
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Summary
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Morsi Regime
November 2012, President Morsi issued a presidential
decree which monopolized executive, legislative, and
judiciary powers in his hands
Forced constitution that had limited political and public
support
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Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis backed the document
Rejected by almost every other political force
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Summary
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Morsi Regime
Morsi’s year in office
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Freedoms of press and media constrained
Women’s rights severely restricted
Country’s religious minorities experienced severe assaults and
threats
Encroachments on independence of the judiciary
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Summary
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Post-Morsi Regime
Tamarod Movement
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Largely responsible for Morsi’s ouster
Supported by military
Seeks peaceful end to Muslim Brotherhood reign, ousting of
President Morsi
U.S. and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) have also played a hand in Morsi’s ouster
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Key Indicators
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Mubarak's Ouster U.S. Involvement
U.S. secretly supported the April 6th movement while
publicly praising Mubarak as a key ally in the Middle
East
U.S. placed pressure on Mubarak to establish military
bases on Egyptian soil
U.S. attempted to assert control over Egypt's telecom
systems
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Key Indicators
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Morsi Regime Ouster
President Morsi issued a decree that monopolized
executive, legislative and judiciary power in his hands
The Tamarod movement was responsible for Morsi’s
ouster
Naguib Sawiris (prominent Egyptian businessman) gave
$28 million to fund the anti-morsi movement
The U.S. and the SCAF could have played a key role in
Morsi’s ouster
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Key Indicators
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Post-Morsi Regime
Egypt is undergoing a major socio-political shift
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Resulting in extreme political polarization
Egypt’s interim government is appointing some
individuals who are friendly to U.S. and Israel
Funding given to a key political mobilization party had a
direct effect on the ouster of Morsi
Al Qaeda is supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and has
threatened jihad in protest
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Key Indicators
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Post-Morsi Regime
Interim Vice President ElBaradei is known to make antiAmerican and anti-Israeli statements and favors a
rapprochement with Syria and Iran
Interim government authorizes use of force in police
dispersion of pro-Morsi protesters
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Predictions
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Internal socio-political polarization leads to increases in
violence, and radicalization
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This may throw Egypt into a civil war
The violence has the potential to spill over into neighboring
areas and create a regional turmoil
Prolonged period of transition
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Throwing the country into stagnation
 Politically, economically, and socially
Transition period may also be beneficial- allowing time for true
democratic transition
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Predictions
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Morsi attempts a return to power
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With the support of the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi’s
supporters the ousted leader attempts a return to Egyptian
politics
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Leads to greater polarization in society
Leads to civil violence and possibly war
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What ifs
Political
How would U.S. interests be affected if Egypt becomes
radicalized and unfriendly to western influence?
Egypt is a stabilizing political force in the region
Loss of this key intermediary would curtail regional
peace efforts and affect:
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Israel
Palestine
Hamas
Hezbollah
Iranian political influence would increase
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Open involvement through regional projection of Iranian
influence would give Iran more leverage
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What ifs
Political
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Egypt would align with Iran or other nations unfriendly to
the West thus destabilizing the region
Abandonment of the 1979 Camp David Peace accords
resulting in the possibility of open conflict with Israel
Inability of the U.S. for projection of regional U.S.
military assets would be curtailed
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What ifs
Political
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Possible Loss of the Suez canal Affecting
o Global distribution of Middle Eastern oil
o U.S. Naval priority access to pass through would be revoked or
completely not allowed
Egypt would align with Iran thus destabilizing the region
o Open conflict with Israel would most likely occur
Projection of regional U.S. military assets would be
curtailed
o U.S. military overflights of Egyptian airspace
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Political Quick Facts
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Arab Republic of Egypt
Mixed legal system with Sharia Law and Napoleonic
Law
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Codified system- with some informal practices of adherence to
previous court decisions
Republicanism with presidential-parliamentary structure
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Political Quick Facts
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Key political players
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Muslim Brotherhood
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Freedom and Justice Party
Military
National Salvation Front
Tamarod Movement
2012 Election Results:
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No candidate received the required majority of the popular vote
to win the election.
A run-off election between the top 2 candidates was held
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Freedom & Justice Party candidate Mohammed Morsi
Independent candidate Ahmed Shafiq
Morsi won the run-off election with 51.7% of the popular vote
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Political Quick Facts
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Mohammed Morsi was a former member of the terrorist
organization Muslim Brotherhood
Drafting the new constitution in 2012 was the
responsibility of the elected president
Morsi’s presidency was marked by, a power grab for the
benefit of the Muslim Brotherhood
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) ruled Egypt’s
legislature was illegally elected on June 2, 2013
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Political Quick Facts
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Significant Political Parties:
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Al-Dostour (Constitution Party)
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Founded by Interim Vice President Mohamed ElBaradei
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Non-ideological party
Al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party)
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Political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood
Seeks an Islamic state based in Sharia Law (Islamic law)
Al-Masriyeen al-Ahrrar (Free Egyptians Party)
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Supports secular state
Strong economic focus
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Effects of Social Media on Political
Instability
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Indications social media has played a key role in the
‘Arab Spring’ uprising throughout the Middle East
With increased internet usage social media has become
the new outlet for public mobilization and incendiary
discourse
Access to Facebook and Twitter has become a social
norm and a political tool
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Effects of Social Media on Political
Instability
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Most governments faced with growing political instability
issues have made the decision to shut down the
Internet with an “Internet Kill Switch”
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Except for key economic industries
Societies with oppressive governments turn to social
media to inform the populace
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When the traditional media is unable to do their job to inform
the populace and check the government
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Social media has taken responsibility for this role in society
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Effects of Social Media on Political
Instability
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Egyptians use of social media has increased steadily
Increases levels of political polarization within state
Most Egyptians have access to social media sites
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Internet access
Smart phones
Social media played a key role in the ouster of Mubarak
First use of this media outlet in Egypt
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April 6th movement used social media to get the word out
Advise protesters where and when the protest were held
Allowed for precision military organization to the protest
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Effects of Social Media on Political
Instability
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Former President Mubarak used social media to
announce his retirement
The military used social media sites not only to advise
Egyptians of the coming actions
Also used social media as an intelligence source
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Against both competing parties
For control of general population
Mass information
Fearing increased protests the government shut all
internet access down
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Allowed only one connection for the Egyptian stock market
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Pervasiveness of New Media
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The Egyptian people recognize the importance of social
media in the ouster of former President Mubarak the
pervasiveness of this new outlet can be seen even in
the common jokes between friends
“Hosni Mubarak, Anwar Sadat, and Gamal Abdel Nasser are
having tea in the afterlife. Mubarak asks Nasser, ‘‘How did
you end up here?’’ ‘‘Poison,’’ Nasser answers. Mubarak then
turns to Sadat. ‘‘What about you?’’ he asks. ‘‘An assassin’s
bullet,’’ Sadat says. Sadat and Nasser then turn to Mubarak,
‘‘And you?’’ To which Mubarak replies: ‘‘Facebook”
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Effects of Social Media
2012 Elections
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All sides of the Egyptian 2012 election used social
media to inform Egyptians of their position on key
issues
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Correlation of positive social media
posts
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Correlation to positive social media posts indicate the
persuasiveness in its use
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Brief Summary of Recent Political
Events
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2011 Revolution ousted President Hosni Mubarak and
his regime
June 2012 Elections are held and Mohamed Morsi
takes office with 51.7% of the run-off vote
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Morsi- formerly a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood
(MB) and the Freedom and Justice Party
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He was forced to renounce both when he took office
His actions while in office lead us to believe that he did not
actually renounce the MB- his policies and actions were largely
influenced by the MB
December 2012 A new constitution is passed by
referendum
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Egypt Plagued by Socio-Political
Issues
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Leading up to the ouster; lower income Egyptians have
had little to eat besides government-subsidized bread
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Domestic demand for high-gluten wheat (for bread) outpaces
production
Morsi regime attempted to become self-sufficient by doubling
wheat production
 Simultaneously reduced the amount of wheat imported
 Failed to double wheat production
Malnutrition is epidemic in form of extreme protein
deficiency
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40% of the adult population is "stunted" by poor diet
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Egypt Plagued by Socio-Political
Issues
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Poor Literacy rate leads to lost revenue:
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Males 80%
Females 64%
Low levels of literacy impede development
Estimated $6.18 billion in lost revenue due to illiteracy in 2011
 Lost revenue is ~1% of GDP
65
Political Polarization
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Political Islam under the Muslim Brotherhood
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Incite violence against minorities
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Liberal and secular groups
Prompts thousands of Christians to emigrate
Sectarian violence is not new in Egypt
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Political Polarization
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North Sinai hotspot
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Unidentified attackers killed Christians
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Including a priest, in three different incidents
Luxor hotspot
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July 5, 2013 four Copts beaten to death, three injured after
Muslim’s corpse was found near Naga Hassan
24 Christian properties were destroyed
 Including burning and shooting the churches
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Political Polarization
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Politically-motivated
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Very dangerous situation
Christians and the church are seen by Morsi supporters as
involved with ouster by military
Figures such as Pope Tawadros and Naguib Sawiris, are
giving their blessings
Some Christians are hopeful that recent ouster will
result in improved situation for minorities
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Many are hopeful that their basic human rights will be
respected
Many are also fearful of an Islamic backlash against them
68
United States’ Ties with Egypt
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Since World War II United States has been involved in
regional stabilization efforts
Since 1948, Israel and Egypt have been No. 1 and No.
2 recipients, respectively, of U.S. foreign aid
United States has played key role to resolve conflicts
between Israel and neighboring countries
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Continuing U.S. involvement is necessary because without
peace in the region our financial and military efforts are drained
by temporary fixes
69
United States’ Ties with Egypt
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Camp David Accords - Egypt/Israel formal peace treaty
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Israel to withdraw their military and civilians from Sinai
Peninsula
Egypt agrees to end the state of war and establish peace after
nearly 31 years of hostilities
Agreed on self-rule for Palestinians in Israeli-occupied areas
70
2011 Revolution and the April 6th
Movement
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Protests began January 25, 2011
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April 6th Movement
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Inspired by recent successful revolution in Tunisia
Causes:
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Formed by a group of young intellectuals
Gained a following through social media
Poverty
Unemployment
Government Corruption
Autocratic governance of President Mubarak
Mubarak resigns as President on February 11, 2011
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Previously set to retire in September, 2011
71
2012 Elections
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First free and democratic public elections in Egyptian
history took place May 23 - 24, 2012
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12 Candidates
46.42% voter turnout
Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq received the most
votes
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Morsi ran on a platform of economic reform with emphasis on
reducing unemployment
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Sought to make Islam a central part of governance
Shafiq ran on a pro-military platform
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Was seen as a continuation of the Mubarak administration
Neither candidate received enough votes to win
72
2012 Elections
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Run-off election took place June 16 - 17, 2012
Mohamed Morsi declared winner June 24, 2012
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Received 51.4% of run-off vote vs. 48.3% for Shafiq
51% voter turnout for run-off election
Morsi assumed Presidency June 30, 2012
73
2011 Revolution
What Went Wrong?
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Egypt was run by military between Mubarak’s ouster
and the elections - nearly 1.5 years
No constitution in place prior to elections
Election first round - no candidate received enough
votes to be declared winner
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12 Candidates appeared on the ballot
Abundance of moderate candidates shared the collective
moderate votes
The more extreme candidates survived, creating an election
run-off between two extreme candidates
74
2011 Revolution
What Went Wrong?
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No clear vision of the revolution beyond anti-dictatorship
mission
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Following Mubarak’s ouster, conflicting interpretations of the
revolution’s slogans emerged
Military generals saw the opportunity to remove an
ailing dictator to renew their influence in a post-Mubarak
political vacuum
Following Morsi’s election, a dramatic shift toward
Islamist rule and the ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood
was evident
75
Tamarod Movement
•
April 2013 founded by five members of Egyptian
Movement for Change
•
•
•
Young, previously unknown leaders
June 30 obtained 22 million signatures to remove Morsi
from power
June 30 led mass protests
76
Tamarod Movement
•
•
•
Seeking peaceful ends to the Muslim Brotherhood reign
and President Morsi
Continues to influence political direction following ouster
Relies heavily on support of military for protection and
to carry out the orders of the Supreme Constitutional
Court
77
Tamarod Movement
•
Initial funding for the Tamarod movement was given by
Naguib Sawiris, an Egyptian businessman
•
•
•
Owns Orascom
Indications this was an investment for the sole purpose
of ousting Morsi
Speculation surrounds Sawiris motive
•
•
Reports have surfaced Sawiris owes over a billion dollars in
unpaid taxes to the Egyptian Government
Other reports indicate Sawiris is not well liked by the
Brotherhood, due to his religion, “Christianity”
78
Tamarod Movement Petition
•
22 Million Egyptians signed Tamarod’s petition
•
7 Points of Rejection:
•
•
•
Security has not been fully restored since 2011 revolution
The poor "have no place" in society
The government has had to "beg" the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) for a $4.8bn (£3.15bn) loan to help shore up the
public finances
79
Tamarod Movement Petition
•
7 Points of Rejection (continued)
•
•
•
•
There has been "no justice" for people killed by security forces
during uprising and at anti-government protests
"No dignity is left" for Egyptians or their country
The economy has "collapsed"

