Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Transportation Research Part D journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/trd An innovative gravity-based approach to assess vulnerability of a Hazmat road transportation network: A case study of Guangzhou, China Huiling Zhonga, Jun Wanga, Tsz Leung Yipb, Yimiao Gua, a b T ⁎ Department of Logistics Engineering, School of Economic and Commerce, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong A R T IC LE I N F O ABS TRA CT Keywords: Vulnerability Hazmat transportation Road transportation Gravity model Guangzhou/China The transportation of hazardous material (hereinafter referred to as Hazmat) is different from general cargo. If a Hazmat road transportation accident occurs, it will not only cause significant casualties and road network damage but also threaten the safety of the lives and property of the residents near the road. Therefore, a quantitative vulnerability analysis of the Hazmat road transportation network is developed to assess the vulnerability of each link, which can help improve the road transportation risk management level. First, we propose an indicator to measure the relevance between two links based on comprehensive analysis of the road transportation network topology and Hazmat road transportation risk characteristics. Second, we discover that we cannot identify road vulnerability using only topology and risk characteristics alone. Thus, an Impact Strength model is developed to assess Hazmat road transportation vulnerability. This model is based on the classical Gravity model and considers both topology and risk characteristics. Relevant algorithms are proposed accordingly. Third, we use Guangzhou’s Hazmat highway transportation as a case study to verify our Impact Strength model. The related statistics data are collected, and ArcGIS software is employed. By using this model, we can calculate the Impact Strength of each link in the whole transportation network. The empirical results verify that this innovative Impact Strength model can help to identify the links with significant vulnerabilities, which can thus help to reduce road transportation risk in advance and build the road transportation risk early-warning mechanism. This innovative model can also be used to support the relevant decision-making process for further analysis. 1. Introduction The United Nations defines hazardous materials (Hazmats) as those substances that have physical and chemical properties that are potentially harmful to human life and to the environment (UNECE, 2011). With the development of the world economy and the increasing growth of the population, Hazmats have become indispensable materials in industry, agriculture, national defence and citizen’s daily lives. It is estimated that more than 4 billion tons of Hazmats were shipped at the worldwide level in the first half of the current decade (Zografos and Androutsopoulos, 2004). In the United States, approximately 3.2 billion tons of Hazmats are transported each year (Kara and Verter, 2004), which explains why Hazmat shipment network planning has been a very popular research ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: hlzhong@scut.edu.cn (H. Zhong), 201620136623@mail.scut.edu.cn (J. Wang), t.l.yip@polyu.edu.hk (T.L. Yip), guymcheers@scut.edu.cn (Y. Gu). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2018.03.003 1361-9209/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. area in the United States. However, an increasing number of scholars are beginning to pay attention to Hazmat transportation problems all over the world. For example, Bianco et al. (2009) built a bi-level flow model for Hazmat road transportation network design that considers both total risk minimization and risk equity together, using an Italian regional network as a case study. Huang et al. (2004), from Singapore, combined Geographic Information System (GIS) and the Genetic Algorithm to improve Hazmat road route planning using Singapore’s populated area to test the method. In China, more than 1 million tons of Hazmats are transported every day, and the annual Hazmat transportation burden is over 400 million tons (Zhang and Zhao, 2007). With the rapid expansion of the Chinese chemical industry, the number of enterprises related to Hazmats reaches more than 300 thousand. In most cases, the regions where Hazmats are consumed and produced are different and far apart. More than 95% of Hazmats, in terms of tons, are transported between different regions, with more than 80% of Hazmat transportation depending on road transportation (Wu and Sun, 2006; Fan et al., 2015). In recent years, many road accidents involving Hazmats have resulted in catastrophic losses to human beings and to the environment in China (Wu and Lin, 2015). Meanwhile, the damaged road transportation networks are heavily blocked or even paralyzed. According to historical statistics, over 92% of transportation-related accidents occur during road transfer in China, with an annual average of 36 serious, social-impact accidents involving Hazmat road transportation. One example is the March 2005 collision in Nanjing that involved a truck carrying chlorine, which caused 29 fatalities, and over 10,000 people had to be evacuated. These Hazmat road accidents have attracted great attention from the Chinese public, the Chinese government at all levels, and various non-governmental organizations/communities (Yang et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2015). In an attempt to ensure public and environmental safety and to reduce the occurrence of Hazmat accidents, the Chinese government at all levels has created rules and regulations for Hazmat transportation. There are many ways in which governments can regulate Hazmat transportation, such as by setting standards for the vehicles that are used in carrying Hazmats, or by