US-Taiwan Relations Since 1979
Dr. Jaw-ling Joanne Chang
Research Fellow,
Institute Of European And American Studies,
Academia Sinica
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
1) Michel Tatu’s Theory of the Triangle Game
Michel Tatu, an expert on US-China-USSR relations,
observed in 1970, that “the surest way for any of the
three to provoke the other two into collision is to
display undue aggressiveness.” Tatu’s theory of the
game had three other principles:
1. The existence of an “adversary number one” leads to
“objective collusion” with number two.
2. Each of the three players aims to reduce collusion
between the others to a minimum.
3. At the same time, it is in the interest of each to bluff or
blackmail this chief adversary by threatening collusion
with the other.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
2) When China acts with undue
aggressiveness against Taiwan, the result
has been strengthened US military ties
with Taiwan.
 The Taiwan Strait Crisis: In 1995-1996, Beijing had
launched a series of missile exercises to retaliate
against President Lee’s private visit to the Cornell
University.
 During the March 1996 missile crisis, the US
dispatched two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait.
 US military observation of Taiwan’s Hankuang military
exercises resumed in 2001.
 In 2002, Taiwan and the US militaries set up hotline.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
 In 2003, the U.S designated Taiwan as a “major nonNATO ally.”
 In August 2005, the first active-duty defense attaché
began his duty in AIT/Taipei with civilian clothes.
 There are a dozen security related dialogues with
Taiwan. One led by the State Department: US-Taiwan
Political-Military Talks; One led by AIT/ Washington:
Political-Military Working Group; Ten led by Defense
Department: such as Monterey Talks, Defense Review
Talks, Security Cooperation Talks, General officer Steering
Group, Service-to-Service Security Cooperation Programs
and Engagement.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
 The United States and Taiwan have held high-level
defense-related meetings in the US since 2002. On
October 2, 2012, Taiwan’s Vice Minister of National
Defense Andrew Yang met with US Deputy Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter at the Pentagon. Later, the
DOD posted the meeting photo on the official website
for the first time since 1979.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
3) When the US administration unduly
injures Taiwan's interests, US Congress
takes concrete actions to strengthen USTaiwan ties.
 The US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in
1979.
 In 2002, Congress passed “Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of Fiscal 2003” to authorize the
assignment of active-duty personnel to Taiwan and
designate Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally.”
 In April, 2002, US House established “Congressional
Taiwan Caucus” to strengthen US-Taiwan relations; In
2003, Senate also established “Senate Taiwan Caucus.”
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
 From 1999 to 2004, five resolutions passed by
Congress became US Public Laws, supporting
Taiwan’s observer status at the annual meeting of the
World Health Organization (WHO).
 In September 2012, US Congress passed a concurrent
resolution (S. Con. Res. 17) supporting Taiwan’s
observer status in the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO).
 From 1979 to September, 2012, members of Congress
have proposed at least 577 resolutions to strengthen
US-Taiwan political, economic, military relations and
US arms sales to Taiwan.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
4) When Taiwan “surprises” its interlocutors,
as with the 2003 referendum initiative
and 2007 application of U.N .
membership, Washington and Beijing
found common ground to contain Taipei.
 December 9, 2003, President Bush met with Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao in the White House. In a press
conference President Bush said: “We oppose any
unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change
the status quo. And the comments and actions made
by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing
to make decisions unilaterally to change the status
quo, which we oppose.”
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
 August 30, 2007, National Security Council Senior
Director for Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder said
“membership in the United Nations requires statehood.
Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a
state in the international community.”
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
5) The US has objected to all administrative
barriers that unilaterally determine the
political status of Taiwan by UN system
agencies, as when UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon misinterpreted the status of
Taiwan in 2007
 On May 25, 2007, the PRC. has successfully downgraded
Taiwan’s status in OIE (Office international des épizooties)
to “non-sovereign regional member.”
 On March 28, 2007, the U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon in a letter to Nauru’s Ambassador to the United
Nation, stated that in accordance with the General
Assembly resolution 2758, adopted on October 25, 1971,
the U.N. considers “Taiwan for all purposes to be an
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integral part of the PRC.”
A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
 In August 2007, the US reportedly presented a
demarche to U.N. Secretary General. The US key
position as follows:
 The United States noted that the PRC has become more active in international
organizations and has called on the UN Secretariat and member states to
accept its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
 The United States noted that the UN General Assembly resolution 2758
adopted on 25 October 1971 does not in fact establish that Taiwan is a province
of the PRC. There is no mention in Resolution 2758 of China’s claim of
sovereignty over Taiwan.
 The United States urged the UN Secretariat to review its policy on the status of
Taiwan and to avoid taking sides in a sensitive matter on which UN members
have agreed to disagree for over 35 years.