Poor growth and high inflation
Egypt is "following in the footsteps" of the U.S.
 Growing anti-American sentiment
 Obama administration officially supported Morsi’s
governance
 Egypt-U.S. relations under Mubarak was strong and
created anti-American sentiment among anti-Mubarak
Egyptians
80
Tamarod Movement Tactics
•
Actively engaged with Egyptian people
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Worked along side the poor populations
Often seen in streets- highly visible
Tamarod founders seen as credible - not previously known
political figures
Reached out to masses via social media platforms
Gained support of mainstream opposition groups
•
Provided logistical support and donated office space
Submitted petition to Supreme Constitutional Court
June 30, 2013, Tamarod organized mass protests
81
Tagarod Movement
•
•
Opposition movement to Tamarod
Founded by a member of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya, Assem
Abdel Maged
•
•
•
Al-Gamaa- Al-Islamyia is considered a terrorist organization in
Europe and the United States
Believe President Morsi is the legitimate leader and
should be allowed to complete his term
•
“We have in him a sign from God” Assem Abdel Maged
Achieved moderate success with a petition countering
Tamarod
•
Tamarod has many more supporters and greater influence
82
Post-Morsi Protests and Violence
•
•
•
•
Clashes left 83 supporters of Islamist president Morsi
dead
At least 20 members of the security forces have been
killed in Sinai by suspected militants and nearly 250 in
the rest of the country
Military-appointed government gives up negotiating with
Islamist backers of ousted president, Morsi
Authorization to use force to disperse tens of
thousands of protesters from two sit-ins within the
capital has been granted
83
Post-Morsi Protests and Violence
•
Anti-Morsi protests
•
•
•
•
Initiated June 30, 2013 as part of the Tamarod movement
against President Morsi
Peaceful protests, disbursed shortly after Morsi’s removal from
power on July 3, 2013.
Military estimates the number of protesters at 14-17 million
Protests carried out at several locations throughout Cairo (see
map, next slide)
84
Post-Morsi Protests and Violence
Anti-Morsi protest locations:
85
Post-Morsi Protests and Violence
•
Pro-Morsi protests
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Initiated June 30, 2013 in response to the Tamarod movement,
in accordance with the Tagarod movement
Began as peaceful rallies in support of President Morsi
Turned violent soon after Morsi’s removal from power
Marked by rock throwing, rifle fire, and use of tear gas by the
military
Muslim Brotherhood leadership arrested for inciting violence
Muslim Brotherhood claims military aggression against the
protesters incited violence
Protests carried out at three primary locations throughout Cairo
(see map, next slide)
86
Post-Morsi Protests and Violence
Pro-Morsi protest locations:
87
Post-Morsi Protests and Violence
•
Pro-Morsi protests (continued)
•
August 7, 2013: Interim government issues statement that
negotiations had ended with pro-Morsi protesters




Hinted at forcible dispersion of the protesters
Referred to the two main sit-ins as “non-peaceful”
Prime Minister El Beblawi stated the decision to clear the sit-ins is
irreversible
Government has authorized police to use force to carry out the
orders
88
Al Qaeda
•
•
Muhammad al-Zawahiri
•
•
Egypt's al-Qaeda leader
Fled to Sinai (al Qaeda’s headquarters)
Zawahiri declared to the public that the terrorist
organization would not hesitate to commit to a jihad to
save Morsi and preserve an Islamic Egypt
89
Al Qaeda
•
•
•
He publicly remarked, that they have nothing to lose
and that they should take advantage of chaos to
achieve their goals
The military has taken heed- and has made many
arrests since the ouster including former President
Morsi
The Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda will not go out
peacefully
90
Muslim Brotherhood
•
•
1928- Muslim Brotherhood began as social and
religious club
2011-2012 Elections
•
•
•
•
Brotherhood’s political wing: Freedom and Justice Party won
43% of seats in Parliament
Islam based platform, with promises of conservative reforms
All together Islamist parties won ~70% of seats in People’s
Assembly
Suffered decades of political repression up until the
ouster of Hosni Mubarak
•
They now represent one of the most powerful party blocs in
Egypt
91
Muslim Brotherhood
•
2011 Elections military and Muslim Brotherhood
cooperate to force rapid elections
•
•
•
•
Low levels of trust in the electoral process
Pushed the election through to leave little to no time for
opponent parties to gain footing
Prior to 2011 election MB held a “Kill the Jews Rally”
•
•
Co-sponsored by Al-Azhar University
Held in prominent mosque within the city of Cairo
The rally received very little attention from western
countries
•
•
The MB wanted to appear as a moderate party
They were aiming to please not only Egyptians but Western
countries as well
92
National Salvation Front
•
•
The primary opposition coalition to the Freedom and
Justice Party - they are displeased with the upcoming
election process in the fall of 2013
Brings together four key figures who are leading
protests against President Mohamed Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood.
•
•
•
•
The Constitution party
The Egyptian Popular Current
The Social Democratic party
The Socialist Popular Alliance party
93
Constitution Party
•
Al-Dostour (Constitution Party)
•
•
•
•
Founded by Mohamed ElBaradei in April, 2012
Non-ideological party
Political Issues:
 Guarantee fundamental human rights by inclusion in the
constitution
 Equal powers between the branches of government
 Independence of print and broadcast media from the
government
Foreign Policy:
 Re-evaluate the value of U.S. assistance to “ensure that
costs will not outweigh benefits”
 Solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict while focusing on the
rights of Palestinians
94
Free Egyptians Party
•
Al-Masriyeen al-Ahrrar (Free Egyptians Party)
•
•
•
•
Formed April, 2011 by Naguib Sawiris
Large financial resources
Strongly pro-business and pro-trade
Political issues:

•
Secular state
Foreign Policy:

Supports two-state resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
•


Palestinian state on 1967 borders
Free Middle East from all Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Develop stronger ties with both Turkey and Iran
95
Inter-Governmental Organizations
•
•
•
•
•
African Union (AU)
League of Arab States
Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)
96
Interim Government
•
Interim President Mansour dissolves Islamist-controlled
higher house, appoints Ahmed Farid as Minister of
Intelligence
•
•
•
The new appointment is significant to Israel, since the Egyptian
intelligence minister is usually in charge of security
coordination with Israel
Replaced Mohamed Raafat Shehata, who held the position
during the Morsi regime
Omar Suleiman held the position during the Mubarak regime
97
Interim Government
•
President Adly Mansour
•
•
•
•
•
Former head of Supreme Constitutional Court
Responsible for appointments to interim cabinet
Main role is to draft a new constitution prior to next elections
Appointed Interim President by General El-Sisi
No known political affiliations
98
Interim Government
•
Vice President Mohamed ElBaradei
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
2005 Nobel Peace Prize winner for efforts to prevent nuclear
proliferation
Former Director General of International Atomic Energy
Agency
Started Constitution Party in April, 2012
Political positions reflect those of the Constitution Party
Openly criticized transition of power to new government in
June, 2012
Known to make anti-American and anti-Israeli statements
Favors a rapprochement with Syria and Iran
99
Interim Cabinet
•
Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawi
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Supported 2011 revolution against Hosni Mubarak
Appointed Finance Minister for interim government following
2011 revolution
Formed Egyptian Social Democratic Party after the 2011
revolution
Headed Export Development Bank of Egypt from 1983-1995
Served as United Nations Undersecretary-General between
1995-2000
Known for liberal economic views
Supports free market system in Egypt
Expected to follow a pragmatic line in economic matters as
interim prime minister
100
Interim Cabinet
•
First Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Defence
Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi
•
•
•
•
•
Head of Egypt’s armed forces
Member of Supreme Council of Armed Forces as former head
of military intelligence
Charismatic presence- seen smiling and known for delivering
speeches on emotive topics
Known as religious man (Islamic), but not associated with
Muslim Brotherhood
Reportedly has strong ties with U.S. officials on diplomatic and
military issues
101
Interim Cabinet
•
•
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Higher Education
Hossam Eissa
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Planning and
International Cooperation Ziaad Bahaa El-Din
102
Executive Branch
•
•
•
Chief of State - President
•
Elected by majority popular vote
Vice President
•
•
•
•
Position defined in Constitution of 1971
President may appoint and dismiss
Position abolished under the Constitution of December 26,
2012
Position restored by President Adly Mansour July 7, 2013
Head of Government - Prime Minister
•
•
Appointed by President
Head of cabinet of ministers appointed by the Prime Minister
103
Legislative Branch
(2012 Constitution)
•
Parliament - two chambers
•
Shura Council (Majlis Al-Shura)



•
Upper House
Functions in consultative role
At least 150 seats
•
•
•
Up to 1/10th of seats are appointed by President
6 year terms
⅓ of seats are reserved for independent candidates
People’s Assembly



Lower House
Primary legislative body
At least 350 seats
•
•
•
All members elected by popular vote
5 year terms
⅓ of seats are reserved for independent candidates
104
Judicial Branch
•
•
Supreme Constitutional Court
•
•
•
•
•
Determine constitutionality of laws
Determine jurisdiction
Final arbiter in disputed cases
Interpret laws of Legislative Authority
Judges appointed by President
Court of Cassation
•
•
•
Judicial jurisdiction cases
Interpretation of law
Issuance of annual collection
105
Judicial Branch (continued)
•
•
•
•
Court of Appeal
•
•
7 courts
Second degree court
Court of First Instance
Family Court
Egyptian State Lawsuits Authority
106
Political Risk Assessment
Source: The Fund For Peace, Failed States Index
107
Political Risk Assessment
Source: The Fund For Peace, Failed States Index
108
Political Risk Assessment
•
•
•
When a state fails we can expect chaos
•
•
A failed state cannot provide for its citizenry
Low to no economic growth



We will see malnourishment as a result
Gender discrimination
Lack of education
Internal violence
•
Conflict, civil violence, higher insecurity
Border violence
•
•
Refugee problem
Spillover violence
109
Syrian Refugees
•
Syrian refugees have been flooding into border towns in
Egypt
•
•
•
250,000-300,000 Syrians currently residing in Egypt
80,000 registered with United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) as of 25 July 2013
Tensions are high between the Egyptian natives and
their new neighbors
110
Syrian Refugees
•
•
Many refugees are being detained
Local television stations critical of Morsi claim that the
Muslim Brotherhood paid refugees to march in support
of Morsi
•
The truth in this is unknown- nevertheless it speaks volumes to
the rise in political tensions amongst the people of Egypt
111
Economic
Presented by, Darcy Pitkin and Naveen
Kumar
112
EGYPT
ECONOMIC
Agenda
•
•
•
•
•
Summary
Key Indicators
Predictions
What If Scenario
Economic Organization
113
Summary
•
Egyptian economy is unique- the Government controls
all aspects including the limited private sector and
Foreign Direct Investment
•
•
•
•
Key players

Government

Military
 Limited private industry
The economy is often referred to as stagflation
Tourism is a major source of hard currency
Egypt relies on government subsidies for basic needs
•
•
Food
Fuel
114
Summary
Continued
•
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment is essential for Egyptian
prosperity
•
•
•
U.S. is a major contributor of foreign aid to Egypt

Defense, agriculture, & development aid
U.S. commercial investment in oil exploration is key for
Egyptian energy independence
•
$12 billion anticipated investment in 2013
Suez Canal is major avenue for distribution for world
trade
•
Tariffs for goods being transported are a major source of
revenue for Egypt
115
Summary
Continued
•
•
•
•
The European Union is the greatest source of FDI in
Egypt
•
UK is top source
Middle East investment is growing
•
Especially after fall of Morsi
Egypt is involved in several trade agreements
•
EU, Middle East, Israel, Turkey & U.S.
Egypt’s peace agreements with Israel have opened up
financial relations between the two nations
•
Qualified Industrial Zone Agreement
116
Key Indicators
•
•
Substantial decrease in overall industry outputs from
April 2012 to March 2013
Domestic oil output shows a steady decline in
production capabilities
•
•
•
1990-2000: 850-900 bl/day
2001-Present: Average 600bl/day Approx.