designating which roads are used for Hazmat transportation. Both technology and management instruments are applied simultaneously (Erkut and Verter, 1995). Despite the increasing demands and significance of Hazmat transportation, upon review of a comprehensive literature review of Hazmat transportation by Erkut et al. (2007), it is clear that the vulnerability of Hazmat transportation networks has not yet been thoroughly studied. This paper develops an innovative model to effectively identify road vulnerability in Hazmat transportation networks. It will help transport authorities recognize the most vulnerable links in the traffic network, build early-warning mechanisms and otherwise elevate their management capabilities. It can also assist governments at all levels in creating related policies in various forms (e.g., regulations and rules) for Hazmat transportation. From the users’ perspectives, it can help a driver to make a relatively more reasonable decision with less risk on road routing planning when he or she can obtain the road vulnerability information in advance. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a literature review on Hazmat road transportation is provided. Section 3 presents the innovative vulnerability assessment model and related explanations. Section 4 proposes the algorithms according to the model in Section 3. Section 5 addresses a case study of Guangzhou’s Hazmat highway road transportation. Finally, Section 6 is dedicated to conclusions and implications. 2. Related literature After reviewing two classical and state-of-the-art literature reviews by List et al. (1991) and Centrone et al. (2008), it is clear that Hazmat transportation literature can be classified into three major branches as follows: risk analysis, routing/scheduling, facility location, and a combination of the three. As early as 1985, Saccomanno and Chan (1985) proposed a model that could realistically represent the effects of an accident occurring in a crowded population. The model employs two criteria as follows: a minimum risk criterion and a minimum accident likelihood. Beroggi and Wallace (1995) considered a situation in which a dispatcher receives realtime information, such as weather and traffic reports, and can use that information to judge the risk for road transportation of Hazmat and re-direct the shipments. With regard to the transportation risks themselves, there does not seem to be any consensus on how to define transportation risks and how to model the associated transportation risks. Erkut and Verter’s (1998) empirical analysis of the U.S. road network, indicates that different risk models usually select different optimal paths (routing) for Hazmat transportation between a given origin–destination pair. Therefore, selection of the road transportation risk model is crucial and tricky. As early as 1995, Alp (1995) proposed the Traditional Risk (TR) model, which is a non-linear binary integer programme, to minimize the expected consequences of Hazmat road transportation. In 1997, Jin and Batta (1997) simplified and approximated Alp (1995)’s Traditional Risk model to the Approximated Traditional Risk (ATR) model as follows: Rr = ∑ Pij Cij (1) (i,j ) ∈ Lr In this model, Hazmat road transportation risk on link (i,j ) is the product of accident probability (Pij ) on link (i,j ) and accident consequence (Cij ) on link (i,j ) . Thus, the following two approaches exist to minimize Hazmat road transportation risk: minimizing accident probability, minimizing accident consequence and a combination of these two factors. This Approximated Traditional Risk (ATR) model is easier to optimize than Alp (1995)’s Traditional Risk (TR) model. That is why several other risk models have been developed based on the ATR model from different perspectives over the past years. For example, Kara et al. (2003) defined the transportation risk as the product of incident probability and the affected population, and use “affected population” to represent the “accident consequence”. As early as 1994, Laurentius (1994) defined vulnerability as “a susceptibility for rare, though big, risks, while the victims can hardly change the course of events and contribute little or nothing to recovery”. Unfortunately, to date there is still no internationally 660 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. accepted definition of “vulnerability” in road transportation research. Das et al. (2012) proposed a risk-assessment framework defining vulnerability in terms of the mortality and morbidity faced by the adjoining population. From the road network point of view, vulnerability is a susceptibility to incidents that can lead to considerable reductions in road network serviceability (Berdica, 2002). Taylor and D’Este (2003) suggested that vulnerability studies could substantially utilize existing road network risk analysis research, as vulnerability analysis concepts are related to risk analysis concepts. This suggestion was proposed by Renier and Dullaert (2013) as well. Husdal (2004) extended the ATR model to include the “vulnerability” factor as follows: Rr = ∑ Pij Vij (2) (i,j ) ∈ Lr where the Hazmat road transportation risk on link (i,j ) is the product of the “probability of an external circumstance or threat occurring (Pij ) on link (i,j ) ” and the “vulnerability to the occurrence of an external circumstance or threat (Vij ) on link (i,j ) ”. Here, external circumstance refers to the density of the population around the link, Hazmat and other surrounding transportation vehicles, as well as the length of the link and the rate of traffic accidents. Berdica and Mattsson (2007) studied the Stockholm road network and noted that identifying the critical components of the network (e.g., Network topology structure analysis) is very important in vulnerability analysis. For instance, it can help us to determine where the