 If the UN Secretariat insists on describing Taiwan as a part of the PRC, or on
using nomenclature for Taiwan that implies such status, the United States will
be obliged to disassociate itself on a national basis from such position.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
 On May 17, 2011, US Secretary of Health and Human
Services Kathleen Sebelius stated “No organization of
UN has unilaterally determined the position of Taiwan.”
 On October 4, 2011, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell testified
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated
that “We have also seen UN system agencies and
other international organizations affiliated with the UN
take further steps to limit Taiwan’s participation based
on the 1971 General Assembly resolution which
expelled Taiwan from the UN. We have consistently
objected to any and all administrative barriers that
unilaterally determine the political status of Taiwan,
and we will continue to do so if this issue arises in the
future.”
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
6) With proper Cross-Strait policies, Taipei
can maintain good relations with
Washington and Beijing at the same time
a) Under President Lee Tung-hui (1990-1994)
Cross-Strait Relations:
 In 1991, the ROC government created the “Straits
Exchange Foundation” (SEF) and the PRC set up the
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
(ARATS) as “white gloves” to manage Cross-Strait
relations.
 In1992, both sides met in Hong Kong to discuss the
“one China principle.” In 1993, the head of SEF Koo
Chen-fu and the head of ARATS Wang Daohan, met in
Singapore and reached four agreements.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
US-Taiwan Relations:
In 1991, the US supported Taiwan’s application of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). With US
support, Taiwan became a member of Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991.
In 1992, the Bush Administration announced the sales of
150 F-16 A/B to Taiwan and sent US cabinet memberTrade Representative Carla Hills-to visit Taiwan for the first
time since 1979.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
b) Under President Ma Ying-jeou (since May 2008)
Cross-Strait Relations:
 Since June 2008, there are eight meetings between
Chiang Pin-kung and Chen Yunlin. By September 2012,
on the basis of the 1992 consensus, SEF and ARATS
have reached 18 agreements including Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).
 Currently there are 558 flights across the Taiwan Strait
every week.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
US-Taiwan Relations:
On January 29, 2010, the Obama Administration submitted
his first notification to Congress on arm sales to Taiwan worth
US $6.4 billion. On September 21, 2011, the Obama
Administration formally notified Congress of three programs to
upgrade Taiwan’s 145 F-16 A/Bs worth US $5.85 billions.
In November 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
said Taiwan is “an important security and economic partner” in
Hawaii.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
 Resumption of US high-level officials visit to Taiwan
since September 2011:
 Daniel Poneman (United States Deputy Secretary of
Energy), Rajiv Shah(Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, USAID),
Sandra Henriquez (Assistant Secretary for Public and
Indian Housing), Suresh Kumar (Assistant Secretary
for Trade Promotion and Director General of the US
and Foreign Commercial Service);
 July 2012: Dawn McCall (Coordinator of International
Information Programs);
 August 2012: Jose Fernandez (Assistant Secretary of
Economic And Business Affairs);
 September 2012: Atul Keshap (the US APEC Senior
Official and Coordinator for Economic Policy in the
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs).
A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
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 In July 2012, Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the
American Institute in Taiwan, observed that
Washington once thought of Taiwan as an “agenda” or
even a “problem” for the US relations with China, but
now recognizes Taiwan as a success story in Asia and
values its relationship with Taiwan.
 On September 9, 2012, President Obama’s
representative US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
hold bilateral meeting with President Ma’s
representative Dr. Lien Chan at the Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Vladivostok,
for the first time since Taiwan joined APEC.
 October 2, 2012, the US announced Taiwan’s visawaiver status.
A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
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7) Taiwan’s Position on the Diaoyutais
 The Diaoyutais are an island group of Taiwan
under the administrative jurisdiction of Yilan
County, Taiwan, and are therefore an inherent part
of the sovereign territory of the Republic of China.
 Diaoyutai issue should be addressed in
accordance with the principles of “safeguarding
sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace
and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration
and development.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
 On August 5, 2012, President Ma proposes “East
China Sea Peace Initiative”, calling on all concerned
parties to:
1. Refrain from taking any antagonistic actions.
2. Shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue.
3. Observe international law and resolve disputes
through peaceful means.
4. Seek consensus on a code of conduct in the East
China Sea.
5. Establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring
and developing resources in the East China Sea.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.
8) With the rise of China, Taiwan will face
further challenges in its relations with
the United States
 China continues to build up missiles against Taiwan.
 Abandon Taiwan proposals
 If Taiwan's economy is further marginalized and grows more
reliant on the Chinese market, this will have strategic
implications for Cross-Strait negotiation and US-Taiwan
relations.
 Jeff Bader observed in his book Obama and China's Rise
(2012) that “the growing disparity between the militaries on the
two sides meant it was increasingly unrealistic to think the United
States could provide Taiwan with weapons sufficient for its
defense.”
 Taiwan’s domestic division on Cross-Strait policy and many
other issues.
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A Paper Presented at 2012 Annual Conference of American Association for Chinese Studies, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA. October 13, 2012.