Can no longer meet their own needs
Foreign Trade
•
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) fell by almost 2/3
117
Key Indicators
•
•
U.S. Trade
•
Oil exports to the U.S. increased substantially
2011-2012 The U.S. didn’t see Muslim Brotherhood as
a reliable partner and members of Congress kept loans
and aid at a trickle
• Under the Morsi regime poverty increased by 30%
118
Key Indicators
•
U.S. involvement in the IMF
•
The U.S. heavily influenced IMF is demanding Egypt reform
subsidies before providing a much needed loan

•
•
U.S. is the top contributor to IMF & has strongest voting power for
lending decisions
Egypt has snubbed this demand and has turned to the Middle
East, including Iran, and China for financial assistance
Egyptian military owns 25-40% of Economy.
119
Predictions
•
•
•
Egypt’s tourism industry will decline as violence and
attacks towards tourists increases
The Middle East will continue to provide short-term
financial support while long-term financial relationships
with the EU and U.S. will dissipate.
Consumption of oil & natural gas will continue to
surpass domestic production rates resulting in potential
increased trade relations with Iran
120
Predictions
•
•
•
Stock Market will collapse as investors (including
foreign investors) pull their investments
Tensions will rise again with Israel eliminating financially
beneficial trade agreements that exist between them
Subsidies will increase public debt and will soon
exhaust all foreign currency reserves
•
Will cause subsidies to be eliminated resulting in riots and
violence
121
What If...
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
Tourism
•
Egypt’s tourism industry will decline dramatically
•
Egypt’s street violence will drive tourists away
•
•
•
In Egypt’s 2011 revolution the tourism figure dropped by a third
compared to previous year’s figures
Ranked 85th out of 140 countries in a recent travel and tourism
report by, The World Economic Forum
Muslim extremists have attacked tourists in the past with hopes
of weakening tourism sector


Will cause government to weaken
November 1997 attack at Luxor claimed lives of 58 foreign visitors
by Islamic extremists
122
What If...
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
Stock Market
Stock Market will drop dramatically
•
•
•
•

Orascom Construction Industries & Commercial International
Bank Egypt's largest publicly traded companies, saw double digit
drops in share price in 2012
Foreign traders will be discouraged to invest & will sell
their current holdings
•
•
883 companies on Egyptian Exchange (EGX) will decline
substantially in value
Blue chip companies will no longer be stable
Foreign investors withdrew investments after realizing Morsi’s
political orientation toward an extremist state
Stock Market will collapse with extremist Egypt
123
What If...
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
Subsidies
Extremists will provoke riots and protests with loss/cut
of subsidies
•
•
•
Egypt’s Subsidies expenditure will increase
•
•
Will add more debt to public expenditures
Much of the poor population will continue to not benefit much
of the government provided subsidies
Will create more corruption
•
For every 1 LE (equivalent to $0.14) of fuel savings the state
spends 40 LE (equivalent to $5.73)
•
Will cause truck driver to put gas on the side and sell it at
four times the price
124
What If…
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
Poverty
Already high poverty rates will continue to increase
•
•
•
Lack of trade relationships will reduce food & fuel
quantities
•
•
•
Was 25.2% during 2010-2011 & increased to 40% during Morsi
(2012)
•
Result in starvation- Egypt wheat reserves estimated at three
months
Riots and unrest will occur in streets of Egypt
More unemployed youth will become Islamic extremists
and support violent groups
•
Unemployed youth have been asking for economic reform
“Sadaqa” or the practice of Islamic charity to needy and125
faithful will be sole source of sustaining Egyptian society
What If…
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
U.S. Investment
U.S. FDI, Trade & Loans with an extremist Egypt would
substantially decrease
•
•
•
During reign of Morsi & Muslim Brotherhood:



U.S. FDI dropped 1.2 billion
U.S. Trade with Egypt declined from 6.8 billion to 5.5 billion
U.S. loans and aid to Egypt were significantly withheld
Exception: U.S. has maintained a steady commitment to
military aid in Egypt

Assist in promoting democracy/overthrowing Islamic run
governments and/or maintaining U.S. financial interests
126
What If…
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
U.S. Oil/Natural Gas Interests
•
U.S. would curtail their oil & natural gas imports from
Egypt
•
Currently accounts for 50% of U.S. imports from Egypt and
20% of Egypt’s overall international petroleum exports

•
U.S. investment in oil and gas sector would be
withdrawn
•
Financing for further oil exploration in Egypt would cease

•
Overall oil and natural gas prices internationally would
substantially increase
Egypt’s need for production to meet consumption and export
demands would not be met
Egypt would look to Iran to meet consumption demands
•
127
Financial relationship would subject Egypt to U.S. sanctions
What If…
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
U.S. Interests in the Suez Canal
Transportation of Petroleum, natural gas, and other
goods from Persian Gulf and African nations friendly
with the U.S. and Europe would be cut off
•
•
•
•
Would result in a loss of revenue for Egypt but would be a
greater loss to U.S. and Europe
U.S. has substantial financial and military interest in canal
Could initiate war between U.S. and Egypt to restore and
protect access to canal


Parallel-Persian Gulf War
U.S. desire to protect oil interests
128
What If…
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
U.S. Role in Financial Relationship with Israel
The Qualified Industrial Zone Agreement would end
•
•
•
Egypt’s textile and clothing exports to U.S. doubled with QIZ,
without it the industry could collapse
Egypt will boycott trade with Israel
•
Could join the Arab League and participate in Arab Boycott of
Israel

Arab League prohibits engaging buying, selling or entering into
business with Israel
•

4% of Egypt’s oil is exported to Israel, boycott=loss of this revenue
U.S. will withdraw tax credits and export rights. Will also impose
hefty civil and criminal penalties for participation in boycott
129
What If…
Economy in an Extremist Egypt
Foreign Investment
•
•
EU is the primary financial investor in Egypt
•
In an extremist Egypt, EU investment would decline

Fear of sanctions by U.S.
Egypt would become more reliant on Middle East
investment
•
•
Iran would become a greater trade partner to meet Egypt’s oil
demands
Middle East investment in Egypt increased after fall of Morsi

$5 billion from Saudi Arabia, $4 billion from United Arab Emirates,
$3 billion from Kuwait
•
•
Money was earmarked subsidizing the Egyptian elite & paying off
the debts U.S.-dominated international banks
Agenda for Middle East money is to shore up the military regime and
130
detract from any pursuit towards democracy
Economic Organization
General Statistics
National Budget:
Revenues: $56.64 Billion
Expenditures: $83.24 Billion (2012 Est.)
•
•
•
2012 Budget Deficit: $19.2 Billion


April 2013 Deficit: $26.4 Billion
June 2013 Deficit: $28.2 Billion
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $537.8 Billion (2012 Est.)
•
•
Ranked 27th In the world
GDP Growth Rate: 2%
Major Economic Sectors:
•
•
•
Services: 47.9%
Industry: 37.4%
Agriculture: 14.7%
131
Economic Organization
Labor Force Statistics
Total Labor Force: 26.42 million (2012 est.)
•
Approximately 1.6 million are children ages 5-17
Labor Force per Sector:
•
•
•
Agriculture: 32%
Industry: 17%
Services: 51% (2001 est.)

Tourism is a service sector output that either directly or indirectly
employs one in seven workers
Unemployment rate: 13.5% (2012 est.)
132
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Service Outputs
•
Tourism, trade, banking and shipping services on the Suez Canal.
Industry Outputs
•
Textiles, food processing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals,
hydrocarbons, construction, cement, metals and light
manufactures.
•
Industrial production growth rate: 0.5%
Agriculture Outputs
•
Cotton, rice, corn, wheat, beans, fruits, vegetables, cattle, water
buffalo, sheep and goats.
133
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Service Outputs
•
•
•
Largest and fastest-growing economic
sector.
•
Accounts for 51% of GDP.
Suez Canal
•
Generates $438.1 Million in revenues
(May 2013 figure).


May 2012 - $434.6 Million
April 2013 - $406.1 Million
Tourism
•
•
•
Received 5 million tourists since start
of the year.

Generated $4 Billion in revenues
Estimated to reach 13 million visitors
by the end of the year.
Each tourist on average spends
$70.30 per night.
Source: Tourism in egypt: Arab spring break. (2013,
May 4). Retrieved July 21, 2013, from The Economist
[online]:
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21577089turmoil-has-scared-all-rugged-and-russians-arab-springbreak
134
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Industry Outputs
• Increased 6.26% in April 2013.
• Averaged 5.11% from 2004 to 2013
• Clothing and textiles sector is the largest industrial employer.
• Main industrial centers in Egypt: Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Helwan.
•
Producing iron, steel, textiles, refined petroleum products, plastics, building
materials, electronics, paper, trucks and automobiles, and chemicals.
Source: Egypt industrial production. (2013). Retrieved July 22, 2013, from Trading Economics - Egypt
Business: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/industrial-production
135
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Industrial Potential Growth to 2025
Source: Rachid, R. M. (2012, December). Egypt’s industrial development strategy industry: The engine
of growth. Retrieved July 26, 2013, from TRALAC.org - Trade Law Centre:
http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/12/Egypt-National-Industrial-Development-Strategy_EN.pdf
136
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Source: Economic activity [map]. (n.d.).
Retrieved July 22, 2013, from The
University of Texas at Austin:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/atlas_mi
ddle_east/egypt_econ.jpg
137
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Role of Suez Canal in Energy Transportation
An important transit point for oil and liquefied natural
gas.
2011-petroleum accounted for 15% of total Suez
cargoes and liquefied natural gas accounted for 6%
accounted of Suez cargoes
Shipments come from African and Persian Gulf states
to Europe and the Mediterranean Basin.
Fees collected from operation of these two transit points
are significant sources of revenue for the Egyptian
government.
•
•
•
•
138
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Oil Production
Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer in Africa
2011 production= 815,000 barrels/day
Egyptian oil production comes from five main areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Primarily the Gulf of Suez and the Nile Delta
Additionally, the Western Desert, the Eastern Desert, and the
Mediterranean Sea.
Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) is the
state entity charged with managing infrastructure,
licensing, and production. Also owns and operates
much of the country's refining capacity.
•
EGPC accounts for 20% of Egypt’s oil production
139
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Oil Production (continued)
Source: Egypt. (2013, July 31). Retrieved August 6, 2013, from U.S. Energy Information Administration:
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EG
140
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Oil Production (continued)
Foreign Investment
•
•
•
•
•
U.S.-based Apache is the heaviest investor in exploration over
the years
Italy’s Eni is also heavily invested in Egypt's crude oil
hydrocarbons
Other investors: Dana Gas, BG Group, Shell, Hess, Petronas,
and LUKoil
Domestic Use
•
•
Egypt's oil consumption has outpaced production since 2008.
Egypt's imports of both crude oil and refined petroleum
products increased to make up for decreased oil output
141
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Oil Production (continued)
Oil as an Export
Crude oil exports
increased by just
over 15 percent
from 2010-2011
Refined petroleum
exports have been
declining
Future trends in
both crude and
product exports
mainly depend on
the government's
ability to curtail
domestic demand of
oil and discovery of
new reserves
•
•
•
Source: Egypt. (2013, July 31). Retrieved August 6, 2013, from U.S. Energy
Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EG
142
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Natural Gas
Second largest natural gas producer on the continent
•
•
•
•
Production = 3.8 billion barrels in 2010
Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (GASCO) is
charged with promoting the sector
50% of production occurs in the Nile Delta area and
surrounding offshore areas
143
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Natural Gas (continued)
Foreign Investment
•
•
Major foreign players include Eni, BG Group, BP, and Apache