weakest links (vulnerable elements) are and what we can do about them in advance. In this research paper, we combine the concepts of “vulnerability” from the Husdal (2004) and the Berdica and Mattsson (2007) papers. Here, we define vulnerability on the basis of both road transportation risks and road network topology structure. In other existing literature on Hazmat road transportation, road transportation risks are discussed without analysing the network topology structure. However, network topology structure analysis will help us identify the critical components (vulnerable elements). Information from vulnerability analysis will assist in building early-warning mechanisms in the Hazmat road transportation network, which can help reduce catastrophic losses to human beings, the environment, and the economy. For example, transportation authorities should pay more attention to monitoring these links with high vulnerability and should choose to close some of them, in case of emergency. Moreover, it is necessary to take link vulnerability factors into account in the design of the emergency rescue network. Transportation operators can use vulnerability information to design their day-by-day transportation network, which can help to minimize total operational risks. On the whole, integrating security considerations by reducing risks or vulnerabilities into the overall framework of Hazmat transportation is essential (Huang et al., 2004; Bonvicini and Spadoni, 2008). 3. Model formulation Based on the definition of road network vulnerability and the characteristics of Hazmat transportation, we find that the vulnerability of the Hazmat road transportation network, which impacts the entire network when an accident happens, is highly related to transportation network topology and transportation risks. 3.1. Transportation network topology analysis The edge number represents the influential power of an edge in the whole network and is often used to analyse the topology characteristics of the traffic network. In practice, there will be traffic interaction between different road links. The more traffic interactions, the greater the influence that exists between the different links. However, the edge number cannot indicate the interrelationship between the different links. Interrelationship means traffic interaction here. According to the definition of edge number, we define a Link Correlation Coefficient to measure the correlation degree between two links. (1) Edge number The edge number is the sum of the ratio of the number of shortest paths between node a and node b that cross link i and the shortest path number in the entire network (Holme et al., 2002). For link i , the edge number ED (i) is ∑ ED (i) = a,b ∈ N (a ≠ b) Nab (i) Nab (3) where Nab is the number of the shortest paths between node a and node b ; Nab (i) is the number of the shortest paths between node a and node b passing through link i ; N is the set of all nodes. (2) Link Correlation Coefficient The Link Correlation Coefficient is the number of the shortest paths between node a and node b passing through link i and link j simultaneously, which is expressed as follows: CC (i,j ) = ∑ Nab (i,j ) (4) a,b ∈ N (a ≠ b) 661 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. where CC (i,j ) is the correlation coefficient of link i and link j ; Nab (i,j ) is the number of shortest paths between node a and node b passing through link i and link j . 3.2. Development of Approximated Traditional risk (ATR) model According to the ATR model, the risk of link is used to represent its transportation network vulnerability. The risk of traffic accidents is the product of the probability of an accident and the outcome of an accident (Lepofsky et al., 1993; Alp, 1995; Erath et al., 2009). Thus, the risk of Hazmat transportation vehicles passing through link i can be calculated as follows: (5) Ri = P (R)i Ci where P (R)i is the probability of accident on link i ; Ci is the outcome of accident on link i . The probability of a Hazmat accident on link i (P (R)i ) is related to conditional leakage probability and vehicle accident rate on link i . It can be calculated as follows: (6) P (R)i = TARi × P (R|A)i × Li × ni where TARi is the vehicle accident rate on link i , and its unit is the number of accidents per kilometre-year; P (A)i is the Hazmat accident rate per year which is given, and P (R|A)i is the conditional leakage probability of the Hazmat accident; Li is the length of link i , and the unit is kilometre; ni is the number of vehicles that transport Hazmats on link i . It is assumed that the outcome of the accident is only related to the population of the affected area. The affected area of the link is a strip-shaped area with fixed width. The affected area is divided into the following two parts: the population in the link and the population out of the link. Therefore, the outcome of the accident on link i can be expressed as follows: Ci = (πλ2 + 2λLi −Wi Li ) ρ + ni + ∑ x ik Nik (7) k where λ is the impacted radius of the accident, and the unit is km; Li is the length of link i , and the unit is kilometre; Wi is the width of link i , and the unit is kilometre; ρ is the population density surrounding link i , and the unit is number of people per km2 ; ni is the number of vehicles that transport Hazmats on link i ; x ik is the amount of vehicles that the k class non-Hazmat is transported on link i ; Nik is the seats of the k class vehicles that non-Hazmat is transported on link i . From the above Eqs. (5)–(7), the risk of vehicles that transport Hazmats on link i can be expressed as follows (Ren, 2007): Ri = TARi × P (R|A)i × Li × ni × [(πλ2 + 2λLi −Wi Li ) ρ + ni + ∑ x ik Nik ] k (8) 3.3. Traditional vulnerability assessment without analysing the network topology structure As we know, there are various network topology structures. In our research article, we only want using two topological structures, the “Hub-and-Spoke” and the “Peer-to-Peer” structures, to illustrate the importance of topological structure in determining the link vulnerability. Because we learn that under the same link lengths and risks, it is so difficult to decide which link is more vulnerable. We find out that the network topology structure in determining the link vulnerability is very important as well. We use Section 3.3 as an illustration to show that we need an innovative vulnerability assessment model (in Section 3.4) which combines link length, risk and topological characteristics together to assess the link vulnerability in Hazmat road transportation network. (1) Hub-and-Spoke network Fig. 1 is a typical road traffic network, which is called Hub-and-Spoke topology. It is assumed that the traffic flow and the number of vehicles are the same in the gravity model. Thus, the traffic flow of each link in the model can be set to 1. The length, risk and edge number of each link are listed in Table 1. The detailed information is shown in Table 1. Fig. 1. Hub-and-Spoke topology network. 662 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. Table 1 Traditional vulnerability assessment model for Hub-and-Spoke network. Link Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 The Length of Link (km) The Risk of Link Edge Number 1.3 4.5830E-04 0.174 1.3 1.1608E-04 0.174 1.3 2.3529E-04 0.304 1.3 2.4279E-04 0.174 1.3 4.2772E-04 0.174 Sources: compiled by authors. In Table 1, the risk of Link 3 is only ranked 4th. However, from the topology structure of Fig. 1, it can be easily determined that Link 3 is the most important link in the whole network. The edge number of Link 3 is 0.304, which is the highest value among all the links, indicating that Link 3 plays a very important role in topology. When considering the risk of link, Link 1 is the link with the highest risk; however, when considering edge number, Link 3 is the link with the highest edge number. Therefore, the question arises as to, which link has the highest vulnerability in the network? Link 1 or Link 3? In the traditional risk assessment model, the risk of each link is used to assess the road vulnerability of the Hazmat transportation network. The significance of network topology structure cannot be reflected in the traditional risk assessment model. Therefore, a new innovative model is needed to reflect the importance of network topology structure in Hazmat road transportation networks. (2) Peer-to-Peer network Fig. 2 is a typical road traffic network, which is called Peer-to-Peer topology. We assume that the amount of traffic flow and the number of vehicles are the same in the gravity model as well. The traffic flow of each link in the model can be set to 1. The specified information is shown in Table 2. From Table 2, it can be easily determined that there are five links with the same length of 1.2 km. Only the length of Link 2 is different (2.08 km). From the topology structure viewpoint, the edge numbers of all links are the same with the value of 0.1667. If we Fig. 2. Peer-to-Peer topology network. 663 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. Table 2 Traditional vulnerability assessment model for Peer-to-Peer network. Link Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 Link 6 The length of link (km) The risk of link Edge number 1.2 1.5982E-01 0.1667 2.08 5.4253E-03 0.1667 1.2 8.5560E-02 0.1667 1.2 3.5924E-03 0.1667 1.2 6.3453E-02 0.1667 1.2 7.5354E-04 0.1667 Sources: compiled by authors. compare the links with the same length and edge number, the link with the higher risk is the link with higher vulnerability. Thus, Link 1 is the link with the highest vulnerability among these five links (Link 1, Link 3, Link 4, Link 5, and Link 6). However, when considering the vulnerability of the network, we are required to calculate the distances from the accident link to the affected links. Usually, the distance from the accident link to the affected link is measured between the middle points of each link. Therefore, the length of each link matters. Thus, it is indispensable to introduce a new innovative model which considers the length (distance) factor in the vulnerability assessment model. 3.4. An innovative vulnerability assessment model In the Hazmat road transportation network, vehicle transportation is high risk. When an accident occurs in a certain link, it is necessary to evacuate the population around the link. In one study of emergency evacuation, it was assumed that the population would be using vehicles to escape (Yamada, 1996). The affected population around the accident link would be the traffic flows in the road network, which is similar to the process of traffic distribution and population migration. To determine the vulnerability of a Hazmat road transportation network, we define “Link Impact Strength” (Si ) to measure the vulnerability of the link. The “Link Impact Strength” relates to the consequence of evacuation of the population and the traffic flow in the affected area when the accident occurs on the entire road network. The “Link Impact Strength” is used to measure the vulnerability of the link. In the study on traffic flow and population migration, the gravity model is regarded as a common method to evaluate the strength of the flow. The classical gravity model drawing on analogy with Newton's Law of Gravitation is shown as follows: Pi Pj Tij = k Dij2 (9) where Tij is the expected strength of the traffic flow; Pi is the quantity of traffic generation; Pj is the quantity of traffic attraction; Dij is the distance between different traffic zones; and k is the gravity constant, which is usually set to 1 (Jung et al., 2008; Anderson, 2011). In the process of evacuation, the expected impact of the accident link i on the affected link j is related not only to the risk of link i and traffic