•
Companies based in Italy, United States and the UK
BG Group produces about 40 percent of Egypt's total gas
production

UK based company
144
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Natural Gas (continued)
•
Liquid Natural Gas as an
Export
Arab Gas Pipeline(AGP)provides gas to Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, Turkey, Israel,
European markets
•
•
•
AGP was sabotaged due to
political protest in 2011-2012
which caused gas disruptions to
recipient countries
2010- over half of Egypt's LNG
was shipped to Europe
2010-U.S. second largest
recipient of Egyptian LNG
Source: Egypt. (2013, July 31). Retrieved August 6, 2013, from U.S. Energy
Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EG
145
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
SUMED Pipeline
•
•
Source: Egypt. (2013, July 31). Retrieved August 6, 2013, from U.S. Energy
Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EG
200-mile long SuezMediterranean (SUMED)
Pipeline-provides an
alternative to the Suez
Canal for those cargos
too large to transit
through the Canal.
Only alternative route to
transport crude oil from
the Red Sea to the
Mediterranean if ships
were unable to navigate
through the Suez Canal
146
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
•
•
Agriculture Sector by the Numbers (Est. 2001):
•
•
•
•
•
Agricultural production has increased from 1990 to
1999
•
•
•
•
•
620,000 metric tons of Banana Production
138,000 metric tons of Cereal Production
6,820,000 metric tons of Coarse Grain Production
5,900,000 metric tons of Corn Production
3,900,000 metric tons of Rice Production
Wheat production increased from 4,268,000 to 6,347,000
Maize production increased from 4,799,000 to 6,143,000
Rice production increased from 2,113,000 to 3,880,000
Sugar production increased from 971,000 to 1,350,000
Egypt Ministry of Agriculture constitutes 20% of
GDP as well as exports
147
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Wheat Production over the
Years
Source: Statistics at a glance - Egypt. (2013). Retrieved July 24, 2013, from
AMIS Statistics: http://statistics.amis-outlook.org/data/index.html#
148
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Cereal Production over the
Years
Source: Statistics at a glance - Egypt. (2013). Retrieved July 24, 2013, from
AMIS Statistics: http://statistics.amis-outlook.org/data/index.html#
149
Economic Organization
Sector Outputs
Coarse Grain Production over the
Years
Source: Statistics at a glance - Egypt. (2013). Retrieved July 24, 2013, from
AMIS Statistics: http://statistics.amis-outlook.org/data/index.html#
150
Economic Organization
Debt
Overall Public Debt: 85% of GDP
•
Debt was 102.7% in 2004
Loans from foreign countries: $34.88 Billion (2012 Est.)
•
Recent loans from Qatar, Libya, Turkey and Saudi Arabia

Pending Loan from International Monetary Fund (IMF) of $4.8
Billion
Egypt’s Subsidies System accounts for a third of public
expenditure
•
•
For gas, bread, food, gas cylinder and energy.
Provides aid to one-in-four Egyptian in poverty
151
•
•
Economic Organization
Debt
Foreign and Domestic Debtors
•
Increased from $30 Billion to $40 Billion:




$3 Billion each from Qatar and Saudi Arabia
$1 Billion from Turkey
$2 Billion from Libya
Egyptian public bought government bonds.
International Monetary Funds $4.8 Billion Loan
pending
•
IMF demands subsidies reform to stop draining Egypt’s
economy before loan will be issued


Egypt reluctant to make reforms-doesn’t want a repeat of the
1977 bread riots
Receiving funds from Middle East to combat debt as a short-term
solution
152
Economic Organization
Debt
Source: Egypt public debt. (2013, February 21). Retrieved July 21, 2103, from
Index Mundi: http://www.indexmundi.com/egypt/public_debt.html
153
Economic Organization
Debt
Subsidies
•
Bread Subsidies
•
•
Estimated $4 Billion a year
Egyptians consume ~210 million loaves of subsidized flat bread per
day


•
Makes it the world’s largest wheat importer
Production cost of loaf is 6 cents
•
Sold at 1 cents through subsidies
Fuel Subsidies
•
•
Estimated $14.5 Billion a year
Military owns or manages 80% of the gas stations


Wataniyya gas stations
Budget is considered “Classified”
154
Economic Organization
Debt
Subsidies (Continued)
•
•
Energy Subsidies
•
•
Estimated $16.8 Billion a year
Petroleum Ministry produces oil at $23.8 Billion a year

Sells at $7.15 Billion a year after subsidies
Gas Cylinder Subsidies
•
•
•
Estimated to $8.9 Billion in 2012-2013 Budget
Egyptians consume nearly 360 million gas cylinders every year
Military Generals manage production of Gas Cylinders
 Budget is considered “Classified”
155
Economic Organization
Debt
Source: Slominski, B. (2013). Egypt: Subsidies and other transfers (% of expense). Retrieved July 26, 2013, from
factfish: http://www.factfish.com/statistic-country/egypt/subsidies%20and%20other%20transfers%20of%20expense
156
Economic Organization
Stock Market
•
•
•
•
•
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) consists of 2 major stock exchanges
•
•
•
Alexandria established in 1883
Cairo established in 1903
Both Stock Exchange ranked fifth in the world in the 1940s
Previously known as the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange
(CASE)
Revival of Egyptian stock market came in the 1990s after
restructuring of government and economic reforms
883 companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange with a market
capitalization of about L.E.71.3 Billion
In 1991, 627 companies listed with L.E. 8.8 Billion
•
Stock exchange fell by 6.25% following the start of the Egyptian
Revolution of 2011
•
•
•
Market was closed for almost 8 weeks
Fell another 8.9% after reopening of stock market
EGX30 fell 45% of its volume from 7156 to 3970 points

Stock markets taken financial beating since Arab Spring protest in 2011
157
Economic Organization
Stock Market
•
Stock markets declining according to 2013 Semi Annual Report
•
•
•
GX30 index closed at 4,752 points with a 13% decrease
EGX70 index posted 24.5% loss
EGX100 index fell 19.66%
Source: Semi annual report: 01/01/2013 - 30/06/2013.
(2013, July 9). Retrieved July 24, 2013, from The
Egyptian Exchange:
http://www.egx.com.eg/getdoc/971b4aee-6891-4d2db600-7bb4f5796eb5/EGX-Semi-Annual-Report_en.aspx
158
Economic Organization
Foreign Trade/Investment
Data Source: The World Factbook: Egypt. (2013, July 10). Retrieved July 20, 2013, from Central Intelligence
Agency Library: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html
159
Economic Organization
Foreign Trade/Investment
Data Source: The World Factbook: Egypt. (2013, July 10). Retrieved July 20, 2013, from Central Intelligence
Agency Library: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html
160
Economic Organization
Foreign Trade/Investment
Egypt is party to the following trade agreements:
European Union-Egypt Association Agreement
•
•
•
•
•
•
Agreement between Egypt and EU effective 2004, also referred
to as the Partnership Agreement
Establishes a free trade area over a 12-year transitional period
by 2016.
All goods exported from Egypt to the EU were immediately
exempt from tariffs
EU export tariffs will gradually be dismantled by 2016
Local component requirements (a minimum of 60% from
Egypt or the EU)
161
Economic Organization
Foreign Trade/Investment
Trade Agreements (continued)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)
•
•
•
•
•
Signed in 1994; Egypt became a member in 1998
Currently there are 19 active African member states
All commodities are exempted between member countries with
a minimum local component value of 45%
Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA)
•
•
•
Established in 1998.
As of 2005, all 18 GAFTA countries exempted all customs
duties and charges between the Arab countries.
Local component requirements under GAFTA rules of origin
also allow for the use of inputs from all other member.
162
Economic Organization
Foreign Trade/Investment
Trade Agreements (continued)
•
•
•
Agadir Agreement
•
Bilateral trade agreement signed in 2004 with Jordan, Tunisia
& Morocco
Egypt-Turkey Free Trade Agreement
•
•
Signed in 2005, Effective 2007
Establishes a free trade area between Egypt & Turkey over a
transitional period of no more than twelve years
Egypt is also party to several free and preferential trade
agreements with individual Arab countries
•
111 bilateral trade agreements in total
163
Economic Organization
Foreign Trade/Investment
•
•
2nd Most Attractive Country in Africa for Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI)
•
Accounts for 10.5% of Africa’s FDI
The top five sources of FDI in Egypt from 2011-2012
were:
•
•
•
•
•
U.K.: $5.8 billion (49.5% of Egypt's FDI)
Belgium: $2.1 billion (17.8%)
U.S.: $577.6 million (4.9%)
United Arab Emirates: $559.8 million (4.8%)
Netherlands: $409.4 million (3.5%)
164
•
Economic Organization
Foreign Trade/Investment
The European Union has invested more than any other
region
•
•
•
•
•
$9.5 billion (2011-2012)
80.7% of Egypt's foreign investment
U.K. is the largest foreign investor EU nation in Egypt

Overall total investment as of 2012-$30 billion
U.S. remains a major investor; however, direct
investment fell by two-thirds, from 2010-2012
•
$1.8 billion to $577.6 million
Direct investment from the Middle East increased from
2010-2012.
•
Investment from the Middle East remains only a small
percentage of Egypt's FDI (9.77%)

Middle Eastern interest has increased since fall of Morsi
•
165
Middle Eastern Investment after fall of Morsi = $12 billion
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
Overview of Egypt-U.S. Trade 2002-2012
Source: Egypt-u.s. trade and investment profile: Egypt-u.s. trade values [chart]. (2013, April). Retrieved July 23, 2013, from The
American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt: http://www.amcham-egypt.org/BSAC/EgyUSprof13.pdf
166
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
Egypt Exports to the
United States
*Oil/Natural Gas Products are
the Top Export to the United
States
•
•
Total Value = $1.4 Billion
Account for almost 50%
of all Exports in 2012
Source: Egypt-u.s. trade and investment profile: Egypt non-petroleum exports to the u.s. (2012). (2013,
April). Retrieved July 2013, from The American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt: http://www.amcham167
egypt.org/BSAC/EgyUSprof13.pdf
Economic OrganizationU.S.
Trade/Investment
Egypt Imports from the
United States
•
•
The U.S. has a surplus trade
balance with Egypt.
It exports around twice as
much in goods and services
to Egypt per month than what
Egypt exports to the U.S.
168
Source: Egypt-u.s. trade and investment profile: Egypt imports from the u.s. (2012). (2013,
April). Retrieved July 23, 2013, from The American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt:
http://www.amcham-egypt.org/BSAC/EgyUSprof13.pdf
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
Qualified Industrial Zone Agreement
•
•
•
Articles entering the U.S. under QIZ must be grown, produced, or
manufactured in a QIZ and meet the rules of origin requirements.
Upon entering the U.S., the material and processing costs incurred
must total no less than 35%
In the original agreement 11.7% of the material and processing
costs were to originate in Israel and 23.3% in Egypt
•
•
•
The percent has been renegotiated, the component originating from
Israel was lowered to 10.5% and Egypt makes up the difference at
24.5%.
In addition, U.S. materials may account for up to 15% of the appraised
value of the finished goods.
The QIZ protocol has resulted in almost doubling Egypt’s textile
and clothing exports to the U.S.
•
•
2004-$582.6 million
2012-$963 million
169
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
Qualified Industrial Zone Agreement (continued)
December 2004 - U.S. announced the formation of Qualifying Industrial
Zones (QIZ) in Egypt
February 2005-QIZ was implemented
Under the QIZ, goods manufactured in designated industrial areas
in Egypt utilizing Israeli inputs will receive duty-free treatment when
imported into the United States.
Articles entering the U.S. under QIZ must be grown, produced, or
manufactured in a QIZ and meet the rules of origin requirements.
•
•
•
•
Goal was foster economic cooperation between the Israel and Egypt.
170
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
U.S. Investment in Egypt
•
•
•
•
Overall Total FDI reached $16.7 billion in 2012
Represents 27.2% of all U.S. direct investment in Africa
The Oil & Gas Sector Accounts for the Bulk of U.S. FDI
•
Apache Corporation-Houston Based oil/gas exploration and
production company