flow of link j but also to the distance and the exchange of traffic flow between them. In reality, if there is a frequent exchange of traffic flow between two areas during a period of population migration and traffic flow, the strength of traffic flow will be affected. However, this point is not considered in the classical gravity model. To accurately measure the impact of traffic exchange on the strength of traffic flow between two links, we introduce the parameter C (i,j ) , called “Link Correlation Coefficient” in Section 3.1, to modify the classical gravity model. Accordingly, an innovative vulnerability assessment model is constructed based on the classical gravity model, and the formula is expressed as follows: Sij = a Ri Hj dij2 C (i,j ) (10) where Sij is Link Impact Strength, which means the expected impact of the accident link i on the affected link j ; a is the gravity constant and usually set to 1; Ri is the risk of link i when a vehicle carrying Hazmats passes through; Hj is the traffic volume of link j ; dij is the distance between link i and link j , which means the shortest distance between the midpoint of the link i and the midpoint of the link j ; C (i,j ) is the Link Correlation Coefficient. Therefore, the total expected Link Impact Strength of the accident link i on the entire Hazmat transportation network could be expressed as follows: Si = ∑ a j Ri Hj dij2 C (i,j ) (11) Si can mirror the potential impact of the accident link i to the entire Hazmat transportation network. The value of Si is greater, and the potential impact of link i to the entire network is greater, which means the vulnerability of link i is stronger. 3.5. The related proof procedure To illustrate the feasibility of the application of the classical gravity model to derive the Link Impact Strength Si , the following proof procedure is given based on Chen and Liu (2002)’s research paper. The basic hypotheses are as follows: 664 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. (1) The expected Link Impact Strength of a Hazmat transportation network is subjected to link risk, traffic flow, distance between the accident link and the affected link, and the Link Correlation Coefficient in between. (2) Different links are obviously independent. The first hypothesis is self-evident, and the second hypothesis is logically self-consistent. According to the first hypothesis, we obtain: I = a • f (x1,x2,x3,x 4 ) (12) where I is the expected Link Impact Strength of Hazmat road transportation network, x1 is the risk of Hazmat vehicle passing through link i , x2 is the traffic flow of the link j , x3 is the distance between link i and link j , x 4 is the correlation coefficient of link i and link j , and a is the scale factor. We make a total differential to Eq. (12) and obtain the following: 4 4 ∂f ∂I dx i = ∑ dx i ∂ xi ∂x i i=1 i=1 dI = a ∑ (13) Both sides are divided by I , then 4 dI dx = ∑ δi i I xi i=1 (14) According to the second hypothesis, we can obtain δi = ∂I x i ∂x i I (15) δi is a constant and it is an elasticity coefficient. Making an integral to the Eq. (15), 4 ∫ dlnI = ∑ ∫ δi dlnxi (16) i=1 Then, the result is as follows: 4 I = u ∏ x iδi (17) i=1 This is a specific form of the spatial interaction model, where u = exp ∑ Ci is the gravitational coefficient (Ci is an integral constant). According to Eq. (15), ∂lnI = δi ∂lnx i , then we have I = Ci x iδi (18) which means that: I = C1 x1δ1, I = C2 x 2δ2 , I = C3 x 3δ3 , I = C4 x4δ4 . We can form a new equation as follows: I = Kx1α x 2β x 3γ x4χ (19) where K = (C1 C2 C3 C4 )1/4 , α = δ1/4 , β = δ2/4 , γ = δ3/4 , χ = δ4/4 By using the technique of change of variables, a = K , Ri = x1, Hj = x2 , dij = x3 , C (i,j ) = x 4 ,we can obtain the formula as follows: Sij = a Riα H jβ dijγ C (i,j ) χ (20) The total Link Impact Strength of the accident link i on the entire Hazmat transportation network could be expressed as follows: Si = ∑ a j Riα H jβ dijγ C (i,j ) χ (21) Regression analysis is used to determine the parameter values (α,β,γ ,χ ). According to Hu et al. (2015)’s regression results, we can set the parameter values as α = 1,β = 1,γ = 2,χ = 1. Therefore, the Eq. (21) can be simplified to Si = ∑ a j Ri Hj dij2 C (i,j ) (22) 4. Algorithms The key point of “Link Impact Strength” (Si ) calculation is to obtain the Link Correlation Coefficient (CC (i,j ) ). Thus, we first design 665 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. an iteration algorithm to calculate the correlation coefficient of links (CC (i,j ) ), and then we develop a step-by-step algorithm to obtain Link Impact Strength Si according to Eq. (22). 4.1. The algorithm to obtain “Link Correlation Coefficient” It is necessary to build a matrix BB to record “Link Correlation Coefficient”. Because the traffic network is a sparse network (Newman, 2010), the nodes connected with links are rare among all the nodes in the network. If using the maximum link number 1 m = 2 n (n−1) to build a m × m matrix BB , the BB matrix will become extremely large. Therefore, this paper builds a mapping matrix “S_Name”. In this “S_Name” matrix, the sequence numbers of the row and column represent the name of the node, while the value in the matrix represents the name of links between the node pair. Using the links that actually exist in the mapping matrix “S_Name” to develop the “Link Correlation Coefficient” matrix BB can help to reduce the scale of matrix BB greatly. The detailed algorithm is as follows: Step 1: Set “start” = 0; Step 2: Check whether the “start” has visited all the nodes. If yes, stop the iteration; Step 3: According to the Dijkstra (1959) algorithm, calculate the shortest path from node “start” to each other node, and record the shortest path index from node “start” to each other node. Step 4: Backtrack the obtained shortest path index to determine all the links in each shortest path, and count out the total number that each shortest path from node “start” to each other node passing through link i and link j simultaneously. Sub-step 4.1: Check whether the node i has traversed all the nodes on the shortest path index; if so, set start = start + 1, go to Step 2; Sub-step 4.2: Check whether node i is connected to node “start” directly or node i is node “start”; if yes, set i = i + 1, go to Substep 4.1; Sub-step 4.3: Find out all the nodes on the shortest path from node “start” to node i , and determine all the link names on the shortest path from node “start” to node i according to the mapping matrix “S_Name”, then record and store these link names in the one-dimensional array called “Bpath”. Sub-step 4.4: Make permutations and combinations of all the links in the one-dimensional array “Bpath”. Add 1 (i = i + 1) to the corresponding position of matrix BB to record every link combination, and then go to Sub-step 4.1. 4.2. The algorithm to obtain “Link Impact Strength” We first utilize the ArcGIS software to analyse the road network, which can help us to obtain the following three tables: the spatial relation table about links and nodes (Relation), the midpoint distance table between two links (Distance), and the link information table (Link). The “Relation” table contains information about link name, node name, link length; the “Distance” table provides information about link i and link j , the midpoint distance between these two links; the “Link” table includes information about link name, population density around the link, link length, and the vehicle number on the link. The detailed procedures are as follows: Step 1: Initialization. Through reading the data from these three tables (“Relation”, “Distance” and “Link”), we can generate the weight matrix between nodes, the distance matrix between links, the mapping matrix between node name and link name, and the information matrix about links. Step 2: Calculating the Link Correlation Coefficient. By using the iteration algorithm in Section 4.1, we calculate the Link Correlation Coefficient, and record the information in the BB matrix Step 3: Calculating the Link Impact Strength. According to Eq. (8) above, we calculate the Hazmat transportation risk of each link. Then, we input all the obtained data from previous steps into Eq. (22) to calculate the Link Impact Strength of each link. 5. Case study The Hazmat transportation network in GuangZhou is an example of a two-way network that contains 3930 nodes and 5062 links (in Fig. 3). For simplicity, only two types of non-Hazmat vehicles are considered in the network. One is the 55-seat bus and the other is the 5-seat car. Based on the GPS data of the vehicles that transport Hazmats or passengers and the traffic data of the highways in 2015 in Guangdong Province, the total number of vehicles of each type per hour on each link can be calculated. The density of the population can be obtained by reference to the Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook of 2015. According to the Hazmat transportation statistics from September 2014 to August 2015 in Guangzhou, the main transported Hazmats are cyanide and toluene-2 isocyanate. Therefore, it is assumed that only the Hazmat transportation of cyanide and toluene-2 isocyanate is considered in this research. According to Frank et al. (2000)’s research, the impact scope of these Hazmat accidents is 8 km. Referring to Ren (2007)’s PhD thesis, the accident rate of the transportation vehicle is TARi = 1.35E −6 on the highway link, and the conditional leakage probability is P (R|A)i = 0.062 . Referring to Berdica (2002)’s paper, we set α = 1. According to the above formulas, we calculate the Impact Strength (Si ), the Risk (Ri ), the Edge Number (ED (i) ) and the Total Correlation Coefficient (CC (i,j ) ) for each link i . The results are normalized and shown in Table 3. To make horizontal comparison of the four indicators, the top ten links with high indicator values are selected and ranked in Table 4. In Table 4, Column 1 represents the links with the top ten highest values of Impact Strength, Column 2 represents the links with the top ten highest values of Risk, 666 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. (a) A Global View (b) A Partial View Fig. 3. Hazmat road transportation network on the highway network of Guangzhou. Table 3 The four main indicators of each link (normalized). Link ID Impact Strength Si Risk Ri Edge Number ED (i) Total Correlation Coefficient ∑j ≠ i ∑a,b ∈ N (a ≠ b) Nab (i,j ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ⋮ ⋮ 5060 5061 5062 3.84833E-04 4.13257E-05 1.41032E-05 1.42476E-04 3.08512E-05 9.75155E-06 1.21597E-05 2.80823E-05 2.48958E-04 6.28842E-05 1.42814E-05 6.43318E-06 1.80591E-05 3.48868E-04 2.94514E-05 3.55830E-05 6.55303E-05 3.12403E-05 2.41887E-04 6.32091E-05 ⋮ ⋮ 3.27773E-06 2.61016E-05 7.09699E-06 4.58303E-04 3.55806E-07 9.38307E-08 1.16083E-04 2.88998E-07 9.04340E-06 2.78114E-07 4.16158E-07 1.28317E-04 4.27718E-05 5.94511E-07 1.71147E-07 2.55219E-07 2.73529E-04 4.03547E-07 1.26739E-06 1.66400E-05 1.82737E-06 1.32918E-04 1.15367E-06 ⋮ ⋮ 1.49365E-07 1.01399E-07 2.85704E-08 4.52888E-04 1.25270E-04 4.83201E-05 2.46005E-04 8.71835E-05 1.24233E-04 1.01563E-04 1.17627E-04 3.59875E-04 2.23724E-04 1.48717E-04 7.34518E-05 1.05579E-04 3.60911E-04 1.05579E-04 1.00656E-04 2.09474E-04 1.08040E-04 4.27886E-04 1.60635E-04 ⋮ ⋮ 1.04802E-04 1.80844E-04 8.95153E-05 3.33051E-04 1.52922E-04 1.24146E-04 2.10757E-04 1.49075E-04 1.70158E-04 1.40600E-04 1.66526E-04 2.81199E-04 1.97081E-04 1.75073E-04 1.31554E-04 1.30699E-04 2.86755E-04 1.35685E-04 1.37252E-04 2.18449E-04 1.34901E-04 3.28564E-04 1.70942E-04 ⋮ ⋮ 1.38819E-04 1.87039E-04 1.43947E-04 Sources: Compiled by authors. Column 3 represents the links with the top ten highest values of Edge Number, and Column 4 represents the links with the top ten highest