Largest American Investor in Egypt

Total Investment 10 billion, 1.1 billion additional investment expected in
2013
Other American petroleum companies investing in Egypt:
ExxonMobil, Haliburton, IPR Transoil, Merlon International
171
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
Non-petroleum U.S. Investment
•
•
1,066 non petroleum U.S. companies are active in the economy of
Egypt
U.S. manufacturing companies hold 47.2% of U.S. non-petroleum
capital in Egypt
•
3M, American Automotive, American Standard, Bristol-Myers Squib,
Cargill, Coca-Cola, Colgate-Palmolive, Dow Chemicals, Edison
International, Energizer, GE, GM, Gillette, Heinz, Hundz Soil, Johnson
& Johnson, Merck, PepsiCo, Pfizer, Procter & Gamble & Xerox
172
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
Non-petroleum U.S. Investment (Cont.)
•
U.S. service sector investment in Egypt accounts for 23.1 % of U.S.
capital in Egypt
•
•
•
Financial: AIG, American Express, BNY Mellon, Citigroup, Coldwell
Banker, Metlife, Visa
Telecommunication/IT: Cisco, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Microsoft
Food Service: Baskin-Robbins, Burger King, Chili’s, Cinnabon, Cold
Stone Creamery, Dairy Queen, TGIFridays, Hardee’s, Hard Rock
Café, KFC, Little Caesars, McDonald's, Outback Steakhouse, Pizza
Hut, Starbucks, Ruby Tuesday
173
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
U.S. Foreign Assistance
•
•
•
Egypt is the 5th largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance
2nd largest recipient in Middle East/North Africa (after Israel)
•
•
2011 Total Foreign Assistance-$1.6 billion
2012 Total Foreign Assistance-$1.6 billion

1.3 billion (military)

250 million (economic)

60 million (“enterprise fund”)
U.S. Agencies responsible for providing Egypt with assistance:
•
•
•
U.S. Agency for International Development-primary provider of
assistance
U.S. Department of Agriculture-2nd
U.S. Department of Defense-3rd
174
Economic Organization
U.S. Trade/Investment
U.S. Foreign Assistance (continued)
•
•
•
Timeline of Assistance:
1977-Sadat made his historic trip to Israel. This resulted in tight
partnership with the U.S. and international lenders like the IMF,
which gave the country credit on easy terms, and debt forgiveness
when times got tough.
1990's-Egypt supported the U.S,-led coalition to drive Iraqi troops
out of Kuwait. Mubarak was rewarded with at least $15 billion in
international debt forgiveness.
2011-2012-The U.S. didn’t see Muslim Brotherhood as a reliable
partner, and members of Congress blocked loans and aid
175
Economic Organization
Military Relationship
Egypt’s Economic Relationship with the Military
Egyptian Forces own 25-40% of Egypt’s Economy
•
•
•
Control over the economy began after 1952 revolution/coup
Budget is considered “Classified”



•
•
Buying and selling real estate on behalf of the government
Domestic cleaning services
Managing the following:
•
•
•
•
•
Gas Stations
Farming Livestock
Producing food products
Manufacturing plastic table covers
Gas Cylinders
Military using seized lands to build tourist resorts and hotels
Military is violating labor laws and violating their rights.
176
Military
Presented by, Dan Routier, Ekow Ocran,
Enzi Jauregui
177
EGYPT
MILITARY
Agenda
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Summary
Key Indicators
Predictions
What If Scenario
Supporting History
Organization
Conclusions
178
Summary
•
•
•
Egyptian military plays a pivotal role in Egyptian affairs
Egyptian military is the second largest recipient of U.S.
military aid
Egyptian military benefited financially and politically
from the 1979 peace accord with Israel
179
Summary
•
•
•
The Egyptian military is the key to regional stabilization
efforts
Largest military force on the African continent
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
instituted several coups in the past 2 years at the
behest of the Egyptian people
•
•
SCAF is currently the most stable force in Egypt
SCAF has a unique relationship with the U.S.
180
Summary
•
U.S. provides hi-tech arms and training to SCAF
•
SCAF plays a major role in the economy of Egypt
•
•
SCAF is the controlling force in the Suez Canal and
Sinai region
SCAF plays a minor role in anti-drug and anti-terrorism
in the region
181
Summary
Identification of U.S. Strategic
Interests
•
•
•
Maintaining access to the Suez Canal for the global
distribution of oil
Deterrence of Iranian military involvement in the region
Key asset for projection of U.S. military power in the
Middle East region
•
•
•
Access to the Suez Canal
Access to Egyptian Air Bases
Egypt’s military acts as a regional stabilizing force in the
182
Illustration of Egypt's Strategic Importance to
U.S. Interest
183
Key Indicators
U.S. discontent with SCAF and the current Egyptian crisis
•
The U.S. questions providing military and economic aid
in light of SCAF military coup against Morsi
•
•
U.S. has declined to call it a coup, to avoid ending payments
U.S. temporarily halted sale of F-16 fighter jets and
other military related equipment
•
Until the military hands over government to an elected body
184
Key Indicators
Egyptians discontent with U.S. foreign policy
•
•
Egyptian military commanders blame current crisis on
the United States involvement
Egyptian military is a major arms importer, not only from
the U.S. but from China as well
185
Key Indicators
•
•
•
•
Relationship with Other Players
The U.S. providing military assistance to SCAF this
allows SCAF to purchase arms from other sources
using their Egyptian military budget
Egypt has more arms control violations than any other
country in the world
The SCAF has a strong military relationship with China
UN could remove peacekeepers from Sinai
•
Could signal further deterioration of the Camp David Accord,
and peace in place because of it
186
Key Indicators
Disruption of Water
•
•
•
If the Suez Canal is Disrupted
•
•
Egyptian military would definitely respond with force
Likely backed by other powers from around the world (U.S.)
If the Strait of Tiran is Disrupted
•
•
Israel would be likely to respond militarily
As it has in the past
If flow of the Nile is Disrupted
•
•
Egypt could take military action against Ethiopia
Could kick off regional reactions
187
Predictions
•
•
Egypt’s military will continue to violently suppress
Islamist actions throughout the state
•
Egypt’s military will transfer governance to the newly
elected government
•
•
•
As they did pre-Morsi
This will be enhanced by pressure from U.S. and others
They are likely to potentially stage a coup again if they don’t
like the new regime
Even if Egypt does not radicalize- there is a possibility
that they will become less friendly to the United States
•
•
If the U.S. withdraws $1.3B military aid
Competing interest from China and Russia in Africa
188
Predictions
•
The establishment of an Islamist insurgent force using
tactics similar to the Afghan rebels and Syrian rebels
•
•
•
Strong possibility in Sinai region
Also possible in the southwest desert (Al Qaeda from Mali is
gathering in southern Libya)
Sinai rebellion would be quickly handled by Egyptian,
Israeli, or joint army action
•
•
⅓ of world oil supply from Persian Gulf flows through the Suez
Canal
This area is too valuable to allow insurgents to occupy the
Sinai region
189
Predictions
•
Egypt would increase arms purchases from Russia or
China
•
•
U.S. will lose most of its military influence in Egypt and the
surrounding areas
Egypt could attempt to ‘export security’ to the region in
exchange for resources
•
Particularly northern Africa (Libya)
190
What ifs
How would U.S. interests be affected if Egypt becomes
radicalized and unfriendly to western influence?
Possible disruption of Tiran
•
•
•
•
Conflict with Israel
Egypt would align with Iran thus destabilizing the region
•
•
Open conflict with Israel would most likely occur
More than likely result in another preemptive strike

As we observed in the 6 Day War
Projection of regional U.S. military assets would be
curtailed
•
U.S. military’s ability to fly in Egyptian airspace, and pass
through Suez would be severed
191
What ifs
How would U.S. interests be affected if Egypt becomes
radicalized and unfriendly to western influence?
Use of Egypt to link radicals to Libya, Tunisia, Sudan
•
•
•
Funnel people and weapons to anti Islamist fighters throughout
Africa
Possible loss of Suez canal
•
•
•
Global distribution of Middle Eastern oil
U.S. Naval priority access to pass through would be reduced or
revoked
Not just U.S. but all western traffic could be shut down
192
What ifs
How would U.S. interests be affected if Egypt becomes
radicalized and unfriendly to western influence?
•
Tension between Egypt and Libya will escalate, possibly to war
Alliance will form between Muslim Brotherhood in Libya to
extremist Egypt
would give Muslim Brotherhood enough power and support to
challenge current Libyan government, this will mean war
•
•
193
Supporting History
U.S. Military relations
•
•
•
Bright Star
•
•
Biannual U.S.-Eg Military Exercise
Largest multi-national exercise (33+ countries)
Officer Exchange Program
•
•
Staff, and War College (Al-Sissi studied at U.S. War College)
Over 1,000 Egyptians trained annually in the U.S.
U.S. military aid (1.3M annually)
•
•
Largely goes to equipment
Over 1000 M1A1 Tanks and 212+ F-16 jets
194
U.S. Military Aid Distributions
•
International Military Education and Training Fund
(IMET)
•
•
•
•
Used to train foreign militaries on U.S. weapon systems and
military management
Over 2,000 courses are available
Assistance comes in the form of grant money
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs (NADR)
•
Funding provided by the U.S. to support resources to security
objectives in foreign countries
195
U.S. Military Aid Distributions
continued
•
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
•
•
•
•
Tool for promoting U.S. interests abroad
Improvement of key foreign militaries to aid U.S. in achieving
goals
Provides financial backing
Economic Support Funds (ESF)
•
•
•
Tool for promoting political and economic stability abroad
Used in areas that are of strategic importance for U.S.
Funds are disbursed using grants

This money is meant to be used for infrastructure issues- while at
the same time freeing up funds to be used for military purposes
196
U.S. Military Aide
Projected 2013-14
197
U.S. Military Aid History
198
Egypt and Libya Recent History
•
Egypt and Libya have had a positive relationship during
the late 20th Century
•
•
•
Open war in July 21, 1977,

Armistice signed July 24, 1977
Up until late 2010 unstable relationship
After 2010 both countries move to improve relationship
•
•
September 3, 2011 Libya seeks Egyptian military assistance
against rebels Diplomats seek to meet Egypt’s Supreme
Council of Armed Forces
January 2012, Egypt's top general meets Libyan
representatives to negotiate return of Egyptian citizens