values of the Total Correlation Coefficient. The next step is to build Table 5 to exhibit the link coincidence ratio between different indicators. In Table 5, Column 1 is the link coincidence ratio of Impact Strength to Risk in the top N links; Column 2 is the link coincidence ratio of Impact Strength to the Total Correlation Coefficient in the top N links; Column 3 is the link coincidence ratio of Impact Strength to Edge Number in the top N links; 667 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. Table 4 The Top Ten links with the highest indicator values. Sources: Compiled by authors. Table 5 The link coincidence ratio between different indicators. Comparison Scope The Link Coincidence Ratio of Impact Strength to Risk The Link Coincidence Ratio of Impact Strength to Total Correlation Coefficient The Link Coincidence Ratio of Impact Strength to Edge Number The Link Coincidence Ratio of Edge Number to Total Correlation Coefficient Top 10 Top 30 Top 50 Top 70 Top 100 Top 150 Top 200 Top 300 Top 400 Top 500 Top 600 Top 700 Top 800 Top 900 Top 1000 Top 1500 Top 2000 Top 2500 Top 3000 Top 3500 Top 4000 Top 4500 Top 5000 Total 5062 70.0% 86.7% 90.0% 92.9% 95.0% 92.7% 91.0% 89.7% 86.5% 84.6% 83.3% 81.1% 79.6% 78.4% 77.4% 71.6% 69.8% 71.6% 74.2% 78.9% 84.1% 90.9% 98.8% 100.0% 30.0% 30.0% 34.0% 40.0% 48.0% 56.0% 61.0% 66.3% 72.0% 74.6% 76.7% 77.3% 77.0% 76.8% 76.4% 72.6% 72.1% 75.6% 78.4% 82.2% 86.5% 92.0% 98.9% 100.0% 30.0% 30.0% 34.0% 40.0% 47.0% 55.3% 60.0% 65.7% 73.3% 74.8% 77.3% 77.4% 78.6% 77.6% 77.0% 74.1% 73.3% 75.6% 79.2% 82.7% 87.2% 92.6% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 97.1% 99.0% 98.0% 98.0% 97.7% 96.0% 95.8% 95.8% 95.0% 94.6% 93.3% 92.4% 90.3% 89.6% 90.0% 92.2% 94.2% 94.6% 96.4% 99.3% 100.0% Sources: Compiled by authors. and Column 4 is the link coincidence ratio of Edge Number to the Total Correlation Coefficient in the top N links. Based on the above tables, some comparative analyzes are as follows: (1) From Table 4, we can see that 7 links appear simultaneously in Column 1 (Impact Strength) and Column 2 (Risk) which are Link 3104, Link 2636, Link 2463, Link 3460, Link 2105, Link 2980, and Link 3340. Seventy per cent of the links with the top ten highest values of “Impact Strength” and “Risk” are the same. This finding indicates that 70% of the links with high “Impact Strength” are high “Risk” as well. With regard to the top 500 links, 423 links have simultaneously high “Impact Strength” and “Risk” (Ratio = 423/500 = 84.6%). For the top 1000 links, the ratio is 77.4%. From the second column of Table 5, we can see that all the ratios are above 70%, and some ratios are even greater than 90%, which means that the identification of “Impact Strength” can be used to identify the links with high risks in the Hazmat transportation network. (2) In Table 4, Link 2380 is not presented in the “Risk” column, but it appears in the other three columns. Link 2380 is ranked 7th in “Edge Number” and 6th in “Total Correlation Coefficient” which means it has important topological characteristics. Due to its topological characteristics, Link 2380 has high an “Impact Strength” value (means a high vulnerability). However, Link 2380 does not have a high transportation risk. Because “Impact Strength” (vulnerability) is determined by many factors, such as traffic 668 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. Fig. 4. The cumulative distribution. flow, transportation risk, and topological characteristics, the link with a low transportation risk can also have a high vulnerability (impact strength). In the third column of Table 5, the link coincidence ratio of Impact Strength to Total Correlation Coefficient grows when the comparison scope grows (increasing from 30% to 100%). The fourth column (the ratio of Impact Strength to Edge Number) of Table 5 shows the same ratio growth (increasing from 30% to 100%) as the third column. In a large-scale comparison, the “Impact Strength” can identify the links with important topological characteristics. (3) In Table 4, all the links in “Total Correlation Coefficient” column exist in the “Edge Number” column as well. In Table 5, the majority of ratios of “Edge Number to Total Correlation Coefficient” in the fifth column are greater than 90%. Therefore, we can say that “Total Correlation Coefficient” indicator can be used to recognize the links with important topological characteristics (e.g., Edge Number) in the Hazmat transportation network. (4) In Table 4, we see that the links in the four different indicator columns have great differences. Thus, we cannot identify the vulnerable links solely on the topology structure of Hazmat transportation network. For example, Link 2396 is ranked 1st in the “Edge Number” column and “Total Correlation Coefficient” column in Table 4. However, its “Impact Strength” ranking is 1954th, because it has a low transportation ranking (1200th), a low traffic flow and is far from other links, and so on. Thus, in reality, Link 2396 is less risky, which implies less vulnerability (less “Impact Strength”). According to the data in Table 3, it can be drawn out of the cumulative distribution of four indicator values, as shown in Fig. 4: From Fig. 4, the cumulative distribution curves of Impact Strength and Risk are similar and overlap in many areas, which confirms that there is a high overlap between “Impact Strength” and “Risk” (The Link Coincidence Ratios of Impact Strength to Risk are all greater than 70%) in Table 5. Table 5 indicates that the links with a high vulnerability identified by the “Impact Strength” model have high transportation risk characteristics as well. In Fig. 4, the cumulative distribution curve of risk reaches 1 faster than the curve of Impact Strength, because there exist a small number of links with high risks and important topology structures, which means they have high vulnerabilities. Due to these links’ existence, the cumulative distribution curve of Impact Strength reaches 1 with a slow speed in the later stage. This phenomenon indicates that Impact Strength is affected by the topology structure of a Hazmat transportation network. In Fig. 4, the cumulative distribution curves of Edge Number and Total Correlation Coefficient are very similar, and these two curves almost overlap. The main reason for this is that they are both network topological structure perspectives that measure link vulnerabilities, which confirms that there is a high overlap between the values of “Edge Number” and “Total Correlation Coefficient”(The Link Coincidence Ratios of Edge Number to Total Correlation Coefficient are all more than 89.6%) in Table 5. Fig. 5 reveals that the probability density curves of Edge Number and Total Correlation Coefficient are very similar, which indicates that Total Correlation Coefficient can reflect the characteristics of Edge Number and recognize “important” links (from topological structure perspective) in the entire road transportation network. Fig. 6 reveals that the probability density curve of Risk (approaching 300) is far greater than the curve of Impact Strength (approximately 55) in the interval of 0–0.05. This phenomenon is mainly due to Impact Strength but is also related to risk, topological characteristics, traffic flow, and length of link. For example, some links have high transportation risks but are “unimportant” links (topological characteristic), having low traffic flow, and being located far from other links and densely populated areas. These high risk links have low Impact Strength values on the whole Hazmat road transportation network. Thus, from a practical viewpoint, we can confidently state that “Impact Strength” can overtake “Risk” in identifying the vulnerability of Hazmat road transportation networks. Fig. 5. The probability density distribution of Impact Strength, Edge Number and Total Correlation Coefficient. 669 Transportation Research Part D 62 (2018) 659–671 H. Zhong et al. Fig. 6. The probability density distribution of Impact Strength and Risk. 6. Conclusion and implications Through the combination of the analyses of transportation network topology and Hazmat transportation risk on the basis of the Gravity model, this paper develops an innovative Impact Strength model to assess the vulnerability of Hazmat road transportation networks. Then, we used Guangzhou’s Hazmat highway transportation as a case study to verify the Impact Strength model, and make a comparative analysis on the four indicators of each link: Impact Strength, Risk, Edge Number and Total Correlation Coefficient. The analysis results indicate that the characteristics of Impact Strength and Risk are very similar, meaning that we can use Impact Strength model to identify the links with high risks in Hazmat transportation networks. Meanwhile, the Impact Strength of links was affected by the topological structures as well. By combining the transportation risk and network topological structure factors, we can calculate the Impact Strength of each link and identity the links with high vulnerabilities (high Impact Strength values). In other studies, vulnerability identification of Hazmat transportation was only concerned with transportation risk, which is not comprehensive. Here, we use the Impact Strength model to assess the vulnerability of Hazmat transportation, which is an innovative approach due to its comprehensive considerations. This research contributes to Hazmat road transportation management by improving the capabilities of emergency relief materials’ distribution and scheduling and building early-warning mechanism capabilities by using vulnerability identification for Hazmat transportation networks. This paper proposes evaluating road vulnerability through Impact Strength. This method effectively overcomes the drawbacks from the single perspective of risk, improves the identification accuracy and analytical resolution, and manages to accurately position the road section with higher risk and important traffic network topology. With the help of the vulnerability assessment model, we can provide a sound basis for decision making in planning, design, construction and management of Hazmats in road transportation, as well as helping to provide early warning of Hazmat transportation accidents, helping decision makers in the layout of rescue facilities and transportation distribution. Knowing the vulnerability of each link can help to reduce the vulnerability of the whole road transportation network. The government can reduce the vulnerability of the whole road transportation network by restricting the scope of Hazmats transportation network, reducing the number of transport links with higher vulnerabilities and opening more links with lower vulnerabilities. In the restricted road transportation network, based on the vulnerability of each link calculated by the Impact Strength model, Hazmats transportation enterprises can select routes with less vulnerability links through route planning. This research contributes by improving capabilities of emergency relief in the two main approaches as well. On the one hand, the emergency rescue points can be set near the most vulnerable links in the Hazmat road transportation network according to our research findings which links have the highest Link Impact Strength (the highest vulnerabilities). On the other hand, according to our research findings, the road authorities can pay more attention to these links with highest Link Impact Strength, e.g. setting more monitoring and rescue equipment, providing more staffs. When a Hazmat transportation accident happens, the road authorities can quickly grasp the emergency situation and propose and implement a rescue scheme for the first time. 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