Ones who went to Libya to help during the Libyan revolution
199
Egypt and Libya Today
April 11, 2013 – An agreement for military cooperation has
been signed between Egypt and Libya
•
•
Will include cooperating in the areas of training, sharing experience,
fighting illegal immigration, illegal fish operations, and the fight against
drug trafficking.
Agreement “is the beginning of cooperation between the two countries to
protect the region”
200
Egypt and Libya Today
April 23, 2013 New Deal reforming U.S. Defense
Cooperation with Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia
•
•
As expected, after military Coup in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood
was quick to condemn militaries actions while the prime Minister
“expressed his respect for the will of the people”
Egypts actions recently could cause issues with Egypt/Libya
relationship, Libyan Islamists might not trust the democratic system
and decide to turn to violence thus causing further issues for Egypt
201
July 3, 2013 Coup d'état
This shows the military has important role in Egypt
Egypt's military toppled the country's first democratically
elected president reportedly put him under house arrest
•
•
•
•
Put many of his top leaders under house arrest as well
El-Sisi said the military was fulfilling its "historic responsibility"
to protect the country by ousting Morsyt
Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, those in
support of Morsi and those against
8 people killed, 340 wounded during the brief fighting
•
Fighting was between Morsy supporters and the Military
202
July 3, 2013 Coup d'état
Adly Mansour, head of the country's Supreme
Constitutional Court, will replace Morsy as Egypt's
interim president
Country's constitution has been suspended, and
Mansour will "establish a government that is a strong
and diverse"
•
•
New parliamentary elections will be held, and
Mansour will have the power to issue constitutional
declarations in the meantime
203
Military Timeline
Military has played a very important part in the recent
History of Egypt, heavily involved in politics
•
Egypt and Israel have traditionally had a rocky
relationship, always going to war with each other.
•
•
1948 War (against Israel partition of Israel and Palestine)
•
Gamal Abdul Nassar fought in the battle for Negev Desert
1949 General Armistice
•
Gamal Abdul Nassar formed the Committee of the Free Officers'
Movement within army
204
Military Timeline
The Sinai Peninsula and Suez Canal
•
•
•
•
•
1950 - Egypt restricts Israeli shipping through Suez
•
Nassar was elected chairman of committee of free officers
1952 - Free Officers staged a coup, made Ali Mahir Naguib the
head
1953 - Coup leader Muhammad Najib becomes president as Egypt
is declared a republic
1954 - Gamal Abdel Nasser becomes prime minister
1955 - Attack on Egyptian military outposts in Gaza by Israeli army
convinced Nassar to build Up military force to defend itself against
Israel
205
Military Timeline
The Sinai Peninsula and Suez Canal
•
•
•
•
•
1956 - Nasser becomes president
1956 - Suez nationalized
1956 - Egypt was invaded by Britain, France and Israel due to
Nationalization of the Suez Canal
1956 - Israel Occupies large swath of Sinai
1956 - Establishment of UNEF on Sinai
206
Military Timeline
Egypt/Israel (Continued)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1967 UNEF Left Sinai
War of 1967 Third Arab Israeli War (6 day war)
1973 Yom Kippur War
1974 SOFA following Yom Kippur War (MFO sent to Sinai)
1978 Camp David Accord
1979 Peace Treaty
1982 Israel Withdraws from Sinai
Egypt Military Coup 1981
•
•
June 1981 - Failed Military Coup. Sadat ordered crackdown and arrest of
several opposition figures.
October 6, 1981 Anwar al-Sadat is assassinated by a Jihadist cell in the
military led by Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli. There are speculations that
the Muslim Brotherhood was behind the assassination.
207
Military at a Glance
•
•
Egypt military ranked 14th in the world
•
•
•
•
Active Frontline Personnel 468,500
Active Reserve Personnel 479,000
Defense Budget $4, 107,000,000
Military spending is about 3.12 % of GDP
Military Service
•
Age 18-30 for males



Service obligation of 18-36 months
9-year reserve obligation
Voluntary enlistment from age 16 (2012)
208
Military Organization
Key Leadership
Supreme Council Armed Forces
SCAF
Commander in Chief of Armed Forces is General Abdul
Fatah Al-Sisi (Morsi Appointee)
•
•
•
•
Assumed office August 12, 2012
Is the most powerful Man in Egypt now that Morsi is gone
Has lead most of the fighting between the military and the ousted Morsi
supporters
Blames current instability on the U.S. “You left the Egyptians. you turned
your back on the Egypti and and they
won’t forget that.”
209
Military Organization
Key Leadership
Chief of Staff is Lieutenant General Sedki Sobhi (Morsi
Appointee)
•
•
Like General Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi, was appointed by Morsi on August 12
2012
Youngest to be appointed 2nd in command of the Egyptian Military
Assistant Defense Minister is Major General Mohamed El
Assar (Morsi Appointee)
•
In charge of armament affairs, which makes him a one of key men in
Egypt’s relationship with Washington (purchasing U.S. weapons using the
$1.3 billion annual U.S. military aid).
210
Military Power
Land Systems
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Tanks 4,487
Armored fighting
Vehicles 9,646
Self-Propelled Guns
965
Towed Artillery
Pieces 2,760
Rocket Projectors
(MLRS) 1,600
Portable Mortar
Systems 10,334
Air Power
•
•
Total Aircraft
863
Helicopters 200
Naval Power
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Total Strength 221
Aircraft Carriers 0
Frigates 8
Destroyers 0
Corvettes 2
Submarines 4
Coastal Craft 51
Mine Warfare 28
Amphibious
Assault 20
Portable AT
Weapons 23,600
211
Where does Egypt get its Arms?
As of now, Egypt primarily is getting its arms from the U.S.
The U.S. gives over $1.5 billion each year
U.S. and Egypt recently entered agreements for
M1A1 Abrams Tanks and F-16 fighter Jets
•
•
•
•
•
U.S. and Egypt jointly produce the M1A1 Abrams Tank
Since 1948 the U.S. has given Egypt $76.1 Billion
U.S. also sells attack helicopters, frigates, and
advanced Sidewinder and Hellfire missiles
U.S. low popular opinion in Egypt is forcing them to
consider alternate avenues of procuring weapons.
212
Where does Egypt get its Arms?
•
Russia has been putting pressure on Morsi to
cancel deals with U.S. and start with them at lower
prices
•
•
Moscow officials told Egyptian leaders that Russia is interested in
replacing the U.S. as the Middle Eastern country’s main weapons
dealer
Russia wants to put a “check” on the U.S. in the Middle East
213
Where does Egypt get its Arms?
•
China is fighting to move in as well
•
•
China is looking to increase influence in the Middle East by selling
weapons to Egypt
Morsy was looking to make Egypt more independent of western
powers and China is a good place to start.
 China has a 50% approval rating in Egypt, U.S. us 8%
214
Conclusions
•
SCAF is the controlling force in the Suez Canal and
Sinai region
•
•
•
Choke point for global distribution of goods including oil
SCAF ensures U.S. military has priority access
Key asset for projection of U.S. military power in the
Middle East region
•
•
Access to Egyptian Air Bases
Ensures U.S. Military has flyover rights
215
Conclusions
Continued
•
•
•
Egypt is dependent on $1.3B in military aid from the
U.S. annually (20% of total operating budget)
•
•
U.S. provides hi-tech arms and training to SCAF
Threat of losing military influence to Russia or China
Deterrence of Iranian military involvement in the region
SCAF plays a pivotal role in Egyptian affairs
•
•
•
History of coups
Key to regional military and political stabilization
Key to Egyptian economy
216
Intelligence and Cyber
Security
Presented by, Jeff Sperry and Kyle
Leisner
217
EGYPT
INTELLIGENCE / CYBER SECURITY
Agenda
•
•
•
•
•
•
Summary
Key Indicators
Predictions
What If Scenario
Supporting History
Organization
218
Summary
•
•
•
•
•
Egypt’s Intelligence system has been in existence since
1910
Egypt’s Intelligence system viewed as the most
competent in the Arab World
Egypt Intelligence involved in Israeli-Pakistan and
Fatah-Hamas negotiations
Recent Cyber cooperation with neighboring countries
Cyber security and cyber defense still relatively new to
Egypt
219
Key Indicators
•
•
•
•
•
Intelligent Services willing to continue aiding U.S. with
rendition program
Egyptian intelligence still being shared
regionally/internationally, including with Israel
Intelligence services are corrupt, poor information
sharing amongst units
Intelligence services focused on keeping their specific
Cabinet head (President or Minister) in power
Growth in recent cyber activity, both through social
networking and malicious actions
220
Predictions
•
Intelligence services at odds with Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood
o
Likely to remain, unless there is a major personnel
overhaul
•
Cyber security/defense still relatively new, but malicious
cyber activity has grown quickly
•
Government has access and control to all
telecommunications; could end up in the hands of
extremists, if they come back to power
221
What if...
If Egypt radicalizes, how will that impact their relations with
neighboring countries, and with the U.S. as a whole?
•
•
•
•
Intelligence services will be at odds with MB
(extremists), unless there is a complete overhaul of
personnel
An extremist government would have control of the
entire nation’s telecommunications
Could halt any further “rendition program” the US-CIA
still conducts out of Egypt
Could impact any Egypt-Israeli intelligence cooperation
in the Sinai Peninsula region
222
Supporting History – Intelligence
•
•
Egyptian Intelligence system seen as early as 1910
o Dealt with militant nationalists and Islamists
1940– students at American University in Beirut
organized Arab National Movement (ANM)
o During Egyptian-Syrian union, ANM members became United
Arab Republic (Egypt) intel personnel
•
President Abdel Nasser established General
Intelligence Service (GIS) in 1954
223
Supporting History – Intelligence
•
Leading up to Six-Day War (1967)
o Intelligence services oversold Egyptian capabilities and
underestimated Israeli capabilities
•
Conducted successful feint before Yom Kippur War
(1973)
o General Intelligence Service developed Strategic Deception
Plan, spied on Mossad to identify weak points in Israeli forces
•
General Intelligence Service (GIS) assumed role of
foreign relations post-Mubarak
224
Supporting History – Intelligence
•
•
Effective Intelligence and Security Services make Egypt
unattractive to terrorist groups
o However, Sinai Peninsula is haven for smuggling activity
Aids U.S. with rendition program
o Foreign Nationals apprehended abroad are brought to Egypt
for interrogation, using questionable tactics
o Omar Suleiman - C.I.A.’s liaison for renditions in Egypt
o Suspects were not supposed to be tortured
225
Supporting History – Cyber
•
Cyber activities have been slow to develop
o Illiteracy, lack of computers and expensive usage fees limit
access to general population
o In 2008, largest Internet Service Provider (T-Data Company)
was still government-owned
•
o During Mubarak’s rule, sites critical of government were
blocked, Internet was “threat to national security”
E-Signature Law signed in 2004
o E-signature services for public and private sector not seen until
September 2009
o Established Information Technology Industry Development
Agency
226
Supporting History – Cyber
•
Egypt’s Cyber Peace Initiative
o Partnered with Intel corporation, founded by Suzanne Mubarak
o Intel-sponsored Youth Camp held in Nov 2009, “Forming
Young Digital Citizens”
o Helping students develop 21st century skills/responsibilities
towards cyberspace
•
Cyber Security and Data Protection Law (2010)
o Supported by Government, Private sector and Academia
o Scheduled to go into effect at end of 2010
227
Supporting History – Cyber
•
Cyber activities began showing signs of growth in 2011
o Increase in Internet activity, rapid adoption of social networking
across country
o Egypt ranked second across Europe, Africa and Middle East as
source for malicious activity online, primarily phishing
o Malicious cyber actors do not appear aligned with government
228
Intelligence Organizations
•
General Intelligence Service (GIS) - Gihaz alMukhabarat al-Amma
o Established in 1954 by President Abdel Nasser
o Considered most effective Intel Community in Arab World
o Provides National Security Intelligence, with counter-terrorism
o
o
o
o
focus
Plagued with corruption, focused on keeping leader in power
Director of Intelligence answers to President
GIS director's identity usually kept secret
Director of Intelligence in charge of security coordination with
Israel
229
Intelligence Organizations
•
General Intelligence Service (GIS) - Gihaz alMukhabarat al-Amma
o 1993 – LtGen Omar Soliman named Director, close ties to
President Mubarak





Leading figure in Egyptian Intelligence since 1986, head of GIS
since 1993
Under Soliman, Egypt became key player in America’s “war on
terror"
Key figure in Hamas-Fatah / Israel-Palestine negotiations
Close confidant to Mubarak
Died in Cleveland Clinic (USA), on 19 July 2012
230
Intelligence Organizations
•
Office of Military Intelligence Services and
Reconnaissance (OMISR) - Idarat al-Mukhabarat alHarbyya wa al-Istitla
o Subordinate to Ministry of Defense
o Poor information sharing, distrust among units
o Some Intelligence practices seen as dangerous by U.S.
 Egyptian forces won’t change, means admitting failure
o Egyptian security missed indications of jihadist cell that
assassinated Sadat
231
Intelligence Organizations
•
State Security Investigations Service (SSIS) - Gihaz
Mabahith Amn al-Dawla
o Under control of Minister of Interior
o Main organization for domestic security matters
o Established Emergency Unit for monitoring/controlling Internet
connections, blocking websites, shutting down telecomms
o Plagued with corruption, focused on keeping leader in power
o President Nasser turned SSIS obtrusive; detained numerous
political prisoners, discourage public discussions or meetings
o Under Sadat, less so; failed to uncover assassination
o Disbanded in March 2011
o Renamed [Egypt's] National Security Agency (NSA)
232
Intelligence Incidents
•
Famous Israelis captured “allegedly” spying in Egypt
o Ouda Tarabim – detained in 2000

Negotiations for his release in exchange for 83 Egyptian
detainees still ongoing (May 2012)
o Ilan Grapel – U.S-Israeli dual-citizen, detained June 2011,
allegedly spying against Egypt during fall of Mubarak

Released in October 2011, in exchange for 25 Egyptian detainees
o Azzam Azzam – arrested in 1996, sentenced to 15 years;

Released in 2004, in exchange for 6 Egyptian students accused
of planning terrorist attacks
233
Intelligence Incidents
•
April 2013 – Egypt Intelligence services uncovered proIsraeli spy ring in Sinai Peninsula
o Nine Egyptians and Palestinians, providing information back to
Israel on Sinai security situation
•
August 2013 - Israel closed Eilat Airport based on
Egyptian Intelligence
o Egyptian Intelligence indicated Salafi terrorists with shoulderlaunched missiles targeting Israel
o Intelligence passed to Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
o IDF order airport, near Egypt-Israel border, closed
234
International Cooperation
•
•
Egypt-Israel intelligence cooperation important – if
extremist get foothold in Israel, could spill over to Egypt
November 2012 – Director of Intelligence (Raafat
Shehata) visited Turkey
o Discussed Syria crisis and strengthening security cooperation
235
International Cooperation
Continued
•
•
February 2013 – MCIT (Atef Helmy) held cyber-security
co-op talks with Estonia,
• Discussed possible MOUs on digital identity initiation
2013 – Egypt, India signed five MOUs, including:
• Information and Communication Technology cooperation
• Cyber security cooperation
• Establishment of Centre of Excellence in IT (CEIT) in Egypt
236
Cyber Organizations
•
Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology (MCIT)
o Egypt’s ICT sector a major driver of national economy
o Contributes to setting of ICT-related policies, regionally and
internationally
•
Information Technology Industry Development Agency
(ITIDA)
o Founded in 2004 as executive arm of MCIT
o Spearheads developing IT industry
o Operates National Root-Certificate Authority trust center
237
Cyber Organizations
•
•
•
Eitesal - Egyptian Information Telecommunications,
Electronics & Software Alliance
o Non-Governmental Organization founded in 2004 as merger of
two major IT associations
National Telecom Regulatory Authority (NTRA)
o Hosted first Workshop for Cyber Security Researches, May
2013
EG-CERT
o Established in April 2010, part of NTRA
o Functions similar to U.S. CERT
o Homepage appears stagnate since mid-2012
238
Hacking Groups - Egypt/Arab
•
•
•
•
Team Evil
o June 2006 – hacked 750 Israeli websites in a one-day
coordinated attack
Egyption.H4x0rz
o Known to have attacked critical Israeli websites including Lukid
Party, PM Netanyahu’s page, Radio of Israel, and others
Eg-r1z Team
o Released a worm that infected 50,000 Israeli and U.S.
computers
Egy-Virus Team
o Hacked more than 800 Israeli computers, spread botnets
throughout Israel
239
Malware and Political Stability
•
Malware infection rate in Egypt has trended upward
o One of the top five locations with highest malware rates
Source: Rains, T. (2013, February 18). Regime stability, demographic instability and regional malware infection rates – part 1: egypt [web
log post]. Retrieved August 10, 2013, from Microsoft Security Blog: http://blogs.technet.com/b/security/archive/2013/02/18/regime-stabilitydemographic-instability-and-regional-malware-infection-rates-part-1-egypt.aspx
240
Malware and Political Stability
•
Viruses and worms in Egypt well above the worldwide
average
Source: Rains, T. (2013, February 18). Regime stability, demographic instability and regional malware infection rates – part 1: egypt [web
log post]. Retrieved August 10, 2013, from Microsoft Security Blog: http://blogs.technet.com/b/security/archive/2013/02/18/regime-stabilitydemographic-instability-and-regional-malware-infection-rates-part-1-egypt.aspx
241
Cyber-related incidents
•
2009 - Two-year probe named “Operation Phish Phry”
o
o
•
Egyptian-based hackers phish for bank accounts and
personal information
o
•
First Joint cyber-investigation between Egypt and U.S.
Egyptian & U.S. (FBI) investigators broke up an international
phishing identity theft scam
Passed info to US-based conspirators to transfer cash to
fraudulent accounts
Detained 33 people in the US; 47 more charged in
Egypt
242
Cyber-related incidents
•
January 2011 - Egyptian government “turned off
Internet"
o Most likely at the hands of the SSIS
o Internet activity was reduced to possibly one Internet Service
Provider, supporting Egyptian stock market
o Security firm Sophos reported an 85% drop in global spamming
during this timeframe
243
Cyber-related incidents
•
Feb 2013 - Anonymous launched cyber-attack (DDoS)
against Egyptian government
o Possibly in response to riot police beating a man during protest
in Cairo
o Sites affected included:





Egyptian Cabinet (cabinet.gov.eg)
Ministry of Culture (ecm.goc.eg)
Ministry of Interior (moiegypt.gov.eg)
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (mic.gov.eg)
Ministry of Information (moinfo.gov.eg)
244
Cyber-related incidents
•
July 2013 – United Arab Emirates Telecommunications
Authority claimed cyber attacks from Egypt
o UAE government websites hit, no specifics about which sites or
when attack occurred
o Linked attack to UAE support of transitional government; UAE
critical of Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood
o UAE handed over tracking addresses, wants Egypt to find and
present those behind attack
•
August 2013 - Egypt disrupts mobile phone service prior
to attack on terrorists in Sinai Peninsula
o
Response to recent terrorist threat against Israel
245
Foreign Relations
Presented by Jay Kippen
246
EGYPT
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Agenda
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Summary
Key Indicators
Predictions
What If Scenario
Supporting History
Organization
Consequences
247
Summary
•
•
•
Over the years, Egypt has developed an intricate global
foreign relations network with many different nations
Key aspect concerning Egyptian foreign relations is
continued access to the Suez Canal for global
economic distribution of foreign goods
Effects of Egyptian radicalization will vary by nation and
geopolitical position
248
Summary
Continued
•
Egyptian foreign relations can be broken down into
seven specific areas
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
United States
China
Russia
EU
Gulf States

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Libya
Israel
Turkey
249
Indicators
Egypt’s foreign policy
•
•
Mubarak-Era
•
Foreign Ministry controls foreign policy through the President
and key cabinet members
Post-Mubarak
•
•
Foreign Ministry regulated control over foreign policy is
diminished substantially
General Intelligence Service (GIS) assumed role of foreign
relations post-Mubarak, reports directly to the President
250
Indicators Morsi regime
Political Discontent
•
•
•
Morsi receives Foreign relations advice from key
Muslim Figures familiar with Foreign relations and MB
ideology
One of the Muslim Brotherhood’s key foreign relations
platform was developing stronger ties with Iran and
Turkey
President Morsi started building relations with U.S.
adversaries during his tenure
251
Indicators Morsi regime
Regional Foreign Affairs
•
•
•
April 2012 Egypt state-owned gas company terminated
exports to Israel
Saudi Arabia guaranteed a 5B loan once Morsi and the
MB was removed from power
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood has stated that the
Israeli-Egyptian treaty may need to be adjusted
252
Indicators Post Morsi regime
•
•
•
•
ME involvement in Egyptian Foreign relations
Middle East investment in Egypt increased after fall of
Morsi
•
•
•
•
$5 billion from Saudi Arabia
$4 billion from United Arab Emirates,
$3 billion from Kuwait
$2 billion from Libya
Saudi 5B loan was contingent on the military ousting
Morsi
Investment was for economic stabilization
Loan terms were extremely good
253
Predictions
Morsi remains or returns to power
•
•
•
U.S. continues its refusal to use its influence with the
IMF to assist Egypt with the the $4.8 billion loan
requested
Egyptian economy will face uncertainty, most likely
complete collapse within two years
China and Russia will step in to assist Egypt’s economy
•
China and Russia have already made steady gains with the
Morsi regime
254
Predictions
Morsi remains or returns to power
•
•
•
U.S. bilateral relations with Egypt will suffer
Egypt will align politically and strategically with Middle
Eastern (ME) nations that are unfriendly to U.S. or
western powers
Increased tension along the Egyptian-Israeli border will
result in the possibility of open conflict
255
What if
•
•
•
•
•
U.S. will lose bilateral relations with Egypt
•
Harming U.S. relations with surrounding states
Iran will become unchecked in the region
Egypt will cancel the 1979 peace accord with Israel
resulting in the possibility of open conflict ultimately
involving the entire region
The U.S. will lose Egypt as a regional political stabilizing
force
China, Russia, and Iran will step in to fill the strategic
void left by the U.S.
256
General Predictions
Morsi remains in power or is removed
Egyptian-Ethiopian water rights issues
•
•
•
•
•
Egyptian water rights with Ethiopia may result in
regional destabilization
Egypt to protect their interests may launch a preemptive
military strike using American supplied equipment
Military action is backed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia
Egypt has the backing of key ME nations
Action could result in multiple African and ME nations
going to war
257
Supporting History
•
•
Morsi Regime
Since taking office, President Morsi has presented
Egyptian foreign relations as almost an open door
policy, especially for U.S. adversaries
•
•
•
China
Russia
Iran
President Morsi made numerous foreign relations trips
to various U.S. adversaries during his tenure
258
Supporting History
Continued
•
•
Egyptian foreign relations policy is decided by key
figures in the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
Morsi appointed Essam el-Haddad as Head of Office of
the President and Assistant to President on Foreign
Relations
•
•
el-Haddad is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's guidance
office and known to be the Brotherhood’s foreign minister
Is a close confidant of the Muslim Brotherhood's deputy
spiritual leader Khairat el-Shater
259
Supporting History
•
•
•
United States
During the current Egyptian crisis (Morsi regime), the
U.S. administration believes bilateral relations are still in
question
Continued efforts from the previous regime of Morsi to
downplay U.S. involvement in regional affairs that
heighten discontent
Inability of the U.S. to influence the IMF loan for Egypt is
a contentious issue, since the U.S. maintains a major
influence within the IMF
260
Supporting History
•
•
•
•
China
March 2012 - China grants Egypt a $200 million shortterm loan
April 2013 - Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed with
President Morsi to move ahead with strategic relations
China agrees to invest $20 billion in the African
continent
President Morsi has attempted to alleviate the Egyptian
economy from its current burden
•
Appealed to various U.S. foes for support- mainly China
261
Supporting History
•
•
•
Russia
Under the Morsi presidency, Egyptian trade with Russia
has almost doubled from previous years
March 2013 BRICS summit
•
Russia and Egypt agree to increase economic and trade
investments in Egypt
Syrian and Palestinian issues discussed with Morsi,
stressing the communication channels between Cairo
and Moscow are always open
262
Supporting History
•
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA)
Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood
•
•
•
•
Eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will help KSA limit
potential blowback in Syria
KSA provided the military with a guarantee that it would
support them after they removed the Muslim Brotherhood from
power
KSA offered Egypt subsidized oil and cash for urgent food
purchases
King Abdullah congratulated the Egyptian military with $5 billion
in aid

Allows military to appear as national heroes
263
Supporting History
Iran
•
•
•
•
•
Morsi visited Iran during the NAM Summit
First time in 30 years Egyptian leader has attended
summit and visited Iran
The fact that he attended the summit and visited Iran,
indicates a shift in Egyptian foreign policy
Openly expressed concern over the Syrian conflict,
calling Assad’s regime “oppressive”
Morsi reduced restrictions on cross border trade with
Gaza
264
Supporting History
Libya
• After 2010 both countries move to improve relationship
•
•
•
September 3, 2011 Libya seeks Egyptian military assistance
against rebels
Diplomats seek to meet Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed
Forces
January 2012, Egypt's top general meets Libyan
representatives to negotiate return of Egyptian citizens

Ones who went to Libya to help during the Libyan revolution
265
Supporting History
Libya
April 11, 2013 – An agreement for military cooperation has
been signed between Egypt and Libya
•
•
Will include cooperating in the areas of training, sharing experience,
fighting illegal immigration, illegal fish operations, and the fight against
drug trafficking
Agreement “is the beginning of cooperation between the two countries to
protect the region”
266
Supporting History
•
•
•
Israel
Israel has erected a fence along the Egyptian border
•
•
Designed to stop illegal immigrants
Border fence timeline has increased since 2011
President Morsi planned to respect all international
accords including the 1979 peace treaty with Israel
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood has stated that the
Israeli-Egyptian treaty may need to be adjusted
267
Supporting History
•
•
Israel
2012- Increase in threats from militants in Sinai
Peninsula against Israel and Egypt
Hamas is an offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood
•
•
•
Since Morsi’s rise to power, trade routes between Egypt and
the Gaza saw a substantial increase
Since Morsi’s ouster, the Egyptian military has destroyed
smuggling tunnels into Gaza, trade restrictions have resumed
April 2012 - Egypt state-owned gas company
terminated exports to Israel
268
Supporting History
•
•
•
•
•
Turkey
Recently instituted 27 agreements with Egypt
Guaranteed a $2 billion loan
Both states support removing Syria’s Assad from power
2012 - Trade between Turkey and Egypt increased 27%
Both Egypt and Turkey spoke out against Israel
concerning Gaza incidents
269
Supporting History
Water Rights
•
Ethiopia intends to construct The Renaissance Dam on
the Nile River
•
•
Intended to provide hydroelectric power
Egypt’s military, with U.S. backing, is prepared to
defend their water rights on the Nile River
•
•
Formed an alliance with Sudan to protect water rights
Air strikes will not be ruled out to stop construction

Use of F-16’s that were provided to Egypt by the U.S.
270
Supporting History
Water Rights
•
Saudi Arabia backs Egypt
•
•
Believe that the dam is being built as a subversive political
move
Threat to Egyptian and Sudanese national security

•
Built too close to the Sudanese border
Appears that Ethiopia is going to stop freshwater flow
from the Nile
•
Egypt relies on the river as a major freshwater source
271
Supporting History
Water Rights
•
•
1959 Egypt- negotiation with Sudan
•
•
•
Egypt was given rights to 14,500 billion gallons/year
Leaves 488 billion gallons for Sudan
The countries upstream were left with even less, and not
invited to the talks
The dam is a path to circumvent agreement
•
•
This will give them political leverage over the region
Threatens Egyptian supremacy
272
Supporting History
Water Rights
273
Organization
•
•
•
Egyptian Foreign Affairs Ministry
Pre-Morsi era foreign policy
•
•
Decisions were the President’s responsibility
Agreed upon by both the President and key members of his
cabinet
2001 the Foreign Ministry is still in charge of foreign
affairs but no longer plays a major role
General Intelligence Service (GIS) assumed role of
foreign relations post-Mubarak
274
Consequences
If Morsi returns to power
•
•
•
•
U.S. will undoubtedly withhold support for the IMF to
loan Egypt the $4.8 billion requested
•
Egypt’s economy will collapse if the cash is not obtained
Morsi will seek aid from nations that are not aligned with
U.S. interests
U.S. will lose the political stabilizing force in the region
Egypt may cancel the 1979 peace accord and attempt
military action against Israel
275
Alternate Competing
Hypotheses
Nation Building
Presented by, Jay Kippen
276
ACH
Egypt
AGENDA
Summary
Indicators
Predictions
Intentions
Capabilities
Related Supporting Facts
Conclusion
277
Summary
•
•
•
Some data points indicate possible U.S. involvement in
the ouster of Egyptian President Mubarak and Morsi
Analyzing these data points raises concerns over the
possibility of U.S. nation building strategy
Key points to consider
•
•
•
U.S. State Department involvement with key April 6th
movement players- resulted in the ouster of the Mubarak
Regime
Did Egyptian military fabricate an economic crisis in order to
overthrow Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood regime?
Egyptian Military recognizes substantial U.S.
involvement and openly blames the U.S. for the crisis
278
Summary
Continued
Morsi Ouster
•
•
•
Did the Egyptian Military, at the behest of the U.S.
Government, fabricate the current economic crisis in
order to facilitate the removal of Morsi from office?
How much role did Military Inc. have in Morsi’s ouster?
Could the U.S. have known about the military's planned
course of action and assisted?
279
Indicators
Mubarak ouster
•
•
•
•
•
•
December 2008 key Egyptian activists attended summit
in NYC (Alliance Youth Movement)
Summit was sponsored by the U.S. State Department
Summit was designed to teach activist how to evade
government surveillance and harassment
Activist “reported to his state department contact” that
another strike was planned for April 9th 2009
January 25th 2011 protest was run like a military
operation
United States knew this was going to happen three
years prior
280
Indicators
•
•
Morsi ouster
Inability to secure IMF loan (U.S. involvement)
Economic crisis affecting the Egyptian people
•
•
•
•
•
Diesel shortage
Food shortage
Shortage of key sustenance items
Egyptian cities experience intermittent power blackouts
Morsi on February 2013 stopped imported wheat
281
Indicators
•
•
•
•
Morsi ouster
Morsi curtails fuel subsidies for heavy industry
Talks of cutting fuel subsidies for general motorist
Lack of police on the streets increased crime rate
Curtailing of basic services i.e. garbage pickup
282
Predictors
•
•
•
•
The situation resulting in President Morsi’s ouster will
define a new Egypt capable of handling its own internal
affairs absent of interference from the MB
Military Inc. will continue to play an important role in the
Egyptian economy (Inevitable since the two are so
closely tied)
The U.S. will continue support for SCAF
Many influential ME nations will continue aid to egypt as
needed in order to curtail MB expansion
283
Intentions
Mubarak regime
Based on available data points it is believed
•
•
•
•
The U.S. instigated his removal in order to facilitate the
democratic process in Egypt
The resulting ouster of Mubarak was the intended
purpose of the U.S.
With Mubarak gone the democratic process could begin
The free elections in 2012 was not the intended results
the U.S. wanted
284
Intentions
Morsi regime
Based on available data points it is believed
•
•
•
The Egyptian military in conjunction with the U.S. and
other key ME nations fabricated the current economic
crisis under the Morsi regime to facilitate his and the
MB’s removal from Egyptian politics
This was needed to ensure the MB never again
regained authority over the Egyptian people
It was also needed to ensure SCAF continued
cooperation with the U.S. and their interests
285
Capabilities
Is the military capable of manufacturing an economic
crisis?
•
•
•
Military Inc.
The military’s expansion into the civilian sector began
after the 1979 Camp David Accords
The Egyptian military owns or has key interest in
several civilian industries
Manufacturing many items of non-military use
286
Capabilities
Continued
•
•
The industry's managers are all ex-military officers
The military has demanded political and economic
reforms designed to keep their budget from
governmental oversight and privatization
287
Supporting Facts
Military Inc.
Key Military Industrial Organizations
•
Ministry of Military Production (MMP)
•
•
Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI)
•
•
Currently owns 8 manufacturing plants with 40% of their
production geared to civilian markets
Owns 11 factories and companies with 70% of their production
geared towards civilian markets
National Service Products Organization (NSPO)
•
Performs manufacturing and service industries
288
Supporting Facts
Continued
•
The military commands the civilian economy but also
has control over the civil service sector
•
•
•
•
Of the 29 Egyptian Provinces 21 are controlled by former
military officers (Governor)
Security service officers control Key Ministries and the Suez
Canal authority
Each factory is staffed completely by the military with
officers in key management positions
Most workers in the factories are military conscripts
•
Paid standard military wages
289
Supporting Facts
Continued
•
•
•
•
August 2007 Alexandria shipyard controlled by the
Ministry of Defense
2002 Arab Organization Industry (AOI) owns 100% of
the Egyptian Railway system
Military Inc. has holdings in Tharwa a state owned
petroleum company
Military Inc. is incorporated into many joint ventures with
various nations
290
Supporting Facts
Continued
•
Military Food Production and Distribution
Under the NSPO the Food Security Division
•
•
•
•
•
Military responsible for approx 18% of the national food
production*
Military Inc. owns two major Super Stores
•
•
Military Club Supermarkets
Al Ahram
Both outlets compete for business with several privately
held stores
Total volume rivals the privately held stores
The military also has an extensive operation for small
business
291
Supporting Facts
Continued
Military Food Production and Distribution
• Military still owns many large farms
• Military controls distribution chain including outlets
• Military Inc. is suspected of owning or having controlling
interest in various delivery methods
o
o
Rail
Truck
292
Military Inc. distribution outlets
293
Military Inc. distribution outlets
Military conscripts in a small military store
294
Military Inc. Agriculture
Availability of Agricultural products
Morsi Regime
• The backbone of Egyptian food self sufficiency rests in
the hands of small farmers (Fellahin)
• Small farmers have demanded reforms
o
o
o
Debt relief
Land ownership
Subsidies
• Morsi and the MB are not in favor of small farmers rights
and demands and have been openly hostile towards
them
295
Supporting Facts
Continued
Availability of key food producing items
-Wheat production
296
Supporting Facts
Continued
Availability of key food producing items
-Cereal Production
297
Supporting Facts
Continued
Availability of key food producing items
-Coarse grain
298
Supporting Facts
Continued
Commodities Imports
• Morsi stopped importing wheat in Feb 2013
• Stated Egypt has enough wheat to last till Nov 2013
• Was given false information
• Once Morsi was ousted- interim government ordered
300,000 tons of wheat
• Purchase was paid for by funds received from ME
nations
• New interim minister states this is enough to get
through the transition
299
SCAF and Distribution of petroleum
•
•
•
Military owns and operates approx 80% of gas stations
•
Wataniyyah military owned
NSPO provides privately held stations with
management services
Egyptian rumors indicate the SCAF made fuel
shortages even at “their own gas stations in order to
soften the blow for when fuel subsidies are cut”
300
SCAF and petroleum products
•
•
•
•
•
Reports indicate the Egyptian production of oil has
decreased and demand has increased
2008 Egypt meets the demand
2009 Demand increased beyond production
2009-2012 Demand increased substantially beyond
production
Analyzing the proceeding graph
•
•
Egypt has always met the demand
Except 2009-2012 demand was higher than production
301
SCAF and petroleum products
Production and consumption comparison
302
SCAF and petroleum products
Petroleum Exports
303
Industrial Outputs
•
•
Production from May 2012 to March 2013 has been in
steady decline
Main industrial centers in Egypt: Greater Cairo,
Alexandria and Helwan
•
•
Producing iron, steel, textiles, refined petroleum products,
plastics, building materials, electronics, paper, trucks and
automobiles, and chemicals
Who owns these industries or has controlling interest
•
Military Inc.
304
Industrial Outputs
• Production from May 2012 to March 2013 has been in
steady decline
305
Key Financial Facts
• Estimates put Military Inc. control of the economy at
approx. 8% of GDP
• Total Egyptian Economy Approx. 180 Billion
• At 8% this puts Military Inc. profit at approx. $14 Billion
• To emphasize this the military loaned the central bank
approx. $1 Billion in December 2011
• That same year Military Inc. paid bonuses to military
officers in the amount of $4,000
306
Conclusion
• It’s obvious the U.S. is tied to Mubarak's ouster- this
was an effort to start the democratic process in Egypt
• Which had drastic results the U.S. did not foresee
• From the stated facts it is possible the military
fabricated the economic crisis to ferment fever in the
Egyptian people in order to oust Morsi
• Did the military act with full knowledge of the U.S.
307
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